Petition for Writ of Certiorari — J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

- ccewaveme erouststi st, W. &.-

MAY 7 IE

MICHAEL RIBA;

IN THE samme ent

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

we 72-1501

J. H. RUTTER REX MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

INC.

Petitioner

versus

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Henry J. Read and

Daniel Lund

806 First National Bank

of Commerce Building,

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Counsel for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read

806 First National Bank of Commerce Building

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

INDEX

Page

Opinions below 1

Jurisdiction 2

Questions presented for review 2

Authority and Statutes involved 2

Statement of the case 3

Reasons for granting the writ 6

Conclusion 13

Certificate 14

Appendices 15

Appendix A., Opinion of the Fifth Circuit 1-A

Appendix B., Judgment of the Fifth Circuit 46-A

Appendix C., Order denying rehearing: en banc 49-A

Appendix D., Decisions and orders of the Board and

Trial Examiner eatecssece ee

Appendix E., Opinion in NLRB vy. J. H. Rutter Rex

Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969) 74-A

CITATIONS

Cases: Page

Consumers Union of U.S. v. Veterans Administration,

301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 11

Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, 18 NLRB 591

(1939) 6

Florence Printing Company v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216

‘4th Cir. 1967) 9

G.S.A. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969) 11

General Engineering Ins. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367

‘9th Cir. 1965) 9

Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 11

Heinrich Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 145 (2nd

Cir, 1968) 9

Hickman y. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385

(1947) 2,7,8

J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Company, Ine., 115

NLRB 383 (1956) 3

J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Company, Ine. vy.

NLRB, 399 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1968) 3

Morgan Precision Parts v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 1210 (5th

Cir. 1971) 9

NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) 7,12

I]

CITATIONS (Continued)

Cases: Page

NLRB vy. Capitol Fish Company, 294 F.2d 868 (5th

Cir. 1961) 9,10, 11

NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, Inc., 315

U.S. 685 (1942) 6

NLRB vy. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854

i2nd Cir. 1970) ‘cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915) a)

NLRB vy. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Company,

Inc. 245 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1957) 3

NLRB vy. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co., 305

F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1962) 3

NLRB vy. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co., 396

U.S. 258 11969) 2, 4, 6

NLRB y. Seine and Line Fishermen’s Union of San

Pedro, 374 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1967) i)

Southern Railway Company vy. Campbell, 309) F.2d

569 (5th Cir. 1962) S

Southern Railway Company v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119

(5th Cir. 1968) S

Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Ad-

min., 464 F.2d 657 16th Cir. 1972) 11

U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Company, 356 U.S. 677

(195s) a)

Ii]

CITATIONS (Continued)

Cases: Page

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474

RISERS... SUR . 12

STATUTES

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, as amended

(61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 USC $15l et seq). 2

ss ss etcetera

UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE:

28 USC $1254(1) - 2

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:

5S USC sean) 6) 7)... 0

OTHER

NLRB Rules and Regulations:

ct y 2) 45) Ss

IV

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

No.

J. H. RUTTER REX MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

INC.

Petitioner

versus

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Company, Inc., peti-

tions for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which

enforced, in part, an order of the National Labor Relations

Board.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Appendix A, pages

1A-45A infra) is reported 473 F.2d 223, 82 LRRM 2264

(5th Cir. 1973). The Board’s supplemental decision and

order are reported at 194 NLRB No. 6 (1971) (Appendix

D, pages 50A-73A infra).

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

125411), The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on February 7, 1973. ‘Appendix B, p. 46A infra'. On

March 12, 1973, the court of appeals denied « timely peti-

tion for rehearing en bane filed by J. H. Rutter Rex Manu-

facturing Company, Ine. (Appendix C, p. 49A, infra,

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether, in the light of this Court’s opinion in

NLRB vv. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S.

258 11969) (Appendix E, pages T4A-85A, infras the court

of appeals erred in enforcing the backpay order of the

Board without mitigation on the basis of the Board's

further delay in presenting the backpay claims.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in extending the

lawyer's work product exemption from discovery of Hick-

man vy, Taylor, 329 U.S, 495 11947) to create a new priv-

ilege applicable to the work product of non-lawyer Board

personnel.

AUTHORITY AND STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves interpretation of this Court’s opinion

in NLRB v, J. H. Rutter Rev Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S.

258 11969) and application of 29 U.S.C. §160tb) (National

Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat.

