Appendix — Top Vision Cable Co. v. City of Owensboro
Supreme Court brief1973
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Civil Action No. 2519
Top Viston Caste, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation - Plaintiff
Vv.
Ciry or Owenssoro, Kentucky, a Municipal
Corporation of the Second Class, and
Irvin Terri, Mayor,
Wairman C. Taytor, Commissioner,
Joun D. Minter, Commissioner,
Joun C. Fisuer, Commissioner,
Auton Puckett, Commissioner - - ~- Defendants
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1. This is an action for declaratory judgment as au-
thorized by Section 2201 of Title 28 of the United States
Code, and is brought because there is an actual controversy
now existing between the parties of the above-entitled ac-
tion, as to which the Plaintiff seeks the judgment of this
Court.
2. The action arises under the Constitution of the
United States, Article I, Section 8, Clause III, as herein-
after more fully appears. The matter in controversy ex-
ceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of ten thou-
sand dollars.
3. Plaintiff is a corporation organized wnder the laws
of the State of Kentucky. Plaintiff is engaged in provid-
ing community antenna television service (CATV) to the
public within the corporate limits of the City of Owensboro.
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In brief, Plaintiff’s business may be described as follows:
Signals of nearby and distant television broadcast stations
are received off the air by means of a master antenna
advantageously located to obtain maximum signal strength
and quality. These signals are relayed by means of coaxial
cable lines attached to utility poles through amplification
equipment to the residences of subscribing members of the
public for a fee. The cable is terminated in the home where
a connection is made to the subscriber’s privately owned
television receiver. The subscriber is thus enabled to re-
ceive television broadcasts which would not otherwise be
available or which would be received with lesser quality.
4. Defendant City of Owensboro is a municipal cor-
poration of the State of Kentucky, and Defendants Irvin
Terrill, Waitman C. Taylor, John D. Miller, John C. Fisher
and Alton Puckett are the members of the Board of Com-
missioners, the governing body of the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky.
5. On or about October 22, 1965, the Defendant City of
Owensboro, by and through its Board of Commissioners,
enacted Ordinance Number 63-65, authorizing the adver-
tisement and sale of a CATV franchise within the City of
Owensboro. A certified copy of said Ordinance is annexed
to this Complaint and is marked “Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1”,
and made a part hereof.
6. On or about December 17, 1965, the Defendant City
of Owensboro, by and through its Board of Commissioners,
adopted Resolution No. 36-65 confirming the sale of the
CATV franchise to Plaintiff and granted a CATV franchise
to the Plaintiff by way of a “Franchise Agreement”, (here-
inafter Agreement), described more particularly in and
comprising Section 3 of Defendants’ Ordinance No. 63-65,
referred to hereinabove. Under the terms of the Agree-
ment, Plaintiff must pay to the Defendant an annual gross
receipts tax equal to twenty-six percent (26%) of the gross
income received by the Plaintiff from all receipts derived
ao
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within the City of Owensboro from its CATV system. Cer-
tified copies of said resolution and said “Franchise Agree-
ment” are annexed to this Complaint marked “Plaintiff’s
Exhibit No. 2” and “Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3”, respectively,
and made a part hereof.
7. By the terms of the Agreement the Plaintiff’s oper-
ations must be in accordance with the laws of the United
States of America (paragraphs 1 and 7).
8. On March 26, 1970, in the consolidated cases of
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, Wonder-
land Ventures, Inc. v. City of Fremont (hereinafter Won-
derland) (not yet reported), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a controlling case in this
jurisdiction struck down the ordinances enacted by the De-
fendants. These ordinances attempted to impose a gross
receipts tax on the respective CATV systems there in-
volved. As in the instant case, the Fremont ordinance re-
quired each CATV applicant to submit a bid based upon a
percentage of gross receipts to be paid to the City for units
of 1,000 or more subscribers. The ordinance enacted by
the City of Fremont imposed precisely the same kind of
gross receipts tax as has been imposed by the Defendant
upon the Plaintiff. However, the tax therein involved was
only 3% of the gross receipts of the CATV system. The
Wonderland decision is, therefore, most relevant in its ap-
plication to the instant case. A true copy of the opinion of
the Court in this case is annexed to this Complaint ard is
marked “Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 4” and is made a part
hereof.
9. In Wonderland, the Court of Appeals held the or-
dinances of both Sandusky and Fremont invalid, inter alia,
“ because they impose a gross receipts tax upon the
proceeds of interstate commerce in violation of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution of the United States” (at
page 5).
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10. On or about May 23, 1970, representatives of the
Plaintiff appeared before a meeting of the Board of Com-
missioners of the Defendant City of Owensboro and re-
quested that Section 3 of the Agreement providing for a
26% gross receipts tax be renegotiated; Plaintiff's request
was founded upon its experience in operating the Owens-
boro system. Plaintiff explained that the 26% gross re-
ceipts tax payments to the city made it most difficult for
the Plaintiff to make its CATV system at Owensboro eco-
nomically viable. Moreover, Plaintiff stated its view that
should it be required to continue remitting said tax, it would
necessarily impair the quality of CATV service which the
Plaintiff would be capable of providing. In Section 3,
Paragraph II of the Owensboro Ordinance (Paragraph II
of the Agreement), any impairment in the quality of serv-
ice conceivably could work a forfeit of the Plaintiff’s legal
right to the franchise, and all rights inhering therein. It
was further stated that it was the considered opinion of
Plaintiff that Wonderland invalidated the gross receipts
tax imposed on the Plaintiff by the Defendant, City of
Owensboro.
11. Defendant, City of Owensboro, through its Board
of Commissioners has stated its refusal to renegotiate the
tax.
12. Therefore, even though the constitutional validity
of the 26% gross receipts tax imposed upon Plaintiff’s op-
eration is in substantial doubt, efforts to seek a judicial
determination by means other than through declaratory
judgment places Plaintiff in extreme jeopardy in the fol-
lowing ways:
(a) Defendant City of Owensboro, through its Board
of Commissioners has indicated its intention to treat the
entire franchise as void should Plaintiff fail to remit
the said 26% tax or if it be declared invalid. This means
_ —
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that Plaintiff would lose its business and most likely the
$430,000.00 it has invested thus far in attempting in
good faith to provide CATV service to Owensboro.
(b) On information and belief, if the 26% tax is de-
elared invalid and if the provisions relating thereto were
determined by the Court to be severable from the re-
mainder of the Franchise, certain reprisals would never-
theless be taken by Defendants against Plaintiff. Plain-
tiff must complete construction of the entire system by
December 20, 1970, unless a further extension of time
within which to complete construction is granted by De-
fendant. The Plaintiff on information and belief ex-
pects that the Defendants would not permit any addi-
tional extensions of time within which to complete the
construction of the entire system, thus rendering all of
Plaintiff's right forfeited. The inequity of this situation
and Plaintiff's dilemma will be apparent to this Court
sinee in large part it is the existence of the 26% tax
which not only makes existing operation most difficult
but has rendered it virtually impossible to attract the
additional capital necessary to complete construction of
the system. Plaintiff may not decline to pay the tax nor
may it litigate the lawfulness of the tax without loss of
its franchise and most if not all of its investment in the
CATV system.
13. Therefore, absent the availability of a declaratory
judgment procedure and injunctive relief, Plaintiff is ef-
fectively foreclosed from seeking judicial review to amelio-
rate the deleterious effects of the burdensome 26% gross
receipts tax in view of Defendants’ position which threatens
Plaintiff with economic extinction, and is foreclosed from
seeking a judicial determination of the lawfulness under the
Constitution of the United States of said tax.
14. Plaintiff is willing to pay a lawful and reasonable
fee to the Defendant to defray costs which Defendant may
i.
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incur relative to the use of the rights of way by Defendant
and the privileges granted in the Agreement, and in regu-
lating the operations of Plaintiff. Plaintiff believes a fee
so determined to be lawful.
Wuenrerore, Plaintiff prays:
1. Judgment of this Court whether or not Section 3,
Paragraph 2 of Defendant’s Ordinance 63-65, referred to
previously and incorporated and made a part herein, is
constitutional under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitutiton of the United States.
2. Should said Section 3, Paragraph 2 of Ordinance 63-
65 be determined unconstitutional, and the payment of the
gross receipts tax imposed therein is thereby judged con-
trary to law, judgment of this Court whether or not such
Section 3, Paragraph 2 is severable from the remainder of
Ordinance 63-65, thereby presefving said remainder’s va-
lidity.
3. Should said Section 3, Paragraph 2 of Ordinance 63-
65 be determined unconstitutional, and the payment of the
gross receipts tax imposed therein is thereby judged con-
trary to law, and that such Section 3, Paragraph 2 is not
severable from the remainder of Ordinance 63-65, that this
Court determine a lawful fee to be paid Defendant by Plain-
tiff consistent with Article I, Section 8, Clause III of the
Constitution of the United States.
4. Should said Section 3, Paragraph 2 be determined
to be so severable, that the Defendant City of Owensboro
and all officers thereof and their successors be restrained
from treating the remaining valid part of said Ordinance
as null and void and of no legal effect; from preventing or
attempting to prevent Plaintiff from operating its proposed
CATV system for the purpose of providing service to the
citizens of Owensboro by withdrawing said franchise, or
_——
otherwise taking reprisals against Plaintiff as a result of
its seeking this judicial determination.
McKinley and Howard
By (s) Joseph H. McKinley
100 St. Ann Building
Owensboro, Kentucky
EK. Stratford Smith
Smith, Pepper, Shack & L’Heureux
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Exhibits attached to this complaint are omitted.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER—Entered Nov. 23, 1970
In October, 1965, the Board of Commissioners of the
City of Owensboro, Kentucky, enacted Ordinance No. 63-65
empowering the City Manager of Owensboro to advertise
and sell “a franchise authorizing the purchaser thereof to
use the public ways, streets, highways, bridges or public
places of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, for the purpose
of supplying community antenna television and audio tele-
vision and radio signals to the public”. Consideration for
the franchise was to be a sum equal to the cost of adver-
tising and selling the franchise, plus a percentage of the
purchaser’s gross income derived from within the City of
Owensboro. Plaintiff, a Kentuckv Corporation, obtained
the franchise with a bid of 26% of its gross income. The
original contract between the parties called for substantial
completion of the CATV system within two years. How-
ever, on written application of plaintiff, the City extended
the completion date to December 20, 1970.
Early in 1970 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that two ordinances substantially similar to the
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Owensboro Ordinance were unconstitutional because they
imposed a gross receipts tax upon proceeds from interstate
commerce. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky,
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 423 F. 2d
548 (6th Cir. 1970). Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action
in this Court seeking a declaration that Ordinance 63-65 is
unconstitutional and a determination of the rights and lia-
bilities of the parties under the 1965 agreement.
On November 6, 1970, the Board of Commissioners of
the City of Owensboro approved Resolution No. 56-70
wherein it was conceded that the provision of Ordinance
No. 63-65 calling for payment to the City of a certain per-
centage of the franchise purchaser’s gross income “is in-
valid and unenforceable under Article I, Section 8, Clause
III of the Constitution of the United States”. Defendants
have now filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the ground that
there is no disagreement between the parties regarding the
only federal question raised by the complaint. In its re-
sponse to the motion to dismiss plaintiff urges us to declare
Ordinance No. 63-65 unconstitutional and to reach the ques-
tions of Kentucky law under the theory of pendent juris-
diction.
