Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Durovic v. Weinberger

Supreme Court brief1973

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

SUP; = COURT, UB

7

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

NaTIoNaL HELIUM CORPORATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,

Inc., PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CoMPANY, Petitioners

Vv.

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and

Ebert F. Ossorn, Director, Bureau of Mines,

Department of the Interior

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RaYMOND S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO

1625 K Street, N. W.

Z Washington, D. C., 20006

Of Counsel: K AB

se a MMET A. BLAES

WENDELL J. DoccETT JocHEMS, SaRGENT & BLAEs

General Counsel & 200 East First Street

_ Secretary — Wichita, Kansas 67201

National Helium

Corporation

Attorneys for

Petitioner, National

Helium Corporation

P. O. Box 1642

Houston, Texas 77001

(See page 2 of cover for additional counsel.)

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

>,

eee ITS

Of Counsel:

R. Price Howarp

Senior Counsel

Phillips Petroleum

Company

Bartlesville, Oklahoma

74003

Wruiam H. ALLEN

EvGENE D. GULLAND

CovincTton & BURLING

888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

JosePpH W. KENNEDY

Morris, Larne, EvANs,

Brock & KENNEDY,

CHARTERED

Suite 430

200 West Douglas

Wichita, Kansas 67202

Attorneys fer

Petitioner, Phillips

Petroleum Company

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO

1625 K Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C., 20006

Wituiam S. RICHARDSON

ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND

MALONE, CHARTERED

P. O. Box 1034

Wichita, Kansas 67201

Dante, R. HOPKINS

P. O. Box 25128

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

73125

Attorneys for

Petitioner, Cities Service

Helezx, Inc.

Page

I Ne Sai ee ae hose UREN ENE EN EE OSES 1

NE Se wea bebe exew ae ehh eRe ee 2

Qunerions PRRSENTED .. ..0. sce cccce secs seesseness 2

eS CIN Sos Soy vo dca Reeve eo kd ee OW ee 3

PAU EEES OP SUR CAM oo kccick he cade rere sewn ence 3

Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT ...........2.000-- 9

I. The Court of Appeals’ Ruling that the Dis-

trict Court was Without Jurisdiction to Engage

in Substantive Review of Agency Action Under

the National Environmental Policy Act, is in

Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,

Seventh and Eighth Cireuits ................ 11

Il. The Court of Appeals Ruling That Review of

the Substantive Ageney Decision was not Avail-

able Under the Administrative Procedure Act

Conflicts with Decisions of the Second, Fourth,

Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits ...... 15

III. The Court of Appeals Applied a Standard of

Judicial Review of Impact Statements Under

NEPA that Conflicts with the Standard Applied

by Other Civemits .... cscs sissy setinescvenes 22

ON EE EE PL EMT EES Pe Pee eee Oe ee 26

CITATIONS

CasEs:

Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C.

ee SRS oe ns Ota ag aa anke seis aisha nares 16

Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 4383 F.2d

Sie A SPE a eka a cect en aed Chenoa eces 16

Calvert Cliff’s Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449

F.2a 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1071) ............ 13, 14, 23, 25

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 188 (1978) ...........- 2. eee 7

Ege ee

ii Table of Contents Continued

Page

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

ik Bb: 6) ey sere 8, 14, 15, 19, 22

Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463

3d 788 (PAC. Cir. BBTT) q25 005 cc ceeeseneersss 24

Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 4638

F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir, 1971) ......-ccccneseecees 24

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lynv, 362 F. Supp.

1905 CELE. WTS) nue scccecccses enter resenes 16

Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke,

473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) ...........0. 11, 14, 16

Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) .......... 11

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-

neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) ............ 11,13

Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d

$033 (Oth Cie. TOTS) ox noes vkece ce cennctvsese 16

Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346

(Othe Cit, ISTE)... «ons cee nes tetas nercaceenees 14, 25

Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (Sth Cir. 1961) .... 16

Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1972) .. 16

Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412

(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).. 28

Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) .. 14, 16

Hopewell Township Citizens I-95 Committee v. Volpe,

482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) .......ceecseccesce 16

Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th

ae SREP iio acon se reveuedsserbasesr arene ers 16

Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (Ast Cir. 1973) ........- 16

Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) .... 16

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,

it eh | er rrr rere 15, 20, 21

Littel v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) ...... 16

Local 2677, American Federation of Government

Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.

EDGE) oxen nsanxeseues aeeeneners etnseereb seer eh 16

Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,

£72 PBa GOS (3d Cow. WOTS) ow oan ne ns ce cnsssces 16

Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) .. 21

National Council of Community Health Centers v.

Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) .... 16

National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,

456 F934 G27 (BO. Cir. WIS) gov ccc cccccxeceveee 26

Northern Helex Co. vy. United States, 455 F.2d 546

(0% Ch BUTE co cscs coches dceeckseacuiseeens 18, 19

Loe ES ES SE TELE Ne RIE OS

Table of Contents Continued ili

Page

Pace Co. v. Resor, 344 F.Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),

reversed on other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.

ef a rer nn rrr y fer rrr ti 16

Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp.

OO 4 TG. FORE oa edn ks es eee crass rs cass

Scanwell. Laboratories, Luc. ve Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859

(DG. Civ, WTO) 6 xcuu sca ces cee civtcctersosees 16

Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir, 1972) ...--. 16

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973)... 14

Silva v. Lume, 482 F.2d 1282 (st Cir. 1973) .... 14, 16, 24

Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. |. tt Sees 16

State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099

(Oth Cir. W907)... sso rene sveceecrseresesness ys 16

Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.

iy et: 2) ee eee ras pe rergerenyy rere ae 16

Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) 20... eee ee eee 21

Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C.

eS) pence yey eet eae 16

Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484

WeS5 3944 (10th Cir. 1973) 2.2 cece ese seecees 16

STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 ef seq.

(1970)

ein. tees we tC 1) ) ere ners rr eee 19

ie eee bo Nk Sa ee ren Pe ee 3, 21

ie TRRe Be bg. | ee ee rae 2, 8, 17, 22, 23

Re a 6 eee Bde whew aca cawacke these exe 17

Helium Act, 43 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat. 918, 50

U.S.C. $$ 167 ef seq. (1970)

Se...) ETE CL ER et 3, 4, 17

SS SeE EON as cit eee ere teries ecnawens 15

National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42

U.S.C. $$ 4321 et seq. (1970)

nee Me eee eee Tepe ree TE ee Ler. 2, 3, 6, 17

42 U.S.C. § 4831(b) (1)

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

S. Rep. No. 1814, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. CE eb akvass 3

H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ...... 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1975

No.

NaTIoNaAL HentuM CorPoRATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,

Ixc.. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, Petitioners

Vv.

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and

E.burt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,

Department of the Interior

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners National Helium Corporation, Cities

Service Helex, Ine., and Phillips Petroleum Company

respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit in this proceeding.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix pp.

la-19a) is reported at 486 F.2d 995, The opinion of

the District Court for the District of Kansas (Appen-

dix pp. 19a-73a) is reported at 361 F.Supp. 78.

Nese

2

Opinions of these courts at an earlier stage of this

litigation are also reproduced in the Appendix at pp.

73a-83a and 83a-96a, and are reported at 455 F.2d 650

and 326 F.Supp. 151, respectively.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on October 19, 1973. This Court's jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether in judicial review of federal agency

action a court measuring compliance with the National

Environmental Policy Aet properly limits itself to a

determination only of whether the ageney prepared

an adequate environmental impact statement.

9. Whether the federal courts have jurisdiction

to review, pursuant to the judicial review section of

the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency decision

to terminate an important conservation program, on

grounds other than compliance with the procedural

requirements of the National Environmental Policy

Act.

2 Whether in the review of the adequacy of an

environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to

the National Environmental Poliey Act a eourt prop-

erly asks only whether, on the face of the statement, the

agency preparing the statement made ‘tan objective

good faith effort to comply with the statutory proce-

dural requirements,”” or whether, on the other hand,

the court should engage in the “thorough, probing, in-

depth review” of the statement required under the

“arbitrary and eapricious” standard of review pro-

vided for in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).

2 ae AE rE EOE wee a OM

STATUTES INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4531, et

seq.. Helium Act, 42 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat.

918, 50 U.S.C. §§ 167a, et seq. and the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, 704, 706, are set

forth in the Appendix to this Petition (pp. 120a-

139a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from the issuance in January 1971

of notices terminating the contracts of four companies

that were extracting helium from natural gas and

supplying it to the Government for storage and conser-

vation in accordance with the helium conservation

program established by the Department of the Interior

pursuant to the Helium Act Amendments of 1960.

The Helium Conservation Program

Helium, the subject of the prematurely terminated

conservation program and of this case, is an extraor-

dinary element with exceptional characteristics, some

of them unique.’

1Its value has long been recognized. The first important use

of helium was as a lifting gas for lighter-than-air ships. That

and uses associated with medicine and deep-sea diving were vir-

tually its only uses until World War IT. (App. 23a-25a). Since

World War IT many other more advanced and complex applica-

tions of helium have been discovered and put into practices.

(App. 25a-26a). By 1960, the annual consumption of helium was

80 times what it had been in 1937. In 1960, helium was authori-

tatively described as ‘‘essential to our missile and atomic energy

programs and. . . inereasingly valuable as industrial material.”’

At that time it was said that ‘‘the new field of eryogenics involv-

ing extremely low temperatures in the region of absolute zero

opens up exciting new frontiers of science."" S. Rep. No. 1814,

86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th

Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1960).

4

Helium has the unique properties of inertness, of

not liquifying until a temperature just above absolute

zero is reached, and of remaining liquid down to abso-

lute zero. These properties make helium essential—

there is no known practical substitute—to the creation

of very low temperatures and thus the recognized key

to the development of critical new and economic meth-

ods of power generation and transmission that will

have to be put to use as fossil fuel runs out. These

methods include magnetohydrodynamie power genera-

tion, power generation by nuclear fusion and super-

conducting power transmission. (App. 252).

Helium that can be economically extracted and used

is found only in association with natural gas. Helium-

rich natural gas has been found in significant quanti-

ties in the United States only in the Hugoton-Pan-

handle fields of Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, which

contain 99 percent of the nation’s known helium re-

serves. (App. 26a). As the gas is extracted for use

as fuel, the gas is consumed, and the helium, which is

not combustible, is wasted into the atmosphere unless

steps are taken to conserve it. Because of the demand

for fuel, the gas and the helium will be gone well before

the end of this century. (App. 26a-27a).

A national program for conserving helium first came

under serious consideration in the late 1950’s. An

interdepartmental study concluded that helium should

be conserved (App. 25a-28a). Soon thereafter, in

1960, Congress enacted amendments to the Helium

Act of 1925, specifically authorizing a conservation

program. 74 Stat. 918 (App. 28a-29a).

As authorized by the amended Helium Act, the See-

retary chose to implement the conservation program by

5

contracting * with four companies to extract and sup-

ply to the Government crude helium from the Hugoton-

>anhandle Field to be stored for future use. (App.

30a). The helium conservation pr ram based on these

contracts was intended to be se!f-liauidating. Outlays

for the acquisition of helium in the early years were

to be repaid with interest as the Government sold

helium from storage in later years.

The helium conservation program has been eriti-

cized over the years by financially oriented government

officials who have been unable or unwilling to appre-

ciate the full implication of the fact that some day

there will be no more helium to be economically re-

covered from natural gas. In addition, the curtailment

of the space program has diminished the current gov-

ernmental demand for helium, and the Government's

helium program has suffered financially from the in-

roads of private helium producers into the current

helium market.

The First Termination

The Department of the Interior in 1970 undertook

negotiations with the contractors lo« ‘king toward a con-

servation program that would be less expensive to the

Government. (App. 32a). These negotiations were

2 Bach of the contracts, entered into in 1961, extends to 1983

but contains a clause allowing the Government to terminate the

contract if, ‘tin the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the

discovery of large new helium resources or a substantial diminu-

tion in helium requirements or any cireumstanee of similar nature

should occur which would make the continued operation of {the

contractor's] plant and the continued purchase of helium-gas

mixture extracted therein unnecessary to accomplish the purposes

of the [Helium] Act or any amendment thereto... .7° (App.

33a. Tha). (The quotation is from the contract of petitioner Na-

tional Helium Corporation. The other contractual termination

clauses are substantially identical.)

Se eee

eC NE Po . mes

still in progress when the notices of termination of the

contracts were served in January, 1971. Documents

that subsequently came to light made it clear that,

until very shortly before the termination notices were

issued, the Department had urged continuation of the

helium program and that it was not the Secretary of

the Interior who decided upon termination but officials

in the Office of Management and Budget. (App. 33a,

dda).

After receiving the notices of termination and un-

successfully asking for reconsideration, three of the

contractors, petitioners here, brought suit in the Dis-

trict Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin the

termination of the conservation program, naming as

defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the di-

rector of the Bureau of Mines, respondents here, * as-

serting not merely a private interest but the interest

of the public in the conservation of a wasting natural

resource.

On petitioners’ motions the District Court tempo-

rarily enjoined the termination of the program. It

did so principally on the ground of the agency’s fail-

ure to comply with Section 102(2)(C) of the National

Environmental Policy Act. No environmental impact.

statement had been prepared in advance of the ter-

mination of the conservation program even thougi)

Section 102(2)(C) requires such a statement in the

case of any proposal for any major federal action

significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-

ment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. (App. 73a-

83a) Respondents at that point did not seek review in

* The fourth contractor, Northern Helex Company, had elected

already to treat its contract as breached by nonpayment and had

brought suit in the Court of Claims for damages. (See p. 19,

fn. 13.

7

this Court or a trial on the merits. Instead, they

undertook to prepare and publish an environmental

impact statement, which was accomplished in No-

vember, 1972.

The Second Termination

Several rounds of pleadings and hearings in the

District Court and interlocutory appeals in the Court

of Appeals followed the issuance of the impact state-

ment. The upshot was that the Secretary of the

Interior on February 2, 1973, issued new notices of ter-

mination of the three contracts. (App. 33a-34a) The

outstanding preliminary injunction remained in effect,

and these notices therefore did not become effective in

the prescribed 60 days pending review of their validity.

Judicial Review

A. The District Court

Petitioners filed verified amended complaints chal-

lenging the attempted new termination, reiterating cer-

tain of their original allegations of illegality relating

to the inconsistency of the termination with the relevant

provisions of the contracts themselves, with the Helium

Act and with the duty of the Secretary of the Interior

and not OMB to make any termination decision; and

alleging further that the Secretary had still not com-

plied with NEPA because the impact statement relating

to the termination did not satisfy the statute, and that

the termination of the helium conservation program

was not consistent with the environmental values

identified in the impact statement. The Court of Ap-

peals directed the District Court to proceed to de-

termine the case forthwith and to do so, in accordance

with the court’s reading of this Court’s opinion in

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), solely on the

Cee

8

basis of the administrative record and without an

evidentiary hearing on the merits of the amended

complaints. *

On that record and on briefs and oral argument of

the parties, the District Court ruled on June 11, 1973,

that the decision to terminate the Helium Conserva-

tion Program was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of

discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law

because there had not yet been compliance with the

procedural and substantive mandates of NEPA. The

court continued the preliminary injunction in effect

pending further order of the court to give the agency

the opportunity to comply with NEPA. ( App. 72a-

73a).