O19, 29 U.S.C. $151 et seq) the pertinent provision of

which states,

“tbe... Any such | Board! proceeding shall, so

far as practicable, be conducted in accordance

With the rules of evidence applicable in the dis-

trict courts of the United States under the rules of

civil procedure for the district courts of the United

States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the

United States...” (Brackets added).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of a strike which occurred at peti-

tioner’s New Orleans, Louisiana plant in April, 1954 and

lasted one year, In 1956, the Board concluded that the

strike was an unfair labor practice strike and ordered

reinstatement of the strikers. J. H. Rutter Rew Manituc-

turing Company, Ine. 115 NLRB 383 11956). The Board's

order was enforced by the Fifth Circuit on June 10, 1957.

The Court stated that the numerous problems inherent in

complying with the Board order should be resolved “in

further administrative proceedings .. . or in direct con-

tempt proceedings.” NLRB, J. H. Rutter Ree Manu-

*

facturing Compan, Tive., 245 F.2d 504, NOS ioth Chr, May oF

Nearly four years Tater on November 4, 1961, the Board

filed a backpay specification ‘referred to herein as the

initial specification! Petitioner sought an injunction

against the hearings on the initial specification due to the

unreasonable delay of the Board in handling the case. In-

junctive relief wes denied. NLRB cv. J. H. Rutter Ree

Munvfocturing Co, 305 F.2d 2420 th Cir, 1962). After

hearings in 1962 and 1965, an initial backpay order was

issued by the Board. |158 NLRB 1414 (1966) |.

On review of the initial proceedings, the Fifth Circuit

modified the initial backpay order by terminating petition-

er's backpay liability as of July 50, 1950 because of the

Board’s inordinate delay in concluding the case. The court

held that this cutoff reflected a proper balancing of the

equities between all parties. J. H. Rutter Ree Manutactir-

ing Company, Ine. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356 (th Cir, 196s),

4

On writ of certiorari, this Court' reversed in an opinion

expressly limited to “. . . the circumstances of this case.”

NLRB v. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co., 396 U.S.

258, 259 (1969). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas

and Harlan dissented, believing that the circuit court had

properly approached the case as a problem in “. . . working

out the equities of a back-pay order” and that the circuit

court had “. . . arrived at its judgment as an exercise of its

responsibility ‘for assuring that the Board keeps within

reasonable bounds’ . . . in an area that necessarily in-

volves ‘diverse, complicated situations.’” (396 U.S. at p.

267-8) (p. 85A, infra).

The initial backpay specification did not consider any

claims beyond June 26, 1961. The instant proceeding was

initiated on November 30, 1970 by the filing of a supple-

mental backpay specification claiming additional backpay

owed to thirty-three claimants for the period July 1, 1961

through May, 1963 with six claims extending beyond the

latter date. This filing was more than 15 years after

termination of the strike, more than 13 years after the

1957 enforcing opinion of the circuit court and more than

nine years after the initial specification was filed.

During the 1971 hearings before the Board on the

supplemental specification, petitioner contended that the

additional Board delay between 1961 and 1970 should be

taken into account in fashioning a supplemental backpay

order. The Board’s Trial Examiner rejected this argument

stating that this Court’s 1969 opinion had answered the

argument adversely. (p. 68A, infra). The Board affirmed

without comment, (p. 52A, infra’. The circuit court held

that “. . . the Board was correct in refusing to allow the

1At the time, the court was composed of the Chief Justice and

seven Justices.

5

administrative delay to prejudice the claimants.” (p. 6A,

infra); and further, that to do so would be “. . - both

unjust and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s deci-

sion...” (p. 8A, infra).

Also in connection with the hearing, petitioner obtained

a subpoena duces tecum directed first to the Board’s

Regional Director (R21) and later to the Board’s General

Counsel (R25) requiring production of notes and memo-

randa made by Board agents during interviews with the

thirty-three claimants named in the supplemental backpay

specification. These memoranda were prepared by non-

lawyer compliance officers and were referred by them in

the preparation of the backpay specification. The notes and

memoranda_ included factual information bearing upon

credibility of witnesses and relevant to the issues which

had to be developed if petitioner was to defend itself against

the gross amounts of backpay claimed."

The comprehensive manner in which petitioner’s request

for documents Was pressed is outlined in the footnote.’

2» This and all “R” references are to the joint appendix filed in the

circuit court which document, consisting of two volumes, is being

certified and transmitted to this Court as the record in accordance

with Supreme Court Rule 21¢2).

