Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hammons Products Co. v. Agrashell, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1973
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Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner
v.
AGRASHELL, Inc., Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Wortn Row .eEy
JouN C. Scorr
Sreven K. YABLONSKI
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Morris CHERTKOV
1780 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Puzss or Braon S. Apanes Paorrine, Inc., Wassmncrom, D. C.
=,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Reasons for Granting Certiorari ................... 6
I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Other Courts
of Appeals in That It Holds That Dangerous
Probability of Actual Monopolization, Like Spe-
cific Intent, Is an Essential Element of ‘‘At-
tempt to Monopclize’’ Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, and at All Times Requires Proof
gE RS 6
II. There Is Real Need for This Court to Clarify
Several of Its Decisions That Have Given Rise
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EASTERN tie emer ee Pre eRe pe PE la
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Case CITATIONS:
American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus-
tries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 996 (8th Cir. 1966) ...... 5
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
I eee bce be lacie ae atlas eee 9,10
Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969) .................. ot
Table of Contents Continued
Page
Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d
1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969). ...ceceecncccccccceses
Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir.
BEE pcx paccaskacsksnsesss econ totes cee.
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203,
906-207 (Sth Cir. 1969) ....------2etttt ye 9
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 US.
690, 699, 707 (1962) ..-----------ree re 8
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T. & Co., 446 F.2d 825,
932 (9th Cir. 1971) ...-----sereer teeta ene 7
Industrial Building Materials v. Interchemical Corp.,
437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1971) ..------eerss eres 7
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis Inc., 452
_ F.2d 579, GOB (1971) ...---2--crrecccceecerteees 9
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Te ME ca sssaseusseeneneseeseune sats sts. 5
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
a) cade ag 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 877-8 (W.D.
We WE - cnavvnnceseessncerbonseanssesss+****
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) ..-- 5,9
Union Carbide €& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561,
GOS (10th Cir.) ....--c00seoreererrssrtsse es,
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) ....--+++-:- 11
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alcoa, 438 I".2d
1286, 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) ...-.ceeeeeeeeeeeeeen®
ARTIOLE:
Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Donald F.
Turner, 70 Harvard Law Rev. 281 (1956) ...-----
STALE ST RE _—
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser TERM, 1973
No
Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner
v.
AGRASHELL, INc., Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Hammons Products Company petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Hight Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals, not yet reported,
appears in Appendix B hereto. No opinion was
rendered by the district court, but its judgment also
appears in Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on March 30, 1973. <A petition for rehearing (App. B,
p. 37a) was denied on May 1, 1973. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. section
1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a finding of ‘‘attempt to monopolize” under
section 2 of the Sherman Act always requires proof of
the total market for the product involved and the
respective shares held by the competitors.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statutory provisions involved are sections 1 & 2
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 1 & 2, and sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 15. They
are printed in Appendix A, hereto.
STATEMENT
This case arose out of a patent infringement suit
by Agrashell, Ine. (Agrashell) against Hammons
Products Company (Hammons), and a counterclaim
by Hammons for misuse of patent and various actions
in connnection therewith in illegal restraint of trade
and attempt to monopolize under sections 1 & 2 of the
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. sections 1 & 2) and section 4
of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. section 15). The patent
was finally adjudicated invalid due to obviousness and
therefore uninfringed, and thereafter Hammons’
counterclaim was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict
of $41,750 for loss of profits and $162,374 for litigation
expenses incurred by Hammons in defending itself
and a customer against Agrashell’s infringement suits.
—— om .
NER ME IDI BE A LV See
Some rs 9
The District Court rendered judgment in treble the
amount of the damages for these two items, and Agra-
shell appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
There, the award for lost profits of $125,250 was sus-
tained on the basis of a section 1 violation, but the
litigation expense award of $487 ,122 was nullified on
the sole ground that there was insufficient evidence
on the total product market and shares held by each
competitor for a determination of a ‘‘dangerous prob-
ability’? that the monopolization attempt would suc-
ceed. Our (Hammons’) request for certiorari, while
naturally questioning the correctness of this absolute
requirement in “‘attempt to monopolize”’ cases, is based
on the belief that the decision below stems from un-
warranted interpretations of certain Supreme Court
decisions and is in clear and open conflict with the
Ninth Cireuit, and probably in conflict with several
other Circuits.
The product involved here is ground black walnut
shells and apricot pits used as a soft grit abrasive
(SGA) in blast-cleaning metals and plastics. The
market for this particular use is nationwide, though
concentrated in the industrial Northeast. Since the
1960’s, Hammons, with its plant in Missouri, and Agra-
shell, in California, were the principal competitors in
the manufacture and sale of the product.’ While there
were several other competitors in the market, there
is insufficient evidence in the record to show what the
total market was and the respective shares of these
additional competitors.
The product was the subject of a patent under which
Agrashell acquired an exclusive license in 1947 and had
11] App. 40 T-41 T, 56 T, 202 T, 292 T, III App. 555 T, 573 T,
574 T, 609 T, V App. 27-29, DX 42, 43(b).
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4 |
retained until the patent expired in 1964. Hammons’
troubles, as well as those of other producers and dis-
_tributors of the product, began when Agrashell insti-
tuted a concerted campaign to gain control of the entire
market by assertion of its alleged patent rights. In
its antitrust counterclaim in Agrashell’s infringement
suit which is the subject of certiorari here, Hammons
charged and produced evidence to show that Agra-
shell, through threats and institution of patent in-
fringement suits, had already succeeded in forcing some
competitors to give up without a fight and to enter
into an exclusive agency relationship with Agrashell
for periods beyond the expiration of the patent (App.
B, pp. 9a-17a) ; that these threats and suits were not
in legitimate exercise of patent rights but in flagrant
and illegal misuse of the patent; and that the instant
suit was but a continuation of Agrashell’s predatory
schemes in restraint of trade and attempt to moncp-
olize. All this evidence was presented not on a piece-
meal basis aimed at recovery of lost profits for one
antitrust violation and recovery of litigation costs
for another, but rather on the basis of Agrashell’s
single cohesive and protracted scheme of anticompeti-
tive conduct.
As previously stated, the District Court’s award of
treble damages for lost profits on a nationwide basis
was affirmed on appeal under section 1 (App. B, pp.
920-29a). The affirmance was based on the Court’s
finding that the period of two exclusive agency con-
tracts extended beyond the expiration of the patent
and the jury could find this a misuse of the patent
and an illegal restraint of trade (App. B, pp. 19a-22a).
Having decided this, the Court abruptly turned to a
consideration of the litigation cost award under sec-
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tion 2, with the following statement: ‘It is clear that
the act of filing the infringement suits is a unilateral
act and section 2, in contrast with section 1, is the
proper method to test unilateral activity such as that
involved in this case” (App. B, p. 29a).”
Considering the case under section 2, the Court comes
to its one and only basis for nullifying the litigation
’ eost award. It says that there was no evidence of what
the total market for this product was and the respective
shares of all the competitiors, and that therefore it could
not be determined whether Agrashell approached so
close to monopolization as to create a dangerous prob-
ability of it (App. B, pp. 32a-35a). Although the jury
was instructed no less than four separate times on the
necessity of finding ‘‘dangerous probability” (III App.
985 T, 996 T), the appellate decision nowhere considers
those instructions. In thus treating ‘‘dangerous prob-
ability’? as an element separate and distinct from
‘‘specific intent’’ and equating it with market power,
the Court expressly recognizes that it is in direct and
clear conflict with the Ninth Circuit case of Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964) (App. B, p. 35a).
On the authority of Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905) and decisions in other Circuits, we sub-
mit that where a predator’s specific intent to monopo-
2We are genuinely troubled by this quoted statement. If a
causal relationship is established between incurred litigation costs
and contracts in illegal restraint of trade, as we believe the jury
could have found here, we perceive no reason why such litigation
costs cannot be recovered as damages under section 1. Kobe, Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F. 2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952) ; American
Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Industries, Inc., 360 F. 2d 977,
996 (8th Cir. 1966). Whether this point provides still another
and independent reason for certiorari, however, is not so clear.
6
lize and his employment of illegal and commonly effec-
tive weapons to accomplish such intent are established,
indeed even as here to the point of an adjudicated vio-
lation of the restraint of trade provisions of section 1,
proof of actual market power, while permissible, is not
essential. To accept the view of the Court below is to
tolerate a degree of brinkmanship by the would-be
monopolist that greatly weakens the effectiveness of the
‘attempt to monopolize” provision of section 2 in
nipping monopolization before it is too late.
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI
ment of “Attempt To Monopolize” Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, and At All Times Requires Proof of Market
Shares.
A. We submit that the decision below directly and
irreconcilably conflicts with the Ninth Circuit when it
expressly rejects Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d
459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). (App.
B, p. 35a). Lessig is basically our case and meets the
issue head on.
Tidewater argues that attempt to monopolize is
established only if there is proof of ‘‘dangerous
probability of success, i.e., that if unchecked mono-
polizaiton will result’’; that this requires an evalu-
ation of Tidewater’s power in the relevant market ;
that the evidence on this issue was inadequate, and
such evidence as there was indicated a lack of any
possibility that Tidewater could monopolize the
sale of petroleum products or TBA.
