Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Durovic v. Weinberger
Supreme Court brief1973
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SUP; = COURT, UB
7
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1973
NaTIoNaL HELIUM CORPORATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,
Inc., PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CoMPANY, Petitioners
Vv.
Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and
Ebert F. Ossorn, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Rosert L. ACKERLY
RaYMOND S. E. PUSHKAR
SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.
Z Washington, D. C., 20006
Of Counsel: K AB
se a MMET A. BLAES
WENDELL J. DoccETT JocHEMS, SaRGENT & BLAEs
General Counsel & 200 East First Street
_ Secretary — Wichita, Kansas 67201
National Helium
Corporation
Attorneys for
Petitioner, National
Helium Corporation
P. O. Box 1642
Houston, Texas 77001
(See page 2 of cover for additional counsel.)
Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.
>,
eee ITS
Of Counsel:
R. Price Howarp
Senior Counsel
Phillips Petroleum
Company
Bartlesville, Oklahoma
74003
Wruiam H. ALLEN
EvGENE D. GULLAND
CovincTton & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
JosePpH W. KENNEDY
Morris, Larne, EvANs,
Brock & KENNEDY,
CHARTERED
Suite 430
200 West Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67202
Attorneys fer
Petitioner, Phillips
Petroleum Company
Rosert L. ACKERLY
RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR
SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006
Wituiam S. RICHARDSON
ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND
MALONE, CHARTERED
P. O. Box 1034
Wichita, Kansas 67201
Dante, R. HOPKINS
P. O. Box 25128
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
73125
Attorneys for
Petitioner, Cities Service
Helezx, Inc.
Page
I Ne Sai ee ae hose UREN ENE EN EE OSES 1
NE Se wea bebe exew ae ehh eRe ee 2
Qunerions PRRSENTED .. ..0. sce cccce secs seesseness 2
eS CIN Sos Soy vo dca Reeve eo kd ee OW ee 3
PAU EEES OP SUR CAM oo kccick he cade rere sewn ence 3
Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT ...........2.000-- 9
I. The Court of Appeals’ Ruling that the Dis-
trict Court was Without Jurisdiction to Engage
in Substantive Review of Agency Action Under
the National Environmental Policy Act, is in
Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth Cireuits ................ 11
Il. The Court of Appeals Ruling That Review of
the Substantive Ageney Decision was not Avail-
able Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Conflicts with Decisions of the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits ...... 15
III. The Court of Appeals Applied a Standard of
Judicial Review of Impact Statements Under
NEPA that Conflicts with the Standard Applied
by Other Civemits .... cscs sissy setinescvenes 22
ON EE EE PL EMT EES Pe Pee eee Oe ee 26
CITATIONS
CasEs:
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C.
ee SRS oe ns Ota ag aa anke seis aisha nares 16
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 4383 F.2d
Sie A SPE a eka a cect en aed Chenoa eces 16
Calvert Cliff’s Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449
F.2a 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1071) ............ 13, 14, 23, 25
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 188 (1978) ...........- 2. eee 7
Ege ee
ii Table of Contents Continued
Page
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
ik Bb: 6) ey sere 8, 14, 15, 19, 22
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463
3d 788 (PAC. Cir. BBTT) q25 005 cc ceeeseneersss 24
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 4638
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir, 1971) ......-ccccneseecees 24
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lynv, 362 F. Supp.
1905 CELE. WTS) nue scccecccses enter resenes 16
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) ...........0. 11, 14, 16
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) .......... 11
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) ............ 11,13
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d
$033 (Oth Cie. TOTS) ox noes vkece ce cennctvsese 16
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346
(Othe Cit, ISTE)... «ons cee nes tetas nercaceenees 14, 25
Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (Sth Cir. 1961) .... 16
Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1972) .. 16
Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).. 28
Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) .. 14, 16
Hopewell Township Citizens I-95 Committee v. Volpe,
482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) .......ceecseccesce 16
Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th
ae SREP iio acon se reveuedsserbasesr arene ers 16
Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (Ast Cir. 1973) ........- 16
Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) .... 16
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,
it eh | er rrr rere 15, 20, 21
Littel v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) ...... 16
Local 2677, American Federation of Government
Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.
EDGE) oxen nsanxeseues aeeeneners etnseereb seer eh 16
Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,
£72 PBa GOS (3d Cow. WOTS) ow oan ne ns ce cnsssces 16
Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) .. 21
National Council of Community Health Centers v.
Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) .... 16
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
456 F934 G27 (BO. Cir. WIS) gov ccc cccccxeceveee 26
Northern Helex Co. vy. United States, 455 F.2d 546
(0% Ch BUTE co cscs coches dceeckseacuiseeens 18, 19
Loe ES ES SE TELE Ne RIE OS
Table of Contents Continued ili
Page
Pace Co. v. Resor, 344 F.Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
reversed on other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.
ef a rer nn rrr y fer rrr ti 16
Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp.
OO 4 TG. FORE oa edn ks es eee crass rs cass
Scanwell. Laboratories, Luc. ve Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(DG. Civ, WTO) 6 xcuu sca ces cee civtcctersosees 16
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir, 1972) ...--. 16
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973)... 14
Silva v. Lume, 482 F.2d 1282 (st Cir. 1973) .... 14, 16, 24
Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. |. tt Sees 16
State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099
(Oth Cir. W907)... sso rene sveceecrseresesness ys 16
Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.
iy et: 2) ee eee ras pe rergerenyy rere ae 16
Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) 20... eee ee eee 21
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C.
eS) pence yey eet eae 16
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
WeS5 3944 (10th Cir. 1973) 2.2 cece ese seecees 16
STATUTES:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 ef seq.
(1970)
ein. tees we tC 1) ) ere ners rr eee 19
ie eee bo Nk Sa ee ren Pe ee 3, 21
ie TRRe Be bg. | ee ee rae 2, 8, 17, 22, 23
Re a 6 eee Bde whew aca cawacke these exe 17
Helium Act, 43 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat. 918, 50
U.S.C. $$ 167 ef seq. (1970)
Se...) ETE CL ER et 3, 4, 17
SS SeE EON as cit eee ere teries ecnawens 15
National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42
U.S.C. $$ 4321 et seq. (1970)
nee Me eee eee Tepe ree TE ee Ler. 2, 3, 6, 17
42 U.S.C. § 4831(b) (1)
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
S. Rep. No. 1814, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. CE eb akvass 3
H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ...... 3
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBER TERM, 1975
No.
NaTIoNaAL HentuM CorPoRATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,
Ixc.. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, Petitioners
Vv.
Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and
E.burt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioners National Helium Corporation, Cities
Service Helex, Ine., and Phillips Petroleum Company
respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in this proceeding.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix pp.
la-19a) is reported at 486 F.2d 995, The opinion of
the District Court for the District of Kansas (Appen-
dix pp. 19a-73a) is reported at 361 F.Supp. 78.
Nese
2
Opinions of these courts at an earlier stage of this
litigation are also reproduced in the Appendix at pp.
73a-83a and 83a-96a, and are reported at 455 F.2d 650
and 326 F.Supp. 151, respectively.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on October 19, 1973. This Court's jurisdiction is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether in judicial review of federal agency
action a court measuring compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Aet properly limits itself to a
determination only of whether the ageney prepared
an adequate environmental impact statement.
9. Whether the federal courts have jurisdiction
to review, pursuant to the judicial review section of
the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency decision
to terminate an important conservation program, on
grounds other than compliance with the procedural
requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act.
2 Whether in the review of the adequacy of an
environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to
the National Environmental Poliey Act a eourt prop-
erly asks only whether, on the face of the statement, the
agency preparing the statement made ‘tan objective
good faith effort to comply with the statutory proce-
dural requirements,”” or whether, on the other hand,
the court should engage in the “thorough, probing, in-
depth review” of the statement required under the
“arbitrary and eapricious” standard of review pro-
vided for in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
2 ae AE rE EOE wee a OM
STATUTES INVOLVED
The relevant provisions of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4531, et
seq.. Helium Act, 42 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat.
918, 50 U.S.C. §§ 167a, et seq. and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, 704, 706, are set
forth in the Appendix to this Petition (pp. 120a-
139a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from the issuance in January 1971
of notices terminating the contracts of four companies
that were extracting helium from natural gas and
supplying it to the Government for storage and conser-
vation in accordance with the helium conservation
program established by the Department of the Interior
pursuant to the Helium Act Amendments of 1960.
The Helium Conservation Program
Helium, the subject of the prematurely terminated
conservation program and of this case, is an extraor-
dinary element with exceptional characteristics, some
of them unique.’
1Its value has long been recognized. The first important use
of helium was as a lifting gas for lighter-than-air ships. That
and uses associated with medicine and deep-sea diving were vir-
tually its only uses until World War IT. (App. 23a-25a). Since
World War IT many other more advanced and complex applica-
tions of helium have been discovered and put into practices.
(App. 25a-26a). By 1960, the annual consumption of helium was
80 times what it had been in 1937. In 1960, helium was authori-
tatively described as ‘‘essential to our missile and atomic energy
programs and. . . inereasingly valuable as industrial material.”’
At that time it was said that ‘‘the new field of eryogenics involv-
ing extremely low temperatures in the region of absolute zero
opens up exciting new frontiers of science."" S. Rep. No. 1814,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1960).
4
Helium has the unique properties of inertness, of
not liquifying until a temperature just above absolute
zero is reached, and of remaining liquid down to abso-
lute zero. These properties make helium essential—
there is no known practical substitute—to the creation
of very low temperatures and thus the recognized key
to the development of critical new and economic meth-
ods of power generation and transmission that will
have to be put to use as fossil fuel runs out. These
methods include magnetohydrodynamie power genera-
tion, power generation by nuclear fusion and super-
conducting power transmission. (App. 252).
Helium that can be economically extracted and used
is found only in association with natural gas. Helium-
rich natural gas has been found in significant quanti-
ties in the United States only in the Hugoton-Pan-
handle fields of Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, which
contain 99 percent of the nation’s known helium re-
serves. (App. 26a). As the gas is extracted for use
as fuel, the gas is consumed, and the helium, which is
not combustible, is wasted into the atmosphere unless
steps are taken to conserve it. Because of the demand
for fuel, the gas and the helium will be gone well before
the end of this century. (App. 26a-27a).
A national program for conserving helium first came
under serious consideration in the late 1950’s. An
interdepartmental study concluded that helium should
be conserved (App. 25a-28a). Soon thereafter, in
1960, Congress enacted amendments to the Helium
Act of 1925, specifically authorizing a conservation
program. 74 Stat. 918 (App. 28a-29a).
As authorized by the amended Helium Act, the See-
retary chose to implement the conservation program by
5
contracting * with four companies to extract and sup-
ply to the Government crude helium from the Hugoton-
>anhandle Field to be stored for future use. (App.
30a). The helium conservation pr ram based on these
contracts was intended to be se!f-liauidating. Outlays
for the acquisition of helium in the early years were
to be repaid with interest as the Government sold
helium from storage in later years.
The helium conservation program has been eriti-
cized over the years by financially oriented government
officials who have been unable or unwilling to appre-
ciate the full implication of the fact that some day
there will be no more helium to be economically re-
covered from natural gas. In addition, the curtailment
of the space program has diminished the current gov-
ernmental demand for helium, and the Government's
helium program has suffered financially from the in-
roads of private helium producers into the current
helium market.
The First Termination
The Department of the Interior in 1970 undertook
negotiations with the contractors lo« ‘king toward a con-
servation program that would be less expensive to the
Government. (App. 32a). These negotiations were
2 Bach of the contracts, entered into in 1961, extends to 1983
but contains a clause allowing the Government to terminate the
contract if, ‘tin the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the
discovery of large new helium resources or a substantial diminu-
tion in helium requirements or any cireumstanee of similar nature
should occur which would make the continued operation of {the
contractor's] plant and the continued purchase of helium-gas
mixture extracted therein unnecessary to accomplish the purposes
of the [Helium] Act or any amendment thereto... .7° (App.
33a. Tha). (The quotation is from the contract of petitioner Na-
tional Helium Corporation. The other contractual termination
clauses are substantially identical.)
Se eee
eC NE Po . mes
still in progress when the notices of termination of the
contracts were served in January, 1971. Documents
that subsequently came to light made it clear that,
until very shortly before the termination notices were
issued, the Department had urged continuation of the
helium program and that it was not the Secretary of
the Interior who decided upon termination but officials
in the Office of Management and Budget. (App. 33a,
dda).
After receiving the notices of termination and un-
successfully asking for reconsideration, three of the
contractors, petitioners here, brought suit in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin the
termination of the conservation program, naming as
defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the di-
rector of the Bureau of Mines, respondents here, * as-
serting not merely a private interest but the interest
of the public in the conservation of a wasting natural
resource.
On petitioners’ motions the District Court tempo-
rarily enjoined the termination of the program. It
did so principally on the ground of the agency’s fail-
ure to comply with Section 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act. No environmental impact.
statement had been prepared in advance of the ter-
mination of the conservation program even thougi)
Section 102(2)(C) requires such a statement in the
case of any proposal for any major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. (App. 73a-
83a) Respondents at that point did not seek review in
* The fourth contractor, Northern Helex Company, had elected
already to treat its contract as breached by nonpayment and had
brought suit in the Court of Claims for damages. (See p. 19,
fn. 13.
7
this Court or a trial on the merits. Instead, they
undertook to prepare and publish an environmental
impact statement, which was accomplished in No-
vember, 1972.
The Second Termination
Several rounds of pleadings and hearings in the
District Court and interlocutory appeals in the Court
of Appeals followed the issuance of the impact state-
ment. The upshot was that the Secretary of the
Interior on February 2, 1973, issued new notices of ter-
mination of the three contracts. (App. 33a-34a) The
outstanding preliminary injunction remained in effect,
and these notices therefore did not become effective in
the prescribed 60 days pending review of their validity.
Judicial Review
A. The District Court
Petitioners filed verified amended complaints chal-
lenging the attempted new termination, reiterating cer-
tain of their original allegations of illegality relating
to the inconsistency of the termination with the relevant
provisions of the contracts themselves, with the Helium
Act and with the duty of the Secretary of the Interior
and not OMB to make any termination decision; and
alleging further that the Secretary had still not com-
plied with NEPA because the impact statement relating
to the termination did not satisfy the statute, and that
the termination of the helium conservation program
was not consistent with the environmental values
identified in the impact statement. The Court of Ap-
peals directed the District Court to proceed to de-
termine the case forthwith and to do so, in accordance
with the court’s reading of this Court’s opinion in
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), solely on the
Cee
8
basis of the administrative record and without an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the amended
complaints. *
On that record and on briefs and oral argument of
the parties, the District Court ruled on June 11, 1973,
that the decision to terminate the Helium Conserva-
tion Program was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of
discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law
because there had not yet been compliance with the
procedural and substantive mandates of NEPA. The
court continued the preliminary injunction in effect
pending further order of the court to give the agency
the opportunity to comply with NEPA. ( App. 72a-
73a).
