Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Mobil Oil Corp. v. Woolard

Supreme Court brief1973

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Text

Sacreme Cosrt, U.S.

FILED

AUG 30 1973

MICHAEL RODAK, JR.,CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

73-387

‘NO

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

v.

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, et al, Appellees.

' PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

B. Jerr CRANE, JR.

First City National Bank

Building

Houston, Texas 77002

Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

WILLIAM H. TABB

Mobil Oil Corporation

P. O. Box 900

Dallas, Texas 75221

DaniEL A. HyDE

First City National Bank Building

Houston, Texas 77002

Alpha Law Brief Co., One Main Plaza, No. 1 Main St., Houston, Texas 77002

Appendix “3” (Order Denying Petition for Rehearing)... .

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew, 285 S.W.2d 483 (Amarillo

1955, writ ref'd Dre.) .......ccccccccccccccccccccces

Daniels v. Shell Oil Co., 485 S.W.2d 948 (Ft. Worth 1972,

BE GE ED ccccesecdksddscevennceceectcaceswees

Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174 S.W.2d 1015

(Galv. 1943, Wo writ) .......cccccccccccccccccccccces

Flynn v. Pan American Hotel Co., 183 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.

BR. BOGE) . nccccccccsccccccccccsccccergeesceccoocs

Ft. Worth v. Barlow, 313 S.W.2d 906 (Ft. Worth 1958, writ

EES EEE Ee ee ee ee

Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Austin 1936, writ

PL: ccgnntiichser Cee riene Tenant owenes

Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266 (1883) ................-

Medlin v. Havener, 98 S.W.2d 863 (Ft. Worth 1936, no writ)

UNITED STATES STATUTES

BO , BRED vc ccscwccscvteseccsecnscccssscccease

[Soa EE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

NO

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

¥

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, et al, Appellees.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner Mobil Oil Corporation respectfully prays

that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on June 7, 1973

and the denial of Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing and

Petition for Rehearing En Banc entered on July 16, 1973.

OPINION

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit, F.2d appears as Appendix “A”

hereto. The Order denying Mobil Oil’s Petition for Re-

hearing and Rehearing En Banc appears as Appendix “B”

hereto.

2

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

June 7, 1973, and the Petition for Rehearing and Rehear-

ing En Banc was denied on July 16, 1973. This Petition

for Certiorari was timely filed within ninety days from those

dates. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a landlord not in possession or control of the

leased premises owes a duty to the lessee’s employees to

correct unsafe conditions created by the lessee.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

There are no statutory provisions involved in this ap-

peal. ,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action for damages for injuries and death

sustained by Gilbert Lee Woolard as a result of an ex-

plosion and fire occurring at the Beaumont Metering Sta-

tion of Mobil Pipe Line Company on June 20, 1969. The

fatal injuries of the deceased were sustained during the

course of his employment with Mobil Pipe Line Company.

Suit was brought pursuant to Article 4671 et seq. and

Article 5525 of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of

Texas, and was based on alleged negligence of Mobil Oil

Corporation and alleged gross negligence of Mobil Pipe

Line Company. Federal jurisdiction was based on diver-

sity of citizenship.

The trial of this case began on March 1, 1972 in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Texas. In Answers to Special Interrogatories submitted by

the court, the jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was

he PGR AAT RT A GTI LE REE FN OE RT LR NG eR EEO IN

3

negligent in failing to provide a flare system to be used

by the metering station in its operations. It also found

several acts of gross negligence committed by Mobil Pipe

Line Company. Judgment was entered on behalf of the

Plaintiff on May 15, 1972 against both Mobil Oil Cor-

poration and Mobil Pipe Line Company.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-

cuit affirmed the judgment as to Mobil Oil Corporation

and reversed as to Mobil Pipe Line Company. This Peti-

tion for Certiorari is filed on behalf of Mobil Oil Corpora-

tion.

We fully realize that this Court would rarely grant such

a Petition in a case of this nature. The holding in this case,

however, places a new and intolerable burden upon every

landowner in this country. Taken literally, this holding

means that a lessor has a duty to seek out and correct

dangerous or unsafe conditions that are created by his

lessee. That duty would extend not merely to third persons

but also to the very persons that create such a dangerous

condition. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit has ignored

Texas law, and allowing its opinion to stand will create

hopeless confusion among landowners and their attorneys

who attempt to advise them. It clearly calls for an exercise

of this Court’s supervisory powers.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Some review of the facts of this case and of the opera-

tion being conducted the night of the accident is necessary

to enable this Court to understand the simple fact that

Mobil Oil Corporation had absolutely nothing to do with

any of it and the impossible burden placed upon Petitioner

and those similarly situated by the Court of Appeals.

On the night of June 20, 1969, Gilbert Lee Woolard,

an employee of Mobil Pipe Line Company, was working

4

on the premises of the Beaumont Metering Station of that

company with two other men—Red Marsh, another em-

of the pipe line, and Walton James Goodwin, an

employee of Mobil Oil Corporation. The Metering Station

is located on a tract of land approximately .8 of an acre

in size just outside the Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery at

Beaumont. The land is leased from Mobil Oil Corporation

to Mobil Pipe Line Company. When a product passes

through the meters on these premises, it in effect has been

transferred from the custody of Mobil Pipe Line Company

to that of Mobil Oil Corporation.

