Petition for Writ of Certiorari — S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

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In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973.

78-223

S. E. NICHOLS SHILLINGTON CORP.,

Petitioner,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

James L. Burke,

Attorney for Petitioner,

315 Lake Street,

Elmira, N. Y. 14901

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Table of Contents.

Page

nion Below 1

en III co si saasoenllahchiebsiammsacsneienanebditns 1

isons for Granting the Writ 2

RRR Pin. ERIS, ee UO et NN OCR Nec eS ey eC 3

Appendix of Decisions.

lzment Order of the Court of Appeals, Third

Circuit 4

‘ision and Order of National Labor Relations

Board 6

Oe MT PD cece cncecnstccerccotoneientnas 8

CITATIONS.

ber v. N.L.R.B. (CCA-5), 223 F. 2d 748 ............... 2

.R.B. v. Barberton Plasties (CCA-6), 354 F.

2d 66 2

R.B. v. J. P. Stevens, 167 N.L.R.B. (#37) ........ 2

4R.B. v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats (CCA-2),

341 F. 2d 725

R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1...

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In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973.

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S. E. NicHots SHILLINGTON CorpP.,

Petitioner,

v.

NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp,

Respondent.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

-etitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to

jew the judgment of the United States Cireuit Court

Appeals for the Third Cireuit entered on the above

e on May 2, 1973.

Opinion Below.

‘he U. S. Court of Appeals, Third Cireuit, rendered

opinion but issued a judgment order. This judgment

ler, as well as the decision and order of the National

bor Relations Board and the Trial Examiner’s de-

ion, are set forth in an appendix at the end of this

ition.

Question Presented.

s an employee who has committed wilful misconduct

‘tected against discharge because the misconduct arose

the course of attempting to organize a union?

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The facts are admitted. An employee in an active retail

department store, in the middle of the store’s operating

hours, ealled a meeting of between 10 and 15 clerks,

held in the store but away from their work areas. These

clerks manned between 40 and 50% of the entire store

area. The meeting lasted for a period of ten to twenty

minutes.

The store manager, to the knowledge of the offending

employee, was absent from the store, but discharged

the employee the next day.

Prior to the discharge there is no allegation or proof

of anti-union animus.

Previously the Board has held that wilful misconduct

will not be condoned even though its purpose is to foster

a union. N.L.R.B. v. Barberton Plastics (CCA-6), 354

F. 2d 66; N.D.R.B. v. J. P. Stevens, 167 N.L.R.B. (#37).

Two Cireuit Courts of Appeal have likewise held that

a purpose of union organization is not a defense against

discharge for wilful misconduct. Huber v. N.L.R.B.

(CCA-5), 223 F. 2d 748; N.L.R.B. v. Park Edge Sheridan

Meats (CCA-2), 341 F. 2d 725.

Reasons for Granting the Writ.

As part of the judicial evolution of employees’ rights

while organizing unions and the rights of business enter-

prises to carry on activities without undue interference,

it was early held by this Court that the National Labor

Relations Act does not interfere with an employer's

inherent right to operate his business including the right

to discharge if the discharge was motivated by reasons

associated with efficient conduct of his business. N.U.R.B.

v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1.

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The Board by the appealed decision and others has

and is ruling directly contrary to Jones & Laughlin.

The Board no longer requires showing of an anti-union

animus but concludes that since the employee was active

in union organization and is discharged, ipso facto,

regardless of normal business conduct, the discharge was

motivated primarily to discourage union organization.

Conclusion.

For the reason set forth above, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that this petition for a writ of certiorari should

be granted.

JAMES L. BURKF,

Attorney for Petitioner,

315 Lake Street,

Elmira, N. Y. 14901

SOUT ee

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4

APPENDIX OF DECISIONS.

Judgment Order of the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

For THE TuHirp CiRcvirt.

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NationaL Laspor Retations Boarp,

Petitioner,

v.

S. E. Nicnots Saiiumncton Corp.,

Respondent.

No. 72-1538

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On APPLICATION OF ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE

NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp

Submitted Under Third Cireuit Rule 12(6) April 9, 1973

Before:

Adams and Gibbons, Circuit Judges and Joseph S.

Lord, III, District Judge.

Peter G. Nash, General Counsel.

Patrick Hardin, Associate General Counsel.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Assistant General Counsel.

Elliott Moore, Ronald I. Tish, Attorneys.

National Labor Relations Board.

James L. Burke, 315 Lake Street, Elmira, New York

14901, Attorney for Respondent.

ARRON PA DTN

5

After considering the respondent's contention that the

National Labor Relations Board erred in finding that the

S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp. violated Sections 8(a) (1)

& (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, we find that

there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole

to support the Board's finding that the Company violated

Sections S(a)(1) & (3) of the Act by discharging em-

ployee, Rosemary Stamm, because of her union activities,

and it is

ORDERED AND aDsuDGED that the Order of the National

Labor Relations Board in this matter be enforced. Costs

taxed against respondent.

Dated: April 10, 1973.

By the Court,

(Illegible) M. ADAMS

Cirenit Judge

Attest:

THomas FE. Quinn

Certified as a true copy and issue in lieu of a formal

mandate on May 2, 1973.

Costs taxed in favor of petitioner as follows:

Brief & Appx. for petitioner $743.45

Test:

Tomas E. Quinn

Clerk, United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

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Decision and Order of National Labor Relations Board.

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NationaL Laspor Retations Boarp,

Petitioner,

v.

S. E. Nicnots Sxititixcton Corp.,

Respondent.

<<

On November 8, 1971, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer

issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. There-

after, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,

and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National

Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in

this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the record and the Trial

Examiner’s Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs

and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner’s rulings,

findings,’ and conclusions and to adopt his recommended

Order.

‘The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings

made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board’s established policy

not to overrule a Trial Examiner’s resolutions with respect to

credibility unless the. clear preponderance of all of the relevant

evidence convinees us that the resolutions were incorrect. Stand-

ard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F. 2d 362

(C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no

basis for reversing his findings.