Section 2201 of Title 28, United States Code, requires
that in every suit for a declaratory judgment an actual
controversy exist between the parties. In this section the
term “controversy” is used in its constitutional sense. U. S.
Const. Art. III, §2, cl. 1; Public Service Commission of
Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U. S. 237 (1952); Muller v.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 404 F. 2d 501 (2nd Cir.
1968). It is hornbook law that a federal court has no power
to hear claims that do not satisfy the “case or controversy”
requirement of the Constitution. United Public Workers
of America (C.1.0.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947) ; Musk-
rat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911). If for any
eat EORRE CRATE PAO METER Cae ee a a ee ea oer she _ argent s ~ say
—_—_
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reason a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear the only
federal claim before it, absent diversity of citizenship it
cannot reach other questions of state law raised by the com-
plaint. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966) ; California Water Service Co. v. Redding,
304 U. S. 252 (1938).
Questions regarding the “case or controversy” require-
ment most commonly arise when the facts indicate that the
interests of the parties are not sufficiently adverse. Us-
ually it is clear from the pleadings that the parties disagree
on some point of law. In the case at bar, curiously enough,
the usual situation is reversed. While the pleadings and
motions clearly indicate that the interests of the parties
are adverse, both sides apparently are in complete agree-
ment regarding the only federal question raised.
Counsel have cited no cases directly on point in their
supporting memoranda, and we also have been unable to
find any. However, after careful consideration, we have
concluded that neither the framers of the Constitution nor
the Congress could have intended us to rule on a question
of constitutional law concerning which no disagreement
exists between the parties, merely for the purpose of reach-
ing additional state law questions under the theory of pen-
dent jurisdiction. State issues predominate in this case, anc
we think that their resolution should be left to the courts
of Kentucky. Accordingly, we hold that no actual contro-
versy exists between the parties as to the only federal ques-
tion raised by the complaint, and that therefore we lack
jurisdiction to rule on both the constitutionality of Ordi-
nance No. 63-65 and on the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties under Kentucky law.
In view of our disposition of this case it is unnecessary
to rule on defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants’ mo-
A
wee - ve - - o-* :
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tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is SusTAINED.
November 19, 1970
(s) James F. Gordon
United States District Judge
Copies to:
Hon. Joseph H. McKinley
Hon. E. Stratford Smith
Hon. Hugh D. Moore
11-23-70
BS MOST PPC SONI IM TA OE ELE ONIN SHS oat RE wen Ne EC Ree eT Re
a
COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY
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File No. V-63-71
City or Owrnsporo, Kentucky, Er Au. - Appellants
v.
Top Vision Caste Co.or Ky. - - - - Appellee
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
SECOND DIVISION
APPELLANT, CITY OF OWENSBORO’S, RESPONSE
TO APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR
REHEARING
APPELLANT’S COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUES-
TIONS PRESENTED ON APPELLEE’S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
1. Did the Court overlook a material fact or a con-
trolling statute or decision, or misconstrue the issue, in
holding that the voiding of Top Vision’s obligation to pay
its bid of 26% of its CATV gross receipts vitiated the
franchise despite the severability clause contained therein?
2. Did the Court overlook a material statute or reg-
ulation in failing to consider the effect of the Federal Com-
munications Commission Regulations of March 31, 1972, in
deciding the intent of the City of Owensboro and Top Vi-
sion in executing the December 17, 1965, franchise contract?
| 7
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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nothing in Appellee’s Statement of Case Requires a
Rehearing
Appellee’s Statement of the Case contains no showing
that Appellee is entitled to a rehearing. Nothing is stated
to show that this Court “overlooked a material fact in the
record or a controlling statute or decision . . .” or that
Your Honors “. . . misconceived the issues presented
under the appeal or the law applicable thereto.” R.C.A.
1.350.
Appellee Repeats Statement on Original Appeal, Omitting
Facts Fatal to Its Claims
The Statement of the Case in the Petititon for Rehear-
ing is addressed to the issues on the original appeal, rather
than to the issues now before the Court. It is simply a
repeat—largely en haec verba—of the Counterstatement of
the Case contained at pages 1-10 of Appellee’s original
brief. In common with such original Counterstatement of
the Case, it omits many vital record facts, including these
facts which are fatal to Appellee’s case:
1. As an express condition of the franchise, Appellee
was required to complete its CATV system“. . . to the
extent of making available community antenna service to
substantially all the citizens of Owensboro, Kentucky, on
or before two (2) years from the date . . .” of the fran-
chise, December 17, 1965, or the “. . . franchise shall be
and become null and void without notice or further act of
the Party of the First Part” (R. 26).
2. Appellee conceded that it had only constructed ap-
proximately one-third of the required CATV system within
the two year period (R. 35).
3. In two successive extensions (the first for one year,
and the second for two years) gratuitously granted by the
City to Appellee for the completion of its CATV system,
ff;
TN Bp TE Reh 2) mAs So Pan Nig at Ee eee RM a Te ae CI al ine Suk Ae aaa Cn cies pe HORER Sate haere a ane Maas ry se
a
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Appellee made no additions to its system. On December
19, 1970, when Top Vision filed this suit—five years after
the granting of the franchise, three years after the initial
deadline for the completion of the system,—Top Vision still
claimed only to have constructed a CATV system adequate
for one-third of the citizens of Owensboro (R. 8).
4. The franchise made the granting of extensions for
the completion of the CATV system entirely a discretionary
matter with the City, to be exercised only upon written ap-
plication from the franchise holder “. . . at least sixty
days (60) priorto . . .” the deadline for the construction
of the system or any extension of such deadline. (Appel-
lee’s request for its third extension of time was not made
until November 4, 1970, or 14 days after the deadline fixed
by the contract R. 28).
The City exercised its discretionary legislative power
by declining to grant a third extension of time for com-
pliance with the contractual completion date (R. 28-29).
5. Appellee was selected as the highest and best bidder
at the public auction of the CATV franchise solely because
of its bid to pay the City 26% of the gross receipts of the
CATV business. All other terms and conditions of the
franchise offered by the City were fixed in the franchise
ordinance; competition between bidders was limited solely
to the percentage of gross receipts which the bidder was
willing to pay to the City (R. 18).
The City of Owensboro respectfully refers the Court
to pages 1-11 of its original brief for its Statement of the
Case on the issues presented in the original appeal.
City of Owensboro Accepts Statement of Facts in Court’s
Opinion
The City accepts the statement contained in the Court’s
opinion, pages 18 to 20 of the Appendix to the Petition for
Rehearing, as a fair and full statement of the case presented
on the original appeal, noting only that the Court decided
i
Bane AOS Y a .~ _— = = . en ™ - —
—_
the case before reaching the issue of Top Vision’s failure to
complete its CATV system within the contract term as
extended.?
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Issues Now Pending
The issues now before the Court for decision are: (1)
Did the Court overlook a material fact or a controlling
statute or decision, or misconstrue the issue in holding that
the voiding of Top Vision’s obligation to pay its bid of 26%
of its CATV gross receipts vitiated the franchise contract,
despite the severability clause contained therein? and (2)
Did this Court overlook a material statute or regulation
in failing to consider the effect of the Federal Communica-
tion Commission’s regulations which became effective on
March 31, 1972, in deciding the intent of the City of Owens-
boro and Top Vision in executing the December 17, 1965
franchise contract?
The facts with respect to each of these issues will be
taken up in the City’s argument of the issues.
1Top Vision concedes its default in this respect. Its effort to
escape this default by estoppel against the City is untenable. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Magoffin, etc., Ky., 358 S. W. 2d 353 (1962),
Continental Illinois, etc. v. City of Middlesboro, Ky., 109 F. 2d 961
‘6th Cir., 1940), and cases there cited.
Te a eee at oe Ta, Oe a ee et a ie ce SS
_
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK A MATERIAL
FACT OR A CONTROLLING STATUTE OR DECI-
SION OR MISCONSTRUE THE ISSUE IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE VOIDING OF TOP VISION’S
OBLIGATION TO PAY ITS BID OF 26% OF ITS
CATV GROSS RECEIPTS VITIATED THE FRAN-
CHISE DESPITE THE SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
CONTAINED THEREIN
Top Vision argues that the severability clause in the
franchise requires a holding that the parties intended that
the promise of Top Vision to pay 26% of its gross proceeds
to the City may be severed from the franchise and yet leave
the franchise in full force and effect.
The Court did not overlook the severability clause or
the law applicable to it; nor did it misconstrue the issue.
Indeed, Top Vision only claims that the Court “failed to
give adequate consideration” to it (Appellee’s Pet. for Reh.,
pp. 6-7).
The effect of the invalidation of Top Vision’s covenant
to pay the 26% of gross receipts in fee upon the remainder
of the franchise contract was hotly argued in the original
briefs (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 18-28; Appellee’s Brief, pp.
15-18). The Court’s Opinion evidences its careful consid-
eration of the issue. It recited the substance of the sever-
ability clause as a part of its review of all of the clauses in
the contract (Appendix to Pet. for Reh., pp. 18-19). It
resolved this issue against Top Vision in this language:
“The city further contends that the 26-percent clause
cannot be severed from the remainder of the agreement
without doing violence to one of the underlying pur-
poses of the franchise, to-wit, to provide revenue for
the city, and the elimination of the clause vitiated the
contract. This contention, we believe, is sound.”
osnstietetmeniil —
30
The City respectfully refers Your Honors to pages 18
to 28 of its original brief for a full treatment of this issue.
It asks indulgence in a short additional statement.
The Severability Clause is Part of the Entire Contract,
Which Must be Construed as a Whole
The severability clause in the franchise is only one of
many clauses in the contract between the City and Top
Vision. This contract must be construed as a whole, and
enforced in accordance with the intent of the parties as
gathered from the language used, the subject matter, the
parties’ situation, and the conditions under which the con-
tract was written. L & N v. Joseph, Ky. 1944, 183 S. W.
2d 953, Reese v. Greenlee, Ky. 1948, 214 S. W. 2d 262.
Test of Severability
The severability test is stated in Asher, supra, cited by
Top Vision, as follows:
“The usual test of severability is whether the consider-
ation is so segregated that it may be separately applied
to each independent covenant in the Contract.” 11
S. W. 2d 114, 115.
Am. Jur. defines a “divisible” contract as follows:
“On the other hand, a ‘divisible contract,’ using that
term correctly, is one contract and not several. It dif-
fers from other contracts, ordinarily, in one respect
only—that on performance by one side of each of its
successive divisions the party becomes liable for his
performance of that division. In other words, a ‘divis-
ible contract’ is one the performance of which is divided
into different grotss, each set embracing performances
which are the agreed exchange for each other.” 17 Am
Jur 2d Contracts, Sec. 324, p. 757.