Following the directive of this Court in Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Ine. vy. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

415-16 (1971), that in the application of the ‘arbitrary

and capricious’? standard of review enunciated in 5

U.S.C. §706(2) (A) there should be ‘ta substantial in-

quiry ...a thorough, probing, in-depth review .. .

[an] inquiry into the facts [that] is to be searching

and careful,’’ the District Court found the assessmeut

and consideration of environmental factors evidenced

in the impact statement and the Secretary's statemeut

of reasons for terminating the conservation program

“woefully inadequate’, (App. 51la-68a)

The District Court found it unnecessary to decide

the other issues petitioners had raised, notably the

legality of the termination under the Helium Act.

However, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to

determine these issues, contrary to the position taken

by respondents. (App. 41a-42a).

***The hearing in the district court consisted of judicial review

of the administrative record. It was not a trial de novo. (This

was in accordance with the adjudication of this court after the

mentioned interlocutory appeals).’’ (App. 4a).

ae eat oy

9

B. The Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with

directions to dismiss the complaints. It limited it-

self to a review of the impact statement and in making

that review rejected the ‘arbitrary and capricious”’

standard applied by the District Court. Instead, it

assessed the impact statement on its face against a

standard of whether the ageney had made ‘tan objec-

tive good faith effort to comply with the statutory

procedural requirements, * a test that it elsewhere de-

scribed as a ‘‘rule of reason.”? There is no statutory

basis for this standard of judicial review. By this

standard, the impact statement was inevitably found

not wanting for, of course, some kind of ‘effort’? at

compliance with NEPA had quite evidently been

made. The Court of Appeals also rejected the Dis-

trict Court’s conclusion that review of the termination

action could be had under the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act on grounds other than failure to comply

with the procedural requirements of NEPA (App.

8a)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In its practical effect the decision below is of the

greatest significance. A foresighted program of con-

serving the invaluable, scarce and wasting resource,

helium, adopted more than a decade ago pursuant to

*The Court of Appeals delineated its review as, ‘‘In summary,

then, our view is that the review of the FES is limited to the

following: (1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural

requirements of NEPA. (2) Whether the environmental impact’

statement constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the

demands of NEPA. (3) Whether the statement contains a rea-

sonable discussion of the subject matter involved in the five re-

quired areas.” (App. 12a).

10

Congressional authorization and_ direction, is

abandoned. °

Abandonment of this program has been permitted

without the kind of judicial inquiry into the legality

of the agency action terminating it that is required by

decisions of this Court and of other courts of appeals,

including in various aspects, the First, Second,

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and District of Co-

lumbia Circuits. Because the several conflicts relate

to important and recurring questions of federal law,

the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit should be reviewed by this Court.

Judge Breitenstein, in a concurring opinion, ac-

knowledged one of the conflicts explicitly. He said:

‘*T reject, and I believe the majority opinion

rejects, the apparent holdings of the Eighth and

Fourth Circuits that an environmental impact

statement is judicially reviewable on its merits

to determine sufficiency.’’ (App. 18a).

The question whether an impact statement is re-

viewable ‘‘on its merits to determine sufficiency’’ or

whether, as the court below held, a good faith effort at

6 Abandonment of the conservation program, ironically, coincides

with the abrupt and forceful coming to public awareness of an

energy crisis that, we are told, will be a chronic condition until

sources of energy other than fossil fuels are developed for prac-

tical application. The irony lies in the fact that among the most

promising substitutes for fossil fuels are methods of power genera-

tion—nuclear fission and fusion and the even more exotie method

called magnetohydrodynamics—that, in the present state of our

knowledge, require helium with its singular behavioral characteris-

tics at very low temperatures. Those characteristics also make

helium uniquely suitable for inducing superconductivity in metals

so as to create greater efficiency in the transmission of energy pro-

duced from whatever sources are available.

NRE IT Le TAD TREE Sat x . ors

we ae

11

compliance with the impact statement requirement is

enough is the third of three important federal ques-

tions presented and dealt with hereinbelow. (pp. 22-

26, infra).* The other two questions arise from the

actions of the Court of Appeals in (1) limiting its re-

view of agency action to determining ‘*compliance with

the [NEPA] requirement of the environmental im-

pact statement’’ and (2) dismissing without considera-

tion other and substantial questions raised concerning

the validity of the challenged agency action.

L

The Court of Appeal’s Ruling That the District Court Was

Without Jurisdiction To Engage in Substantive Review of

Agency Action Under the National Environmental Policy

Act Is in Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,

Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

The Court of Appeals correctly reaffirmed in the

decision below its ruling on the earlier appeal from

the preliminary injunction of 1971 that the District

Court had jurisdiction to determine agency compliance

with NEPA. (App. 5a-6a; 455 F.2d at 653-54).

But it limited review in a manner that conflicts with

decisions of other courts of appeals.

7 Judge Breitenstein cited for the ‘‘apparent holdings’’ of the

Fourth and Eighth Circuits on reviewability of impact statements,

Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d

289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), and Conservation Council of North Caro-

lina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d, 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973). In fact, those

cases, discussed in the text of this Petition below, relate at the

pages cited to review of the substantive agency decision for com-

pliance with NEPA, not review of the impact statement. But

both courts have reviewed or called for review of impact statements

on the ‘‘merits’’ to determine sufficiency’’ in the way that Judge

Breitenstein and his brethren eschewed. See Environmental De-

fense Fund v. Frochlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348-52 (8th Cir. 1972);

Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).

Eres tener eS =

12

The District Court conducted a properly careful

examination of the impact statement in making its

NEPA review and found it unnecessary to go fur-

ther. There was no need to ‘‘reach the propriety of

the Secretary’s actual decision to terminate’’ because

the inadequacies of the impact statement made it im-

possible for the Secretary to have sensibly balanced

adverse environmental impacts against the benetits of

his proposed actions as NEPA substantively requires.

(App. 42a.)

The Court of Appeals, viewing the impact state-

ment against a far too uncritical standard, found it

adequate—and stopped there. It did not make the

further inquiry required of it once it had ruled that

the necessary condition precedent to valid agency

action was satisfied by the impact statement. That

inquiry is into whether the action itself, the decision

to terminate the conservation program, reflected the

the balancing of environmental and other values

that NEPA requires. The court was explicit on this

point. It said that its review was ‘‘strictly limited

to compliance with the requirement of the environ-

mental impact statement,’’ that ‘‘the only issue giv-

ing the district court jurisdiction to entertain the

injunction suit was non-compliance with the require-

ment of an impact statement.’” (App. 8a, 6a,).

While it said that this review ‘‘includes consideration

given to the statement by the Secretary,’’ it did not, on

the face of its opinion, actually probe the extent, if

any, of the consideration of the impact statement.

Much less did it inquire into whether the Secretary’s

consideration of the environmental factors entering

into his decision satisfied the substantive standards of

NEPA.

OTE al Sa Ce Da UE BOCRE. £ era

13

In so limiting NEPA review, the court ruled in a

way that squarely conflicts with decisions of at least

four other courts of appeals.

The leading decision is that of the Eighth Circuit

in Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of Engi-

neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The court there

held:

“Given an agency obligation to carry out the

substantive requirements of . .. [NEPA] we

believe that courts have an obligation to review

substantive ageney decisions on the merits.”

Id. at 298.

It later explained what it meant by review on the

merits.

‘“‘Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court

must first determine if the agency reached its

decision after a full, good faith consideration and

balancing of environmental factors. The court

must then determine, according to the standards

set forth in §§101(b) and 102(1) of the Act,

whether the actual balance of costs and benefits

that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave in-

sufficient weight to environmental values.’’ /d.

at 300, quoting from Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating

Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.Cir.

1971). +

The court proceeded to engage in the type of review

suggested in the foregoing quotation. Jd. at 301.

While it sustained the agency action in the case, the

court subsequently reversed a district court decision

in favor of an agency in a NEPA ease and made un-

mistakable its view that the district courts have an

obligation ‘‘to review agency decisions on the merits

to determine if they are in accord with NEPA.”

14

Environmental Defense Fund vy. Froehlke, 473 F.2d

346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).

The Fourth Circuit has followed these rulings of the

Eighth Circuit and has reversed a district court

judgment in a NEPA ease on the sole ground that

the district court erred in not engaging in ‘ta ‘sub-

stantial inquiry’ to determine whether there has been

a clear error of judgment’’ on the merits of the agency

decision. Conservation Council of North Carolina v.

Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973).

The Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,

486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973), held that:

‘San agency's decision should be subjected to a

review on the merits to determine if it is in accord

with substantive requirements of NEPA. The

review should be limited to determining whether

the agencies’ decision is arbitrary or capricious.

‘The Court is not empowered to substitute its

judgment for that of the ageney,’ ’’ quoting from

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).

See also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v.

AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; Hanley.

Kleindienst 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), and Silva

v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).

The conflict between the decision below and the

decisions of these other courts of appeals is square

and unavoidable. The question, simply put, is

whether review of agency action under NEPA ends

with a determination that a procedurally adequate im-

pact statement has been prepared and includes no in-

quiry into whether the agency has given full con-

sideration to environmental values including alterna-

tives to the proposed action or whether the environ-

mental considerations revealed by the statement have

properly entered into the agency decision to which the

impact statement relates. This question of the scope

of review in NEPA eases arises here in the context of

a truly major federal action that will significantly

affect the quality of the human environment and of

human life for years to come.* The case is therefore

an appropriate vehicle for resolving the conflict.

This Court should grant review.

Il.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling That Review of the Substantive

Agency Decision Was Not Available Under the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act, Conflicts With Decisions of the

Second, Fourth, Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits.

The court below denied review of the termination of

the helium conservation program on any ground other

than procedural compliance with NEPA. The Helium

Act, supra, provides in part that the Administrative

Procedure Act shall apply to any ageney proceeding

and any agency action taken under the Act. 50

U.S.C. See. 167h. Nevertheless the Court below re-

fused to review the termination of the program relying

principally upon Larson vy. Domestic & Foreign Com-

merce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1949). To the

extent that the Larsen decision precludes judicial re-

view of agency action it is in conflict with the Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act, the apparent position of

this Court as reflected in decisions such as Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, and a host of

lower court decisions which have consistently re-

8A cardinal purpose of NEPA is ‘**. .. that the Nation may—

(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the

environment for succeeding generations . .. .’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 4331(b) (1).

re tase hss EAN ENS Le n «OO ee BL RT OS

16

viewed agency action under the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act.* The NEPA contains no provisions for

judicial review, yet federal courts have unhesitatingly

reviewed agency compliance with the Act, granting

injunctive relief where non-compliance was ap-

parent. *°

Petitioners’ principal contention relating to the

merits of the decision to terminate the helium conser-

vation program is that the termination was incon-

® Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.

1970): Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Littell

v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971); Estrada v. Ahrens,

296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961); Ballerina Pen. Co. v. Kunzig, 433

F.2d 1204, 1207, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk Heating &

Plbg. Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;

Steinthal and Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;

Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;

Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pace

Co. v. Resor, 344 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), reversed on

other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971); State Highway

Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1105 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) ;

Local 2677, American Federation of Government Employees v.

Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973); National Council of

Community Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897

(D.D.C. 1973); Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F.

Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1973) and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.

Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).

” Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Hanley v.

Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conser-

vation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Con-

servation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 665

(4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (Ast Cir. 1973) ;

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Frochlke, 477 F.2d 1033

(Sth Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973);

Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Hopewell Township

Citizens 1-95 Committee v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) ;

Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244

(10th Cir. 1973) and Indian Lookout Alliance vy. Volpe, 484 F.2d

11 (18th Cir. 1973).

ee ee ee

17

sistent with the provisions and intent of the Helium

Act, particularly when those provisions are interpreted,

as they must be **to the fullest extent possible,” in ac-

cordance with the policies set forth in NEPA." The

argument in brief is: Congress by the Helium <Act

Amendments of 1960 authorized the Secretary of the

Interior to embark on a program of conserving helium;

implicitly he was necessarily authorized to terminate

any such program when it had fulfilled its purpose;

the Secretary entered into the helium supply contracts

that constitute the conservation program and provided

in each of them for termination when, on his judg-

ment, the conservation purposes of the Helium <Act

have been fulfilled (p. 5, n. 2, supra); unless the

circumstances set*forth in the contractual termination

clauses exist and lead the Secretary rationally to the

judgment that those purposes have been fulfilled, he

has neither contractual nor statutory authority to ter-

minate the program; in fact, the circumstances do not

exist, and therefore the Secretary’s action in purport-

ing to terminate the program is illegal.

™ Section 102(1) of NEPA states that the Congress ‘‘ authorizes

and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . the policies,

regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be inter-

preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth

in this Act ...’’ When, as in the cases cited at pp. 13-14, supra,

a court holds that agency action may be set aside as arbitrary,

capricious or an abuse of discretion, 5 U.S.C. $706(2)(A), for

failure to comply with the substantive standards of NEPA, it

presumably is relying on the requirement of administration in

accordance with NEPA policies laid down in §$ 102(1). Petitioners

chose to emphasize the requirement that publie laws be interpreted

in accordance with NEPA policies. On this view agency action

that, without warrant, does not accord with NEPA policies would

be set aside as ‘‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or

limitations .. .,°° 5 U.S.C. $706(2)(C). Different wavs of stat-

ing substantially the same claim should not affect the standard of

review.

18

Apart from a conclusory, afterthought statement of

the Court of Appeals that ‘‘we fail to perceive any

violation of the 1960 Helium Act Amendments,” which

clearly does not suffice to dispose of a serious, sub-

stantial legal argument, petitioners have not been heard

on this claim.”

The Court of Appeals’ discussion of why petitioners

could not be heard on this claim is confused. What-

ever the court intended as its reasons, however, the

important question raised by its effectively depriving

petitioners of their day in court is important enough to

to warrant review and resolution by this Court.

First, the court said in its original opinion affirm-

ing the preliminary injunction that, aside from NEPA

considerations, the termination action was one entirely

12 Nor have they been heard on their claim that the termination

was illegal because the Secretary did not decide to terminate but

instead the decision was made for him by officials of the Office of

Management and Budget. To this claim the Court of Appeals

made the wholly unresponsive answer that ‘‘the Office of Manage-

ment and Budget does not have the authority to dictate to the

Secretary the decision that he is to make in connection with a

contract entered into and terminable by him.’’ (App. 16a).

The court's statement is true, and it is indeed the heart of peti-

tioners’ claim of illegality on this score. But it only states the

issue, not the resolution of it. The court mistook a statement of

a legal conclusion for a statement of what in fact happened. The

District Court did not have to reach the issue of termination by

an unauthorized official. The indications that the OMB dictated

the first termination of the conservation program in 1971 were

disclosed as a result of the trial process in the Court of Claims in

Northern Heler Co. vy. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).

Petitioners urged below that, were the issue to be reached, they

could not be restricted to argument on the administrative record

but must have an evidentiary trial to ascertain OMB’s role in

the 1973 termination. The effect of the Court of Appeals’ judg-

ment in this respect is to deprive petitioners of a trial to which

they were entitled on the undenied allegations of their verified

amended complaints.

ee ee

19

within the discretion of the Secretary. 455 F.2d at

653 (App. 75a). In the decision below it adhered to its

views that **the Secretary was not compelled to pur-

chase any helium; that the matter was left to his

discretion and he was within his rights in terminating

the contracts.’ If this was intended as a statement

that agency action respecting helium conservation is

so far ‘committed to agency discretion by law’’ that,

according to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2), review of the action

eannot be had, it is obviously inconsistent with this

Court’s opinions in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

Inc. v. Volpe, supra at 410 (1971).