. LANA ESE TALE RIS

7

Order

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-

lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations

Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the

Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent,

S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., Shillington, Pennsylvania,

its officers, agents successors, and assigns, shall take

| the action set forth in the Trial Examiner’s recommended

Order.

Dated, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1972.

NationaL Laspor Rexrations Boarp

Edward B. Miller,

Chairman

John H. Fanning,

Member

Ralph E. Kennedy,

Member

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[Issued November 8, 1971]

Trial Examiner’s Decision.

Statement of the Case

Pavut Biscyer, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, with

all the parties represented, was heard on August 10 and

11, 1971 at Reading, Pennsylvania, on the complaint of

the General Counsel issued on June 25, 1971,’ and the

answer of S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., herein called

the Respondent or Company. The question litigated is

whether the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a) (1)

and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended,

discriminatorily discharged employee Rosemary Stamm

because of her union or other concerted activities. At

the close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argu-

ment but thereafter submitted briefs in support of their

respective positions.

'The complaint is based on original, first, second, and third

amended charges filed on April 13, 22, May 19 and June 24,

1971, respectively. Copies of these charges were duly served

on the Respondent by registered mail on the respective filing

dates.

*Seetion 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prae-

tice for an employer ‘to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-

ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”

Insofar as pertinent, Section 7 provides that “[{e]mployees shall

have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor

organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of

their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or

protection .. .”

Section 8(a)(3), with certain qualifications not material

herein, prohibits an employer, ‘‘by discrimination in regard to

hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-

ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor

organization .. .”

wz TTD

Upon the entire record, and from my observation of

the demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration

being given to the arguments advanced by the parties,

I make the following:

9

Fixpincs anp CoNcLUsIONS

I. The Business of the Respondent

The Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with its

principal office in Shillington, Pennsylvania, operates

a retail discount department store at that location.

In the regular course and conduct of its business the

Respondent’s annual gross sales exceed $1,000,000. It

also annually purchases and receives from outside the

State goods valued in excess of $50,000.

I find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in

commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of

the Act.

II. The Labor Organization Involved

It is conceded, and I find that Retail Clerks, Employees

Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks International Associa-

tion, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor

organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the

Act.

Ill. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

A. The Evidence

This is another one of those familiar cases where the

employer is charged with attempting to stem the organi-

zational tide by unlawfully terminating the leader in the

union movement, while the employer protests his inno-

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10

cence, insisting that the discharge was motivated solely

by legitimate business reasons. On the basis of the

evidence presented, I find the allegations of discrimination

sustained.

1. Stamm’s employment; the commencement of union

activities

Rosemary Stamm was hired by the Respondent in De-

cember 1970 as a cashier on the night shift.* Her hours

were from 5 to 10 p.m. Monday through Friday and

from 1 to 10 p.m. on Saturday. In February 1971,

Stamm was assigned additional functions previously per-

formed by Shirley Laman, the night head cashier who

left the Respondent’s employ. These duties included

verifying customer checks and charges; supplying cashiers

with change; checking out registers; authenticating

“voids”; releasing cashiers from their stations and seeing

that receipts were brought to the office at the close of

the business day; arranging for rest breaks; and training

new cashiers. She was instructed in these fuctions by

Jean Ann Nyman, the head office cashier, who informed

her that Store Manager Murray Jacobs was pleased with

her performance and thought that she was qualified to

take on the indicated new duties.© On April 7, Stamm

°Stamm also had responsibilities with respect to the operation

of the eandy counter.

‘Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1971.

‘These findings are based on the persuasive testimony of

Stamm and Sharon DeLong, who was a cashier during Stamm’s

employment. Neither Jacobs’ denial that Stamm was assigned

head cashier functions nor Nyman’s denial of knowledge that

Stamm was performing them impresses me as coming from candid

witnesses. Moreover, it is hardly likely that DeLong, who is

still in the Respondent’s employ, would bear false testimony

against her employer and thus invite its ill will. Georgia Rug

Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305, fn. 2.

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was, nevertheless, summarily discharged under circum-

stances related below.

Because of her dissatisfaction with the wages, hours and

other working conditions in the store, Stamm discussed

the situation and the desirability of union representa-

tion with the employees on the night shift. Receiving a

favorable response from a majority of those employees,

Stamm on March 29 telephoned the Union and advised

its president of the employees’ union interest. The

next day, Organizer Eugene Nissley visited Stamm at her

home, gave her union authorization cards and booklets

and instructed her in the technique of soliciting card

signatures from employees. About 4:30 in the after-

noon, before she was scheduled to begin work, Stamm

arrived at the store and in the employee cloakroom

succeeded in securing 23 signed cards from employees as

they arrived for work. Having thus exhausted her supply

of cards, Nissley on Monday, April 5, furnished her with

more authorization cards.

11

2. The events of April 6

On the morning of April 6, Store Manager Murray

Jacobs left the store to attend a seminar in Lancaster,

Pennsylvania. Upon learning this, Robert Soto, the

manager of the leased shoe department, telephoned Stamm

at her home about 11:30 a.m., informed her of Jacob’s

absence and that he (Soto)® and other day shift em-

ployees were interested in having a union and suggested

that she come to the store. Accordingly, about noon-

time, Stamn# arrived there and proceeded to solicit card

signatures at the snack bar and work stations from

employees, some of whom Soto indicated were likely

“Soto had previously expressed his reluctance to become in-

volved in the union movement when Stamm sought his s:pport

and assistance in organizing the day shift employees.

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prospects. When discussing the Union with clerks in

the selling areas, Stamm credibly testified without con-

tradiction, she was careful that there were no customers

around to be waited upon. Soto also engaged in this

organizational effort, securing a number of signed cards

which he turned over to Stamm. By the time Stamm

left the store that afternoon she had collected 25 to

30 signed cards.

In the course of the foregoing activities some 10 to 15

employees gathered in the receiving room which is sepa-

rated from the public areas of the store. Several of

these employees had left their work stations on the

selling floor to be present while others were in the re-

ceiving room or were passing through in connection with

the performance of their regular duties. Probably other

employees on their lunch period were also there. The

number in the group at any particular time, however,

varied as some left and others entered the room. Whether

or not Stamm and Soto deliberately convened this meet-

ing and invited employees to attend,’ it is quite clear

; that they were responsible for it. Manifestly, there was

i nothing secretive about this meeting which appears to

i have been more in the nature of a question and answer

; period where Stamm and Soto explained the advantages

of unionization in response to questions put to them.