Following the directive of this Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Ine. vy. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415-16 (1971), that in the application of the ‘arbitrary
and capricious’? standard of review enunciated in 5
U.S.C. §706(2) (A) there should be ‘ta substantial in-
quiry ...a thorough, probing, in-depth review .. .
[an] inquiry into the facts [that] is to be searching
and careful,’’ the District Court found the assessmeut
and consideration of environmental factors evidenced
in the impact statement and the Secretary's statemeut
of reasons for terminating the conservation program
“woefully inadequate’, (App. 51la-68a)
The District Court found it unnecessary to decide
the other issues petitioners had raised, notably the
legality of the termination under the Helium Act.
However, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to
determine these issues, contrary to the position taken
by respondents. (App. 41a-42a).
***The hearing in the district court consisted of judicial review
of the administrative record. It was not a trial de novo. (This
was in accordance with the adjudication of this court after the
mentioned interlocutory appeals).’’ (App. 4a).
ae eat oy
9
B. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with
directions to dismiss the complaints. It limited it-
self to a review of the impact statement and in making
that review rejected the ‘arbitrary and capricious”’
standard applied by the District Court. Instead, it
assessed the impact statement on its face against a
standard of whether the ageney had made ‘tan objec-
tive good faith effort to comply with the statutory
procedural requirements, * a test that it elsewhere de-
scribed as a ‘‘rule of reason.”? There is no statutory
basis for this standard of judicial review. By this
standard, the impact statement was inevitably found
not wanting for, of course, some kind of ‘effort’? at
compliance with NEPA had quite evidently been
made. The Court of Appeals also rejected the Dis-
trict Court’s conclusion that review of the termination
action could be had under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act on grounds other than failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of NEPA (App.
8a)
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
In its practical effect the decision below is of the
greatest significance. A foresighted program of con-
serving the invaluable, scarce and wasting resource,
helium, adopted more than a decade ago pursuant to
*The Court of Appeals delineated its review as, ‘‘In summary,
then, our view is that the review of the FES is limited to the
following: (1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA. (2) Whether the environmental impact’
statement constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the
demands of NEPA. (3) Whether the statement contains a rea-
sonable discussion of the subject matter involved in the five re-
quired areas.” (App. 12a).
10
Congressional authorization and_ direction, is
abandoned. °
Abandonment of this program has been permitted
without the kind of judicial inquiry into the legality
of the agency action terminating it that is required by
decisions of this Court and of other courts of appeals,
including in various aspects, the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits. Because the several conflicts relate
to important and recurring questions of federal law,
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit should be reviewed by this Court.
Judge Breitenstein, in a concurring opinion, ac-
knowledged one of the conflicts explicitly. He said:
‘*T reject, and I believe the majority opinion
rejects, the apparent holdings of the Eighth and
Fourth Circuits that an environmental impact
statement is judicially reviewable on its merits
to determine sufficiency.’’ (App. 18a).
The question whether an impact statement is re-
viewable ‘‘on its merits to determine sufficiency’’ or
whether, as the court below held, a good faith effort at
6 Abandonment of the conservation program, ironically, coincides
with the abrupt and forceful coming to public awareness of an
energy crisis that, we are told, will be a chronic condition until
sources of energy other than fossil fuels are developed for prac-
tical application. The irony lies in the fact that among the most
promising substitutes for fossil fuels are methods of power genera-
tion—nuclear fission and fusion and the even more exotie method
called magnetohydrodynamics—that, in the present state of our
knowledge, require helium with its singular behavioral characteris-
tics at very low temperatures. Those characteristics also make
helium uniquely suitable for inducing superconductivity in metals
so as to create greater efficiency in the transmission of energy pro-
duced from whatever sources are available.
NRE IT Le TAD TREE Sat x . ors
we ae
11
compliance with the impact statement requirement is
enough is the third of three important federal ques-
tions presented and dealt with hereinbelow. (pp. 22-
26, infra).* The other two questions arise from the
actions of the Court of Appeals in (1) limiting its re-
view of agency action to determining ‘*compliance with
the [NEPA] requirement of the environmental im-
pact statement’’ and (2) dismissing without considera-
tion other and substantial questions raised concerning
the validity of the challenged agency action.
L
The Court of Appeal’s Ruling That the District Court Was
Without Jurisdiction To Engage in Substantive Review of
Agency Action Under the National Environmental Policy
Act Is in Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits.
The Court of Appeals correctly reaffirmed in the
decision below its ruling on the earlier appeal from
the preliminary injunction of 1971 that the District
Court had jurisdiction to determine agency compliance
with NEPA. (App. 5a-6a; 455 F.2d at 653-54).
But it limited review in a manner that conflicts with
decisions of other courts of appeals.
7 Judge Breitenstein cited for the ‘‘apparent holdings’’ of the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits on reviewability of impact statements,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d
289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), and Conservation Council of North Caro-
lina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d, 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973). In fact, those
cases, discussed in the text of this Petition below, relate at the
pages cited to review of the substantive agency decision for com-
pliance with NEPA, not review of the impact statement. But
both courts have reviewed or called for review of impact statements
on the ‘‘merits’’ to determine sufficiency’’ in the way that Judge
Breitenstein and his brethren eschewed. See Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Frochlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348-52 (8th Cir. 1972);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
Eres tener eS =
12
The District Court conducted a properly careful
examination of the impact statement in making its
NEPA review and found it unnecessary to go fur-
ther. There was no need to ‘‘reach the propriety of
the Secretary’s actual decision to terminate’’ because
the inadequacies of the impact statement made it im-
possible for the Secretary to have sensibly balanced
adverse environmental impacts against the benetits of
his proposed actions as NEPA substantively requires.
(App. 42a.)
The Court of Appeals, viewing the impact state-
ment against a far too uncritical standard, found it
adequate—and stopped there. It did not make the
further inquiry required of it once it had ruled that
the necessary condition precedent to valid agency
action was satisfied by the impact statement. That
inquiry is into whether the action itself, the decision
to terminate the conservation program, reflected the
the balancing of environmental and other values
that NEPA requires. The court was explicit on this
point. It said that its review was ‘‘strictly limited
to compliance with the requirement of the environ-
mental impact statement,’’ that ‘‘the only issue giv-
ing the district court jurisdiction to entertain the
injunction suit was non-compliance with the require-
ment of an impact statement.’” (App. 8a, 6a,).
While it said that this review ‘‘includes consideration
given to the statement by the Secretary,’’ it did not, on
the face of its opinion, actually probe the extent, if
any, of the consideration of the impact statement.
Much less did it inquire into whether the Secretary’s
consideration of the environmental factors entering
into his decision satisfied the substantive standards of
NEPA.
OTE al Sa Ce Da UE BOCRE. £ era
13
In so limiting NEPA review, the court ruled in a
way that squarely conflicts with decisions of at least
four other courts of appeals.
The leading decision is that of the Eighth Circuit
in Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The court there
held:
“Given an agency obligation to carry out the
substantive requirements of . .. [NEPA] we
believe that courts have an obligation to review
substantive ageney decisions on the merits.”
Id. at 298.
It later explained what it meant by review on the
merits.
‘“‘Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court
must first determine if the agency reached its
decision after a full, good faith consideration and
balancing of environmental factors. The court
must then determine, according to the standards
set forth in §§101(b) and 102(1) of the Act,
whether the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave in-
sufficient weight to environmental values.’’ /d.
at 300, quoting from Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.Cir.
1971). +
The court proceeded to engage in the type of review
suggested in the foregoing quotation. Jd. at 301.
While it sustained the agency action in the case, the
court subsequently reversed a district court decision
in favor of an agency in a NEPA ease and made un-
mistakable its view that the district courts have an
obligation ‘‘to review agency decisions on the merits
to determine if they are in accord with NEPA.”
14
Environmental Defense Fund vy. Froehlke, 473 F.2d
346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
The Fourth Circuit has followed these rulings of the
Eighth Circuit and has reversed a district court
judgment in a NEPA ease on the sole ground that
the district court erred in not engaging in ‘ta ‘sub-
stantial inquiry’ to determine whether there has been
a clear error of judgment’’ on the merits of the agency
decision. Conservation Council of North Carolina v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973).
The Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973), held that:
‘San agency's decision should be subjected to a
review on the merits to determine if it is in accord
with substantive requirements of NEPA. The
review should be limited to determining whether
the agencies’ decision is arbitrary or capricious.
‘The Court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the ageney,’ ’’ quoting from
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
See also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; Hanley.
Kleindienst 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), and Silva
v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).
The conflict between the decision below and the
decisions of these other courts of appeals is square
and unavoidable. The question, simply put, is
whether review of agency action under NEPA ends
with a determination that a procedurally adequate im-
pact statement has been prepared and includes no in-
quiry into whether the agency has given full con-
sideration to environmental values including alterna-
tives to the proposed action or whether the environ-
mental considerations revealed by the statement have
properly entered into the agency decision to which the
impact statement relates. This question of the scope
of review in NEPA eases arises here in the context of
a truly major federal action that will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment and of
human life for years to come.* The case is therefore
an appropriate vehicle for resolving the conflict.
This Court should grant review.
Il.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling That Review of the Substantive
Agency Decision Was Not Available Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, Conflicts With Decisions of the
Second, Fourth, Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits.
The court below denied review of the termination of
the helium conservation program on any ground other
than procedural compliance with NEPA. The Helium
Act, supra, provides in part that the Administrative
Procedure Act shall apply to any ageney proceeding
and any agency action taken under the Act. 50
U.S.C. See. 167h. Nevertheless the Court below re-
fused to review the termination of the program relying
principally upon Larson vy. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1949). To the
extent that the Larsen decision precludes judicial re-
view of agency action it is in conflict with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the apparent position of
this Court as reflected in decisions such as Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, and a host of
lower court decisions which have consistently re-
8A cardinal purpose of NEPA is ‘**. .. that the Nation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations . .. .’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b) (1).
re tase hss EAN ENS Le n «OO ee BL RT OS
16
viewed agency action under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.* The NEPA contains no provisions for
judicial review, yet federal courts have unhesitatingly
reviewed agency compliance with the Act, granting
injunctive relief where non-compliance was ap-
parent. *°
Petitioners’ principal contention relating to the
merits of the decision to terminate the helium conser-
vation program is that the termination was incon-
® Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970): Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Littell
v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971); Estrada v. Ahrens,
296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961); Ballerina Pen. Co. v. Kunzig, 433
F.2d 1204, 1207, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk Heating &
Plbg. Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;
Steinthal and Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;
Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pace
Co. v. Resor, 344 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), reversed on
other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971); State Highway
Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1105 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) ;
Local 2677, American Federation of Government Employees v.
Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973); National Council of
Community Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897
(D.D.C. 1973); Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F.
Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1973) and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
” Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Hanley v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conser-
vation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Con-
servation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 665
(4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (Ast Cir. 1973) ;
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Frochlke, 477 F.2d 1033
(Sth Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973);
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Hopewell Township
Citizens 1-95 Committee v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) ;
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973) and Indian Lookout Alliance vy. Volpe, 484 F.2d
11 (18th Cir. 1973).
ee ee ee
17
sistent with the provisions and intent of the Helium
Act, particularly when those provisions are interpreted,
as they must be **to the fullest extent possible,” in ac-
cordance with the policies set forth in NEPA." The
argument in brief is: Congress by the Helium <Act
Amendments of 1960 authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to embark on a program of conserving helium;
implicitly he was necessarily authorized to terminate
any such program when it had fulfilled its purpose;
the Secretary entered into the helium supply contracts
that constitute the conservation program and provided
in each of them for termination when, on his judg-
ment, the conservation purposes of the Helium <Act
have been fulfilled (p. 5, n. 2, supra); unless the
circumstances set*forth in the contractual termination
clauses exist and lead the Secretary rationally to the
judgment that those purposes have been fulfilled, he
has neither contractual nor statutory authority to ter-
minate the program; in fact, the circumstances do not
exist, and therefore the Secretary’s action in purport-
ing to terminate the program is illegal.
™ Section 102(1) of NEPA states that the Congress ‘‘ authorizes
and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be inter-
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this Act ...’’ When, as in the cases cited at pp. 13-14, supra,
a court holds that agency action may be set aside as arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion, 5 U.S.C. $706(2)(A), for
failure to comply with the substantive standards of NEPA, it
presumably is relying on the requirement of administration in
accordance with NEPA policies laid down in §$ 102(1). Petitioners
chose to emphasize the requirement that publie laws be interpreted
in accordance with NEPA policies. On this view agency action
that, without warrant, does not accord with NEPA policies would
be set aside as ‘‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations .. .,°° 5 U.S.C. $706(2)(C). Different wavs of stat-
ing substantially the same claim should not affect the standard of
review.
18
Apart from a conclusory, afterthought statement of
the Court of Appeals that ‘‘we fail to perceive any
violation of the 1960 Helium Act Amendments,” which
clearly does not suffice to dispose of a serious, sub-
stantial legal argument, petitioners have not been heard
on this claim.”
The Court of Appeals’ discussion of why petitioners
could not be heard on this claim is confused. What-
ever the court intended as its reasons, however, the
important question raised by its effectively depriving
petitioners of their day in court is important enough to
to warrant review and resolution by this Court.
First, the court said in its original opinion affirm-
ing the preliminary injunction that, aside from NEPA
considerations, the termination action was one entirely
12 Nor have they been heard on their claim that the termination
was illegal because the Secretary did not decide to terminate but
instead the decision was made for him by officials of the Office of
Management and Budget. To this claim the Court of Appeals
made the wholly unresponsive answer that ‘‘the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget does not have the authority to dictate to the
Secretary the decision that he is to make in connection with a
contract entered into and terminable by him.’’ (App. 16a).
The court's statement is true, and it is indeed the heart of peti-
tioners’ claim of illegality on this score. But it only states the
issue, not the resolution of it. The court mistook a statement of
a legal conclusion for a statement of what in fact happened. The
District Court did not have to reach the issue of termination by
an unauthorized official. The indications that the OMB dictated
the first termination of the conservation program in 1971 were
disclosed as a result of the trial process in the Court of Claims in
Northern Heler Co. vy. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
Petitioners urged below that, were the issue to be reached, they
could not be restricted to argument on the administrative record
but must have an evidentiary trial to ascertain OMB’s role in
the 1973 termination. The effect of the Court of Appeals’ judg-
ment in this respect is to deprive petitioners of a trial to which
they were entitled on the undenied allegations of their verified
amended complaints.
ee ee
19
within the discretion of the Secretary. 455 F.2d at
653 (App. 75a). In the decision below it adhered to its
views that **the Secretary was not compelled to pur-
chase any helium; that the matter was left to his
discretion and he was within his rights in terminating
the contracts.’ If this was intended as a statement
that agency action respecting helium conservation is
so far ‘committed to agency discretion by law’’ that,
according to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2), review of the action
eannot be had, it is obviously inconsistent with this
Court’s opinions in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, supra at 410 (1971).