31
Top Vision’s Promise to Pay 26%, Being Illegal, Voids the
Contract
: It is an unquestioned principle of law that if an im-
) portant part of the consideration for an indivisible contract
is illegal, the contract is invalid. Johnson v. McMillan, 178
Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070 (1918); Newport Rolling Co. v.
Hall, 147 Ky. 598, 144 S. W. 760 (1912); 17 Am Jur 2d,
Contracts, Sec. 231, p. 612; Re-Statement of the Law, Con-
tracts, Vol. 2, p. 1124 (1932).
A severability clause is but an aid to the construction
of acontract. As stated in 13 A C.J.S. Sec. 1335, page 313:
“However, a declaration in the contract that is divisible
is but an aid to construction and will not justify a court
in declaring a clause divisible when in considering an
entire contract, it obviously is not.”
In Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. 8S. 287, 44 S. Ct. 323, 68
L. Ed. 686 (1923), the Supreme Court considered the effect
of a severability clause in a Kansas statute, one portion of
which had been declared unconstitutional. In determining
the intent of the legislature, Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
“Section 28 of the Act (the severability clause) pro-
vides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid
in determining that intent. But it is an aid merely;
not an inexorable command.” 68 L. Ed. at 690.
The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Kansas
Court for a determination of whether Section 19 of the Act
then under consideration “. . . is so interwoven with the
system (of compulsory arbitration) that the section cannot
stand alone.”
Subject to the limitations imposed on cities by Sec. 164
of the Kentucky Constitution, the city agrees with Top Vi-
sion’s statement that “whether a contract clause may be
severed from the remainder of the contract without affect-
Re SAAS AO TRE Ue OU EET
. ie 5
32
ing the validity of that contract as a whole ‘involves an
ascertainment of the intention of the parties, which must
be deduced from the contract itself (Koppers Co. v. Asher
Coal Min. Co., 226 Ky. 492, 11 S. W. 2d 114, 115)’”. (Ap-
pellee’s Pet. for Reh., p. 7). The City of Owensboro—Top
Vision franchise contract contains an abundance of evidence
that the parties did not intend that the franchise should
remain valid, even though Top Vision was relieved of its
obligation to pay its bid price of 26% of its gross receipts.
There Were No Divisions of Performance
The franchise contained no divisions of performance by
Top Vision which could be set opposite items of perform-
ance due from the City. This being the case, the obligation
of Top Vision to pay the City 26% of the gross proceeds
from its franchised operations was not intended by the
parties to be a divisible undertaking.
Kentucky Constitution Requires Franchise be Let to
Highest and Best Bidder
The City and Top Vision entered into this franchise
contract uuder the mandate of Section 164 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which provides that:
“Befo . granting such franchise or privilege for a term
of years, such municipality shall first, after due adver-
tisement, receive bids therefor publicly, and award the
same to the highest and best bidder . . .”
Both parties thus knew that the City had no power to
negotiate the consideration which should be paid for the
franchise, and that this had to be fixed by public bidding.
Franchise Was Awarded to Top Vision Entirely on Basis
of Its 26% Bid
The franchise advertised and sold by the City fixed all
of the terms and conditions of the franchise, leaving blank
a ——
33
only che percent of gross receipts which should be paid by
the successful bidder. Thus, only the consideration to be
paid was submitted to competitive bidding and Top Vision
was awarded the contract solely because of its bid of 26%
of its gross receipts. Since this 26% covenant was the sole
basis for the award to Top Vision, the striking of this clause
removes the entire basis of the agreement between the
parties.
The Size of Top Vision’s Bid is Significant
The amount bid by Top Vision is in itself significant.
The Court has had municipally granted franchises before
it on many occasions; it will be taxed to recall any franchise
sold at a price as high © that bid by Top Vision. Neither
the Board of Commissioners of the City of Owensboro nor
the bidder could have regarded this bid as a nominal con-
sideration, or as anything other than an important source
of revenue to the City and a heavy burden to the bidder.
Indeed, Top Vision alleged that the existence of the 26%
provision “made it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to
attract either outside equity or working capital from in-
vestors. . . .” (BR. 8).
City Required to Consider Revenue to be Raised by
Franchise Grant
Top Vision errs in arguing that “there is nothing to
indicate that the authority to issue franchises was bestowed
upon municipalities for any purpose relating to the raising
of revenue” (Appellee’s Pet. for Reh., p. 8).
The Kentucky Constitution affords a short answer to
Top Vision’s argument. Section 164 requires the sale of
a franchise to be the “highest” as well as the “best” bidder.
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Commissioners of
the City of Paris, 254 Ky. 527, 71 S. W. 2d 1024 (1934),
in considering the reasons back of the twenty-year limita-
tion on franchises, emphasized the city’s interest in reve-
nues to be derived from a franchise sale:
34
“A reading of the Constitutional Debates reveals that
the main purpose behind this section 164 was to insure
that every so often the municipality should have the
opportunity of revising the terms of the franchise
which it had granted as to rates, quality, service, and
the like, and to have the advantage of obtaining from
time to time for the franchise its value which most
likely would be enhanced by the growth of population
and business. Thus, in the case of Hilliard v. George
C. Fetter Lighting & Heating Co., 127 Ky. 95, 105 S. W.
115, 118, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1330, Judge Carroll, himself
a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1890,
speaking for the court on this point, said:
‘Further illustrating the intention of the section, the
limitation of 20 years upon the time for which fran-
chises might be granted was added, as what would be
an adequate price for a franchise granted to a public
utility corporation to use the streets of a city today
might be a mere pittance 20 years hence. The value to
the owners of the right granted would keep pace with
the growth, wealth, and population of the city, and un-
less at some future time the city had the right to obtain
additional compensation for the privilege it would give
the grantees of the franchise undue advantage, and
deny to the city the right to exact a consideration in
keeping with the value of the privilege bestowed.’ ”
(Emphasis added).
Other Clauses in Contract Show Severability Clause
Doesn’t Preserve Franchise When Vital
Part Is Invalidated
Many other clauses in the franchise agreement show
that the severability clause is “not an inexorable com-
mand”, but is a rule of construction which this Court prop-
erly applied to the Owensboro-Top Vision contract. For
BERIT LA RIL Eee AAR IN MERRIE RE NTT a Bp TENG POSED A AR AT TA
35
example, the term of the franchise is fixed at 15 years.
Suppose this term should be held invalid, or should be re-
duced to 3 years. Despite the severability clause, Top
Visiuz would not be required to construct a CATV system
for the entire city. The parties intended a grant of a term
adequate to make construction of the system economically
feasible. The term of the contract is thus so vital and so
interwoven with other covenants of the contract that it
cannot be stricken without destroying the contract.
But suppose that the covenant in the franchise requir-
ing Top Vision to provide one free drop to each parochial
school passed by the CATV cable is declared invalid. A
proper construction of the contract would require that this
covenant be severed from the remainder of the franchise.
Parochial schools are only one of a number of public build-
ings to which free drops must be supplied; the amount in-
volved in the covenant with respect to parochial schools is
small; it was not an item considered by the City in deter-
mining who should be the successful bidder; and its pres-
ence in the contract is not required by any constitutional
section.
To accept Top Vision’s argument that the severability
clause alone is determinative of the intention of the parties
leads to the absurd conclusion that all of Top Vision’s
obligations under the contract could be severed without
invalidating Top Vision’s franchise, i.e. leaving Top Vision
with all of the benefits with none of the burdens.
The 26% covenant is such an important part of the
franchise and is so interwoven with the franchise that the
parties did not intend that the franchise should survive the
striking of the 26% covenant. This Court was thus correct
in ruling that “. . . the 26-percent clause cannot be
severed from the remainder of the agreement without doing
violence to one of the underlying purposes of the franchise,
to-wit, to provide revenue to the City, and the elimination
of the clause vitiated the contract.”
. on
36
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK A MATERIAL
STATUTE OR REGULATION IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION’S 1972 REGULATIONS IN DECID-
ING THE INTENT OF THE CITY OF OWENS.
BORO AND TOP VISION IN EXECUTING THE
DECEMBER 17, 1965 FRANCHISE AGREEMENT
Appellee argues that it is entitled to a rehearing because
the Court did not consider the effect of the Federal Com-
munications Commission’s regulations which became ef-
fective on March 31, 1972; that under these regulations
“(i)t is no longer legally permissible for a municipality
to use a CATV franchise to raise revenue for general
municipal purposes”, and that this Court’s decision “pre-
sumptively invalidates most existing CATV franchises in
Kentucky” (Pet. Reh. pp. 9-10).
These arguments are fallacious.
26% Fee Fell Under Wonderland v. Sandusky, and Not
Under FCC Regulations
The City of Owensboro and Top Vision agreed that Top
Vision’s 26% CATV franchise fee covenant “is invalid and
unenforceable under Article I, Section 8, Clause III, of the
Constitution of the United States” as construed in Wonder-
land Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F. 2d 548 (6th
Cir. 1970) (R. 31), which held such a covenant to be an
unlawful burden on interstate commerce. This agreement
was the basis of the dismissal of Top Vision’s suit against
the City of Owensboro in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky (R. 30-33). Thus,
Top Vision’s 26% covenant was not invalidated under any
FCC regulation.
Invalidation of Franchise Based on Construction of the
Contract and Not on FCC Regulations
This Court’s decision that Top Vision’s franchise falls
with the voiding of the 26% of gross profits franchise fee
RETIREE ERRAND ERE YP EEG INIA A BIEN LEER AOL ATES IIE! OE A IN LE MOR AOE TS BRE BLS A
es
37
covenant is based upon the intention of the parties as ex-
pressed in the December 17, 1965 franchise contract. The
FCC regulation which went into effect on March 31, 1972,
as quoted by Top Vision’s brief at page 10 of its Petition
for Re-hearing, casts no light on the intention of the City
of Owensboro and Top Vision as expressed in their 1965
contract.
FCC Regulations Do Not Forbid Use of CATV Fees for
General Municipal Purposes
Appellee mis-states the facts in saying that under the
1972 FCC regulations “(i)t is no longer legally permissible
for a municipality to use a CATV franchise to raise revenue
for general municipal purposes”. No such prohibition is
contained at any place in these regulations 76 C.F.R. 1-617.
These regulations require only that CATV franchise fees
“be reasonable” and suggest 3% to 5% of gross receipts as
a reasonable range (App. Pet. for Re-hearing, p. 10). While
this range is much less than the 26% bid in 1965 by Top
Vision, the granting of CATV franchises remains a lucra-
tive source of municipal revenue, as will be apparent when
the Court compares 3% to 5% of gross receipts with the fees
provided in other franchises coming before it.
Neither This Opinion Nor the 1972 FCC Regulations Pose
Any “Chaos” for Kentucky CATV
Top Vision is not warranted in arguing—entirely out-
side the record—that this decision (coupled with the 1972
FCC regulations) poses “chaos . . . for CATV through-
out Kentucky” or “presumptively invalidates most exist-
ing CATV franchises in Kentucky.”
As we have shown, this decision is not based on the FCC
regulations, but upon the Wonderland decision, and this
Court’s construction of the terms and conditions of the
particular contract between the City of Owensboro and Top
Vision. It is sheer speculation to forecast what intention
PLIES AS APCS
38
may be attributable to parties to other CATV franchise
agreements which are not before the Court.