This meeting lasted 10 to 20 minutes and no employee

was reprimanded for leaving his or her work station

unattended. After this meeting, Stamm resumed her

solicitation in the store until! her departure about 1 or

1:30 p.m.

The above events were promptly reported the same

afternoon to the Respondent’s executive offices in New

12

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*In view of my findings and conclusions, it is unnecessary to

determine whether Stamm and Soto had actually assembled

these employees which they denied they did in contradiction of

other testimony.

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York and then to Store Manager Jacobs while he was

still in Laneaster. The testimony relating to these re-

ports was given by Jacobs, the only witness produced

hy the Respondent, and is as follows: While still in

Lancaster Jacobs received two telephone calls, urging

him to return to the store immediately because there

were “meetings and disruptions.” One call was from

Alma Dietrich, then an employee in the Shillington store

office, who simply relayed a message to Jacobs that

he was wanted back in the store. The second call came

from Gerald Holt, the area supervisor of ladies’, men’s

and children’s wear departments. Holt works out of

the New York offices and occasionally visits the Shilling-

ton store. Stating that he was making the call on behalf

of Company President Rosenbaum, Holt told Jacobs that

he should immediately return to the store because “all

hell was breaking loose—or something to that effect”;

that union organization “meetings” were being held in the

hack stockroom; that employees were off the floor; and

that store operations were being disrupted. Although

earlier in his cross examination Jacobs denied that Holt

mentioned that Stamm or any other person was involved

in the organizational activities or attended “the meet-

ings” or that Stamm solicited cards or discussed the

Union in the store, he later testified that Holt told him

that Soto “was behind” the union organizational drive

and was at the meeting. As for Stamm’s union activity,

so Jacobs testified, he first learned about it after he

returned to the store from Lancaster and was unhappy

with this development. However, in subsequent testi-

mony, Jacobs stated that Holt informed him in the above

telephone conversation that Stamm and Soto, were the

two “principals” who “were leading the meetings.” Con-

cerning the reports of the above episode made to the

Respondent’s executive offices in New York, Jacobs testi-

fied that in the same telephone conversation Holt ad-

13

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vised him that he had previously conveyed the informa-

tion to President Rosenbaum in New York after Juanita

Wentzell, an area supervisor who was then visiting the

store, called him at home and apprised him of the

situation.

Jacobs further testified that after the second telephone

eall he left Lancaster, arriving at the store between 3:30

and 4 in the afternoon, at which time Stamm and Soto

had already gone. He also testified that he then received

reports from his assistant managers, Wentzell, and

several employees, that in his absence Stamm and Soto

had been “conducting meetings in the stockroom” and that

employees were off the floor. However, he testified,

his informants did not furnish him with details regarding

the meetings and dislocations or the duration of the em-

ployees’ absence from their work stations. Admittedly,

Jacobs did not reprimand any employee for leaving his

or her station to attend a meeting. In fact, he denied

knowing who attended the meeting except the two “prin-

cipals,’ Stamm and Soto. Furthermore, there is no

direct, convincing testimony that Stamm’s and Soto's

union solicitation and discussions in the store caused

any serious disruption or dislocation of store operations.

Indeed, if they did, it is difficult to understand why the

persons in charge of the store in Jacohs’ absence or

other supervisors did not take measures to halt such

conduct. According to the head office cashier, Jean Ann

Nyman, who unquestionably was unsympathetic to the

union organizational campaign, testified that when = she

reported the afternoon happenings to Jacobs, he simply

14

SAceording to the testimony of DeeDee Schillermann, the

manager of the ladies’ and girls’ wear department, she told

one or two girls in her department that Stamm and Soto wanted

to talk to them in the receiving room. This information was

passed on to other employees in this department. Schillermann

and apparently other employees in that department joined the

group in the reeeiving room.

| EN a NOME AEA

15

commented “Don’t worry about it. These things happen.”

In the evening (April 6), Stamm came to work as

usual. However, according to her uncontroverted testi-

mony, which I credit, Jacobs personally kept her under

surveillance, following her wherever she went, including

to the door of the ladies’ room. She further credibly

testified without contradiction that, while working at

her cash register, one of the security guards approached

her, patted her clothes pocket which contained union

cards, and cautioned her that she “better not let Mr.

Jacobs see [the cards] ... He’s watching you.” Never-

theless, during her break at the snack bar Stamm secured

additional signed cards from a few employees.

3. The involvement of the New York office in Stamm’s

discharge

It is disputed that the Respondent's executives in the

New York offices, including President Rosenbaum, Execu-

tive Vice President Manfred Brecker, and Vice President

Keller were fully conversant with Stamm’s and Soto’s

organizational activity in the Shillington store during

the afternoon of April 6. Later in the evening Jacobs

received a long distance telephone call from Brecker in

New York to discuss the subject of discharging Stamm.

Jacobs gave the following account of this conversation :*°

Brecker asked Jacobs whether he had been aware of

Stamm’s organizational activity. When Jacobs re-

sponded in the negative, Brecker retorted that he “was

very remiss as store manager in not having knowledge

of some of these things that went on under—[his] roof.”

In discussing Stamm’s employment status, Brecker pointed

out that she was a security risk who had previously con-

*It appears that Soto was discharged by his employer, the

lessee of the store’s shoe department, on April 6 or 7.

“Brecker did not testify, nor did any other company execu-

tive in the New York office.

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fessed to giving unauthorized discounts and taking candy

for her own use. Jacobs further testified that, although

Area Supervisor Katz had 3 weeks before Stamm's

discharge advised him that Stamm was a security risk,

this was the first time he learned the details. The facts

of this accusation will be later considered.

According to Jacobs, the final discharge decision was

made the following day, April 7. It is clear that the

decision emanated from the New York executive offices

and that Jacobs’ participation was apparently to agree

that this action was “long overdue.” Jacobs conceded

that he did not initiate the discharge, even though as

store manager he had the power to terminate store em-

ployees.

