Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — United Transportation Union v. United States
Supreme Court brief1973
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1972
No. £27393
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit
CHARLES R. JUDGE
WILLIAM C. MAIER
1601 Syndicate Trust Building
915 Olive Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
241-4261
Attorneys for Petitioner
St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411-15 N. Eighth St. 63101 814-231-4477
—
INDEX
Page
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DE kc sechatiaekeebereebeedecesndsneesees 2
Statutory provisions involved ..................+4-- 2
/ ¶ ͤ—;ůB—ͤ-⅜ẽ V4 4
, ci¢neetdeedecudewesebasvaceccee 7
Reasons for granting the write. 8
DED <cdtecsoutasetsniedbaisddicorbersenstes 14
Appendix A—Opinions of the Court of Appeals ..... A-1
Appendix B—Opinion of the District Court ........ A-27
Cases Cited
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard (1952),
EE CO sacdoddenteendiscuncecesmedcoeekecens 5,9
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transportation
Rene. e 9
Conley v. Gibson (1957), 355 U.S. 1ũd41U᷑d̃ꝗ. 9
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), 401 U.S. 424 12, 13
Howard v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co. (8th Cir. 1951), 191 F.2d
— Qͥ] 6m x 5
Howard v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co. (8th Cir. 1954), 215 F. 2d
— ĩ⅛ͤ dd . ceusemmelel 5
Howard v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co. (E. D. Mo. 1965), 244 F.
f A 5
Howard v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co. (8th Cir. 1966), 361 F. 2d
aasee occ cccsvsvncccesccsves 5, 9
ii
Howard v. Thompson (E.D.Mo. 1947), 72 F.Supp. 695
Norman v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1969), 414 F.2d 73 10
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1944), 323 U.S. 192 9
U. S. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. (1971), 451 F.2d
418, cert. den. April 24, 1972 ............eceeseeee 10
Statutes Cited
—1 A ninmiawcecaiics 2
Werne 4 4 2,12
% cdukaivelaviovned 3,12
—. ——U—U— Kk 4
— 1 —lQ̃7ô3“V ß 3,12
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Congressional Record Cited
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1972
6
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit
The Petitioner, United Transportation Union, as suc-
cessor to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, respect-
fully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment and opinions of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit entered in this proceeding on
June 13, 1972.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported,
appear in the Appendix hereto. The opinion of the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern Division of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri is reported at 52 FRD 276 and also ap-
pears in the Appendix hereto.
a
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
June 13, 1972 and this petition for certiorari was filed
within ninety (90) days of that date. This Court’s ju-
risdiction is invoked under 28 USC 5 1254 (1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
United States Code, Title 42 § 20000-2(h)
Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of
production; ability tests; compensation based on
sex and authorized by minimum wage provisions
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit sys-
tem, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production or to employees who work in dif-
ferent locations, provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter for any employer to differ-
entiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to em-
ployees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
—
§ 20000-2(j)
Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of
existing number or percentage imbalance
(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-
preted to require any employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified for employment by any em-
ployment agency or labor organization, admitted to mem-
bership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted
to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or percent-
age of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or
in the available work force in any community, State, sec-
tion, or other area.
Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 255.
§ 2000-5 (g)
Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; reinstatement,
hiring, back pay; reduction of back pay by interim
earnings or amount earnable; limitations on judicial
orders
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
.
clude reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or with-
out back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, re-
sponsible for the unlawful employment practice). Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence
by the person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No
order of the court shall require the admission or rein-
statement of an individual as a member of a union or
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of
this title.
United States Code, Title 45
§ 152 First
General Duties
First. It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers,
agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort
to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all dis-
putes, whether arising out of the application of such
agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interrup-
tion to commerce or to the operation of any carrier grow-
ing out of any dispute between the carrier and the em-
ployees thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought in the name of the United
States, by the then Attorney General, against the St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway Company (Frisco) and the
— °°.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, predecessor of peti-
tioner, under the authority of section 707 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCA § 2000e-6). Relief was sought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for train
porters employed by Frisco, and is a follow-on of earlier
litigation involving the train porter-brakemen dispute
brought under the Railway Labor Act.!
Train porters constituted a class of employees, all of
whom are Negro, working exclusively on passenger trains
(R 546, 651). They have existed as a separate craft on
the Frisco since at least 1884 (R 649-650). The District
Court found that their primary duty was the care and
comfort of passengers (R 44, 48) but they also performed
head-end braking duties when the occasion required (R
45, 48). Frisco discontinued passenger service in De-
cember 1967, terminating the employment of train porters
(R 589). Frisco offered other employment to its fur-
loughed train porters, waiving some of its normal re-
quirements for new hires, but without carryover seniority
(R 676-7). Some of them accepted employment as brake-
men (R 586-9, 607).