The current Television Fact Book (recognized by the
City of Owensboro and Top Vision as authoritative in
Paragraph 10 of the franchise between them, R. 20), Serv-
ices Volume 1972-1973, Edition No. 42, pp. 465a to 473a lists
a total of 54 CATV systems in Kentucky for which fran-
chise fee information is published. Only one of these
franchise fees is shown as exceeding 5% of gross receipts—
the exception being the franchise in Paris, Kentucky, which
calls for a fee of 5.6% of gross receipts.
An existing CATV system is not required to comply
with FCC regulations affecting franchise fees until March
31, 1977, or the renewal of the franchise, whichever occurs
first (76 CFR 31(b)).
Section 7 of these regulations also provides liberal relief
for hardship cases:
“(a) Upon petition by a cable television system, an
applicant, permittee, or licensee of a television broad-
cast, translator, or microwave relay station, or by any
other interested person, the Commission may waive
any provision of the rules relating to cable television
systems, impose additional or different requirements,
or issue a ruling on a complaint or disputed question.”
76 CFR 7(a).
Top Vision is shaking scarecrows at the Court.
. sas
Cereb area 2. 7
39
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Hvueu D. Moore
Ricuarp D. Giiu1aM, JR.
Gimut1am & Moore
324 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, Kentucky 42301
Attorneys for Appellant,
City of Owensboro, Kentucky
We ASE BRS
40
APPENDIX “A”
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION II
No. 13298
Tor Vision Caste Co. or Ky., a Kentucky
Corporation - - - - - - - Plaintiff
Vv.
Crry or Owenssoro, Kentucky, a Municipal
Corporation of the Second Class, and
Irvin Territt, Mayor,
Wairman C. TayLor, Commissioner,
Joun D. Mitier, Commissioner,
Joun C. Fisner, Commissioner,
Auton Puckett, Commissioner - - = - Defendants
Be Ir Remembered, That heretofore to-wit, on the 19th
day of December, 1970, came the plaintiff, Top Vision Cable
Co. of Ky., a Kentucky corporation, by counsel, and filed its
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief
herein, which is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1. This is an action for declaratory judgment as au-
thorized by Section 418.045 of the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes, and is brought because there is an actual controversy
now existing between the parties of the above-entitled ac-
’
ern ats . :
VY DELLE GENES LION, BT OTTER ELLIO NE EEA BILE GENIN Be IY PAG BE EIEN BIS 5 OL SR FB
—
41
tion, as to which the Plaintiff seeks the judgment of this
Court.
2. This action arises under the provisions of a certain
Franchise Agreement, (hereinafter Franchise Agreement),
existing between the Plaintiff and the City of Owensboro,
et al. (hereinafter Defendants).
3. Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Kentucky. Plaintiff is engaged in providing
community antenna television service (CATV) to the public
within the corporate limits of the City of Owensboro. In
brief, Plaintiff’s business r:ay be described as follows: The
signals of nearby and distant television broadcast stations
are received off the air by means of a master antenna ad-
vantageously located to obtain maximum signal strength
and quality. By means of coaxial cable lines attached to
utility poles, these signals are relayed through amplifica-
tion equipment to the residences of subscribing members
of the public for a nominal monthly fee. The cable is ter-
minated in the home where a connection is made to the
subscriber's privately owned television receiver. The sub-
scriber is thus able to receive television broadcasts which
would not otherwise be available or which would be received
with lesser quality.
4. Defendant City of Owensboro, Kentucky is a munici-
pal corporation of the State of Kentucky and Defendants
Irvin Terrill, Waitman C. Taylor, John D. Miller, John C.
Fisher, and Alton Puckett are the members of the Board
of Commissioners, the governing body of the City of Owens-
boro, Kentucky.
5. On or about October 22, 1965, the Defendant City
of Owensboro, by and through its Board of Commissioners,
enacted Ordinance No. 63-65, authorizing the advertisement
and issuance of a CATV franchise within the City of Owens-
boro. A copy of said Ordinance is annexed to this Com-
plaint and is marked “Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1”, and made
a part hereof.
— ° . . .
42
6. On or about December 17, 1965, the Defendant City
of Owensboro, by and through its Board of Commissioners,
adopted Resolution No. 36-65 confirming the issuance of the
CATV franchise to Plaintiff and granted a CATV franchise
to the Plaintiff under the terms of the Franchise Agreement
described hereinabove. Under the terms of the Agreement,
Plaintiff must pay to the Defendants an annual gross re-
ceipts tax equal to twenty-six percent (26%) of the gross
income received by the Plaintiff from all receipts derived
within the City of Owensboro from its CATV system.
Copies of said Resolution and said Franchise Agreement
are annexed to this Complaint, marked “Plaintiff’s Exhibit
No. 2” and “Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 3”, respectively, and
made a part hereof.
7. By the terms of the Franchise Agreement, the Plain-
tiff’s operations must be in accordance with the laws of the
United States of America (See Paras. 1 and 7 thereof).
8. On March 26, 1970, in the consolidated cases of
Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, Wonder-
land Ventures, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 423 F. 2d 548 (6th
Cir. 1970), (hereinafter Wonderland), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (which includes
Owensboro) struck down the ordinances enacted by the de-
fendant cities imposing a gross receipts tax on the respec-
tive CATV systems there involved.
9. In Wonderland, the Court of Appeals held the or-
dinances of both Sandusky and Fremont invalid, inter alia,
“|. because they imposed a gross receipts tax upon the
proceeds of interstate commerce in violation of the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. On
several occasions following this decision Plaintiff sought to
re-negotiate the percent of gross receipts payment with
Defendants to reflect compensation to the City of Owens-
boro on the basis of a fee covering the cost of the Defendant
City of the use by Plaintiff of the public right of ways
a
defen
Pears
| RAG
al
within the City of Owensboro. Defendants refused and
still refuse to negotiate in any manner whatsoever. Never-
theless, on August 31, 1970, some five months after the
decision in Wonderland, the City of Owensboro accepted a
payment of $2,241.47, which amount represented full pay-
ment of 26% of the gross receipts of Top Vision then due
for the preceding six months, ended June 30, 1970.
10. On September 22, 1970, Plaintiff filed an action for
a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Owensboro, nam-
ing as defendants therein the same defendants as are des-
ignated herein, and asking that the 26% gross receipts tax
provision of the Franchise Agreement be adjudged uncon-
stitutional under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Con-
stitution of the United States (hereinafter “Interstate Com-
merce Clause”) and the authority of the Wexderland de-
cision. The defendants therein answered plaintiff’s com-
plaint with a “Motion to Dismiss’, filed October 22, 1970,
and for the first time gave notice to Plaintiff of defendants’
agreement with Plaintiff’s position that the 26% gross re-
ceipts tax provision was unconstitutional under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause and the Wonderland decision.
11. Subsequently defendants, City of Owensboro, et.
al., filed a further pleading entitled “Reply to Response of
Plaintiff To Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss For Lack of
Jurisdiction and Failure to State Facts Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted”, attaching to this further response a copy
of a certain “Resolution No. 56-70”. Said Resolution is
annexed to this Complaint, marked “Plaintiffs Exhibit No.
4” and made a part hereof. This Resolution, enacted sub-
sequent to the Plaintiff’s initiation of the declaratory judg-
ment action, officially conceded the constitutional invalidity
of the 26% gross receipts tax provision under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause. As is pointed out hereinafter in
said Resolution the defendants simultaneously refused
Plaintiff’s pending request for an extension of time within
pe
ee
—_— PER * RRA Srey SSR TAT FEELERS OMEN OE ARREST E RIT RPE OPES
eo yee : i SS : Se SN
43
—
At
which to complete construction of the system. Whereupon,
based upon the apparent agreement between the plaintiff
and the defendants in that proceeding respecting the inva-
lidity of the 26% gross receipts tax provision, the Court
found that no “actual controversy” existed between the
parties and therefore dismissed the Plaintiff’s action be-
cause of a lack of jurisdiction. The Court stated that since
state issues was most properly a matter for the courts of
Kentucky. A copy of that court’s “Memorandum and
Order”, is annexed to the Complaint, marked “Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 5” and made a part hereof.
12. Paragraph 12 of the Franchise Agreement pro-
vides :
The party of the second part shall commence the con-
struction of the system herein at a reasonable time
from the securing of such permits, licenses and ap-
provals and shall prosecute such construction with due
diligence; it being understood, as a condition of this
franchise, that the construction of such system shall be
completed to the extent of making available community
antenna service to substantially all of the Citizens of
Owensboro, Kentucky, on or before two (2) years from
the date hereof or this franchise shall be and become
null and void without notice or further act by the party
of the first part. For cause, in its sole discretion, the
Board of Commissioners of the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky may extend said two (2) year deadline from
time to time upon written application for same by the
second party at least sixty (60) days prior to said
deadline or extension thereof.
13. As hereinbefore noted at Paragraph 11, by letter
dated October 20, 1970, Plaintiff officially requested of the
Defendants a further extension of time from and after
December 20, 1970, to complete construction of its CATV
a ee ee ee eee eee ee ee eee
yin Seis Lie
45
system in the City of Owensboro, such request being based
on the identical circumstances supporting the prior two
requests.' As stated at Paragraph 11 hereof, by Resolu-
tion No. 56-70 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 hereto) enacted
subsequent to Plaintiff’s initiation of its Federal Declara-
tory Judgment action, Defendants summarily denied Plain-
tiff’s request.
14. Commencing almost immediately after execution
of the Franchise Agreement, Plaintiff encountered unex-
pected, unforeseeable and severe hardships wholly beyond
its control in proceeding to complete construction of its
CATV system. Two basic factors unforeseen by Plain-
tiff have prevented completion of the system.
(1) FCC prohibition against importation of dis-
tant signals into the top 100 markets, resulted in a
severe loss of subscribers and a concomitant loss of
working capital needed for completion of the system.
It became an imperative of providing the service
needed by the people of Owensboro for Top Vision
to concentrate its funds and efforts toward seeking
relief at the FCC.?
(2) After the foregoing FCC action the existence
of the 26% tax provision made it virtually impossible
for the Plaintiff to attract either outside equity or
working capital from investors, said capital to have
been utilized as an alternative source of construction
capital to substantially complete the system.
1This request did, however, indicate that in addition to FCC problems,
Top Vision had been experiencing grave difficulty in getting potential
capital investors to commit funds in view of the 26% gross receipts tax
imposed upon the system. _
20wensboro, Kentucky is located within the primary service area of
television stations operating in Evansville, Indiana, one of the nation’s
largest television markets. Under FCC rules and policy adopted subse-
quent to issuance of the Top Vision Franchise, non-local television sta-
tions are not being authorized for carri by CATV systems operating
° ~ Bg largest television markets of which Evansville, Indiana is
e .
SETA OEY
46
15. Notwithstanding these serious difficulties, Plain-
tiff has to date expended in excess of $430,000.00 in con-
nection with its Owensboro CATV system, and cable serv-
ice is presently available to approximately one-third of the
citizens of the City.
16. In recognition of the extreme difficulty encountered
by Plaintiff from the FCC, Defendants have twice granted
extensions of time within which to complete the system.