Jacobs testified that on April 7 Vice President Keller

visited the store and instructed him to discharge Stamm.

He further testified that Keller told him that “the biggest

reason” for Stamm’s dismissal was the fact that she

was a security risk, adding another reason that “to a

great extent” she caused disruption of the store operation

the day before when “most of the staff” left their work

stations to attend the organizational meeting. Admittedly,

Stamm was never given the opportunity to answer these

charges.

4. Stamm’s discharge on April 7; the Respondent's

reasons asserted at the hearing

On April 7, at 5 p.m. Stamm reported for work on

her regular shift. While hanging up her coat in the

cloakroom, she was paged over the intercommunication

system to go to the office. There she met Jacobs who

asked her to enter the conference room. Stamm ex-

pressed her reluctance to do so, stating that anything

Jacobs had to say to her could be said in the office.

This evoked Jacobs’ angry response that he hoped she

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17

had a good lawyer. Stamm, nevertheless, proceeded to

the conference room where Jacobs told her that company

rules did not permit the employment of relatives and

that she therefore had to go. Stamm protested her

selection and pointed out that she had been in the Com-

pany’s employ longer than her sister-in-law, Linda Stamm.

Besides, Stamm noted, a sister and brother, Susi and

Mike Warner, were then working in the store. Jacobs

answered that this was none of her business and Stamm

walked out of the conference room and went to the

snack bar.”

At the snack bar, Stamm heard the Warners being

paged. A few minutes later the Warners left the con-

ference room. Susie Warner was in tears when her

brother approached Stamm and aceused her of causing

Susie’s discharge."*? Stamm disavowed responsibility.

At the hearing, Jacobs admitted telling Stamm that

she was being separated because of the Company’s “no

relative” rule. However, he testified that this was not

the true reason. When questioned why he gave Stamm

a false reason, Jacobs testified that he was “a coward”:

that he “didn’t want to start a commotion by going into

details”; and that he “thought the best way to solve the

situation was to invoke the relationship rule.” However,

this leaves unexplained the separation of Susie Warner

under this alleged rule except to suggest that it was

"The foregoing findings are based on Stamm’s testimony.

Jacobs did not contradict Stamm’s account except that he denied

that he stated that he hoped she had a good lawyer. I find

Stamm to be a more credible and candid witness than Jacobs

who demonstrated his unreliability, among other things, in his

highly dubious testimony regarding the reasons for Stamm’s

discharge discussed below.

Stamm testified that she later learned that Susie Warner

was transferred to the Antietam Valley store. No contradicting

testimony was adduced.

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prompted by a desire to lend an air of legitimacy to

Stamm's discharge."

After staying at the snack bar for a short while, Stamm

made a telephone call to Union Organizer Nissley and

reported her discharge. Thereafter, when Area Super-

visor Holt began to follow her in the store, Stamm in-

vited him to walk with her. Holt then told her that

he had to ask her to leave, adding that she knew why;

that “[t]here’s things going on” in which he id not

want to get involved; that she was a “good worker”

and “a nice person”; and that it was “nothing personal.”

Stamm agreed to leave, and Holt took her to the snack

bar and bought her a soda. While there, Vice President

Keller approached and angrily reminded Holt that he

had directed him to get Stamm out of the store. Holt

answered that Stamm wasn't doing anything and was

going to leave peacefully as soon as she finished her

soda. Keller remained at the snack bar until Stamm

departed.

Although the discharge obviously originated in the

Respondent’s New York executive offices, Jacobs was the

only management witness to attest to the asserted under-

lying reasons for this action, namely, Stamm was a

security risk; she caused a disruption of store operations

on April 6; and her repeated unauthorized absences

from her regular cashier’s post at the checkout counter.

As for Stamm’s purported designation as a security risk,

the undisputed facts are contained in Stamm’s follow-

ing testimony: Tn accordance with her agreement noted

in her employment application, Stamm submitted in

January to an interview and polygraph test conducted

According to the undisputed testimony of employee DeLong,

at a company meeting of employees on April 7 or 8, a manage-

ment official also stated, in answer to an employee's question,

that Stamm was terminated because of the company rule pro-

hibiting the employment of relatives of employees.

19

by Lincoln Zohn for the Respondent. After preliminary

interrogation and testing, the examiner told her that

because of her nervousness no valid results could be

achieved and that therefore he would forego the poly-

graph test. In the interview, Stamm freely admitted

that at one time while cleaning up candy shelves, which

was one of her assigned duties, she found a half-empty

bag of candy. After making an appropriate notation in

a markup book, she shared the candy with several cashiers.

The examiner expressed his opinion that this was not

stealing. Stamm also told him that she once gave an

unauthorized discount. The examiner assured her that

these admissions would not affect her job and that she

need not worry. At the examiner's request, she signed a

statement containing her admissions and the interview

ended. Nothing was said to her thereafter concerning

her acts in question or the necessity for taking another

polygraph test.”

As indicated above, Jacobs testified that on April 17,

when he was instructed by Vice President Keller to

terminate Stamm, he was advised that Stamm’s being a

security risk was “the biggest reason” for this action.

Jacobs further testified that about 3 or 4 weeks before

the discharge, he was orally informed by Area Super-

visor Katz for the first time that she was a_ security

risk but that he was given no details regarding the basis

for this designation. Under cross examination, it de-

veloped that at that time he was given a list of about

half a dozen “[slecurity risk employees that were sched-

uled for dismissal” and that all but Stamm were dis-

charged before April 6. When questioned why she was

‘At the hearing, the Respondent's counsel stated that one

ground for discharging Stamm was the Company's belief that

she was a security risk because of her refusal to submit to a

polygraph examination. However, not only was no evidence

presented to substantiate this assertion, but the record establishes

the contrary to be the fact.

>]

Disrrvicsais Ld A ceeaaeide ictans.s

retained during the 3 or 4 week period, Jacobs testified

that it was to keep her under surveillance “as a means

of leading us to other employees who might be involved

with her.” Yet, since Jacobs concededly was not in-

formed why Stamm was considered a security risk, her

asserted retention for surveillance purposes while the

other listed security risks were discharged is highly

questionable. Moreover, although Jacobs admitted that

he had no evidence that Stamm had repeated the alleged

offenses which made her a security risk, she was never-

theless subsequently discharged.