Brakemen worked in both freight and passenger serv-
ice, with those holding passenger assignments being senior
men with extensive freight experience (R 456, 635). The
characteristics of freight work stand in stark contrast
to passenger work (R 635-6). In the yards, and in local
freight and road switching, the work is largely outdoors,
extremely hazardous, involving complex switching move-
ments and long hours (R 151-4, 463-6, 536-7). In through
freight, the length and weight of trains causes equipment
1 Prior reported decisions in the first Howard case include How-
ard v. Thompson (E.D.Mo. 1947), 72 F.Supp. 695; Howard v.
St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co. (8th Cir. 1951), 191 F.2d 442; Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Howard (1952), 343 U.S. 768; Howard v.
St.L.-S.F. Ry. Co. (8th Cir. 1954), 215 F.2d 690. The second
Howard case is reported at Howard v. St.L.-S.F. Ry. Co. (ED.
Mo. 1965), 244 F.Supp. 1008; Howard v. St.L.-S.F. Ry. Co. (8th
Cir. 1966), 361 F.2d 905, cert. den. 385 U.S. 986.
failures requiring on the spot repairs (R 620-2, 636-670),
and since the crews work out of pools, the starting time
for a crew is uncertain (R 544, 636-7). Passenger service
was largely indoor work, with regular hours and virtually
no equipment problems (R 635). The passenger brake-
man, as flagman, was required by flagging rules to appear
at the rear of the train every time it stopped (R 543-4).
With the introduction of Centralized Traffic Control, and
as a result of Arbitration Award 282 under Public Law
88-108 the flagging rules were changed, and most flagman
positions were abolished (R 666-8).
Prior to 1928, Negroes were hired as brakemen. In that
year an agreement between four train service organiza
tions and Frisco prohibited the future employment of Ne-
groes in train, engine and yard service except as train
porters. This agreement was terminated in 1949, but the
first employment of a Negro in those services appears to
have been in 1963, when train porter Pogue was employed
as a fireman (R 542, 694).
The District Court in a memorandum decision found that
“the duties of a train porter and brakeman are essentially
different” and that “the crafts of train porter and brake-
man are based upon functional differentiations” (R 50).
alten
failure to grant carryover seniority to train porters hired
as brakemen violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The relief ordered requires Frisco to offer employ-
ment as brakemen to all former train porters, to create
and implement a training program, providing training
for a period of not to exceed six months, with those for-
mer train porters who are then found to be qualified to
receive seniority as brakemen for 100% of the time spent
in training plus 50% of their former seniority as a train
porter. Those former train porters now employed as brake-
men are to receive 100% credit for time spent as a brake-
man plus 50% of their time as a train porter. Back pay
was denied.
hazardous duties of freight brakemen with safety and
efficiency.
2. Whether the fact that Negroes had not been hired as
brakemen for a period of years prior to the effective date
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes a
court to grant to one group of Negroes, previously em-
ployed in the functionally distinguishable craft of train
porter and who are wholly without experience in freight
service, seniority rights as brakemen, which brakeman sen-
iority will be retroactive to dates prior to the effective date
of Title VII, or whether such action constitutes preferen-
tial treatment and retroactive relief prohibited by the Act.
I
In this action, the majority of the Court of Appeals, in
granting relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, grants retroactive seniority as brakemen to men
formerly employed as train porters, a functionally differ-
by experience to perform the hazardous and demanding
duties of freight brakemen, the decision requires a train-
ing period and then restricts the exercise of the seniority
rights so granted by giving Frisco the power to exclude
them from any duty they should not perform for safety
reasons. It thus reduces to a shambles the historical
practices in the railroad industry, developed under the
mandates of the Railway Labor Act (45 USCA, §151 et
seq.) and which can be related directly to safety and ef-
ficiency that are so vital to the industry, its employees and
the public.
It is self evident that to justify relief under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 there must be found to
exist some violation of that Act. The only alleged viola-
tion found by the majority was ‘‘Frisco’s refusal to ac-
cord the train porters any seniority’’ (p. 8, slip opinion).
Totally ignored was the fact that that action was com-
pelled by Frisco’s statutory obligation under the Railway
Labor Act ‘‘to make and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions (45 USCA,
§ 152, First, R. 653-5). That this command is not merely
a statement of policy but imposes a judicially enforceable
legal obligation binding on both the carrier and the union
was settled in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Trans-
portation Union (1971), 402 U.S. 570.