We reject the premise that probability of actual
monopolization is an essential element of proof of
attempt to monopolize. Of course, such a proba-
ae PEAS ISAS
7
bility may be relevant circumstantial evidence of
intent, but the specific intent itself is the only evi-
dence of dangerous probability the statute requires
—perhaps on the not unreasonable assumption that
the actor is better able than others to judge the
practical possibility of achieving his illegal objec-
tive. (Footnotes omitted), 327 F.2d, at p. 474.
The suggestion by the Court below that the strength
of the Lessig ratiopale might be questioned as a result
of two later decisions in its own Circuit is not borne
out by a reading of those cases (App. B, p. 35a, note
10). In Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Company,
446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972), the court expressly found the evidence on
“specific intent” insufficient, and that this ended the
matter. In Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116,
121 (9th Cir. 1972), we believe that Lessig is definitely
discussed with approval rather than disapproval, as is
still another case in the Ninth Circuit which expressly
confirms Lessig, i.e., Industrial Building M aterials, Inc.
v. International Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1971). As
to both Lessig and Industrial Building Materials, the
court in Bushie said, ‘“‘the attempted monopolization
claim was founded upon a substantial claim of restraint
of trade, from which we indicated the specific intent
required for a claim of attempt to monopolize could be
inferred” (460 F.2d 12). Thus, Bushie reaffirms that
‘‘specific intent” is the one essential element, and that
the predatory acts serve to confirm and arm such intent.
So in our case was the attempted monopolization claim
founded upon ‘‘a substantial claim of restraint of
trade” i.e., the use of a commercially important patent
well beyond its scope, together with suits for infringe-
ment which resulted in subjugating three competitors,
and indeed the making of contracts in illegal restraint
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of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act for which
substantial damages were awarded and affirmed by the
Court below. Presumably, that is why the Court be-
low expressly negatived that it was basing its reversal
on lack of ‘‘specific intent’’ and instead based its deci-
sion on the ground that ‘‘dangerous probability”’ at all
times requires proof of market power (App. B, pp. 30a,
34a).
B. There is a certain virtue in the conflict between the
Fighth and Ninth Circuits in that it is direct and sharp.
In some Circuits there are no decisions one way or other
which qualify in any reliable degree of authority on our
particular issue. As to other Circuits, varying degrees
of uncertainty, and even confusion, exist as to where
they stand. The trend, however, appears to be in the
direction of the Lessig rationale (See generally, Anti-
trust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Donald F.
Turner, 70 Harvard Law Rev. 281 (1956)). For ex-
ample, in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300
F.2d 561, 586 (1962), the Tenth Circuit waved aside an
objection that the jury was not instructed that specific
intent must be accompanied by conduct sufficient to
create a dangerous probability of monopolization, con-
sidering it sufficient that the jury was told that “‘the
attempt must be accompanied by a specific intent to
acquire power and exclude others from competition.”’
The court added, however, that the requested instruc-
tions ‘‘may have been literally correct statements.”’
The Fifth Circuit, while declaring it unnecessary to de-
cide the issue in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. Vv.
Aluminum Company of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1304,
3 Evidence establishing an illegal restraint of trade under sec-
tion 1, also tends to establish an attempt to monopolize under
section 2. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 US.
490, 699, 707 (1962) ; Bushic v. Stenocord Corp., supra, at p. 120.
1306 (1971) nevertheless quotes with apparent ap-
proval from a district court opinion suggesting that
market power is not an essential element of proof in
attempt to monopolize cases. In the same Circuit,
however, Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.,
417 F.2d 203, 206-207 (1969) is frequently cited
as going the other way because of its expressed
views on “dangerous probability’? and the require-
ment of proof of market power in support thereof,
although proof of specific intent to monopolize
does not appear to have been shown there. Prac-
tically the same thing can be said of the situation
in the Seventh Circuit where Kearney & Trecker Corp.
v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (1971)
heavily smacks of Lessig rationale, but Bernard Food
Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Company, 415 F.2d 1279,
1284 (1969) is often cited as going the other way be-
cause of its proof requirements under “‘dangerous
probability”, although the Court specifically found that
there was no showing of an intent to monopolize. The
Third and Fourth Circuits appear to be in the Lessig
orbit on the authority of lower court decisions. Rea v.
Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 877-8 (W.D. Pa.
1973) ; Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969).
We believe that the persistence of uncertainty and
confusion within Circuits lends additional urgency to
this petition for certiorari.
Il. There Is Real Need for This Court To Clarify Several of Its
Decisions That Have Given Rise to the Conflict.
The two Supreme Court cases that are most fre-
quently cited on ‘dangerous probability”’ are Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), and American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
Unfortunately, they are cited with almost equal facility
BA NTE NET ea a
10
to reach different results. We believe that the age of
these cases, the seemingly never-ending controversies
and confusion over what they stand for, and the in-
creasing number of cases on this obviously important
issue coming before lower courts, should invite the
attention of this Court.
The Lessig decision nowhere suggests that it is de-
parting from old or breaking new ground. On the con-
trary, among the several cases it prominently cites in
support is Swift. There it finds in the clause ‘‘when
that intent and the consequent dangerous probability
exist”’ (196 U.S. 396), that ‘specific intent”’ is the only
essential element in predatory situations and ‘‘danger-
ous probability” is but an attendant consequence of
such intent, evidence of which may be used (though not
required) in some cases to bolster proof of specific in-
tent. It should be noted that the Court in our case
also finds support in Swift, but obviously does not
accept the discerning reading of it in Lessig and
arrives at a totally opposite conclusion (App. B, p.
30a).
The Court below also cites American Tobacco Co. V.
United States and quotes from it as follows (App.
B, p. 32a) : “The phrase ‘attempt to monopolize’ means
the employment of methods, means and practices which
would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and
which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so
close as to create a dangerous probability of it - - _—
(328 U.S. 785). Unfortunately, lower courts using this
quotation either fail to realize, or at least to note, that
it is neither the language of the Supreme Court nor
bears its stamp of approval. Indeed, nowhere in that
decision did this Court even use the phrase ‘*danger-
ous probability.” In fact, the quoted language was
among the District Court’s charges to the jury under
| section 2 of the Sherman Act which this Court quoted.
FET RN LR I RS ORS
“11
But this Court never considered this particular charge,
nor was there any occasion to do so, for the simple rea-
son that both the grant of certiorari and the subsequent
decision were solely concerned with consummated mo-
nopolization—not attempts to monopolize—and only
the District Court’s charges as they bore on consum-
mated monopolization were in issue (328 U.S. 784-788).
The error in regarding this case as standing for the ne-
cessity of proof of “dangerous probability’’ as a sepa-
rate and distinct element in ‘‘attempt’’ cases has been
compounded by the Court below and other courts by an
additional requirement that there be proof of actual
market power under ‘“‘dangerous probability’’—a re-
quirement that calls for a considerable stretch of the
imagination to lay at the door of this Court’s decision
in American Tobacco.
Perhaps even more disturbing on the clash between
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, insofar as they rely on
Supreme Court decisions, is the great weight that the
Court below appears to give to some general statements
in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
& Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), which was de-
cided after Lessig (App. B, p. 32a). We might note,
however, that this appearance is somewhat tempered
by the fact that the immediate thrust of the Opinion
below is cast essentially in terms of a direct clash be-
tween Circuits rather than on the foreclosing basis that
the “Supreme Court hath spoken’’ (App. B, p. 35a).
We submit that nothing in Walker, either by way of di-
rect holding or dictum, supplies, or was intended to sup-
ply, any clues to solving the immediate issue here. The
issue in Walker was ‘“‘whether the maintenance and en-
forcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent
Office may be the basis of an action under section 2 of
the Sherman Act”? (382 U.S. 173). The answer was
anal
12
affirmative, but since “‘the area of per se illegality is
carefully limited”’, the Court was ‘‘reluctant to extend
it on the bare pleadings and absent examination of
market effect and economic consequences” (382 U.S.
178). The case raised no question whatever as to the
distinction between attempts to monopolize and actual
monopolization, much less any questions as to the kind
and degree of proof required under each offense. As a
matter of fact, it appears that the petitioner only
pleaded monopolization, not attempt to monopolize
(382 U.S. 174). This Court’s statements with respect to
market effect, economic consequences and damages were
obviously all by way of general exposition of section 2
as a whole and in reiteration of its reluctance to treat
the case on a per se violation basis. In effect, the
Court told the petitioner that he could now go back to
the trial court and proceed with the very evidence he
said he was ready to introduce under his pleadings but
had been foreclosed from introducing.
CONCLUSION
Important as it is to private litigants that the issue
here presented be resolved, we believe its resolution to
be of even greater importance to the public in the effec-
tive administration of a vital provision of the antitrust
laws.
Respectfully submitted,
Worth Row Ley
JoHN C. Scorr
Sreven K. YABLONSKI
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
7 Washington, D. C. 20036
Of Counsel: Counsel for Petitioners
Morris CHERTKOV
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
;
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APPENDIX A
Sherman Act
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agree-
ments prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a com-
modity which bears, or the label or container of which
bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or
distributor of such commodity and which is in free and
open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or
agreements of that description are lawful as applied to
intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public
policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be
made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for
such resale, and the making of such contracts or agree-
ments shall not be an unfair method of competition under
section 5, as amended and supplemented, of the Act en-
titled “An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to
define its power and duties, and for other purposes’’, ap-
proved September 26, 1914: Provided further, That the
preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or
agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance
of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein in-
volved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or
between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between
factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or
corporations in competition with each other. Kvery person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
2a
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Clayton Act
Sec. 4. That any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.