The transparency of the security risk reason for

Stamm’s termination requires no further discussion. In-

deed, the Respondent in its brief realistically discounts

the security risk ground in observing that “the polygraph

report, while justifying unusual surveillance, did not

produce anything of substance against Stamm.” As for

my appraisal of Jacob’s testimony, I do not believe that

the Respondent ever regarded Stamm a security risk or

that she was kept under surveillance for that reason.

With respect to Stamm’s asserted disruption of store

operations on April 6, this has already been discussed

earlier in this Decision. Turning then to the final reason

for Stamm’s discharge, her alleged unauthorized absence

from her assigned station at the cash register, the Re-

spondent presented such a dismal picture of her neglect

of duties which, if true, leaves one perplexed why it

had not gotten rid of her sooner. Moreover, if she

were actually guilty of these derelictions, and they really

“In its brief, the Respondent acknowledges the understand-

able doubt that Stamm’s neglect of duties really motivated her dis-

charge. Thus, the brief states that ‘‘the employer knowing of

her neglect for a long period of time did not act on it previously,

so that taken alone it does not appear to be the reason for dis-

charge.”” However, it argues that Stamm’s neglect of duties

“taken in conjunction with the disruption of store operations

amply justifies discharge.”

PRET LtePC PS,

21

prompted the discharge, it is incomprehensible why Jacobs

should have failed to inform Stamm at her discharge

interview of such fact.

In any event, Jacobs recited the following account of

Stamm’s neglect of duties: For at least several weeks

before her dismissal, Stamm failed to perform her job

at the cash register. She would wander around in the

store, requiring him “frequently” to page her to return

to her register at the checkout counter. This happened

approximately three times an evening, despite the fact

that he had admonished her that her business was to be

at her register and not to leave it except for breaks

and “under . .. [his] direction.” As time went on,

Jacobs’ warnings to Stamm became more severe. He prob-

ably verbally warned her four or five times but could

not remember the nature of those reprimands. On some

occasions of her absence from her register, he asked

her for the reason she was away but could not recall

the most recent date of such inquiry. However, he re-

called that when he found Stamm in the shoe department

a week before her discharge, he questioned her about

her absence and ordered her to return to her register.

Jacobs testified that he kept no written record of Stamm’s

reprimands or unauthorized absences; nor did he have

records of any employee’s performance.”

Also testifying on the Respondent’s behalf was Jean

Ann Nyman, the head office cashier, who I find was hostile

to the Union” and inclined to gross exaggeration. She

testified, in substance, that her workday began 8 o’clock

in the morning but she usually worked to 7, 8 or 9

Because of the absence of written records of this nature,

Jacobs indicated that the New York executive offices would have

no knowledge of Stamm’s performance.

“Although not contended to be a supervisor within the mean-

ing of the Act, Nyman enjoys a position of responsibility with

respect to employees. About noon on April 6, in response to

the Union's organizational drive, Nyman initiated and drafted

PDisatanseviacitcwrat scr wh Seu Five

22

o'clock in the evening and thus had an opportunity to

observe Stamm’s work habits on the night shift. Accord-

ing to Nyman, Stamm was a fine cashier until the middle

of January when she began leaving her register to walk

around the store or sit at the snack bar. Before Stamm

developed these bad habits, she (Nyman) had intended

to recommend Stamm to Jacobs as a replacement for

the night head cashier who had left the Company's em-

ploy. Nyman testified that she did not make the recom-

mendation because of Stamm’s repeated delinquences in

“never” being at her register; that she wandered around

in areas where she had no right to be and “constantly”

had to be called back; that for 2 or 3 weeks before her

discharge, Stamm was called back to the register “several

times”—“four or five times, six, seven, eight, nine times a

night”—and, on occasions after returning, she would leave

again, necessitating her being paged again; that through-

out February and March several eashiers and office em-

ployees complained to her (Nyman) about Stamm’s ab-

sences; that she reported Stamm’s conduct and employee

complaints to Jacobs who stated that he would observe

Stamm; and that one day in the middle or end of March,

Nyman also spoke to Stamm about her wanderings which

griped employees with the result that her conduct only

worsened.

(footnote continued):

a petition that the employees ‘‘did not wish to be part of any

Union organization” and thereafter solicited and secured some

50 employee signatures. She also furnished employees advice

on sending individual letters to the Union, requesting return of

their previously signed authorization ecards. According to the

testimony of DeeDee Schillermann, the department manager of

ladies’ and girls’ wear whom the Respondent produced as a wit-

ness, she and several other employees gave Nyman the with-

drawal letters they had written to be forwarded to the Union

by certified mail, without affixing postage stamps. The com-

plaint, however, does not allege that the Respondent violated

the Act by reason of Nyman’s conduct.

23

The testimony of Carol L. McElwee, a former em-

ployee and witness for the Respondent,** was in the

same general vein. According to her, Stamm was “fre-

quently” in the shoe department and soft goods depart-

ment areas in the rear of the store where she overheard

conversations between Stamm and Soto. McElwee fur-

ther testified that these conversations occurred at least

once a night and sometimes more often; that Stamm’s

wanderings began in December when Stamm was first

employed and remained away from her work stations

until paged to return; that she (McElwee) heard Stamm

being paged at least every night with its frequency in-

creasing as time went on; and that she (McElwee) on

several occasions complained to management that Stamm

was talking in the rear of the store and was disturbing

employees working there.

Disputing the foregoing recitation of her derelictions,

Stamm testified, in effect, that her absences from the

register were in connection with the performance of her

duties or when she was on a break and referred to three

such incidents. One incident involved the handling of

a refund about 4 weeks before her discharge. According

to Stamm, she took care of the refund in the rear of

the store, at Nyman’s direction, when Jacobs paged her

to return to the checkout counter to approve a check.

In the office, Jacobs reprimanded her for running around

in the store. When Stamm explained her presence in

the rear of the store, Jacobs turned to Nyman who

answered that she told Stamm to have somebody else

handle the refund.

