Opposition Brief — Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.

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CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY and

INTERSTATE BRANDS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY

IN OPPOSITION

FREDERIC L. KIRGIS

JOHN S. PFEIFFER

1900 Security Life Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

(303) 893-1000

Of Counsel:

ROBERT E. WARREN, JR.

ROBERT J. KAPELKE

GORSUCH, KIRGIS, CAMPBELL,

WALKER AND GROVER

1900 Security Life Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

(303) 893-1000

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE I

REASONS FOR DENYING WRIT 5

I 6

II 16

III 19

CONCLUSION 20

APPENDIX la

Article III of By-Laws — Five States

Supply Company — Exhibit 52 la j

Letter Agreement — Continental Baking

Company and Five States Supply Co. E

Exhibit 124A-D 3a i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir.

1961) 9 :

Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F.Supp.

796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd. 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.

1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 991 (1956). rehearing

denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956) 11 ¥

Beatrice Foods Co., (1967-1970 Transfer Binder) Trade

Reg. Rep. para. 19,045 (FTC 1969), aff'd. sub

nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.

OMAR SEE BIRD

1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) 10 :

Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 177 (5th

Cir. 1967) 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 :

SRT MOIR SUNY Lt RR

TABLE OF CONTENTS — CONTINUED

Page

Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825

(9th Cir. 1971). 9

FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 646 (1966) 14

Hampton v. Graff Vending Company, 478 F.2d 527,

534 (5th Cir. 1973) 19

Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 285

(7th Cir. 1966) - 10

Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115,

118 (1954) 16

Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,

224 F.Supp (D.N.J. 1963) 11

; Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,

282 U.S. 555 (1931) oe 6

Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,

; 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) 9

} U.S. v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, (1972) 14, 15

MISCELLANEOUS:

Supreme Court Rule 24(1) . 19

16C von Kalinowski, Business a §29.03

[3]; $29.03 [4] 11, 18

Iu the

Supreme Cowt of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1973

No. 73-227

CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY and

INTERSTATE BRANDS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY

IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Old Homestead Bread Company (“Old Homestead” ;

sought and acquired judgment against Continental Baking

Company (“Continental”) based upon separate jury verdicts,

finding that Continental had violated four different provisions

of the federal antitrust laws: conspiracy in restraint of trade

(JA. 2726) ; attempting to monopolize (JA. 2727) ; conspir-

acy to monopolize (JA. 2728); and unlawful price discrimi-

nation (JA. 2729). All four verdicts were submitted to the

Court of Appeals for its consideration and although that court

7

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2

discussed only the unlawful price discrimination aspects of the

case it clearly affirmed all four verdicts by its concluding

remark:

“There was indeed sufficient evidence before the jury

upon which to base the verdicts, and we find no error

in the various rulings by the trial court. The case is thus

AFFIRMED.” (Emphasis supplied) App. to Petition

27a.

Continental has sought review of the verdict based upon

the violation of Section 2(a) of The Robinson-Patman Act

amendments to the Clayton Act only and apparently does not

seek review of the judgment based on the other three verdicts.

The parties to this action were the competing wholesale

bakers serving the Colorado and Southeastern Wyoming mar-

ket. Old Homestead, the only locally-owned bakery in the

market, baked “Town Talk” bread; Continental, the world’s

largest baking company (X. 542), baked “Wonder” bread; In-

terstate Brands baked “Butternut” bread; and, the Rainbo

companies baked “Rainbo” bread. The large retail chain

stores, Safeway, King Soopers and Millers (National Tea).

baked and sold their own bread and thus were not in the

wholesale bakery business. JA. 478-79, 548, App. to Petition

8a. The majority of the independent grocers in the market

were members of a cooperative called A.G. (Associated Gro-

cers) and purchased their bread requirements from the whole-

sale bakers. JA. 479. The lead or volume product of all the

wholesale bakers was the one pound loaf of white pan bread.

JA. 476, 1041-42.

In 1962 Continental built and opened the largest bakery

in the Rocky Mountain area (X. 502, JA. 739), which was

more than twice the size of its previous two bakeries com-

bined (JA. 1532, 1538), in spite of its knowledge that this

new plant would be running at no more than 50% of its capa-

city based on production figures available at the time (JA.

3

1538). Continental had to run its new plant substantially in

excess of 50% of its capacity to make a profit. JA. 1695-96.

Prior to August of 1964 the wholesale bakers all mer-

chandised their products through route salesmen, who com-

peted for preferred position and adequate space on the bread

rack in each store served. JA. 474-76. Adequate preferred

space was a Critical prerequisite to the successful merchan-

dising of bread and was obtained by securing the good will

of each store manager through prompt and courteous service.

JA. 475-76, 793, 1253.

Although A.G. had previously asked, the wholesale bakers

had refused to provide a private label bread program (JA.

524), because of the bitter wholesale price war that would

result from any attempt by one baker to tie up the majority

of bread purchasers in the market (JA. 560-61, 719, 726-27).