In Overton Park, this Court said that the **com-

mitted to agency discretion”’ exception to the general

rule of reviewability under the Administrative Proce-

dure Act is a very narrow one, limited to those cases

in which ‘‘there is no law to apply.’’ In this case

there plainly is law to apply in the Helium Act as that

statute is illuminated by the policies of NEPA.”

3 Indeed, neither in this case nor in a very significant related

ease has the Secretary argued that he has untrammeled discretion

to terminate the contracts whenever and in whatever circumstances

he wishes. The related case is the suit of the fourth helium supply

contractor for damages in the Court of Claims based upon the

Government's failure to pay for helium before the attempted 1971

termination of the contracts. The Court of Claims found a breach

by virtue of nonpayment. Northern Helex Co. v. United States,

455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972). The case is awaiting the decision of a

Court of Claims trial judge on the issue of damages. The Govern-

ment in its argument in that case that the subsequent 1971 ter-

mination limits the damages for which it is liable to those sus-

tained before the termination, acknowledges that to be valid. the

termination must have been based on a rationally supported

judgment that the purchase of helium was no longer necessary

to achieve the purposes of the Helium Act. The argument there

is over the breadth of the ‘‘purposes’’ of the statute that must

have been fulfilled to justify termination. Thus, the suggestion

of the court below that there is no law to apply is untenable, even

on respondents’ view.

ar 7 — PLE . . =e Satine - - + 0} er: © ETE Ee

20

A second possible basis for the Court of Appeals’

decision to dismiss several of petitioners’ claims with-

out hearing is the suggestion in its opinion that in-

junctive relief cannot be had in a suit that arises in

the context of a government contract. (App. 7a). The

court, without explanation, excepted from its ban suits

to compel compliance with the procedural commands

of NEPA. (App. 8a). The erection of an otherwise

impenetrable barrier to injunctive suits involving

agency action is inconsistent with this Court’s govern-

ing decisions. The court below invoked some of these

decisions, including particularly Larson vy. Domestic

& Foreign Commerce Corp., supra. However, Larson

and the other modern sovereign immunity cases stand

squarely opposed to the proposition that there is any

all-inclusive ban on equitable suits to redress griev-

ances arising from government contracts.

Were there any such ban, Larson itself could have

been decided very simply and without contributing as

it has to the subtleties of sovereign immunity analysis.

For in Larson there was a contract of sale, and the

plaintiff there could have sued for damages in the

Court of Claims. Instead of deciding the ease on

that ground, however, the Court engaged in a lengthy

discussion in the course of which it set forth rules that

still guide decisions—notably, for purposes of this case,

the rule that, if an officer has acted beyond his statutory

authority, he cannot invoke the sovereign’s immunity

to forestall judicial inquiry into his conduct.

In this case there are substantial allegations that

contracts were terminated by officials acting in excess

of their statutory authority. The fact that damages

may be available to redress private wrongs under the

Tucker Act because of such action does not prevent

eS

21

courts from passing upon such allegations in an in-

junction suit to vindicate the public interest, which

is otherwise trammeled by the ageney action. Mr.

Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Larson, said in a

statement to which the majority of the Court took no

exception that *‘the general statute permitting suit in

a Court of Claims in certain instances against the Gov-

ernment is not a statute that provides that remedies

otherwise at the plaintiff's command are to be dis-

placed.”” 337 U.S. at 722. To be sure, there are cases,

such as Wells vy. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918), much

relied on by respondents below, in which there is no

significant public interest element in a government

contract dispute and the Tucker Act damages remedy

is therefore adequate for the redress of private wrongs.

But that is obviously not this ease. Here the public

interest is gravely implicated.

Finally, the Court of Appeals said that ‘‘we reject

the plaintiff’s argument that review of the termination

is permissible under the Administrative Procedure(s)

Act.”” (App. 8a) If this statement was intended

to add anything to what the court had already said by

way of dismissal of petitioners’ substantive claims,

it was a reaffirmation of the Tenth Cireuit’s holding

that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,

now 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, is not a waiver of sovereign

immunity as to agency action within its scope. See

Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968).

That holding conflicts with decisions of the courts of

appeals of four other circuits and several district

courts that Section 10 is such a waiver.’ This Court

has not decided this question relating to the scope and

See cases cited in footnotes 9 and 10 supra.

as A BREET EELS oS TEER ET IDA IE Se! oN ~ : LOD x bh God FAN Se TA Aa li i que

22

effect of Section 10 even though the APA is now more

than a gvarter-century old. It should resolve the

conflict now.

ITI.

The Court of Appeals Applied a Standard of Judicial Review

of Impact Statements Under NEPA That Conflicts With

the Standard Applied by Other Circuits.

Aggravating the limited view it took of the scope

of judicial review, the Court of Appeals applied an

impermissibly lenient standard of review to the only

thing it undertook to review at all, the impact state-

ment.

In its consideration of the adequacy of the impact

statement. the District Court applied the ‘‘arbitrary

and eapricious’’ standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),

with all that standard was said by this Court in Citi-

zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra

at 415-16 (1971), to imply in the way of a ‘‘substan-

tial inquiry’’ and ‘‘a thorough, probing in-depth re-

view.’ (App. 45a) In a long and thoughtful opinion,

the District Court had regard not only to the face of

the impact statement but also to the content of the

statement—the full range of scientific and technical

opinion on helium supply, helium uses and helium

demand. It found that such material, readily avail-

able to the Interior Department, was ignored in many

aspects of the impact statement.” (App. 51a-68a)

1 Tllustratively, the court found the statement flawed by its

failure to discuss the disputed issue of whether alternative helium

gas supplies would be available in the future (App. 65a-66a) ; its

apparent obliviousness to the impact on developing energy and

other technology of the future unavailability of helium, which is

well-documented elsewhere (App. 56a-58a) ; and its lack of analysis

of the environmental impact of alternative future helium recovery

techniques (App. 58a-60a).

23

The Court of Appeals rejected the searching stand-

ard of review applied by the District Court and pur-

ported to follow **the better reasoned decisions,”’ which

it said permitted no more than a determination, based

on the face of the impact statement, whether the agency

made ‘tan objective good faith effort to comply with

the statutory procedural requirements.’* (App. 10a.)

Such a standard of review, which the court elsewhere

deseribed as a ‘‘rule of reason,’’ ean find no support in

any pertinent statute and far from according with

‘better reasoned decisions,”’ conflicts with the decisions

of other courts of appeals in reviewing NEPA impact

statements.

Other circuits have undertaken a careful review to

determine the sufficiency of impact statement on their

merits. In doing so, these courts have not second-

cuessed ‘*the scientists, experts, economists and plan-

ner who make the environmental statement,’’ which

Judge Breitenstein, in his concurring opinion acknow]l-

edging the conflict on this point (p. 10, supra), viewed

as the necessary alternative to his court’s lenient stand-

ard of review. (App. 18a.) Rather, they have acted

to ensure that NEPA serves its purpose as an ‘‘action-

forcing’? statute, Calrert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-

mittee v. AEC, supra at 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971),

by carefully reviewing what the experts have written,

in the light of what is known or ean readily be ascer-

tained about the subject of the statement, to see whether

the statement is in fact the ‘*single coherent and com-

prehensive environmental analysis,’’ Greene County

Planning Ba. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). called for by the

statute. Only thus can there be any guarantee that

the immediate decision-maker and the others for whom

we I RN Se LLL LALIT CL OE OLEH eI Ds . Aas a ARNE

24

impact statements are intended—themselves typically

non-experts—have the benefit of the systematic laying

out of environmental considerations affecting a pro-

posed action. Only thus can there be assurance that the

ultimate purpose of NEPA, described once by the

Court below itself as a mandate ‘‘that action can be

taken only following complete awareness on the part of

the actor of the environmental consequences of his

action,’’ 455 F.2d at 656, is served.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit has emphasized the duty of reviewing courts

to determine whether the agency preparing an impact

statement has properly included and considered in its

analysis relevant technical and scientific opinion avail-

able to it that may conflict with its own views. That

court has held that NEPA requires impact statements

at the very least to identify and evince an awareness

of significant conflicting scientific and technical opin-

ion that is responsible and available to the agency.

Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463

F.2d 783, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Committee

for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,

795 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A standard of review limited

to determining from the face of the impact statement

whether there was a ‘‘good faith effort to comply with

the statutory procedural requirements”’ is at odds with

the rigorous standard of review that the District of

Columbia Cireuit and other circuits have raised.

Most recently, the First Circuit said in Silva v.

Lynn, supra at 1283:

‘In identifying the source of review power courts

have, as did the district court here, drawn on

NEPA itself, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. and the gen-

eral ‘‘federal question’’ power, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

cieieenmtnieieing >

25

We think an alternative source, equally applicable

is the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 702

and 706. In any eveut, the judicial inquiries are

whether the agency’s findings and conclusions in

the EIS are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-

cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,

and whether the agency followed the procedures

required by law.”’

The court found the impact statement there in issue

to be inadequate in that it lacked sufficient discussion

of alternatives and a reasoned basis for the choices

made.

In operational terms, the court below in this case

has adopted a standard that is satisfied by ‘‘a catalog

of environmental facts,’’ Environmental Defense Fund

v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972), and an

incomplete catalog at that."

The District Court applied the standard of review

of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706

(2)(A) and found glaring deficiencies in the impact

statement. (App. 5la-68a). The Court of Appeals

ignored the record below in a comment unrelated to

the issues presented saying that ‘‘the statement did

not have to dwell on the imaginary horribles posed by

the plaintiffs.’”” (App. 14a). The issues presented

to the District Court and the Court of Appeals were,

as required, supported solidly by the record in this

ease. To avoid review by a statement as quoted above

permits an agency to completely circumvent NEPA

which requires the agency, among other things, to

16The notion that NEPA is merely a full-disclosure law has

been flatly rejected. So to construe NEPA would render it a

‘paper tiger’’. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC,

supra.

Ee 7

Pardee: te T°

26

compare ‘“‘the net balance [of benefits and environ-

mental risks] for the proposed project with the en-

vironmental risks presented by alternative courses of

action.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

This Court should review the decision below to de-

termine whether the standard for judging the adequacy

of environmental impact statements is to be the lenient

standard applied by the Tenth Circuit or the more rig-

orous standard applied by other Courts of Appeals.

Only the latter, we submit, will ensure that impact

statements serve the high purposes intended for them

by Congress.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the writ of certiorari

prayed for should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO

1625 K Street. N. W.

Washington, D. C., 20006

Of Counsel:

Emmet A. BLAES

WENDELL J. DocGeTt JocHEMS, SARGENT & BLAES

General Counsel & 200 East Pirst Street

_ Secretary Wichita, Kansas 67201

National Helium

Corporation Attorneys for

P. 0. Box 1642 Petitioner, National

Houston, Texas 77001 Helium Corporation

Of Counsel:

R. Price Hlowarp

Senior Counsel

Phillips Petroleum

Company

Bartlesville, Oklahoma

74003

Witulam H. ALLEN

EUGENE D. GULLAND

COVINGTON & BURLING

888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

JOSEPH W. KENNEDY

Morris, Lainc, EVANs,

Brock & KENNEDY,

(CHARTERED

Suite 430

200 West Douglas

Wichita, Kansas 67202

Attorneys for

Petitioner, Phillips

Petroleum Company

Ropert L. ACKERLY

RayMONp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO

1625 K Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C., 20006

Wituram S. RICHARDSON

ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND

MALONE, CHARTERED

P. O. Box 1034

Wichita, Kansas 67201

DanteL R. HOPKINS

P. O. Box 25128

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

73125

Attorneys for

Petitioner, Cities Service

Heler, Ine.

kia ret te er

\ISRARY *&

SUPT, OL ge

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No 78-1129

NATIONAL HELIUM CORPORATION,

and

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,

and

CITIES SERVICE HELEx, INc.,

Petitioners,

Vs

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior,

and

Exstrt F. Osporn, Director, Bureau of Mines,

Department of Interior,

Respondents.

—_—————_—_

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

TENTH CIRCUIT

————_—_

Press or Byron S. Apams Printinc, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

=S.

2

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

Opinions BELow:

National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th

Cle. B0FE) vc cccccnscvertsrveavesvescauesessers la

National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78

(D. Kan. 1973) .....cccccccccsccescccsccnccces 19a

National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th

Che, TFG) vnc nese ccnsacSccesevenverstesrentees 73a

National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151

(D. Kan. 1971) ........cccccersccvcvcccccccces 83a

Judgment, Tenth Cireuit Court of Appeals, October

TE. DUSE c h cnc cbderesestvccestonsseeeveseaviess 140a

Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts by the Sec-

retary, Department of Interior, February 2, 1973 97a

STATUTES:

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

Beetions 4321-4335 (1970) ....csvcccvvcsvssvens 120a

Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. Sections 167-167n (1970) ..... 124a

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

Sections 701-706 (1970) ....ccsccscvescccsceces 136a

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

SerreMsBer Term, 1973

NationaL Hetium Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

Pururps PerroLeum CoMPANY

and

Citres Service Hetex, Ixc.,

Intervenor-Plaintiff-

Appellees,

v.

Rocers C. B. Mortox, Secretary of the Interior, and -

Exbvrt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,

Department of the Interior,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Nos. 73-1169

73-1449

Opinion

Before Brerrensters, Hit and Doyte, Cireuit Judges.

Doyte, Cireuit Judge.

This cause has been appealed on prior occasions. In

National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th

Cir. 1971), the district court had ruled that helium pur-

chase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium Act,

50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. could not be terminated by the See-

CEB, Or ee

2a

retary of the Interior without the filing by the Interior

Department of an environmental impact statement in

accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. This court affirmed

that decision, holding that the Department was required

to comply with this provision of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA). Following the filing of an

environmental impact statement by the Department, the

Secretary again terminated the helium purchase contracts

and once again plaintiffs-appellees filed an injunction suit

in the United States District Court for the District of

Kansas. The district court again enjoined the Secretary.

On this occasion it was due to the dissatisfaction of the

court with the impact statement. There have been two

other appeal proceedings presented to us. One of these

involved the scope of the retrial—whether it was to be an

agency review or a de novo hearing. The other had to do

with efforts of plaintiffs-appellees to discover government

documents.

The district court filed the decision leading to the instant

appeal on June 11, 1973. It again enjoined the Secretary

of the Interior from terminating three of the helium pur-

chase contracts. Although the Department had filed an

impact statement the court ruled that it had failed to

comply with the mandate of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969; that the impact statement, if not

deficient in scope, was essentially lacking in depth. At

present, then, the primary issue before the court is whether

the Department’s impact statement or report was in accord-

ance with the statutory standards and in accordance with

this court's mandate in the prior ease.

Qn the prior occasion and now the Secretary terminated

the contracts pursuant to their express termination provi-

sions. He did so on the basis that the helium program

had been substantially carried out. The mentioned provi-

sions authorize him to terminate when there has been a

substantial diminution in helium requirements, discovery of

3a

large new helium resources or other changes of a similar

nature.’

