Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hammons Products Co. v. Agrashell, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1973

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner

v.

AGRASHELL, Inc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Wortn Row .eEy

JouN C. Scorr

Sreven K. YABLONSKI

1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

Morris CHERTKOV

1780 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Puzss or Braon S. Apanes Paorrine, Inc., Wassmncrom, D. C.

=,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ES EO IO CM 1

ore cick eda unapithuinbad engioeaemmadennieatdins 2

ccc nslnceaiacbugieemeemeawase ae

EE sivcicnctgeanueenghiheanaewneerns 2

RTE EN SER ESE GEE Set A OE ne aS 2

Reasons for Granting Certiorari ................... 6

I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Other Courts

of Appeals in That It Holds That Dangerous

Probability of Actual Monopolization, Like Spe-

cific Intent, Is an Essential Element of ‘‘At-

tempt to Monopclize’’ Under Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, and at All Times Requires Proof

gE RS 6

II. There Is Real Need for This Court to Clarify

Several of Its Decisions That Have Given Rise

i ED cccncendewcsenvadenaneiowwcee 9

I i tin das aah ceed hiahd dia areinemmalbeind a aiees ware a 12

EASTERN tie emer ee Pre eRe pe PE la

IRE L aptzR Ee apa lek Ue PR Re EE 2a

Case CITATIONS:

American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus-

tries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 996 (8th Cir. 1966) ...... 5

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781

I eee bce be lacie ae atlas eee 9,10

Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.

1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969) .................. ot

Table of Contents Continued

Page

Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d

1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969). ...ceceecncccccccceses

Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir.

BEE pcx paccaskacsksnsesss econ totes cee.

Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203,

906-207 (Sth Cir. 1969) ....------2etttt ye 9

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 US.

690, 699, 707 (1962) ..-----------ree re 8

Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T. & Co., 446 F.2d 825,

932 (9th Cir. 1971) ...-----sereer teeta ene 7

Industrial Building Materials v. Interchemical Corp.,

437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1971) ..------eerss eres 7

Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis Inc., 452

_ F.2d 579, GOB (1971) ...---2--crrecccceecerteees 9

Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th

Te ME ca sssaseusseeneneseeseune sats sts. 5

Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.

a) cade ag 5, 6, 7, 8, 10

Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 877-8 (W.D.

We WE - cnavvnnceseessncerbonseanssesss+****

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) ..-- 5,9

Union Carbide €& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561,

GOS (10th Cir.) ....--c00seoreererrssrtsse es,

Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &

Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) ....--+++-:- 11

Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alcoa, 438 I".2d

1286, 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) ...-.ceeeeeeeeeeeeeen®

ARTIOLE:

Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Donald F.

Turner, 70 Harvard Law Rev. 281 (1956) ...-----

STALE ST RE _—

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM, 1973

No

Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner

v.

AGRASHELL, INc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Hammons Products Company petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Hight Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, not yet reported,

appears in Appendix B hereto. No opinion was

rendered by the district court, but its judgment also

appears in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on March 30, 1973. <A petition for rehearing (App. B,

p. 37a) was denied on May 1, 1973. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. section

1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a finding of ‘‘attempt to monopolize” under

section 2 of the Sherman Act always requires proof of

the total market for the product involved and the

respective shares held by the competitors.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved are sections 1 & 2

of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 1 & 2, and sec-

tion 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 15. They

are printed in Appendix A, hereto.

STATEMENT

This case arose out of a patent infringement suit

by Agrashell, Ine. (Agrashell) against Hammons

Products Company (Hammons), and a counterclaim

by Hammons for misuse of patent and various actions

in connnection therewith in illegal restraint of trade

and attempt to monopolize under sections 1 & 2 of the

Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. sections 1 & 2) and section 4

of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. section 15). The patent

was finally adjudicated invalid due to obviousness and

therefore uninfringed, and thereafter Hammons’

counterclaim was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict

of $41,750 for loss of profits and $162,374 for litigation

expenses incurred by Hammons in defending itself

and a customer against Agrashell’s infringement suits.

—— om .

NER ME IDI BE A LV See

Some rs 9

The District Court rendered judgment in treble the

amount of the damages for these two items, and Agra-

shell appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

There, the award for lost profits of $125,250 was sus-

tained on the basis of a section 1 violation, but the

litigation expense award of $487 ,122 was nullified on

the sole ground that there was insufficient evidence

on the total product market and shares held by each

competitor for a determination of a ‘‘dangerous prob-

ability’? that the monopolization attempt would suc-

ceed. Our (Hammons’) request for certiorari, while

naturally questioning the correctness of this absolute

requirement in “‘attempt to monopolize”’ cases, is based

on the belief that the decision below stems from un-

warranted interpretations of certain Supreme Court

decisions and is in clear and open conflict with the

Ninth Cireuit, and probably in conflict with several

other Circuits.

The product involved here is ground black walnut

shells and apricot pits used as a soft grit abrasive

(SGA) in blast-cleaning metals and plastics. The

market for this particular use is nationwide, though

concentrated in the industrial Northeast. Since the

1960’s, Hammons, with its plant in Missouri, and Agra-

shell, in California, were the principal competitors in

the manufacture and sale of the product.’ While there

were several other competitors in the market, there

is insufficient evidence in the record to show what the

total market was and the respective shares of these

additional competitors.

The product was the subject of a patent under which

Agrashell acquired an exclusive license in 1947 and had

11] App. 40 T-41 T, 56 T, 202 T, 292 T, III App. 555 T, 573 T,

574 T, 609 T, V App. 27-29, DX 42, 43(b).

POSE ROME Dini EAS SEL ALT OG EIR GSP Sb

4 |

retained until the patent expired in 1964. Hammons’

troubles, as well as those of other producers and dis-

_tributors of the product, began when Agrashell insti-

tuted a concerted campaign to gain control of the entire

market by assertion of its alleged patent rights. In

its antitrust counterclaim in Agrashell’s infringement

suit which is the subject of certiorari here, Hammons

charged and produced evidence to show that Agra-

shell, through threats and institution of patent in-

fringement suits, had already succeeded in forcing some

competitors to give up without a fight and to enter

into an exclusive agency relationship with Agrashell

for periods beyond the expiration of the patent (App.

B, pp. 9a-17a) ; that these threats and suits were not

in legitimate exercise of patent rights but in flagrant

and illegal misuse of the patent; and that the instant

suit was but a continuation of Agrashell’s predatory

schemes in restraint of trade and attempt to moncp-

olize. All this evidence was presented not on a piece-

meal basis aimed at recovery of lost profits for one

antitrust violation and recovery of litigation costs

for another, but rather on the basis of Agrashell’s

single cohesive and protracted scheme of anticompeti-

tive conduct.

As previously stated, the District Court’s award of

treble damages for lost profits on a nationwide basis

was affirmed on appeal under section 1 (App. B, pp.

920-29a). The affirmance was based on the Court’s

finding that the period of two exclusive agency con-

tracts extended beyond the expiration of the patent

and the jury could find this a misuse of the patent

and an illegal restraint of trade (App. B, pp. 19a-22a).

Having decided this, the Court abruptly turned to a

consideration of the litigation cost award under sec-

Tose Ned Sn

MES

me CI a IE RAR SR tis pe oe RIN

+5

tion 2, with the following statement: ‘It is clear that

the act of filing the infringement suits is a unilateral

act and section 2, in contrast with section 1, is the

proper method to test unilateral activity such as that

involved in this case” (App. B, p. 29a).”

Considering the case under section 2, the Court comes

to its one and only basis for nullifying the litigation

’ eost award. It says that there was no evidence of what

the total market for this product was and the respective

shares of all the competitiors, and that therefore it could

not be determined whether Agrashell approached so

close to monopolization as to create a dangerous prob-

ability of it (App. B, pp. 32a-35a). Although the jury

was instructed no less than four separate times on the

necessity of finding ‘‘dangerous probability” (III App.

985 T, 996 T), the appellate decision nowhere considers

those instructions. In thus treating ‘‘dangerous prob-

ability’? as an element separate and distinct from

‘‘specific intent’’ and equating it with market power,

the Court expressly recognizes that it is in direct and

clear conflict with the Ninth Circuit case of Lessig v.

Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, cert. denied, 377 U.S.

993 (1964) (App. B, p. 35a).

On the authority of Swift & Co. v. United States, 196

U.S. 375 (1905) and decisions in other Circuits, we sub-

mit that where a predator’s specific intent to monopo-

2We are genuinely troubled by this quoted statement. If a

causal relationship is established between incurred litigation costs

and contracts in illegal restraint of trade, as we believe the jury

could have found here, we perceive no reason why such litigation

costs cannot be recovered as damages under section 1. Kobe, Inc.

v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F. 2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952) ; American

Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Industries, Inc., 360 F. 2d 977,

996 (8th Cir. 1966). Whether this point provides still another

and independent reason for certiorari, however, is not so clear.

6

lize and his employment of illegal and commonly effec-

tive weapons to accomplish such intent are established,

indeed even as here to the point of an adjudicated vio-

lation of the restraint of trade provisions of section 1,

proof of actual market power, while permissible, is not

essential. To accept the view of the Court below is to

tolerate a degree of brinkmanship by the would-be

monopolist that greatly weakens the effectiveness of the

‘attempt to monopolize” provision of section 2 in

nipping monopolization before it is too late.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

ment of “Attempt To Monopolize” Under Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, and At All Times Requires Proof of Market

Shares.

A. We submit that the decision below directly and

irreconcilably conflicts with the Ninth Circuit when it

expressly rejects Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d

459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). (App.

B, p. 35a). Lessig is basically our case and meets the

issue head on.