Continental needed volume of sales (JA. 776, 1695-96).

and A.G. wanted a private label bread program which would

provide its members with greater profits (JA. 686). In the sum-

mer of 1964 Continental began increasing its volume of sales

and A.G. acquired its private label bread program through

what became known as the “Tender Crust Program.”

An affiliated corporation of A.G. was formed called Five

States Supply Co. (“Five States”). X. 764-67, JA. 579. Upon

payment of a $100 fee (X. 822, JA. 626) and the execu-

tion of a statement binding the applicant to covenants set

forth in the Company by-laws (App. 1a), a member of A.G.

could join Five States (JA. 591). These covenants required

all members to give first position on their bread racks to the

private label baked by Continental (Tender Crust) and sec-

ond position to the Continental's advertised products (Won-

der) (X. 753, JA. 579) and, that they keep the price of Ten-

der Crust “. . . so that it will always be offered [to the public!

at the same price of any other bakery products of the same

quality, weight or size” (X. 753, JA. 579).

4

Five States and Continental entered into a written agree-

ment (App. 3a), which provided that the wholesale price of

Tender Crust to the retail grocery store member of Five States

would be at least one cent per loaf less than the price charged

for Wonder products (JA. 754-55, 773, 841-42, 846, 866, 881-

82, X. 852, JA. 600). And further, the wholesale price of the

Wonder products would always be maintained at the whole-

sale prices of Continental’s competition (JA. 755, 841-42, 846,

866, 881-82), that is, Rainbo, Old Homestead and Interstate.

As a result, the profit to the grocer was always at least one

cent greater on Tender Crust products than on the products

of any competitor of Continental. JA. 623-24, 686-87, 1266.

Under the Tender Crust program there clearly were no price

benefits available to the public.

The Board meetings of Five States were frequently at-

tended by Continental personnel (X. 673, 676-77, 712-13,

730, JA. 579), and its weekly newsletters were typed and

mailed by Continental to all member grocers after the con-

tents thereof were reviewed and discussed by representatives

of Continental (JA. 614-15, X. 770-821). New Members solici-

tation meetings were held by Five States at the Continental

plant with representatives of Continental urging membership.

JA. 625-27, 674. In 1965, 112 grocers joined the program; by

February of 1967 there were 167 members; and in January

of 1968, the membership had grown to 200 members, out of

a total of 415 eligible A.G. stores. X. 775, JA. 616, X. 833-42,

JA. 588.

Immediately after the Tender Crust program began, Con-

tinental’s competitors reduced prices (JA. 761, 1955), gave

discounts, introduced private and secondary labels and em-

ployed other defensive tactics (JA. 971, 1 167-68, 1191-92). Con-

tinental, in addition to granting discounts, would always match

the price of its competition with its Wonder products, then

sell its Tender Crust products to the grocer at least one cent be-

5

low the price of its Wonder products. JA. 971, 981. The whole-

sale prices of bread plummeted as did the volume sold by Old

Homestead. JA. 796, 934. The wholesale price of the one

und loaf went from 20.5 cents in July of 1964 to 13.2 cents

in the fall of 1967. JA. 915-16, X. 843, JA. 742.

Between July of 1964 and January of 1968, Continental's

volume of sales went from 27.7 million pounds to 40.8 million

pounds, and its receipts from $5.1 million to $7.3 million.

X. 827. Between 1963 and 1966 Continental lost money at its

Denver plant. X. 823, JA. 2099. In 1967 it made a modest

profit of $14,000. Nationally, Continental profits were in the

millions of dollars for all years. X. 823. In contrast, and as

noted by the Court of Appeals (App. to Petition 12a) Old

Homestead’s volume of sales went from 22.8 million pounds

in 1963 to 5 million pounds in 1967 and its dollar sales from

$4.1 million in 1963 to $900,000 in 1967. X. 432, JA. 518.

Predictably (JA. 1034, 1265-67), Continental's only local

competitor (JA. 474), Old Homestead, after successfully

serving the market since 1892 (JA. 801) closed its doors and

left the industry on December 31, 1967 (JA. 515). Two days

later Continental removed all discounts and raised its prices

on all products. JA. 919-20.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The holding below does not pose any substantial issues of

federal law or public policy. Nor does it, as Continental con-

tends, represent an attack on the institution of private label

merchandising. Only Continental's peculiar methods of mis-

using the private label system for predatory purposes were at

‘esue in this case. Continental's private label program not only

failed to afford any benefit whatsoever to the consumer but

it actually prevented price competition at the retail level, by

requiring retail grocers to sell all of their bread loaves at the

same price, regardless of differences in cost or label. More-

over, there are no conflicts between the decision in this case

and the decisions of any other United States court of appeals,

6

as an analysis of the decisions and the evidence of record will

demonstrate.*

Further, since Continental attacks but one of the four

antitrust verdicts against it, no useful purpose would be served

by consideration of the single verdict now being assailed.

I.

THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AMPLY DEM-

ONSTRATES THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN

CONTINENTAL'S UNLAWFUL PRICE DISCRIMINA-

TION AND OLD HOMESTEAD’S INJURY, AND

THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE

HOLDING OF THE COURT BELOW AND THE FIFTH

CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN THE BORDEN CASE.

Continental has made an imaginative attempt to create

a phantom conflict between two circuits in this case. The

alleged conflict is said to exist between the holding of the

Fifth Circuit in Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (Sth Cir.

1967), and the ruling of the Tenth Circuit in the present case

on the question of causal connection between the price dis-

crimination and the injury to plaintiffs. In Borden the Fifth

Circuit commented by way of dictum that among several

other deficiencies in the case against Borden the evidence had

shown that “Borden did not subsidize below-cost or unrealis-

tically low prices on its private label milk with profits received

from sales of the Borden brand.” 381 F.2d at 177.

*Continental’s statement that Plaintiff's damage theory “was sup-

ported solely by assumptions of Plaintiff's counsel which were totally

without support in the record” is palpably erroneous. Plaintiff's dam-

age theory is supported in law by this Court's decision in Story Parcn-

ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), and

in fact by the following references: JA. 506-509, 742-44, X. 428-36

JA. 1224, 1452, 1457, X. 843-47, JA. 742.

7

In the present case the Tenth Circuit did not discuss the

question of subsidization, for it found that “the record shows

that both plaintiffs suffered some injury during the complaint

period” and that “taking the record as a whole, the jury could

easily infer that Continental’s price discrimination incorpor-

ated in the Tender Crust program was the proximate cause”

of the plaintiffs’ injuries. App. to Petition, 10a. It may thus be

seen that the “conflict” which Continental so dramatically

emphasizes lies between a comment on the evidence or a dic-

tum by the Fifth Circuit and the fact that the Tenth Circuit

did not even feel the need to discuss whether there was or

was not a “subsidization.”

Continental's primary argument is that there was no rela-

tionship or “causal nexus” between the damages suffered by

Old Homestead and the differences in prices charged by Con-

tinental for its private and advertised label breads respectively.

Petition, 2, 5, 6, 9-12, 14.

This is. indeed, an ostrich-like position for Continental to

take, for it is precisely this price differential that prevented

any wholesale baker in the market, including Old Homestead,

from competing with Continental. JA. 1285-87. The very key-

stone of the “Tender Crust” program was Continental's abso-

lute guarantee that its private label products would always

be priced at least one cent per unit less than its advertised

label products (JA. 623, 755-56, X. 723, JA. 579). no matter

what the cost (JA. 841-42).

This price differential must be considered in context. how-

ever. The by-laws of Five States contained the price sta-

blization provision (App. 1a) that the retail price of Tender

Crust would be the same as the retail prices of all advertised

products. Continental, of course, was well aware of this by-

law provision; its representatives had even discussed it with

the Board of Five States on several occasions. JA. 620-21.

Being familiar with the by-laws of Five States, it took

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little imagination on Continental’s part to insert the following

provision in the “Tender Crust” private label agreement:

“13. In the event prices on any of our regular adver-

tised products shall, in response to, a general price

decrease in any market fall below the prices in effect

as of June 1, 1964, then any private label price set

forth in paragraph 7, 8, and 9 shall be reduced in that

market to a price at least 1 cent below the price on our

comparable advertised items.” (Emphasis added.) X.

852, JA. 600. App. 6a.

It was also understood that Continental would always keep

the per unit wholesale price of its advertised label products

equal to the price of its competitors’ products (JA. 755, 841-

42, 846, 866, 881-82) and, in accordance with the by-laws of

Five States, each member was required to charge the same

retail price for all products of the same size and quality re-

gardless of label or baker (X. 753, JA. 579, X. 822, JA. 626).

In this context, only one result could obtain: the grocer would

always make at least one cent more profit on the sale of Ten-

der Crust bread than any other label bread on the market.

JA. 648, 708, 756, 846, 1266, 1287. This one cent or more

guaranteed price differential arises out of the difference in

price between Continental’s advertised label products and its

Tender Crust products. App. 6a. As the program was ad-

ministered, if any other baker in the market attempted to

meet the wholesale price of “Tender Crust” by lowering the

price of its own bread, Continental would, under the Tender

Crust program, lower the price of its advertised label bread

to “meet competition” and lower its “Tender Crust” prices at

least one cent under the advertised label price, thus beating

competition in every case. JA. 648, 672, 773, 841-42, 846, 850-

52, 866, 881-82, 981. On one occasion, the price of bread

dropped one cent per day for a weck: Rainbo dropped the

price of its secondary label bread to meet the price of Tender

Crust, then Continental dropped the price of its advertised

label Wonder bread to meet Rainbo’s secondary label price

9

and the price of Tender Crust was automatically dropped one

cent below. JA. 881, 981.

It was this one cent or more price differential, provided

for in the “Tender Crust” private label agreement, therefore,

that made it impossible for Old Homestead or any other

wholesale baker in the market to compete with Continental.