At the time that these contracts were entered into, the

U.S. helium requirements amounted to 530 million eubie

feet of helium per year. This requirement increased in

subsequent years, but commenced to decline in 1967 and has

declined every year since so that in the year 1970 the

demand had decreased to 400 million cubic feet. An

average of 3.126 billion cubie feet of helium had been pur-

chased each year. In the years 1971-72 the demand dimin-

ished in substantial amounts and all of the purchases have

decreased, although they continue to be in excess of two

billion cubie feet annually. During this entire purchase

period the government through the Bureau of Mines had

purchased enough helium to meet all of its needs and has

not needed to use the purchased helium. Furthermore, the

government believes that it has much more of a supply than

can possibly be used between now and 2000. It is estimated

that it is six times as much as will be needed.

1In our prior opinion, 455 F.2d at 653, we said:

Under the Act the Secretary is not required to purchase

any helium. The entire matter is left to his discretion. In

deciding to terminate the contract the Secretary stated that

the basic purposes of the Act had been fulfilled, that is that

the 25-year purchase program envisioned by the Act was

unnecessary because as of the time of termination his esti-

mates showed that there was enough helium in storage to

fulfill government requirements through 1995. The Secretary

notified the companies on January 26, 1971, that the contracts

would be terminated effective March 27, 1971. In his letter he °

stated that there had been a diminution in the requirements of

helium for essential governmental activities, and that there had

been new discoveries since the execution of the contract, which

discoveries had provided large sources of available helium if

more of the gas ‘‘is required for essential government activ-

ities than is now in storage or will be recovered in govern-

ment plants.”

28 SY RE

da

Following this court’s decision the Interior Department

proceeded at once to conduct a study leading to the prepar-

ation and filing of an environmental impact statement. The

initial draft was submitted to interested parties, including

the plaintiffs, and comments were received. These are in-

cluded as part of the report of the Department. The final

environmental statement was issued November 13, 1972.

The hearing in the district court consisted of a judicial

review of the administrative record. It was not a trial

de novo. (This was in accordance with the adjudication of

this court after the mentioned interlocutory appeal.) The

proceedings in the district court were extensive as to the

composition of the administrative record. Plaintiffs had

full opportunity to express their views, and the court’s

opinion was thorough and exhaustive.

In its final decision the court ruled that it was limited to

determining whether the agency’s action was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in

accordance with the law. It concluded that the Depart-

ment’s effort in preparing the impact statement was an in-

sufficient one which failed to come up to the mentioned

standard in numerous respects. It characterized the state-

ment as ‘‘feeble,’’ ‘‘obviously incomplete,’’ ‘‘appallingly

deficient,’’ ‘‘startling in its brevity and lack of depth,’’ and,

finally, said that the statement totally failed to consider

the environmental impact of termination. The court dis-

approved the statement in its entirety and remanded the

cause for further proceedings.

Reversal is demanded on the following grounds:

First, it is contended that there was a lack of jurisdiction

for the district court to even entertain the case in view of

the Supreme Court’s recent decision (rendered since our

last decision) in United States v. Students Chal. Reg. Agey.

Pro. (SCRAP), —— USS. , 93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973).

Second, the environmental! statement was valid and suf-

ficient ; the district court erred in condemning it.

—*

5a

Third, the Secretary complied with the procedural re-

quirements of NEPA as well as with this court’s mandate.

Hence, there was no justification for issuing the injunction.

Fourth, the district court erred in considering grounds

other than sufficiency of F.E.S. since it lacked authority

to enjoin for any ground except noncompliance with NEPA.

1.

JURISDICTION

A. WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY IS

SUPERSEDED BY NEPA.

First we consider the renewed challenge to jurisdiction.

As above noted, this question was determined adversely to

the government in the early appeal. See 455 F.2d at 653-

54. The government now urges that the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in United States v. Students Challenging

Regulatory Agency Procedures, supre, has changed the

applicable law and that this issue must be reexamined. In

this recent case the Supreme Court reviewed the decision

of the District of Columbia three-judge court which en-

joined a proposed railroad rate increase of the Interstate

Commerce Act. Under that Act a railroad is required to

give at least 30 days notice for carrying out a proposed rate

increase. During this period the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission may, pursuant to $15(7) of the Act, suspend the

operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven

months pending an investigation and decision of the lawful-

ness of the new rates. The Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion refused to suspend the rate increase and the environ-

mental issue arose from the fact that the increase involved

a 2.5 percent surcharge on nearly all freight rates. Plain-

tiffs alleged that the modified rate structure would dis-

courage the transportation of recyclable material and pro-

mote the use of raw materials which compete with scrap

material and would thereby affect the environment. The

Court based its decision on Arrow Transportation Co, v,

a a . 3 ce

rr rrr ere Fee eed

6a

Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963), which had held

that Congress had in the ICC Act vested exclusive power in

the ICC to suspend rates pending final decision and had

deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant this relief;

the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction.

It seems apparent that the case at bar differs from the

so-called SCRAP decision in that the Helium Act does not

vest the Secretary with the same kind of regulatory

authority as was present in the SCRAP case. The holding

that NEPA did not subvert the power of the Interstate

Commerce Commission was not surprising since the Com-

mission is a tribunal in its own right with peculiarly exelu-

sive authority within its sphere.

The SCRAP decision does create at least a shadow of

doubt as to whether the Secretary’s power was undermined

by NEPA. The fact, however, that it gives pause is not

enough because the differences between the two conditions

are marked.

The district court held that additional bases of jurisdic-

tion existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question),

§ 1361 (action to compel a federal officer to perform his

duty), and §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments). Jur-

isdiction on other than NEPA grounds becomes important

only if we find compliance with NEPA. This argument is

superfluous since NEPA furnishes a jurisdictional base,

and the case being properly in federal court it is there for

all purposes. Hence, we have no concern over jurisdiction

outside the NEPA base.

B. Contract TERMINATION—UskE or INJUNCTION

The trial court did not follow this court’s mandate that

the only issue giving the district court jurisdiction to enter-

tain the injunction suit was the noncompliance with the re-

quirement of an impact statement. We stated in our

former opinion that the Secretary was not compelled to

purchase any helium; that the matter was left to his dis-

7a

cretion and he was within his rights in terminating the con-

tracts. We adhere to these views.

We have fully considered the Supreme Court cases which

prohibit injunctive relief against governmental officers on

account of their upholding the rights of the government

arising under a contract. Such a suit is distinguished by

the Supreme Court from actions seeking compensations for

an alleged wrong and are regarded as actions against the

sovereign to which there has not been consent. See Larson

v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S.

682 (1949).?

It is fundamental that the Tucker Act which contains a

limited consent of the United States to be sued does not

authorize an action in injunction. See Richardson v.

Morris, U.S. ——, 93 S.Ct. 629 (1973) and United

States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).

We view the action seeking to require the Department to

file an impact statement to stand on a different footing in

2In distinguishing between actions seeking damages and suits

like the case at bar, the Supreme Court said:

But the reasoning is not applicable to suits for specific relief.

For, it is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen

may be compensated for a wrong done to him by the Gov-

ernment. It is a far different matter to permit a court to

exercise its compulsive powers to restraiin the Government

from acting, or to compel it to act. There are the strongest

reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot be

had against the sovereign. The Government as representative

of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks

by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property

or contract right. As was early recognized, ‘‘the interference

of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties

of the executive departments of the government, would be

productive of nothing but mischief. * * * ”’

337 U.S. at 704. See also some of the numerous other cases which

support the Larson holding: Dugan vy. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ;

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. 584 (1941).

So ee Se

8a

relationship to the sovereign immunity doctrine and the

cited cases because the action merely seeks * to obtain com-

pliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969 and is not for the purpose of asserting and enforcing a

private right. Also, if the impact statement is to be mean-

ingful the requirement must be virtually absolute. Thus,

we conceive of the review of the Secretary’s action as being

strictly limited to compliance with the requirement of the

environmental impact statement. This, of course, includes

consideration given to the statement by the Secretary, for if

he failed to consider it his action would assume arbitrari-

ness and capriciousness.

Efforts to enjoin the Secretary from terminating the

contracts for an indefinite period of time must, of course,

fail. We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that review of the

termination is permissible under the Administrative Pro-

cedures Act. We fail to perceive any violation of the 1960

Helium Act Amendments.

II.

Next we consider whether the Secretary and the Depart-

ment fulfilled the requirements of § 4332. A primary issue

is the scope and the test of judicial review. First, what is

the standard to be used in such review and, second, whether

the court correctly assessed the agency’s action in the light

of the NEPA requirements.

A. Tue Staxparp To Be Apptiep.

The specific procedural requirements of NEPA are de-

lineated in 42 U.S.C. $4332. Section 4332(2)(A)-(H)

imposes specific procedural duties on federal agencies, one

of which is the duty of preparing a detailed impact state-

ment to accompany any recommendation for a major federal

action significantly affecting the environment. The require-

5 Since the defendants are engaged in upholding a publie right

they can only be acting pursuant to publie laws.

9a

ments of this impact statement contained in § 4332(2)(C)

include five specific areas to be covered in the impact state-

ment:

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

_ (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot

be avoided should the proposed be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses

of the man’s environment and the maintenance and

enhancement of long-terin productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments

of resources which would be involved in the proposed

action should it be implemented.

The trial court employed the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’

standard of § 706 of the APA.‘ This sets aside the action

if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-

wise not in accordance with law. The trial court pur-

portedly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-

14 (1971). This ease did not, however, involve the prepara-

tion of an environmental impact statement. This was a

review of the decision of the Secretary of Transportation

in respect to the building of a highway through a park. This

was in truth ‘‘agency action.’’ The decision of the Sec-

retary in Overton Park was concerned with the Depart-

ment of Transportation Act of 1966 and the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1968. In assessing the adequacy of the

impact statement, we are not here reviewing, as we said

above, agency action within the meaning of $706 of the

APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA require-

ment which is, to be sure, a prerequisite for agency action

but is not agency action itself. The trial court’s conclu-

4 National Helium Company, et al. v. Morton, No. W-4568, filed

June 11, 1973 (D. Kansas), page 26.

10a

sion that it was required by Overton Park to apply the

arbitrary and capricious standard was, in our view,

erroneous.

The better reasoned decisions have required an objective

good faith effort to comply with the statutory procedural

requirements. Other than that, the courts have demanded

that the agency do more than mechanically pursue the pro-

eedural standards. Thus, in Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Com. v.

United States A. E. Com’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971),

the court added to the good faith standard by saying that

the agency must comply with the procedural requirements

to the fullest extent possible. The same Cireuit in

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458

F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), has said that the procedural

requirements are not intended to be a straitjacket or to

demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible.

Finally, the most recent decision of the D.C. Circuit,

Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic

Energy Commission, D.C. Cir., No. 72-1331, June 12, 1973,

expounds the standards more clearly than eatlier decisions:

It is apparent, however, that the Commission seeks to

avoid issuing its forthcoming ‘‘environmental survey’’

as an impact statement under Section 102, not out of

any desire to cireumvent NEPA’s procedural require-

ments, but rather because of a fear that Section 102’s

requirements as to the contents of an impact statement

are so strict, particularly as to the need for ‘‘detail’’

in the statement, that any Commission attempt to issue

its environmental survey as a NEPA statement would

be doomed to failure. While we do not altogether

understand the Commission’s fears, we feel they are

based on certain misapprehensions as to what NEPA

requires.

* * * #

Accordingly, if the Commission’s environmental

survey is prepared and issued in accordance with

NEPA procedures, and if the Commission makes a

good faith effort in the survey to describe the reason-

jo owen jaatiiieeiatae

lla

ably foreseeable environmental impact of the program,

alternatives to the program and their reasonably for-

seeable environmental impact, and the irreversible and

irretrievable commitment of resources the program in-

volves, we see no reason why the survey will not fully

satisfy the requirements of Section 102(C).

The environmental impact statement should be placed in

perspective. The relevant provisions bring environmental

factors into the agency decision-making placing them on an

equal footing with economic, technical and other considera-

tions. .Also, this environmental impact statement serves as

<ource material for the head of the agency, the Congress, for

the President and the public. See Calvert Cliffs’ supra. If

the agency had failed altogether to follow out the procedure

required by NEPA, the arbitrary and capricious standard

might well apply. That is not our present problem. The

rule of reason is a more appropriate standard where the

sufficiency of the statement is being tested.’

5 The cases cited by the trial court as calling for a ‘careful

review’? of agency action in environmental cases do not support

the trial court’s use of the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious”’ standard

in assessing the factual adequacy of an impact statement. Calvert

Cliffs’ did not involve the review of an impact statement. Scenic

Hudson was concerned with the adequacy of an agency's decision,

not the adequacy of the impact statement contributing to that

decision. N.R.D.C. v. Morton dealt with the legal question of

whether an agency's impact statement could exclude environmental

alternatives merely because the agency had no specifie authority

to implement them. E.D.F. v. Corps of Engineers is somewhat

confusing in its discussion of the standard of review. Careful

examination of the case reveals, however, that the language about

using the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious”’ test refers to review of

agency decisions rather than the factual sufticieney of impact state-

ments. The court actually adopted the ‘‘rule of reason’” test

which we have here approved when it assessed the factual suffi-

ciency of the agency’s compliance with §102(2)(D) of NEPA.

470 F.2d at 297. A similar test would presumably be applied by

that court in assessing the factual adequacy of other procedural

requirements under § 102, including preparation of the impact

statement.

12a

In summary, then, our view is that the review of FES is

limited to the following:

(1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural

requirements of NEPA.

(2) Whether the environmental impact statement

constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the

demands of NEPA.

(3) Whether the statement contains a reasonable dis-

cussion of the subject matter involved in the five re-

quired areas.

III.

The remaining issue and the crucial one in the case per-

tains to the adequacy of the Final Environmental State-

ment testing it by the five prescribed areas set forth in

$ 4332(2)(C), supra.

As a preface, we note that there is some dispute as to

whether the comments which were given by the various

agencies and institutions to which the draft environmental

statement were sent are to be regarded as a part of the

Final Statement. The Department solicited, received and

considered comments from many interested parties, includ-

ing the plaintiff-appellees. They contend that the various

comments are not to be considered as a part of the Final

Statement. However, we disagree. These were incor-

porated into the Final Statement and were available for

consideration by all interested parties and are available for

the information of the President, the Congress and the

public. Those commenting included the various agencies

within the Interior Department and teu other federal

agencies, including the National Science F oundation, Atomic

Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.

In addition, there were comments of three states, various

scientific groups and a number of business and educational

institutions. Moreover, the Final Environmental State-

@ mes a

13a

ment shows that the comments were considered by the

authors of the statement. The cases hold that the comments

are to be regarded as an integral part of the statement.

See Con. Council of N. Car. v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222

(M.D.N.C. 1972), and Environmental D. Fund, Inc. v. Corps.

of Eng. of U.S. Army, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark.

W.D. 1972).

In general, the district court found fault’ with the fact

that the impact statement did not deal adequately with

economic feasibility. In our judgment, however, this sub-

ject was treated sufficiently insofar as it affected the

environmental consequences which, after all, are the import-

ant factors to be considered. The role of the Final Environ-

mental Statement is to enunciate the environmental consid-

erations for the benefit of the decision-makers.

We are of the opinion that consideration of the five sub-

jects prescribed by the statute was sufficient.

(i) Environmental impact of the proposed action.

There is no contention that the loss of helium, should it

be lost, will affect the environment. It is, after all, a color-

less, odorless, nonflammable, inert gas. Therefore, the

matter to be weighed, and which the impact statement did

weigh in accordance with our mandate in the previous case,

is the secondary effect, namely, loss of the resource. As

we have noted above, the supply which the government has

in storage is sufficient to the year 2000 and perhaps beyond.