In June of 1969, three pipe lines came into the meter-

ing station in Beaumont. One was a 20-inch crude line,

one a 16-inch crude line, and one a 10-inch liquid petro-

leum gas (LPG) line coming from Corsicana. It is the

operation of this 10-inch LPG line that is at issue in this

lawsuit.

Prior to the date of the accident involved in this law-

suit, it had been necessary for Mobil Pipe Line Company

to repair sections of pipe at two locations between Cor-

sicana and Beaumont. Before the repair work was started,

it was necessary to insert quantities of water into the pipe

line. By inserting the water into the pipe line, the repairs

necessary could be made without great danger of fire or

explosion. ‘Prior to the time the contents of the pipe line

were to be delivered to Mobil Oil Refinery for processing,

it was necessary to remove the quantities of water which

had been inserted into the line. It was the operation of

removing this quantity of water from the pipe line that

was being carried on at the time of the explosion and fire

at the Beaumont Metering Station facility.

In the repair process, the water inserted had become

separated into two slugs. The first slug arrived at the

Beaumont Metering Station at approximately 9:15 on the

morning of June 20, 1969. Approximately 697 barrels

of water were discharged during the next hour and a half.

There are no allegations that there were any problems

with the discharge procedure at this time. At any rate,

there were no accidents.

The second slug of water arrived at the metering station

at approximately 7:00 P.M. on the evening of June 20,

1969. Since it is the operation of discharging this water

that forms the basis of this lawsuit, we will attempt to go

into the nature of this operation in some detail.

As any product enters the Beaumont Metering Station

facility through the 10-inch LPG line, any of several things

can be done with the product. Normally, when the product

is in fact LPG, it simply passes through the meters and is

directed toward the Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery. The

operation being conducted on June 20, 1969, although

not an unusual operation, was not daily routine. Thus,

when the water entered that facility through the 10-inch

LPG lines, it was directed to a 4-inch discharge line and

into a settling tank with a 2-inch discharge line on the

bottom of it. The water was thus discharged through these

two lines into a ditch which paralleled the railroad track

on the east side of the facility. It then ran down this ditch

and into a nearby swamp.

It was also possible to direct the incoming product to

a flare system located on Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery

premises. The product would be directed to the flare if

some sort of an emergency arose.

It is undisputed that at the time of the explosion and

fire, the product coming in through the 10-inch lines was

being diverted through the 4-inch line and also into the

settling tank and through the 2-inch line. There is no evi-

dence that the flare system was used or that its use was

6

even contemplated. Furthermore, the valves on the pipes

leading to the refinery were closed.

At the time of the accident, the metering station was

substantially in the same condition that it had been for

a number of years. One witness familiar with the opera-

tion of the metering station testified that in the seven

years preceding the accident he could recall at least six

times that the draining operation being conducted on the

night of the accident had been performed. During all of

those years, there were no fires or accidents of any kind.

In other words, the operation being carried on on the

night of June 20, 1969 had been conducted safely on

many occasions Over a substantial number of years. It

was only through an unforseeable and bizarre set of facts,

many of which are not understood to this day, that three

men were killed in an essentially safe operation.

As might be expected, there is an area of intermingling

between the water and the LPG known as an interface.

In the interface at both the head and the tail of the slug

of water were inserted scrapers, or pigs, which served the

dual purpose of cleaning the pipe line and signalling the

arrival of the new product. The arrival time of the inter-

face is calculated by the dispatcher in Dallas by dividing

the total amount of displacement in a section of line by

the number of barrels being pumped per hour.

Prior to the arrival of the interface, Marsh was given

an estimated time of arrival of 12:35 A.M., but at 10:45

P.M. was told that it could arrive at any time. The fire

and explosion took place at approximately 11:25 P.M.

The accident occurred when the LPG following the slug

of water arrived at the metering station, discharged ap-

parently through the 4-inch and 2-inch lines, and from

some unknown source, was ignited. The resulting explo-

sion and fire took the lives of all three workers.

It is also without dispute that at the time of his death

Gilbert Woolard was an employee of Mobil Pipe Line

Company, a subscriber to the Texas Workmen’s Compen-

sation Act, and that benefits under that Act have been

paid unto the survivors of Gilbert Lee Woolard.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Texas courts

would impose a duty of ordinary care upon a landlord

who shares control of the leased premises with his tenant.

The elements of sharing found by the Court of Appeals

were:

(1) Mobil Oil could veto any of Mobil Pipe Line’s

proposed alterations in the metering station which

Mobil Oil considered unsafe to its employees;

(2) Mobil Oil employees had keys to unlock gates in

the fence surrounding the metering station;

(3) New Mobil Oil executives were given a tour of the

metering station as part of their orientation; and

(4) Goodwin, the Mobil employee who was killed in

the explosion, had the authority to decide when to

open and close valves during the purging opera-

tion.