Tidewater argues that attempt to monopolize is

established only if there is proof of ‘‘dangerous

probability of success, i.e., that if unchecked mono-

polizaiton will result’’; that this requires an evalu-

ation of Tidewater’s power in the relevant market ;

that the evidence on this issue was inadequate, and

such evidence as there was indicated a lack of any

possibility that Tidewater could monopolize the

sale of petroleum products or TBA.

We reject the premise that probability of actual

monopolization is an essential element of proof of

attempt to monopolize. Of course, such a proba-

ae PEAS ISAS

7

bility may be relevant circumstantial evidence of

intent, but the specific intent itself is the only evi-

dence of dangerous probability the statute requires

—perhaps on the not unreasonable assumption that

the actor is better able than others to judge the

practical possibility of achieving his illegal objec-

tive. (Footnotes omitted), 327 F.2d, at p. 474.

The suggestion by the Court below that the strength

of the Lessig ratiopale might be questioned as a result

of two later decisions in its own Circuit is not borne

out by a reading of those cases (App. B, p. 35a, note

10). In Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Company,

446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S.

1049 (1972), the court expressly found the evidence on

“specific intent” insufficient, and that this ended the

matter. In Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116,

121 (9th Cir. 1972), we believe that Lessig is definitely

discussed with approval rather than disapproval, as is

still another case in the Ninth Circuit which expressly

confirms Lessig, i.e., Industrial Building M aterials, Inc.

v. International Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1971). As

to both Lessig and Industrial Building Materials, the

court in Bushie said, ‘“‘the attempted monopolization

claim was founded upon a substantial claim of restraint

of trade, from which we indicated the specific intent

required for a claim of attempt to monopolize could be

inferred” (460 F.2d 12). Thus, Bushie reaffirms that

‘‘specific intent” is the one essential element, and that

the predatory acts serve to confirm and arm such intent.

So in our case was the attempted monopolization claim

founded upon ‘‘a substantial claim of restraint of

trade” i.e., the use of a commercially important patent

well beyond its scope, together with suits for infringe-

ment which resulted in subjugating three competitors,

and indeed the making of contracts in illegal restraint

TONS STF

IIE EC OLGA SRO TIE I OTN TOO

= Ege LI Bi I

Sechaba aaah ke Natalee

biases ale

ne

of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act for which

substantial damages were awarded and affirmed by the

Court below. Presumably, that is why the Court be-

low expressly negatived that it was basing its reversal

on lack of ‘‘specific intent’’ and instead based its deci-

sion on the ground that ‘‘dangerous probability”’ at all

times requires proof of market power (App. B, pp. 30a,

34a).

B. There is a certain virtue in the conflict between the

Fighth and Ninth Circuits in that it is direct and sharp.

In some Circuits there are no decisions one way or other

which qualify in any reliable degree of authority on our

particular issue. As to other Circuits, varying degrees

of uncertainty, and even confusion, exist as to where

they stand. The trend, however, appears to be in the

direction of the Lessig rationale (See generally, Anti-

trust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Donald F.

Turner, 70 Harvard Law Rev. 281 (1956)). For ex-

ample, in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300

F.2d 561, 586 (1962), the Tenth Circuit waved aside an

objection that the jury was not instructed that specific

intent must be accompanied by conduct sufficient to

create a dangerous probability of monopolization, con-

sidering it sufficient that the jury was told that “‘the

attempt must be accompanied by a specific intent to

acquire power and exclude others from competition.”’

The court added, however, that the requested instruc-

tions ‘‘may have been literally correct statements.”’

The Fifth Circuit, while declaring it unnecessary to de-

cide the issue in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. Vv.

Aluminum Company of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1304,

3 Evidence establishing an illegal restraint of trade under sec-

tion 1, also tends to establish an attempt to monopolize under

section 2. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 US.

490, 699, 707 (1962) ; Bushic v. Stenocord Corp., supra, at p. 120.

1306 (1971) nevertheless quotes with apparent ap-

proval from a district court opinion suggesting that

market power is not an essential element of proof in

attempt to monopolize cases. In the same Circuit,

however, Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.,

417 F.2d 203, 206-207 (1969) is frequently cited

as going the other way because of its expressed

views on “dangerous probability’? and the require-

ment of proof of market power in support thereof,

although proof of specific intent to monopolize

does not appear to have been shown there. Prac-

tically the same thing can be said of the situation

in the Seventh Circuit where Kearney & Trecker Corp.

v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (1971)

heavily smacks of Lessig rationale, but Bernard Food

Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Company, 415 F.2d 1279,

1284 (1969) is often cited as going the other way be-

cause of its proof requirements under “‘dangerous

probability”, although the Court specifically found that

there was no showing of an intent to monopolize. The

Third and Fourth Circuits appear to be in the Lessig

orbit on the authority of lower court decisions. Rea v.

Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 877-8 (W.D. Pa.

1973) ; Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F.

Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969).

We believe that the persistence of uncertainty and

confusion within Circuits lends additional urgency to

this petition for certiorari.

Il. There Is Real Need for This Court To Clarify Several of Its

Decisions That Have Given Rise to the Conflict.

The two Supreme Court cases that are most fre-

quently cited on ‘dangerous probability”’ are Swift &

Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), and American

Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).

Unfortunately, they are cited with almost equal facility

BA NTE NET ea a

10

to reach different results. We believe that the age of

these cases, the seemingly never-ending controversies

and confusion over what they stand for, and the in-

creasing number of cases on this obviously important

issue coming before lower courts, should invite the

attention of this Court.

The Lessig decision nowhere suggests that it is de-

parting from old or breaking new ground. On the con-

trary, among the several cases it prominently cites in

support is Swift. There it finds in the clause ‘‘when

that intent and the consequent dangerous probability

exist”’ (196 U.S. 396), that ‘specific intent”’ is the only

essential element in predatory situations and ‘‘danger-

ous probability” is but an attendant consequence of

such intent, evidence of which may be used (though not

required) in some cases to bolster proof of specific in-

tent. It should be noted that the Court in our case

also finds support in Swift, but obviously does not

accept the discerning reading of it in Lessig and

arrives at a totally opposite conclusion (App. B, p.

30a).

The Court below also cites American Tobacco Co. V.

United States and quotes from it as follows (App.

B, p. 32a) : “The phrase ‘attempt to monopolize’ means

the employment of methods, means and practices which

would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and

which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so

close as to create a dangerous probability of it - - _—

(328 U.S. 785). Unfortunately, lower courts using this

quotation either fail to realize, or at least to note, that

it is neither the language of the Supreme Court nor

bears its stamp of approval. Indeed, nowhere in that

decision did this Court even use the phrase ‘*danger-

ous probability.” In fact, the quoted language was

among the District Court’s charges to the jury under

| section 2 of the Sherman Act which this Court quoted.

FET RN LR I RS ORS

“11

But this Court never considered this particular charge,

nor was there any occasion to do so, for the simple rea-

son that both the grant of certiorari and the subsequent

decision were solely concerned with consummated mo-

nopolization—not attempts to monopolize—and only

the District Court’s charges as they bore on consum-

mated monopolization were in issue (328 U.S. 784-788).

The error in regarding this case as standing for the ne-

cessity of proof of “dangerous probability’’ as a sepa-

rate and distinct element in ‘‘attempt’’ cases has been

compounded by the Court below and other courts by an

additional requirement that there be proof of actual

market power under ‘“‘dangerous probability’’—a re-

quirement that calls for a considerable stretch of the

imagination to lay at the door of this Court’s decision

in American Tobacco.

Perhaps even more disturbing on the clash between

the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, insofar as they rely on

Supreme Court decisions, is the great weight that the

Court below appears to give to some general statements

in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery

& Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), which was de-

cided after Lessig (App. B, p. 32a). We might note,

however, that this appearance is somewhat tempered

by the fact that the immediate thrust of the Opinion

below is cast essentially in terms of a direct clash be-

tween Circuits rather than on the foreclosing basis that

the “Supreme Court hath spoken’’ (App. B, p. 35a).

We submit that nothing in Walker, either by way of di-

rect holding or dictum, supplies, or was intended to sup-

ply, any clues to solving the immediate issue here. The

issue in Walker was ‘“‘whether the maintenance and en-

forcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent

Office may be the basis of an action under section 2 of

the Sherman Act”? (382 U.S. 173). The answer was

anal

12

affirmative, but since “‘the area of per se illegality is

carefully limited”’, the Court was ‘‘reluctant to extend

it on the bare pleadings and absent examination of

market effect and economic consequences” (382 U.S.

178). The case raised no question whatever as to the

distinction between attempts to monopolize and actual

monopolization, much less any questions as to the kind

and degree of proof required under each offense. As a

matter of fact, it appears that the petitioner only

pleaded monopolization, not attempt to monopolize

(382 U.S. 174). This Court’s statements with respect to

market effect, economic consequences and damages were

obviously all by way of general exposition of section 2

as a whole and in reiteration of its reluctance to treat

the case on a per se violation basis. In effect, the

Court told the petitioner that he could now go back to

the trial court and proceed with the very evidence he

said he was ready to introduce under his pleadings but

had been foreclosed from introducing.

CONCLUSION

Important as it is to private litigants that the issue

here presented be resolved, we believe its resolution to

be of even greater importance to the public in the effec-

tive administration of a vital provision of the antitrust

laws.