3 The initial specification sought $342,000.00 but the ultimate liability

imposed was $119,790.00, Thus, the inflation in the initial specification

amounted to 64.7%. In the instant case, $54.551.000 Was sought and

$53,078.00) was awarded by the Board. (p. S7A. infra). Except for a

single claim amounting to $9,592.00 which was remanded by the court

of appeals, all awards, essentially unmitigated, were enforced. The

remanded claim is not made a subject of this application.

4a) Subpoena duces tecum te Regional director dated February 5.

1971. ¢R21).

b) Subpoena duces tecum to counsel for General Counsel dated March

23, 1971 (R25).

«) Letter to General Counsel dated Mareh 10, 1971 (R42).

d) Letter to counsel for the General Counsel dated March 10, 1971

(R54).

e) Oral requests, e.. R232-2438.

f) Motion to dismiss (R46; S59-875).

g) Exception, ¢ RS5).

Although the Trial Examiner ordered compliance with the subpoenas

(R772-775) he was reversed by the Board on a special interim appeal.

(R28;30). Letter requests were also denied. (R380)

6

The General Counsel refused to produce the notes and

memoranda of the Board’s lay personnel, claiming privilege,

and the court of appeal ultimately agreed that the work

product of the Board’s lay personnel was protected in a

trial proceeding by a “qualified privilege.”

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

POINT I

Although the Board and the court of appeals purported

to consider the impact of the Board’s further delay on

the rights of the parties the decision of both is that this

Court's 1969 opinion in NLRB v. J. H. Rutter Rex Man-

utacturing Co., supra, foreclosed the issue.

Such construction of this Court's 1969 decision is errone-

ous and has resulted in the failure of the Beard and the

court to apportion the prejudicial effects of the delay be-

tween the parties. This Court limited its 1969 opinion to

the circumstances then presented, to wit: the aiministrative

delay preceding the filing of the initial backpay specifica-

tion. This Court did not anticipate nor dispose of in ad-

vance the delay issue related to the supplemental backpay

specification.

In its 1969 opinion, this Court cited NLRB rv. Electric

Vacuum Cleaner Company, Ine., 315 U.S. 685 (1942), a

case in which the Court refused further to shorten a back-

pay period which had already been shortened by the Board

because of its administrative delay. See Electric Vacuum

Cleaner Company, 18 NLRB 591, 636-637 (1939). Electric

Vacuum Cleaner establishes the right of the Board to ex-

clude a portion of the backpay period if the Board has

unreasonably delayed the proceedings.

7

This Court’s 1969 opinion dealt solely with the power

of the reviewing court to modify a Board order — not

with the power of the Board to consider its own delay

in drafting its remedial order. The error of the Board

lies in its belief that this Court’s 1969 opinion precluded

it from considering the further delay. The court of appeals

erred in not requiring the Board to make findings on the

delay issue and to consider the interests of the employer

who was prejudiced by the delay. See NLRB v. Brown, 350

US. 278, 291-292 (1965).

POINT Il

The effect of the court of appeals decision is to create

a new evidentiary privilege precluding the production of

factual material.” The court did not rely upon any judicially

recognized privilege or statutory exemption from dis-

closure.

re?

In its petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum (R25

the Board’s General Counsel contended that the notes and

memoranda of the Board's lay personnel which he refused

to produce were the privileged “work product” of the

Joard’s “agents” citing Hichkinaw ©. Taylor 329 U.S. 495.

67 S. Ct. B85 1947). and in its brief to the court of

appeals at page 16, the Board stated, “. . . the materiais

sought. which included notes and other memoranda made

by Board agents in preparation of the case, are the ‘work

product’ of such agents. H ickman ¢. Taylor...”

In upholding this contention, the court of appeals has

> Whether or not a claimant looked for work during a given period,

the names of employers and potential employers. dates of employment,

dates of job applications, dollar amounts of interim earnings. if

any. and reasons for lack of interim earnings. the information soeusht

by the subpoenas, is hard factual information. The non-lawyer compli-

ance officers questioned the elaimanis on these matters q¢R229-232:

244-249) and used the information elicited from them to prepare the

supplemental specification. (See e.s. footnote 10 of the supplemental

specification at RV).