It is important to point out in connection with Good-

win’s authority that even assuming the Court of Appeals’

statement is true, which it is not, liability was imputed to

Mobil Oil Corporation not on the basis of anything Good-

win did or did not do, but rather on the failure of Mobil

Oil Corporation to provide the pipe line company with a

flaring system for use in the pipe line company’s opera-

tions.

Out of this “control” over the premises arose the

duty, according to the Court of Appeals, to interfere

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actively with the busineses operation conducted on the

adjoining premises. Specifically, in this case, the Court

of Appeals has now held that Mobil Oil Corporation

was negligent in not providing additional equipment for

use by another company in that company’s operations.

The holding that these elements constituted sufficient con-

trol to establish a duty on the part of the landlord com-

pletely ignores established Texas law.

The Court of Appeals, moreover, in its apparent effort

to hold Mobil Oil Corporation liable on some invented

theory neither argued nor briefed by either side, has

ignored the established law of the State of Texas that

an employee of the tenant stands in no better shoes

than the tenant himself. The court could have disposed

of this entire matter without having to strain to find

joint control had it not ignored Texas law in this regard.

It is ironic that the very cases cited by the Court

of Appeals in arriving at its conclusion that “Texas

courts would impose a duty to use ordinary care upon a

landlord who shares control of the leased premises with

his tenant” preclude liability on the part of Mobil Oil

Corporation in this very situation. Consider, for example,

Johnson v. Murry Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Austin 1936, writ dism’d), cited by the court for the

proposition that Texas court impose upon the landlord

a duty owed to his tenant and those entering under the

tenant to use ordinary care when the lease is a mere

sham employed by the landlord to fraudulently conceal

his continued control over the premises. We do not so

read that case, but that is immaterial. That case stands

much more clearly for the proposition that “it is settled

law that where a dangerous or defective condition of the

leased tenement or machinery is as well known to the

lessee as to the lessor, the latter may not be held liable

Sn tie RT ah RP ae

9

at the suit of the lessee’s servant or employee; because

of action, if any exists, is against the lessee.” Id. at

924, citing Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266 (1883).

A careful reading of the case will show that the landlord

there maintained at least as much “control” over the

premises as in this case. In fact, it is almost incon-

ceivable that a landlord would not retain at least this

much “control” over the premises. It is important for

this Court to realize that this decision completely changes

the nature of the duty owed by every landlord in this

State. This degree of control over the premises can al-

ways be found, and the landlord will always then be

deemed to control the premises jointly with his tenant.

This is sheer nonsense.

The Court of Appeals did cite in footnote 4 of its

decision in Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174

S.W.2d 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1943, no

writ). In that case plaintiff sued the owner of an office

building for negligence in maintaining the stairways and

lights in the common parts of the building. The court in

that case held that the landlord’s only legal duty was

to use reasonable care to keep its stairs and lights in a

reasonably safe condition. This makes complete sense,

as do the cases cited by the Court of Civil Appeals hold-

ing that the landlord is under a duty to use reasonable

care to eliminate unsafe conditions on portions of the

leased premises over which he has retained exclusive

control, and in those areas reserved for the common

use or benefit of several tenants. This makes sense be-

cause only the landlord is in a position to undertake

that duty. It is in no sense an exception to the rule con-

cerning the duties of landlords, as found by the Court

of Appeals, but rather is a statement of the duty of a

landlord concerning unleased property.

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10

In Medlin v. Havener, 98 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.

—Ft. Worth 1936, no writ), plaintiff alleged that the

lessors of land on which a swimming pool was located

were negligent in failing to provide a cover over a drain-

age pipe that would prevent the foot or leg of a swimmer

from being drawn by suction into the drain while the

pool was being drained. In that case the court stated:

“Tt is a well settled rule of decisions of this State

that in the absence of a special contract to the con-

trary, and in the absence of fraud and deceit induc-

ing the lessee to believe the landlord would make

such repairs, the lessor is under no implied obliga-

tion to the lessee to keep the rented premises in a

condition safe and suitable for the uses to be made

of the demised premises by the lessee. And in the

absence of a showing that the condition of the prem-

ises causing the injury constituted a nuisance exist-

ing at the time the lease was made, and that the lease

was made with the intention of the lessor that it

would be used by the lessee in that condition, then

the lessor is not liable to the lessee or his servant

or agent or invitee for injuries sustained as a result

of the unsafe condition of the premises. It is specifi-

cally held that the servant or agent or invitee stands

in the shoes of the lessee and with no higher right.

See Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266; Perez v. Ra-

baud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 L.R.A. 620;

O’Connor v. Andrews, 81 Tex. 28, 16 S.W. 628,

629; Paternostro v. Bradley (Tex. Civ. App.) 262

S.W. 896; Jackson v. Amador (Tex. Civ. App.) 75

S.W.2d 892 (writ of error dismissed). Id at 864

(emphasis supplied).