Although McElwee also enjoyed a position of responsibility

over employees while she was in the Respondent’s employ, it is

not urged that she was a supervisor within the meaning of the

Act. She admitted that employees tried to keep knowledge of

the Union’s campaign from her because they considered her un-

friendly as to the Union.

pratt sesh ere 5S ere = = ee De Ses ag Pie le NA SOY,

Disiticisisitcttsiconwiccinncrs Fad R

24

The second occasion she was paged, Stamm testified,

was when she went to the ladies’ room. As for the third

incident, Stamm testified that she went to the jewelry

counter after she was called by a salesgirl to show her

how to make out a charge; that while she was explaining

the procedure, she was paged; and that when Stamm

informed Jacobs the reason for being at the jewelry

counter, Jacobs told the salesgirl that if she needed as-

sistance in preparing a charge, to go to the office. Stamm

also testified that she was never warned that she risked

discharge or other consequences if she persisted in ab-

senting herself from the register.

Employee DeLong, who worked as a cashier near

Stamm, substantially corrohorated Stamm’s testimony in

various respects. She testified that Stamm was not

absent from her register too often, probably three or

four times, but did not know the purpose of those ab-

sences. She further testified that Stamm did not operate

a register at times when she was engaged in performing

other duties, such as checking coupons, getting change

for the cashiers or signing “voids” or charges. In addi-

tion, DeLong denied that she ever complained about

Stamm’s absences from the register nor, to her knowl-

edge, did the other cashiers complain.

From my appraisal of the testimony in the context of

all the circumstances related above, I find that the testi-

mony of Jacobs and other company witnesses concerning

Stamm’s delinquencies was greatly exaggerated and _ be-

yond reasonable belief. T seriously doubt that if her

conduct were as bad as it was pictured to be Jacobs

would have retained her as long as he did or that he

would not have mentioned her shortcomings at the time

of her dismissal. Accordingly, T credit Stamm’s and

DeLong’s testimony. In any event, as I later conclude,

whatever estimate the Respondent might have had of

Stamm’s work habits or performance, it did not enter

into its decision to discharge her.

—eSSEeooX__“ SDSS SB

25

5. Stamm’s subsequent evictions from the store

On April 10, Rosemary Stamm and her husband visited

the store to purchase a pair of shoes for their child.

While their child was being fitted, Store Manager Jacobs

approached and asked them to leave. When Stamm’s

husband protested that there was no reason for this re-

quest, Jacobs responded that Rosemary was a union

organizer, and that he was going to call the police unless

they left. After Jacobs walked away, two security guards

informed the Stamms that Jacobs wanted them out of

the store. Asserting their constitutional right to shop

in the store, the Stamms nevertheless departed.

On April 15, pursuant to prior arrangement with the

Union’s attorney, Joseph E. Organtini, constable of the

Township of Cumru, accompanied Rosemary Stamm and

her husband on another visit to the store. The following

is Organtini’s version as corroborated in substantial

respects by Rosemary Stamm. The Stamms first bought

a carton of cigarettes at the tobacco counter and pro-

ceeded to the dry goods department. While Rosemary

Stamm was examining a dress pattern, a security officer

appeared and ordered the Stamms to leave the store.

Organtini identified himself and inquired whether the

Stamms had done anything wrong. When the security

officer answered that he was only acting on orders from

Jacobs, Organtini asked to speak to Jacobs and was

directed to him at the front of the store. There, with

the Stamms standing nearby, Organtini introduced him-

self and stated that he accompanied the Stamms to the

store at the request of the Union’s attorney. Organtini

then inquired whether the Stamms had done anything

wrong to be ordered out of the store. Receiving Jacobs’

reply that Rosemary Stamm had been discharged, Organ-

tini asked whether the discharge was for shoplifting, steal-

ing or anything like that. Jacobs gave a negative re-

peers IR IP AAMAS ta coe Be ca! + — SusDaotes RS Ae eae . . MAL he LD SBLE |

4

os

eibecsisirincine aD le ide EA GUE Vk tas ito ee

26

sponse, adding that she was discharged because she was

a union organizer. This elicited Organtini’s expression

of doubt that such activity was unlawful. At that point,

a town police officer appeared at the scene. Organtini

advised the officer the purpose of his mission, which was

to protect the Stamm’s civil rights. Organtini then state!

that if the police officer wanted the Stamms to leay-

they would do so peacefully. When Jacobs affirm:

that was his wish, the Stamms and Organtini left tl»

store.

Jacobs’ account of this incident is essentially the same

except that he eategorically denied telling Organtini

that Rosemary Stamm was discharged because she was

a union organizer. According to Jacobs, he said he wanted

her to leave the store because she was “a known or-

ganizer.” Concerning the reasons for her termination,

he testified, he told Organtini that they were for “an

infraction of the rules and we were not permitted to

employ relatives in the store.” As previously indicated,

Jacobs did not impress me as a reliable witness. Organ-

tini’s testimony, corroborated by Rosemary Stamm’s, was

very persuasive, and I accordingly credit. In any event,

even were Jacobs’ testimony credited in this respect, my

ultimate determination would be the same.

Under cross examination, Jacobs admitted that at the

time of the Stamms’ eviction from the store, they had

not caused any disruption of operations but that his

action was taken “on advice of counsel and other execu-

tives.” There is also undisputed testimony that 2 or 3

weeks later Rosemary Stamm experienced another un-

gracious invitation to leave the store. On that occasion,

she and a union organizer entered the store and while

they were having a soda at the snack counter, Jacobs

directed them to leave, which they did.

27

B. Concluding Findings

The question whether an employee was illegally dis-

charged because of his union activities is not susceptible

of easy determination as it involves an inquiry into

the employer's state of mind. In resolving this question,

therefore, all the facts and circumstances surrounding

the separation must be carefully appraised with due

recognition being accorded to the settled principle that

an employer may terminate an employee for any reason,

good, bad, or indifferent, provided he is not motivated

by union considerations. It is equally well established

that the existence of a “justifiable ground for dismissal

is no defense if it is a pretext and not the moving

cause."””