APPENDIX B
[Filed June 21, 1971]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Civil Action No. 2131
AcrasHELL, Ino., Plaintiff,
v.
Hammons Propucts Company, Defendant.
Judgment on Hammons’ Counterclaim
Wuenreas, this cause has come on for hearing and been
tried to a jury in open court and the jury has rendered its
verdict in favor of the Hammons Products Company
against Agrashell in the amount of $204,124.21; and
3a
Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for entry of
final judgment on its verdict and each party has submitted
complete briefs thereon; and
Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for award to
it of a reasonable attorneys’ fee pursuant to Section 4 of
the Clayton Act and a hearing having been held thereon
and evidence having been submitted by the parties and the
question having been briefed; and ’
Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for award to
it of cost of suit pursuant to both Section 4 of the Clayton
Act and Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
a hearing having been held thereon and the question hav-
ing been fully briefed; and
Wuereas, the Court has reviewed the record of these
proceedings, has evaluated the time and effort of Ham-
mons’ counsel in preparing, presenting and trying the coun-
terclaim, and has reviewed the cases and the criteria for
award of an attorneys’ fee in complex antitrust litigation
pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, including whether
counsel had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in a
case brought by the Government, standing of counsel at the
Bar, the time and labor spent, the magnitude and complex-
ity of the litigation, the responsibility undertaken, and the
amount recovered; and
Wuergas, the Court has reviewed the costs sought to be
taxed by Hammons against Agrashell pursuant to Section
4 of the Clayton Act and Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ;
Tuererore, it is hereby this ........ day of June, 1971,
Orperep, ApgupcEep AND Decreep THat:
1. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Hammon
Products Company as follows:
(a) Verdict of the jury in the amount of $612,372.63,
as trebled, in accordance with Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.
4a
(b) Award of attorneys’ fee to Hammons Products
Company in the amount of $150,000.
(c) Award of cost of suit in the amount of $13,361.31
awarded in a memorandum and order filed this date.
2. Total amount of the judgment to be entered herein is
$775,733.76.
3. There being no just reason for delay, the Court directs
that this judgment be entered as a final judgment on Ham.
mons’ counterclaim against Agrashell for antitrust viola-
tions.
4, A stay of execution is hereby granted on this judg-
ment until July 1, 1971, to provide for the filing of a super-
sedeas bond on appeal or the issuance of a stay of execu-
tion pending an appeal on such equitable terms as the par-
ties may stipulate or the Court fix.
/s/ Wu. R. CoLLInson
District Judge
Appendix B—Continued
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 71-1538
AGRASHELL, Inc., Appellant,
v.
Hammons Propucts Company, Appellee.
Appeal from United States District Court for the
Western District of Missourt
Submitted: June 15, 1972
Filed: March 30, 1973
Before Ross and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and Ursom,
Chief District Judge.
Ross, Circuit Judge.
Agrashell, Inc. (Agrashell) appeals from a judgment en-
tered on a jury verdict in favor of Hammons Products
5a
Company (Hammons), on a counterclaim filed by Ham-
mons in a patent infringement suit alleging violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and requesting treble
damages under the Clayton Act. For reasons hereinafter
set forth, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judg-
ment of the trial court and order the dismissal of that por-
tion of the counterclaim alleging violations of section 2 of
the Sherman Act. .
Procedural History
Agrashell instituted a patent infringement action against
Hammons in 1963. The trial court granted Hammons a
summary judgment because it found that Agrashell, as an
exclusive licensee, did not have a right to sue for patent
infringement in its own name without participation of the
patent owner as party-plaintiff. Agrashell, Inc. v. Ham-
mons Products Co., 248 F. Supp. 248, 260 (W.D. Mo. 1965),
aff’d, 352 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1965).
Although the patent expired in 1964, Agrashell obtained
an assignment of title to the patent and refiled the action
in 1965 for past infringement. These proceedings were
stayed pending the outcome of the appeal from the 1963
summary judgment. Thereafter, Hammons filed an answer
and counterclaim charging violations of sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. $§ 1-2) and for a declaratory
judgment of patent invalidity, unenforceability and non-
infringement. The case was then set for trial.
A motion, made by Agrashell at the outset of the 1967
infringement trial, to sever the antitrust counterclaim issue
from the patent issue was granted at the conclusion of the
patent infringement portion of the case. On the patent
claim, the trial court entered judgment for Hammons, find-
ing the patent invalid and not infringed either directly or
contributorily. The court also found that even if the
method claim were valid, it was not infringed by Hammons.
Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., 279 F. Supp. 522
(W.D. Mo. 1967), aff’d, 413 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969). The
ers. 2 EF
court, however, denied Hammons’ request for attorneys’
fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Immediately following the trial of the patent issue, both
parties conducted discovery relating to Hammons’ anti-
trust counterclaim, and Hammons requested a jury trial.
Agrashell then requested leave of the court to file an
amended reply and counter-counterclaims for breach of
contract and antitrust violations. Agrashell alleged that
Hammons had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18), and the
Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13). Both rsequests
were granted and the case proceeded to trial in 1970.
At the outset of the 1970 trial, Hammons moved for trial
of its counterclaim separate from trial of Agrashell’s
counter-counterclaim. The trial court decided that each
ease would be presented separately but to the same jury.
However, five weeks later, at the close of all of the evi-
dence on Hammons’ counterclaim, the motion for severance
was granted over Agrashell’s objection, Agrashell’s mo-
tions for a directed verdict were denied,’ and a verdict was
returned by the jury in favor of Hammons. Thereafter,
pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, Agrashell’s coun-
ter-counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice. Agra-
shell’s motions for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial were
denied, and this appeal was taken.
Statement of Facts
A. The Product
This case involves the use of processed nutshells in two
ways: First, as a soft grit abrasive (SGA) in cleaning op-
erations, and secondly, as lost circulation material (LCM)
used in oil well drilling.
1 At the same time, however, the trial court noted that it refused
to submit to the jury the issue of fraud in the procurement of the
patent. See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
& Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
7a
SGA is “‘soft’’ in relation to harder abrasives such as
sand. For example, SGA is projected against deposits on
engine parts by air blasting and other means so as to re-
move the deposits with a minimum of gamage to the part
itself. While SGA may be composed of nutshells, it may
also be composed of fruit pits, sawdust, rice hulls, corn
cobs and clover seeds. The type of nutshells used may also
be differentiated as either soft or hard. Agrashell sells
SGA which is composed of black walnut and apricot pit
shell, and Hammons sells SGA which is composed solely of
black walnut shell.
Various companies processed or ‘‘manufactured’’ SGA
in some form during the time periods in question. Agra-
shell of Los Angeles, California; Hammons of Stockton,
Missouri; Gravette Shelling Company of Gravette, Arkan-
sas? (Gravette); Block Brothers, Inc. of Nashville, Ten-
nessee; and Block Walnut Processing Corp., of Nashville,
Tennessee (known together as Block); Continental Nut
Company of Chico, California (Continental); Industrial
Flour and Abrasives Company of Morristown, Tennessee
(Industrial Flour); Lufkin Pecan Company of Lufkin,
Texas (Lufkin); Star of Texas Company of Fort Worth,
Texas (Star of Texas); Texas Feed and Grain Company
of Fort Worth, Texas (Texas Feed); and Southeastern
Reduction Company of Valdosta, Georgia (Southeastern)
are, or were during the periods of time in question, proc-
essors of SGA. Various companies distributed SGA, but
apparently did not manufacture it: Pangborn Corporation
of Hagerstown, Maryland (Pangborn); American Wheel-
abrator & Equipment Corporation of Mishawaka, Indiana
(Wheelabrator) [both Pangborn and Wheelabrator were
large manufacturers of blast cleaning equipment]; Com-
position Materials Company (Composition) [Block’s job-
ber]; Bernard Sirotta Company of New York, New York
2Hammons acquired the controlling interest in Gravette in
August of 1966.
PNR RT LR poet oD
(Sirotta) [which at one time sold Hammons’ SGA], and
several others distributed Agrashell’s SGA.
The Pan American Petroleum Corporation developed
another use for processed nutshell and patented the idea,
giving Cherokee Laboratories an exclusive license under
the patent for part of the time relevant here. Pan Amer-
ican’s patent covered the use of processed nutshells in con-
trolling the loss of circulation of drilling muds utilized in
oil well drilling. Agrashell sells this ‘‘lost circulation ma-
terial’? (LCM) which is composed primarily of english
walnut shell and thus different from its SGA. Hammons
sells LCM which is almost identical to its SGA, except for
somewhat different sizes of the particles. LCM may also
be composed of non-nutshell products ranging from cotton
seed hulls to golf balls. Other companies, including Gra-
vette and Block, manufacture nutshell LCM.
The geographic markets for LCM and SGA are different.
SGA is sold nationwide, with emphasis in the industrial
northeast, while LCM is concentrated in the Mid-Continent
and Gulf States oil producing regions.
B. The Patent
Frank Perry, a civilian employee at an army air depot
in California during World War II, learned that project-
ing ground black walnut shells of 10/15 or 10/30 mesh size
against airplane engine parts constituted an ideal SGA.