JA. 648, 672, 1266, 1287. It requires no surfeit of imagination

to conclude, as did both the jury and the court below, that

there was clearly a proximate causal connection between Con-

tinental’s price discrimination and Old Homestead’s injury.

App. to Petition 10a.

In addition to these facts in the record leading to the

inevitable conclusion that Continental’s price differential

caused Old Homestead’s injury, it is significant to note that

there was ample evidence of predatory behavior on the part

of Continental, including sales below cost. JA. 1649, X. 113-

115. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the evidence in the

record from which a strong inference of predatory intent on

the part of Continental could be drawn. App. to Petition,

9a-10a.

By significant contrast, in Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d

175, 177 (5th Cir. 1967), the court concluded quite explicitly

that “Borden is not in any sense guilty of predatory behav-

ior... .” The importance of this factual distinction is aptly

capsulized in the following statement of this Court in Utah

Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) :

i Sas a a Sa

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“Courts and commentators alike have noted that the

existence of predatory intent might bear on the likeli-

hood of injury to competition.” , j

See also, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 4

1961) ; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825

(9th Cir. 1971).

Bi a i lal hd

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10

The ciffere’ results in the present case and Borden are

easily recets....d by recognition of the principle enunciated by

the Federal Trade Commission in Beatrice Foods Co., (1967-

1970 Transfer Binder) Trade Reg. Rep. para. 19,045 (FTC

1969), aff’d. sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372

(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971):

“a finding of primary line injury might be based

either on proof of predatory intent or on a market anal-

ysis, sufficient under the circumstances of the case to

raise a reasonable probability of injury to competition.

National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605,

612-13 (7th Cir. 1969).”

Both the present case and the Borden case reflect an applica-

tion of this principle to the facts of each case. In Borden (as in

Beatrice) there was no evidence of predatory intent while in

the present case the record was replete with such evidence.

The decisions are comfortably compatible rather than in a

“square conflict” as Continental would have this Court be-

lieve.

The Fifth Circuit’s single comment upon the evidence in

Borden to the effect that Borden did not subsidize below cost

or low price sales on its private label milk with profits from

its sales of advertised label milk can hardly be read as a hold-

ing that proof of subsidization is a sine qua non of liability

under the Robinsun-Patman Act. Indeed that suggestion was

categorically rejected by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 285 (7th

Cir. 1966) :

“Petitioners urge that there can be no violation of Sec-

tion 2(a) in area price discrimination cases unless the

Commission finds that the higher prices elsewhere sup-

port the lower prices in the market under examination.

We have been cited to no authoritative decision to sup-

port this view. No such requirement was enunciated

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11

in Moore v. Meaa’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 75

S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145, or E. B. Muller & Co. v. Fed-

eral Trade Commission, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).

Congress and the cases assume that the ‘higher price to

purchasers supports the lower price to others’. . .”

The critical distinction between the cases such as the pres-

ent one and Fry Roofing on the one hand, and Borden and the

other decisions relied upon by Continental on the other hand

is that in the former there was evidence of predatory intent

or behavior while in the latter there was a total absence of

such proof. The omission of evidence of predatory intent was

recognized by the respective courts in Borden Co. v. FTC,

supra; Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,

294 F.Supp. (D.N.J. 1963) ; and Balian Ice Cream Co. v.

Arden Farms Co., 104 F.Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd.

931 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 991

(1956), rehearing denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956). This factual

distinction and its importance have been emphasized by com-

mentators. See, for example, 16C von Kalinowski, Business

Organizations, $29.03[4', p. 99-99-29-93, fn. 99 where it is

concluded, following a discussion of the decisions, that proof

of predatory intent “clearly establishes the requisite nexus be-

tween the price discrimination and the competitive injury.”

Since Continental's position is primarily based upon its

expansive reading of the dictum in the Fifth Circuit Borden

decision, a close scrutiny of the evidence in that case is both

necessary and instructive. Incredibly enough, Continental ven-

tures the bold and conclusory proposition that “the facts of

this case are indistinguishable” fromm those in Borden. Peti-

tion, 11. The deceiving inaccuracy of this statement is high-

lighted by the following comparative analysis:

(1) Borden did not charge “below-cost or unreal-

istically low prices on its private label milk . . 381

F.2d at 177. Continental sold at prices below cost for

extended periods. JA. 1649, X. 113-15.

12

(2) Borden was “not in any sense guilty of preda-

tory behavior similar to that which may accompany

territorial price wars.” 381 F.2d at 177. The Court of

Appeals in the instant case expressly acknowledged the

existence of evidence of predatory behavior in the rec-

ord, including sales below cost (JA. 1649, X. 113-15,

JA. 1632), discriminatory price cuts “represented by

discounts to Tender Crust customers only,” (JA. 590-

91, 928-29), as well as the evidence that Continental

set for itself and accomplished the seemingly impossi-

ble goal of increasing production by 50% in four years

in order to operate its oversized Denver plant at a

profit (JA. 823, 930, 2078, 2080, X. 823, JA. 2099).