Similar allegations of an unsafe swimming pool were

contained in City of Ft. Worth v. Barlow, 313 S.W.2d

906 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ft. Worth 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Again the Court stated:

il

“Where there is no agreement by the landlord to

repair the demised premises and he is not guilty of

any fraud or concealment by failing to disclose hid-

den defects of which he has knowledge, the tenant

takes the risk of their safety and the landlord is not

liable to him or to any other person entering under

his title or by his invitation for injury caused by

their unsafe condition.” [Citations] Id at 917 (em-

phasis is original opinion)

In Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew, 285 S.W.2d 483

(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1955, writ refd n.r.e.), the

court again affirmed the rule of Marshall v. Heard, supra,

that:

“At common law the occupant, and not the owner,

is bound, as to the public, to keep the premises in

such repair that they may be safely visited by the

public. . . . And it is well settled that to give the

party injured a right of action for damages arising

from defects in rented premises against the owner,

he must show that such defects existed at the time

the premises were leased. . . . Those who claim upon

the ground that they were invited into a dangerous

place must seek their remedy against the person who

invited them. If they are the guests of the tenant he,

and not the landlord, is the person from whom they

must seek redress for injuries caused by defects in

the premises.”

As applied to the facts of Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew,

supra, the lessor of land on which a junk car race track

was

located was not liable to an injured spectator. As

the court stated,

“There is no evidence in this record that there was

any defect in the leased premises at the time of the

making of the parol lease between Buffalo Lakes,

Inc. and Ralph Roberts as the race track was con-

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12

structed by Roberts following the making of the

lease. If there was any defect in the construction

of the race track since it arose following the exe-

cution of the lease by Appellant, Buffalo Lakes, Inc.,

and was due solely to the acts of the lessee, Roberts,

he was solely liable for the injury proximately caused

thereby.” Id. at 486.

Flynn v. Pan American Hotel Co., 183 S.W.2d 446

(Tex. Sup. 1944), makes completely clear that “the em-

ployee of the tenant or lessee occupies no better position

as against the landlord than that of his employer.” Jd. at

449.

In Daniels v. Shell Oil Co., 485 §.W.2d 948 (Tex.

Civ. App.—Ft. Worth 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) a service

station employee sued the landlord, Shell, alleging negli-

gence in the operation of the station. As might be ex-

pected, the degree of “control” over the premises and

operation in that case makes the “control” found by this

Court in the case at bar look minute by comparison.

Plaintiff in that case alleged that Shell retained the right

to regulate the work hours of the service station attend-

ants. The allegations were quite similar to those in this

case. They alleged that Shell Oil Company was not the

employer of plaintiffs, but that the agreement between

Shell and its tenant gave Shell the right to control plain-

tiff in such a way as to require him to work alone in the

early morning hours. The court found that Shell, while

it did retain many rights, did not retain those rights

relied on. The court, however, went further:

“But even if Appellee did have the right of control

in the two respects referred to we would still be re-

quired to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

—— ee ee a 4

DON a AC NEA FR

13

“In the absence of an agreement by a landlord to

make repairs during the term of the lease and in the

absence of hidden defects of which the landlord was

aware that existed at the time the premies were let,

the tenant takes the risk of the safety of the leased

premises, and the landlord is not liable to lessee or to

lessee’s employees for injuries that are caused by an

unsafe condition of the premises. ({Citations] The

courts hold that an employee of the lessee in such

a case stands in the shoes of the lessee and has no

higher right. Citations.” Jd. at 951. (emphasis sup-

plied)

Certainly there is no dispute that Mobil Pipe Line

Company, the tenant, would have no cause of action

against Mobil Oil Corporation for damages araising out

of a condition it created. Woolard, Mobil Pipe Line’s

employee, has no higher right. Texas law is completely

settled in this regard.

The theory on which this Court chose to find Mobil

Corporation liable was neither advanced nor argued nor

briefed by any party to this lawsuit. In its haste to hold

Mobil Oil Corporation liable on some theory, the court

has completely disregarded Texas law. It has rendered

a decision that can meet the test of neither precedent

nor logic.

We urge that this Honorable Court consider the far ‘

reaching nature of the Court of Appeals opinion. We :

urge that it realize that it completely changes the duty

of every landlord. We urge that it understand that the

opinion is contrary to every reported opinion in the

State of Texas. We urge that it note that in reaching :

this extraordinary conclusion the Court of Appeals was

able to cite neither a case nor a commentator support-

ing its position. The opinion is clearly wrong.

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CONCLUSION

Because the Court of Appeals has, contrary to existing

law in Texas and other jurisdictions, created an im-

possible and intolerable burden for lessors of property,

a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted

B. JEFF CRANE, JR.

First City National Bank Building

Houston, Texas 77002 225-2411

Of Counsel:

WILLIAM H. TaBB

Mobil Oil Corporation

P. O. Box 900

Dallas, Texas 75221

DanreEL A. HyDE

First City National Bank Building

Houston, Texas 77002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

‘ I hereby certify that on this day of August,

§ 1973, three copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

were mailed, postage prepaid, certified, return receipt

4 requested, to Mr. John O’Quinn, Attorney at Law, 500

: Houston First Savings Building, Houston, Texas 77002,

3 counsel for the respondent. I further certify that all

“4 parties required to be served have been served.