Resolutions 60-67, dated October 6, 1967, and attached here-
to as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, sets forth the first exten-
sion. This resolution specifically recognizes the fact that
the Commissioners “. . . deem said request for an ex-
tension of time to be reasonable; . . .” since“. . . the
Board of Commissioners is aware of the matters now pend-
ing between the Top Vision Cable Company and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission . . .” In the most re-
cent grant the Defendants by Resolution No. 66-68 adopted
December 20, 1968, granted a two year extension to and
including December 20, 1970. Therein the Defendants ex-
pressly stated that the City “. . . deem(s) the unfore-
seen stringent regulation of the Federal Communications
Commission now in force and the proposed proceedings
challenging them, sufficient cause for granting the written
application of Top Vision Cable Company, Inc. for an ex-
tension of time within which to complete its system within
the City.” A complete copy of Resolution No. 66-68 is at-
tached hereto as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 7.
17. The denial of the most recent extension request
by Defendants was an arbitrary abuse of discretion in view
of the fact that circumstances before the FCC are substan-
tially unchanged. Moreover, the Defendants have exhibited
bad faith insofar as they have contributed directly and
substantially to the very situation which has prevented
Plaintiff from completing construction by exacting an un-
lawful fee. Plaintiff has been given no fair and reasonable
opportunity to complete construction. Plaintiff was not
i SAAT SAAT LEO IR RFD RSE RCH DT SEES TRI ET oe See
47
notified until November 6, 1970, after it had filed its action
in Federal Court that Defendants would not grant a further
extension of time within which to complete construction.
Thus, it is impossible for Plaintiff to complete construction
by December 20, 1970 and Defendants by their own ac-
tions have forced a lapse of Plaintiff's Franchise in the
absence of relief by this Court through absolutely no fault
or omission by Plaintiff.
18. Defendants herein have asserted the position be-
fore the Federal Court and privately to Plaintiff that the
effect of the Wonderland decision is to cause forfeit of
Plaintiff's franchise since in Defendant’s view the gross
receipts tax is not severable from the remainder of the
Franchise Agreement. Defendants have sought to regulate
the operation of Plaintiff's CATV by ordinance and Fran-
hiss a public utility. Plaintiff has in the past sub-
jected itself voluntarily to the franchise procedure but in
so doing has not at any point conceded that such was a
necessary part of doing business in the City of Owensboro.
Plaintiff now denies that there exists statutory authority
vested in the City of Owensboro to permit that municipality
to so regulate its operations as a CATV system. In this
regard Plaintiff asserts that:
(a) The defendant City has no power or authority gen-
erally to franchise community antenna television
systems because they are not public utilities sub-
ject to municipal regulation and control.
Defendants have no power or authority to require
that the construction, operation and maintenance
of Plaintiff's system shall be dependent solely upon
permission of the defendant City.
Defendants have no power of authority to control
the time within which Plaintiff shall obtain permits
from any appropriate regulatory agency or com-
mence or complete construction of its facilities.
48
(d) Defendants have no power or authority to require
Plaintiff to donate a portion of its property to the
defendant City nor to provide free service to other
public and private bodies.
(e) Defendants have no power or authority to require
Plaintiff to bid with others for the right to engage
in a lawful business on the basis of the largest
cash payment and percentage of income to be paid
to defendant City.
(f) Defendants have no power or authority to grant a
so-called non-exclusive franchise for operation of a
community antenna television system in the City
of Owensboro which is to be awarded on the basis
of bids and will have the practical effect of creating
a government imposed monopoly in such business.
19. Therefore, even though the Defendants have con-
ceded the constitutional invalidity of the 26% gross re-
ceipts tax, Plaintiff remains in extreme jeopardy in the
following ways:
(a) Defendant City of Owensboro through its Board
of Commissioners has stated its intention to treat
the entire Franchise as void. This means that Plain-
tiff would lose its business and most likely the
more than $430,000.00 it has invested thus far in
attempting in good faith to provide CATV service
to Owensboro.
(b) The Defendant City of Owensboro through its
Board of Commissioners on November 6, 1970, re-
fused to grant Plaintiff’s request for extension of
time to complete construction. This was an arbi-
trary and abusive action taken as reprisal against
Plaintiff for raising a question as to the validity
of the 26% tax in view of the Wonderland decision.
49
The inequity of this situation and Plaintiff's di-
lemma will be apparent to this Court since it is in
large part the existence of the 26% tax which not
only renders existing operation most difficult but
has rendered it impossible to attract the additional
capital necessary to complete construction of the
system.
20. Plaintiff is willing to pay a lawful and reasonable
fee to the Defendants to defray costs which Defendants
may incur relative to the use of the right of ways by
Plaintiff. Defendants may not unreasonably withhold such
use of the right of ways from Plaintiff in connection with
the conduct of Plaintiff’s lawful and desirable business.
21. The damages which will be suffered by the Plain-
tiff unless equitable relief is granted are irreparable and
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy of law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays:
(1) For a judgment declaring and adjudicating that
Defendant City of Owensboro has no legislative authority
to require that local CATV operations be franchised by the
City.
(2) For a judgment declaring that Defendants may not
unreasonably withhold use of the public right of ways
from Plaintiff and that any charges made therefor be
reasonably related to the costs to Defendants of Plaintiff's
use.
(3) For a judgment in the alternative declaring and
adjudicating the rights and duties of the Plaintiff and
Defendants under the provisions of the Franchise Agree-
ment, including but not limited to, the following:
(a) That Section 3, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement is
severable from the remainder of the Agreement,
thereby preserving said remainder’s validity.
(b) That equity requires that Plaintiff be granted an
additional, sufficient and reasonable period within
(c)
(d)
(e)
50
which to complete construction of its CATV sys-
tem.
That the Court determine a reasonable fee to be
paid Defendant City by Plaintiff, to defray costs
which Defendants incur relative to the use of the
public right of ways consistent with the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United
States.
That the Court order Defendants to refund to
Plaintiff all monies received from Plaintiff pur-
suant to the unlawful 26% gross receipts tax.
That the Court prohibit Defendants during the
pendency of this action from soliciting or consid-
ering bids or granting a Franchise for a CATV
operation within the City of Owensboro to any
party.
(f) That the Defendant City of Owensboro and all
Officers thereof and their successors be restrained
from treating the remaining valid part of said
Agreement as null and void and of no legal effect,
and from preventing or attempting to prevent Plain-
tiff from operating its CATV system for the pur-
pose of providing service to the citizens of Owens-
boro by withdrawing said franchise, or otherwise
taking reprisals against Plaintiff as a result of its
seeking this judicial determination.
Wyatt, Grafton & Sloss
Third Floor
Marion E. Taylor Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
/s/ Edgar A. Zingman
/s/ Stuart E. Lampe
McKinley & Howard
/s/ Joseph McKinley
Counsel for Plaintiff
51
Smith, Pepper, Shack & L’Heureux
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 10008
Of Counsel
Complaint & Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7, each filed.
Civil Summons & 6 copies issued to Daviess Co. Dec.
19, 1970.
Attest: James W. Clayton, Clerk
By: Jean P. Moure, D. C.
EXHIBIT 1
ORDINANCE NO. 63-65
AN ORDINANCE DIRECTING THE CITY MAN-
AGER OF THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KEN-
TUCKY, TO ADVERTISE AND PUBLICLY SELL A
FRANCHISE AUTHORIZING THE PURCHASER
THEREOF TO USE THE PUBLIC WAYS,
STREETS, HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, OR PUBLIC
PLACES OF THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KEN-
TUCKY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPLYING
VISUAL AND AUDIO TELEVISION AND RADIO
SIGNALS TO THE PUBLIC.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COM-
MISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KEN-
TUCKY, AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. The City Manager of the City of Owens-
boro, Kentucky, is hereby authorized and directed to ad-
vertise and publicly sell, subject to the approval of the
Board of Commissioners, a franchise authorizing the pur-
chaser thereof to use the public ways, streets, highways,
bridges or public places of the City of Owensboro, Ken-
tucky, for the purpose of supplying community antenna
- a
52
television and audio television and radio signals to the
public.
SECTION 2. The notice of said sale of franchise shall
be posted on the public bulletin board at the City Hall and
shall be advertised at least once, said publication to be not
less than seven (7) days nor more than twenty-one (21)
days prior to said sale; said sale date shall be on Novem-
ber 16, 1965, at 10:00 A.M., CST, in the lobby of City Hall
and shall be made to the highest and best bidder at such
sale; however, the City retains the right to reject any and
all bids.
SECTION 3. The advertisement of sale shall contain
a description of the franchise to be sold. The terms and
conditions of said franchise to be granted in the event the
sale is confirmed shall be as follows:
This Franchise Agreement made and entered into
on this the day of , 1965, by and
between the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, a munici-
pal corporation of the second class, Party of the First
Part, and Party of the Second
Part.
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of
the public service to be rendered by the party of the
second part to the residents of Owensboro, Kentucky,
and the further consideration as more fully set out here-
in, the party of the first part does hereby grant unto
the party of the second part, its successors and assigns,
for a period of fifteen (15) years from the date hereof,
the franchise and privilege of using the public ways,
streets, highways, bridges or public places of the City
of Owensboro, Kentucky, for the supplying of visual
and audio television and radio signals to the public,
subject to the following terms, conditions and cov-
enants, to-wit:
—
1. The party of the second part, its successors or as-
signs, shall have the franchise, privilege, right and
power to erect, install, construct, re-construct, replace,
remove, repair, maintain and operate in or upon, under,
above, across and from the streets, avenues, highways,
sidewalks, bridges and other public ways, easements,
right-of-way and lands, as now existing and all ex-
tensions thereof and additions thereto, in the City of
Owensboro, Kentucky, all equipment, facilities, appur-
tenances and apparatus of any nature for the purpose
of receiving, amplifying, transmitting and distributing
therefrom radio, electrical and electronic energy, pic-
tures, sounds, signals, impulses and communication,
uni-directional and multi-directional of every nature
and description, audio and video, embracing any and
all of the frequencies of the electrical magnetic spec-
trum and to otherwise engage in the business, services
and activities generally known as and practiced now
and in the future by community antenna television and
audio communication services in accordance with the
laws of the United States of America, the Common-
wealth of Kentucky and the City of Owensboro, Ken-
tucky, for a period of fifteen (15) years from and after
the date hereof; but subject to the restrictions and pro-
visions herein contained.
2. The party of the second part, in consideration of
the terms of this franchise, agrees to pay to the party
of the first part a sum equal to the cost of the adver-
tising and selling of this franchise, upon proper billing
by first party to second party plus the sum of money
equal to % of the gross income received by the
party of the second part from all sources whatsoever
derived within the City of Owensboro, the payment of
which shall be payable one-half (1/,) thereof in semi-
annual payments. Said semi-annual payment dates
53
—
shall be the 30th day of June and the 31st day of
December of each year and each semi-annual payment
shall be made within 30 days thereafter. The party
of the second part shall keep complete records of ac-
counts showing dates and payments received and any
duly authorized agent of the City of Owensboro shall
have the right, power and authority to inspect the
gross monthly income records of the party of the sec-
ond part.