The Court of Appeals found this achievement indica-

tive of more than “fierce competitive instincts.” App.

to Petition, 10a. Another significant fact evidencing

predatory intent was Continental's price raise and abo-

lition of discounts merely two days after Old Home-

stead had ceased to do business. JA. 919-20. The Court

of Appeals noted the existence of other evidence as well

which would create a “strong inference” of predatory

intent by Continental. App. to Petition, 10a.

(3) The Borden case did not “involve any device

similar to the conventional volume discount.” 381 F.2d

at 177. Continental employed such a device in the form

of its so-called weekly specials which clearly constituted

a thinly-disguised discriminatory allowance in favor of

the A.G. stores. JA. 694-95.

(4) In Borden, “all of Borden’s customers, large

and small alike, paid the same prices for the Borden

brand milk or for the private label milk.” 381 F.2d at

177. In the present case the Tender Crust private label

bread and its special pricing schedule were made avail-

able by Continental only to A.G. stores who were mem-

bers of Five States and who were thus willing

to accept the strictures imposed by Continental (JA.

ary

13

591, 765, X. 822, JA. 626), including the requirement

that Tender Crust be given the preferred rack position

and Wonder the second best position (X. 850, JA. 579).

Moreover, Continental’s other private label breads

were not made available at the same price and on the

same basis as Tender Crust. JA. 912. Finally, a vast

number of customers purchased Wonder bread at the

regular list price rather than the lower price offered

to the purchasers under the Tender Crust program. JA.

2074-75.

(5) The evidence in Borden demonstrated that

“Borden's practices did not lead to a substantial in-

crease in Borden’s market position at the expense of

[its] competitors.” 381 F.2d at 179. The practices of

Continental permitted it to increase its tonnage of sales

from the Denver plant by a phenomenal 50% and its

increase in market share by 15% resulting in a 51.5%

of the market as noted in the opinion of the Court of

Appeals. App. to Petition, 8a, JA. 853. This increase

was manifestly at the “expense of its competitors” as

dramatically illustrated by the fact that Old Home-

stead, the only true independent in the market, was

driven out of business altogether. JA. 907-08.

The record in the instant case so overwhelmingly dispels

any suggestion that the Borden case is factually “indistinguish-

able” that one may safely conclude that the only notable simi-

larity between the cases is the fact that they both involved

private label products.

Continental consistently attempts to characterize the

Court of Appeal’s ruling as an all-out frontal assault on the

whole concept of private labeling. For example, Continental

inaccurately frames the issue in the case as “the degree to

which . . . [the Robinson-Patman] Act may be construed to

prevent sellers from passing along to their customers the cost

savings inherent in private label merchandising.” Petition, 8, 9.

14

Old Homestead has no quarrel with the basic institution

of private label merchandising—but only with the predatory

and piratical abuse of the institution of which Continental has

been guilty. This Court has not been deceived by the bold sug-

gestion that private label programs are entilted to an auto-

matic immunity status under the federal antitrust laws.

For example, in FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 646

(1966) this Court concluded:

“The arguments for exempting private brand selling

from §2(a) [of the Clayton Act as amended by the

Robinson-Patman Act} are, therefore, more appropri-

ately addressed to the Congress than to this Court.”

Similarly, in the very recent holding in United States v.

Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, (1972) this Court flatly re-

jected the notion that private label programs, no matter how

conducted, are endowed with an aura of per se legality under

the antitrust statutes.

By quoting out of context, Continental has tried to char-

acterize the holding of this Court in FTC v. Borden Co., 383

U.S. 637 (1966) as being favorable to the concept of private

label programs. The following statement is from page 14 of

Continental’s Petition:

“fT his Court itself has characterized the provisions of

the Robinson-Patman Act that are applicable to the

sale of private label products as being ‘flexible . . . pro-

visions’ that may take account of the difference be-

tween “branded and unbranded commodities,’ ” quoting

from 383 U.S. at 646.

Compare the generality and coloration of Continental's

statement with the actual language of this Court in Borden:

“Tangible consumer preferences as between branded

and unbranded commodities should receive due legal

15

recognition in the more flexible ‘injury’ and ‘cost justi-

fication’ provisions of the statute.’” 383 U.S. at 646,

quoting from Report of the Attorney General’s Na-

tional Committee to study the Antitrust Laws 159

(1955).

This Court was simply saying that if any; special consid-

eration were to be afforded private label pricing, such con-

sideration would have to be pleaded under one of the Act’s

defense provisions. The private label concept would not pre-

vent a finding of a prima facie violation. As this Court’s

quotation makes clear, special recognition would only be given

private label pricing where the price differential reflected

“tangible consumer preferences.” Continental’s pricing scheme

in the present case has nothing to do with consumer prefer-

ences and indeed even stifles this notion; for although Con-

tinental sold its Tender Crust bread to the Five States stores

at a price guaranteed to be one cent lower than the price

of Wonder bread, the by-laws of Five States required that the

two brands of bread be resold at retail to the housewife at

identical prices. X. 753, JA. 579. Indeed this provision was at

the very core of Continental’s scheme. Consumer preference

is thus completely absent from this case, which involves dis-

crimination and injury at the primary level rather than a dif-

fering price structure between private labeled advertised prod-

ucts at the secondary or retail level.