Respectfully submitted,

Worth Row Ley

JoHN C. Scorr

Sreven K. YABLONSKI

1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

7 Washington, D. C. 20036

Of Counsel: Counsel for Petitioners

Morris CHERTKOV

1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

;

}

:

|

i

;

eee SOAs TA

la

APPENDIX A

Sherman Act

Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-

merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,

is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing

herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agree-

ments prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a com-

modity which bears, or the label or container of which

bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or

distributor of such commodity and which is in free and

open competition with commodities of the same general

class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or

agreements of that description are lawful as applied to

intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public

policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory,

or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be

made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for

such resale, and the making of such contracts or agree-

ments shall not be an unfair method of competition under

section 5, as amended and supplemented, of the Act en-

titled “An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to

define its power and duties, and for other purposes’’, ap-

proved September 26, 1914: Provided further, That the

preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or

agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance

of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein in-

volved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or

between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between

factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or

corporations in competition with each other. Kvery person

who shall make any contract or engage in any combination

or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed

guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall

be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprison-

ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,

in the discretion of the court.

2a

Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt

to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-

son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-

merce among the several States, or with foreign nations,

shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on convic-

tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five

thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one

year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the

court.

Clayton Act

Sec. 4. That any person who shall be injured in his busi-

ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the

antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the

United States in the district in which the defendant resides

or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount

in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by

him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable

attorney’s fee.

APPENDIX B

[Filed June 21, 1971]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. 2131

AcrasHELL, Ino., Plaintiff,

v.

Hammons Propucts Company, Defendant.

Judgment on Hammons’ Counterclaim

Wuenreas, this cause has come on for hearing and been

tried to a jury in open court and the jury has rendered its

verdict in favor of the Hammons Products Company

against Agrashell in the amount of $204,124.21; and

3a

Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for entry of

final judgment on its verdict and each party has submitted

complete briefs thereon; and

Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for award to

it of a reasonable attorneys’ fee pursuant to Section 4 of

the Clayton Act and a hearing having been held thereon

and evidence having been submitted by the parties and the

question having been briefed; and ’

Wuereas, Hammons has made its motion for award to

it of cost of suit pursuant to both Section 4 of the Clayton

Act and Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

a hearing having been held thereon and the question hav-

ing been fully briefed; and

Wuereas, the Court has reviewed the record of these

proceedings, has evaluated the time and effort of Ham-

mons’ counsel in preparing, presenting and trying the coun-

terclaim, and has reviewed the cases and the criteria for

award of an attorneys’ fee in complex antitrust litigation

pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, including whether

counsel had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in a

case brought by the Government, standing of counsel at the

Bar, the time and labor spent, the magnitude and complex-

ity of the litigation, the responsibility undertaken, and the

amount recovered; and

Wuergas, the Court has reviewed the costs sought to be

taxed by Hammons against Agrashell pursuant to Section

4 of the Clayton Act and Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure ;

Tuererore, it is hereby this ........ day of June, 1971,

Orperep, ApgupcEep AND Decreep THat:

1. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Hammon

Products Company as follows:

(a) Verdict of the jury in the amount of $612,372.63,

as trebled, in accordance with Section 4 of the Clayton

Act.

4a

(b) Award of attorneys’ fee to Hammons Products

Company in the amount of $150,000.

(c) Award of cost of suit in the amount of $13,361.31

awarded in a memorandum and order filed this date.

2. Total amount of the judgment to be entered herein is

$775,733.76.

3. There being no just reason for delay, the Court directs

that this judgment be entered as a final judgment on Ham.

mons’ counterclaim against Agrashell for antitrust viola-

tions.

4, A stay of execution is hereby granted on this judg-

ment until July 1, 1971, to provide for the filing of a super-

sedeas bond on appeal or the issuance of a stay of execu-

tion pending an appeal on such equitable terms as the par-

ties may stipulate or the Court fix.

/s/ Wu. R. CoLLInson

District Judge

Appendix B—Continued

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 71-1538

AGRASHELL, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Hammons Propucts Company, Appellee.

Appeal from United States District Court for the

Western District of Missourt

Submitted: June 15, 1972

Filed: March 30, 1973

Before Ross and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and Ursom,

Chief District Judge.

Ross, Circuit Judge.

Agrashell, Inc. (Agrashell) appeals from a judgment en-

tered on a jury verdict in favor of Hammons Products

5a

Company (Hammons), on a counterclaim filed by Ham-

mons in a patent infringement suit alleging violations of

sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and requesting treble

damages under the Clayton Act. For reasons hereinafter

set forth, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judg-

ment of the trial court and order the dismissal of that por-

tion of the counterclaim alleging violations of section 2 of

the Sherman Act. .

Procedural History

Agrashell instituted a patent infringement action against

Hammons in 1963. The trial court granted Hammons a

summary judgment because it found that Agrashell, as an

exclusive licensee, did not have a right to sue for patent

infringement in its own name without participation of the

patent owner as party-plaintiff. Agrashell, Inc. v. Ham-

mons Products Co., 248 F. Supp. 248, 260 (W.D. Mo. 1965),

aff’d, 352 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1965).

Although the patent expired in 1964, Agrashell obtained

an assignment of title to the patent and refiled the action

in 1965 for past infringement. These proceedings were

stayed pending the outcome of the appeal from the 1963

summary judgment. Thereafter, Hammons filed an answer

and counterclaim charging violations of sections 1 and 2 of

the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. $§ 1-2) and for a declaratory

judgment of patent invalidity, unenforceability and non-

infringement. The case was then set for trial.

A motion, made by Agrashell at the outset of the 1967

infringement trial, to sever the antitrust counterclaim issue

from the patent issue was granted at the conclusion of the

patent infringement portion of the case. On the patent

claim, the trial court entered judgment for Hammons, find-

ing the patent invalid and not infringed either directly or

contributorily. The court also found that even if the

method claim were valid, it was not infringed by Hammons.

Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., 279 F. Supp. 522

(W.D. Mo. 1967), aff’d, 413 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969). The

ers. 2 EF

court, however, denied Hammons’ request for attorneys’

fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.

Immediately following the trial of the patent issue, both

parties conducted discovery relating to Hammons’ anti-

trust counterclaim, and Hammons requested a jury trial.

Agrashell then requested leave of the court to file an

amended reply and counter-counterclaims for breach of

contract and antitrust violations. Agrashell alleged that

Hammons had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman

Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18), and the

Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13). Both rsequests

were granted and the case proceeded to trial in 1970.

At the outset of the 1970 trial, Hammons moved for trial

of its counterclaim separate from trial of Agrashell’s

counter-counterclaim. The trial court decided that each

ease would be presented separately but to the same jury.

However, five weeks later, at the close of all of the evi-

dence on Hammons’ counterclaim, the motion for severance

was granted over Agrashell’s objection, Agrashell’s mo-

tions for a directed verdict were denied,’ and a verdict was

returned by the jury in favor of Hammons. Thereafter,

pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, Agrashell’s coun-

ter-counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice. Agra-

shell’s motions for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial were

denied, and this appeal was taken.

Statement of Facts

A. The Product

This case involves the use of processed nutshells in two

ways: First, as a soft grit abrasive (SGA) in cleaning op-

erations, and secondly, as lost circulation material (LCM)

used in oil well drilling.

1 At the same time, however, the trial court noted that it refused

to submit to the jury the issue of fraud in the procurement of the

patent. See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery

& Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).

7a

SGA is “‘soft’’ in relation to harder abrasives such as

sand. For example, SGA is projected against deposits on

engine parts by air blasting and other means so as to re-

move the deposits with a minimum of gamage to the part

itself. While SGA may be composed of nutshells, it may

also be composed of fruit pits, sawdust, rice hulls, corn

cobs and clover seeds. The type of nutshells used may also

be differentiated as either soft or hard. Agrashell sells

SGA which is composed of black walnut and apricot pit

shell, and Hammons sells SGA which is composed solely of

black walnut shell.

Various companies processed or ‘‘manufactured’’ SGA

in some form during the time periods in question. Agra-

shell of Los Angeles, California; Hammons of Stockton,

Missouri; Gravette Shelling Company of Gravette, Arkan-

sas? (Gravette); Block Brothers, Inc. of Nashville, Ten-

nessee; and Block Walnut Processing Corp., of Nashville,

Tennessee (known together as Block); Continental Nut

Company of Chico, California (Continental); Industrial

Flour and Abrasives Company of Morristown, Tennessee

(Industrial Flour); Lufkin Pecan Company of Lufkin,

Texas (Lufkin); Star of Texas Company of Fort Worth,

Texas (Star of Texas); Texas Feed and Grain Company

of Fort Worth, Texas (Texas Feed); and Southeastern

Reduction Company of Valdosta, Georgia (Southeastern)

are, or were during the periods of time in question, proc-

essors of SGA. Various companies distributed SGA, but

apparently did not manufacture it: Pangborn Corporation

of Hagerstown, Maryland (Pangborn); American Wheel-

abrator & Equipment Corporation of Mishawaka, Indiana

(Wheelabrator) [both Pangborn and Wheelabrator were

large manufacturers of blast cleaning equipment]; Com-

position Materials Company (Composition) [Block’s job-

ber]; Bernard Sirotta Company of New York, New York

2Hammons acquired the controlling interest in Gravette in

August of 1966.

PNR RT LR poet oD

(Sirotta) [which at one time sold Hammons’ SGA], and

several others distributed Agrashell’s SGA.

The Pan American Petroleum Corporation developed

another use for processed nutshell and patented the idea,

giving Cherokee Laboratories an exclusive license under

the patent for part of the time relevant here. Pan Amer-

ican’s patent covered the use of processed nutshells in con-

trolling the loss of circulation of drilling muds utilized in

oil well drilling. Agrashell sells this ‘‘lost circulation ma-

terial’? (LCM) which is composed primarily of english

walnut shell and thus different from its SGA. Hammons

sells LCM which is almost identical to its SGA, except for

somewhat different sizes of the particles. LCM may also

be composed of non-nutshell products ranging from cotton

seed hulls to golf balls. Other companies, including Gra-

vette and Block, manufacture nutshell LCM.