B. JEFF CRANE, JR.

BE cp ancl hat be gs Bind

Counsel for Petitioner

ITA IR ae RRR SR ba A

15

APPENDIX “A”

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2726

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, a widow, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

MOBIL PIPE LINE COMPANY, ET AL.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

(June 7, 1973)

Before TUTTLE, THORNBERRY and DYER,

Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge: On the night of June

20, 1969, Gilbert Lee Woolard, an employee of Appellant

Mobil Pipe Line Company, was working at that com-

pany’s Beaumont, Texas, metering station with two other

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16

men: Red Marsh, another Pipe Line Company employee,

and Walton Goodwin, an employee of appellant Mobil

Oil Corporation, which leased the land on which the

metering station was located to Mobil Pipe Line, its

wholly-owned subsidiary.’ The men were removing water

from a ten-inch liquid petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline

running from Corsicana, Texas, through Pipe Line’s

Beaumont metering station and into the Mobil Oil re-

finery immediately adjacent to the metering station. The

water was moving down the line under pressure, having

been inserted to facilitate repairs on two sections of the

line. During the repairs, the water had become separated

into two slugs, the first of which arrived at the metering

station at approximately 9:15 am. on June 20, 1969,

and was removed without incident, by diverting it from

the ten-inch LPG line into a four-inch and then a two-

inch line, and thence into an open ditch along the east

side of the metering station.

The second slug of water arrived at the metering sta-

tion at approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 20, and the

three men began discharging it through the four- and

two-inch lines into the open ditch. Directly behind this

slug of water, the pipe was filled with extremely flam-

mable LPG; in order to prevent the LPG from being

discharged into the open ditch where it might ignite, the

men at the metering station had to have an accurate idea

of the arrival time of the “interface” between the water

and the LPG, so that they could divert the LPG either

into the Mobil Oil refinery through the ten-inch line, or

1. Pointing to the fact that the lease calls for a consideration

of only one dollar per year, appellees urge us to treat the lease as

a mere formality. We decline, however, to base our decision on this

ground.

WOM eae sk a

17

into Mobil Oil's flare system, which was available for

the metering station’s use in emergencies.

Mobil Pipe Line’s dispatcher in Dallas had earlier told

Marsh, the other Pipe Line employee at the metering

station, that the estimated time of arrival of the water-

LPG interface at the metering station was 12:35 a.m.,

June 21; but at 10:45 p.m. on June 20, while the second

slug of water was discharging from the line, Marsh was

told that the water-LPG interface could arrive at any

time. The interface arrived at 11:25 p.m.; LPG was dis-

charged into the atmosphere through the four-inch and

two-inch lines and was ignited by some unknown source.

The resulting explosion and fire took the lives of all three

men in the metering station.

Woolard’s parents and his widow, on behalf of herself

and her children, filed this wrongful death and survival

action in the court below. In response to special interroga-

tories, the jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was

negligent in failing to provide a flare system for the ex-

clusive use of Mobil Pipe Line’s metering facility, and

that Mobil Pipe Line, Woolard’s employer, was grossly

negligent in several respects to be fully discussed below.”

Judgment was entered against Mobil Oil Corporation for

$125,000, and against Mobil Pipe Line Company for

$100,000, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judg-

ment against Mobil Oil Corporation, but reverse the judg-

ment against Mobil Pipe Line Company.

2. It is without dispute that Woolard’s employer, Mobil Pipe

Line, is a subscriber to the Texas Workman’s Compensation Act,

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 8306, and that benefits under that

Act have been paid to his survivors. Under Texas law, therefore,

Woolard’s survivors can recover from Mobil Pipe Line only if Mobil

Pipe Line was grossly negligent. Jd. § 5.

LDAP EATEN uly TL?

18

L

Negligence of Mobil Oil

Pointing to the fact that it leased the land on which

the metering station was located to Mobil Pipe Line

Company, Mobil Oil claims that it was a mere landlord

without possession Or control of the premises, and as such

owed its tenant’s employee, Woolard, no duty to use

reasonable care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the

metering station. Appellees, on the other hand, contend

that the evidence established that Mobil Oil was a “joint

metering station, and that Mobil Pipe Line’s negligence

could therefore be imputed to Mobil Oil.

The Texas doctrine of “joint venture” makes each party

thereto the agent of the other for purposes of tort liability;

when the facts show a joint interest in the purpose of

the enterprise and an equal right to control its conduct,

the doctrine imposes vicarious liability upon a party for

the other’s negligence. Bonney Vv. San Antonio Transit

Co., 325 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1959); Straffus v. Barclay,

219 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1949). In the case at hand, the

jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was negligent, in

its own right, in failing to provide a flare system for the

exclusive use of the metering station,’ Mobil Oil argues

a

3. Mobil Oil’s refinery flare system, whereby petroleum products

could be safely disposed of, was available for the metering station’s

use in emergencies; there was no flare system for the exclusive use

of the metering station. The testimony suggested that the refinery

flare system was inadequate to handle the quanitity of water that

would have to have been discharged through it to insure the safe

discharge of the LPG (App. 212; 369), and that the men in the

metering station knew that the refinery flare system was inadequate

for this purpose. (App. 369).