In Overton Park, this Court said that the **com-
mitted to agency discretion”’ exception to the general
rule of reviewability under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act is a very narrow one, limited to those cases
in which ‘‘there is no law to apply.’’ In this case
there plainly is law to apply in the Helium Act as that
statute is illuminated by the policies of NEPA.”
3 Indeed, neither in this case nor in a very significant related
ease has the Secretary argued that he has untrammeled discretion
to terminate the contracts whenever and in whatever circumstances
he wishes. The related case is the suit of the fourth helium supply
contractor for damages in the Court of Claims based upon the
Government's failure to pay for helium before the attempted 1971
termination of the contracts. The Court of Claims found a breach
by virtue of nonpayment. Northern Helex Co. v. United States,
455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972). The case is awaiting the decision of a
Court of Claims trial judge on the issue of damages. The Govern-
ment in its argument in that case that the subsequent 1971 ter-
mination limits the damages for which it is liable to those sus-
tained before the termination, acknowledges that to be valid. the
termination must have been based on a rationally supported
judgment that the purchase of helium was no longer necessary
to achieve the purposes of the Helium Act. The argument there
is over the breadth of the ‘‘purposes’’ of the statute that must
have been fulfilled to justify termination. Thus, the suggestion
of the court below that there is no law to apply is untenable, even
on respondents’ view.
ar 7 — PLE . . =e Satine - - + 0} er: © ETE Ee
20
A second possible basis for the Court of Appeals’
decision to dismiss several of petitioners’ claims with-
out hearing is the suggestion in its opinion that in-
junctive relief cannot be had in a suit that arises in
the context of a government contract. (App. 7a). The
court, without explanation, excepted from its ban suits
to compel compliance with the procedural commands
of NEPA. (App. 8a). The erection of an otherwise
impenetrable barrier to injunctive suits involving
agency action is inconsistent with this Court’s govern-
ing decisions. The court below invoked some of these
decisions, including particularly Larson vy. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., supra. However, Larson
and the other modern sovereign immunity cases stand
squarely opposed to the proposition that there is any
all-inclusive ban on equitable suits to redress griev-
ances arising from government contracts.
Were there any such ban, Larson itself could have
been decided very simply and without contributing as
it has to the subtleties of sovereign immunity analysis.
For in Larson there was a contract of sale, and the
plaintiff there could have sued for damages in the
Court of Claims. Instead of deciding the ease on
that ground, however, the Court engaged in a lengthy
discussion in the course of which it set forth rules that
still guide decisions—notably, for purposes of this case,
the rule that, if an officer has acted beyond his statutory
authority, he cannot invoke the sovereign’s immunity
to forestall judicial inquiry into his conduct.
In this case there are substantial allegations that
contracts were terminated by officials acting in excess
of their statutory authority. The fact that damages
may be available to redress private wrongs under the
Tucker Act because of such action does not prevent
eS
21
courts from passing upon such allegations in an in-
junction suit to vindicate the public interest, which
is otherwise trammeled by the ageney action. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Larson, said in a
statement to which the majority of the Court took no
exception that *‘the general statute permitting suit in
a Court of Claims in certain instances against the Gov-
ernment is not a statute that provides that remedies
otherwise at the plaintiff's command are to be dis-
placed.”” 337 U.S. at 722. To be sure, there are cases,
such as Wells vy. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918), much
relied on by respondents below, in which there is no
significant public interest element in a government
contract dispute and the Tucker Act damages remedy
is therefore adequate for the redress of private wrongs.
But that is obviously not this ease. Here the public
interest is gravely implicated.
Finally, the Court of Appeals said that ‘‘we reject
the plaintiff’s argument that review of the termination
is permissible under the Administrative Procedure(s)
Act.”” (App. 8a) If this statement was intended
to add anything to what the court had already said by
way of dismissal of petitioners’ substantive claims,
it was a reaffirmation of the Tenth Cireuit’s holding
that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
now 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, is not a waiver of sovereign
immunity as to agency action within its scope. See
Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968).
That holding conflicts with decisions of the courts of
appeals of four other circuits and several district
courts that Section 10 is such a waiver.’ This Court
has not decided this question relating to the scope and
See cases cited in footnotes 9 and 10 supra.
as A BREET EELS oS TEER ET IDA IE Se! oN ~ : LOD x bh God FAN Se TA Aa li i que
22
effect of Section 10 even though the APA is now more
than a gvarter-century old. It should resolve the
conflict now.
ITI.
The Court of Appeals Applied a Standard of Judicial Review
of Impact Statements Under NEPA That Conflicts With
the Standard Applied by Other Circuits.
Aggravating the limited view it took of the scope
of judicial review, the Court of Appeals applied an
impermissibly lenient standard of review to the only
thing it undertook to review at all, the impact state-
ment.
In its consideration of the adequacy of the impact
statement. the District Court applied the ‘‘arbitrary
and eapricious’’ standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),
with all that standard was said by this Court in Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra
at 415-16 (1971), to imply in the way of a ‘‘substan-
tial inquiry’’ and ‘‘a thorough, probing in-depth re-
view.’ (App. 45a) In a long and thoughtful opinion,
the District Court had regard not only to the face of
the impact statement but also to the content of the
statement—the full range of scientific and technical
opinion on helium supply, helium uses and helium
demand. It found that such material, readily avail-
able to the Interior Department, was ignored in many
aspects of the impact statement.” (App. 51a-68a)
1 Tllustratively, the court found the statement flawed by its
failure to discuss the disputed issue of whether alternative helium
gas supplies would be available in the future (App. 65a-66a) ; its
apparent obliviousness to the impact on developing energy and
other technology of the future unavailability of helium, which is
well-documented elsewhere (App. 56a-58a) ; and its lack of analysis
of the environmental impact of alternative future helium recovery
techniques (App. 58a-60a).
23
The Court of Appeals rejected the searching stand-
ard of review applied by the District Court and pur-
ported to follow **the better reasoned decisions,”’ which
it said permitted no more than a determination, based
on the face of the impact statement, whether the agency
made ‘tan objective good faith effort to comply with
the statutory procedural requirements.’* (App. 10a.)
Such a standard of review, which the court elsewhere
deseribed as a ‘‘rule of reason,’’ ean find no support in
any pertinent statute and far from according with
‘better reasoned decisions,”’ conflicts with the decisions
of other courts of appeals in reviewing NEPA impact
statements.
Other circuits have undertaken a careful review to
determine the sufficiency of impact statement on their
merits. In doing so, these courts have not second-
cuessed ‘*the scientists, experts, economists and plan-
ner who make the environmental statement,’’ which
Judge Breitenstein, in his concurring opinion acknow]l-
edging the conflict on this point (p. 10, supra), viewed
as the necessary alternative to his court’s lenient stand-
ard of review. (App. 18a.) Rather, they have acted
to ensure that NEPA serves its purpose as an ‘‘action-
forcing’? statute, Calrert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-
mittee v. AEC, supra at 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
by carefully reviewing what the experts have written,
in the light of what is known or ean readily be ascer-
tained about the subject of the statement, to see whether
the statement is in fact the ‘*single coherent and com-
prehensive environmental analysis,’’ Greene County
Planning Ba. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). called for by the
statute. Only thus can there be any guarantee that
the immediate decision-maker and the others for whom
we I RN Se LLL LALIT CL OE OLEH eI Ds . Aas a ARNE
24
impact statements are intended—themselves typically
non-experts—have the benefit of the systematic laying
out of environmental considerations affecting a pro-
posed action. Only thus can there be assurance that the
ultimate purpose of NEPA, described once by the
Court below itself as a mandate ‘‘that action can be
taken only following complete awareness on the part of
the actor of the environmental consequences of his
action,’’ 455 F.2d at 656, is served.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has emphasized the duty of reviewing courts
to determine whether the agency preparing an impact
statement has properly included and considered in its
analysis relevant technical and scientific opinion avail-
able to it that may conflict with its own views. That
court has held that NEPA requires impact statements
at the very least to identify and evince an awareness
of significant conflicting scientific and technical opin-
ion that is responsible and available to the agency.
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 783, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Committee
for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,
795 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A standard of review limited
to determining from the face of the impact statement
whether there was a ‘‘good faith effort to comply with
the statutory procedural requirements”’ is at odds with
the rigorous standard of review that the District of
Columbia Cireuit and other circuits have raised.
Most recently, the First Circuit said in Silva v.
Lynn, supra at 1283:
‘In identifying the source of review power courts
have, as did the district court here, drawn on
NEPA itself, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. and the gen-
eral ‘‘federal question’’ power, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
cieieenmtnieieing >
25
We think an alternative source, equally applicable
is the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 702
and 706. In any eveut, the judicial inquiries are
whether the agency’s findings and conclusions in
the EIS are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,
and whether the agency followed the procedures
required by law.”’
The court found the impact statement there in issue
to be inadequate in that it lacked sufficient discussion
of alternatives and a reasoned basis for the choices
made.
In operational terms, the court below in this case
has adopted a standard that is satisfied by ‘‘a catalog
of environmental facts,’’ Environmental Defense Fund
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972), and an
incomplete catalog at that."
The District Court applied the standard of review
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2)(A) and found glaring deficiencies in the impact
statement. (App. 5la-68a). The Court of Appeals
ignored the record below in a comment unrelated to
the issues presented saying that ‘‘the statement did
not have to dwell on the imaginary horribles posed by
the plaintiffs.’”” (App. 14a). The issues presented
to the District Court and the Court of Appeals were,
as required, supported solidly by the record in this
ease. To avoid review by a statement as quoted above
permits an agency to completely circumvent NEPA
which requires the agency, among other things, to
16The notion that NEPA is merely a full-disclosure law has
been flatly rejected. So to construe NEPA would render it a
‘paper tiger’’. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC,
supra.
Ee 7
Pardee: te T°
26
compare ‘“‘the net balance [of benefits and environ-
mental risks] for the proposed project with the en-
vironmental risks presented by alternative courses of
action.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
This Court should review the decision below to de-
termine whether the standard for judging the adequacy
of environmental impact statements is to be the lenient
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit or the more rig-
orous standard applied by other Courts of Appeals.
Only the latter, we submit, will ensure that impact
statements serve the high purposes intended for them
by Congress.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the writ of certiorari
prayed for should issue.
Respectfully submitted,
Rosert L. ACKERLY
RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR
SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street. N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006
Of Counsel:
Emmet A. BLAES
WENDELL J. DocGeTt JocHEMS, SARGENT & BLAES
General Counsel & 200 East Pirst Street
_ Secretary Wichita, Kansas 67201
National Helium
Corporation Attorneys for
P. 0. Box 1642 Petitioner, National
Houston, Texas 77001 Helium Corporation
Of Counsel:
R. Price Hlowarp
Senior Counsel
Phillips Petroleum
Company
Bartlesville, Oklahoma
74003
Witulam H. ALLEN
EUGENE D. GULLAND
COVINGTON & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
JOSEPH W. KENNEDY
Morris, Lainc, EVANs,
Brock & KENNEDY,
(CHARTERED
Suite 430
200 West Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67202
Attorneys for
Petitioner, Phillips
Petroleum Company
Ropert L. ACKERLY
RayMONp S. E. PUSHKAR
SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006
Wituram S. RICHARDSON
ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND
MALONE, CHARTERED
P. O. Box 1034
Wichita, Kansas 67201
DanteL R. HOPKINS
P. O. Box 25128
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
73125
Attorneys for
Petitioner, Cities Service
Heler, Ine.
kia ret te er
\ISRARY *&
SUPT, OL ge
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1973
No 78-1129
NATIONAL HELIUM CORPORATION,
and
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
and
CITIES SERVICE HELEx, INc.,
Petitioners,
Vs
Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior,
and
Exstrt F. Osporn, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of Interior,
Respondents.
—_—————_—_
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH CIRCUIT
————_—_
Press or Byron S. Apams Printinc, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.
=S.
2
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Page
Opinions BELow:
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th
Cle. B0FE) vc cccccnscvertsrveavesvescauesessers la
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78
(D. Kan. 1973) .....cccccccccsccescccsccnccces 19a
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th
Che, TFG) vnc nese ccnsacSccesevenverstesrentees 73a
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151
(D. Kan. 1971) ........cccccersccvcvcccccccces 83a
Judgment, Tenth Cireuit Court of Appeals, October
TE. DUSE c h cnc cbderesestvccestonsseeeveseaviess 140a
Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts by the Sec-
retary, Department of Interior, February 2, 1973 97a
STATUTES:
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
Beetions 4321-4335 (1970) ....csvcccvvcsvssvens 120a
Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. Sections 167-167n (1970) ..... 124a
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
Sections 701-706 (1970) ....ccsccscvescccsceces 136a
la
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
SerreMsBer Term, 1973
NationaL Hetium Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
Pururps PerroLeum CoMPANY
and
Citres Service Hetex, Ixc.,
Intervenor-Plaintiff-
Appellees,
v.
Rocers C. B. Mortox, Secretary of the Interior, and -
Exbvrt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior,
Defendants-A ppellants.
Nos. 73-1169
73-1449
Opinion
Before Brerrensters, Hit and Doyte, Cireuit Judges.
Doyte, Cireuit Judge.
This cause has been appealed on prior occasions. In
National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th
Cir. 1971), the district court had ruled that helium pur-
chase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium Act,
50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. could not be terminated by the See-
CEB, Or ee
2a
retary of the Interior without the filing by the Interior
Department of an environmental impact statement in
accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. This court affirmed
that decision, holding that the Department was required
to comply with this provision of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). Following the filing of an
environmental impact statement by the Department, the
Secretary again terminated the helium purchase contracts
and once again plaintiffs-appellees filed an injunction suit
in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. The district court again enjoined the Secretary.
On this occasion it was due to the dissatisfaction of the
court with the impact statement. There have been two
other appeal proceedings presented to us. One of these
involved the scope of the retrial—whether it was to be an
agency review or a de novo hearing. The other had to do
with efforts of plaintiffs-appellees to discover government
documents.
The district court filed the decision leading to the instant
appeal on June 11, 1973. It again enjoined the Secretary
of the Interior from terminating three of the helium pur-
chase contracts. Although the Department had filed an
impact statement the court ruled that it had failed to
comply with the mandate of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969; that the impact statement, if not
deficient in scope, was essentially lacking in depth. At
present, then, the primary issue before the court is whether
the Department’s impact statement or report was in accord-
ance with the statutory standards and in accordance with
this court's mandate in the prior ease.
Qn the prior occasion and now the Secretary terminated
the contracts pursuant to their express termination provi-
sions. He did so on the basis that the helium program
had been substantially carried out. The mentioned provi-
sions authorize him to terminate when there has been a
substantial diminution in helium requirements, discovery of
3a
large new helium resources or other changes of a similar
nature.’