Perry applied for and was granted a patent, basically
claiming
‘‘the method of cleaning metal by ‘projecting there
against a stream of fluid under pressure carrying in
suspension therein pelletized black walnut shells,’ and
a product, ‘an abrasive material for use in air blasts
for cleaning metal comprising pelletized black walnut
shells.’ ’? Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co.,
supra, 279 F. Supp. at 522.
It was later learned that apricot pits have very similar
physical characteristics to the black walnut shell, and they
are used interchangeably by Agrashell.* Id. at 523.
Perry assigned the patent to Turco Products Company,
Inc., which granted an exclusive license to Agrashell. The
patent was in turn assigned to Purex Corporation, when
Turco merged with Purex, and finally was assigned by
Purex to Agrashe]l. Throughout this entire period, dat-
ing from 1947, Agrashell had an exclusive license. The
patent expired on June 10, 1964.
C. The alleged Sherman Act violations
Hammons’ claim was essentially that Agrashell had at-
tempted to monopolize hard nutshells within the SGA mar-
kets in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by means
of infringement suits and certain formal and informal con-
tractual relationships so as to extend the Perry patent
beyond its terms and life. Hammons also claimed that
certain formal and informal contractual relationships un-
reasonably restrained trade in hard nutshells within the
SGA markets in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
because the arrangements extended the Perry patent be-
yond its terms and life.
(1) The Sirotta suit
In 1958 Sirotta had begun to purchase Hammons’ SGA
for sale to Sirotta’s customers. In October of 1960 Sirotta
received a notice of infringement from Agrashell; Agra-
shell-had in 1954 written Sirotta about the possibility of
3’The Perry Patent Reissue indicates that the shells to be used
were those ‘‘having the hardness of black walnut shells,”’’ as well
as, black walnut shell alone. The patent ‘‘contemplates the use
of pellets of other types of ground or cracked nutshells having
equivalent characteristies’’ of black walnut shell. The testimony
of both parties indicated that apricot pit shell and black walnut
shell have similar hardness, resilience, and resistance to breakdown
characteristics.
i
__|
10a
infringement liability. Sirotta contacted patent counsel
who investigated the situation and concluded that there
was insufficient basis to challenge the patent at least inso-
far as ‘‘prior art’? was concerned. Sirotta was selling
nutshell SGA, including black walnut and apricot pit SGA,
for use in blasting equipment, including air blasting equip-
ment. Settlement negotiations broke down between Agra-
shell and Sirotta and the infringement suit was filed in
February of 1963.
During the course of taking a deposition Bernard Sirotta,
the president of Sirotta, asked to speak to Ayers, the presi-
dent of Agrashell, alone. Sirotta purportedly asked Ayers
whether the suit could be settled as between two business-
men. Sirotta claims Ayres replied as follows:
‘“'There can be only one way to settle this matter and
that is for you to get out of the business. You have
no right to be in the walnut shell business. This is my
domain. If you do not leave the business, I will cut
prices so low that you will not be able to survive.”’
Ayers contradicted this statement at trial and indicated
that he only asked Sirotta about his position in light of
the Perry patent and told Sirotta that he thought he was
infringing the Perry patent.
Hammons was impleaded by Sirotta as a third party de-
fendant on the basis of an indemnity agreement between
Hammons and Sirotta established when Sirotta bought
Hammons’ SGA. Hammons resisted Sirotta’s attempt to
obtain jurisdiction over it, see Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard
Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965), but finally entered
a personal appearance in the suit in 1966 and counter-
claimed against Agrashell for antitrust violations. The
Sirotta litigation was settled when Sirotta payed $2,500 to
Agrashell in 1968. Hammons’ counterclaim in the Sirotta
action was dismissed by stipulation without prejudice.
pre remy
a+ jo SPN
lla
(2) The Hammons suit
In April of 1962 Hammons agreed to supply Agrashell
with black walnut shell of a mesh size suitable for blast
cleaning. Shortly after the consummation of that agree-
ment, Ayers visited with the Hammons officers. Although
the evidence is conflicting, Ayers apparently informed
Hammons that he had a patent for cleaning metal utilizing
black walnut shell. He indicated that his lawyers advised
him to sue every shell grinder who was infringing the pat-
ent but that he did not intend to sue Hammons because
Hammons had not been cutting prices. An official of Ham-
mons testified that Ayers
‘‘made us aware of the Perry Patent, and then also
that there was some discussion on lost circulation ma-
terial and he told us that the main purpose of his visit
was to get acquainted, check our material, and to see
if we couldn’t work out a lost circulation price that
would be profitable to everybody involved.”’
The official further testified:
‘‘Mr. Ayers advised me that his attorney had advised
him to sue everyone who was in the [sic] selling soft
grit abrasive materials. However, that they didn’t
plan to sue everyone but they were going after those
who were guilty of cutting prices.”’
The official was asked whether Ayers made any statements
about Hammons’ LCM price and the official responded that
Ayers stated ‘‘he didn’t think that we were cutting prices
and from the prices that they gave me at that time, we
were getting approximately the same prices, close, not ex-
actly, but close.”’
In June of 1962 Hammons signed an LCM contract with
a former customer of Agrashell. Shortly thereafter Ayers
called Hammons wanting to know about the contract.
Ayers was told only that there was a contract, but no
specifies were given to him. About October of 1962 Agra-
pains
CEEOL SS OL
12a
shell began to complain about the SGA material supplied
to Agrashell and its customers, indicating that Agrashell
had received a number of complaints relating to objection-
able dust in the Hammons product sold to Agrashell and to
‘ts customers. In November of 1962 Agrashell ordered
Hammons to stop production for Agrashell’s account with
regard to the prior contract. In December of 1962 Agra-
shell sent Hammons a notice of infringement of the Perry
patent.
Agrashell was willing to settle the matter based upon the
payment of royalties on ‘‘pellets of black walnut shells, or
other nutshells (including apricot pit shells) equivalent
thereto for blast cleaning purposes’’ sold by Hammons for
or used as SGA and requiring Hammons to accept a license.
Negotiations broke down partly because Hammons did not
consider apricot pit shell to come within the confines of
the Perry patent but primarily because Hammons finally
decided it would not pay the royalty after first evidencing
an intent to settle on that basis. Agrashell’s suit against
Hammons was filed on August 7, 1963.
In its complaint filed in 1965 after acquiring title to the
patent, Agrashell alleged, among other things, that:
‘‘Within the six (6) years last past, and within the
term said reissued letters patent, defendant has manu-
factured, sold, used, and actively induced others to use
within the Western District of Missouri and elsewhere
pelletized nutshells having the hardness of black wal-
nut shells, including pelletized black walnut shells and
such pelletized nut shells having screen sizes of 10-30
mesh and 10-15 mesh, for the cleaning of articles by
use of the pelletized nut shells in blasts projected
against the articles. Defendant thereby has infringed
said reissued letters patent.”
Hammon answered, asserting affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. Hammons alleged, among other things, that
Te SE re CI, PEERS
13a
Agrashell had misused the patent by attempting to extend
it to materials not covered including ‘‘walnut shells and/or
ground fruit pits.’”” Hammons counterclaimed asserting,
among other things, that Agrashell had attempted to re-
strain and did restrain trade in commerce of ground black
walnut shells in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
gg 1-2. Hammons additionally claimed that the Perry
Patent Reissue had been obtained by virtue of fraud in that
Agrashell knew of a prior patent covering the same con-
ception patented in the Perry Patent Reissue.
A meeting between Agrashell and Hammons was ar-
ranged on March 24, 1966, by an official of Gravette who ap-
parently wanted to clarify the situation between Gravette
and Agrashell. The relationship between Gravette and
Agrashell was awkward because while Gravette and Agra-
shell had engaged in certain contractual relationships, Ham-
mons, who was being sued by Agrashell, was in the process
of acquiring the majority of Gravette’s stock. During this
meeting, an official of Agrashell, apparently in response to
a question from an official of Hammons about Agrashell’s
position in the lawsuit, indicated that if Hammons was in-
terested in concentrating on the walnut meats alone, Agra-
shell would be interested in handling Hammons’ shell pro-
duct of acquiring their shell grinding facilities.
No agreement being reached and neither party having
requested a jury, trial was commenced before the district
court on March 20, 1967. On that day one of Agrashell’s
counsel moved to sever the antitrust counterclaim. The
motion was taken under advisement. The district court held
that the patent was invalid due to obviousness and there-
fore not infringed, but that even if the method claim was
valid it was not infringed either directly or indirectly.‘
4In the judgment the district court did not explicitly state
whether the product claims would have been infringed by the
Hammons product if the patent was valid. But in the trial of the
antitrust counterclaim the same district judge referred to the
Hammons product as an ‘‘admittedly infringing product.’’
14a
Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., supra, 279 F.
Supp. at 522-524. Prior to its judgment on the patent case,
but after all evidence had been taken with regard to the
infringement side of the suit, the district court ordered a
continuance with regard to the antitrust counterclaim. The
district court also declined to award attorneys’ fees to Ham-
mons.” See 35 U.S.C. § 285.
(3) Contracts
Two types of contractual-like arrangements are involved
in this case. The first is known as a ‘‘Statement of Policy’’
which Agrashell sent to some of its sales agents. The
policy had three essential parts which are especially rele-
vant: Agrashell reserved the right to set selling prices to
the ultimate consumer invoiced by the agent; the selling
agent agreed to buy, sell and merchandise only Agrashell
SGA as long as the agent distributed Agrashell SGA; and
Agrashell averred that it was the exclusive licensee under
the Perry patent and had the exclusive right to convey the
right to use SGA materials.