3. There is hereby granted to the party of the second
part, insofar as the City of Owensboro may legally
grant same, the further right, privilege and authority
to lease, rent or in any other manner obtain the use
of towers, poles, lines, cables and other equipment and
facilities from any city owned utility and any and all
holders of public licenses and franchises within the
corporate limits of the City of Owensboro, subject to
all existing and future ordinances, regulations and
laws of the City of Owensboro and the Commonwealth
of Kentucky. It is the stated intention of the party
of the first part that all holders of public licenses and
franchises within the corporate limits of the City of
Owensboro shall cooperate with the party of the second
part to allow party joint useage of their poles and
pole-line facilities whenever possible and whenever
such use does not interfere with the normal operations
of such poles and pole-lines. However, the party of
the second part shall own and have complete respon-
sibility for the maintenance and operation of the full
system and that responsibility shall not be divided.
Prior to the erection or installation of any such towers,
poles, guys and anchors on any municipal properties,
including public ways and easements, the party of the
second part shall secure approval of said location by
the City Manager of the City of Owensboro or any
—
55
other authorized person designated by the City and
also secure approval from any state or county official
of any locations on the properties, including public
ways and easements of the State of Kentucky and
County of Daviess. Such permission shall not be un-
reasonably withheld on the part of the City.
4. The party of the second part shall, during the ex-
istence of this franchise, furnish reasonable, adequate
and efficient community antenna reception service to
the subscribers connected to its system within the
corporate limits of the City of Owensboro and said
party of the second part agrees to construct and main-
tain its system in reasonable repair and working order,
said system to be constructed with top grade American
made equipment and second party shall provide ade-
quate facilities for maintenance of same. These main-
tenance requirements may be temporarily suspended
by disaster or emergency conditions or other circum-
stances beyond its reasonable control.
5. The party of the second part shall charge only
reasonable rates for the service rendered to its cus-
tomers, but shall not as to any rates, charges, service
facilities, rules, regulations or in any other respect
make or grant any preference or advantage to any per-
son or subject any person to any prejudice or disad-
vantage; provided, however, they shall not be deemed
to prohibit the establishment of a graduated scale of
charges and classified rate schedules to which any
customer, within such classification shall be entitled.
6. The party of the second part shall not directly or
indirectly engage in any phase of the business of tele-
vision receiving set sale, lease, repair or maintenance
within the City of Owensboro, Daviess County, Ken-
tucky, nor shall it use its community antenna televi-
sion, radio and audio communication services con-
structed under this franchise for the purpose of pay
television.
7. No privilege or exemption is granted or deferred
by this franchise except those specifically prescribed
herein. Any privilege claimed under this franchise in
any street, public way or easement shall be subordi-
nate to any prior lawful occupancy of the street and
to all laws, ordinances and regulations of the City of
Owensboro, State of Kentucky and the United States
of America. No rights, franchise or privileges herein
granted are to be exclusive.
8. The party of the second part shall at all times in-
demnify, protect and save harmless the City of Owens-
boro, any official, agency, commission or board thereof
from and against any and all liability, losses and phys-
ical damage to property and bodily injury or death
to persons, including payments made under Work-
men’s Compensation laws which may arise out of or
be caused by the erection, construction, replacement,
removal, maintenance and operations of the party of
the second part’s community antenna television and
audio communications service and resulting from or
by any negligent fault or misconduct on its part or by
its agents, officers, servants and employees and it shall
carry a policy or policies of liability insurance indem-
nifying all loss, damage or destruction of property to
the extent of $25,000.00 and as to any one person, city,
agency or board in the amount of $100,000.00 and as
to any one accident resulting in liability on account of
injury to or death of one person and in the amount of
$300,000.00 as to any one accident as it may relate to
damages to persons and property.
9. The party of the second part shall, in the case of
any opening or obstruction in the streets or other pub-
—
57
lic ways of the City of Owensboro made by it in the
course of construction, operation or removal of its in-
stallations, guard such activity by the placement of
adequate barriers, fences or boardings, the bounds of
which during the periods of dusk and darkness shall
be clearly designated by warning lights. In the case
of any disturbance or damage to any streets or public
ways occurring in the course of erection, installation,
construction, reconstruction, replacement, removal, re-
pair, maintenance or operation, the party of the second
part shall properly repair and restore same at its own
expense. In the event that at any time the party of
the first part shall lawfully elect to alter any street,
alley or other public way, the party of the second part
shall, upon reasonable notice, remove or relocate its
poles, wires, cables, conduits or other fixtures at its
own expense.
10. The party of the second part shall include in its
coverage to its customers any telecast originating from
a transmitter located within a forty (40) air mile radius
from the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, provided that
such telecasts effect either a Grade A, or Grade B, con-
tour in the City of Owensboro as indicated in the cur-
rent edition of Television Factbook, or any other au-
thoritative publication carrying such designation. It
is further agreed and understood that notwithstanding
any of the foregoing, the party of the second part shall
at all times include within its coverage to its customers
telecasts from all of the major networks.
11. The party of the first part may declare a forfeiture
of the franchise herein granted in the event of sub-
stantial violation of any of the terms hereof upon writ-
ten notice to the party of the second part specifying
the nature of the violation unless such violation is
58
corrected or ceases to exist within sixty (60) days from
the date of the written notice of same to the party of
the second part. Such forfeiture shall be by resolution
of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Owens-
boro, Kentucky.
12. The party of the second part shall, within sixty
(60) days from the date hereof, make proper applica-
tion to the Federal Communications Commission and to
any and all other governmental agencies, both state
and federal as is provided by law, for any permits, li-
censes or approvals necessary to construct, maintain
and operate the system. The party of the second part
shall commence the construction of the system hereia
at a reasonable time from the securing of such permits,
licenses and approvals and shall prosecute such con-
struction with due diligence; it being understood, as a
condition of this franchise, that the construction of
such system shall be completed to the extent of making
available community antenna service to substantially
all of the citizens of Owensboro, Kentucky, on or be-
fore two (2) years from the date hereof or this fran-
chise shall be and become null and void without notice
or further act by the party of the first part. For cause,
in its sole discretion, the Board of Commissioners of
the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, may extend said
two (2) year deadline from time to time upon written
application for same by the second party at least sixty
(60) days prior to said deadline or extension thereof.
13. The franchise, right, privilege and power herein
granted, together with all of the terms and conditions
hereof, shall extend and apply to the successors and
assigns of the party of the second part, however, no
assignment of same may be made, except by operation
of law, until said assignment has been approved by a
_—
59
resolution of the Board of Commissioners of the City
of Owensboro, Kentucky, which approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. In the event such assignment
takes place with such consent, then immediately upon
the delivery to the City of Owensboro of the aforesaid
agreement of assignment, duly executed by the as-
signee, all of the rights, obligations and privileges
herein granted to the second party shall forthwith de-
volve upon the assignee who shall im all respects stand
in the place and stead of the original corporation here-
under. In the event the party of the second part, or its
successors or assigns shall be adjudged bankrupt or
placed in receivership, the party of the first part may,
at its option, declare the rights herein granted to be
forfeited and terminated.
14. As part of the consideration for the rights and
privileges herein granted, the party of the second part
agrees to provide one free drop, with no monthly serv-
ice charge to the City Hall building, fire and police sta-
tions, public library and to all public and parochial
primary and secondary schools located within the City
of Owensboro, Kentucky, which are passed by a cable.
15. It is agreed and understood that the party of the
second part shall not erect its receiving tower in an
area of Daviess County, Kentucky, that will interfere
in any manner with aircraft approaches to the Owens-
boro-Daviess County Airport and shall secure approval
of such location from the F.A.A. prior to constructing
such receiving tower.
16. In the event any section, clause, paragraph or pro-
vision of this grant shall be declared invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall
not effect the validity of this grant as a whole, or any
part thereof, other than the part declared invalid.
60
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOFP, witness the signa-
tures of the parties hereto on this the day and date
first hereinabove written.
City of Owensboro, Kentucky
Attest: By
Mayor
City Clerk
SECTION 4. The City Manager shall report the sale
of said franchise to the Board of City Commissioners which
shall then either affirm or reject said sale. In the event
of the affirmation of the sale, said Board of Commissioners
shall direct the execution and delivery of the franchise to
the buyer by the Mayor and City Clerk.
SECTION 5. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in
conflict herewith are to the extent of such conflict hereby
repealed.
Introduced, publicly read and approved on first read-
ing this 15th day of October, 1965.
Publicly read and approved on second reading this 22nd
day of October, 1965.
/s/ Dugan Best
Mayor
Attest:
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
STATE OF KENTUCKY
SCT.
CITY OF OWENSBORO
The undersigned as City Clerk of the City of Owens-
boro, Kentucky, hereby certifies that the above is a true
61
copy of said Ordinance as same appears on the records of
the City of Owensboro, of which records the undersigned is
legal custodian.
This July 24, 1970.
(s) Adelle Shelton, City Clerk
EXHIBITS 2 and 3
RESOLUTION NO. 36-65
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING SALE OF THE
CATV FRANCHISE TO TOP VISION CABLE
COMPANY, INC.
WHEREAS, by Ordinance No. 63-65, a Community An-
tenna Television Franchise was created and defined. Said
ordinance also directed the City Manager to advertise for
and sell said Franchise, and
WHEREAS, on November 16, 1965, the City Manager
of the City of Owensboro did make such sale of franchise
to the highest and best bidder, Top Vision Cable Company,
Ine. as indicated in his Report of Sale heretofore made to
the Board of Commissioners of the City of Owensboro.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY, AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. That the sale of the CATV Franchise
by the City Manager of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky,
to the highest and best bidder, the Top Vision Cable Com-
pany for 26% of the gross proceeds of its income as shown
on the report of such sale, be, and the same is hereby con-
firmed, ratified and approved.
SECTION 2. The Mayor and the City Clerk of the
City of Owensboro are hereby authorized and directed to
execute the Franchise Agreement as defined and created
by Ordinance 63-65 and deliver same to the said Top Vision
Cable Company, Inc.
ee”
—
62
Introduced, publicly read and finally approved on one
reading this 17th day of December, 1965.
/s/ Dugan Best
Mayor
Attest:
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
CITY OF OWENSBORO
The undersigned as City Clerk of the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky, hereby certifies that the above is a true copy of
Franchise Agreement as same appears on the records of
the City of Owensboro, of which records the undersigned
is legal custodian.
This July 24, 1970.
This Franchise Agreement made and entered into on
this the 17th day of December, 1965, by and between the
City of Owensboro, Kentucky, a municipal corporation of
the second class, Party of the First Part, and TOP VI-
SION CABLE COMPANY, INC. OF KENTUCKY, Party
of the Second Part.