The geographic markets for LCM and SGA are different.

SGA is sold nationwide, with emphasis in the industrial

northeast, while LCM is concentrated in the Mid-Continent

and Gulf States oil producing regions.

B. The Patent

Frank Perry, a civilian employee at an army air depot

in California during World War II, learned that project-

ing ground black walnut shells of 10/15 or 10/30 mesh size

against airplane engine parts constituted an ideal SGA.

Perry applied for and was granted a patent, basically

claiming

‘‘the method of cleaning metal by ‘projecting there

against a stream of fluid under pressure carrying in

suspension therein pelletized black walnut shells,’ and

a product, ‘an abrasive material for use in air blasts

for cleaning metal comprising pelletized black walnut

shells.’ ’? Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co.,

supra, 279 F. Supp. at 522.

It was later learned that apricot pits have very similar

physical characteristics to the black walnut shell, and they

are used interchangeably by Agrashell.* Id. at 523.

Perry assigned the patent to Turco Products Company,

Inc., which granted an exclusive license to Agrashell. The

patent was in turn assigned to Purex Corporation, when

Turco merged with Purex, and finally was assigned by

Purex to Agrashe]l. Throughout this entire period, dat-

ing from 1947, Agrashell had an exclusive license. The

patent expired on June 10, 1964.

C. The alleged Sherman Act violations

Hammons’ claim was essentially that Agrashell had at-

tempted to monopolize hard nutshells within the SGA mar-

kets in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by means

of infringement suits and certain formal and informal con-

tractual relationships so as to extend the Perry patent

beyond its terms and life. Hammons also claimed that

certain formal and informal contractual relationships un-

reasonably restrained trade in hard nutshells within the

SGA markets in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act

because the arrangements extended the Perry patent be-

yond its terms and life.

(1) The Sirotta suit

In 1958 Sirotta had begun to purchase Hammons’ SGA

for sale to Sirotta’s customers. In October of 1960 Sirotta

received a notice of infringement from Agrashell; Agra-

shell-had in 1954 written Sirotta about the possibility of

3’The Perry Patent Reissue indicates that the shells to be used

were those ‘‘having the hardness of black walnut shells,”’’ as well

as, black walnut shell alone. The patent ‘‘contemplates the use

of pellets of other types of ground or cracked nutshells having

equivalent characteristies’’ of black walnut shell. The testimony

of both parties indicated that apricot pit shell and black walnut

shell have similar hardness, resilience, and resistance to breakdown

characteristics.

i

__|

10a

infringement liability. Sirotta contacted patent counsel

who investigated the situation and concluded that there

was insufficient basis to challenge the patent at least inso-

far as ‘‘prior art’? was concerned. Sirotta was selling

nutshell SGA, including black walnut and apricot pit SGA,

for use in blasting equipment, including air blasting equip-

ment. Settlement negotiations broke down between Agra-

shell and Sirotta and the infringement suit was filed in

February of 1963.

During the course of taking a deposition Bernard Sirotta,

the president of Sirotta, asked to speak to Ayers, the presi-

dent of Agrashell, alone. Sirotta purportedly asked Ayers

whether the suit could be settled as between two business-

men. Sirotta claims Ayres replied as follows:

‘“'There can be only one way to settle this matter and

that is for you to get out of the business. You have

no right to be in the walnut shell business. This is my

domain. If you do not leave the business, I will cut

prices so low that you will not be able to survive.”’

Ayers contradicted this statement at trial and indicated

that he only asked Sirotta about his position in light of

the Perry patent and told Sirotta that he thought he was

infringing the Perry patent.

Hammons was impleaded by Sirotta as a third party de-

fendant on the basis of an indemnity agreement between

Hammons and Sirotta established when Sirotta bought

Hammons’ SGA. Hammons resisted Sirotta’s attempt to

obtain jurisdiction over it, see Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard

Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965), but finally entered

a personal appearance in the suit in 1966 and counter-

claimed against Agrashell for antitrust violations. The

Sirotta litigation was settled when Sirotta payed $2,500 to

Agrashell in 1968. Hammons’ counterclaim in the Sirotta

action was dismissed by stipulation without prejudice.

pre remy

a+ jo SPN

lla

(2) The Hammons suit

In April of 1962 Hammons agreed to supply Agrashell

with black walnut shell of a mesh size suitable for blast

cleaning. Shortly after the consummation of that agree-

ment, Ayers visited with the Hammons officers. Although

the evidence is conflicting, Ayers apparently informed

Hammons that he had a patent for cleaning metal utilizing

black walnut shell. He indicated that his lawyers advised

him to sue every shell grinder who was infringing the pat-

ent but that he did not intend to sue Hammons because

Hammons had not been cutting prices. An official of Ham-

mons testified that Ayers

‘‘made us aware of the Perry Patent, and then also

that there was some discussion on lost circulation ma-

terial and he told us that the main purpose of his visit

was to get acquainted, check our material, and to see

if we couldn’t work out a lost circulation price that

would be profitable to everybody involved.”’

The official further testified:

‘‘Mr. Ayers advised me that his attorney had advised

him to sue everyone who was in the [sic] selling soft

grit abrasive materials. However, that they didn’t

plan to sue everyone but they were going after those

who were guilty of cutting prices.”’

The official was asked whether Ayers made any statements

about Hammons’ LCM price and the official responded that

Ayers stated ‘‘he didn’t think that we were cutting prices

and from the prices that they gave me at that time, we

were getting approximately the same prices, close, not ex-

actly, but close.”’

In June of 1962 Hammons signed an LCM contract with

a former customer of Agrashell. Shortly thereafter Ayers

called Hammons wanting to know about the contract.

Ayers was told only that there was a contract, but no

specifies were given to him. About October of 1962 Agra-

pains

CEEOL SS OL

12a

shell began to complain about the SGA material supplied

to Agrashell and its customers, indicating that Agrashell

had received a number of complaints relating to objection-

able dust in the Hammons product sold to Agrashell and to

‘ts customers. In November of 1962 Agrashell ordered

Hammons to stop production for Agrashell’s account with

regard to the prior contract. In December of 1962 Agra-

shell sent Hammons a notice of infringement of the Perry

patent.

Agrashell was willing to settle the matter based upon the

payment of royalties on ‘‘pellets of black walnut shells, or

other nutshells (including apricot pit shells) equivalent

thereto for blast cleaning purposes’’ sold by Hammons for

or used as SGA and requiring Hammons to accept a license.

Negotiations broke down partly because Hammons did not

consider apricot pit shell to come within the confines of

the Perry patent but primarily because Hammons finally

decided it would not pay the royalty after first evidencing

an intent to settle on that basis. Agrashell’s suit against

Hammons was filed on August 7, 1963.

In its complaint filed in 1965 after acquiring title to the

patent, Agrashell alleged, among other things, that:

‘‘Within the six (6) years last past, and within the

term said reissued letters patent, defendant has manu-

factured, sold, used, and actively induced others to use

within the Western District of Missouri and elsewhere

pelletized nutshells having the hardness of black wal-

nut shells, including pelletized black walnut shells and

such pelletized nut shells having screen sizes of 10-30

mesh and 10-15 mesh, for the cleaning of articles by

use of the pelletized nut shells in blasts projected

against the articles. Defendant thereby has infringed

said reissued letters patent.”

Hammon answered, asserting affirmative defenses and

counterclaims. Hammons alleged, among other things, that

Te SE re CI, PEERS

13a

Agrashell had misused the patent by attempting to extend

it to materials not covered including ‘‘walnut shells and/or

ground fruit pits.’”” Hammons counterclaimed asserting,

among other things, that Agrashell had attempted to re-

strain and did restrain trade in commerce of ground black

walnut shells in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

gg 1-2. Hammons additionally claimed that the Perry

Patent Reissue had been obtained by virtue of fraud in that

Agrashell knew of a prior patent covering the same con-

ception patented in the Perry Patent Reissue.

A meeting between Agrashell and Hammons was ar-

ranged on March 24, 1966, by an official of Gravette who ap-

parently wanted to clarify the situation between Gravette

and Agrashell. The relationship between Gravette and

Agrashell was awkward because while Gravette and Agra-

shell had engaged in certain contractual relationships, Ham-

mons, who was being sued by Agrashell, was in the process

of acquiring the majority of Gravette’s stock. During this

meeting, an official of Agrashell, apparently in response to

a question from an official of Hammons about Agrashell’s

position in the lawsuit, indicated that if Hammons was in-

terested in concentrating on the walnut meats alone, Agra-

shell would be interested in handling Hammons’ shell pro-

duct of acquiring their shell grinding facilities.

No agreement being reached and neither party having

requested a jury, trial was commenced before the district

court on March 20, 1967. On that day one of Agrashell’s

counsel moved to sever the antitrust counterclaim. The

motion was taken under advisement. The district court held

that the patent was invalid due to obviousness and there-

fore not infringed, but that even if the method claim was

valid it was not infringed either directly or indirectly.‘

4In the judgment the district court did not explicitly state

whether the product claims would have been infringed by the

Hammons product if the patent was valid. But in the trial of the

antitrust counterclaim the same district judge referred to the

Hammons product as an ‘‘admittedly infringing product.’’

14a

Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., supra, 279 F.