The Statement of Policy was first formulated some time
in the late 1940’s. Agrashell contended at trial that the
agents who sold its SGA were never bound by the provi-
sions of the policy, and two of Agrashell’s agents testified
that they were neither familiar with the Statement of
Policy nor operated under it. However, there is Agrashell
5 During the trial of the antitrust counterclaim the trial judge
explained why he did not award attorneys’ fees to Hammons in
the patent case:
‘J had read the few cases that are in the books under it [35
U.S.C. § 285] and to me, the determining factor was a ques-
tion of good faith and J—whether I had the proper inter-
pretation of good faith or not, I came to the conclusion there
was no question that the plaintiffs [ Agrashell ] thought they
had a valid patert, they were trying to uphold what they
thought was a valid patent, and they brought the suit in good
faith in that sense * * ad
EPPA LIE AGT
15a
correspondence which tends to support the inference that
the Statement of Policy was agreed to by some of the
agents.
While there was Agrashell correspondence which indi-
cated the possibility of sale of SGA to agents for resale,
there was direct evidence from two of Agrashell’s agents
who testified that they never took title to the goods, never
insured against loss, never paid storage costs, never paid
taxes on the goods, and were merely paid a commission for
the sales they made of Agrashell’s products.
The second type of contractual arrangement involved
the negotiation of more formal contracts with Wheelabrator
and Pangborn. The contract with Wheelabrator was nego-
tiated in 1950, and it appointed Wheelabrator, a large man-
ufacturer of blasting equipment, Agrashell’s del credere
factor for the sale of SGA. The contract also established
that Wheelabrator was to receive a commission on the sale
of Agrashell’s SGA, that Wheelabrator did not need to
maintain an inventory of SGA, that Agrashell would ship
directly to the buyer, and that Agrashell would be able to
set the selling price. If, for certain enumerated reasons,
Agrashell could not fill Wheelabrator’s orders, Wheela-
brator, after notification to Agrashell, was free temporarily
to obtain similar materials for its requirements. This con-
tract could be terminated by giving notice 60 days prior to
any anniversary date thereof.
The contract with Pangborn, another large blast clean-
ing equipment manufacturer, was negotiated in settlement
of an infringement suit brought by Agrashell against Pang-
born. Pangborn had been selling black walnut SGA
obtained from Gravette.
The Pangborn agreement bound Pangborn to handle only
Agrashell ©GA until the patent expired, and after that
time, for a period of some three years, Pangborn agreed to
buy from Agrashell all of the SGA it needed unless a com-
Te On Ye TT
SES Te OE, Wa ne ee
16a
petitor could quote a lower price on similar quality goods,
in which case Pangborn remained bound to buy from Agra-
shell unless Agrashell elected not to meet the lower price.
The Pangborn agreement did not allow Agrashell to set
prices. An administrative assistant to the president of
Pangborn testified that at no time under the contract did
Pangborn own the Agrashell product or pay taxes or
freight costs thereon.
(4) Related activity
On June 13, 1962, Ayers visited Jimmy Cox, president of
the Block companies. Block had been active in the LCM
and black walnut shell SGA markets. The substance of the
conversation between Ayers and Cox purportedly involved
Ayers’ dissatisfaction with the price structure in the LCM
market in particular and the shell business in general.
Ayers noted that he had a price stabilization plan for the
LCM market, but Cox would not agree to any price stabili-
zation plan. Ayers indicated that if Block would not agree,
Agrashell would enforce its patent. About a month later
Block received a notice of infringement from Agrashell.
Suit based, in part, on the Perry patent was filed against
Block in March of 1963. The suit was finally settled for
$2,500, with Block paying half and Composition Materials,
its jobber, paying half. Ayers contradicted Cox’s testi-
mony concerning this incident at the trial and contended
that the only purpose for his visit to Block was to speak
about Block’s infringement of the Perry patent with re-
gard to SGA and to speak about a joint promotional pro-
gram for the sale of LCM.
After Agrashell’s settlement with Pangborn, an official
of Gravette approached Agrashell with the proposition that
Gravette might become licensed under the Perry patent.
Gravette had concluded that if Pangborn was satisfied that
the Perry patent was valid it too would recognize the pat-
ac at a enpanA: sO
17a
ent. During a meeting between the president of Agrashell
and officials of Gravette, Ayers allegedly stated that there
was ‘‘one of two ways this can be handled, either by law-
suit or by negotiating a contract.’”’ A contract was negoti-
ated by Agrashell and Gravette with Gravette agreeing to
supply black walnut shell processed and suitable for use as
LOM, although 10 percent of the material might be shell
st:itable for SGA use. The contract, which was negotiated
prior to the expiration of the patent, extended some three
years after the expiration of the patent.
D. The Verdict and Damages
The district court sent the counterclaim to the jury after
five weeks of trial, but he refused to submit the issue of
whether the patent had been fraudulently procured because
he felt that no submissible case of patent fraud had been
established. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ham-
mons and assessed damages in the sum of $204,124.21. That
sum was comprised of $162,374.21 for litigation expenses
and, $41,750.00 for loss of profits. The jury assessed no
damages for injury to going concern value. The gross
amount of damages was trebled by the district court and
that sum equaled $612,372.63. The district court awarded
attorneys’ fees of $150,000.00 and costs of $13,361.31. The
total judgment was $775,733.76.
The litigation expense damage was predicated upon
Hammons’ proof of the amount it had spent to defend the
patent infringement suit brought against Sirotta, $20,455.20,
and the amount it had spent to defend the infringement suit
Agrashell brought against Hammons itself, $141,919.01.
The jury award of $41,750.00 in damages was apparently
based upon evidence adduced by Dr. Kuhlman, an economist.
His testimony concerning the damages sustained by Ham-
mons was the only theory of damages Hammons presented
and is summarized later in this opinion.
18a
Issues Presented on Appeal
In its appeal from the judgment of the trial court, Agra-
shell raises these issues:
1. Whether Hammons failed to establish that Agra-
shell had violated the Sherman Act and by so doing
proximately injured Hammons.
2. Whether Hammons’ claims were barred by princi-
pals of res jud cata, collateral estoppel, or compul-
sory counterclaim.
3. Whether certain instructions relating to ‘‘dangerous
probability,”’ prosecution of the suit for patent in-
fringement, ‘‘targe: area,’? and agency arrange-
ments, were prejudicially erroneous.
4, Whether prejudicial error occurred in the conduct
of trial relating to the issues of waiver of jury trial,
admission of deposition testimony, and exclusion of
offers of compromise.
Sufficiency of Proof of Sherman Act
Violation and Damages
Hammons alleged violations of both section 1 and section
2 of the Sherman Act. After a careful review of all of the
pleadings, testimony and exhibits, we are convinced that
Hammons did make a submissible case under section 1 of the
Sherman Act but did not make a submissible case under
section 2-of the Act; and that the trial court should have
granted the motion for a directed verdict made at the close
of all of the evidence as to section 2. That motion stated, in
part, that ‘‘Hammons has not established by sufficient com-
petent evidence a violation of ... section 2 of the Sherman
Act by Agrashell.”’
A. Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes contracts in re-
straint of trade or commerce. Hammons claims that the
written contracts with Pangborn and Wheelabrator and
OWS
19a
the ‘‘Statement of policy’’® used with Agrashell’s sales
agents as heretofore described, and the alleged illegal use
of the patent in those contracts, constituted restraint of
trade, and that as a result of those alleged contracts in re-
straint of trade, it was damaged by loss of business. Agra-
shell claimed that the contract with Wheelabrator did not
require Wheelabrator to deal exclusively in Agrashell’s
SGA; that the requirement to that effect in the contract with
Pangborn terminated upon the expiration of the patent;
that the ‘‘Statement of Policy’? was not a contract but a
unilateral declaration by Agrashell which could not be and
was not enforced; that in any event Pangborn, Wheelabra-
tor and the other sales representatives were not purchasing
for resale but merely selling as agents for the account of
Agrashell retaining title to the goods until delivery to a
buyer and therefore under United States v. General Elec-
tric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), such sales agency agreements
with price fixing provisions were legal, especially in view of
the patent and the presumption of validity that attached
thereto prior to its expiration; and that before recovery can
be had under section 1 of the Sherman Act, Hammons must
prove damages with a reasonable degree of certainty result-
ing from the alleged illegal contracts. While there is much
merit in several of these allegations by Agrashell, we can-
not say that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to
find that the Pangborn and Wheelabrator contracts were
violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
First, we conclude that Hammons failed to prove that
the Statement of Policy established either formal or in-
formal contractual relationships with Agrashell and its
agents in the market place. Hammons called no agents to
testify as to their relationships with Agrashell, but relied
6 Although the trial judge commented that the ‘‘Statement of
Policy’’ pertained to the intent issue under section 2, Hammons’
proof also presented the ‘‘Statement of Policy’’ in terms of sec-
tion 1.
li a te te is
Pc OLE EIT LT TOS Or OI
PLT POOLE S
— vt er rer”
aE on
solely on Agrashell’s correspondence which indicates that
the Statement of Policy was sent to a number of agents.