At the time that these contracts were entered into, the
U.S. helium requirements amounted to 530 million eubie
feet of helium per year. This requirement increased in
subsequent years, but commenced to decline in 1967 and has
declined every year since so that in the year 1970 the
demand had decreased to 400 million cubic feet. An
average of 3.126 billion cubie feet of helium had been pur-
chased each year. In the years 1971-72 the demand dimin-
ished in substantial amounts and all of the purchases have
decreased, although they continue to be in excess of two
billion cubie feet annually. During this entire purchase
period the government through the Bureau of Mines had
purchased enough helium to meet all of its needs and has
not needed to use the purchased helium. Furthermore, the
government believes that it has much more of a supply than
can possibly be used between now and 2000. It is estimated
that it is six times as much as will be needed.
1In our prior opinion, 455 F.2d at 653, we said:
Under the Act the Secretary is not required to purchase
any helium. The entire matter is left to his discretion. In
deciding to terminate the contract the Secretary stated that
the basic purposes of the Act had been fulfilled, that is that
the 25-year purchase program envisioned by the Act was
unnecessary because as of the time of termination his esti-
mates showed that there was enough helium in storage to
fulfill government requirements through 1995. The Secretary
notified the companies on January 26, 1971, that the contracts
would be terminated effective March 27, 1971. In his letter he °
stated that there had been a diminution in the requirements of
helium for essential governmental activities, and that there had
been new discoveries since the execution of the contract, which
discoveries had provided large sources of available helium if
more of the gas ‘‘is required for essential government activ-
ities than is now in storage or will be recovered in govern-
ment plants.”
28 SY RE
da
Following this court’s decision the Interior Department
proceeded at once to conduct a study leading to the prepar-
ation and filing of an environmental impact statement. The
initial draft was submitted to interested parties, including
the plaintiffs, and comments were received. These are in-
cluded as part of the report of the Department. The final
environmental statement was issued November 13, 1972.
The hearing in the district court consisted of a judicial
review of the administrative record. It was not a trial
de novo. (This was in accordance with the adjudication of
this court after the mentioned interlocutory appeal.) The
proceedings in the district court were extensive as to the
composition of the administrative record. Plaintiffs had
full opportunity to express their views, and the court’s
opinion was thorough and exhaustive.
In its final decision the court ruled that it was limited to
determining whether the agency’s action was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. It concluded that the Depart-
ment’s effort in preparing the impact statement was an in-
sufficient one which failed to come up to the mentioned
standard in numerous respects. It characterized the state-
ment as ‘‘feeble,’’ ‘‘obviously incomplete,’’ ‘‘appallingly
deficient,’’ ‘‘startling in its brevity and lack of depth,’’ and,
finally, said that the statement totally failed to consider
the environmental impact of termination. The court dis-
approved the statement in its entirety and remanded the
cause for further proceedings.
Reversal is demanded on the following grounds:
First, it is contended that there was a lack of jurisdiction
for the district court to even entertain the case in view of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision (rendered since our
last decision) in United States v. Students Chal. Reg. Agey.
Pro. (SCRAP), —— USS. , 93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973).
Second, the environmental! statement was valid and suf-
ficient ; the district court erred in condemning it.
—*
5a
Third, the Secretary complied with the procedural re-
quirements of NEPA as well as with this court’s mandate.
Hence, there was no justification for issuing the injunction.
Fourth, the district court erred in considering grounds
other than sufficiency of F.E.S. since it lacked authority
to enjoin for any ground except noncompliance with NEPA.
1.
JURISDICTION
A. WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY IS
SUPERSEDED BY NEPA.
First we consider the renewed challenge to jurisdiction.
As above noted, this question was determined adversely to
the government in the early appeal. See 455 F.2d at 653-
54. The government now urges that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, supre, has changed the
applicable law and that this issue must be reexamined. In
this recent case the Supreme Court reviewed the decision
of the District of Columbia three-judge court which en-
joined a proposed railroad rate increase of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Under that Act a railroad is required to
give at least 30 days notice for carrying out a proposed rate
increase. During this period the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission may, pursuant to $15(7) of the Act, suspend the
operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven
months pending an investigation and decision of the lawful-
ness of the new rates. The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion refused to suspend the rate increase and the environ-
mental issue arose from the fact that the increase involved
a 2.5 percent surcharge on nearly all freight rates. Plain-
tiffs alleged that the modified rate structure would dis-
courage the transportation of recyclable material and pro-
mote the use of raw materials which compete with scrap
material and would thereby affect the environment. The
Court based its decision on Arrow Transportation Co, v,
a a . 3 ce
rr rrr ere Fee eed
6a
Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963), which had held
that Congress had in the ICC Act vested exclusive power in
the ICC to suspend rates pending final decision and had
deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant this relief;
the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction.
It seems apparent that the case at bar differs from the
so-called SCRAP decision in that the Helium Act does not
vest the Secretary with the same kind of regulatory
authority as was present in the SCRAP case. The holding
that NEPA did not subvert the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission was not surprising since the Com-
mission is a tribunal in its own right with peculiarly exelu-
sive authority within its sphere.
The SCRAP decision does create at least a shadow of
doubt as to whether the Secretary’s power was undermined
by NEPA. The fact, however, that it gives pause is not
enough because the differences between the two conditions
are marked.
The district court held that additional bases of jurisdic-
tion existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question),
§ 1361 (action to compel a federal officer to perform his
duty), and §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments). Jur-
isdiction on other than NEPA grounds becomes important
only if we find compliance with NEPA. This argument is
superfluous since NEPA furnishes a jurisdictional base,
and the case being properly in federal court it is there for
all purposes. Hence, we have no concern over jurisdiction
outside the NEPA base.
B. Contract TERMINATION—UskE or INJUNCTION
The trial court did not follow this court’s mandate that
the only issue giving the district court jurisdiction to enter-
tain the injunction suit was the noncompliance with the re-
quirement of an impact statement. We stated in our
former opinion that the Secretary was not compelled to
purchase any helium; that the matter was left to his dis-
7a
cretion and he was within his rights in terminating the con-
tracts. We adhere to these views.
We have fully considered the Supreme Court cases which
prohibit injunctive relief against governmental officers on
account of their upholding the rights of the government
arising under a contract. Such a suit is distinguished by
the Supreme Court from actions seeking compensations for
an alleged wrong and are regarded as actions against the
sovereign to which there has not been consent. See Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S.
682 (1949).?
It is fundamental that the Tucker Act which contains a
limited consent of the United States to be sued does not
authorize an action in injunction. See Richardson v.
Morris, U.S. ——, 93 S.Ct. 629 (1973) and United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
We view the action seeking to require the Department to
file an impact statement to stand on a different footing in
2In distinguishing between actions seeking damages and suits
like the case at bar, the Supreme Court said:
But the reasoning is not applicable to suits for specific relief.
For, it is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen
may be compensated for a wrong done to him by the Gov-
ernment. It is a far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsive powers to restraiin the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act. There are the strongest
reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot be
had against the sovereign. The Government as representative
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks
by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property
or contract right. As was early recognized, ‘‘the interference
of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties
of the executive departments of the government, would be
productive of nothing but mischief. * * * ”’
337 U.S. at 704. See also some of the numerous other cases which
support the Larson holding: Dugan vy. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ;
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 (1941).
So ee Se
8a
relationship to the sovereign immunity doctrine and the
cited cases because the action merely seeks * to obtain com-
pliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 and is not for the purpose of asserting and enforcing a
private right. Also, if the impact statement is to be mean-
ingful the requirement must be virtually absolute. Thus,
we conceive of the review of the Secretary’s action as being
strictly limited to compliance with the requirement of the
environmental impact statement. This, of course, includes
consideration given to the statement by the Secretary, for if
he failed to consider it his action would assume arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness.
Efforts to enjoin the Secretary from terminating the
contracts for an indefinite period of time must, of course,
fail. We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that review of the
termination is permissible under the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. We fail to perceive any violation of the 1960
Helium Act Amendments.
II.
Next we consider whether the Secretary and the Depart-
ment fulfilled the requirements of § 4332. A primary issue
is the scope and the test of judicial review. First, what is
the standard to be used in such review and, second, whether
the court correctly assessed the agency’s action in the light
of the NEPA requirements.
A. Tue Staxparp To Be Apptiep.
The specific procedural requirements of NEPA are de-
lineated in 42 U.S.C. $4332. Section 4332(2)(A)-(H)
imposes specific procedural duties on federal agencies, one
of which is the duty of preparing a detailed impact state-
ment to accompany any recommendation for a major federal
action significantly affecting the environment. The require-
5 Since the defendants are engaged in upholding a publie right
they can only be acting pursuant to publie laws.
9a
ments of this impact statement contained in § 4332(2)(C)
include five specific areas to be covered in the impact state-
ment:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
_ (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposed be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of the man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-terin productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
The trial court employed the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’
standard of § 706 of the APA.‘ This sets aside the action
if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-
wise not in accordance with law. The trial court pur-
portedly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-
14 (1971). This ease did not, however, involve the prepara-
tion of an environmental impact statement. This was a
review of the decision of the Secretary of Transportation
in respect to the building of a highway through a park. This
was in truth ‘‘agency action.’’ The decision of the Sec-
retary in Overton Park was concerned with the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act of 1966 and the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968. In assessing the adequacy of the
impact statement, we are not here reviewing, as we said
above, agency action within the meaning of $706 of the
APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA require-
ment which is, to be sure, a prerequisite for agency action
but is not agency action itself. The trial court’s conclu-
4 National Helium Company, et al. v. Morton, No. W-4568, filed
June 11, 1973 (D. Kansas), page 26.
10a
sion that it was required by Overton Park to apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard was, in our view,
erroneous.
The better reasoned decisions have required an objective
good faith effort to comply with the statutory procedural
requirements. Other than that, the courts have demanded
that the agency do more than mechanically pursue the pro-
eedural standards. Thus, in Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Com. v.
United States A. E. Com’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the court added to the good faith standard by saying that
the agency must comply with the procedural requirements
to the fullest extent possible. The same Cireuit in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), has said that the procedural
requirements are not intended to be a straitjacket or to
demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible.
Finally, the most recent decision of the D.C. Circuit,
Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission, D.C. Cir., No. 72-1331, June 12, 1973,
expounds the standards more clearly than eatlier decisions:
It is apparent, however, that the Commission seeks to
avoid issuing its forthcoming ‘‘environmental survey’’
as an impact statement under Section 102, not out of
any desire to cireumvent NEPA’s procedural require-
ments, but rather because of a fear that Section 102’s
requirements as to the contents of an impact statement
are so strict, particularly as to the need for ‘‘detail’’
in the statement, that any Commission attempt to issue
its environmental survey as a NEPA statement would
be doomed to failure. While we do not altogether
understand the Commission’s fears, we feel they are
based on certain misapprehensions as to what NEPA
requires.
* * * #
Accordingly, if the Commission’s environmental
survey is prepared and issued in accordance with
NEPA procedures, and if the Commission makes a
good faith effort in the survey to describe the reason-
jo owen jaatiiieeiatae
lla
ably foreseeable environmental impact of the program,
alternatives to the program and their reasonably for-
seeable environmental impact, and the irreversible and
irretrievable commitment of resources the program in-
volves, we see no reason why the survey will not fully
satisfy the requirements of Section 102(C).
The environmental impact statement should be placed in
perspective. The relevant provisions bring environmental
factors into the agency decision-making placing them on an
equal footing with economic, technical and other considera-
tions. .Also, this environmental impact statement serves as
<ource material for the head of the agency, the Congress, for
the President and the public. See Calvert Cliffs’ supra. If
the agency had failed altogether to follow out the procedure
required by NEPA, the arbitrary and capricious standard
might well apply. That is not our present problem. The
rule of reason is a more appropriate standard where the
sufficiency of the statement is being tested.’
5 The cases cited by the trial court as calling for a ‘careful
review’? of agency action in environmental cases do not support
the trial court’s use of the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious”’ standard
in assessing the factual adequacy of an impact statement. Calvert
Cliffs’ did not involve the review of an impact statement. Scenic
Hudson was concerned with the adequacy of an agency's decision,
not the adequacy of the impact statement contributing to that
decision. N.R.D.C. v. Morton dealt with the legal question of
whether an agency's impact statement could exclude environmental
alternatives merely because the agency had no specifie authority
to implement them. E.D.F. v. Corps of Engineers is somewhat
confusing in its discussion of the standard of review. Careful
examination of the case reveals, however, that the language about
using the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious”’ test refers to review of
agency decisions rather than the factual sufticieney of impact state-
ments. The court actually adopted the ‘‘rule of reason’” test
which we have here approved when it assessed the factual suffi-
ciency of the agency’s compliance with §102(2)(D) of NEPA.
470 F.2d at 297. A similar test would presumably be applied by
that court in assessing the factual adequacy of other procedural
requirements under § 102, including preparation of the impact
statement.
12a
In summary, then, our view is that the review of FES is
limited to the following:
(1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA.
(2) Whether the environmental impact statement
constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the
demands of NEPA.
(3) Whether the statement contains a reasonable dis-
cussion of the subject matter involved in the five re-
quired areas.
III.
The remaining issue and the crucial one in the case per-
tains to the adequacy of the Final Environmental State-
ment testing it by the five prescribed areas set forth in
$ 4332(2)(C), supra.
As a preface, we note that there is some dispute as to
whether the comments which were given by the various
agencies and institutions to which the draft environmental
statement were sent are to be regarded as a part of the
Final Statement. The Department solicited, received and
considered comments from many interested parties, includ-
ing the plaintiff-appellees. They contend that the various
comments are not to be considered as a part of the Final
Statement. However, we disagree. These were incor-
porated into the Final Statement and were available for
consideration by all interested parties and are available for
the information of the President, the Congress and the
public. Those commenting included the various agencies
within the Interior Department and teu other federal
agencies, including the National Science F oundation, Atomic
Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.
In addition, there were comments of three states, various
scientific groups and a number of business and educational
institutions. Moreover, the Final Environmental State-
@ mes a
13a
ment shows that the comments were considered by the
authors of the statement. The cases hold that the comments
are to be regarded as an integral part of the statement.
See Con. Council of N. Car. v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222
(M.D.N.C. 1972), and Environmental D. Fund, Inc. v. Corps.
of Eng. of U.S. Army, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark.
W.D. 1972).
In general, the district court found fault’ with the fact
that the impact statement did not deal adequately with
economic feasibility. In our judgment, however, this sub-
ject was treated sufficiently insofar as it affected the
environmental consequences which, after all, are the import-
ant factors to be considered. The role of the Final Environ-
mental Statement is to enunciate the environmental consid-
erations for the benefit of the decision-makers.
We are of the opinion that consideration of the five sub-
jects prescribed by the statute was sufficient.
(i) Environmental impact of the proposed action.
There is no contention that the loss of helium, should it
be lost, will affect the environment. It is, after all, a color-
less, odorless, nonflammable, inert gas. Therefore, the
matter to be weighed, and which the impact statement did
weigh in accordance with our mandate in the previous case,
is the secondary effect, namely, loss of the resource. As
we have noted above, the supply which the government has
in storage is sufficient to the year 2000 and perhaps beyond.