Continued purchases by the government would at best

extend the inventory for a period of from four to fourteen

years. Thus, it would not solve the problem of the future

use of it. The Final Environmental Statement considers the

recovery of helium from the atmosphere. It considers the

amount of electrical power which would be required and the

effects of the generation of such power on air and thermal

pollution. It notes that the extent of use of helium beyond

the year 2000 is conjectural and speculative, and thus the

rr cs re nw ore - oe - —

l4a

effect on the atmosphere of recovering the helium is itself

conjectural. For our purpose the statement took into con-

sideration all of the possibilities and it was not required to

do more than this.

(ii) Adverse environmental effects which are unavoidable.

The statement points out the future problems of recap-

turing the lost helium if it is necessary.

(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action

The statement considers several alternatives, including

reliance on the normal market process, expansion of the

helium program by legislative action, use of leaner gases

and recapture from the atmosphere. The discussion in

our view satisfies the present requirement and the state-

ment did not have to dwell on the imaginary horribles posed

by the plaintiffs.°

(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of

man’s environment and the maintenance and enhance-

ment of long term productivity.

That which appears in parts i, ii, and iii above considers

the present question. The statement took into account the

known sources and supplies together with the possible uses

such as generation and transmission of electrical power for

nuclear reactors, for the space program, for levitation sys-

tem of mass transportation and for cyrogenies.

We disagree with the trial court’s finding that the impact

statement’s failure to consider the alternative of making

the helium purchase program financially self-sustaining was

a fatal defect. Such an alternative is somewhat obvious

in that it would be a continuation of the present purchase

program. This alternative is discussed in the statement.

*Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458

F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

15a

The impact of this alternative is implicit in the diseussion

of the several alternatives mtained in the Final Statement.

(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-

sources which would be involved in the proposed action

should it be implemented.

The termination which is the proposed action is reversible

by continuation of one or more of the contracts in modified

form or by the negotiation of new contracts or by congres-

sional action. Should the contracts be cancelled, and should

the company shut down their separation plants, the helium

which is now preserved would, of course, be lost. Beyond

this. hard and fast predictions about the effect of termina-

tion of helium purchases on the technology which we would

have in the Twenty-First Century would be nothing more

than speculation. We consider the subject matter suffici-

ently diseussed in the Final Statement. There is enough

there to alert the decision-makers and others concerned,

Apart from the five eategoris, ¢ 4322(2)(C) requires that

the Department ‘*consult with and obtain the comments of*’

federal agencies having jurisdiction or special expertise

with respect to any environmental impact involved in a con-

templated action. The impact statemeat meets the standard

preseribed by § 4522(2)(C) in this regard, when viewed in

light of the ‘*rnle of reason”’ we have the approved. The

requirement should not be viewed as necessitating that the

completion of an impact statement be unreasonably or

interminably delayed in order to include all potential com-

ments or the results of works in progress which might shed

some additional light on the subject of the impact state-

ment. Such a result would often inordinately delay or pre-

vent any decision in environmental cases. The courts

should look for adequacy and completeness in an impact

statement, not perfection. E.D.F. v. Corps of Engineers,

470 F.2d at 297. In this particular case this court expressed

the opinion that an ultimate resolution of the issues involved

in this case was urgent and should be expedited, 455 F.2d

es ed SO EDN I OR EB oe

l6a

657. The initial impact statement was not issued unti!

May 16, 1972, and the Final Statement issued on Noven.ber

5, 1972. To have delayed the statement any longer would

have flown in the face of what we considered a reasonable

time for preparation of the statement.

It is also contended by the parties (appellees) that the

statement is defective because of failure to state the pur-

pose of the contemplated action. Section 4332(2)(C) does

not explicitly require that the purpose of the contemplated

government action be spelled out. While in many types of

governmental action the exact purpose of the action might

be unclear and thus lead to confusion were it not stated, this

is not such a case, The self-evident purpose of the pro-

posed action here is to terminate the continued purchase

of helium reserves which the Secretary regards as economi-

cally superfluous and beyond the goals set forth in the 1960

Amendments to the Helium Act.

We see no merit in the further argument of the appellees

that the real reason for contract termination was to effect

a financial saving and that the Office of Management and

Budget dictated cancellation. The Secretary terminated the

contracts and the Office of Management and Budget does

not have authority to dictate to the Secretary the decision

that he is to make in connection with a contract entered

into and terminable by him.*

Applying the rule of reason which is enunciated in the

cases, we conclude that the statement is fully acceptable. It

‘adequately diseusses future needs and future supplies. It

weighs the costs now as opposed to the future. It is a

comprehensive and thorough document. We disagree with

the derogatory comments of the parties and the district

court regarding it.

Much time and opportunity have been extended to the

appellees, There has been much delay as a result and we

7 Walter Holm & Company v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C.

Cir. 1971).

GIDE CDEP ns Se eae eo

17a

repeat what we have said in our prior decisions that inas-

much as the decision has been made the termination should

be carried out without delay.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed

and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the

action.

Nos. 73-1169 and 73-1449—National Helium Corporation

v. Morton

BreiteNstern, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the result. It may be that my differences with

the majority go to form rather than substance.

The decision in United States v. Students Challenging

Regulatory Agency Procedures, U.S. —, 41 LW

4866, SCRAP, does not affect federal jurisdiction in the

instant case because we have no concern with any federal

statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on an agency. The

argument of the Government ix that this case involves

federal contracts and that the Tucker Act, 98 U.S.C. §§

1346(a)(2) and 1491, is the only statute which gives federal

courts jurisdiction over government contract cases. In the

first place, this suit does not arise out of any contract. It

;< concerned with compliance with the National Environ-

mental Policy Act of 1969, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4821 et seq.

In the second place the Tucker Act does not equate with

the statute giving the Interstate Commerce Commission

exclusive power to suspend rates.

The general standard of judicial review of agency actions

:s found in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

£706(2)(A). The action is set aside if it is arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-414. The key phrase in § 706 is

‘‘agency action.”’ NEPA directs that ‘‘to the fullest extent

possible * * * all agencies of the Federal Government shall

* * * include in every * * * major Federal action(s) signi-

ERI TIM OE LR He TET I EDEN BE

18a

ficantly affecting the quality of the human environment. a

detailed statement by the responsible official’? covering

stated subject areas. NEPA alters the decision-making

process of the federal agencies and brings environmental

factors to an equal footing with economic, technical, and

other traditional considerations, all of which must be

balanced by the decision-maker.

The issue of scope of judicial review must be divided into

two parts: first, the review of the Final Environmental

Statement (FES), second, the review of the action of the

Secretary terminating the contracts. See Wyoming Out-

door Coordinating Council v. Butz, 10 Cir., F.2d ;

slip opinion p. 12, n. 5. I believe that different standards

apply to each part.

I reject, and I believe that the majority opinion rejects,

the apparent holdings of the Eighth and Fourth Circuits

that an environmental statement is judicially reviewable on

its merits to determine sufficiency. See Environmental

Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States

Army, 8 Cir., 470 F.2d 289, 298, and Conservation Council

of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 4 Cir., 473 F.2d 664, 665. I

believe that judicial review of an impact statement is limited

to a determination of whether the statement is a good faith,

objective, and reasonable presentation of the subject areas

mandated by NEPA. The courts should not second-guess

the scientists, experts, economists, and planners who make

the environmental statement.

In my opinion FES is an excellent job which fully com-

plies with both the letter and the spirit of NEPA. It isa

comprehensive study which displays objectivity and good

faith. Its discussion reasonably presents the environ-

mental effects, the alternatives, the relationship between

short-term and long-term uses of man’s environment, and

the possible economic effects.

This brings me to the second question, judicial review of

the Secretary’s action terminating the contracts. Here

Pes CO. COS PN AE RY Pa

beens soe nee ren

19a

the standard is that provided by the APA. The statement

of the Seeretary at termination of the contracts shows that

in accordance with NEPA he carefully reviewed FES. His

action was not a mechanical compliance with NEPA but

rather a full consideration of FES with an understanding

and reasonable application of its comprehensive study. He

balanced the environmental factors with the other pertinent

factors. His final action was neither arbitrary, capricious,

nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the district court’s

injunction was improper.

One other point should be mentioned. Neither the state-

ments of the trial nor of this court determine the contrac-

tual rights of the parties, whatever they may be. Those are

for consideration by the Court of Claims under the Tucker

Act.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, D. KANSAS

June 11, 1973.

Civ. A. No. W-4568.

NationaL HELIUM CoRPORATION, Plaintiff,

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY and C1rT1es SERVICE

Hetex, Inc., Jntervenors,

Vv.

Rocers C. B. Mortoy, Secretary of the Interior, and

Exsvrt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,

Department of the Interior, Defendants.

Decision and Opinion of the Court

Tuners, District Judge.

On March 27, 1971, this Court temporarily enjoined the

Secretary of the Interior from terminating the National

Helium Conservation Program as implemented by three

Pe eee nee ee et te ae Te eae ie oes e ” & Ae hE el SLE RRL UE PAN MSIE So . s

20a

helium procurement contracts entered into with the plain-

tiffs prior to a hearing on the merits or, alternatively, a

reconsideration by the Department of Interior of its action

in the light of the applicable substantive and procedural re-

quirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; the Helium Act,

as amended by the Helium Act Amendments of 1960, 74

Stat. 918, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq.; and the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $551 et seq. National Helium

Corporation v. Morton, 326 F.Supp. 151 (D.Kan. 1971),

aff’d. 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). Of particular concern

to the Court was the failure of the Department of Interior

to prepare a final environmental impact statement prior to

taking the contemplated action. On February 2, 1973, the

Secretary of Interior again determined that the helium

procurement contracts should be terminated, since the pur-

poses of the Helium Act of 1960 had been satisfied and,

accordingly, notices were sent to the plaintiffs that termina-

tion would occur on April 4, 1973, at 8:00 a.m., C.S.T. Hav-

ing prepared a final environmental impact statement in

accordance with § 4332(2)(C) of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C., the Secretary immediately

moved for dissolution of the preliminary injunction.

In response to the defendants’ notices of termination and

motion for dissolution, the plaintiffs filed verified amended

complaints seeking, inter alia, the continuation of the pre-

liminary injunction pending a full hearing on the merits of

the case. They alleged that: (1) the defendants had not

complied with the procedural and substantive requirements

of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321

et seq. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘NEPA’’), the Helium

Act Amendments of 1960, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. (herein-

after referred to as the ‘‘Helium Act’’); and the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., prior to the

termination of the contracts; (2) the necessary conditions

precedent for termination of the implementing contracts

and the National Helium Conservation Program had not in

2la

fact occurred; and (3) the proposed agency action was

otherwise arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and

not in accordance with law. In support of their allegations,

the plaintiffs submitted documents, briefs, and a number of

affidavits.

On March 14, 1973, the Court heard oral argument on the

defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

The defendants contended that since a comprehensive final

environmental impact statement had been prepared, upon

which the Secretary of Interior had determined to termi-

nate the helium contracts, the Secretary’s decision was en-

titled to a presumption of regularity, and the preliminary

injunction should accordingly be dissolved. After a careful

examination of the defendants’ draft and final environ-

mental statements and the pertinent comments attached

thereto, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and supporting

affidavits and documents, and the applicable law, the Court

overruled the defendants’ motion.

The Court had already ruled that it had jurisdiction of

the suit by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1361, 2201 and 2202,

and 5 U.S.C. $$ 701-706; that the plaintiff had standing to

raise the issues herein involved; that the termination of

these contracts was a major federal action significantly

affecting the quality of human environment and posing

serious environmental consequences within the meaning of

§ 4332(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.; that the requirements

of NEPA were applicable to the Department of Interior

‘to the fullest extent possible’? in the administration of

the Helium Act by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 4332: that there

had been a sufficient showing of a likelihood of irreparable

injury to the plaintiffs and the publie if the Seeretary’s

action was not enjoined; and that the Secretary's decision

was subject to limited judicial review pursuant to $ 706(2)

(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U.S.C., Na-

tional Helium Corporation v. Morton, supra. Although the

Seeretary’s decision was entitled to a presumption of regu-

larity, ‘‘that presumption [was] not to shield his action

eee whee

from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.’’ Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415,

91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

Since the plaintiffs’ amended complaints and supporting

documents presented a substantial controversy involving

complex factual and legal issues justifying the maintenance

of the status quo pending further hearings, and the Court

was convinced that the plaintiffs had established a proba-

bility of ultimate success, thereby justifying the issuance

of a preliminary injunction in the first instance in accord-

ance with the standards enunciated in Crowther v. Seaborg,

415 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1969), the Court determined that

the dissolution of the previous injunction would be a futile

gesture. See Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of

Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F.Supp. 749

(E.D. Ark. 1971). The Court did, however, require the

plaintiffs to post a bond in the sum of £2,000,000 for the

payment of such costs and damages as might be incurred

by defendants if they were found to have been wrongfully

restrained, and determined that this bond, along with the

twenty-eight million dollars owed by the Government to the

contractors, gave it a thirty million dollar security cushion.

The defendants immediately perfected an appeal of this

Court’s order denying their motion for dissolution of the

preliminary injunction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals. In response to the defendants’ request, this Court

also certified its subsequent orders denying the defendants’

motions for summary judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P. and, in the alternative, dismissal of

the amended complaints, in part, for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), F.R.C.P. The

Tenth Cireuit did not rule on any of the orders, but it did

direct that the trial on the merits should be held within

thirty days on the administrative record, rather than by

trial de novo, in conformity with the recent United States

Supreme Court decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,

93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). Having resolved the

23a

preliminary matters, reviewed the administrative record as

supplemented by the plaintiffs, and heard oral argument,

this case is ripe for final disposition.

FactuaL BackGROUND

This is a case of considerable complexity and moment.

A basic review of the characteristics of helium and the

history and development of this country’s helium conserva-

tion program, including the role played by the implement-

ing helium procurement contracts herein involved, conse-

quently serves as an instructive prelude to its resolution.

The summary which follows was gleaned from the admin-

istrative record submitted by the Department of Interior,

including numerous departmental studies, compilations,

and reports, and is supported by the findings of facts in

related litigation in Northern Natural Gas Company v.

Grounds, 292 F.Supp. 619, 624-680 (D. Kan. 1968), aff’d.

$41 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971); Air Reduction v. Hickel,

137 U.S. App. D.C. 24, 420 F.2d 592 (1969); and Northern

Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (C.CI. 1972).

Helium is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas which,

in the present state of scientific knowledge, will not react

chemically or physically with any other element, except

under laboratory conditions. Helium is non-combustible.

It is the second lightest element found on earth next to

hydrogen, which is highly combustible. Helium does not

liquefy at standard atmospheric pressure until is reaches

—452.1 degrees Fahrenheit, almost absolute zero and lower

than any other gas. It is the only known gas which can

develop superconductivity in metals. It is the best known

transmitter of sound and the best.conductor of heat at near

absolute zero of any gas. It becomes a super fluid near

absolute zero. Helium is non-toxie to man and it does not

become radioactive.