PIR RE LTTE

19

that it could not have been negligent because in its role

as landlord it owed no duty to Mobil Pipe Line’s em-

ployees. The doctrine of joint venture, however, is one

of imputed, not actual, negligence; if one of two joint

venturers is negligent, then the negligence of the other is

immaterial to the imposition of vicarious liability upon

him. A determination of whether Mobil Oil and Mobil

Pipe Line were joint venturers in the operation of the

metering station is therefore irrelevant to the question

whether Mobil Oil itself breached a duty it owed to

Woolard. Accordingly, we intimate no view as to whether

the evidence showed that Mobil Oil and Mobil Pipe Line

were joint venturers, and instead turn to the question

whether Mobil Oil owed to Woolard a duty to use reason-

able care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the meter-

ing station.

According to Texas law, a landlord who does not agree

to repair the leased premises and who does not fraudu-

lently conceal defects of which he has knowledge, is under

no duty to either his tenant or the tenant’s employee to

correct an unsafe condition on the premises. Flynn v.

Pan American Hotel, 183 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1944); Yar-

brough v. Booher, 174 §.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1943); Daniels

v. Shell Oil Co., 485 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ft.

Worth 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Katz v. Southwestern

Scrap Materials Co., 412 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Dallas 1967, no writ).* This rule, however, is subject

to exceptions. If the lease is a mere sham employed by

the “landlord” to fraudulently conceal his continued con-

trol over the premises, Texas courts impose upon him a

duty owed to his tenant and to those entering under the

4. But see Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174 S.W.2d

1015 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1943, no writ).

ences

| PANO "ena

exclusive control, Brown v. Frontier Theaters, Inc., 369

S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963), and in areas reserved for the

common use or benefit of several tenants occupying the

ises. Hall v. Medical Building of Houston, 251 S.W.

24 497 (Tex. 1952); Lang v. Henderson, 215 S.W.2d

585 (Tex. 1948).

In each of these situations in which Texas courts im-

pose a duty of ordinary care upon a landlord, the land’

lord, by virtue of his continued possession or control of

the premises, is in a position to know of the defect and

Furthermore, our review of the record discloses sufficient

evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude

that control over the Beaumont metering station was

shared by Mobil Oil and Mobil Pipe Line. Mobil Oil

could veto any of Mobil Pipe Line’s proposed alterations

in the metering station which Mobil Oil considered un-

safe (App. 314); Mobil Oil employees had keys to un-

lock gates in the fence surrounding the metering station

(App. 294-95), and new Mobil Oil executives were given

a tour of the metering plant as part of their orientation

(App. 291); Goodwin, the Mobil Oil employee who was

gE.

REDE ME EL LICL IEE LI I POG

21

killed in the explosion, had the authority to decide when

to open and close valves during the purging operation

(App. 343-52; 363). Accordingly, we hold that there

was evidence from which the jury could properly decide

that Mobil Oil owed to Woolard a duty to use ordinary

care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the metering

station.

Mobil Oil’s contention that proximate causes was not

established need not detain us long. Mobil Oil argues

that the failure to provide an adequate flare for the ex-

clusive use of the metering station had nothing to do

with Woolard’s death, because there was no proof that

any of the men attempted to close the one valve neces-

sary to divert the LPG into the refinery’s flare system.

But the jury could reasonably conclude that the valve

was not closed because the LPG had vaporized and

frozen it (App. 396-97), or because the men at the

metering station knew that the refinery’s flare system was

inadequate under these circumstances (App. 366-69). In

short, the failure to close the valve did not preclude a

finding of proximate cause.

Mobil Oil contends further that the trial court errone-

ously overruled its objections to evidence showing altera-

tions in procedure and equipment made subsequent to

the accident at the metering station. In particular, Mobil

Oil objected to evidence showing that employees of Mobil

Oil and Mobil Pipe Line jointly decided to leave un-

locked the gates in the fence surrounding the metering

station (App. 324), and to testimony concerning the

method of discharging water and LPG that is now fol-

lowed at Mobil Oil’s new Spindletop facility. The general

rule in both the Texas and the federal courts is that evi-

dence of subsequent repairs or modifications is not ad-

i i a iad

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22

mnissible, owing both to the strong policy favoring TY

sedial qeasures and to the danger that the jury may Grew

me unwarranted inference that the repairs or modifice-

tions are an admission of negligence. Roosth & Genecov

Production Co. v. White, 262 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1953);

Cir. 1963, 321 F.2d 683. Such evidence is admissible,

tion with the operation of the metering station. Evidence

that its employees participated in the decision to leave

no bearing on that issue, because the Spindletop station

is wholly separate from the Beaumont metering station

and was not completed until after the occurrence in

question. But a thorough study of the record convinces

us that any error in the admission of this evidence was

harmless.

I.

Gross Negligence of Mobil Pipe Line

In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found

that Mobil Pipe Line Company was grossly negligent in

five respects, each of which was 4 proximate cause of

Woolard’s death:

2 SOIR RE <

23

(1) In locating an office building on the premises

of the metering station with window unit air condi-

tioners, a water heater with an open flame, and a

non-explosion-proof telephone;

(2) In actively furnishing inaccurate dispatch in-

formation under the circumstances;

(3) In discharging water and gas into the atmo

sphere;

(4) In building and maintaining the four-inch line

used to bleed off water followed by LPG

(5) In requiring Woolard, a novice at this type

of operation, to work without providing him a flare

system to be used exclusively by the metering station.