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the
public service to be rendered by the party of the second
part to the residents of Owensboro, Kentucky, and the fur-
ther consideration as more fully set out herein, the party
of the first part does hereby grant unto the party of the
second part, its successors and assigns, for a period of
fifteen (15) years from the date hereof, the franchise and
privilege of using the public ways, streets, highways,
bridges or public places of the City of Owensboro, Ken-
tucky, for the supplying of visual and audio television and
radio signals to the public, subject to the following terms,
conditions and covenants, to-wit;
STATE OF KENTUCKY
SCT.
al ‘
1. The party of the second part, its successors or assigns,
shall have the franchise, privilege, right and power to erect,
install, construct, re-construct, replace, remove, repair,
maintain and operate in or upon, under, above, across and
from the streets, avenues, highways, sidewalks, bridges and
other public ways, easements, right-of-way and lands, as
now existing and all extensions thereof and additions
thereto, in the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, all equipment,
facilities, appurtenances and apparatus of any nature for
the purpose of receiving, amplifying, transmitting and dis-
tributing therefrom radio, electrical and electronic energy,
pictures, sounds, signals, impulses and communication, uni-
directional and multi-directional of every nature and de-
scription, audio and video, embracing any and all of the fre-
quencies of the electrical magnetic spectrum and to other-
wise engage in the business, services and activities gener-
ally known as and practiced now and in the future by com-
munity antenna television and audio communication serv-
ices in accordance with the laws of the United States of
America, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the City of
Owensboro, Kentucky, for a period of fifteen (15) years
from and after the date hereof; but subject to the restric-
tions and provisions herein contained.
2. The party of the second part, in consideration of the
terms of this franchise, agrees to pay to the party of the
first part a sum equal to the cost of the advertising and
selling of this franchise, upon proper billing by first party
to second party plus the sum of money equal to 26% of the
gross income received by the party of the second part from
all sources whatsoever derived within the City of Owens-
boro, the payment of which shall be payable one-half (14)
thereof in semi-annual payments. Said semi-annual pay-
ment dates shall be the 30th day of June and the 31st day
of December of each year and each semi-annual payment
shall be made within 30 days thereafter. The party of the
—"
second part shall keep complete records of accounts show-
ing dates and payments received and any duly authorized
agent of the City of Owensboro shall have the right, power
and authority to inspect the gross monthly income records
of the party of the second part.
3. There is hereby granted to the party of the second part,
insofar as the City of Owensboro may legally grant same,
the further right, privilege and authority to lease, rent or
in any other manner obtain the use of towers, poles, lines,
cables and other equipment and facilities from any city
owned utility and any and all holders of public licenses and
franchises within the corporate limits of the City of Owens-
boro, subject to all existing and future ordinances, regula-
tions and laws of the City of Owensboro and the Common-
wealth of Kentucky. It is the stated intention of the party
of the first part that all holders of public licenses and fran-
chises within the corporate limits of the City of Owensboro
shall cooperate with the party of the second part to allow
party joint useage of their poles and pole-line facilities
whenever possible and whenever such use does not interfere
with the normal operations of such poles and pole-lines.
However, the party of the second part shall own and have
complete responsibility for the maintenance and operation
of the full system and that responsibility shall not be di-
vided. Prior to the erection or installation of any such
towers, poles, guys and anchors on any municipal proper-
ties, including public ways and easements, the party of the
second part shall secure approval of said location by the
City Manager of the City of Owensboro or any other au-
thorized person designated by the City and also secure ap-
proval from any state or county official of any locations
on the properties, including public ways and easements of
the State of Kentucky and County of Daviess. Such per-
mission shall not be unreasonably withheld on the part of
the City.
64
ZZ
65
4. The party of the second part shall, during the existence
of this franchise, furnish reasonable, adequate and efficient
community antenna reception service to the subscribers
connected to its system within the corporate limits of the
City of Owensboro and said party of the second part agrees
to construct and maintain its system in reasonable repair
and working order, said system to be constructed with top
grade American made equipment and second party shall
provide adequate facilities for maintenance of same. These
maintenance requirements may be temporarily suspended
by disaster or emergency conditions or other circumstances
beyond its reasonable control.
5. The party of the second part shall charge only reason-
able rates for the service rendered to its customers, but
shall not as to any rates, charges, service facilities, rules,
regulations or in any other respect make or grant any pref-
erence or advantage to any person or subject any person
to any prejudice or disadvantage; provided, however, they
shall not be deemed to prohibit the es*ablishment of a grad-
uated seale of charges and classified rate schedules to which
any customer, within such classification shall be entitled.
6. The party of the second part shall not directly or in-
directly engage in any phase of the business of television
receiving set sale, lease, repair or maintenance within the
City of Owensboro, Daviess County, Kentucky, nor shall it
use its community antenna television, radio and audio com-
munication services constructed under this franchise for the
purpose of pay television.
7. No privilege or exemption is granted or deferred by this
franchise except these specifically prescribed herein. Any
privilege claimed under this franchise in any street, public
way or easement shall be subordinate to any prior lawful
occupancy of the street and to all laws, ordinances and reg-
ulations of the City of Owensboro, State of Kentucky and
the United States of America. No rights, franchise or priv-
ileges herein granted are to be exclusive.
- tone
—
8. The party of the second part shall at all times indem-
nify, protect and save harmless the City of Owensboro, any
official, agency, commission or board thereof from and
against any and all liability, losses and physical damage to
property and bodily injury or death to persons, including
payments made under Workmen’s Compensation laws which
may arise out of or be caused by the erection, construction,
replacement, removal, maintenance and operations of the
party of the second part’s community antenna television and
audio communications service and resulting from or by any
negligent fault or misconduct on its part or by its agents,
officers, servants and employees and it shall carry a policy
or policies of liability insurance indemnifying all loss, dam-
age or destruction of property to the extent of $25,000.00
and as to any one person, city, agency or board in the
amount of $100,000.00 and as to any one accident resulting
in liability on account of injury to or ‘death of one person
and in the amount of $300,000.00 as to any one accident as
it may relate to damages to persons and property.
9, The party of the second part shall, in the case of any
opening or obstruction in the streets or other public ways
of the City of Owensboro made by it in the course of con-
struction, operation or removal of its installations, guard
such activity by the placement of adequate barriers, fences
or boardings, the bounds of which during the periods of
dusk and darkness shall be clearly designated by warning
lights. In the case of any disturbance or damage to any
streets or public ways occurring in the course of erection,
installation, construction, reconstruction, replacement, re-
moval, repair, maintenance or operation, the party of the
second part shall properly repair and restore same at its
own expense. In the event that at any time the party of
the first part shall lawfully elect to alter any street, alley
or other public way, to party of the second part shall, upon
reasonable notice, remove or relocate its poles, wires, cables,
conduits or other fixtures at its own expense.
66
—
10. The party of the second part shall include in its cov-
erage to its customers any telecast originating from a
transmitter located within a forty (40) air mile radius from
the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, provided that such tele-
casts effect either a Grade A, or Grade B, contour in the
City of Owensboro as indicated in the current edition of
Television Factbook, or any other authoritative publication
carrying such designation. It is further agreed and under-
stood that notwithstanding any of the foregoing, the party
of the second part shall at all times include within its cov-
erage to its customers telecasts from all of the major net-
works.
11. The party of the first part may declare a forfeiture of
the franchise herein granted in the event of substantial vio-
lation of any of the terms hereof upon written notice to the
party of the second part specifying the nature of the viola-
tion unless such violation is corrected or ceases to exist
within sixty (60) days from the date of the written notice
of same to the party of the second part. Such forfeiture
shall be by resolution of the Board of Commissioners of
the City of Owensboro, Kentucky.
12. The party of the second part shall, within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, make proper application to the
Federal Communications Commission and to any and all
other governmental agencies, both state and federal as is
provided by law, for any permits, licenses or approvals
necessary to construct, maintain and operate the system.
The party of the second part sha!l commence the construc-
tion of the system herein at a reasonable time from the
securing of such permits, licenses and approvals and shall
prosecute such construction with due dilligence; it being
understood, as a condition of this franchise, that the con-
struction of such system shall be completed to the extent
of making available community antenna service to substan-
tially all of the citizens of Owensboro, Kentucky, on or be-
fore two (2) years from the date hereof or this franchise
67
aa
68
shall be and become null and void without notice or further
act by the party of the first part. For cause, in its sole
diseretion, the Board of Commissioners of the City of
Owensboro, Kentucky, may extend said two (2) year dead-
line from time to time upon written application for same by
the second party at least sixty (60) days prior to said dead-
line or extension thereof.
13. The franchise, right, privilege and power herein
granted, together with all of the terms and conditions
hereof, shall extend and apply to the successors and assigns
of the party of the second part, however, no assignment of
same may be made, except by operation of law, until said
assignment has been approved by a resolution of the Board
of Commissioners of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky,
which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. In the
event such assignment takes place with such consent, then
immediately upon the delivery to the City of Owensboro
of the aforesaid agreement of assignment, duly executed by
the assignee, all of the rights, obligations and privileges
herein granted to the second party shall forthwith devolve
upon the assignee who shall in all respects stand in the place
and stead of the original corporation hereunder. In the
event the party of the second part, or its successors or
assigns shall be adjudged bankrupt or placed in receiver-
ship, the party of the first part may, at its option, declare
the rights herein granted to be forfeited and terminated.
14. As part of the consideration for the rights and priv-
ileges herein granted, the party of the second part agrees
to provide one free drop, with no monthly service charge
to the City Hall building, fire and police stations, public
library and to all public and parochial primary and secon-
dary schools located within the City of Owensboro, Ken-
tucky, which are passed by a cable.
15. It is agreed and understood that the party of the sec-
ond part shall not erect its receiving tower in an area of
Daviess County, Kentucky, that will interfere in any man-
<n
69
ner with aircraft approaches to the Owensboro-Daviess
County Airport and shall secure approval of such location
from the F.A.A. prior to constructing such receiving tower.
16. In the event any section, clause, paragraph or provi-
sion of this grant shall be declared invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not effect the
validity of this grant as a whole, or any part thereof, other
than the part declared invalid.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness the signatures
of the parties hereto on this the day and date first herein-
above written.
City of Owensboro, Kentucky
By /s/ Dugan Best
Mayor
Attest:
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
(Seal)
Top Vision Cable Company, Inc.
of Kentucky
By /s/ Harold R. Sagraves
Vice-President
STATE OF KENTUCKY
SCT.
CITY OF OWENSBORO
The undersigned as City Clerk of the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky, hereby certifies that the above is a true copy of
Franchise Agreement as same appears on the records of the
City of Owensboro, of which records the undersigned is
legal custodian.
This July 24, 1970.
a
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
mp
70
EXHIBIT 4
RESOLUTION NO. 56-70
RESOLUTION DENYING REQUEST FOR EX.
TENSION OF TIME TO COMPLETE SYSTEM
AND CONCEDING THE INVALIDITY OF SEC.
TION 2 OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT OF
TOP VISION CABLE COMPANY, INC. PROVID-
ING FOR PAYMENT OF 26% OF ITS GROSS
PROCEEDS.