Since its discovery on the sun by Sir Norman Lockyear

in 1868, helium has grown from a laboratory curiosity with

,

carta ow en = Fi AE FOOD EE laa SN IO eR SO OMT 2

24a

no practical applications to one of the most valuable, yet

rapidly wasting, elements on earth. As measured by its

demand, helium has established itself as a tool in shielded

are welding and other metallurgical applications, lighter-

than-air applications, chromatography as a carrier gas,

leak detection, heat transfer medium in nuclear power re-

actors, pressurizing and purging liquid propellants for

space boosters, under sea work as a breathing gas when

mixed with oxygen, medical research and therapeutic treat-

ment, eryogenics, and in low temperature research. Helium

is also presently being used as a coolant in high-tempera-

ture gas-cooled reactors.

Future uses of helium for which research is presently

being carried on by the Government and private industry

include its application in such areas as power generation

by helium-cooled fission reactors, nuclear fusion reactors,

superconducting systems of generation and transmission

of power, magnetohydrodynamics, and transportation by

superconducting magnetic levitation systems, to name a

few. In the future, uses of helium are expected to develop

which are now unforeseen or unknown.

Before 1960, with minor exceptions, the production and

marketing of helium was accomplished by the Bureau of

Mines, pursuant to the Helium Act of 1925, 50 U.S.C. § 161

et seq.:

‘*An act authorizing the conservation, production, and

exploitation of helium gas, a mineral resource pertain-

ing to the national defense, and to the development of

commercial aeronautics, and for other purposes.’’ 43

Stat. 1110.

The Act authorized the Bureau of Mines to operate plants,

to store and care for helium, and to conduct exploration.

The Secretary of Interior was authorized to acquire land

or interest in land by purchase, lease or condemnation

where necessary, to provide helium to supply the needs of

25a

the Army, Navy, and other branches of the Government.

50 U.S.C. § 161. Other than a minor amendment of the Act

in 1927 in order to permit the limited leasing or selling of

helium to aid scientific and commercial development, 44

Stat. 1387, the Act remained essentially the same until 1937.

By amendment in 1937, Ch. 895, 50 Stat. 885, to the Helium

Act of 1925, Ch. 426, 43 Stat. 1110, the Secretary was di-

rected to purchase, if possible, all properties developed or

constructed by private parties for helium production prior

to the passage of the amendment.

Until the advent of World War II, the uses of helium

outside the laboratory were in lighter-than-air-craft and,

when mixed with oxygen, in medicine and deep-sea diving.

Since the Government was the predominant consumer of

helium, the emphasis of the helium program was accord-

ingly upon meeting current and short-range helium needs.

At the commencement of World War II, all helium extrac-

ion facilities were owned by the United States, and con-

sisted solely of the Amarillo Plant, located at the Cliffside

Field in Potter County, Texas, which had been purchased

in 1933.

During World War II, the usefulness of helium was

broadened considerably. Four plants were built to meet

the greatly increased military need for helium, and during

the 1930’s demand for helium rose spectacularly due to the

development of new uses, including atomic weapons, nu-

clear energy plants, military and civilian rocketry, explo-

ration of outer space, eryogenics, and other uses connected

with both science and industry. As increasing helium de-

mands threatened to outstrip the production capacity of

the Bureau of Mines, concern arose regarding the future

ability to meet mobilization needs and the causal wastage

of the natural resource. In 1957, the Director, Office of

Defense Mobilization, recommended to the Secretary of

Interior that a working group be established to determine

the feasibility of making the conservation aspect of the

Swe sect rem He vt

wat > EEN ENE MN TB SE ES Foes ee ee

26a

helium program the primary, rather than incidental, ob-

jective of the Department of Interior.

A working group was subsequently established, com-

prised of representatives from the Departments of Com-

merce, Defense and Interior, Atomic Energy Commission,

Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, and

Federal Power Commission. Headed by then Undersecre-

tary of Interior, O. Hatfield Chilson, now our esteemed

colleague on the federal bench in the District of Colorado,

the group compiled a study entitled ‘*Cost and Implemen-

tation of a National Helium Conservation Policy.’’ (The

Chilson Report, January 24, i958). As a result of the

study, a national helium conservation policy was subse-

quently recommended to President Eisenhower and for-

mally approved on April 25, 1958.

The Report noted that approximately 99% of the known

helium-bearing natural gas resources in the United States

was concentrated in four fields containing approximately

119 billion cubie feet of potentially recoverable helium:

(1) the Hugoton Field of Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas;

(2) the Panhandle Field of Texas; (3) the Keyes Field of

Oklahoma; and (4) the Greenwood Field of Kansas. The

Report further noted that these fields had been developed

by private companies to supply natural gas to fuel mar-

kets, and that since the companies merely considered the

helium to be a minor impurity no effort was being made

to remove it; consequently, the helium was merely passing

into the atmosphere without serving any useful purpose.

The study group recognized a number of significant

factors suggesting the need for a long term helium con-

servation program. First, although the demand for helium

had been consistently rising, the emphasis of the helium

program was on meeting current, short term needs. Sec-

ond, helium was essential to the country’s missile and

atomic energy programs, and an invaluable industrial tool.

Third, the helium supply being conserved by the Bureau

27a

of Mines, although sufficient to meet current foreseeable

governmental needs, would likely not be sufficient to meet

future governmental and private demands resulting from

expected and unforeseeable developments in new and ex-

panding technologies. Fourth, natural gas was the only

known commercial source of helium, since recovery from

the atmosphere and other sources was impracticable due

to the economic and environmental barriers. Fifth, the

world’s largest helium-bearing gas fields were located in

the United States, yet the helium was being allowed to

vent into the air without serving any useful purpose and

would probably be totally depleted by 1985. Sixth, due to

the inability to place a ‘‘value’* on helium as a result of

the speculative nature of its future demand and the pre-

dominant government utilization, there was no economie

incentive for private industry to extract and store the he-

lium for future use. Seventh, if nothing was done, the

nation’s richest source of helium would be least available

at a time when it was needed the most. Finally, that pres-

ent legislation did not permit the implementation of a long-

range conservation program as envisioned.

In order that an effective long-range helium conserva-

tion program might be implemented, the Report recom-

mended that the Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. $161 et seq., be

amended in such a way so as to give the Secretary of In-

terior the authority to build up to thirteen new helium

production plants to extract the helium prior to transmis-

sion of the natural gas to fuel markets, and to store the

helium thus conserved in the government-owned Cliffside

gas field or in some other suitable underground reservoir.

In addition, the Report suggested that it might be feasible

to augment this basic conservation plan by acquiring and

shutting in relatively small isolated helium-bearing gas

fields, although the acquisition of all of the fields was

thought to be impracticable.

Since it was not certain that private companies would

be willing or able to participate in the program, however,

28a

and in light of the current and unforeseeable importance

of helium to the national welfare, the Report suggested

that the legislation be drafted in such a way so as to au-

thorize the Secretary to condemn the helium-bearing nat-

ural gas after its removal from place of deposit in nature.

Furthermore, although suggesting an end to the long-

standing governmental monopoly on the production of he-

lium, the Report recommended that the Secretary retain

control over the sale and use of helium produced by pri-

vate companies not participating in the program, and thus

be able to control the price of the gas and determine its

end uses,

Due to the magnitude of the expense involved in ae-

complishing the conservation program, the Report recom-

mended that: (1) private industry be encouraged to par-

ticipate in the program by entering long-term contracts

with the Government which would give the companies

a reasonable return on their capital investment and, at the

same time, help to defray the overall costs of the program;

(2) the Secretary be authorized to set the price for the

helium at a level which would enable the Department of

Interior to cover all costs incurred in carrying out the

provisions of the program; (3) all federal agencies and

contractors purchase all major requirements of helium

from the Secretary; and (4) the private companies par-

ticipating in the program be prohibited from selling any

helium to any purchaser other than the Secretary at a

price lower than the lowest price paid by any government

agency.

In 1958 the Department of the Interior proposed legis-

lation to Congress for the implementation of the recom-

mended conservation program. This was not acted upon,

however, and redrafted proposals were subsequently sub-

mitted to Congress on July 27, 1959. After lengthy hear-

ings and incidental revisions and amendments of the pro-

posed bill, a legislative amendment was adopted on Sep-

29a

tember 13, 1960, to be known as ‘‘An Act to amend the

Helium Act of March 3, 1925, as amended, for the defense,

security, and the general welfare of the United States.’’?

50 U.S.C. ¢ 167 et seq. The Act became effective on March

1, 1961, and a limitation on the annual contracting author-

ity of 47.5 million dollars was established by the Act of

August 3, 1961, 75 Stat. 246, 253.

The 1960 Helium Act Amendments authorized the See-

retary of the Interior to enter into long-term contracts

for the acquisition, processing, transportation, or con-

servation of helium, not exceeding twenty-five years. 90

U.S.C. §167a(a)(2). In addition, he was given the power

to acquire, by eminent domain, helium contained in he-

lium-bearing natural gas and so much of such gas as was

necessarily removed in the extraction process, if he were

unable to acquire helium otherwise upon reasonable terms

and at the fair market value. 50 U.S.C. § 167a(a)(2). In

an attempt to make the program self-liquidating, the Act

provided for a comprehensive system similar to that ree-

ommended by the Chilson Report. 50 U.S.C. $$ 167a(e),

167¢. 167d and 167j. The Secretary was given authority to

set his own price for the helium that he sold (50 U.S.C.

1 Pub.L. 86-777. 74 Stat. 920. All proceedings were before the

séth Congress. The bill which became the Helium Act Amend-

ments of 1960 was H.R. 10548. Other bills which were considered

are S, 827, 8. 2567, S. 3376, TLR. 8440, HLR. 8451 and HLR. 11030.

The Reports of the hearings before the Committee on Interior and

Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on H.R. 1054s and 8. 3376,

June 1 and 15, 1960, and the Report of Hearings Before the Sub-

committee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and

Insular Affairs, House of Representatives on H.R. 8440, FLR. 5451,

ILR. 10348 and H.R. 11030, February 19, Mareh 10 and 11, 1960,

are printed. The Report of the House Committee is designated

H.Rptr. No. 1552 and of the Senate, 8.Rptr. No. 1814, U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin.News 1960, p. 3595, with a minority report by

Senator Carroll designated Part 2. Debate in the House and Sen-

ate is reported in 106 Cong.Ree., pp. 9089-9099, 15119-15125, 17855,

18936-18538, 18544-18546, 18602-18609 and 18902-15904.

ee oe we Oe ent gr aa

30a

§167d(c)), and to establish and promulgate such rules

and regulations, consistent with the directions of the Act,

which were necessary to carry out its provisions. 50 U.S.C,

§ 167g.

Pursuant to the authority given the Secretary by the

Helium Act Amendments, the Secretary of Interior en-

tered into helium procurement contracts with the plain-

tiff companies and with Northern Helex Company in Aug-

ust, October, and November, 1961. These companies were

chosen due to the large amount of helium which they could

assure, and their ability to accomplish the necessary pro-

duction assemblage and perform the underlying contracts.

The award of the contracts to these four companies obli-

gated all of the available 47.5 million dollars contracting

authority and thus completed that phase of the helium

conservation program, unless and until the contracting au-

thority was increased. That authority has not been in-

creased by Congress.

Each contract provided for the sale and delivery to the

United States of a helium-gas mixture for a term of

twenty-two years. The companies were required to con-

struct at their own risk and expense helium extraction

plants and necessary facilities capable of processing at

least 500 million eubie feet of Hugoton area’ gas per day

(in the ease of National Helium, approximately 840 mil-

lion eubie feet of natural gas per day). The contracts fol-

lowed a general pattern, although they varied in detail.

Each contract contained an initial price per MCF of con-

tained helium varying from $10.30 to $11.78. The prices

were broken down into two parts, one related to the cost

of gas and the other related to other costs. The companies

have at all times fully met their obligations under the con-

tracts.

Subsequent to the implementation of the expanded he-

lium conservation program, numerous studies and reports

concerning the program were prepared by federal agen-

eens susserawe

3la

cies and by interested private groups and, in accordance

with §167n of the Helium Act Amendments, the Secre-

tary of Interior made annual reports to advise Congress

of the current status of the government’s helium program.

Generally, these reports contained financial, statistical,

and operating information concerning the program for

each fiseal year that it was in operation.

The helium conservation program apparently ran

smoothly until some time in 1968. After the passage of the

1960 Act, however, several private companies had begun

their own helium extraction outside of the government

program. Because the Secretary’s price for helium re-

flected not only direct extraction costs, but also a portion

of the costs involved in the administration of the conser-

vation program, the Secretary’s price for helium exceeded

the private producers’ price. As the private companies’

sales increased, the Secretary’s sales decreased, despite

increased overall demand.

In response to this situation, the Secretary proposed

regulations in 33 Fed. Reg. 5219-20 (1968), which were

later revised and officially published on October 18, 1968,

in 33 Fed. Reg. 15478-80, to become effective December

2, 1968. The regulations would heve forbidden govern-

ment agencies and their contractors from purchasing their

major requirements of helium from any source other than

the Secretary, or private companies ‘‘eligible’’? under the

regulations.

In Air Reduction Company v. Hickel, supra, these regu-

lations were stricken down. The Court held that, although

Congress had intended that the Seceretary not lose his

market because of private competition, it had not pro-

vided statutory authority to require government con-

tractors to purchase their helium from the Secretary. The

Court noted, however, that the Secretary’s purpose could

be accomplished by obtaining an Executive Order requir-

ing that such provisions be included in all contracts en-

err nee eS SN et ATRL Sp OE RL 4 ~ oA ~~?

32a

tered into by government agencies. Air Reduction Com-

pany v. Hickel, supra, 420 F.2d at p. 597. An Executive

Order was never obtained.

It became increasingly evident that the costs of the

program were not diminishing according to expectations

and that the program was being adversely affected by the

intrusion into what had been a virtually exclusive gov-

ernment market of private producers of helium. More-

over, the program was suffering financially from a tem-

porary lull in sales occasioned principally by the large

cuts in the space program. Consequently, the Department

of Interior started negotiations with the four helium con-

servation contractors in an attempt to modify the con-

tracts in a way that would reduce the costs of the program

to the Government and still fulfill the goals of the program.

Due to diminished sales, however, the Department of

Interior had fallen into arrears in making payments to

the four helium contractors. Partial payments were made

for a while, but payments ceased entirely in November,

1969, notwithstanding the continuance of deliveries. At

the close of the calendar year of 1970, the Government

owed large sums to the helium contractors for delivered

helium. Consequently, on December 24, 1970, one of the

helium contractors, Northern Helex Company, brought an

action in the Court of Claims against the United States

for breach of contract. In Northern Helex Company v.

United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct.C1.1972), the Court of

Claims held that the Government was liable for anticipa-

tory breach of the contract, but the issue of damages is

still pending.

On January 26, 1971, and while negotiations were still

in progress with at least one of the remaining contractors,

the Department of Interior advised plaintiffs that, pur-

suant to paragraph 12.1 of the contracts, the contracts

would be terminated effective sixty days thereafter. Al-

33a

though specific language varied, each contract provided

for termination as follows:

‘612.1 Buyer [Federal Government] may, at is option,

terminate this contract at any time if, (1) in the

opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the discovery

of large new helium resources or a substantial dimi-

nution in helium requirements or any circumstance

of similar nature should occur which would make the

continued operation of Seller’s plant and the contin-

ued purchase of helium-gas mixture extracted therein

unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act or

any amendment thereto, or (2) a material circumstance

of force majeure making it impracticable or impossible

for either Buyer or Seller to carry out its obligations

under this contract which circumstance cannot be

remedied with reasonable dispatch.”’