In contrast, there was only one letter which tends to prove
that Agrashell would not deal with an agent unless he
agreed to the Statement of Policy. Moreover, some of the
correspondence clearly indicates that Agrashell dealt with
the agents whether or not they agreed to the Statement
of Policy.
More significant, in terms of the practical application of
the Statement of Policy in the market place, is the testimony
of two Agrashell agents allegedly subject to the Statement
of Policy. William T. Hall, chairman of the board of the
C. P. Hall, companies, together one of the largest if not the
largest Agrashell agent, testified that he had never seen nor
heard of the Statement of Policy. He further testified that
he did not consider himself bound to deal only with Agra-
shell, and that he did deal in other types of SGA such as
corn cob SGA and glass SGA. John C. Lorenzen, a partner
in the Russ-Cattell company, likewise testified that he had
never seen the Statement of Policy. Furthermore, Loren-
zen testified that he handled other types of SGA.
Second, Agrashell strenuously argues that the Wheela-
brator contract with its price fixing provision was legal
| when viewed in light of the doctrine promulgated in United
States v. General Electric Co., supra, 272 U.S. at 488.
General Electric stands for the proposition that a patent
holder does not violate the antitrust laws by seeking to
dispose of his products directly to the consumer and fixing
the price by which his agents transfer the title from him
directly to the consumer. On the other hand, General Elec-
tric does not allow the patent holder to sell his product to a
person and then control the resale price. Assuming that
the Wheelabrator contract was a contract of agency, see
ResTaTEMENT (Seconp) or Acency § 14J (1958), we think
that whatever protection General Electric afforded the
Wheelabrator contract ended when the patent expired.
Ieniccpssoneseoesisiidaisnseaseleaauinaaian anna
2la
See generally R. Noxpuavus and E. Jurow, Patsnt-Ant1-
Trust Law at 147-166 (Nordhaus Ed. 1972). Cf. Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21-24 (1964). Since it was clear
that the Wheelabrator contract was in effect continuously
from 1950, we think the jury could have correctly concluded
that the Wheelabrator contract extended the life of the
patent beyond the expiration date and constituted a contract
in restraint of trade. .
Third, the Pangborn contract, negotiated prior to the
expiration of the patent, extended the power of the patent
beyond the life of the patent. The contract provided:
‘<Tf, after June 10, 1964, Pancsorn furnishes written
evidence of its ability to purchase blast cleaning aggre-
gates made from nut shells of equal quality and at
lower prices than AcRrasHELL’s selling prices to Panc-
porN, AGRASHELL shall have the privilege of either meet-
ing such prices as quoted from a bona fide supplier or
permitting Pancsorn to purchase its requirements else-
where after first tendering the order to AcRasHELL in
writing.”’
Since the Pangborn contract was negotiated prior to the
expiration of the patent, but extended past the expiration
of the patent:
‘‘TA]ny attempted reservation or continuation in the
patentee or those claiming under him of the patent
monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal
device employed, runs counter to the policy and pur-
poses of the patent laws... .’’ Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Manufacturing Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945).
Accord, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964).
The Supreme Court, when faced with a somewhat similar
provision, has noted the antitrust implications:
‘‘The appellant had at all times a priority on the
business at equal prices. A competitor would have to
ONLI EPO ASE TF om RPSL AER wh 9" OY a
22a
undercut appellant’s price to have any hope of cap-
turing the market, while appellant could hold that
market by merely meeting competition. We do not
think this concession relieves the contract of being a
restraint of trade, albeit a less harsh one than would
result in the absence of such a provision... .’’ Inter-
national Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,
397 (1947).
As a consequence, we conclude that the jury was entitled
to find that the Pangborn contract extended the life of the
patent unlawfully and constituted a contract in restraint
of trade.
Turning now to Agrashell’s argument that Hammons
failed to prove the fact of damage resulting from the use
of the contracts and Statement of Policy, it should first be
noted that it expert testimony concerning its damages and
the computation thereof, does not include any reference to
any loss of business which it once had, but only business
which Agrashell had during the extire period in question
and which Hammons felt that it should have had. In this
respect this case is analogous to the case of Herman
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 297 F.2d
906, 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962), in
which Judge Friendly noted as follows:
‘‘Plaintiff’s theory here was not that acts by de-
fendant had unlawfully deprived it of something it
previously possessed. It could not well have been so,
since there was nothing to indicate that defendant’s
conduct had changed for the worse during the damage
period or, indeed, since plaintiff was organized, and
plaintiff’s original investment of $10,000 had produced
an earned surplus of over $300,000 by 1961, after sub-
stantial salary payments to Mr. Schwabe, its sole
stockholder, and dividends. Plaintiff’s evidence,
therefore, was necessarily directed to attempting to
ct em a a wl Sa
kT a oe Nan PTE EL TL A ORO
show how defendant had unlawfully deprived it of
business it might otherwise have secured. It was
entirely competent for plaintiff to seek to show this
%?
Indeed, the evidence showed that both Agrashell and
Hammons prospered during the period in question and
made overall gains in the sale of their nutshell products.
Hammons’ evidence of damages was adduced from the
expert testimony of Dr. Kuhlman during which the charts
summarizing the damages were submitted. Briefly stated,
Dr. Kuhlman first gave his opinion that Agrashall had
erected barriers around a portion of the hard nutshell
SGA market. These barriers were the patent, the patent
litigation, price fixing, and exclusive dealing arrangements.
He then looked for a portion of the market where those
barriers were not present or at least not a factor and chose
the Columbus, Ohio SGA market. The sole customer in
this market was Western Electric. Both Agrashell and
Hammons sold to Western Electric, Hammons selling direct
and Agrashell selling first by agents and later direct.
Having thus found what he considered to be a market
without barriers, he determined that over a period of years
Hammons had 60 percent and Agrashell had 40 percent of
the SGA business in that market. He then concluded that
therefore Hammons should have 60 percent of all of Agra-
shell’s SGA business which it conducted through its prin-
cipal agents. He figured Hammons’ damages by taking the
average price at which Agrashell sold in the Columbus
market, multiplied by 60 percent of Agrashell’s volume
with its dealers and deducted therefrom the amount for
which Hammons sold the same volume of material as LCM.
His theory in this regard was that if the barriers had not
existed Hammons would have been able to sell this sub-
stantial quantity of material as SGA at $109 per ton
average rather than as LCM at $83 per ton average and
that therefore Hammons’ damages were $26 per ton of 60
}
24a
percent of the tons which Agrashell sold through its deal-
ers, or a total of $160,924.55. This approach, although
unique, has many practical defects.
The first defect is in the use of the Columbus market as
a fair example of what might have happened nationwide
in the absence of the barriers. In the first place, there
was only one customer in the market, and it bought in
substantial quantities as distinguished from most of Agra-
shell’s customers who bought in smaller quantities from
stocks shipped into warehouses for distribution by agents.
Secondly, there is no evidence as to whether or not that
customer bought only from Agrashell and Hammons or also
from other suppliers. More importantly, the evidence is
clear that Agrashell sought to sell to Western Electric,
SGA composed of both black walnut shells and apricot pits
while Hammons offered a product composed of only black
walnut shells. The evidence also establishes that Western
Electric was a sophisticated buyer and may not have always
used the two products interchangeably.”
Dr. Kuhlman acknowledged that in making his estimate
of damages he had not considered the impact of sales of
SGA by companies other than Agrashell and Hammons.
Even assuming that the alleged barriers kept Hammons
from its fair share of the market, it is difficult to understand
how anyone could reliably determine what share Hammons
should have had without knowledge of the market shares
other competitors might have captured.
In addition, Dr. Kuhlman did not explain why Agrashell’s
alleged anticompetitive conduct, which was supposedly so
effective in other places, was not effective in the Columbus
market. Apparently one reason for selecting the Columbus
7 Evidence that Western Electric did not consider the products
interchangeable is the fact that during the three years that Agra-
shell made no sales in the Columbus market (1963-1965), Ham-
mons’ sales did not increase as a result.
ee tener ee
25a
market was the fact that both Agrashell and Hammons had
been in some sort of competitive relationship for a number
of years. The failure to explain why the Columbus market
was isolated from Agrashell’s conduct is highly suspect con-
sidering some of the evidence adduced at the trial. For
instance, in 1962 when Agrashell did use an agent in the
Columbus market and when the patent was still viable
Hammons sold 111 tons of SGA and Agrashell 47. In 1963
when Agrashell wrote to Western Electric using the words
‘‘natent protected soft grit abrasive,’’ a technique which
Kuhlman specifically labeled as a ‘‘barrier,’? Hammons
sold 98 tons of SGA and Agrashell sold none. Still further
in 1967 and 1968, long after the patent expired and loug
after Agrashell had ceased doing business with an agent in
the Columbus market, Hammons’ sales fell dramatically
with Hammons selling 29 tons in 1967 to Agrashell’s 114.325
tons, and 54 tons in 1968 to Agrashell’s 127.25 tons.
In applying the percentages derived from the Columbus
market, to the national market serviced by Agrasheil’s
agents, Hammons’ expert witness seemingly ignored critical
differences between the two markets. In the Columbus
market shipments were made direct in large quantities,
thereby allowing Hammons to compete without agents or
warehouse facilities. Most of Agrashell’s ultimate custom-
ers serviced by its agents, bought in smaller quantities after
Agrashell had established regional warehousing permitting
prompt delivery of various sizes and types of its products.