WHEREAS, the Top Vision Cable Company, Ine. of
Kentucky agreed to complete the construction of a CATV
system in the City of Owensboro to the extent of making
available to substantially all the citizens of Owensboro
CATV service on or before December 17, 1967, and,
WHEREAS, the City of Owensboro, pursuant to writ-
ten application of Top Vision Cable Company, Inc., has
extended the time for completion of said system to Decem-
ber 20, 1970, and,
WHEREAS, on the 4th day of November, 1970, the said
Top Vision Cable Company, Inc. did deliver to the City a
written request bearing date of October 20, 1970, for an
extension of an additional one year period from December
20, 1970, for the completion of said system, and,
WHEREAS, the City of Owensboro does not deem fur-
ther extension of time for the completion of said system
to be in the interests of the citizens of Owensboro, and,
WHEREAS, the City of Owensboro wishes to officially
concede and agree with the position taken by Top Vision
Cable Company, Inc. that the agreement of said company
to pay the City 26% of the gross income of the Top Vision
Cable Company, Inc. derived in the City of Owensboro in
consideration of the franchise agreement it holds is invalid
under the interstate commerce clause of the United States
Constitution,
—
71
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY, AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. The request of Top Vision Cable Com-
pany, Inc. for an extension of time from and after Decem-
ber 20, 1970, for the substantial completion of its CATV
system in the City of Owensboro is hereby denied.
SECTION 2. The City of Owensboro does hereby of-
ficially declare its concession to and agreement with the
position of Top Vision Cable Company, Ine. that its agree-
ment to pay to the City 26% of the gross proceeds realized
by it from the operation of a CATV system in the City of
Owensboro is invalid and unenforceable under Article I,
Section 8, Clause III of the Constitution of the United
States.
Introduced, publicly read, rule suspended, and finally
adopted this 6th day of November, 1970.
/s/ Irvin Terrill
Mayor
Attest:
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
STATE OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF DAVIESS
I, Adelle Shelton, City Clerk of the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky, hereby certify that the above is a true copy of
Resolution No. 56-70 as finally approved by the Board of
Commissioners of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, on
November 6, 1970, as same appears of record in my office,
of which records I am legal custodian.
This November 10, 1970.
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
72
EXHIBIT 5
In the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Western District of Kentucky
at Owensboro
Civil Action No. 2519
Tor Vision Casuz,Inc. - - - - - Plaintiff
v.
Crry or Owenssoro, Kentucky, Er Au. - Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In October, 1965, the Board of Commissioners of the
City of Owensboro, Kentucky, enacted Ordinance No. 63-65
empowering the City Manager of Owensboro to advertise
and sell “a franchise authorizing the purchaser thereof to
use the public ways, streets, highways, bridges or public
places of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, for the purpose
of supplying community antenna television and audio tele-
vision and radio signals to the public”. Consideration for
the franchise was to be a sum equal to the cost of advertis-
ing and selling the franchise, plus a percentage of the pur-
chaser’s gross income derived from within the City of
Owensboro. Plaintiff, a Kentucky Corporation, obtained
the franchise with a bid of 26% of its gross income. The
original contract between the parties called for substantial
completion of the CATV system within two years. How-
73
ever, on written application of plaintiff, the City extended
the completion date to December 20, 1970.
Early in 1970 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that two ordinances substantially similar to the Owens-
boro Ordinance were unconstitutional because they imposed
a gross receipts tax upon proceeds from interstate com-
meree. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky,
Wonderland Ventures, Ine. v. City of Fremont, 423 F. 2d
548 (6th Cir. 1970). Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action in
this Court seeking a declaration that Ordinance 63-65 is
unconstitutional and a determination of the rights and lia-
bilities of the parties under the 1965 agreement.
On November 6, 1970, the Board of Commissioners of
the City of Owensboro approved Resolution No. 56-70
wherein it was conceded that the provision of Ordinance
No. 63-65 calling for payment to the City of a certain per-
centage of the franchise purchaser’s gross income “is in-
valid and unenforceable under Article I, Section 8, Clause
III of the Constitution of the United States”. Defendants
have now filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the ground that
there is no disagreement between the parties regarding the
only federal question raised by the complaint. In its re-
sponse to the motion to dismiss plaintiff urges us to declare
Ordinance No. 63-65 unconstitutional and to reach the ques-
tions of Kentucky law under the theory of pendent juris-
diction.
Section 2201 of Title 28, United States Code, requires
that in every suit for a declaratory judgment an actual con-
troversy exist between the parties. In this section the term
“eontroversy” is used in its constitutional sense. U. S.
Const. Art. III, §2, el. 1; Public Service Commission of
Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U. S. 237 (1952); Muller v.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 404 F. 2d 501 (2nd Cir.
1968). It is hornbook law that a federal court has no power
——
74 "
to hear claims that do not satisfy the “ease or controversy”
requirement of the Constitution. United Public Workers of
America (C.1.0.) v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947) ; ; Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911). If for any reason
a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear the only federal
claim before it, absent diversity of citizenship it cannot
reach other questions of state law raised by the complaint.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715
(1966) ; California Water Service Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S.
252 (1938).
Questions regarding the “case or controversy” require-
ment most commonly arise when the facts indicate that the
interests of the parties are not sufficiently adverse. Usu-
ally it is clear from the pleadings that the parties disagree
on some point of law. In the case at bar, curiously enough,
the usual situation is reversed. While the pleadings and
motions clearly indicate that the interests of the parties are
adverse, both sides apparently are in complete agreement
regarding the only federal question raised.
Counsel have cited no cases directly on point in their
supporting memoranda, and we also have been unable to
find any. However, after careful consideration, we have
concluded that neither the framers of the Constitution nor
the Congress could have intended us to rule on a question
of constitutional law concerning which no disagreement
exists between the parties, merely for the purpose of reach-
ing additional state law questions under the theory of
pendent jurisdiction. State issues predominate in this case,
and we think that their resolution should be left to the
courts of Kentucky. Accordingly, we hold that no actual
controversy exists between the parties as to the only federal
question raised by the complaint, and that therefore we lack
jurisdiction to rule on both the constitutionality of Ordi-
nance No. 63-65 and on the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties under Kentucky law.
75
In view of our disposition of this case it is unnecessary
to rule.on defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is SUSTAINED.
November 19, 1970
/s/ James F. Gordon
United States District Judge
Copies to:
Hon. Joseph H. McKinley
Hon. E. Stratford Smith
Hon. Hugh D. Moore
EXHIBIT 6
RESOLUTION NO. 60-67
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING EXTENSION OF
TIME FOR COMPLETION OF CATV SYSTEM
IN OWENSBORO.
WHEREAS, the Top Vision Cable Company, holder of
a CATV Franchise for the City of Owensboro, has re-
quested the Board of Commissioners by letter dated Oc-
tober 5, 1967, that the two year period provided for in its
franchise during which its CATV system shall be com-
pleted, be extended for an additional twelve months due to
its operations being halted by hearing currently pending
with the Federal Communications Commission; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Commissioners is aware of
the matters now pending between the Top Vision Cable
Company and the Federal Communications Commission and
deem said request for an extension of time to be reasonable ;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
-BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY, AS FOLLOWS:
76
SECTION 1. That the request of the Top Vision Cable
Company for a twelve (12) month extension of the time
within which the construction of its system shall be com-
pleted to the extent of making available community antenna
service to substantially all of the citizens of Owensboro be,
and the same is hereby granted.
Introduced, publicly read, rules suspended and finally
approved on one reading this October 6, 1967.
(s) Irvin Terrill
Mayor Pro Tem
Attest:
(s) Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
October 5, 1967
Board of Commissioners
City of Owensboro, Kentucky
Max N. Rhoads, City Manager
Re: CATV Franchise
Completion Date
Gentlemen:
Referring to Article 12 in our Franchise granted Decem-
ber 17, 1965, it states “that the construction of such sys-
tem shall be completed to the extent of making available
community antenna service to substantially all of the citi-
zens of Owensboro, Ky., on or before two (2) years from the
date hereof or this franchise shall be and become null and
void without notice or further act by the party of the
first part. For cause, in its sole discretion, the Board of
Commissioners of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, may
extend said two (2) year deadline from time to time upon
written application for sarae by the second party at least
sixty (60) days prior to said deadline or extension thereof.”
Due to circumstances beyond our control, a situation
you gentlemen are well aware of has hindered us from con-
77
struction work as we had planned. At the present time we
have 55 miles of system in operation and have another 100
miles to complete.
As per the provision made in our franchise, we are ask-
ing for an extension of 12 months from the date the FCC
grants us @ permanent waiver.
Very truly yours,
Drexel V. Bates
Chairman of the Board
DVB:jd
EXHIBIT 7
RESOLUTION NO. 66-68
RESOLUTION GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME
TO DECEMBER 20, 1970 FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
CATV SYSTEM WITHIN CITY OF OWENSBORO,
KY.
WHEREAS, the City of Owensboro has heretofore
granted to Top Vision Cable Company, Inc. the Franchise
created by Ordinance No. 63-65, which provides for the op-
eration of a CATV system in the City of Owensboro, and
WHEREAS, Section 12 of said Franchise provides that
the Board of Commissioners of the City of Owensboro may,
in its discretion for cause, extend the time therein specified
for the completion of said system within the City, and
WHEREAS, since the granting of said Franchise the
Federal Communication Commission has adopted regula-
tions which would adversely affect the contemplated op-
eration of said system within the City, and
WHEREAS, the said Top Vision Cable Company, Inc.
has agreed to institute proceedings before the Federal Com-
munication Commission in an effort to relieve the CATV
System in the City of Owensboro from the operation of
certain restrictive regulations of said Commission, said pro-
Bs 2
78
ceedings being novel in character and constituting a “test
case”, and
WHEREAS, the Board of Commissioners deem the un-
foreseen stringent regulation of the Federal Communica-
tion Commission now in force and the proposed proceedings
challenging them, sufficient cause for granting the written
application of Top Vision Cable Company, Inc. for an ex-
tension of time within which to complete its system within
the City.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF
OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY, AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. Top Vision Cable Company, Inc. is hereby
granted an extension of time to and including December
20, 1970, to substantially complete construction of a CATV
system within the City of Owensboro as provided in the
Franchise from the City for said system heretofore granted.
Introduced, publicly read and approved on one reading
this December 20, 1968.
/s/ C. Waitman Taylor, Jr.
Mayor
Attest:
/s/ Adelle Shelton
City Clerk
October 5, 1967
Board of Commissioners
City of Owensboro, Kentucky
Max N. Rhoads, City Manager
Re: CATV Franchise
Completion Date
Gentlemen:
Referring to Article 12 in our Franchise granted De-
cember 17, 1965, it states “that the construction of such
system shall be completed to the extent of making avail-
79
able community antenna service to substantially all of the
citizens of Owensboro, Ky., on or before two (2) years from
the date hereof or this franchise shall be and become null
and void without notice or further act by the party of the
first part. For cause, in its sole discretion, the Board of
Commisioners of the City of Owensboro, Kentucky, may
extend said two (2) year deadline from time to time upon
written application for same by the second party at least
sixty (60) days prior to said deadline or extension thereof.”
Due to circumstances beyond our control, a situation you
gentlemen are well aware of has hindered us from con-
struction work as we had planned. At the present time we
have 55 miles of system in operation and have another 100
miles to complete.
As per the provision made in our franchise, we are
asking for an extension of 12 months from the date the
FCC grants us a permanent waiver.
Very truly yours,
Drexel V. Bates
Chairman of the Board
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.