Supp. at 522-524. Prior to its judgment on the patent case,

but after all evidence had been taken with regard to the

infringement side of the suit, the district court ordered a

continuance with regard to the antitrust counterclaim. The

district court also declined to award attorneys’ fees to Ham-

mons.” See 35 U.S.C. § 285.

(3) Contracts

Two types of contractual-like arrangements are involved

in this case. The first is known as a ‘‘Statement of Policy’’

which Agrashell sent to some of its sales agents. The

policy had three essential parts which are especially rele-

vant: Agrashell reserved the right to set selling prices to

the ultimate consumer invoiced by the agent; the selling

agent agreed to buy, sell and merchandise only Agrashell

SGA as long as the agent distributed Agrashell SGA; and

Agrashell averred that it was the exclusive licensee under

the Perry patent and had the exclusive right to convey the

right to use SGA materials.

The Statement of Policy was first formulated some time

in the late 1940’s. Agrashell contended at trial that the

agents who sold its SGA were never bound by the provi-

sions of the policy, and two of Agrashell’s agents testified

that they were neither familiar with the Statement of

Policy nor operated under it. However, there is Agrashell

5 During the trial of the antitrust counterclaim the trial judge

explained why he did not award attorneys’ fees to Hammons in

the patent case:

‘J had read the few cases that are in the books under it [35

U.S.C. § 285] and to me, the determining factor was a ques-

tion of good faith and J—whether I had the proper inter-

pretation of good faith or not, I came to the conclusion there

was no question that the plaintiffs [ Agrashell ] thought they

had a valid patert, they were trying to uphold what they

thought was a valid patent, and they brought the suit in good

faith in that sense * * ad

EPPA LIE AGT

15a

correspondence which tends to support the inference that

the Statement of Policy was agreed to by some of the

agents.

While there was Agrashell correspondence which indi-

cated the possibility of sale of SGA to agents for resale,

there was direct evidence from two of Agrashell’s agents

who testified that they never took title to the goods, never

insured against loss, never paid storage costs, never paid

taxes on the goods, and were merely paid a commission for

the sales they made of Agrashell’s products.

The second type of contractual arrangement involved

the negotiation of more formal contracts with Wheelabrator

and Pangborn. The contract with Wheelabrator was nego-

tiated in 1950, and it appointed Wheelabrator, a large man-

ufacturer of blasting equipment, Agrashell’s del credere

factor for the sale of SGA. The contract also established

that Wheelabrator was to receive a commission on the sale

of Agrashell’s SGA, that Wheelabrator did not need to

maintain an inventory of SGA, that Agrashell would ship

directly to the buyer, and that Agrashell would be able to

set the selling price. If, for certain enumerated reasons,

Agrashell could not fill Wheelabrator’s orders, Wheela-

brator, after notification to Agrashell, was free temporarily

to obtain similar materials for its requirements. This con-

tract could be terminated by giving notice 60 days prior to

any anniversary date thereof.

The contract with Pangborn, another large blast clean-

ing equipment manufacturer, was negotiated in settlement

of an infringement suit brought by Agrashell against Pang-

born. Pangborn had been selling black walnut SGA

obtained from Gravette.

The Pangborn agreement bound Pangborn to handle only

Agrashell ©GA until the patent expired, and after that

time, for a period of some three years, Pangborn agreed to

buy from Agrashell all of the SGA it needed unless a com-

Te On Ye TT

SES Te OE, Wa ne ee

16a

petitor could quote a lower price on similar quality goods,

in which case Pangborn remained bound to buy from Agra-

shell unless Agrashell elected not to meet the lower price.

The Pangborn agreement did not allow Agrashell to set

prices. An administrative assistant to the president of

Pangborn testified that at no time under the contract did

Pangborn own the Agrashell product or pay taxes or

freight costs thereon.

(4) Related activity

On June 13, 1962, Ayers visited Jimmy Cox, president of

the Block companies. Block had been active in the LCM

and black walnut shell SGA markets. The substance of the

conversation between Ayers and Cox purportedly involved

Ayers’ dissatisfaction with the price structure in the LCM

market in particular and the shell business in general.

Ayers noted that he had a price stabilization plan for the

LCM market, but Cox would not agree to any price stabili-

zation plan. Ayers indicated that if Block would not agree,

Agrashell would enforce its patent. About a month later

Block received a notice of infringement from Agrashell.

Suit based, in part, on the Perry patent was filed against

Block in March of 1963. The suit was finally settled for

$2,500, with Block paying half and Composition Materials,

its jobber, paying half. Ayers contradicted Cox’s testi-

mony concerning this incident at the trial and contended

that the only purpose for his visit to Block was to speak

about Block’s infringement of the Perry patent with re-

gard to SGA and to speak about a joint promotional pro-

gram for the sale of LCM.

After Agrashell’s settlement with Pangborn, an official

of Gravette approached Agrashell with the proposition that

Gravette might become licensed under the Perry patent.

Gravette had concluded that if Pangborn was satisfied that

the Perry patent was valid it too would recognize the pat-

ac at a enpanA: sO

17a

ent. During a meeting between the president of Agrashell

and officials of Gravette, Ayers allegedly stated that there

was ‘‘one of two ways this can be handled, either by law-

suit or by negotiating a contract.’”’ A contract was negoti-

ated by Agrashell and Gravette with Gravette agreeing to

supply black walnut shell processed and suitable for use as

LOM, although 10 percent of the material might be shell

st:itable for SGA use. The contract, which was negotiated

prior to the expiration of the patent, extended some three

years after the expiration of the patent.

D. The Verdict and Damages

The district court sent the counterclaim to the jury after

five weeks of trial, but he refused to submit the issue of

whether the patent had been fraudulently procured because

he felt that no submissible case of patent fraud had been

established. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ham-

mons and assessed damages in the sum of $204,124.21. That

sum was comprised of $162,374.21 for litigation expenses

and, $41,750.00 for loss of profits. The jury assessed no

damages for injury to going concern value. The gross

amount of damages was trebled by the district court and

that sum equaled $612,372.63. The district court awarded

attorneys’ fees of $150,000.00 and costs of $13,361.31. The

total judgment was $775,733.76.

The litigation expense damage was predicated upon

Hammons’ proof of the amount it had spent to defend the

patent infringement suit brought against Sirotta, $20,455.20,

and the amount it had spent to defend the infringement suit

Agrashell brought against Hammons itself, $141,919.01.

The jury award of $41,750.00 in damages was apparently

based upon evidence adduced by Dr. Kuhlman, an economist.

His testimony concerning the damages sustained by Ham-

mons was the only theory of damages Hammons presented

and is summarized later in this opinion.

18a

Issues Presented on Appeal

In its appeal from the judgment of the trial court, Agra-

shell raises these issues:

1. Whether Hammons failed to establish that Agra-

shell had violated the Sherman Act and by so doing

proximately injured Hammons.

2. Whether Hammons’ claims were barred by princi-

pals of res jud cata, collateral estoppel, or compul-

sory counterclaim.

3. Whether certain instructions relating to ‘‘dangerous

probability,”’ prosecution of the suit for patent in-

fringement, ‘‘targe: area,’? and agency arrange-

ments, were prejudicially erroneous.

4, Whether prejudicial error occurred in the conduct

of trial relating to the issues of waiver of jury trial,

admission of deposition testimony, and exclusion of

offers of compromise.

Sufficiency of Proof of Sherman Act

Violation and Damages

Hammons alleged violations of both section 1 and section

2 of the Sherman Act. After a careful review of all of the

pleadings, testimony and exhibits, we are convinced that

Hammons did make a submissible case under section 1 of the

Sherman Act but did not make a submissible case under

section 2-of the Act; and that the trial court should have

granted the motion for a directed verdict made at the close

of all of the evidence as to section 2. That motion stated, in

part, that ‘‘Hammons has not established by sufficient com-

petent evidence a violation of ... section 2 of the Sherman

Act by Agrashell.”’

A. Section 1

Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes contracts in re-

straint of trade or commerce. Hammons claims that the

written contracts with Pangborn and Wheelabrator and

OWS

19a

the ‘‘Statement of policy’’® used with Agrashell’s sales

agents as heretofore described, and the alleged illegal use

of the patent in those contracts, constituted restraint of

trade, and that as a result of those alleged contracts in re-

straint of trade, it was damaged by loss of business. Agra-

shell claimed that the contract with Wheelabrator did not

require Wheelabrator to deal exclusively in Agrashell’s

SGA; that the requirement to that effect in the contract with

Pangborn terminated upon the expiration of the patent;

that the ‘‘Statement of Policy’? was not a contract but a

unilateral declaration by Agrashell which could not be and

was not enforced; that in any event Pangborn, Wheelabra-

tor and the other sales representatives were not purchasing

for resale but merely selling as agents for the account of

Agrashell retaining title to the goods until delivery to a

buyer and therefore under United States v. General Elec-

tric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), such sales agency agreements

with price fixing provisions were legal, especially in view of

the patent and the presumption of validity that attached

thereto prior to its expiration; and that before recovery can

be had under section 1 of the Sherman Act, Hammons must

prove damages with a reasonable degree of certainty result-

ing from the alleged illegal contracts. While there is much

merit in several of these allegations by Agrashell, we can-

not say that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to

find that the Pangborn and Wheelabrator contracts were

violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.

First, we conclude that Hammons failed to prove that

the Statement of Policy established either formal or in-

formal contractual relationships with Agrashell and its

agents in the market place. Hammons called no agents to

testify as to their relationships with Agrashell, but relied

6 Although the trial judge commented that the ‘‘Statement of

Policy’’ pertained to the intent issue under section 2, Hammons’

proof also presented the ‘‘Statement of Policy’’ in terms of sec-

tion 1.

li a te te is

Pc OLE EIT LT TOS Or OI

PLT POOLE S

— vt er rer”

aE on

solely on Agrashell’s correspondence which indicates that

the Statement of Policy was sent to a number of agents.