From my analysis of the evidence, I am convinced that

Stamin’s discharge was dictated by her leadership in the

Union’s organizational drive and not by the reasons ad-

vanced by the Respondent. As shown above, there can

be little doubt that the Respondent became aware of

Stamm’s union activities on April 6, the day before her

termination, and that it did not weleome the prospect of

its store being unionized. It is also clear that, upon

learning of Stamm’s activities, the Respondent's execu-

tives in its New York offices promptly initiated steps

to terminate her the following day. In a conceded effort

to conceal the real reason for her discharge, Store Man-

ager Jacobs falsely informed Stamm in her exit inter-

view that he was simply enforcing a company rule pro-

hibiting the employment of relatives of employees. How-

ever, when she pointed out that she had entered the Re-

spondent’s employ before her sister-in-law, and that a

brother and sister, Susie and Mike Warner, were then

working in the store, Jacobs retorted that it was none

°N.L.R.B. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F. 2d 521, 525, (C.A.

8).

fotsede dade stat

3

cf

Peiienairerciisciici cx: iewta eke

28

of her business. The transparency of the reason thus

given to Stamm for her discharge probably induced

Jacobs to retract it on the witness stand and acknowl-

edge its pretextual nature. However, his explanation

for giving Stamm a false reason—that he lacked the

courage to tell her the truth—only serves to cast graver

doubts on the purity of the motivation underlying the

discharge. Not only am I unable to discern anything in

the assertedly honest reasons for the discharge requiring

secrecy or confidentiality, but the inexcusable extreme to

which Jacobs went in dismissing an innocent employee,

Susie Warner, in an effort to lend an air of legitimacy

to his purported enforcement of the “no-relative” rule,”

strongly suggests that impermissible considerations en-

tered into the discharge decision.

Turning to the discharge reasons urged at the hearing—

that Stamm was a security risk, neglected her duties in

frequently absenting herself from her station at the cash

register, and disrupted store operations on April 6,—

I‘find that they, too, cannot withstand scrutiny. As found

above, the Respondent actually never regarded Stamm

as a security risk, even though Jacobs testified that he

was advised by Vice President Keller that this was “the

biggest reason” for the discharge. Indeed, in its brief,

the Respondent concedes that the polygraph report “did

not produce anything of substance against Stamm.”

As for Stamm’s asserted neglect of duties, it is diff-

cult to understand why, :f her conduct were really as

intolerable as it was pictured to be, she was retained in

the Respondent’s employ as long as she was, without

even a warning that she risked discharge unless she

mended her ways. The inescapable answer for her re-

tention is that actually she was not an unsatisfactory em-

2>Apparently to make amends for the injustice done to

Susie Warner, the Respondent subsequently reinstated her in its

Antietam Valley store. <A similar offer was not made to Stamm.

cD aie ir Fata ee Re easib.

29

ployee but that, by more than a strange coincidence,

she became persona non grata only when her union

activities became known to the Respondent.

Conceding that Stamm’s derelictions do not appear to

be a justifiable ground for her discharge in view of the

Respondent’s toleration of this conduct for a long period

of time, the Respondent argues that Stamm’s neglect

of duties considered in conjunction with her disruption

of store operations on April 6, nevertheless warranted

the discharge. However, I am not convinced that the

Respondent believed that Stamm caused such a serious

disruption in the store as to compel her summary dis-

charge in the middle of the workweek, without prior

warning or desire to learn her version of the April 6

events. Significantly, neither the so-called disruption nor

her asserted neglect of duties was even given to Stamm

as a reason for her discharge; instead, Jacobs admittedly

attempted to justify his action to Stamm on the basis

of a pretextual reason. Such a deliberate effort to hide

the true motivating reason clearly supports the infer-

ence that Stamm’s alleged acts of misconduct are merely

afterthoughts and that her discharge was really inspired

by her union activities.”

Weighing all the evidence including the timing and

summary nature of Stamm’s discharge,” the involvement

of the Respondent’s executives in New York in a dis-

ciplinary matter ostensibly of local concern, the assign-

ment of pretextuous reasons for the discharge, and the

Respondent’s purposeful efforts to conceal its real mo-

tive, T conclude that the Respondent discriminated against

"\Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 402 F.2d

299, 306, (C.A. 4) in which the court observed that ‘‘[w]here

an asserted business motive is discredited or contradicted by sub-

stantial evidence, the Board is free to treat it as pretextuous

and infer discrimination on account of union activity.’’

*2N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 497,

502 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied 355 U.S. 829.

ADORE Se cd Lata

Dries

PRIOR IE CIS NIB IN a sans acta . te one CO Rt Ane py

s Bs

Vv :

30

Stamm because of her union activity. Such conduct, I

find, necessarily discouraged union membership in viola-

tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and interfered with,

restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their

self-organizational rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1)

of the Act. The validity of these findings is buttressed

by Jacobs’ admission to Constable Organtini at the time

of Stamm’s eviction from the store on April 15 that

she was discharged because she was a union organizer.

Finally, even assuming that Stamm’s alleged neglect of

duties and disruption of store operations to some extent

entered into the Respondent's decision to terminate her, I,

nevertheless, find that a significant factor causing her dis-

charge was her leadership in the union movement and

that therefore her discharge would still be violative of

the same provisions of the Act.**

IV. The Remedy

Pursuant to Section 10(¢c) of the Act, as amended, I

recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and

desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found

and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate

the policies of the Act.

T have found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged

employee Rosemary Stamm because of her union activiy.

To remedy this violation, IT recommend that the Respond-

ent offer her immediate and full reinstatement to her

former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a sub-

stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her

seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her

whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by

23N_.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F. 2d 725, 726

(C.A. 2); Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R.B., supra,

304; N.L.R.B. v. Historic Smithville, Inc., 414 F. 2d 1358, 1361

(C. A. 3).