Continued purchases by the government would at best
extend the inventory for a period of from four to fourteen
years. Thus, it would not solve the problem of the future
use of it. The Final Environmental Statement considers the
recovery of helium from the atmosphere. It considers the
amount of electrical power which would be required and the
effects of the generation of such power on air and thermal
pollution. It notes that the extent of use of helium beyond
the year 2000 is conjectural and speculative, and thus the
rr cs re nw ore - oe - —
l4a
effect on the atmosphere of recovering the helium is itself
conjectural. For our purpose the statement took into con-
sideration all of the possibilities and it was not required to
do more than this.
(ii) Adverse environmental effects which are unavoidable.
The statement points out the future problems of recap-
turing the lost helium if it is necessary.
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action
The statement considers several alternatives, including
reliance on the normal market process, expansion of the
helium program by legislative action, use of leaner gases
and recapture from the atmosphere. The discussion in
our view satisfies the present requirement and the state-
ment did not have to dwell on the imaginary horribles posed
by the plaintiffs.°
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long term productivity.
That which appears in parts i, ii, and iii above considers
the present question. The statement took into account the
known sources and supplies together with the possible uses
such as generation and transmission of electrical power for
nuclear reactors, for the space program, for levitation sys-
tem of mass transportation and for cyrogenies.
We disagree with the trial court’s finding that the impact
statement’s failure to consider the alternative of making
the helium purchase program financially self-sustaining was
a fatal defect. Such an alternative is somewhat obvious
in that it would be a continuation of the present purchase
program. This alternative is discussed in the statement.
*Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15a
The impact of this alternative is implicit in the diseussion
of the several alternatives mtained in the Final Statement.
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
The termination which is the proposed action is reversible
by continuation of one or more of the contracts in modified
form or by the negotiation of new contracts or by congres-
sional action. Should the contracts be cancelled, and should
the company shut down their separation plants, the helium
which is now preserved would, of course, be lost. Beyond
this. hard and fast predictions about the effect of termina-
tion of helium purchases on the technology which we would
have in the Twenty-First Century would be nothing more
than speculation. We consider the subject matter suffici-
ently diseussed in the Final Statement. There is enough
there to alert the decision-makers and others concerned,
Apart from the five eategoris, ¢ 4322(2)(C) requires that
the Department ‘*consult with and obtain the comments of*’
federal agencies having jurisdiction or special expertise
with respect to any environmental impact involved in a con-
templated action. The impact statemeat meets the standard
preseribed by § 4522(2)(C) in this regard, when viewed in
light of the ‘*rnle of reason”’ we have the approved. The
requirement should not be viewed as necessitating that the
completion of an impact statement be unreasonably or
interminably delayed in order to include all potential com-
ments or the results of works in progress which might shed
some additional light on the subject of the impact state-
ment. Such a result would often inordinately delay or pre-
vent any decision in environmental cases. The courts
should look for adequacy and completeness in an impact
statement, not perfection. E.D.F. v. Corps of Engineers,
470 F.2d at 297. In this particular case this court expressed
the opinion that an ultimate resolution of the issues involved
in this case was urgent and should be expedited, 455 F.2d
es ed SO EDN I OR EB oe
l6a
657. The initial impact statement was not issued unti!
May 16, 1972, and the Final Statement issued on Noven.ber
5, 1972. To have delayed the statement any longer would
have flown in the face of what we considered a reasonable
time for preparation of the statement.
It is also contended by the parties (appellees) that the
statement is defective because of failure to state the pur-
pose of the contemplated action. Section 4332(2)(C) does
not explicitly require that the purpose of the contemplated
government action be spelled out. While in many types of
governmental action the exact purpose of the action might
be unclear and thus lead to confusion were it not stated, this
is not such a case, The self-evident purpose of the pro-
posed action here is to terminate the continued purchase
of helium reserves which the Secretary regards as economi-
cally superfluous and beyond the goals set forth in the 1960
Amendments to the Helium Act.
We see no merit in the further argument of the appellees
that the real reason for contract termination was to effect
a financial saving and that the Office of Management and
Budget dictated cancellation. The Secretary terminated the
contracts and the Office of Management and Budget does
not have authority to dictate to the Secretary the decision
that he is to make in connection with a contract entered
into and terminable by him.*
Applying the rule of reason which is enunciated in the
cases, we conclude that the statement is fully acceptable. It
‘adequately diseusses future needs and future supplies. It
weighs the costs now as opposed to the future. It is a
comprehensive and thorough document. We disagree with
the derogatory comments of the parties and the district
court regarding it.
Much time and opportunity have been extended to the
appellees, There has been much delay as a result and we
7 Walter Holm & Company v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
GIDE CDEP ns Se eae eo
17a
repeat what we have said in our prior decisions that inas-
much as the decision has been made the termination should
be carried out without delay.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed
and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the
action.
Nos. 73-1169 and 73-1449—National Helium Corporation
v. Morton
BreiteNstern, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result. It may be that my differences with
the majority go to form rather than substance.
The decision in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, U.S. —, 41 LW
4866, SCRAP, does not affect federal jurisdiction in the
instant case because we have no concern with any federal
statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on an agency. The
argument of the Government ix that this case involves
federal contracts and that the Tucker Act, 98 U.S.C. §§
1346(a)(2) and 1491, is the only statute which gives federal
courts jurisdiction over government contract cases. In the
first place, this suit does not arise out of any contract. It
;< concerned with compliance with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4821 et seq.
In the second place the Tucker Act does not equate with
the statute giving the Interstate Commerce Commission
exclusive power to suspend rates.
The general standard of judicial review of agency actions
:s found in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
£706(2)(A). The action is set aside if it is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-414. The key phrase in § 706 is
‘‘agency action.”’ NEPA directs that ‘‘to the fullest extent
possible * * * all agencies of the Federal Government shall
* * * include in every * * * major Federal action(s) signi-
ERI TIM OE LR He TET I EDEN BE
18a
ficantly affecting the quality of the human environment. a
detailed statement by the responsible official’? covering
stated subject areas. NEPA alters the decision-making
process of the federal agencies and brings environmental
factors to an equal footing with economic, technical, and
other traditional considerations, all of which must be
balanced by the decision-maker.
The issue of scope of judicial review must be divided into
two parts: first, the review of the Final Environmental
Statement (FES), second, the review of the action of the
Secretary terminating the contracts. See Wyoming Out-
door Coordinating Council v. Butz, 10 Cir., F.2d ;
slip opinion p. 12, n. 5. I believe that different standards
apply to each part.
I reject, and I believe that the majority opinion rejects,
the apparent holdings of the Eighth and Fourth Circuits
that an environmental statement is judicially reviewable on
its merits to determine sufficiency. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army, 8 Cir., 470 F.2d 289, 298, and Conservation Council
of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 4 Cir., 473 F.2d 664, 665. I
believe that judicial review of an impact statement is limited
to a determination of whether the statement is a good faith,
objective, and reasonable presentation of the subject areas
mandated by NEPA. The courts should not second-guess
the scientists, experts, economists, and planners who make
the environmental statement.
In my opinion FES is an excellent job which fully com-
plies with both the letter and the spirit of NEPA. It isa
comprehensive study which displays objectivity and good
faith. Its discussion reasonably presents the environ-
mental effects, the alternatives, the relationship between
short-term and long-term uses of man’s environment, and
the possible economic effects.
This brings me to the second question, judicial review of
the Secretary’s action terminating the contracts. Here
Pes CO. COS PN AE RY Pa
beens soe nee ren
19a
the standard is that provided by the APA. The statement
of the Seeretary at termination of the contracts shows that
in accordance with NEPA he carefully reviewed FES. His
action was not a mechanical compliance with NEPA but
rather a full consideration of FES with an understanding
and reasonable application of its comprehensive study. He
balanced the environmental factors with the other pertinent
factors. His final action was neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the district court’s
injunction was improper.
One other point should be mentioned. Neither the state-
ments of the trial nor of this court determine the contrac-
tual rights of the parties, whatever they may be. Those are
for consideration by the Court of Claims under the Tucker
Act.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, D. KANSAS
June 11, 1973.
Civ. A. No. W-4568.
NationaL HELIUM CoRPORATION, Plaintiff,
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY and C1rT1es SERVICE
Hetex, Inc., Jntervenors,
Vv.
Rocers C. B. Mortoy, Secretary of the Interior, and
Exsvrt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior, Defendants.
Decision and Opinion of the Court
Tuners, District Judge.
On March 27, 1971, this Court temporarily enjoined the
Secretary of the Interior from terminating the National
Helium Conservation Program as implemented by three
Pe eee nee ee et te ae Te eae ie oes e ” & Ae hE el SLE RRL UE PAN MSIE So . s
20a
helium procurement contracts entered into with the plain-
tiffs prior to a hearing on the merits or, alternatively, a
reconsideration by the Department of Interior of its action
in the light of the applicable substantive and procedural re-
quirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; the Helium Act,
as amended by the Helium Act Amendments of 1960, 74
Stat. 918, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq.; and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $551 et seq. National Helium
Corporation v. Morton, 326 F.Supp. 151 (D.Kan. 1971),
aff’d. 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). Of particular concern
to the Court was the failure of the Department of Interior
to prepare a final environmental impact statement prior to
taking the contemplated action. On February 2, 1973, the
Secretary of Interior again determined that the helium
procurement contracts should be terminated, since the pur-
poses of the Helium Act of 1960 had been satisfied and,
accordingly, notices were sent to the plaintiffs that termina-
tion would occur on April 4, 1973, at 8:00 a.m., C.S.T. Hav-
ing prepared a final environmental impact statement in
accordance with § 4332(2)(C) of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C., the Secretary immediately
moved for dissolution of the preliminary injunction.
In response to the defendants’ notices of termination and
motion for dissolution, the plaintiffs filed verified amended
complaints seeking, inter alia, the continuation of the pre-
liminary injunction pending a full hearing on the merits of
the case. They alleged that: (1) the defendants had not
complied with the procedural and substantive requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
et seq. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘NEPA’’), the Helium
Act Amendments of 1960, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. (herein-
after referred to as the ‘‘Helium Act’’); and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., prior to the
termination of the contracts; (2) the necessary conditions
precedent for termination of the implementing contracts
and the National Helium Conservation Program had not in
2la
fact occurred; and (3) the proposed agency action was
otherwise arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and
not in accordance with law. In support of their allegations,
the plaintiffs submitted documents, briefs, and a number of
affidavits.
On March 14, 1973, the Court heard oral argument on the
defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
The defendants contended that since a comprehensive final
environmental impact statement had been prepared, upon
which the Secretary of Interior had determined to termi-
nate the helium contracts, the Secretary’s decision was en-
titled to a presumption of regularity, and the preliminary
injunction should accordingly be dissolved. After a careful
examination of the defendants’ draft and final environ-
mental statements and the pertinent comments attached
thereto, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, and the applicable law, the Court
overruled the defendants’ motion.
The Court had already ruled that it had jurisdiction of
the suit by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1361, 2201 and 2202,
and 5 U.S.C. $$ 701-706; that the plaintiff had standing to
raise the issues herein involved; that the termination of
these contracts was a major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of human environment and posing
serious environmental consequences within the meaning of
§ 4332(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.; that the requirements
of NEPA were applicable to the Department of Interior
‘to the fullest extent possible’? in the administration of
the Helium Act by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 4332: that there
had been a sufficient showing of a likelihood of irreparable
injury to the plaintiffs and the publie if the Seeretary’s
action was not enjoined; and that the Secretary's decision
was subject to limited judicial review pursuant to $ 706(2)
(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U.S.C., Na-
tional Helium Corporation v. Morton, supra. Although the
Seeretary’s decision was entitled to a presumption of regu-
larity, ‘‘that presumption [was] not to shield his action
eee whee
from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.’’ Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415,
91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).
Since the plaintiffs’ amended complaints and supporting
documents presented a substantial controversy involving
complex factual and legal issues justifying the maintenance
of the status quo pending further hearings, and the Court
was convinced that the plaintiffs had established a proba-
bility of ultimate success, thereby justifying the issuance
of a preliminary injunction in the first instance in accord-
ance with the standards enunciated in Crowther v. Seaborg,
415 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1969), the Court determined that
the dissolution of the previous injunction would be a futile
gesture. See Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of
Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F.Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971). The Court did, however, require the
plaintiffs to post a bond in the sum of £2,000,000 for the
payment of such costs and damages as might be incurred
by defendants if they were found to have been wrongfully
restrained, and determined that this bond, along with the
twenty-eight million dollars owed by the Government to the
contractors, gave it a thirty million dollar security cushion.
The defendants immediately perfected an appeal of this
Court’s order denying their motion for dissolution of the
preliminary injunction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. In response to the defendants’ request, this Court
also certified its subsequent orders denying the defendants’
motions for summary judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P. and, in the alternative, dismissal of
the amended complaints, in part, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), F.R.C.P. The
Tenth Cireuit did not rule on any of the orders, but it did
direct that the trial on the merits should be held within
thirty days on the administrative record, rather than by
trial de novo, in conformity with the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). Having resolved the
23a
preliminary matters, reviewed the administrative record as
supplemented by the plaintiffs, and heard oral argument,
this case is ripe for final disposition.
FactuaL BackGROUND
This is a case of considerable complexity and moment.
A basic review of the characteristics of helium and the
history and development of this country’s helium conserva-
tion program, including the role played by the implement-
ing helium procurement contracts herein involved, conse-
quently serves as an instructive prelude to its resolution.
The summary which follows was gleaned from the admin-
istrative record submitted by the Department of Interior,
including numerous departmental studies, compilations,
and reports, and is supported by the findings of facts in
related litigation in Northern Natural Gas Company v.
Grounds, 292 F.Supp. 619, 624-680 (D. Kan. 1968), aff’d.
$41 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971); Air Reduction v. Hickel,
137 U.S. App. D.C. 24, 420 F.2d 592 (1969); and Northern
Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (C.CI. 1972).
Helium is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas which,
in the present state of scientific knowledge, will not react
chemically or physically with any other element, except
under laboratory conditions. Helium is non-combustible.
It is the second lightest element found on earth next to
hydrogen, which is highly combustible. Helium does not
liquefy at standard atmospheric pressure until is reaches
—452.1 degrees Fahrenheit, almost absolute zero and lower
than any other gas. It is the only known gas which can
develop superconductivity in metals. It is the best known
transmitter of sound and the best.conductor of heat at near
absolute zero of any gas. It becomes a super fluid near
absolute zero. Helium is non-toxie to man and it does not
become radioactive.