In contrast, there was only one letter which tends to prove

that Agrashell would not deal with an agent unless he

agreed to the Statement of Policy. Moreover, some of the

correspondence clearly indicates that Agrashell dealt with

the agents whether or not they agreed to the Statement

of Policy.

More significant, in terms of the practical application of

the Statement of Policy in the market place, is the testimony

of two Agrashell agents allegedly subject to the Statement

of Policy. William T. Hall, chairman of the board of the

C. P. Hall, companies, together one of the largest if not the

largest Agrashell agent, testified that he had never seen nor

heard of the Statement of Policy. He further testified that

he did not consider himself bound to deal only with Agra-

shell, and that he did deal in other types of SGA such as

corn cob SGA and glass SGA. John C. Lorenzen, a partner

in the Russ-Cattell company, likewise testified that he had

never seen the Statement of Policy. Furthermore, Loren-

zen testified that he handled other types of SGA.

Second, Agrashell strenuously argues that the Wheela-

brator contract with its price fixing provision was legal

| when viewed in light of the doctrine promulgated in United

States v. General Electric Co., supra, 272 U.S. at 488.

General Electric stands for the proposition that a patent

holder does not violate the antitrust laws by seeking to

dispose of his products directly to the consumer and fixing

the price by which his agents transfer the title from him

directly to the consumer. On the other hand, General Elec-

tric does not allow the patent holder to sell his product to a

person and then control the resale price. Assuming that

the Wheelabrator contract was a contract of agency, see

ResTaTEMENT (Seconp) or Acency § 14J (1958), we think

that whatever protection General Electric afforded the

Wheelabrator contract ended when the patent expired.

Ieniccpssoneseoesisiidaisnseaseleaauinaaian anna

2la

See generally R. Noxpuavus and E. Jurow, Patsnt-Ant1-

Trust Law at 147-166 (Nordhaus Ed. 1972). Cf. Simpson v.

Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21-24 (1964). Since it was clear

that the Wheelabrator contract was in effect continuously

from 1950, we think the jury could have correctly concluded

that the Wheelabrator contract extended the life of the

patent beyond the expiration date and constituted a contract

in restraint of trade. .

Third, the Pangborn contract, negotiated prior to the

expiration of the patent, extended the power of the patent

beyond the life of the patent. The contract provided:

‘<Tf, after June 10, 1964, Pancsorn furnishes written

evidence of its ability to purchase blast cleaning aggre-

gates made from nut shells of equal quality and at

lower prices than AcRrasHELL’s selling prices to Panc-

porN, AGRASHELL shall have the privilege of either meet-

ing such prices as quoted from a bona fide supplier or

permitting Pancsorn to purchase its requirements else-

where after first tendering the order to AcRasHELL in

writing.”’

Since the Pangborn contract was negotiated prior to the

expiration of the patent, but extended past the expiration

of the patent:

‘‘TA]ny attempted reservation or continuation in the

patentee or those claiming under him of the patent

monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal

device employed, runs counter to the policy and pur-

poses of the patent laws... .’’ Scott Paper Co. v.

Marcalus Manufacturing Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945).

Accord, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964).

The Supreme Court, when faced with a somewhat similar

provision, has noted the antitrust implications:

‘‘The appellant had at all times a priority on the

business at equal prices. A competitor would have to

ONLI EPO ASE TF om RPSL AER wh 9" OY a

22a

undercut appellant’s price to have any hope of cap-

turing the market, while appellant could hold that

market by merely meeting competition. We do not

think this concession relieves the contract of being a

restraint of trade, albeit a less harsh one than would

result in the absence of such a provision... .’’ Inter-

national Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,

397 (1947).

As a consequence, we conclude that the jury was entitled

to find that the Pangborn contract extended the life of the

patent unlawfully and constituted a contract in restraint

of trade.

Turning now to Agrashell’s argument that Hammons

failed to prove the fact of damage resulting from the use

of the contracts and Statement of Policy, it should first be

noted that it expert testimony concerning its damages and

the computation thereof, does not include any reference to

any loss of business which it once had, but only business

which Agrashell had during the extire period in question

and which Hammons felt that it should have had. In this

respect this case is analogous to the case of Herman

Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 297 F.2d

906, 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962), in

which Judge Friendly noted as follows:

‘‘Plaintiff’s theory here was not that acts by de-

fendant had unlawfully deprived it of something it

previously possessed. It could not well have been so,

since there was nothing to indicate that defendant’s

conduct had changed for the worse during the damage

period or, indeed, since plaintiff was organized, and

plaintiff’s original investment of $10,000 had produced

an earned surplus of over $300,000 by 1961, after sub-

stantial salary payments to Mr. Schwabe, its sole

stockholder, and dividends. Plaintiff’s evidence,

therefore, was necessarily directed to attempting to

ct em a a wl Sa

kT a oe Nan PTE EL TL A ORO

show how defendant had unlawfully deprived it of

business it might otherwise have secured. It was

entirely competent for plaintiff to seek to show this

%?

Indeed, the evidence showed that both Agrashell and

Hammons prospered during the period in question and

made overall gains in the sale of their nutshell products.

Hammons’ evidence of damages was adduced from the

expert testimony of Dr. Kuhlman during which the charts

summarizing the damages were submitted. Briefly stated,

Dr. Kuhlman first gave his opinion that Agrashall had

erected barriers around a portion of the hard nutshell

SGA market. These barriers were the patent, the patent

litigation, price fixing, and exclusive dealing arrangements.

He then looked for a portion of the market where those

barriers were not present or at least not a factor and chose

the Columbus, Ohio SGA market. The sole customer in

this market was Western Electric. Both Agrashell and

Hammons sold to Western Electric, Hammons selling direct

and Agrashell selling first by agents and later direct.

Having thus found what he considered to be a market

without barriers, he determined that over a period of years

Hammons had 60 percent and Agrashell had 40 percent of

the SGA business in that market. He then concluded that

therefore Hammons should have 60 percent of all of Agra-

shell’s SGA business which it conducted through its prin-

cipal agents. He figured Hammons’ damages by taking the

average price at which Agrashell sold in the Columbus

market, multiplied by 60 percent of Agrashell’s volume

with its dealers and deducted therefrom the amount for

which Hammons sold the same volume of material as LCM.

His theory in this regard was that if the barriers had not

existed Hammons would have been able to sell this sub-

stantial quantity of material as SGA at $109 per ton

average rather than as LCM at $83 per ton average and

that therefore Hammons’ damages were $26 per ton of 60

}

24a

percent of the tons which Agrashell sold through its deal-

ers, or a total of $160,924.55. This approach, although

unique, has many practical defects.

The first defect is in the use of the Columbus market as

a fair example of what might have happened nationwide

in the absence of the barriers. In the first place, there

was only one customer in the market, and it bought in

substantial quantities as distinguished from most of Agra-

shell’s customers who bought in smaller quantities from

stocks shipped into warehouses for distribution by agents.

Secondly, there is no evidence as to whether or not that

customer bought only from Agrashell and Hammons or also

from other suppliers. More importantly, the evidence is

clear that Agrashell sought to sell to Western Electric,

SGA composed of both black walnut shells and apricot pits

while Hammons offered a product composed of only black

walnut shells. The evidence also establishes that Western

Electric was a sophisticated buyer and may not have always

used the two products interchangeably.”

Dr. Kuhlman acknowledged that in making his estimate

of damages he had not considered the impact of sales of

SGA by companies other than Agrashell and Hammons.

Even assuming that the alleged barriers kept Hammons

from its fair share of the market, it is difficult to understand

how anyone could reliably determine what share Hammons

should have had without knowledge of the market shares

other competitors might have captured.

In addition, Dr. Kuhlman did not explain why Agrashell’s

alleged anticompetitive conduct, which was supposedly so

effective in other places, was not effective in the Columbus

market. Apparently one reason for selecting the Columbus

7 Evidence that Western Electric did not consider the products

interchangeable is the fact that during the three years that Agra-

shell made no sales in the Columbus market (1963-1965), Ham-

mons’ sales did not increase as a result.

ee tener ee

25a

market was the fact that both Agrashell and Hammons had

been in some sort of competitive relationship for a number

of years. The failure to explain why the Columbus market

was isolated from Agrashell’s conduct is highly suspect con-

sidering some of the evidence adduced at the trial. For

instance, in 1962 when Agrashell did use an agent in the

Columbus market and when the patent was still viable

Hammons sold 111 tons of SGA and Agrashell 47. In 1963

when Agrashell wrote to Western Electric using the words

‘‘natent protected soft grit abrasive,’’ a technique which

Kuhlman specifically labeled as a ‘‘barrier,’? Hammons

sold 98 tons of SGA and Agrashell sold none. Still further

in 1967 and 1968, long after the patent expired and loug

after Agrashell had ceased doing business with an agent in

the Columbus market, Hammons’ sales fell dramatically

with Hammons selling 29 tons in 1967 to Agrashell’s 114.325

tons, and 54 tons in 1968 to Agrashell’s 127.25 tons.

In applying the percentages derived from the Columbus

market, to the national market serviced by Agrasheil’s

agents, Hammons’ expert witness seemingly ignored critical

differences between the two markets. In the Columbus

market shipments were made direct in large quantities,

thereby allowing Hammons to compete without agents or

warehouse facilities. Most of Agrashell’s ultimate custom-

ers serviced by its agents, bought in smaller quantities after

Agrashell had established regional warehousing permitting

prompt delivery of various sizes and types of its products.