Hammons sold direct, or to jobbers for resale from ware-
houses owned by the jobbers, or by manufacturers’ repre-
sentatives with orders shipped direct from Hammons’ plant.
Hammons did not maintain regional warehouse facilities in
order to service these smaller orders.
The evidence indicates that Hammons’ representatives
visited Pangborn in 1958 and 1962—both visits apparently
coming before Pangborn was an Agrashell agent. There
was also correspondence with Pangborn in 1961—before
Pangborn was an Agrashell agent. Hammons made no
attempt to solicit the business of C. P. Hall of Ohio. Ap-
parently the only attempt to acquire the business of C. P.
Hall of Illinois was the sending of a sample to Hill after
Hall called Hammons after receiving a form letter solicita-
tion. No further attempt was made to contact C. P. Hall of
Illinois. It is noted that the C. P. Hall companies combined
composed well over one-third of the business Hammons
claimed to have lost. Solicitation of the Wheelabrator busi-
ness involved sending two letters in response to a form let-
ter from Wheelabrator trying to sell a machine to Ham-
mons. The evidence indicates that Wheelabrator actually
bought SGA from Hammons; some four to five 50 pound
bags. This evidence tends to indicate two things. First,
Hammons sales efforts were rather ill-suited to acquiring
the business of Agrashell agents. Second, when Hammons
did try to solicit the business of the agents, at least C. P.
Hall and Wheelabrator either bought or expressed an in-
terest in the Hammons’ product, and apparently did not
consider themselves bound to deal only with Agrashell.
This conclusion is strengthened by the testimony of Ham-
mons’ own vice president that he could not recall ever being
told by an Agrashell agent that it could not deal in a
Hammons’ product because of the Perry patent or the
Statement of Policy.
More importantly, there was no evidence tending to show
why Hammons could not sell direct or through agents to
the ultimate consumers who were purchasing from Agra-
shell through Agrashell’s agents. It is clear that the so-
called barriers did not stop Hammons from selling a similar
product to Western Electric, or to the automobile manufac-
turers in the Detroit area where it had 100 percent of the
SGA market. It is also clear that Agrashell’s ultimate
consumers were paying higher prices than Hammons was
receiving in its sales to Western Electric, which should
——— aa i RM BC IR REIT TOE,
have made it easier for Hammons to compete for this busi-
ness.2 One conclusion that could be reached is that the only
thing that kept Hammons from selling to the ultimate con-
sumers serviced by Agrashell’s agents from Agrashell’s
warehouses is either the failure of Hammons to actively
solicit the business or its failure to maintain regional ware-
house facilities to permit prompt delivery of small quanti-
ties of a variety of*sizes of SGA. The evidence discloses
very little active solicitation of Agrashell’s ultimate con-
sumers by Hammons, and the premise of Dr. Kuhlman that
Hammons would have obtained 60 percent of their business
except for the alleged barriers is highly questionable in
light of these facts.
We also note that Dr. Kuhlman based his damage esti-
mate on the implicit assumption that the patent and the
patent litigation constituted illegal barriers in addition to
the exclusive dealing and price fixing provision of the con-
tracts. The assumption that the patent was an illegal bar-
rier prior to its expiration was conclusively negated when
the trial judge ruled that the patent had not been fraudu-
lently procured. Likewise the assumption that the patent
litigation constituted a unilateral attempt to monopolize and
thus an illegal barrier is negated by our finding later in this
opinion that Hammons failed to make a submissible case
of an attempt to monopolize. Thus two of the four struc-
tural supports of Kuhlman’s damage theory were highly
questionable.
8 When Dr. Kuhlman was asked why Hammons failed to attempt
to sell to Agrashell’s ultimate consumers, he was unable to explain
other than by vaguely referring to restrictions wherever Agrashell
sold through an agent. To the contrary, Dr. Poe, Agrashell’s
expert, could find nothing in the agreements or Statement of
Policy which would impose a barrier to the ultimate consumer.
In fact, if Agrashell held up its price, it should be expected that
another seller could come in and sell at a lower price.
We have described some of the serious failings of Dr.
Kuhlman’s damage testimony to indicate our hesitancy to
allow a jury to assess damages upon such a theory:
‘<TPJroof of an isolated violation of substantive law
will not entitle defendants to an affirmative recovery.
Before a party is entitled to recover treble damages he
must be able to plead and prove actual monetary injury
to his business or property resulting from the illegal
act. ... It has long been the law that damages which are
purely speculative, remote, or based upon conjecture
cannot serve as a base for antitrust recovery. . . ."
American Infra-Red Radiant Co., Inc. v. Lambert In-
dustries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 995-996 (8th Cir. 1966).
Our critique of this damage formulation must be tempered,
however, by the Supreme Court’s statements relating to the
proper function of an appellate court when reviewing
damage evidence. As the Supreme Court has forcefully
stated :
‘<7 An antitrust plaintiff’s] burden of proving the fact
of damage under Section 4 of the Clayton Act is satis-
fied by his proof of some damage .. . inquiry beyond
this minimum point goes only to the amount and not
the fact of damage. It is enough that the illegality is
shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff
neéd not exhaust all possible alternative sources of
injury in fulfilling his burden of proving compensable
injury under Section 4.’’ Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).
The Supreme Court has consistently reminded critics of
damage formulations that an antitrust violator may not
properly complain about damage proof vagaries when such
ambiquity results from the illegal act itself. See e.g., Bige-
low v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) ;
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359, 379 (1927). With these principles in mind we
INEI sp ERLE FP PRION EN PERE te IE _
cannot say that as a matter of law, Dr. Kuhlman’s theory
failed to demonstrate the fact or quantum of damage with
sufficient clarity. For these reasons the jury award of
$41,750.00 must stand.
Our inquiry does not end with this finding however. The
award of litigation damages allegedly incurred by Hammons
when Agrashell filed.certain infringement suits must stand
or fall on whether the jury could properly conclude that
Agrashell ‘‘attempted to monopolize”’ under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. It is clear that the act of filing the in-
fringment suits is a unilateral act and section 2, in contrast
with section 1, is the proper method to test unilateral
activity such as that involved in this case:
‘‘The Congress which wrote the Sherman Act
directed its main thrust against business conduct in-
volving two or more parties. Section 1, proscribing
every ‘contract, combination or conspiracy’ in restraint
of trade, is strictly confined to joint action. Section 2
covers both individual and joint action ....’’ Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv.
L.Rev. 655 (1962).
B. Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to
‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States
* * * >» Hammons claimed that Agrashell attempted to
monopolize the SGA and the LCM markets although its
proof relating to attempted monopolization of the LCM
market was quite limited, and during the course of the
trial and in its instructions the district court indicated that
evidence of Agrashell’s actions as to LCM was relevant
only to the issue of intent.
RRL Atl Aaa TE mk A
30a
In addition to proving an overt act or acts, the essential
elements which must be proved in a section 2 attempt to
monopolize case are specific intent and dangerous probabil-
ity. See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396,
402 (1905) ; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d
643, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) ; Hib-
ner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of
Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 1966 (1967 ); Smith, Attempt to
Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 227, 229-231 (1957).
Although we do not rest our decision relating to section 2
on this issue, we note that the evidence presented at trial
with regard to ‘‘specific intent”’ bordered on being insuffici-
ent as a matter of law. The issue before the jury was
whether Agrashell specifically intended to monopolize hard
nutshells within the soft grit abrasive markets by seeking
to extend the patent beyond its terms or by extending the
life of the patent.
At the outset, we emphasize that the trial court did not
submit the issue of fraudulent procurement of the patent to
the jury and no cross-appeal was taken on that issue. Thus
the declaration of patent invalidity did not prohibit Agra-
shell from relying on the presumptive validity of the patent.
It therefore had every right to bring each of the three law-
suits against Sirotta, Hammons, and Block if its purpose in
each case was merely to enforce its rights under the patent.
The obvious and difficult problem in this case relates to
differentiating between Agrashell’s intent to bring suits and
enter into contracts under a presumptively valid patent,
thereby enforcing and utilizing a lawful monopoly, and its
alleged intent to bring suits and enter into contracts under
a presumptively valid patent for the purpose of extending
the scope of the patent beyond the grant allowed by law.
The proof of that alleged illegal intent is thin indeed.
The evidence in this case indicates quite clearly that
Hammons sold a product that, but for the declaration of
fs yor rm
DEL LOL ESIES EL LOTEL ELEOE
3la
invalidity, would have infringed Agrashell’s patent; that
Sirotta sold the Hammons product, which, as the trial judge
indicated, was an ‘‘admittedly infringing’? one; that
Gravette and Block also sold an SGA product which was
composed of black walnut shell and that Pangborn at one
time merchandised Gravette’s product; and that Sirotta’s
patent counsel and Pangborn’s patent counsel could not find
sufficient grounds for challenging the patent on the grounds
the patent was subsequently declared invalid.
Much of Hammons’ case rested on the deposition testi-
mony of Sirotta relative to Ayers’ statement that Sirotta
‘chad no right in the walnut shell business. This is my do-
main.”? It is noted that when this statement was made
Ayers had already filed his infringement suit and placed the
infringement issue before a court. Moreover, it was Sirotta
and not Ayers who precipitated the meeting at which the
statement was allegedly made. Understandably we are
hesitant to attach much significance to this statement.