The President’s Budget, issued on January 29, 1971,

coincidentally, did not include a request for appropria-

tions for continued funding of the contracts.

On March 17, 1971, the plaintiffs filed the instant action

against the defendants, and on March 26, 1971, this Court

issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the termination

of the contracts. Following the decision of the Tenth Cir-

euit Court of Appeals in National Helium Corporation

y. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), affirming this

Court’s holding, the decision to terminate the contracts

was remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration in

light of the requirements of the National Environmental

Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq.

A draft environmental impact statement was subse-

quently prepared by the Department of Interior, and its

availability was officially announced in the Federal Regis-

ter on May 23, 1972. A final environmental impact state-

ment entitled ‘‘Termination of Helium Purchase Con-

tracts—United States Department of Interior—Bureau

of Mines’? was issued on November 13, 1972. On Feobru-

Bt wesetrmrien ete rire

34a

ary 2, 1973, the Secretary of Interior gave notice of termi-

nation to the plaintiffs, to become effective sixty days

thereafter. Accompanying the notices was a statement

prepared by the Secretary justifying the termination of

the helium conservation program in terms of the termina-

tion clauses of each of the helium purchase contracts.

The Seeretary’s termination statement, which is based

on the Department’s final environmental statement and

the comments received from the private contractors, rec-

ognizes that: (1) the direct result of the decision to ter-

minate the contracts will be that the Government will

forego the storage of an estimated 20 billion cubic feet of

helium which will be ‘‘wasted’’ or ‘‘depleted’’ if the con-

tractors do not continue to extract and store the helium,

prior to delivery of the natural gas to fuel markets; (2)

natural gas—primarily fuel gas—is the only known source

of helium other than the atmosphere, an environmentally

and economically inferior source; (3) the currently proved

‘‘helium-rich’’ natural gas reserves (containing at least

0.3% helium) will probably be exhausted before the turn

of the century; (4) it is unknown exactly how much, if

any, ‘‘lean’’ helium-bearing natural gas will be available

after the year 2000; (5) present studies predict large de-

mands for helium for environmentally beneficial uses be-

ginning around the turn of the century which could rap-

idly deplete the helium supply then in storage; (6) as-

suming a lack of supply at a later time, future environ-

mentally beneficial technological advancements might be

precluded due to unacceptably adverse environmental ef-

fects of recovery from other sources.

In contrast to the above possibilities, the Secretary’s

statement notes that: (1) government demand for helium

has decreased consistently since 1966, and is presently be-

low the 1961 level; (2) present technological advancement

enables recovery of helium from ‘‘lean’’ sources of he-

lium-bearing natural gas expected to be available in large

quantities in the future; (3) the Bureau of Mines estimates

PPM rm ree vances 5

35a

a total of 17 to 24 billion cubic feet of probable shut-in

‘shelium-rich”’ reserves (i.e., found in natural gas fields

not being exploited for present fuel purposes); (4) in-

cluding the helium currently in storage, in shut-in govern-

ment reserves, and expected to be recoverable from gov-

ernment-owned plants, total reserves approximate 44.5

billion eubie feet; (5) storage of recoverable helium at

today’s costs does not necessarily assure ‘‘low-cost’’ he-

lium in the future; (6) the forecasted large demands for

the future are ‘‘speculative’’ and of questionable reliabil-

ity; (7) government agencies’ estimates for future helium

demands would not require removal of helium presently

in storage ‘‘to meet essential government needs’? until

well into the next century; and (8) assuming the esti-

mated total future demands were to materialize at the

beginning of the next century, as predicted, the storage

now of an additional 20 billion cubic feet of helium would

merely delay, rather than foreclose, the necessity of ob-

taining helium from presently unknown or environmentally

disadvantageous sources.

On the basis of the above assumptions, the Secretary

determined that there had been a substantial diminution

in helium requirements for essential government activi-

ties and that the termination was therefore authorized

under Section 12.1 of the contracts, since the purposes of

the Helium Act Amendments of 1969 had been satisfied,

citing § 167m of the Act, 50 U.S.C.:

‘‘It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the na-

tional interest to foster and encourage individual en-

terprise in the development and distribution of sup-

plies of helium, and at the same time provide, within

economic limits, through the administration of this

chapter, a sustained supply of helium which, together

with supplies available or expected to become avail-

able otherwise, will be sufficient to provide for essen-

tial Government activities.”’

reser Hts Rae et er erg 2 REE EET OT ti

a EN IEE = ERAT ATS RE < .

In their amended complaints, the plaintiffs seek declara-

tory and injunctive relief setting aside the Secretary’s

decision to terminate the helium procurement contracts.

In summary, the complaints allege that: (1) the Secre-

tary’s termination decision was not preceded by full com-

pliance with the procedural and substantive requirements

of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331

et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 701 et seq.; (2) the Secretary’s termination decision was

not warranted by the terms of the contracts, constituting

the helium conservation program, and was accordingly

inconsistent with the purpose of the Helium Act Amend-

ments of 1960, 50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq.; and (3) the Secre-

tary’s termination decision was otherwise ‘‘arbitrary, ca-

pricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with

law.’’

JURISDICTION

The plaintiffs’ amended complaints not only challenge

agency compliance with NEPA, but also seek review of

agency action under the Helium Act Amendments of 1960,

50 U.S.C. $167 et seq. The plaintiffs contend that the

Secretary is, in effect, terminating the entire helium pro-

gram authorized by Congress, and that this Court should

review his action under the Administrative Procedure

Act as authorized by Congress in 50 U.S.C. $167h(a) in

order to determine whether such action is ‘‘arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ae-

cordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).

The defendants concede this Court’s jurisdiction to re-

view procedural compliance with NEPA, but contend that

the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s de-

cision on any other basis. The defendants assert three

bases for this contention.

First, the defendants contend that, assuming full agency

compliance with NEPA, all other claims sound solely in

37a

contract; that since the amount in controversy exceeds

the sum of $10,000, this Court lacks subject matter ju-

risdiction over such claims by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1346

(a)(2); that the proper forum for the relief sought by

the plaintiffs is the Court of Claims in an action brought

under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. ¢ 1491; and that neither

this Court nor the Court of Claims is authorized to grant

equitable or declaratory relief under such contracts, as

dictated by United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct.

1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969), and Richardson v. Morris,

409 U.S. 464, 93 S.Ct. 629, 34 L.Ed.2d 647 (1973).

The Court does not quarrel with the basic proposition

that it lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief to pri-

vate individuals or companies merely seeking to obtain

specifie performance of government contracts, but it cate-

gorically rejects such a characterization of this action. As

;< evident from only a cursory examination of the pleadings

‘n this case, the plaintiffs are not suing for breach of gov-

ernment contracts and seeking damages or specific per-

formance—they are requesting the Court to enjoin the im-

proper termination of practically an entire helium conser-

vation program created by Congress to prevent the unnec-

essary depletion of a vital natural resource.

Although the plaintiffs are admittedly motivated by pri-

vate pecuniary considerations, which fact gives them stand-

ing to sue (Association of Data Processing Service Organi-

zation, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25

L.Ed.2 184 (1970)), the plaintiffs are also seeking vindi-

cation of the public’s interest in protection of a vital wasting

natural resource and the propagation of an important Con-

gressional program. Viewing the plaintiffs’ cause of action

in this perspective, the Court will not permit the Secretary

to shield his actions from judicial scrutiny and relegate the

‘public interest’ to an impotent Court of Claims remedy

‘Smerely because it sounds in contract.”’ National Helium

Corporation v. Morton, £99 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971).

PON ET 2 DOR I OL EEO, Sm 2 Oe SRR CO a ol ae 4

38a

Second, the defendants contend that this is not an action

solely against a government official, but is rather a suit

against the United States, since the relief sought would

expend itself upon the public treasury and preclude au-

thorized government action, and that it is accordingly

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity in accordance

with Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335, 38 S.Ct. 317, 62 L.Ed.

755 (1918); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91

L.Ed. 1209 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-

merece Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed.

1628 (1949) ; and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S.Ct. 999,

10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963). Although impliedly admitting that

the Secretary’s action in this case was ‘‘agency action”’

under the terms of the Administrative Procedure <Act, 5

U.S.C. $$ 551(13) and 701(b) (2), the defendants assert that

that Act does not act as a waiver of sovereign immunity.

It must be recognized at the outset that the plethora of

cases dealing with the nebulous and sometimes oppressive

concept of sovereign immunity cannot be completely recon-

ciled. As Mr. Justice Stewart noted in Malone v. Bowdoin,

369 U.S. 643, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962):

‘‘While it is possible to differentiate many of these

eases upon their individual facts, it is fair to say that

to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court

in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.’’

369 U.S. a 646, 82 S.Ct. at 983.

Since the Court is convinced that this action is clearly not

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it will waive

embarkment. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th

Cir. 1971).

The defendants are correct in their assertion that the

Administrative Procedure Act does not act as a waiver of

sovereign immunity, in and of itself. Motah v. United

States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968), contra Secanwell Labo-

ratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d

39a

859, 874 (1970). Here, however, Congress itself implicitly

waived sovereign immunity as a bar to review of ‘‘agency

action’’ under the Helium Act Amendments of 1960. See-

tion 167h specifically provides that:

«provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act

of June 11, 1946, as amended, shall apply to any agency

proceeding and any agency action taken under this

chapter... and the terms ‘agency proceeding’ and

‘agency action’ shall have the meaning specified in the

Administrative Procedure Act.”’ (Emphasis added.)

It would indeed be anomalous for this Court to hold that

sovereign immunity barred review of action specifically

made subject to review by the sovereign, simply because

such review might eventually expend itself upon the public

treasury. Since the Secretary’s action of terminating the

helium procurement contracts was clearly ‘‘agency action,”’

she doctrine of sovereign immunity is accordingly inapplic-

able.

Finally, the defendants contend that even if the doctrine

of sovereign immunity is not applicable to the plaintiffs’

non-NEP.A claims, the Secretary's action of terminating

the helium procurement contracts is not subject to review

under the Administrative Procedure Act, since it is agency

action ‘‘committed to agency discretion by law.’’ 9 U.S.C.

$701(a)(2). There is simply no question but that the

Secretary’s action is action of an ‘‘authority of the Gov-

ernment of the United States,’’ and that review is not pro-

hibited by the Helium Act Amendments. 50 U.S.C. § 167h.

As noted by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28

L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), the exception to the general rule that

all agency actions are subject to judicial review, unless

‘seommitted to agency discretion by law,’’ is a very narrow

one. Referring to the legislative history of the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act, the Court noted that the exception

+ Sree TTL ae ieee Sa - J

is applicable only ‘‘in those rare instances where ‘statutes

are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is

no law to apply.’ ’’ S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.,

26 (1945):

“The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory

when they relate to administrative agencies any more

than in other cases. To preclude judicial review under

this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such

review, must upon its face give clear and convincing

evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure

to provide specially by statute for judicial review is

certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.”’

H.R.Rep.No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1945).

In determining whether in a particular case agency ac-

tion is ‘‘committed to agency discretion by law,’ there is

no presumption against review and in favor of administra-

tive absolutism absent ‘‘a clear and convincing’? showing

of a contrary legislative intent or unless such purpose is

fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Abbott Labora-

tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510-

1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The inquiry is not limited to

merely whether the agency was given discretion to act, but

also whether: (1) Congress intended that the exercise of

that discretion be left solely to the expertise of the agency ;

and (2) the exercise of that discretion in a particular case

involves the resolution of matters within the special admin-

istrative competence of the agency. Barlow v. Collins,

397 U.S. 159, 166, 90 S.Ct. 832, 837, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

The Court cannot indulge in broad generalizations, but

rather must review each individual agency action com-

plained of in the light of the specific statutory scheme pro-

vided by Congress.

An examination of the legislative scheme provided by

Congress in the Helium Act Amendments of 1960 reveals

that the Secretary was given broad discretion in choosing

an appropriate method of implementing a national helium

conservation program. In the exercise of that discretion,

4la

the Secretary chose to enter into long-term contracts with

the plaintiffs, and within those contracts he provided a

method by which they could be terminated in the event that

further helium procurement Was unnecessary to accomplish

the purposes of the Act. On February 2, 1973, the Secre-

tary again, exercised his discretion when he determined

that the continuation of the contracts was unnecessary,

since the purposes of the Helium Act had been satisfied.

That determination was nevessarily predicated on the

Secretary ’s interpretation of the intended scope and pur-

poses of the helium conservation program as envisioned by

Congress in the promulgation of the Helium Act, and in

particular Section 167m, 50 U.S.C.

Implicit in the Secretary's determination to terminate

these contracts was the Secretary's realization that, al-

though he was given wide discretion in choosing the means

of implementing the Helium Act, his actions were to con-

form to the overall objectives of the Act; that he was not

given unfettered discretion to, in effect, change the under-

ly'ng purpose of the Act itself. The plaintiffs contend that

the Secretary's determination that the objective of the Act

was to conserve helium for foreseeable and ‘‘essential gov-

ernment activities’? was clearly erroneous and constituted

an abuse of discretion. They do not request the Court to

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary in areas

clearly intended to be left solely to his special administra-

tive expertise, but they do assert that the Court is obliged

to review the Secretary's decision insofar as it involves an

interpretation of the underlying statute. The Court agrees.

The principal dispute in this case, beyond the ageney’s

compliance with NEPA, clearly involves the Secretary’s

interpretation of the provisions of the Helium Act. Section

4232(1) directs that ‘‘to the fullest extent possible ...

‘the] public laws of the United States shall be interpreted

and administered in accordance with the policies’? therein

set forth. If in determining to terminate the helium

procurement contracts the Secretary interpreted the objec-

tives of the Helium Act in an erroneous or unnecessarily

restrictive manner, his action would be contrary to not

only the Helium Act, but NEPA as well; the statutes them-

selves clearly provide ‘tlaw to apply.’ This statutory

dispute must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of

matters within the special competence of the Seeretary,

but by judicial application of canons of statutory construe-

tion. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 852, 25

L.Ed.2d 192 (1970). As Justice Harlan so aptly noted in

his dissent in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1,

14, 88 S.Ct. 651, 658-659, 19 L.Ed.2d 787 (1968) :

**The role of the courts should, in particular, be viewed

hospitably where . . . the question sought to be re-

viewed does not significantly engage the agency's ex-

pertise ... ‘where the only or principal dispute relates

to the meaning of the statutory term’... [the contro-

versy] presents issues on which courts, and not [ad-

ministrators], are relatively more expert.’

In light of the nature of the specific ageney action in-

volved in this suit and the clear congressional intention to

permit review of ageney action taken pursuant to the

Helium Act Amendment of 1960 (50 U.S.C. § 167h(a)), this

Court will not preclude review merely because the statute

is written in broad and permissive language, although such

fact necessarily limits the scope of the review. See Zuber

v. Allen, 396 U.S, 168, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969),

and Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 90 S.Ct. 1766,

26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970).

Although it is unnecessary to reach the Secretary's

ultimate decision in this ease, since compliance with NEPA

is a necessary prerequisite to taking any major federal

action and the Court is convinced that the Secretary did

not comply with the procedural or substantive requirements

of NEPA, the Court would advise the Secretary to eare-

fully review the Helium Act as a whole, and especially in

the light of its legislative history.