1
„At any rate, title VII would have no effect on
the duties of any employer or labor organization un-
der the NLRA or under the Railway Labor Act, and
those duties would continue to be enforced as they
now are.“ 110 Cong. Rec. 6986.
It is clear that Title VII can be construed in accom-
modation with the Railway Labor Act. In fact, this was
done in an earlier panel decision of the 8th Circuit, only
one judge of which panel sat in this case. In Norman v.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1969), 414 F.2d 73, involving
a similar train porter-brakeman dispute on the Missouri
Pacific, it was held that if the classification of train
porter was a racial counterpart of brakeman, Title VII
would operate to grant relief; but if that classification
was based on functional differentiations’’, the Railway
Labor Act would apply. The Norman case is not even
mentioned in the opinions below even though petitioner
relied heavily upon it and the District Court followed its
guidelines in reaching its decision.
Had the guidelines of Norman been followed, the result
below would not have been possible and the District Court
would have been affirmed. Instead, the majority chose
to ignore its own prior decision as well as the Railway
Labor Act. In so doing, it has opened the door to great
mischief in a very sensitive area, and has decided an im-
portant question of federal law which has not, but should
be, settled by this court.‘
In the only other appellate decision applying Title VII to the
railroad industry, the 5th Circuit in U.S. v. Jacksonville Ter-
minal Co. (1971), 451 F.2d 418, cert. den. — 24, 1972, ex-
limited the effects of its decision in this language: “It
should be self-evident that our decision with respect to seniority
rights and transfer and promotion restrictions applies only to
their use at this single facility, not to the whole railroad world.”
451 — at 455. No such limitation is discernible in the deci-
sion here.
II
The sole reason assigned by the majority below for
granting relief in this case is the fact that for a number
of years prior to the effective date of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Frisco did not hire Negroes as
brakemen. Since that time, neither Frisco nor petitioner
is charged with any discriminatory acts excepting only
the allegation that the refusal to recognize carry-over
seniority to train porters violates the Act (R. 548-550).
The Pre-Act exclusionary practice had its origin in a
1928 agreement, which was terminated in 1949, under
which the hiring of Negroes in train, engine and yard
service, except as train porters, was prohibited (R. 542).
Negroes as a class were thus excluded from employment,
but train porters, whose existence as a separate craft is
traced in this record back to 1884, were not affected.®
Prior to 1928, Negroes were hired as brakemen and these
continued in service, the government admitting that at all
times since at least 1917 there have been Negroes em-
ployed as brakemen on the Frisco (R. 548). It is not
open to dispute that train porter’ was a functional
classification, the duties of the craft being essentially
different from those of brakemen, as the District Court
found.
The decision below provides preferential treatment for
one group of Negroes, the train porters, solely because all
Negroes were for a time excluded from employment as
brakemen.* We contend that this relief is in clear viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
5 The majority below erred in stating that under federal con-
trol during World War I the crafts of train porter and brakeman
were merged. The pay of train porters was equalized with
that of passenger brakemen, but Frisco continued to earry them
as a separate craft (R. 763, 813-4). ;
The theory of the majority below was that train porters
would have preferred employment as brakemen if that were
1
In the only decision to date by this court involving non-
procedural issues of racial discrimination under Title VII
it was said in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), 401 US.
424 at 431:
‘Discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecesary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
‘esible classification.”
Turning to the Act, sec. 703(h) excepts from the opera-
tion of Title VII differences in pay and other conditions of
employment “pureuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system. 42 USCA § 2000e-2(h).
Sec. 703(j) provides that nothing contained in Title VII
shall require ‘‘preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group’”’ because of race or color. 42 USCA §
20000e-2(j).
Sec. 706(g) dealing with the scope of judicial relief
authorized under Title VII excludes relief where the acts
complained of occurred for any reason other than dis-
crimination on account of race, color * * * in violation of
section 704(a)’’. 42 USCA § 2000e-5(g).
— 13 —
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, the court gave
great weight to the Senate debates on Title VII in arriv-
ing at its proper construction. Turning to those debates
establishes that the relief provided by the majority below
is far beyond the proper scope of judicial authority.
An interpretative memorandum prepared by Senators
Clark and Case, floor managers of the bill, contains the
following statement:
„Title VII would have no effect on established seni-
ority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retro-
spective. Thus, for example, if a business has been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-
white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer’s obligation would be simply to fill fu-
ture vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would
not be obliged—or indeed, permitted—to fire whites
in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for fu-
ture vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give
them special seniority rights at the expense of the
white workers hired earlier.“ 110 Cong. Rec. 6992-4.