Since its discovery on the sun by Sir Norman Lockyear
in 1868, helium has grown from a laboratory curiosity with
,
carta ow en = Fi AE FOOD EE laa SN IO eR SO OMT 2
24a
no practical applications to one of the most valuable, yet
rapidly wasting, elements on earth. As measured by its
demand, helium has established itself as a tool in shielded
are welding and other metallurgical applications, lighter-
than-air applications, chromatography as a carrier gas,
leak detection, heat transfer medium in nuclear power re-
actors, pressurizing and purging liquid propellants for
space boosters, under sea work as a breathing gas when
mixed with oxygen, medical research and therapeutic treat-
ment, eryogenics, and in low temperature research. Helium
is also presently being used as a coolant in high-tempera-
ture gas-cooled reactors.
Future uses of helium for which research is presently
being carried on by the Government and private industry
include its application in such areas as power generation
by helium-cooled fission reactors, nuclear fusion reactors,
superconducting systems of generation and transmission
of power, magnetohydrodynamics, and transportation by
superconducting magnetic levitation systems, to name a
few. In the future, uses of helium are expected to develop
which are now unforeseen or unknown.
Before 1960, with minor exceptions, the production and
marketing of helium was accomplished by the Bureau of
Mines, pursuant to the Helium Act of 1925, 50 U.S.C. § 161
et seq.:
‘*An act authorizing the conservation, production, and
exploitation of helium gas, a mineral resource pertain-
ing to the national defense, and to the development of
commercial aeronautics, and for other purposes.’’ 43
Stat. 1110.
The Act authorized the Bureau of Mines to operate plants,
to store and care for helium, and to conduct exploration.
The Secretary of Interior was authorized to acquire land
or interest in land by purchase, lease or condemnation
where necessary, to provide helium to supply the needs of
25a
the Army, Navy, and other branches of the Government.
50 U.S.C. § 161. Other than a minor amendment of the Act
in 1927 in order to permit the limited leasing or selling of
helium to aid scientific and commercial development, 44
Stat. 1387, the Act remained essentially the same until 1937.
By amendment in 1937, Ch. 895, 50 Stat. 885, to the Helium
Act of 1925, Ch. 426, 43 Stat. 1110, the Secretary was di-
rected to purchase, if possible, all properties developed or
constructed by private parties for helium production prior
to the passage of the amendment.
Until the advent of World War II, the uses of helium
outside the laboratory were in lighter-than-air-craft and,
when mixed with oxygen, in medicine and deep-sea diving.
Since the Government was the predominant consumer of
helium, the emphasis of the helium program was accord-
ingly upon meeting current and short-range helium needs.
At the commencement of World War II, all helium extrac-
ion facilities were owned by the United States, and con-
sisted solely of the Amarillo Plant, located at the Cliffside
Field in Potter County, Texas, which had been purchased
in 1933.
During World War II, the usefulness of helium was
broadened considerably. Four plants were built to meet
the greatly increased military need for helium, and during
the 1930’s demand for helium rose spectacularly due to the
development of new uses, including atomic weapons, nu-
clear energy plants, military and civilian rocketry, explo-
ration of outer space, eryogenics, and other uses connected
with both science and industry. As increasing helium de-
mands threatened to outstrip the production capacity of
the Bureau of Mines, concern arose regarding the future
ability to meet mobilization needs and the causal wastage
of the natural resource. In 1957, the Director, Office of
Defense Mobilization, recommended to the Secretary of
Interior that a working group be established to determine
the feasibility of making the conservation aspect of the
Swe sect rem He vt
wat > EEN ENE MN TB SE ES Foes ee ee
26a
helium program the primary, rather than incidental, ob-
jective of the Department of Interior.
A working group was subsequently established, com-
prised of representatives from the Departments of Com-
merce, Defense and Interior, Atomic Energy Commission,
Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, and
Federal Power Commission. Headed by then Undersecre-
tary of Interior, O. Hatfield Chilson, now our esteemed
colleague on the federal bench in the District of Colorado,
the group compiled a study entitled ‘*Cost and Implemen-
tation of a National Helium Conservation Policy.’’ (The
Chilson Report, January 24, i958). As a result of the
study, a national helium conservation policy was subse-
quently recommended to President Eisenhower and for-
mally approved on April 25, 1958.
The Report noted that approximately 99% of the known
helium-bearing natural gas resources in the United States
was concentrated in four fields containing approximately
119 billion cubie feet of potentially recoverable helium:
(1) the Hugoton Field of Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas;
(2) the Panhandle Field of Texas; (3) the Keyes Field of
Oklahoma; and (4) the Greenwood Field of Kansas. The
Report further noted that these fields had been developed
by private companies to supply natural gas to fuel mar-
kets, and that since the companies merely considered the
helium to be a minor impurity no effort was being made
to remove it; consequently, the helium was merely passing
into the atmosphere without serving any useful purpose.
The study group recognized a number of significant
factors suggesting the need for a long term helium con-
servation program. First, although the demand for helium
had been consistently rising, the emphasis of the helium
program was on meeting current, short term needs. Sec-
ond, helium was essential to the country’s missile and
atomic energy programs, and an invaluable industrial tool.
Third, the helium supply being conserved by the Bureau
27a
of Mines, although sufficient to meet current foreseeable
governmental needs, would likely not be sufficient to meet
future governmental and private demands resulting from
expected and unforeseeable developments in new and ex-
panding technologies. Fourth, natural gas was the only
known commercial source of helium, since recovery from
the atmosphere and other sources was impracticable due
to the economic and environmental barriers. Fifth, the
world’s largest helium-bearing gas fields were located in
the United States, yet the helium was being allowed to
vent into the air without serving any useful purpose and
would probably be totally depleted by 1985. Sixth, due to
the inability to place a ‘‘value’* on helium as a result of
the speculative nature of its future demand and the pre-
dominant government utilization, there was no economie
incentive for private industry to extract and store the he-
lium for future use. Seventh, if nothing was done, the
nation’s richest source of helium would be least available
at a time when it was needed the most. Finally, that pres-
ent legislation did not permit the implementation of a long-
range conservation program as envisioned.
In order that an effective long-range helium conserva-
tion program might be implemented, the Report recom-
mended that the Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. $161 et seq., be
amended in such a way so as to give the Secretary of In-
terior the authority to build up to thirteen new helium
production plants to extract the helium prior to transmis-
sion of the natural gas to fuel markets, and to store the
helium thus conserved in the government-owned Cliffside
gas field or in some other suitable underground reservoir.
In addition, the Report suggested that it might be feasible
to augment this basic conservation plan by acquiring and
shutting in relatively small isolated helium-bearing gas
fields, although the acquisition of all of the fields was
thought to be impracticable.
Since it was not certain that private companies would
be willing or able to participate in the program, however,
28a
and in light of the current and unforeseeable importance
of helium to the national welfare, the Report suggested
that the legislation be drafted in such a way so as to au-
thorize the Secretary to condemn the helium-bearing nat-
ural gas after its removal from place of deposit in nature.
Furthermore, although suggesting an end to the long-
standing governmental monopoly on the production of he-
lium, the Report recommended that the Secretary retain
control over the sale and use of helium produced by pri-
vate companies not participating in the program, and thus
be able to control the price of the gas and determine its
end uses,
Due to the magnitude of the expense involved in ae-
complishing the conservation program, the Report recom-
mended that: (1) private industry be encouraged to par-
ticipate in the program by entering long-term contracts
with the Government which would give the companies
a reasonable return on their capital investment and, at the
same time, help to defray the overall costs of the program;
(2) the Secretary be authorized to set the price for the
helium at a level which would enable the Department of
Interior to cover all costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of the program; (3) all federal agencies and
contractors purchase all major requirements of helium
from the Secretary; and (4) the private companies par-
ticipating in the program be prohibited from selling any
helium to any purchaser other than the Secretary at a
price lower than the lowest price paid by any government
agency.
In 1958 the Department of the Interior proposed legis-
lation to Congress for the implementation of the recom-
mended conservation program. This was not acted upon,
however, and redrafted proposals were subsequently sub-
mitted to Congress on July 27, 1959. After lengthy hear-
ings and incidental revisions and amendments of the pro-
posed bill, a legislative amendment was adopted on Sep-
29a
tember 13, 1960, to be known as ‘‘An Act to amend the
Helium Act of March 3, 1925, as amended, for the defense,
security, and the general welfare of the United States.’’?
50 U.S.C. ¢ 167 et seq. The Act became effective on March
1, 1961, and a limitation on the annual contracting author-
ity of 47.5 million dollars was established by the Act of
August 3, 1961, 75 Stat. 246, 253.
The 1960 Helium Act Amendments authorized the See-
retary of the Interior to enter into long-term contracts
for the acquisition, processing, transportation, or con-
servation of helium, not exceeding twenty-five years. 90
U.S.C. §167a(a)(2). In addition, he was given the power
to acquire, by eminent domain, helium contained in he-
lium-bearing natural gas and so much of such gas as was
necessarily removed in the extraction process, if he were
unable to acquire helium otherwise upon reasonable terms
and at the fair market value. 50 U.S.C. § 167a(a)(2). In
an attempt to make the program self-liquidating, the Act
provided for a comprehensive system similar to that ree-
ommended by the Chilson Report. 50 U.S.C. $$ 167a(e),
167¢. 167d and 167j. The Secretary was given authority to
set his own price for the helium that he sold (50 U.S.C.
1 Pub.L. 86-777. 74 Stat. 920. All proceedings were before the
séth Congress. The bill which became the Helium Act Amend-
ments of 1960 was H.R. 10548. Other bills which were considered
are S, 827, 8. 2567, S. 3376, TLR. 8440, HLR. 8451 and HLR. 11030.
The Reports of the hearings before the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on H.R. 1054s and 8. 3376,
June 1 and 15, 1960, and the Report of Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, House of Representatives on H.R. 8440, FLR. 5451,
ILR. 10348 and H.R. 11030, February 19, Mareh 10 and 11, 1960,
are printed. The Report of the House Committee is designated
H.Rptr. No. 1552 and of the Senate, 8.Rptr. No. 1814, U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1960, p. 3595, with a minority report by
Senator Carroll designated Part 2. Debate in the House and Sen-
ate is reported in 106 Cong.Ree., pp. 9089-9099, 15119-15125, 17855,
18936-18538, 18544-18546, 18602-18609 and 18902-15904.
ee oe we Oe ent gr aa
30a
§167d(c)), and to establish and promulgate such rules
and regulations, consistent with the directions of the Act,
which were necessary to carry out its provisions. 50 U.S.C,
§ 167g.
Pursuant to the authority given the Secretary by the
Helium Act Amendments, the Secretary of Interior en-
tered into helium procurement contracts with the plain-
tiff companies and with Northern Helex Company in Aug-
ust, October, and November, 1961. These companies were
chosen due to the large amount of helium which they could
assure, and their ability to accomplish the necessary pro-
duction assemblage and perform the underlying contracts.
The award of the contracts to these four companies obli-
gated all of the available 47.5 million dollars contracting
authority and thus completed that phase of the helium
conservation program, unless and until the contracting au-
thority was increased. That authority has not been in-
creased by Congress.
Each contract provided for the sale and delivery to the
United States of a helium-gas mixture for a term of
twenty-two years. The companies were required to con-
struct at their own risk and expense helium extraction
plants and necessary facilities capable of processing at
least 500 million eubie feet of Hugoton area’ gas per day
(in the ease of National Helium, approximately 840 mil-
lion eubie feet of natural gas per day). The contracts fol-
lowed a general pattern, although they varied in detail.
Each contract contained an initial price per MCF of con-
tained helium varying from $10.30 to $11.78. The prices
were broken down into two parts, one related to the cost
of gas and the other related to other costs. The companies
have at all times fully met their obligations under the con-
tracts.
Subsequent to the implementation of the expanded he-
lium conservation program, numerous studies and reports
concerning the program were prepared by federal agen-
eens susserawe
3la
cies and by interested private groups and, in accordance
with §167n of the Helium Act Amendments, the Secre-
tary of Interior made annual reports to advise Congress
of the current status of the government’s helium program.
Generally, these reports contained financial, statistical,
and operating information concerning the program for
each fiseal year that it was in operation.
The helium conservation program apparently ran
smoothly until some time in 1968. After the passage of the
1960 Act, however, several private companies had begun
their own helium extraction outside of the government
program. Because the Secretary’s price for helium re-
flected not only direct extraction costs, but also a portion
of the costs involved in the administration of the conser-
vation program, the Secretary’s price for helium exceeded
the private producers’ price. As the private companies’
sales increased, the Secretary’s sales decreased, despite
increased overall demand.
In response to this situation, the Secretary proposed
regulations in 33 Fed. Reg. 5219-20 (1968), which were
later revised and officially published on October 18, 1968,
in 33 Fed. Reg. 15478-80, to become effective December
2, 1968. The regulations would heve forbidden govern-
ment agencies and their contractors from purchasing their
major requirements of helium from any source other than
the Secretary, or private companies ‘‘eligible’’? under the
regulations.
In Air Reduction Company v. Hickel, supra, these regu-
lations were stricken down. The Court held that, although
Congress had intended that the Seceretary not lose his
market because of private competition, it had not pro-
vided statutory authority to require government con-
tractors to purchase their helium from the Secretary. The
Court noted, however, that the Secretary’s purpose could
be accomplished by obtaining an Executive Order requir-
ing that such provisions be included in all contracts en-
err nee eS SN et ATRL Sp OE RL 4 ~ oA ~~?
32a
tered into by government agencies. Air Reduction Com-
pany v. Hickel, supra, 420 F.2d at p. 597. An Executive
Order was never obtained.
It became increasingly evident that the costs of the
program were not diminishing according to expectations
and that the program was being adversely affected by the
intrusion into what had been a virtually exclusive gov-
ernment market of private producers of helium. More-
over, the program was suffering financially from a tem-
porary lull in sales occasioned principally by the large
cuts in the space program. Consequently, the Department
of Interior started negotiations with the four helium con-
servation contractors in an attempt to modify the con-
tracts in a way that would reduce the costs of the program
to the Government and still fulfill the goals of the program.
Due to diminished sales, however, the Department of
Interior had fallen into arrears in making payments to
the four helium contractors. Partial payments were made
for a while, but payments ceased entirely in November,
1969, notwithstanding the continuance of deliveries. At
the close of the calendar year of 1970, the Government
owed large sums to the helium contractors for delivered
helium. Consequently, on December 24, 1970, one of the
helium contractors, Northern Helex Company, brought an
action in the Court of Claims against the United States
for breach of contract. In Northern Helex Company v.
United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct.C1.1972), the Court of
Claims held that the Government was liable for anticipa-
tory breach of the contract, but the issue of damages is
still pending.
On January 26, 1971, and while negotiations were still
in progress with at least one of the remaining contractors,
the Department of Interior advised plaintiffs that, pur-
suant to paragraph 12.1 of the contracts, the contracts
would be terminated effective sixty days thereafter. Al-
33a
though specific language varied, each contract provided
for termination as follows:
‘612.1 Buyer [Federal Government] may, at is option,
terminate this contract at any time if, (1) in the
opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the discovery
of large new helium resources or a substantial dimi-
nution in helium requirements or any circumstance
of similar nature should occur which would make the
continued operation of Seller’s plant and the contin-
ued purchase of helium-gas mixture extracted therein
unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act or
any amendment thereto, or (2) a material circumstance
of force majeure making it impracticable or impossible
for either Buyer or Seller to carry out its obligations
under this contract which circumstance cannot be
remedied with reasonable dispatch.”’