Hammons sold direct, or to jobbers for resale from ware-

houses owned by the jobbers, or by manufacturers’ repre-

sentatives with orders shipped direct from Hammons’ plant.

Hammons did not maintain regional warehouse facilities in

order to service these smaller orders.

The evidence indicates that Hammons’ representatives

visited Pangborn in 1958 and 1962—both visits apparently

coming before Pangborn was an Agrashell agent. There

was also correspondence with Pangborn in 1961—before

Pangborn was an Agrashell agent. Hammons made no

attempt to solicit the business of C. P. Hall of Ohio. Ap-

parently the only attempt to acquire the business of C. P.

Hall of Illinois was the sending of a sample to Hill after

Hall called Hammons after receiving a form letter solicita-

tion. No further attempt was made to contact C. P. Hall of

Illinois. It is noted that the C. P. Hall companies combined

composed well over one-third of the business Hammons

claimed to have lost. Solicitation of the Wheelabrator busi-

ness involved sending two letters in response to a form let-

ter from Wheelabrator trying to sell a machine to Ham-

mons. The evidence indicates that Wheelabrator actually

bought SGA from Hammons; some four to five 50 pound

bags. This evidence tends to indicate two things. First,

Hammons sales efforts were rather ill-suited to acquiring

the business of Agrashell agents. Second, when Hammons

did try to solicit the business of the agents, at least C. P.

Hall and Wheelabrator either bought or expressed an in-

terest in the Hammons’ product, and apparently did not

consider themselves bound to deal only with Agrashell.

This conclusion is strengthened by the testimony of Ham-

mons’ own vice president that he could not recall ever being

told by an Agrashell agent that it could not deal in a

Hammons’ product because of the Perry patent or the

Statement of Policy.

More importantly, there was no evidence tending to show

why Hammons could not sell direct or through agents to

the ultimate consumers who were purchasing from Agra-

shell through Agrashell’s agents. It is clear that the so-

called barriers did not stop Hammons from selling a similar

product to Western Electric, or to the automobile manufac-

turers in the Detroit area where it had 100 percent of the

SGA market. It is also clear that Agrashell’s ultimate

consumers were paying higher prices than Hammons was

receiving in its sales to Western Electric, which should

——— aa i RM BC IR REIT TOE,

have made it easier for Hammons to compete for this busi-

ness.2 One conclusion that could be reached is that the only

thing that kept Hammons from selling to the ultimate con-

sumers serviced by Agrashell’s agents from Agrashell’s

warehouses is either the failure of Hammons to actively

solicit the business or its failure to maintain regional ware-

house facilities to permit prompt delivery of small quanti-

ties of a variety of*sizes of SGA. The evidence discloses

very little active solicitation of Agrashell’s ultimate con-

sumers by Hammons, and the premise of Dr. Kuhlman that

Hammons would have obtained 60 percent of their business

except for the alleged barriers is highly questionable in

light of these facts.

We also note that Dr. Kuhlman based his damage esti-

mate on the implicit assumption that the patent and the

patent litigation constituted illegal barriers in addition to

the exclusive dealing and price fixing provision of the con-

tracts. The assumption that the patent was an illegal bar-

rier prior to its expiration was conclusively negated when

the trial judge ruled that the patent had not been fraudu-

lently procured. Likewise the assumption that the patent

litigation constituted a unilateral attempt to monopolize and

thus an illegal barrier is negated by our finding later in this

opinion that Hammons failed to make a submissible case

of an attempt to monopolize. Thus two of the four struc-

tural supports of Kuhlman’s damage theory were highly

questionable.

8 When Dr. Kuhlman was asked why Hammons failed to attempt

to sell to Agrashell’s ultimate consumers, he was unable to explain

other than by vaguely referring to restrictions wherever Agrashell

sold through an agent. To the contrary, Dr. Poe, Agrashell’s

expert, could find nothing in the agreements or Statement of

Policy which would impose a barrier to the ultimate consumer.

In fact, if Agrashell held up its price, it should be expected that

another seller could come in and sell at a lower price.

We have described some of the serious failings of Dr.

Kuhlman’s damage testimony to indicate our hesitancy to

allow a jury to assess damages upon such a theory:

‘<TPJroof of an isolated violation of substantive law

will not entitle defendants to an affirmative recovery.

Before a party is entitled to recover treble damages he

must be able to plead and prove actual monetary injury

to his business or property resulting from the illegal

act. ... It has long been the law that damages which are

purely speculative, remote, or based upon conjecture

cannot serve as a base for antitrust recovery. . . ."

American Infra-Red Radiant Co., Inc. v. Lambert In-

dustries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 995-996 (8th Cir. 1966).

Our critique of this damage formulation must be tempered,

however, by the Supreme Court’s statements relating to the

proper function of an appellate court when reviewing

damage evidence. As the Supreme Court has forcefully

stated :

‘<7 An antitrust plaintiff’s] burden of proving the fact

of damage under Section 4 of the Clayton Act is satis-

fied by his proof of some damage .. . inquiry beyond

this minimum point goes only to the amount and not

the fact of damage. It is enough that the illegality is

shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff

neéd not exhaust all possible alternative sources of

injury in fulfilling his burden of proving compensable

injury under Section 4.’’ Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-

tine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).

The Supreme Court has consistently reminded critics of

damage formulations that an antitrust violator may not

properly complain about damage proof vagaries when such

ambiquity results from the illegal act itself. See e.g., Bige-

low v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) ;

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273

U.S. 359, 379 (1927). With these principles in mind we

INEI sp ERLE FP PRION EN PERE te IE _

cannot say that as a matter of law, Dr. Kuhlman’s theory

failed to demonstrate the fact or quantum of damage with

sufficient clarity. For these reasons the jury award of

$41,750.00 must stand.

Our inquiry does not end with this finding however. The

award of litigation damages allegedly incurred by Hammons

when Agrashell filed.certain infringement suits must stand

or fall on whether the jury could properly conclude that

Agrashell ‘‘attempted to monopolize”’ under section 2 of

the Sherman Act. It is clear that the act of filing the in-

fringment suits is a unilateral act and section 2, in contrast

with section 1, is the proper method to test unilateral

activity such as that involved in this case:

‘‘The Congress which wrote the Sherman Act

directed its main thrust against business conduct in-

volving two or more parties. Section 1, proscribing

every ‘contract, combination or conspiracy’ in restraint

of trade, is strictly confined to joint action. Section 2

covers both individual and joint action ....’’ Turner,

The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:

Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv.

L.Rev. 655 (1962).

B. Section 2

Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to

‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-

spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any

part of the trade or commerce among the several States

* * * >» Hammons claimed that Agrashell attempted to

monopolize the SGA and the LCM markets although its

proof relating to attempted monopolization of the LCM

market was quite limited, and during the course of the

trial and in its instructions the district court indicated that

evidence of Agrashell’s actions as to LCM was relevant

only to the issue of intent.

RRL Atl Aaa TE mk A

30a

In addition to proving an overt act or acts, the essential

elements which must be proved in a section 2 attempt to

monopolize case are specific intent and dangerous probabil-

ity. See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396,

402 (1905) ; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d

643, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) ; Hib-

ner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of

Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 1966 (1967 ); Smith, Attempt to

Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 227, 229-231 (1957).

Although we do not rest our decision relating to section 2

on this issue, we note that the evidence presented at trial

with regard to ‘‘specific intent”’ bordered on being insuffici-

ent as a matter of law. The issue before the jury was

whether Agrashell specifically intended to monopolize hard

nutshells within the soft grit abrasive markets by seeking

to extend the patent beyond its terms or by extending the

life of the patent.

At the outset, we emphasize that the trial court did not

submit the issue of fraudulent procurement of the patent to

the jury and no cross-appeal was taken on that issue. Thus

the declaration of patent invalidity did not prohibit Agra-

shell from relying on the presumptive validity of the patent.

It therefore had every right to bring each of the three law-

suits against Sirotta, Hammons, and Block if its purpose in

each case was merely to enforce its rights under the patent.

The obvious and difficult problem in this case relates to

differentiating between Agrashell’s intent to bring suits and

enter into contracts under a presumptively valid patent,

thereby enforcing and utilizing a lawful monopoly, and its

alleged intent to bring suits and enter into contracts under

a presumptively valid patent for the purpose of extending

the scope of the patent beyond the grant allowed by law.

The proof of that alleged illegal intent is thin indeed.

The evidence in this case indicates quite clearly that

Hammons sold a product that, but for the declaration of

fs yor rm

DEL LOL ESIES EL LOTEL ELEOE

3la

invalidity, would have infringed Agrashell’s patent; that

Sirotta sold the Hammons product, which, as the trial judge

indicated, was an ‘‘admittedly infringing’? one; that

Gravette and Block also sold an SGA product which was

composed of black walnut shell and that Pangborn at one

time merchandised Gravette’s product; and that Sirotta’s

patent counsel and Pangborn’s patent counsel could not find

sufficient grounds for challenging the patent on the grounds

the patent was subsequently declared invalid.

Much of Hammons’ case rested on the deposition testi-

mony of Sirotta relative to Ayers’ statement that Sirotta

‘chad no right in the walnut shell business. This is my do-

main.”? It is noted that when this statement was made

Ayers had already filed his infringement suit and placed the

infringement issue before a court. Moreover, it was Sirotta

and not Ayers who precipitated the meeting at which the

statement was allegedly made. Understandably we are

hesitant to attach much significance to this statement.