It is absurd to suggest, as does Continental, that the de-

cision in the present case dealt a death blow to private label

marketing. Indeed it is the contrary result which would have

been shocking and economically destructive, for it would mean

that a national giant such as Continental could stage predatory

and even fatal wars on its local competitors, provided it fought

behind the banner of the private label. Moreover, Continental

is hardly in a position to analogize itself to or champion the

cause of “smaller grocery stores” (Petition, 9), or “small in-

dependent retailers” (Petition, 14). The Court of Appeals’ de-

cision, like the ruling of this Court in Topco, merely vindicates

ROO ERS “8

16

the overriding policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts— anti-

competitive and predatory conduct, under whatever guise, will

not be condoned.

Although the evidence abundantly established the causal

nexus between Continental's price discrimination scheme and

Old Homestead’s injury, and although the existing state of

law does not require any additional showing of “subsidization”,

the record does demonstrate that Continental had a sufficient

national “treasury” to enable it to finance its warfare and

absorb losses in the Denver market. cf.. Moore vo. Mead'’s Fine

Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954). While Continental's

Denver bakery lost cighty thousand dollars in 1964, one hun-

dred seventy-nine thousand dollars in 1965 and two hundred

fifty thousand dollars in 1966 during the Tender Crust Pro-

gram, its national bakery operations showed an average yearly

profit of approximately fifteen million four hundred thousand

dollars during these three years. XN. 823, JA. 2099,

NELTHER THE EVIDENCE NOR THE APPLICA.

BLE LAW SUPPORTS CONTINENTAL'S CONTEN-

TION THAT TT MAY AVOTD LIABILITY ON THE

GROUND THAT THE PRIVATE LABEL PRICING WAS

“AVAILABLE” TO ALL OF TTS CUSTOMERS.

Continental contends that it cannot be held liable be-

cause both its advertised label and private label breads were

made “available” to all of its customers.

This “availability” argument is deficient in two respects:

the law and the facts. From a factual standpoint the record

is simply barren of any evidentiary showing of “the full avail-

ability of both the lower priced private label and the higher

priced advertised bread to all purchasers.” Petition, 17. On

the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that Continental of-

fered its Tender Crust private label program only to A.G.

stores. This fact was openly admitted. JA. 693, 765, 928.

own

oe pee — 2 SRK

17

Beyond this, “Continental served approximately 253

charge account customers from its Denver bakery who pur-

chased Wonder label bread . . . at the regular list price” (i.c.,

rather than at the special prices prevailing to those in the

Tender Crust program). JA. 2075.

Moreover, the conditions and strictures which Continental

attached to its proposal to sell the private label bread to even

the A.G. stores dispel any notion that both breads were “avail-

able.” within any commonly accepted and reasonable meaning

of the word. ‘The opinion of the Court of Appeals expressly

acknowledged the “unavailability” of the private label pro-

gram in view of the fact that the A.G. customer, in order to

he eligible for the program, had to become a Five States

member and aceept the following conditions and require-

ments imposed by Continental :

“These requirements included a membership fee of

$100.00, an agreement to give Tender Crust bread the

best shelf space, with the second best to Continental's

advertised label and to participate in the promotion of

weekend specials. We find mo basis to apply the availa-

bility doctrine.” App. to Petition, 16a.

At this juncture Continental apparently does not argue

with the fact that it did not offer its Tender Crust label pro-

gram to all of its purchasers. However, it now argues that it

offered bread “under a variety @f private labels to all buyers

in the market at the established private label price.” Petition,

p. 18.

The patent fallacy of this argument is that Tender Crust

bread was not sold at the so-callled “established private label

price.” i.c., the price shown in X.. 915 upon which Continental

relies in staging this argument. Instead. the Tender Crust

bread was sold at various discownt rates rather than at the

list price. JA. 587, 845. Thus, umder the Tender Crust agree-

ment (X. 885, JA. 600) there was a 2% central billing dis-

an einyinbwesonnan dt

count in effect (X. 886, JA. 600), along with a monthly

volume discount of from 7% to 11% (X. 886, JA. G00), both

of which discounts were applied to the Tender Crust list price.

The net result was that while Wonder bread was being sold

at sixteen cents per unit and Continental's other private label

products were being sold at fifteen cents per unit, the Tender

Crust bread was, as a result of the discounts, being sold at ap-

proximately 13.5 cents per unit.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that some private label

bread was available to all of Continental's customers, the ‘Ten-

der Crust discount pricing was clearly not available to all of

the purchasers, and this argument is again totally precluded

by the facts of record.