The President’s Budget, issued on January 29, 1971,
coincidentally, did not include a request for appropria-
tions for continued funding of the contracts.
On March 17, 1971, the plaintiffs filed the instant action
against the defendants, and on March 26, 1971, this Court
issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the termination
of the contracts. Following the decision of the Tenth Cir-
euit Court of Appeals in National Helium Corporation
y. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), affirming this
Court’s holding, the decision to terminate the contracts
was remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration in
light of the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq.
A draft environmental impact statement was subse-
quently prepared by the Department of Interior, and its
availability was officially announced in the Federal Regis-
ter on May 23, 1972. A final environmental impact state-
ment entitled ‘‘Termination of Helium Purchase Con-
tracts—United States Department of Interior—Bureau
of Mines’? was issued on November 13, 1972. On Feobru-
Bt wesetrmrien ete rire
34a
ary 2, 1973, the Secretary of Interior gave notice of termi-
nation to the plaintiffs, to become effective sixty days
thereafter. Accompanying the notices was a statement
prepared by the Secretary justifying the termination of
the helium conservation program in terms of the termina-
tion clauses of each of the helium purchase contracts.
The Seeretary’s termination statement, which is based
on the Department’s final environmental statement and
the comments received from the private contractors, rec-
ognizes that: (1) the direct result of the decision to ter-
minate the contracts will be that the Government will
forego the storage of an estimated 20 billion cubic feet of
helium which will be ‘‘wasted’’ or ‘‘depleted’’ if the con-
tractors do not continue to extract and store the helium,
prior to delivery of the natural gas to fuel markets; (2)
natural gas—primarily fuel gas—is the only known source
of helium other than the atmosphere, an environmentally
and economically inferior source; (3) the currently proved
‘‘helium-rich’’ natural gas reserves (containing at least
0.3% helium) will probably be exhausted before the turn
of the century; (4) it is unknown exactly how much, if
any, ‘‘lean’’ helium-bearing natural gas will be available
after the year 2000; (5) present studies predict large de-
mands for helium for environmentally beneficial uses be-
ginning around the turn of the century which could rap-
idly deplete the helium supply then in storage; (6) as-
suming a lack of supply at a later time, future environ-
mentally beneficial technological advancements might be
precluded due to unacceptably adverse environmental ef-
fects of recovery from other sources.
In contrast to the above possibilities, the Secretary’s
statement notes that: (1) government demand for helium
has decreased consistently since 1966, and is presently be-
low the 1961 level; (2) present technological advancement
enables recovery of helium from ‘‘lean’’ sources of he-
lium-bearing natural gas expected to be available in large
quantities in the future; (3) the Bureau of Mines estimates
PPM rm ree vances 5
35a
a total of 17 to 24 billion cubic feet of probable shut-in
‘shelium-rich”’ reserves (i.e., found in natural gas fields
not being exploited for present fuel purposes); (4) in-
cluding the helium currently in storage, in shut-in govern-
ment reserves, and expected to be recoverable from gov-
ernment-owned plants, total reserves approximate 44.5
billion eubie feet; (5) storage of recoverable helium at
today’s costs does not necessarily assure ‘‘low-cost’’ he-
lium in the future; (6) the forecasted large demands for
the future are ‘‘speculative’’ and of questionable reliabil-
ity; (7) government agencies’ estimates for future helium
demands would not require removal of helium presently
in storage ‘‘to meet essential government needs’? until
well into the next century; and (8) assuming the esti-
mated total future demands were to materialize at the
beginning of the next century, as predicted, the storage
now of an additional 20 billion cubic feet of helium would
merely delay, rather than foreclose, the necessity of ob-
taining helium from presently unknown or environmentally
disadvantageous sources.
On the basis of the above assumptions, the Secretary
determined that there had been a substantial diminution
in helium requirements for essential government activi-
ties and that the termination was therefore authorized
under Section 12.1 of the contracts, since the purposes of
the Helium Act Amendments of 1969 had been satisfied,
citing § 167m of the Act, 50 U.S.C.:
‘‘It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the na-
tional interest to foster and encourage individual en-
terprise in the development and distribution of sup-
plies of helium, and at the same time provide, within
economic limits, through the administration of this
chapter, a sustained supply of helium which, together
with supplies available or expected to become avail-
able otherwise, will be sufficient to provide for essen-
tial Government activities.”’
reser Hts Rae et er erg 2 REE EET OT ti
a EN IEE = ERAT ATS RE < .
In their amended complaints, the plaintiffs seek declara-
tory and injunctive relief setting aside the Secretary’s
decision to terminate the helium procurement contracts.
In summary, the complaints allege that: (1) the Secre-
tary’s termination decision was not preceded by full com-
pliance with the procedural and substantive requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq.; (2) the Secretary’s termination decision was
not warranted by the terms of the contracts, constituting
the helium conservation program, and was accordingly
inconsistent with the purpose of the Helium Act Amend-
ments of 1960, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq.; and (3) the Secre-
tary’s termination decision was otherwise ‘‘arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with
law.’’
JURISDICTION
The plaintiffs’ amended complaints not only challenge
agency compliance with NEPA, but also seek review of
agency action under the Helium Act Amendments of 1960,
50 U.S.C. $167 et seq. The plaintiffs contend that the
Secretary is, in effect, terminating the entire helium pro-
gram authorized by Congress, and that this Court should
review his action under the Administrative Procedure
Act as authorized by Congress in 50 U.S.C. $167h(a) in
order to determine whether such action is ‘‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ae-
cordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
The defendants concede this Court’s jurisdiction to re-
view procedural compliance with NEPA, but contend that
the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s de-
cision on any other basis. The defendants assert three
bases for this contention.
First, the defendants contend that, assuming full agency
compliance with NEPA, all other claims sound solely in
37a
contract; that since the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum of $10,000, this Court lacks subject matter ju-
risdiction over such claims by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(a)(2); that the proper forum for the relief sought by
the plaintiffs is the Court of Claims in an action brought
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. ¢ 1491; and that neither
this Court nor the Court of Claims is authorized to grant
equitable or declaratory relief under such contracts, as
dictated by United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct.
1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969), and Richardson v. Morris,
409 U.S. 464, 93 S.Ct. 629, 34 L.Ed.2d 647 (1973).
The Court does not quarrel with the basic proposition
that it lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief to pri-
vate individuals or companies merely seeking to obtain
specifie performance of government contracts, but it cate-
gorically rejects such a characterization of this action. As
;< evident from only a cursory examination of the pleadings
‘n this case, the plaintiffs are not suing for breach of gov-
ernment contracts and seeking damages or specific per-
formance—they are requesting the Court to enjoin the im-
proper termination of practically an entire helium conser-
vation program created by Congress to prevent the unnec-
essary depletion of a vital natural resource.
Although the plaintiffs are admittedly motivated by pri-
vate pecuniary considerations, which fact gives them stand-
ing to sue (Association of Data Processing Service Organi-
zation, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25
L.Ed.2 184 (1970)), the plaintiffs are also seeking vindi-
cation of the public’s interest in protection of a vital wasting
natural resource and the propagation of an important Con-
gressional program. Viewing the plaintiffs’ cause of action
in this perspective, the Court will not permit the Secretary
to shield his actions from judicial scrutiny and relegate the
‘public interest’ to an impotent Court of Claims remedy
‘Smerely because it sounds in contract.”’ National Helium
Corporation v. Morton, £99 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971).
PON ET 2 DOR I OL EEO, Sm 2 Oe SRR CO a ol ae 4
38a
Second, the defendants contend that this is not an action
solely against a government official, but is rather a suit
against the United States, since the relief sought would
expend itself upon the public treasury and preclude au-
thorized government action, and that it is accordingly
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in accordance
with Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335, 38 S.Ct. 317, 62 L.Ed.
755 (1918); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91
L.Ed. 1209 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merece Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed.
1628 (1949) ; and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S.Ct. 999,
10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963). Although impliedly admitting that
the Secretary’s action in this case was ‘‘agency action”’
under the terms of the Administrative Procedure <Act, 5
U.S.C. $$ 551(13) and 701(b) (2), the defendants assert that
that Act does not act as a waiver of sovereign immunity.
It must be recognized at the outset that the plethora of
cases dealing with the nebulous and sometimes oppressive
concept of sovereign immunity cannot be completely recon-
ciled. As Mr. Justice Stewart noted in Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 U.S. 643, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962):
‘‘While it is possible to differentiate many of these
eases upon their individual facts, it is fair to say that
to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court
in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.’’
369 U.S. a 646, 82 S.Ct. at 983.
Since the Court is convinced that this action is clearly not
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it will waive
embarkment. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th
Cir. 1971).
The defendants are correct in their assertion that the
Administrative Procedure Act does not act as a waiver of
sovereign immunity, in and of itself. Motah v. United
States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968), contra Secanwell Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d
39a
859, 874 (1970). Here, however, Congress itself implicitly
waived sovereign immunity as a bar to review of ‘‘agency
action’’ under the Helium Act Amendments of 1960. See-
tion 167h specifically provides that:
«provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
of June 11, 1946, as amended, shall apply to any agency
proceeding and any agency action taken under this
chapter... and the terms ‘agency proceeding’ and
‘agency action’ shall have the meaning specified in the
Administrative Procedure Act.”’ (Emphasis added.)
It would indeed be anomalous for this Court to hold that
sovereign immunity barred review of action specifically
made subject to review by the sovereign, simply because
such review might eventually expend itself upon the public
treasury. Since the Secretary’s action of terminating the
helium procurement contracts was clearly ‘‘agency action,”’
she doctrine of sovereign immunity is accordingly inapplic-
able.
Finally, the defendants contend that even if the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is not applicable to the plaintiffs’
non-NEP.A claims, the Secretary's action of terminating
the helium procurement contracts is not subject to review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, since it is agency
action ‘‘committed to agency discretion by law.’’ 9 U.S.C.
$701(a)(2). There is simply no question but that the
Secretary’s action is action of an ‘‘authority of the Gov-
ernment of the United States,’’ and that review is not pro-
hibited by the Helium Act Amendments. 50 U.S.C. § 167h.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28
L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), the exception to the general rule that
all agency actions are subject to judicial review, unless
‘seommitted to agency discretion by law,’’ is a very narrow
one. Referring to the legislative history of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, the Court noted that the exception
+ Sree TTL ae ieee Sa - J
is applicable only ‘‘in those rare instances where ‘statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is
no law to apply.’ ’’ S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.,
26 (1945):
“The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory
when they relate to administrative agencies any more
than in other cases. To preclude judicial review under
this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such
review, must upon its face give clear and convincing
evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure
to provide specially by statute for judicial review is
certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.”’
H.R.Rep.No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1945).
In determining whether in a particular case agency ac-
tion is ‘‘committed to agency discretion by law,’ there is
no presumption against review and in favor of administra-
tive absolutism absent ‘‘a clear and convincing’? showing
of a contrary legislative intent or unless such purpose is
fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510-
1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The inquiry is not limited to
merely whether the agency was given discretion to act, but
also whether: (1) Congress intended that the exercise of
that discretion be left solely to the expertise of the agency ;
and (2) the exercise of that discretion in a particular case
involves the resolution of matters within the special admin-
istrative competence of the agency. Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 166, 90 S.Ct. 832, 837, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).
The Court cannot indulge in broad generalizations, but
rather must review each individual agency action com-
plained of in the light of the specific statutory scheme pro-
vided by Congress.
An examination of the legislative scheme provided by
Congress in the Helium Act Amendments of 1960 reveals
that the Secretary was given broad discretion in choosing
an appropriate method of implementing a national helium
conservation program. In the exercise of that discretion,
4la
the Secretary chose to enter into long-term contracts with
the plaintiffs, and within those contracts he provided a
method by which they could be terminated in the event that
further helium procurement Was unnecessary to accomplish
the purposes of the Act. On February 2, 1973, the Secre-
tary again, exercised his discretion when he determined
that the continuation of the contracts was unnecessary,
since the purposes of the Helium Act had been satisfied.
That determination was nevessarily predicated on the
Secretary ’s interpretation of the intended scope and pur-
poses of the helium conservation program as envisioned by
Congress in the promulgation of the Helium Act, and in
particular Section 167m, 50 U.S.C.
Implicit in the Secretary's determination to terminate
these contracts was the Secretary's realization that, al-
though he was given wide discretion in choosing the means
of implementing the Helium Act, his actions were to con-
form to the overall objectives of the Act; that he was not
given unfettered discretion to, in effect, change the under-
ly'ng purpose of the Act itself. The plaintiffs contend that
the Secretary's determination that the objective of the Act
was to conserve helium for foreseeable and ‘‘essential gov-
ernment activities’? was clearly erroneous and constituted
an abuse of discretion. They do not request the Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary in areas
clearly intended to be left solely to his special administra-
tive expertise, but they do assert that the Court is obliged
to review the Secretary's decision insofar as it involves an
interpretation of the underlying statute. The Court agrees.
The principal dispute in this case, beyond the ageney’s
compliance with NEPA, clearly involves the Secretary’s
interpretation of the provisions of the Helium Act. Section
4232(1) directs that ‘‘to the fullest extent possible ...
‘the] public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies’? therein
set forth. If in determining to terminate the helium
procurement contracts the Secretary interpreted the objec-
tives of the Helium Act in an erroneous or unnecessarily
restrictive manner, his action would be contrary to not
only the Helium Act, but NEPA as well; the statutes them-
selves clearly provide ‘tlaw to apply.’ This statutory
dispute must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of
matters within the special competence of the Seeretary,
but by judicial application of canons of statutory construe-
tion. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 852, 25
L.Ed.2d 192 (1970). As Justice Harlan so aptly noted in
his dissent in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1,
14, 88 S.Ct. 651, 658-659, 19 L.Ed.2d 787 (1968) :
**The role of the courts should, in particular, be viewed
hospitably where . . . the question sought to be re-
viewed does not significantly engage the agency's ex-
pertise ... ‘where the only or principal dispute relates
to the meaning of the statutory term’... [the contro-
versy] presents issues on which courts, and not [ad-
ministrators], are relatively more expert.’
In light of the nature of the specific ageney action in-
volved in this suit and the clear congressional intention to
permit review of ageney action taken pursuant to the
Helium Act Amendment of 1960 (50 U.S.C. § 167h(a)), this
Court will not preclude review merely because the statute
is written in broad and permissive language, although such
fact necessarily limits the scope of the review. See Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S, 168, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969),
and Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 90 S.Ct. 1766,
26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970).