In response to questions submitted by Senator Dirksen,
Senator Clark prepared answers, one of which is the fol-
lowing:
„Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his
employment list because of discrimination, what hap-
pens to seniority?
„Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will
not require an employer to change existing seniority
sts.
110 Cong. Rec. 6995-7.
Looking to the Act, its legislative history, and the de-
cision of this court in Griggs, establishes, we believe, that
the decision below is an impermissible exercise of judicial
authority in the following respects:
=== 14
It requires a change in seniority rosters to give retro-
active seniority as brakemen to train porters, seniority
which will in fact extend back long prior to the effective
date of Title VII.
It nullifies a bona fide seniority system, one that is based
on functional differentiations and business necessity, in
the overriding importance of safety and efficiency in the
inherently dangerous business of train operations.
It gives preferential treatment to one group of Negroes,
solely because of race, where the only act complained of,
the refusal to grant carry-over seniority to that group,
occurred for reasons wholly unrelated to race.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons aforesaid, a Writ of Certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinions of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Respectfully submitted
CHARLES R. JUDGE
WILLIAM C. MAIER
1601 Syndicate Trust Building
915 Olive Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
241-4261
Attorneys for Petitioner
*
APPENDIX A
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 71-1247
United States of America, }
Appellant,
” Appeal from the
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway | United States Dis-
0 d United trict Court for the
—~ Trams- + western District of
portation Union, Successor to —
Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men,
Appellees. 1
Submitted: May 8, 1972.
Filed: June 13, 1792.
Before Matrues, Chief Judge, Van OosterHouT, Menarry,
Lay, Heaney, Bricut, Ross and Srernenson, Circuit
Judges.
Ross, Circuit Judge.
This is an action brought by the United States charging
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company (Frisco) and
United Transportation Union (UTU), successor to the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT), with having
8
engaged in a policy and practice of discrimination on
account of race, in their dealings with black train porters
formerly employed by Frisco, in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg.) .
The Government seeks to have Frisco reclassify the former
train porters as brakemen, and, by a merger of these two
crafts, allow them to claim seniority accumulated as train
porters in their new classification.
The trial court denied the request of the Government
for a merger of the crafts and dismissed the action. United
States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 52 F. R. D.
276 (E. D. Mo. 1971). On appeal to this Court, a majority
of the panel, which heard the case, affirmed on the basis
of the opinion of the trial court. United States v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Railway Co., No. 71-1247 (8th Cir. Feb. 22,
1972). The United States filed a petition for rehearing
en banc, and it was granted. Upon rehearing en banc, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with the views expressed in this opinion.
The essence of the claim of the United States is that
from 1928 to 1966 Frisco discriminated against blacks in
its hiring practices relating to brakemen; that black ap-
plicants for jobs with Frisco were forced to accept the
lower paying job of train porter; that train porters per-
formed head-end braking duties as well as duties relating
to passenger care and maintenance on passenger trains;
that when pasenger trains were discontinued by Frisco,
1 This is the latest in a series of cases involving essentially the
same parties. Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo.
1947); rev'd, 191 F.2d 442 (8 Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 215
F.2d 690 (8 Cir. 1954); Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co., 244 F.Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 905
8 Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 986 (1966). However, this is the
rst action instituted subsequent to the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, it is the first case to consider the
distinction between the duties of the train porter and the freight
brakeman.
-— A.§ —
passenger brakemen were allowed to carry over all of their
seniority to freight braking jobs; that even though train
porters performed braking duties a substantial portion of
the time they spent as train porters, they were not per-
mitted to carry over any seniority to freight braking, but
were required to start at the bottom of the seniority
ladder; and that this denial of carryover seniority was a
present discriminatory effect of past discrimination, pre-
served by an otherwise neutral current employment policy,
which should be remedied under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
The craft of train porter? had been recognized by Frisco
since at least December, 1918; and it had been organized
and represented for collective bargaining purposes since
1921.“ It had always been filled solely by blacks, and the
black train porters were always paid lower wages than
brakemen, except for a period during and shortly after
World War I, when the railroads were under federal con-
trol and the crafts of train porter and brakeman were
merged. Train porters and brakemen were always repre-
sented by separate bargaining units.
In 1928, Frisco and the BRT, which represented the
brakemen, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement,
which provided that ‘‘in the future hiring of employees
in train, engine, and yard service but not including Train
Porters, only white men shall be employed.“ Although this
2 Train porters should not be confused with chair car porters,
who were paid less and whose job included no braking duties.