PPTL EOE AARP: :

T,

Pt a he (eae a

8

improperly extended the “work product” exemption from

discovery of Hickman v. Taylor, to a non-lawyer in a trial

proceeding. Hickman v. Taylor, was decided on the basis

of the public policy that a lawyer, in performing his duties

to the court and to his client, must be able to work with a

degree of privacy, free from unnecessary instrusion. (329

U.S. at p. 510). See U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Company,

356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). The Fifth Circuit has previously

held that Hickman v. Taylor, does not extend to non-

lawyers. Southern Railway Company v. Lanham, 403 F.2d

119 (5th Cir. 1968); Southern Railway Company v.

Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962). Clearly, the same

policy considerations do not prevail when the documents in-

volved are those of a non-lawyer.

The court of appeals purported to qualify the privilege

so that it might give way to disclosure in certain circum-

stances where a balancing of the interests of the litigants

required it. (see p.21A and p.39A, infra’. However, the

court reasoned from an illogical premise. While it stated

that the privilege might give way when the need for pro-

duction outweighs the rationale for the privilege (p. 39A,

infra’ it also held, “Absent some showing of manifest

injustice, the Board behavior must stand or fall on the

existence vel non of that privilege and not on what this

court perceives to be the fairest way for the Board to run

its proceedings.” (p. 11A, infra)

Furthermore, in qualifying the privilege, the court of

appeal created a non-rule to be applied on an ad hoc basis

depending upon “. . . who is investigating, what is being

investigated, and the nature and content of the information

sought to be discovered from the investigator.” (p. 21A,

infra! There is, therefore, no standard for the application

9

of this new privilege even if it can be considered “qualified”

in view of the court’s basic premise. (p. 114, infra)

The problems created by the lower court’s decision in its

application in future cases can not be minimized by pretrial

discovery. Although the Government, as a litigant, is gen-

erally considered subject to the rules of discovery, U.S. v.

Proctor & Gamble Company, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958),

there is no pretrial discovery in National Labor Relations

Board proceedings. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors,

Inc., 432 F. 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970) (cert. den., 402 US.

915); see also, Morgan Precision Parts v. NLRB, 444 F. 2d

1210 (5th Cir. 1971).

The court of appeals opinion is also in direct conflict

with the decision in General Engineering Inc. v. NLRB,

341 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1965) and with an earlier decision

of the Fifth Circuit by a different panel in NLRB v.

Capitol Fish Company, 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).

General Engineering was a backpay proceeding. Compari-

son of the subpoenas issued in the instant case to that

issued in General Engineering and quoted at footnote 1 of

341 F.2d 367, reveal that the subpoenas sought identical

information. Against a claim of privilege, the Ninth Circuit

held that the subpoena duces tecum should not have been

quashed by the Board."

6 The Ninth Circuit described the privilege claimed in General En-

gineering as one claimed under Board Rule 102.118 «29 CFR g102.118),

also relied upon in the instant case (R22), which rule insulates from

disclosure all information which comes to a Board employee in the

course of his official duties. This was the same type of privilege

urged below in the instant case.

See also, NLRB r. Seine and Line Fishermen's Union of San Pedro,

374 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1967); Florence Printing Company vt. NLRB,

375 F.2d 216, 223 (4th Cir. 1967); Heinrich Motors, Inc. vt. NLRB,

403 F.2d 145, 150 (2nd Cir. 1968) where the Court held, “The law

recognizes no general privilege between a dischargea employee and

a Board Compliance officer and the board has no power to create such

a privilege.”

De MT RNa eT Lee Tate

TPR GFT er = |

10

The court of appeals erroneously distinguished Capitol

Fish on the grounds that it did not involve the issue of

privilege. (p. 8A, infra’.? To the contrary, Judge Wisdom

stated in Capitol Fish.

“In the final analysis. justification for excluding

government records rests on privilege.” (294 F.2d

at p. S74)

and,

“It seems to us, however, that when a party has

filed a request for evidence or testimony and the

request can be denied only if the evidence or testi-

mony is privileged, the question of privilege is as

squarely raised by an unexplained refusal to reply

as Ly an express claim of privilege and the court

must decide the question.” (294 F.2d at p. 9755,

It is apparent that the identical issue was presented in

the instant case but it was decided differently.

The effect of the court's decision on the ability of future

respondents to defend themselves before the Board is likely

to be substantial and harmful. This case represents not only

a departure from the jurisprudence on the subject of

privilege, but also a departure by the Board from. the

manner in which it customarily handles its cases by taking

statements producible under the “Jencks Rule” embodied

in the proviso to Board Rule 102.118, 29 CFR $102.118

(R236-242).