Although it is unnecessary to reach the Secretary's
ultimate decision in this ease, since compliance with NEPA
is a necessary prerequisite to taking any major federal
action and the Court is convinced that the Secretary did
not comply with the procedural or substantive requirements
of NEPA, the Court would advise the Secretary to eare-
fully review the Helium Act as a whole, and especially in
the light of its legislative history.
43a
The Court has reviewed that history, and it has been
unable to find any mention of limiting the scope of the pro-
graui to satisfying only ‘essential government activities.’
On the contrary, the Chilson Report (which was the tech-
nical foundation underlying the legislative amendment),
the remarks of Mr. Bennett * (Undersecretary of Interior
who was the major agency representative encouraging pas-
sage of the Act), the repeated statements of Senator Allott *
(the major sponsor of the Bill in the Senate), and the
statements of those appearing before the Insular Com-
mittee, all repeatedly refer to the need to conserve the
helium from being wasted ‘‘without serving any useful
purpose.”” They all refleet deep concern that helium is
wasting that might be needed at some future time for un-
foreseen needs of the entire nation. In the words of Sena-
tor Allott:
“The measure now awaiting final action by this body
ix, as we all must know by now, for the purpose of tak-
ing care of the reserves of helium for future use, both
civilian and defense requirements. Although it is esti-
mated that present reserves are adequate to meet fore-
cast requirements for some time, these reserves are
being depleted. ... Mr. President, if we do not —ct
promptly to halt this negligent, careless waste, we shall
have little helium left for the future when, perhaps, we
shall need it most.’’ 106 Cong. Ree. 17855 (Aug. 26,
1960). .
In reviewing the Helium Act itself, the only mention of
any possible limitation on the conservation program which
could even remotely be considered as limiting the purpose
to conserving helium only for ‘‘essential government activi-
ties?’ ix found in Section 15, 50 U.S.C, § 167m. The Court
2 See, Hearings on H.R. S40, 8451, 10548, 11030 before the
U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong..
2d Sess. (1960).
3 See, 106 Cong. Rec. 17855, 18544-45, 18546, 18602 (1960).
has reviewed that section in light of the overall purpose of
the statute, and it would encourage the Secretary to do the
same. It appears to the Court that the section was intended
to insure that the federal government would not interfere
with private production, development, and sale of helium
unless such activity interfered with the Government’s need
to make its own program self-liquidating or to provide for
‘‘essential government activities,’’ and that it was not
intended as a limitation on the conservation program
itself.
Score axnp STANDARDS FoR REvIEW
Having resolved these preliminary jurisdictional issues,
the Court will now turn to the resolution of the plaintiffs’
claims. As previously noted, the Court views the Secre-
tary’s compliance or non-compliance with NEPA to be the
central issue of this case at this time. The plaintiffs assert
that the procedural and substantive requirements of NEPA
were not satisfied, and that the Secretary's termination of
the helium procurement contracts must be enjoined and the
matter remanded to the Department of Interior. The gen-
eral rules regarding the scope and standards for review
of agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act were only recently set out in detail by the Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
supra. In reviewing agency action, the Court is initially
confronted with three questions: (1) what is the standard
for review: (2) what is the scope of review; and (5) upon
what evidentiary basis is the action to be judged.
First, the standard for review to be applied in this case
is readily apparent. Section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C., provides that in all cases a review-
ing court must set aside agency action found to be ‘‘arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,”’ or which fails to meet statutory, pro-
cedural, or constitutional requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(A), (B), (C), (D). Since the Seeretary’s action in this
45a
case Was not taken pursuant to a rule-making provision of
the Administrative Procedure Act or based on a public
adjudicatory hearing, neither the ‘‘substantial evidence’’
nor de novo review standards are applicable.
Second, the scope of review of agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act was clearly expressed by
the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
yv. Volpe, supra, wherein the Court noted:
‘‘Even though there is no de novo review .. . the gen-
erally applicable standards of § 706 require the review-
ing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly,
the Secretary’s decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity, . .. but that presumption is not to shield
his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.”’
91 S.Ct. at 823-824.
Although this Court does not have the authority to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the Secretary in areas of
administrative expertise, it clearly does have the authority
and obligation to engage in a careful scrutiny of the
agency ’s action to determine whether such action was ‘‘arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.’’ This careful review is especially
appropriate in a case such as this involving alleged non-
compliance with the procedural and substantive require-
ments of NEPA. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-
mittee v. Atomie Energy Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33,
449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Scenie Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence vy. Federal Power Commission, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926, 92 S.Ct. 2453, 32 L.Ed.2d
813 (1972): Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (Sth Cir. 1972); and Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Finally, a more difficult problem arises when determin-
ing upon what evidentiary basis an agency’s action is to
be judged in reviewing its propriety. Section 706 of the
rere ss tH ea ce P< se AOE ADEE NET a “ as “. <a PN BRE Ese BEN TTS ._
46a
Administrative Procedure Act provides that ‘‘in making
the . . . determinations, the court shall review the whole
record.’’ The defendants have persistently maintained
that the administrative record in this case consists solely
of: (1) the information relied upon by the Secretary in
reaching his decision; (2) the comments received from
agencies and interested parties responding to the draft
environmental impact statement; and (3) the information
brought to the attention of the agencies by the plaintiffs.
The Court categorically rejects that position.
The National Environmental Policy Act places a positive
duty on federal agencies to prepare a comprehensive en-
vironmental impact statement prior to taking any major
federal action ($4552). Prior to the preparation of the
statement, the Act directs that the ageney shall ‘consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal ageney which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to
any environmental impact involved,’’ and ‘initiate and uti-
lize ecological information in the planning and development
of resource-oriented projects’? ($4832(C) and (G)). In
this case the plaintiffs have proffered numerous documents
and reports which were either prepared by the Department
of Interior itself or other federal agencies, or readily avail-
able to any member of the public bearing directly upon the
environmental impact of the Seecretary’s action. The
defendants’ pat response is that the documents were not
brought to their attention by the plaintiffs prior to the
preparation of the final environmental statement or the
Secretary’s decision so they are not relevant. The fallacy
inherent in this reasoning is that it assumes that it is the
burden of others outside the agency to bring pertinent ma-
terial to the attention of the agency—it is not. The duty
to unearth and utilize all relevant and available informa-
tion lies direetly and unequivocally with the agency.
In reviewing agency compliance with NEPA, the Court is
obliged to consider all relevant material bearing directly or
indirectly on the environmental aspects of the action under
47a
consideration which were either (1) in the agency’s files.
but not disclosed in the final environmental statement; or
(2) readily available to the agency had it fulfilled its statu-
tory responsibilities. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-
mittee vy. United States Atomic Energy Commission, supra,
449 F.2d at p. 1119.
After having reviewed the administrative record sub-
mitted to the Court by the Department of Interior, and as
supplemented by the plaintitfs, the Court is convinced that
the Seeretary’s attempted compliance with NEPA, which is
a necessary condition precedent to any major federal ac-
tion, falls woefully short of the Act’s requirements in a
number of significant respects, primarily, the shortcomings
of the Department's final environmental impact statement.
Consequently, the Court does not reach the plaintiffs’ re-
maining claims, but rather, remands this matter to the
Department of Interior for further consideration in light
of this opinion.
NEPA
In response to growing national concern about the state
of the environment, Congress passed the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. In so acting, Con-
gress specifically recognized the need for a national policy
which would encourage the productive and enjoyable har-
mony of man with his environment (§ 4821). Although the
Act does not create any substantive rights to a clean and
productive environment or establish environmental protec-
tion as the exclusive goal of federal agencies, it does assure
that environmental amenities are carefully considered
along with other considerations so that a proper balance is
ultimately reached. Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331, requires
the federal government to use ‘‘all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources.’’ Furthermore, in order to as-
sure that the national policy is implemented and that all
remit rs I RC Ke Ra eee bas
48a
federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the chal-
lenge of a better environment, Congress specifically in-
cluded certain ‘‘action-forcing’’ provisions. See S.Rep.
No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969).
Section 102, 42 U.S.C. $4332 provides, among other
things, that each federal agency shall, ‘‘to the fullest extent
possible,’’ included in every recommendation or report on
major federal actions a ‘‘detailed statement’’ on:
sé (C)
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.’’
In addition, the section requires that ‘‘ official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has ... special expertise with respect to the environmental
impact involved,’’ prior to the preparation of the statement
(§ 4852(2)(C)); that the agency ‘‘study, develop, and de-
scribe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of availabie resources’’ (§ 4332
(D)); and that the agency ‘‘initiate and utilize ecological
information in the planning and development of resource-
oriented projects (§ 4332(G)).
In furtherance of this congressional purpose, the Council
on Environmental Quality has issued comprehensive guide-
lines for federal agencies to follow in conforming to the
49a
mandates of NEPA (36 Fed.Reg. 7724, 7727 (1971), Exec-
utive Orders have been issued directing federal agencies to
develop procedures for implementing and enforcing the Act
(Executive Order 11514, 35 Fed.Reg. 4247 (1970)), and the
Department of Interior has itself issued guidelines to be
followed within its department in conforming with NEPA
(36 Fed.Reg. 19,343-19,347 (1971)).
Based upon the clear language of NEPA, its implement-
ing provisions, its legislative history, the many cases inter-
preting its import, and the underlying policy which it was
intended to foster, it is clear that the mere formal filing
of a document, in and of itself, does not satisfy the Act’s
substantive and procedural mandates or preclude further
inquiry by judicial review. As noted in the recent Tenth
Cireuit Court of Appeals decision in Davis v. Morton, 469
F.2d 593 (1972):
‘‘Reading the Act and its legislative history together,
there is little doubt that Congress intended all agencies
under their authority to follow the substantive and
procedural mandates of NEPA.’ 469 F.2d at 596.
(Emphasis added.)
Compliance with NEPA is more than a mere ritual—it
requires thorough research, investigation, corroboration,
and consideration of the environmental effects attending a
given agency action.
In determining whether an agency has complied with
NEPA prior to taking major federal action, the focal point
of attention is the impact statement. As noted by Judge
Leventhal in Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v.
Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972), at page
833 :
‘Congress contemplated that the Impact Statement
would constitute the environmental source material for
the information of the Congress as well as the Execu-
tive, in connection with the making of relevant deci-
ECR IER, PEN EY MA IEE PR rs St EA PITT aS He Sg S
50a
sions, and would be available to enhance enlighten-
ment of—and by—the public. The impact statement
provides a basis for (a) evaluation of the benefits of
the proposed project in light of its environmental
risks, and (b) comparison of the net balance for the
proposed project with the environmental risks pre-
sented by alternative courses of action.”’
Assuming that the agency has fulfilled its responsibilities
by consulting with other agencies and utilizing available
ecological and technical information, the statement should
constitute a full-bodied record upon which Congress, the
Executive, the public and the agency can adequately judge
‘the wisdom of the proposed action. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordi-
nating Committee v. Atomie Energy Commission, supra
(purpose of statement is to aid agency in its decision and
to fully inform other interested agencies and the public of
environmental consequences); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971) (statement must alert President, Council on Environ-
mental Quality, the public, and Congress to all known or
possible environmental consequences); Ely v. Velde, 451
F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971) (genuine, rather than per-
functory compliance with NEPA requires agency to expli-
cate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis, and its reason-
ing): Greene County v. Federal Power Commission, 455
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct.
56, 34 L.Ed.2d 90 (1972) (statement must present a single
coherent and comprehensive environmental analysis).
Before turning to the final environmental impact state-
ment compiled by the Department of Interior in this case, it
is first instructive to note that this is not the run-of-the-
mill NEPA ease. Normally, a federal agency is proposing
to take affirmative action—such as the building of a dam,
nuclear power facility, or pipeline—which is likely to have
certain adverse environmental effects, yet which will also
benefit society in some appreciable manner. The courts
are consequently involved in the acrimonious imbroglio of
fatten . a ee
dla
assuring that the agency has adequately weighed the pos-
sible adverse environmental effects against the likely bene-
ficial goals of the action, and that a thorough cost-benefit
analysis has, in fact, preceded the action.
In this ease, however, the Department of Interior is not
proposing to take any affirmative action—rather, the De-
partment is recommending the abandonment of a compre-
hensive conservation program authorized by Congress to
save a Vital natural resource which was being needlessly
frittered away without first serving any useful purpose. It
is clear beyond peradventure that the recommended action
will not benefit society, except perhaps economically, and
then only temporarily. The question is—will it injure
society ?
The Department of Interior has consistently maintained
from the beginning of this litigation nearly two years ago
that the Secretary’s action does not constitute major fed-
eral action—that it merely involves the termination of three
contracts. An examination of the final environmental im-
pact statement prepared by the Department of Interior in
this case demonstrates that the Department of Interior con-
tinues to harbor that crabbed conception of this action.
Tue Impact STATEMENT
On November 13, 1972, the Department of Interior issued
a document entitled ‘‘ Final Environmental Statement—
Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts—United States
Department of Interior—Bureau of Mines.’’ The state-
ment is comprised of eighty pages, excluding the comments
received from other federal agencies and interested parties.
It contains: (1) a general description of the proposed
action (4 pages); (2) a general description of the environ-
ment (43 pages) including: the characteristics of helium (1
page); its eurrent (9 pages) and prospective future uses
(11 pages); its current proved, provable, possible, and
speculative supply (11 pages) ; and its present and future
demand to the year 2000 (9 pages) ; (3) a discussion of the
environmental impact of the proposed action (11 pages);
(4) a one-paragraph discussion of the possible unavoidable
adverse environmental effects; (5) a two-paragraph discus-
sion of the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity; (6) a one-paragraph discussion
of the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of re-
sources involved in the termination; (7) a discussion of the
alternatives to the proposed action (6 paragraphs); and
(8) a description of the consultation which preceded the
issuance of the statement, and a reply to the comments
received.
The Department’s final impact statement is far from a
coherent and comprehensive environmental! analysis. It
consists primarily of a narrative description of helium’s
characteristics and present and future uses, supply, and
demand. After reviewing it, however, certain basic facts
are evident: (1) these contracts involve the largest known
source of helium-rich natural gas in the world, and if the
helium is not extracted and stored it will be irretrievably
lost; (2) present uses of helium indicate it is a most impor-
tant or even indispensable element in our existing science,
indu try and ecology; (3) helium holds considerable prom-
ise as a necessary tool in the development of many environ-
mentally beneficial technological advancements in such
areas as exploration and future development of the sea,
underground transmission of large blocks of electrical
energy, virtually pollution-free generation of energy, and
efficient high speed ground mass-transportation systems;
(4) of the proven sources of helium-rich natural gas, most
will probably be totally depleted some time between 1985-
2000; (5) if the expected technological breakthroughs, many
of which are now in the experimental stage, come to pass,
helium will either have to be recovered from low content
helium-bearing natural gas or the atmosphere: and (6) if
these contracts are terminated, the future availability af
—
53a
helium will be totally dependent upon the actions of the
private companies.
After reviewing this portion of the statement, a number
of questions beg answering: What is to be gained by ter-
minat
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
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