Although the evidence at trial provided no underpinning

for consideration of Continental's “availability” defense, and

although (as the discussion below will demonstrate) the appli-

cable law does not permit use of such a defense in a case such

as the present one, the trial court, in an apparent abundance

of caution, actually instructed the jury that there would be

no violation if the ‘Tender Crust private label bread was “of-

fered indiscriminately to everybody...” JA. 2659. ‘The jury,

like the Court of Appeals, obviously found Continental's avail-

ability claim to be factually unsupportable.

From a legal standpoint it is imperative to stress that the

so-called “availability” doctrine is not applicable in a case in-

volving injury at the seller level; ic., the primary line of com-

petition. See 16C von Kalinowski, Business Organizations

$29.03 [3) at p. 29-87:

“To date... .. the ‘availability’ doctrine has not been

successfully invoked in any primary line proceeding.

Perhaps the principal reason is that while the availabil-

ity of the lower price might negate competitive injury

to buyers to whom the lower prices are readily avail-

able. it is, according to one view, ‘more difficult logic-

NR cate IE ee ee ey er?

19

ally to conclude that competing scllers have not been

injured merely because buyers had available to them

the lower prices of the challenged seller.’ (Quoting

Attorney Gen. Rep. 127, n. .20 (Supp. 1968) ).

This logical rule was recognized in the quite recent ruling

of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in Hampton v.

Graff Vending Company, 478 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1973)

and the court rejected the defendant's availability argument:

“Based on the findings of the district court, Graff has

continued to assert that no discrimination occurred be-

cause the sale price was available to Hampton. This

secondary line argument carries no weight in a primary

line case.” 478 F.2d at 534. fn. 12.

The Court of Appeals in the present case also noted this legal

principle: see App. to Petition, 159.

In summary, the evidence at trial refuted rather than sup-

ported Continental's contention that both its private label and

advertised label breads were available to all purchasers, and,

as the Court of Appeals recognized, there is neither factual nor

legal support for this contention. As far as the present pro-

ceeding is concerned the “availability” defense is simply not

available.

Ill.

THE THREE ADDITIONAL UNREVERSED VER-

DICTS IN FAVOR OF OLD HOMESTEAD BASED ON

VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT PROVIDE A

STRONG ADDED GROUND FOR DENIAL OF RE-

VIEW.

Rule 24(1) of ‘he Supreme Court Rules provides that a

respondent shal! file “an opposing brief disclosing any matter

or ground why the cause should not be reviewed by this

Court.”

An additional reason why this cause should not be re-

viewed is that the judgment under attack is supported by four

separate verdicts and Continental has attacked only one of

such verdicts. If Continental desired a reversal as to Old

Homestead it should have brought all four verdicts to this

Court. As it has failed to do so, its petition for certiorari based

on but one of the verdicts should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein stated the Petition for Certiorari

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERIC L. KIRGIS

JOHN S. PFEIFFER

1900 Security Life Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

Of Counsel:

ROBERT E. WARREN, JR.

ROBERT J. KAPELKE

GORSUCH, KIRGIS, CAMPBELL,

WALKER AND GROVER

1900 Security Life Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

Dated: August 30, 1973

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have this date served the attached

Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Con-

tinental Baking Company and on Interstate Brands Corp. by _

mailing three copies of the same, airmail postage prepaid, to

their respective counsel of record, John H. Schafer, 888 16th

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, E. Edward Bruce,

Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street, N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20006 and Edward L. Foote, Winston, Strawn, Smith &

Patterson, First National Bank Building, Chicago, Illinois ,

60603. All parties required to be served have thus rved.

August 30, 1973

aoa nom aeroteengeeeinasrone nccatenptieeeas:

AE SES PEREIRA FR IT AIR, A ARI Ty

PAT meee, een g Medi iense' sy TT

la

APPENDIX

(Portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit #52 X752-753)

Article III of the By-Laws

Five States Supply Co.

COVENANTS OF MEMBERS

The members recognize that one of the primary purposes

of this Corporation is to foster, promote and encourage the

business of supplying its members with bread and bakery prod-

ucts for resale to the retail public, and to reform abuses in said

business and to secure for such members freedom from unjust

and unreasonable exactions. The members also recognize and

agree that this Corporation has secured the exclusive use of

the trade and service mark “Tender Crust” for their benefit

and each member agrees, in consideration of the agreement

of the other members, to use his best efforts to establish the

name “Tender Crust” in order that there will be a demand

in the retail trade sufficient to create the sale of “Tender

Crust” bread and other bakery products equal to that of na-

tional and local bakery brands.

In consideration of these premises the members agree

that they will each use their best efforts as members of this

Corporation to promote the aims and purposes thereof and

agree specifically that they are duty bound to and will promote

the “Tender Crust” bakery label at all times and in every pos-

sible manner including the following:

1. To buy and resell “Tender Crust” label bakery

products and assist and give their best effort in pre-

senting, maintaining and enlarging the sale of “Tender

Crust” label bakery products for their own benefit and

2a

for the benefit of all other members hereof who also

handle such label.