43a

The Court has reviewed that history, and it has been

unable to find any mention of limiting the scope of the pro-

graui to satisfying only ‘essential government activities.’

On the contrary, the Chilson Report (which was the tech-

nical foundation underlying the legislative amendment),

the remarks of Mr. Bennett * (Undersecretary of Interior

who was the major agency representative encouraging pas-

sage of the Act), the repeated statements of Senator Allott *

(the major sponsor of the Bill in the Senate), and the

statements of those appearing before the Insular Com-

mittee, all repeatedly refer to the need to conserve the

helium from being wasted ‘‘without serving any useful

purpose.”” They all refleet deep concern that helium is

wasting that might be needed at some future time for un-

foreseen needs of the entire nation. In the words of Sena-

tor Allott:

“The measure now awaiting final action by this body

ix, as we all must know by now, for the purpose of tak-

ing care of the reserves of helium for future use, both

civilian and defense requirements. Although it is esti-

mated that present reserves are adequate to meet fore-

cast requirements for some time, these reserves are

being depleted. ... Mr. President, if we do not —ct

promptly to halt this negligent, careless waste, we shall

have little helium left for the future when, perhaps, we

shall need it most.’’ 106 Cong. Ree. 17855 (Aug. 26,

1960). .

In reviewing the Helium Act itself, the only mention of

any possible limitation on the conservation program which

could even remotely be considered as limiting the purpose

to conserving helium only for ‘‘essential government activi-

ties?’ ix found in Section 15, 50 U.S.C, § 167m. The Court

2 See, Hearings on H.R. S40, 8451, 10548, 11030 before the

U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong..

2d Sess. (1960).

3 See, 106 Cong. Rec. 17855, 18544-45, 18546, 18602 (1960).

has reviewed that section in light of the overall purpose of

the statute, and it would encourage the Secretary to do the

same. It appears to the Court that the section was intended

to insure that the federal government would not interfere

with private production, development, and sale of helium

unless such activity interfered with the Government’s need

to make its own program self-liquidating or to provide for

‘‘essential government activities,’’ and that it was not

intended as a limitation on the conservation program

itself.

Score axnp STANDARDS FoR REvIEW

Having resolved these preliminary jurisdictional issues,

the Court will now turn to the resolution of the plaintiffs’

claims. As previously noted, the Court views the Secre-

tary’s compliance or non-compliance with NEPA to be the

central issue of this case at this time. The plaintiffs assert

that the procedural and substantive requirements of NEPA

were not satisfied, and that the Secretary's termination of

the helium procurement contracts must be enjoined and the

matter remanded to the Department of Interior. The gen-

eral rules regarding the scope and standards for review

of agency action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure

Act were only recently set out in detail by the Supreme

Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

supra. In reviewing agency action, the Court is initially

confronted with three questions: (1) what is the standard

for review: (2) what is the scope of review; and (5) upon

what evidentiary basis is the action to be judged.

First, the standard for review to be applied in this case

is readily apparent. Section 706 of the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C., provides that in all cases a review-

ing court must set aside agency action found to be ‘‘arbi-

trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law,”’ or which fails to meet statutory, pro-

cedural, or constitutional requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)

(A), (B), (C), (D). Since the Seeretary’s action in this

45a

case Was not taken pursuant to a rule-making provision of

the Administrative Procedure Act or based on a public

adjudicatory hearing, neither the ‘‘substantial evidence’’

nor de novo review standards are applicable.

Second, the scope of review of agency action under the

Administrative Procedure Act was clearly expressed by

the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park

yv. Volpe, supra, wherein the Court noted:

‘‘Even though there is no de novo review .. . the gen-

erally applicable standards of § 706 require the review-

ing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly,

the Secretary’s decision is entitled to a presumption of

regularity, . .. but that presumption is not to shield

his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.”’

91 S.Ct. at 823-824.

Although this Court does not have the authority to substi-

tute its judgment for that of the Secretary in areas of

administrative expertise, it clearly does have the authority

and obligation to engage in a careful scrutiny of the

agency ’s action to determine whether such action was ‘‘arbi-

trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.’’ This careful review is especially

appropriate in a case such as this involving alleged non-

compliance with the procedural and substantive require-

ments of NEPA. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-

mittee v. Atomie Energy Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33,

449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Scenie Hudson Preservation Confer-

ence vy. Federal Power Commission, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.

1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926, 92 S.Ct. 2453, 32 L.Ed.2d

813 (1972): Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engi-

neers, 470 F.2d 289 (Sth Cir. 1972); and Natural Resources

Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Finally, a more difficult problem arises when determin-

ing upon what evidentiary basis an agency’s action is to

be judged in reviewing its propriety. Section 706 of the

rere ss tH ea ce P< se AOE ADEE NET a “ as “. <a PN BRE Ese BEN TTS ._

46a

Administrative Procedure Act provides that ‘‘in making

the . . . determinations, the court shall review the whole

record.’’ The defendants have persistently maintained

that the administrative record in this case consists solely

of: (1) the information relied upon by the Secretary in

reaching his decision; (2) the comments received from

agencies and interested parties responding to the draft

environmental impact statement; and (3) the information

brought to the attention of the agencies by the plaintiffs.

The Court categorically rejects that position.

The National Environmental Policy Act places a positive

duty on federal agencies to prepare a comprehensive en-

vironmental impact statement prior to taking any major

federal action ($4552). Prior to the preparation of the

statement, the Act directs that the ageney shall ‘consult

with and obtain the comments of any Federal ageney which

has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to

any environmental impact involved,’’ and ‘initiate and uti-

lize ecological information in the planning and development

of resource-oriented projects’? ($4832(C) and (G)). In

this case the plaintiffs have proffered numerous documents

and reports which were either prepared by the Department

of Interior itself or other federal agencies, or readily avail-

able to any member of the public bearing directly upon the

environmental impact of the Seecretary’s action. The

defendants’ pat response is that the documents were not

brought to their attention by the plaintiffs prior to the

preparation of the final environmental statement or the

Secretary’s decision so they are not relevant. The fallacy

inherent in this reasoning is that it assumes that it is the

burden of others outside the agency to bring pertinent ma-

terial to the attention of the agency—it is not. The duty

to unearth and utilize all relevant and available informa-

tion lies direetly and unequivocally with the agency.

In reviewing agency compliance with NEPA, the Court is

obliged to consider all relevant material bearing directly or

indirectly on the environmental aspects of the action under

47a

consideration which were either (1) in the agency’s files.

but not disclosed in the final environmental statement; or

(2) readily available to the agency had it fulfilled its statu-

tory responsibilities. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-

mittee vy. United States Atomic Energy Commission, supra,

449 F.2d at p. 1119.

After having reviewed the administrative record sub-

mitted to the Court by the Department of Interior, and as

supplemented by the plaintitfs, the Court is convinced that

the Seeretary’s attempted compliance with NEPA, which is

a necessary condition precedent to any major federal ac-

tion, falls woefully short of the Act’s requirements in a

number of significant respects, primarily, the shortcomings

of the Department's final environmental impact statement.

Consequently, the Court does not reach the plaintiffs’ re-

maining claims, but rather, remands this matter to the

Department of Interior for further consideration in light

of this opinion.

NEPA

In response to growing national concern about the state

of the environment, Congress passed the National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. In so acting, Con-

gress specifically recognized the need for a national policy

which would encourage the productive and enjoyable har-

mony of man with his environment (§ 4821). Although the

Act does not create any substantive rights to a clean and

productive environment or establish environmental protec-

tion as the exclusive goal of federal agencies, it does assure

that environmental amenities are carefully considered

along with other considerations so that a proper balance is

ultimately reached. Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331, requires

the federal government to use ‘‘all practicable means, con-

sistent with other essential considerations of national

policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,

programs, and resources.’’ Furthermore, in order to as-

sure that the national policy is implemented and that all

remit rs I RC Ke Ra eee bas

48a

federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the chal-

lenge of a better environment, Congress specifically in-

cluded certain ‘‘action-forcing’’ provisions. See S.Rep.

No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969).

Section 102, 42 U.S.C. $4332 provides, among other

things, that each federal agency shall, ‘‘to the fullest extent

possible,’’ included in every recommendation or report on

major federal actions a ‘‘detailed statement’’ on:

sé (C)

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be

avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of

man’s environment and the maintenance and enhance-

ment of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of

resources which would be involved in the proposed

action should it be implemented.’’

In addition, the section requires that ‘‘ official shall consult

with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which

has ... special expertise with respect to the environmental

impact involved,’’ prior to the preparation of the statement

(§ 4852(2)(C)); that the agency ‘‘study, develop, and de-

scribe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of

action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts

concerning alternative uses of availabie resources’’ (§ 4332

(D)); and that the agency ‘‘initiate and utilize ecological

information in the planning and development of resource-

oriented projects (§ 4332(G)).

In furtherance of this congressional purpose, the Council

on Environmental Quality has issued comprehensive guide-

lines for federal agencies to follow in conforming to the

49a

mandates of NEPA (36 Fed.Reg. 7724, 7727 (1971), Exec-

utive Orders have been issued directing federal agencies to

develop procedures for implementing and enforcing the Act

(Executive Order 11514, 35 Fed.Reg. 4247 (1970)), and the

Department of Interior has itself issued guidelines to be

followed within its department in conforming with NEPA

(36 Fed.Reg. 19,343-19,347 (1971)).

Based upon the clear language of NEPA, its implement-

ing provisions, its legislative history, the many cases inter-

preting its import, and the underlying policy which it was

intended to foster, it is clear that the mere formal filing

of a document, in and of itself, does not satisfy the Act’s

substantive and procedural mandates or preclude further

inquiry by judicial review. As noted in the recent Tenth

Cireuit Court of Appeals decision in Davis v. Morton, 469

F.2d 593 (1972):

‘‘Reading the Act and its legislative history together,

there is little doubt that Congress intended all agencies

under their authority to follow the substantive and

procedural mandates of NEPA.’ 469 F.2d at 596.

(Emphasis added.)

Compliance with NEPA is more than a mere ritual—it

requires thorough research, investigation, corroboration,

and consideration of the environmental effects attending a

given agency action.

In determining whether an agency has complied with

NEPA prior to taking major federal action, the focal point

of attention is the impact statement. As noted by Judge

Leventhal in Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v.

Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972), at page

833 :

‘Congress contemplated that the Impact Statement

would constitute the environmental source material for

the information of the Congress as well as the Execu-

tive, in connection with the making of relevant deci-

ECR IER, PEN EY MA IEE PR rs St EA PITT aS He Sg S

50a

sions, and would be available to enhance enlighten-

ment of—and by—the public. The impact statement

provides a basis for (a) evaluation of the benefits of

the proposed project in light of its environmental

risks, and (b) comparison of the net balance for the

proposed project with the environmental risks pre-

sented by alternative courses of action.”’

Assuming that the agency has fulfilled its responsibilities

by consulting with other agencies and utilizing available

ecological and technical information, the statement should

constitute a full-bodied record upon which Congress, the

Executive, the public and the agency can adequately judge

‘the wisdom of the proposed action. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordi-

nating Committee v. Atomie Energy Commission, supra

(purpose of statement is to aid agency in its decision and

to fully inform other interested agencies and the public of

environmental consequences); Environmental Defense

Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.

1971) (statement must alert President, Council on Environ-

mental Quality, the public, and Congress to all known or

possible environmental consequences); Ely v. Velde, 451

F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971) (genuine, rather than per-

functory compliance with NEPA requires agency to expli-

cate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis, and its reason-

ing): Greene County v. Federal Power Commission, 455

F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct.

56, 34 L.Ed.2d 90 (1972) (statement must present a single

coherent and comprehensive environmental analysis).

Before turning to the final environmental impact state-

ment compiled by the Department of Interior in this case, it

is first instructive to note that this is not the run-of-the-

mill NEPA ease. Normally, a federal agency is proposing

to take affirmative action—such as the building of a dam,

nuclear power facility, or pipeline—which is likely to have

certain adverse environmental effects, yet which will also

benefit society in some appreciable manner. The courts

are consequently involved in the acrimonious imbroglio of

fatten . a ee

dla

assuring that the agency has adequately weighed the pos-

sible adverse environmental effects against the likely bene-

ficial goals of the action, and that a thorough cost-benefit

analysis has, in fact, preceded the action.

In this ease, however, the Department of Interior is not

proposing to take any affirmative action—rather, the De-

partment is recommending the abandonment of a compre-

hensive conservation program authorized by Congress to

save a Vital natural resource which was being needlessly

frittered away without first serving any useful purpose. It

is clear beyond peradventure that the recommended action

will not benefit society, except perhaps economically, and

then only temporarily. The question is—will it injure

society ?

The Department of Interior has consistently maintained

from the beginning of this litigation nearly two years ago

that the Secretary’s action does not constitute major fed-

eral action—that it merely involves the termination of three

contracts. An examination of the final environmental im-

pact statement prepared by the Department of Interior in

this case demonstrates that the Department of Interior con-

tinues to harbor that crabbed conception of this action.

Tue Impact STATEMENT

On November 13, 1972, the Department of Interior issued

a document entitled ‘‘ Final Environmental Statement—

Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts—United States

Department of Interior—Bureau of Mines.’’ The state-

ment is comprised of eighty pages, excluding the comments

received from other federal agencies and interested parties.

It contains: (1) a general description of the proposed

action (4 pages); (2) a general description of the environ-

ment (43 pages) including: the characteristics of helium (1

page); its eurrent (9 pages) and prospective future uses

(11 pages); its current proved, provable, possible, and

speculative supply (11 pages) ; and its present and future

demand to the year 2000 (9 pages) ; (3) a discussion of the

environmental impact of the proposed action (11 pages);

(4) a one-paragraph discussion of the possible unavoidable

adverse environmental effects; (5) a two-paragraph discus-

sion of the relationship between local short-term uses of

man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement

of long-term productivity; (6) a one-paragraph discussion

of the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of re-

sources involved in the termination; (7) a discussion of the

alternatives to the proposed action (6 paragraphs); and

(8) a description of the consultation which preceded the

issuance of the statement, and a reply to the comments

received.

The Department’s final impact statement is far from a

coherent and comprehensive environmental! analysis. It

consists primarily of a narrative description of helium’s

characteristics and present and future uses, supply, and

demand. After reviewing it, however, certain basic facts

are evident: (1) these contracts involve the largest known

source of helium-rich natural gas in the world, and if the

helium is not extracted and stored it will be irretrievably

lost; (2) present uses of helium indicate it is a most impor-

tant or even indispensable element in our existing science,

indu try and ecology; (3) helium holds considerable prom-

ise as a necessary tool in the development of many environ-

mentally beneficial technological advancements in such

areas as exploration and future development of the sea,

underground transmission of large blocks of electrical

energy, virtually pollution-free generation of energy, and

efficient high speed ground mass-transportation systems;

(4) of the proven sources of helium-rich natural gas, most

will probably be totally depleted some time between 1985-

2000; (5) if the expected technological breakthroughs, many

of which are now in the experimental stage, come to pass,

helium will either have to be recovered from low content

helium-bearing natural gas or the atmosphere: and (6) if

these contracts are terminated, the future availability af

—

53a

helium will be totally dependent upon the actions of the

private companies.

After reviewing this portion of the statement, a number

of questions beg answering: What is to be gained by ter-

minat

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.