We are compelled to reject these findings. The first

three set out above were clearly insufficient predicates

for awarding exemplary damages. First, even assuming

that the presence of the air conditioners, water heater,

and non-explosion-proof telephone was evidence of gross

negligence on Mobil Pipe Line’s part, the record contains

not a shred of evidence suggesting that any of these

devices caused the explosion and fire. A Pipe Line em-

ployee testified that when he arrived at the metering

station shortly after the explosion, some grass and a

sample building on the premises were on fire, but the

office building containing the air conditioners, water

heater, and telephone was not burning. Moreover, appel-

lee’s expert witness testified that if these devices had been

the source of ignition, the office building probably would

have exploded. Apart from whether Mobil Pipe Line was

grossly negligent in maintaining the equipment in the

office building, then, its conduct in this respect was clearly

not a proximate cause of Woolard’s death.

aa ae ae Ee ae

24

Secondly, Mobil Pipe Line cannot, under Texas law,

be held liable for the gross negligence, if any, of its

dispatcher in “actively furnishing inaccurate dispatch

information.” Texas law permits the award of exemplary

damages against a corporation only if the grossly negli-

gent employee is a “vice principal,” a category including:

(1) corporate officers, (2) employees authorized to hire

and fire, (3) employees performing “nondelegable” corpo-

rate duties, and (4) department or division managers.

Fort Worth Elevators Co. Vv. Russell, 70 S.W.2d 397

(Tex. 1934); LeJeune v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 410

S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont, 1966, writ refd

n.r.e.); Wooley v. Southwest Portland Cement Co., 5th

Cir. 1959, 272 F.2d 906. There is nothing to suggest

that the dispatcher had sufficient managerial authority to

’ make him such’a vice principal, and Mobil Pipe Line

consequently may not be held liable for his alleged gross

negligence.

Thirdly, the finding that Mobil Pipe Line was grossly

negligent in “discharging water and gas into the atmo-

sphere” is not a proper basis of liability. The discharge of

the LPG is the very accident complained of. It was not

the purpose of the purging operation to discharge water

and LPG. into the atmosphere; indeed, Mobil Pipe Line

had taken measures (including an arrangement to use

the refinery flare system and the employment of a dis-

patcher to warn the men of the arrival of the interface)

to avoid such an accident. A finding that an accident

occurred is by itself insufficient to impose liability upon

a defendant for gross negligence or even for ordinary

negligence. There must be a finding that the defendant's

conduct caused the accident.

The last two jury findings set out above do not satisfy

the strict Texas requirement for proof of gross negligence.

sid aiateuts Meld: PM ae Te

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2

IP Rot ERIE PL

25

In Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376

S.W.2d 825, (Tex. 1964), the Texas Supreme Court

reaffirmed the definition of gross negligence first stated

in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Shuford, 10 S.W. 408

(1888):

Gross negligence, to be the ground for exemplary

damages, should be that entire want of care which

would raise the belief that the act or omission com-

plained of was the result of a conscious indifference

to the right or welfare of the person or persons to

be affected by it. (Emphasis supplied).

In Sheffield the deceased was killed when an electrical

spark ignited gas in a machine he had been ordered by

his supervisor to inspect. The procedure established by

the employer for removing gas from the machine before

inspection had proven inadequate. The deceased’s super-

visor knew that gas was present when he ordered the

deceased to inspect the machine, but assured the deceased

that it was safe to begin the inspection nevertheless. The

Supreme Court held that this evidence did not warrant

a finding of gross negligence, pointing to the existence

of admittedly inadequate safety measures. In the court’s

view, the “evidence failed to meet the requirement that

there be an entire want of care so as to raise the belief

that the acts complained of were the result of a conscious

indifference to the rights or welfare of others. There does

not appear to be an indication of willfulness, wantonness,

or malice.” 276 S.W.2d at 832.

In the wake of Sheffield, Texas Courts of Civil Appeals

have decided several cases which illustrate the stringent

requirements of the Texas concept of gross negligence.

Armstrong v. Texas Power & Light Co., 399-S.W.2d 922

SO ETE Te ee et

26

(Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler, 1966, writ refd mr.c.), for

example, arose out of the electrocution of a utility com

pany lineman engaged in the removal of a charged wire

from a utility pole near a highway. The job required that

coming cars; a car drove into or across the line, suddenly

bringing it into fatal contact with the deceased. The

Court of Civil Appeals held that this evidence failed to

demonstrate that the foreman acted with a conscious dis-

regard of the deceased’s safety.

In Loyd Electric Co. v. DeHoyos, 409 S.W.2d 893

(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio, 1966 writ refd), an

employee was killed while inspecting aircraft fuel pumps.

The pumps were mounted on a stand, under which were

placed drip pans to catch highly volatile aircraft fuel. In

close proximity to the drip pans were electrical connec-

tions with clamps that were described at trial as not

being of the safest variety available. A spark from the

faulty connections ignited the fuel in the drip pans, killing

the employee. The court held that, although the employer

failed to use ordinary care to avoid such an accident,

the evidence did not reveal an entire want of care and

therefore there was no gross negligence.