We are also hesitant to attach any significance to the evi-
dence which indicates that Agrashell sued Hammons in
retaliation for Hammons underbidding Agrashell on an
LCM account or to evidence which tends to indicate that
Agrashell sued Block because Block would not agree to
maintain prices in the LOM market.
We question this evidence because, although Hammons
pleaded an attempt to monopolize the LCM market, the
relevant markets which were the subject of the attempt to
monopolize as defined by the trial judge were solely the
SGA markets. Hammons does not question this instruc-
tion. Indeed by supplemental brief Hammons argued that
it need not prove ‘‘dangerous probability’’ in the LCM
markets precisely because of the judge’s limited instruc-
tion. Although Hammons contends that the LCM intent
evidence somehow relates to the issue of intent in the SGA
market, we attach little significance to conduct related to a
32a
totally distinct product being sold in a different geographic
market.
We turn next to an analysis of whether or not Hammons
proved ‘‘dangerous probability”’ of monopolization.
‘The phrase ‘attempt to monopolize’ means the
employment of methods, means and practices which
would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and
which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so
close as to create a dangerous probability a
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
785 (1946) ; Central Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 422 F.2d 504, 509 (8th Cir.
1970) ; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968,
971 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) ;
Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, supra.
Thus in this case we must determine whether Hammons
presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could
properly conclude that Agrashell approached ‘‘so close [to
monopolization] as to create a dangerous probability of it
*#** >» American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra, 328
US. at 785.
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the Supreme Court
held that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent
may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act provided all other
elements are established. This case relates to extending a
patent beyond its lawful bounds, but we think the same con-
siderations expressed in Walker Process are applicable
here. Those considerations are essentially that, even though
one possesses & fraudulently procured patent or a patent
which is allegedly used in a way to enlarge its scope or life,
an analysis of market factors is still necessary. Indeed, the
Court specifically stated that the trial court had not
‘‘analyzed any economic data’’ when it reversed. Id. at 178.
Thus it is not enought to argue that one has used a patent
in a predatory manner thereby enlarging the scope or life
of the patent; one must look to economic data to determine
the impact of the purported illegal activity on the market
which is the subject of the attempt to monopolize.
‘To establish monopolization or attempt to monopo-
lize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sher-
man Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the
exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms
of the relevant market for the product involved. With-
out a definition of that market there is no way to mea-
sure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy
competition.’? Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., supra, 382 U.S. at
177. See also Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene
Corp., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 912 (1970).
The counterclaim filed by Hammons indicated the product
to be ‘‘ground black walnut shell,’’ and in submitting the
matter to the jury the trial court referred to ‘‘the soft
grit abrasive industry’? and ‘‘hard nutshells within the
soft grit abrasive markets.’? The patent refers to ‘‘an
abrasive material comprising pelletized nut shells having
the hardness of black walnut shells.”” Our conclusion is
that while the exact definition of the product is elusive, the
proof primarily related to crushed black walnut and apri-
cot pit nutshell used as SGA.
Assuming that the product was thus defined, the defini-
tion of the geographic market is even less explicit. Since
no attempt was made to narrow , the geographic area, we
assume the relevant area is the entire United States. How-
ever, no market data was introduced showing the total vol-
ume of sales of hard nutshell SGA in the United States or
any specified portion thereof ; therefore, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to know exactly what geographic market Ham-
mons claims Agrashell attempted to monopolize. The two
34a
principal submarkets identified by Hammons were Detroit,
Michigan and Columbus, Ohio. In Detroit, Hammons ap-
parently had the entire market, and in Columbus, it had a
larger share than Agrashell.
Not only did Hammons fail to show the total sales or
volume of SGA, it also failed to show what shares of that
market were held by Agrashell, Hammons, and several other
major competitors. Continental was referred to as one
of the five largest companies in the field but no evidence was
introduced relating to its volume of sales. Only by associ-
ating widely disconnected and at times contradictory por-
tions of the evidence is it possible to piece together the
respective sales of Agrashell and Hammons.
Hammons’ pleadings attempted to structure the relevant
market to include LCM, but by supplemental brief Ham-
mons agreed that LCM was not within the markets the jury
was instructed to consider as being the target of the at-
tempt.
In conclusion, we view the evidence relating to ‘“‘danger-
ous probability” in this case much as Judge Brown viewed
the evidence in Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 625, 638 (D. Kan. 1965), in which he noted as follows:
‘<Tn the case at bar, plaintiff is unaware of the total
annual volume of commerce * * * in the relevant market
area; the portion or percentage of that volume held by
defendants; the portion or percentage of that volume
held by the plaintiffs ; and the portion or percentage of
that volume affected by any activities of the defend-
ants * * *.
* 7 6
® Of the three manufacturers sued or threatened with suit by
Agrashell (Block, Gravette, and Hammons), Block continued
to produce SGA throughout the periods relevant here, Hammons
sales nearly doubled, and Hammons acquired the controlling in-
terest in Gravette in 1966.
a
BE CS Bees Pe a z ——
. a i EE A OES oe ainpiwat &
Ge ee late On Bribe’ ls lt
OD Rg AT TT ERE Fk + FOG RE
‘Without the facts and evidence which plaintiff
admittedly does not have, a §2 Sherman case simply
cannot, in our opinion, be established.”’
See generally Central Saving and Loan Ass’n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, supra; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., supra; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
supra; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 466 F.2d
825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) ;
Hibner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of
Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 171-177 (1967).
We are aware that the case of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964), is not in accord with the result we have reached in
this case, but we choose not to follow its rationale,"°
especially in view of the fact that the case of Walker Pro-
cess Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,
supra, was decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to the
Lessig case and in view of the decisions of this Court here-
inbefore cited.
Other Alleged Errors
Agrashell claims that Hammons’ recovery of litigation
expenses was barred by principles of res judicata and com-
pulsory counterclaim. Our resolution of the sufficiency of
proof with regard to section 2 of the Sherman Act obviates
the necessity of resolving this issue with regard to litiga-
tion expense damage. Likewise errors allegedly made in
instructing the jury with regard to litigation damages
need not be discussed.
Agrashell further argues that Hammons’ section 1 claims
should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in
the first infringement suit filed by Agrashell against Ham-
10 The strength of the Lessig rationale in the Ninth Circuit is
questionable. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121
(9th Cir. 1972) ; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.8. Co., supra.
OIE ESI DI IN TNE in PT CO aah ROENCANOP NRA KOLO PIN OS 4 5 Bie?
36a
mons in the Western District of Missouri. However, we
think that the instant case is controlled by Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944), which indicates
that cases such as this one involve permissive, not compul-
sory, counterclaims. Furthermore, since the first suit was
dismissed because of Agrashell’s failure to join an indis-
pensable party, since no judgment on the merits was had,
and since Agrashell was explicitly allowed to file a new
action, which it elected to do, no injustice has resulted from
permitting the filing of the counterclaim in this action.
Agrashell argues that the instructions were in error be-
cause of a failure to adequately define Agrashell’s agency
arrangements. We do not think that if any error occurred
that it was prejudicial, and our resolution of the section 1
claim assumes that valid agency relationships existed.
Agrashell further argues that it was an abuse of discretion
to relieve Hammons of its waiver of jury trial. Due to the
complexity of this case and the fact that Hammons changed
from patent counsel to antitrust counsel during the varying
procedural phases of this case we do not think that such a
decision was an abuse of discretion. See generally, 9 C.
Wricut & A. Miier, Feperan Practice anp PRocepure
§ 2334 at 123 (1971).
Agrashell next argues that it was an abuse of discretion
to allow Hammons to deviate from a pretrial narrative
statement by introducing into evidence the deposition testi-
mony of Cox and Sirotta. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows for modification of a pretrial order
to prevent manifest injustice. The trial judge explicitly
indicated that he was acting in the interest of justice and
fair play in allowing the deposition testimony, and indi-
cated that the testimony might well have not been available
earlier because the parties were in litigation in 1967 and
could have been reluctant to speak. We do not think that
the decision in this case was an abuse of discretion. See
generally, 6 C. Wricut & A. Mrier, Feperat Practice anpD
Procepure § 1527 at 608 (1971) ; Cf. Labbee v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 469 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1972).
Ta comd, te a
37a
Finally, Agrashell argues that it was error to exclude
its evidence of settlement offers made to Hammons after the
filing of the suit. The trial judge indicated quite clearly
that he was afraid the probative value of this evidence was
outweighed by the prejudicial impact the evidence might
have had on the jury. We think the judge’s decision in this
respect was carefully considered and not error. Other alle-
gations of error raised in the briefs have been considered,
but in our opinion are not valid and do not require com-
ment.
Conclusion
We affirm that part of the judgment awarding Hammons
$41,750.00 trebled in the amount of $125,250.00. The re-
maining judgment, consisting of litigation expense dam-
ages, is reversed with directions to dismiss that portion of
the case. Attorneys fees and costs in the prosecution of
this case should be redetermined by the district court and
substantially reduced to an amount more in keeping with
the revised judgement.
Appendix B—Continued
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
September Term, 1972
No. 71-1538
AGRASHELL, Inc., Appellant,
v.
Hammons Propucts Company, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.
Petition of appellant for rehearing filed in this cause
having been considered, it is now here ordered by this Court
that the same be, and it is hereby, denied.
May 1, 1973
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