, a eval BRITA NST 7 Poe

reason of the discrimination against her by payment to

her of a sum of money equal to that which she normally

would have earned from April 7, 1971, the date of her

discharge, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less

her net earnings during the said period. Backpay shall

he computed with interest on a quarterly basis in the

manner prescribed by the Board in I’. W. Woolworth

Company, 90 N.L.R.B. 289-294, and Jsis Plumbing &

Heating Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 716. To facilitate the compu-

tation, as well as to clarify the named employee's rights

to reinstatement, the Respondent shall make available

to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records

necessary and appropriate for such purposes. The post-

ing of a notice is also recommended.

In view of the nature of the discrimination for union

membership and activity which “goes to the very heart

of the Act,’** there exists the danger of the commission

by the Respondent of other unfair labor practices pro-

scribed by the Act. Accordingly, I recommend that the

Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any

other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed em-

ployees in Section 7 of the Act.*°

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and

upon the entire record in the case, T make the following:

31

Concivsions or Law

1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the

meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-

ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.

*N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C.A.

4).

*N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426,

433.

peewee SLT PIE NG ABR EINER ELI Wash PNR EILEEN AEN iS RR MT Deen te ee Su oe RE WIRE IO EU Ri ie

BEAL A

Fiat Fast tt

Fe GES Fat eat

DS cet Ate at Ke

32

3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure

of employment of Rosemary Stamm to discourage mem-

bership in, and activities on behalf of, the Union, the

Respondent has engaged, and is engaging in, unfair labor

practices within the meaning of Section S(a)(3) of the

Act.

+. By the foregoing conduct, the Respondent inter-

fered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exer-

cise of their statutory rights within the meaning of

Section S(a)(1) of the Act.

5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-

merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of

the Act.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(e) of

the Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recom-

mended :*°

ORDER

The Respondent, S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., Shil-

lington, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors and

assigns shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discouraging membership in Retail Clerks, Em-

ployees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks International

Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,

by discharging employees or discriminating against them

26In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section

102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Rela-

tions Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order

herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Reg-

ulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, con-

clusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed

waived for all purposes.

in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure

of employment or any term or condition of employment.

33

(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,

or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to

self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join

or assist the above-named Union or any other labor

organization, to bargain collectively through represent-

atives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or

other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any

and all such activities except to the extent that such

right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-

bership in a labor organization as a condition of em-

ployment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-

sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Offer Rosemary Stamm immediate and full rein-

statement to her former job, and if that job no longer

exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without

prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,

and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may

have suffered by reason of the discrimination against

her in the manner set forth in the section of this De-

cision entitled “The Remedy.”

(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the

Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all

payroll records, social security payment records, time-

ecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records

necessary or useful in analyzing the amount of backpay

due and the right to reinstatement and employment under

the terms of this recommended Order.

ite

34

(c) Post at its store in Shillington, Pennsylvania, the

attached notice marked “Appendix.’”** Copies of said

notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for

Region 4, after being duly signed by the Respondent's

authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-

spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-

tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in con-

spicuous places, including all places where notices to

employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps

shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material.

(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4 in

writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,

what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-

with.

Dated at Washington, D. C., November 8, 1971.

/s/ PAUL BISGYER

PAUL BISGYER

Trial Examiner

"In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judg-

ment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the no-

tice reading “Posted By Order Of The National Labor Relations

Board”’ shall be changed to read ‘‘Posted Pursuant To A Judg-

ment Of The United States Court Of Appeals Enforeing An

Order Of The National Labor Relations Board.”

*SIn the event that this recommended Order is adopted by

the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be

modified to read: ‘‘Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in

writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps

the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.”

,

Appendix.

35

Form NLRB-4727

(9-69)

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government

The Act gives all employees the following rights:

To organize themselves.

To form, join or support unions.

To bargain as a group through a representative

they chose.

To act together for collective bargaining or

other mutual aid or protection.

We Witt Nor discharge or layoff any employee or

otherwise discriminate against him or her because of his

or her membership in, or activities on behalf of, Retail

Clerks, Employees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks Inter-

national Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organ-

ization.

We Wit Nor in any other manner interfere with, re-

strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right

to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join

or assist the above-named Union or any other labor or-

ganization, to bargain collectively through representa-

36

tives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted ae-

tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all

such activities except to the extent that such right may

he affected by an agreement requiring membership in a

labor organization as a condition of employment as au-

thorized by Section S(a) (5) of the Act.

We Wut offer Rosemary Stamm immediate and full

reinstatement to her former job, or if that job no longer

exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without

prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,

and make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered

hy reason of the discrimination against her.

All our employees are free to become, remain, or re-

frain from becoming or remaining, members of Retail

Clerks, Employees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks

International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor

organization, except to the extent that such right may

he affected by an agreement requiring membership in a

labor organization as a condition of employment as au-

thorized by Section S(a) (3) of the Act.

S. E. NICHOLS SHILLINGTON CORP.

(Employer)

Date

By

(Representative) (Title)

37

Tuis is AN OrriciaL Notice anp Must Nort Be DeFracep

by ANYONE

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive

days from the date of posting and must not be altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material. Any ques-

tions concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-

visions may be directed to the Board’s Office, 1700 Bank-

ers Securities Building, Walnut & Juniper Sts. Phila-

delphia, Pa. (Tel. No. 215-597-7601).

{Issued December 7, 1971]

OrperR

On November 8, 1971, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer

of the National Labor Relations Board issued his Deci-

sion in the above-entitled proceeding and, on the same

date, the case was transferred to and continued before

the Board in Washington, D. C. The Trial Examiner

found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-

fair labor practices, and recommended that it take spe-

cifie action to remedy such unfair labor practices.

No statement of exceptions having been filed with the

Board, and the time allowed for such filing having ex-

pired,

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-

lations Act, as amended, and Section 102.48 of the Na-

tional Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations,

Series 8, as amended, the Board hereby adopts the find-

ings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner as contained

in his Decision, and orders that the Respondent, S. FE.

Nichols Shillington Corp., its officers, agents, successors,

38

and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial

Kixaminer’s recommended Order.

Dated, Washington, D. C., December 7, 1971.

By direction of the Board:

/s/ GEORGE A. LEET

GEORGE A. LEET

Associate Executive Secretary

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board · 414 U.S. 860 | Frix