Finally, in Thomas v. T. C. Bateson Co., 437 S.W.2d

386 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a

construction worker fell four floors to his death when a

cement buggy he was operating slipped off a ramp, which

was only two inches wider than the wheel base of the

buggy. The ramp was covered with wet concrete, and

the employer had furnished no guard rails or other pro-

tective devices. The employee was a novice at this type

ee nf

27

of work, and had made only two trips up and down the

ramp at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the court,

relying on Sheffield, supra, held that gross negligence had

not been established. See also Stevens v. Dunn, 417 S.W.

2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler, 1967, no writ) (state-

ment by driver of truck which had struck and killed

employee that “the son of a bitch is better off dead shan

he would be alive,” held not to evidence intent or con-

scious disregard for the safety of the deceased workman).

As these cases indicate, the Texas view of gross negli-

gence contemplates something just short of intentional

wrongdoing. Indeed, the summary contained in 13 Tex.

Jr. § 133 and quoted approvingly in Sheffield, supra,

states that recovery of exemplary damages requires a

showing, not merely that defendant could have or ought

to have foreseen the injury, but that “he acted inten-

tionally or willfully or with that degree of ‘gross negli-

gence’ which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about

the injury of which Plaintiff complains.” The Texas

standard demands both advertence to an unreasonable

risk of harm to the plaintiff and an entire want of care

(not merely a failure to take reasonable precautions) to

avoid harm to the plaintiff.

Appellees cite only one instance in which a plaintiff

in a case like the one at bar has carried the seemingly

impossible burden imposed by this view of gross negli-

gence.” In Phillips Petroleume Co. v. Linn, 5th Cir. 1952,

5. Appellees rely on several cases arising under the Texas guest

statute, to support the verdict against Mobil Pipe Line. In Sheffield,

supra, the Texas Supreme Court stated that such cases do not govern

suits against employers for exemplary damages for the death of

deceased employees, because exemplary damages are compensatory in

nature in guest statute suits, but are considered punitive in nature

in such cases as the instant one. 376 S.W.2d at 831.

28

194 F.2d 903, an employee was killed while operating

a sandblasting machine attached to a hose labeled “H.P.

Air.” (meaning “high pressure air”). In fact, the hose

contained high pressure gas, and a spark thrown by a

particle of sand caused the gas to explode. The foreman

of the deceased workman had known for some time that

the hose was mislabeled, and prior to the accident the

foreman had written “gas” on the line in soapstone. By

the time of the accident, however, the soapstone marking

had worn off (the foreman testified that he had expected

it to wear off), leaving only the deceptive label “H.P.

Air.”

This court’s holding that the foreman was grossly negli-

gent was fully consistent with the Texas case. As wit-

nessed by his half-hearted effort to correct the label on

the hose, the foreman reco, i the almost inevitable

consequences of attaching a sandblasting machine to the

gas line. But by the same token, the precautions he took

to correct the defective label—the soapstone marking

which he knew would wear off—were not “precautions”

at all. They were, in short, an “entire want of care.”

Phillips, however, is not this case. True enough, the

end of the four-inch line in the instant case extended

only a few feet outside of the fence surrounding the

metering station, a fence that was locked and that was

difficult to climb. The water heater, telephone, and air

conditioners in the office building were possible sources

of ignition; and it was known that the dispatcher could

give an estimate of the arrival time of the LPG that

might be inaccurate by as much as thirty minutes. More-

over, the jury could reasonably have found that Woolard

was a novice at the purging operation, and was required

to do the work without having exclusive access to an

TLE EVIE FL AAI AGL ALS APNG TREAT NS

29

adequate flare system. From all of this, the jury could

reasonably conclude that Mobil Pipe Line Company failed

to exercise ordinary care to avoid harm to Woolard. It

may even be assumed that Mobil Pipe Line, through its

managerial personnel, knew that Woolard was being sub-

jected to an unreasonable risk. But the obstacle to re-

covery of exemplary damages in this case is the fact that

Mobil Pipe Line had taken measures to avoid such a

tragedy by arranging for the use of the refinery flare

system in emergencies and by employing dispatchers to

calculate the estimated arrival time of the LPG at the

metering station. However inadequate these steps may

appear in retrospect, they are nevertheless sufficient to

negate a finding of an entire want of care on the part

of Woolard’s employer. Accordingly, the award of ex-

emplary damages against Mobil Pipe Line Company is

reversed.

In conclusion, we affirm the judgment against Mobil

Oil Corporation, and reverse the judgment against Mobil

Pipe Line Company.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

ot

30

APPENDIX “B”

Muited States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2726

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, a widow, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

versus

MOBIL PIPE LINE COMPANY, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion June 7, 1973, 5 i975 _.. F.2d —.. ).

(July 16, 1973)

Before TUTTLE, THORNBERRY and DYER,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: The Petition for Rehearing is DE-

NIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular

active service on the Court having requested that the

Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35 Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule

12) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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