2. To always provide fresh bread on the regular

bread rack.

3. To give first position on the regular bread rack

to “Tender Crust” label bakery products.

4. To devote % of space on the regular bread

rack to “Tender Crust” label bread.

5. To give second position on the regular bread

rack to the bakery products carrying the label of the

baker or manufac :cr providing or baking “Tender

Crust” products.

6. To take particular care of the bread rack at all

times in order that the “Tender Crust” section shall

always be neat, clean and orderly.

7. Each member agrees that said “Tender Crust”

label bread shall always be on consignment to the mem-

ber and ownership thereof and title thereto shall re-

main in the Company until disposed of by a member

in the ordinary Course of retail trade.

8. Each member agrees that, in order to maintain

and keep “Tender Crust” bakery products in a com-

petitive price position, he will, upon notice to him from

any other manufacturer of other bread products, of any

change of price, whether decrease or increase, imme-

diately change the retail price of “Tender Crust” so

that it will always be offered at the same price of any

other bakery products of the same quality, weight or

size.

j

{

‘

\

'

| 3a

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 124A-D X 849-852)

Five States Supply, Inc.

Denver, Colorado

Gentlemen:

In view of the recent competitive developments in our

market we wish this letter to serve as our written offer to you

on a private label arrangement. This confirms recent oral of-

fers made by us with reference to our supplying your member

stores with bakery products carrying your own brand name.

These products will be produced by us at our Denver, Colo-

rado Bakery and will be sold to your member stores in accord-

ance with the following terms and conditions:

1,

All bakery products sold to you pursuant to this con-

tract will be of quality comparable to our regular

Wonder and Hostess Products. Formulations will be

made by us in consultation with our Research and

Development Laboratories.

All packaging and labels will be supplied by us sub-

ject to your prior approval.

We will assist your personnel in the proper display

and promotion of all products. When advisable, we

will supply point of purchase material and dislo-

cated displays to accomplish this aim. Sampling and

in-store demonstrations will be used from time to

time at our discretion. Five States Supply agrees to

use their best efforts causing their members to co-

operate with us in these activities. Qualified and

experienced sales personnel will be assigned by us

to assist your member stores in the above program.

You agree to make available to us adequate pre-

ferred space on your member bakery products racks

for the display of our regular Bread, Cake and

OORT nore aI RER SEO NCEE eR ERRNO PIT:

4a

Sweet Goods products so that the full sales potential

of these advertised brands can be realized. You

agree in requesting your members to cooperate with

us in arranging special weekly promotions on said

advertised brand items.

5. Deliveries of all products to your member stores

pursuant to this agreement shall be made by our

regular Wonder and Hostess route salesmen from

their regular delivery trucks. We will give complete

rack service and will be responsible for all stale re-

turns.

6. Introduction into your member stores of products

listed below will be made as soon as practical after

August 10, 1964. At any time during the existence

of this contract, we will discuss with you the addi-

tion of other items to be sold hereunder.

7. You agree to pay us for products produced and de-

livered under this contract at the following prices

on weekly credit terms.

Advertised

Brand Price

as of

Variety Price ‘June 1, 1964

1 Pound Expanded Bread 175 185

114 Pound Round-Top Bread —_.22 .235

114 Pound Sandwich Bread .22 .235*

8 Pack Cluster Buns 21 By

8 Pack Coficy Buns 21 .23

The above prices will apply to both White and Wheat

Bread if there are both varieties in the same weight

category.

*This price was not in effect on June 1, 1964 but will be con-

sidered to have been in effect on that date for the purposes

of this contract.

ee

5a

8. In the event you wish to purchase products with no

stale returns to be absorbed by us, the prices will

be as follows:

Advertised

Brand Price

as of

Variety Price — June 1, 1964

1 Pound Expanded Bread __ .16 185

14% Pound Round-Top Bread — .195 .235

14% Pound Sandwich Bread 195 .235

8 Pack Cluster Buns .20 .23

8 Pack Coney Buns .20 AY

9. In the event you wish to purchase products on a

drop-shipment basis to each of your member stores

whereunder you will be responsible for rack service

and stale returns, prices will be as follows:

Advertised

Brand Price

as of

Variety Price June I, 1964

1 Pound Expanded Bread ao 185

144 Pound Round-Top Bread — .185 .235

14% Pound Sandwich Bread 185 .239

8 Pack Cluster Buns 19 a

8 Pack Coney Buns 19 .23

10. All products hereafter sold by us to you pursuant to

this agreement are hereby guaranteed not to be

adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of

the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as

amended, or any substantially similar state law. We

agree to indemnify you against any claims made

against you or losses sustained by you arising out of

the purchase or use of products covered by this

agreement provided such claims or losses do not re-

sult from your negligence or that of your agents and

it ails 28

‘

te

Ce a a eo |

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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