‘Capitol Fish involved a request that a Board attorney testify in a

Board proceeding concerning an investigation which would have had

an important bearing on the credibility of the witnesses who testified

against the employer. «See 294 F.2d at p. STO-ST1). The Court. held.

“We hold that the investigating attorney's testimony was material.

Was not privileged, and was erroneously excluded . 2.” (294 F.2d at

p. S76).

11

Respondents before the Board are in a peculiar pro-

cedural position because of the lack of pretrial discovery

coupled with the disadvantage of litigating in a proceeding

in which the Board is investigator, accusor, prosecutor,

judge and reviewing tribunal. (‘See NLRB v. Capitol Fish

Company, 294 F.2d at p. 876). In backpay cases, the only

tool of successful defense is frequently the claimant’s state-

ment used for purposes of cross examination.

To the end of depriving respondents of this defense

tool and placing an intolerable defense burden upon them,

it may be to the Board’s interest to investigate cases with-

out any documention producible under its rules. Thus, the

probable effect of this decision, if allowed to stand, will

be to encourage general non-disclosure rather than merely

to serve a legitimate need of reasonable privacy in the

fulfillment of the Board’s statutory duties."

Curbing this attitude on the part of Board agents will

promote fairness in Board proceedings and compliance

with the statutory mandate that such proceedings be con-

ducted, so far as practicable, in accordance with the rules

of evidence and procedure applicable in the district courts.

(29 U.S.C. $160¢b) |.

Reversal of this decision will not impair the Board

function because prior to this case the Board customarily

collected formal statements from claimants. It has been

held that ‘“‘No special characteristics of an administrative

“In this regard, 5 U.S.C. $552 0b) (>) and (7) afford protection

to the Board against disclosure of certain investigative and law

enforcement files but not with respect to information which is “avail-

able by law to a party” as determined by reference to discovery

practices regulated by the courts. Ct. Tennessean Nerspapers, Ine.

Federal Housing Admin., 494 F.2d 657 ¢6th Cir, 172): GSA. 7. Renson,.

$15 F.2d S78 ¢9th Cir. 1999: Consumers Union of U.S. vr. Veterans

Admin., 301 F.Supp. 796 (SDNY. 1969): See also, Getman vr. NLR.

$30 F.2d 670 «dc. Cir isTio.

“ETP GRE PRE” ]

slab aR gram re TEES

igi

z

12

hearing justify the exclusion of evidence which it would

be error to exclude in a court trial... .” NLRB v. Capitol

Fish Company, supra (294 F.2d at p. 872); furthermore,

this Court has enjoined the circuit courts to assure that

the Board keeps within “reasonable bounds”. Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see NLRB

v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).

The departure of the Board in this case from its cus-

tomary procedures prompted the Trial Examiner to state,

“The reason for the Jencks rule, in the opinion of

the Trial Examiner, is to keep the Government

servants honest and to bring about the circum-

stance in which no citizen or person may be

found guilty of a statutory offense, when the

government has in its possession [sic] which

would indicate that citizen or person not guilty

of such an offense. It, no doubt, shocks our

sense of fair play where the government may

have evidence to prove that an individual is not

guilty of an offense and withholds that and the

individual is found guilty of the offense. I think

the intent of all rules of this character must be

circumscribed by the fact that no person be ever

found guilty of any statutory offense where the

government had possession of facts and evidence

and testimony and documents which would in-

dicate that that person was not guilty of the of-

fense.” (R773-774)

The court of appeals holding is unauthorized by statute

and is in conflict with prior decisions of the Fifth and

Ninth Circuits. Furthermore, the newly created privilege

is so substantial a departure from the accepted and usual

rules of conduct for judicial proceedings, applicable to

Board proceedings, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s

13

power of supervision in an important area of federal labor

jaw not heretofore settled by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Henry J . Read

Daniel Lund

806 First National Bank of Commerce

Building

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Counsel for Petitioner,

J. H. Rutter Rex Manufacturing

Company, Inc.

Of Counsel:

MONTGOMERY, BARNETT, BROWN & READ

TARAIOR Y

14

CERTIFICATE

It is certified that three copies of the foregoing petition

for a writ of certiorari have been served by mail, by de-

positing same in a United States mail box, first class air-

mail postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Solicitor General

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C, 20530

Honorable Peter G. Nash

General Counsel

National Labor Relations Board

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20570

Jackson & Hess

Attn: Ralph N. Jackson

1411 Decatur Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70116

New Orleans, Louisiana, May 4, 1975.