We are also hesitant to attach any significance to the evi-

dence which indicates that Agrashell sued Hammons in

retaliation for Hammons underbidding Agrashell on an

LCM account or to evidence which tends to indicate that

Agrashell sued Block because Block would not agree to

maintain prices in the LOM market.

We question this evidence because, although Hammons

pleaded an attempt to monopolize the LCM market, the

relevant markets which were the subject of the attempt to

monopolize as defined by the trial judge were solely the

SGA markets. Hammons does not question this instruc-

tion. Indeed by supplemental brief Hammons argued that

it need not prove ‘‘dangerous probability’’ in the LCM

markets precisely because of the judge’s limited instruc-

tion. Although Hammons contends that the LCM intent

evidence somehow relates to the issue of intent in the SGA

market, we attach little significance to conduct related to a

32a

totally distinct product being sold in a different geographic

market.

We turn next to an analysis of whether or not Hammons

proved ‘‘dangerous probability”’ of monopolization.

‘The phrase ‘attempt to monopolize’ means the

employment of methods, means and practices which

would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and

which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so

close as to create a dangerous probability a

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,

785 (1946) ; Central Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Federal

Home Loan Bank Board, 422 F.2d 504, 509 (8th Cir.

1970) ; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968,

971 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) ;

Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, supra.

Thus in this case we must determine whether Hammons

presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could

properly conclude that Agrashell approached ‘‘so close [to

monopolization] as to create a dangerous probability of it

*#** >» American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra, 328

US. at 785.

In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &

Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the Supreme Court

held that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent

may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act provided all other

elements are established. This case relates to extending a

patent beyond its lawful bounds, but we think the same con-

siderations expressed in Walker Process are applicable

here. Those considerations are essentially that, even though

one possesses & fraudulently procured patent or a patent

which is allegedly used in a way to enlarge its scope or life,

an analysis of market factors is still necessary. Indeed, the

Court specifically stated that the trial court had not

‘‘analyzed any economic data’’ when it reversed. Id. at 178.

Thus it is not enought to argue that one has used a patent

in a predatory manner thereby enlarging the scope or life

of the patent; one must look to economic data to determine

the impact of the purported illegal activity on the market

which is the subject of the attempt to monopolize.

‘To establish monopolization or attempt to monopo-

lize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sher-

man Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the

exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms

of the relevant market for the product involved. With-

out a definition of that market there is no way to mea-

sure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy

competition.’? Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.

Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., supra, 382 U.S. at

177. See also Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene

Corp., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

397 U.S. 912 (1970).

The counterclaim filed by Hammons indicated the product

to be ‘‘ground black walnut shell,’’ and in submitting the

matter to the jury the trial court referred to ‘‘the soft

grit abrasive industry’? and ‘‘hard nutshells within the

soft grit abrasive markets.’? The patent refers to ‘‘an

abrasive material comprising pelletized nut shells having

the hardness of black walnut shells.”” Our conclusion is

that while the exact definition of the product is elusive, the

proof primarily related to crushed black walnut and apri-

cot pit nutshell used as SGA.

Assuming that the product was thus defined, the defini-

tion of the geographic market is even less explicit. Since

no attempt was made to narrow , the geographic area, we

assume the relevant area is the entire United States. How-

ever, no market data was introduced showing the total vol-

ume of sales of hard nutshell SGA in the United States or

any specified portion thereof ; therefore, it is difficult, if not

impossible, to know exactly what geographic market Ham-

mons claims Agrashell attempted to monopolize. The two

34a

principal submarkets identified by Hammons were Detroit,

Michigan and Columbus, Ohio. In Detroit, Hammons ap-

parently had the entire market, and in Columbus, it had a

larger share than Agrashell.

Not only did Hammons fail to show the total sales or

volume of SGA, it also failed to show what shares of that

market were held by Agrashell, Hammons, and several other

major competitors. Continental was referred to as one

of the five largest companies in the field but no evidence was

introduced relating to its volume of sales. Only by associ-

ating widely disconnected and at times contradictory por-

tions of the evidence is it possible to piece together the

respective sales of Agrashell and Hammons.

Hammons’ pleadings attempted to structure the relevant

market to include LCM, but by supplemental brief Ham-

mons agreed that LCM was not within the markets the jury

was instructed to consider as being the target of the at-

tempt.

In conclusion, we view the evidence relating to ‘“‘danger-

ous probability” in this case much as Judge Brown viewed

the evidence in Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., Inc., 244 F.

Supp. 625, 638 (D. Kan. 1965), in which he noted as follows:

‘<Tn the case at bar, plaintiff is unaware of the total

annual volume of commerce * * * in the relevant market

area; the portion or percentage of that volume held by

defendants; the portion or percentage of that volume

held by the plaintiffs ; and the portion or percentage of

that volume affected by any activities of the defend-

ants * * *.

* 7 6

® Of the three manufacturers sued or threatened with suit by

Agrashell (Block, Gravette, and Hammons), Block continued

to produce SGA throughout the periods relevant here, Hammons

sales nearly doubled, and Hammons acquired the controlling in-

terest in Gravette in 1966.

a

BE CS Bees Pe a z ——

. a i EE A OES oe ainpiwat &

Ge ee late On Bribe’ ls lt

OD Rg AT TT ERE Fk + FOG RE

‘Without the facts and evidence which plaintiff

admittedly does not have, a §2 Sherman case simply

cannot, in our opinion, be established.”’

See generally Central Saving and Loan Ass’n v. Federal

Home Loan Bank Board, supra; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v.

Kroger Co., supra; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,

supra; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 466 F.2d

825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) ;

Hibner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of

Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 171-177 (1967).

We are aware that the case of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil

Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993

(1964), is not in accord with the result we have reached in

this case, but we choose not to follow its rationale,"°

especially in view of the fact that the case of Walker Pro-

cess Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,

supra, was decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to the

Lessig case and in view of the decisions of this Court here-

inbefore cited.

Other Alleged Errors

Agrashell claims that Hammons’ recovery of litigation

expenses was barred by principles of res judicata and com-

pulsory counterclaim. Our resolution of the sufficiency of

proof with regard to section 2 of the Sherman Act obviates

the necessity of resolving this issue with regard to litiga-

tion expense damage. Likewise errors allegedly made in

instructing the jury with regard to litigation damages

need not be discussed.

Agrashell further argues that Hammons’ section 1 claims

should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in

the first infringement suit filed by Agrashell against Ham-

10 The strength of the Lessig rationale in the Ninth Circuit is

questionable. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121

(9th Cir. 1972) ; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.8. Co., supra.

OIE ESI DI IN TNE in PT CO aah ROENCANOP NRA KOLO PIN OS 4 5 Bie?

36a

mons in the Western District of Missouri. However, we

think that the instant case is controlled by Mercoid Corp. v.

Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944), which indicates

that cases such as this one involve permissive, not compul-

sory, counterclaims. Furthermore, since the first suit was

dismissed because of Agrashell’s failure to join an indis-

pensable party, since no judgment on the merits was had,

and since Agrashell was explicitly allowed to file a new

action, which it elected to do, no injustice has resulted from

permitting the filing of the counterclaim in this action.

Agrashell argues that the instructions were in error be-

cause of a failure to adequately define Agrashell’s agency

arrangements. We do not think that if any error occurred

that it was prejudicial, and our resolution of the section 1

claim assumes that valid agency relationships existed.

Agrashell further argues that it was an abuse of discretion

to relieve Hammons of its waiver of jury trial. Due to the

complexity of this case and the fact that Hammons changed

from patent counsel to antitrust counsel during the varying

procedural phases of this case we do not think that such a

decision was an abuse of discretion. See generally, 9 C.

Wricut & A. Miier, Feperan Practice anp PRocepure

§ 2334 at 123 (1971).

Agrashell next argues that it was an abuse of discretion

to allow Hammons to deviate from a pretrial narrative

statement by introducing into evidence the deposition testi-

mony of Cox and Sirotta. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure allows for modification of a pretrial order

to prevent manifest injustice. The trial judge explicitly

indicated that he was acting in the interest of justice and

fair play in allowing the deposition testimony, and indi-

cated that the testimony might well have not been available

earlier because the parties were in litigation in 1967 and

could have been reluctant to speak. We do not think that

the decision in this case was an abuse of discretion. See

generally, 6 C. Wricut & A. Mrier, Feperat Practice anpD

Procepure § 1527 at 608 (1971) ; Cf. Labbee v. Roadway Ex-

press, Inc., 469 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1972).

Ta comd, te a

37a

Finally, Agrashell argues that it was error to exclude

its evidence of settlement offers made to Hammons after the

filing of the suit. The trial judge indicated quite clearly

that he was afraid the probative value of this evidence was

outweighed by the prejudicial impact the evidence might

have had on the jury. We think the judge’s decision in this

respect was carefully considered and not error. Other alle-

gations of error raised in the briefs have been considered,

but in our opinion are not valid and do not require com-

ment.

Conclusion

We affirm that part of the judgment awarding Hammons

$41,750.00 trebled in the amount of $125,250.00. The re-

maining judgment, consisting of litigation expense dam-

ages, is reversed with directions to dismiss that portion of

the case. Attorneys fees and costs in the prosecution of

this case should be redetermined by the district court and

substantially reduced to an amount more in keeping with

the revised judgement.

Appendix B—Continued

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term, 1972

No. 71-1538

AGRASHELL, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Hammons Propucts Company, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

Petition of appellant for rehearing filed in this cause

having been considered, it is now here ordered by this Court

that the same be, and it is hereby, denied.

May 1, 1973

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.