8 Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., supra, 361
F.2d at 907. In this litigation, Frisco presented evidence to show
that some train porters had entered service as early as 1884.
* The depositions taken from those black train porters who ini-
tiated their employment during the period this provision was in
force attest to the fact that it was applied strictly on racial
—— Train porter Edwards, who apparently asked for a
eman’s job shortly after the contract was initiated, was told
21111 21
; 1 Hin
A4
Adams,
of a
8
—
jobs as
was not
he
Pogue,
When
train
until „at which ti
a . However,
to trai in which
— —
Pogue ex
a
to revert
1717131.
fi i seh
Train porters assisted passengers, handled baggage,
kept coaches clean, and performed head-end braking duties
exclusively on passenger trains. The rear-end braking
duties on the passenger train, as well as braking duties
ters with Frisco revealed that their braking duties con-
sisted of flagging blocks, throwing switches, watching for
p ä
the
ora
not
whom
knew
hired as a brakeman until 1966, with one exception.“ Yet,
during this period from 1949 until 1965, at least 750 white
From 1966 until June, 1970, 63 black brakemen and switch-
on both ends of freight trains, were performed by brake-
men. The Government insists that throughout the period
in question, train porters were relegated to that craft
simply because of their race, and that this is borne out by
the fact they performed essentially the same functions as
Evidence given by individuals who had been train por-
brakemen were employed by Frisco at the entry level.
men were hired.*
agreement was rescinded in 1949, no black person was
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4d. 343 US.
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II
St. Louis-San
1951),
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7 In 1951
if]
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that on
The duties of freight brakeman include working in local
freight, yard switching, and through freight, which in-
volves ‘‘kicking’’ and dropping cars, where a car, mov
ing under its own momentum, is controlled by the brake-
man using a handbrake. A freight brakeman is also
to or from their starting or termination point) on freights,
and that thereby they were acquainted with most of the
duties,
then bid on a position as conductor or, prior to 1967, as
a rear-end brakeman on passenger trains. There is, how-
bidding, based upon seniority as a brakeman. When a
brakeman became a conductor he retained his seniority
as a brakeman in case he wanted to give up his conductor
classification and return to braking.
_ A majority of the original panel, of this Court, in affirm-
ing the trial court’s decision on the basis of his opinion,
stressed the applicability of the business necessity’’ doc-
trine and that seniority carryover could occur only at the
A of July 2, 1965, the effective
Act of
disability provision of the Railroad
— A-8 —
expense of safety and efficiency. On rehearing, neither
the Government nor the defendants suggested any new
alternative remedies that would adequately protect safety
and efficiency and, at the same time, relieve the train
porters of the continuing effects of past discrimination.
The alternative recommended by the Government, which
was urged by it and considered by the panel earlier, would
accord qualified train porters full seniority carryover in
bidding on future vacancies as brakemen. Thus, the only
difference in that remedy from a complete merger of
crafts is that there could be no displacement of incumbent
brakemen; rather, advancement would be possible only
when a vacancy occurs. The net long term effect of both,
however, is the same.
We are convinced that a remedy is justified and that
it is not impossible to fashion. First of all, it is clear
there was overt racial discrimination prior to the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that the con-
tinuing effect of that past discrimination perpetuates itself
in Frisco’s refusal to accord the train porters any sen-
iority. Second, the business necessity doctrine does not
bar relief where an acceptable remedy provides adequate
safeguards for safety and efficiency. And third, there is
an acceptable remedy in this case.
PRESENT EFFECTS OF PAST
DISCRIMINATION
The facts disclosed by the record in this case, as set
forth above, lead us to the inescapable conclusion that
Frisco systematically discriminated against blacks in hir-
ing new brakemen from 1928 until 1966. During the first
twenty-one years of that period, a written agreement
existed between Frisco and the BRT which absolutely pre-
cluded the hiring of black brakemen by Frisco. From
1949 to 1966, out of over 750 newly hired brakemen, only
one was black. Although the record does not contain spe-
cific evidence of the refusal of Frisco to hire blacks during
this period subsequent to the rescission of the restrictive
agreement in 1949, these statistics demonstrate just as
effectively as the testimony of a witness that Frisco and
the BRT systematically excluded blacks in hiring new
brakemen. See Arkansas Education Association v. Board
of Education, 446 F.2d 763, 770 n.4 (8th Cir. 1971); Bing
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F. 2d 687, 689 (5th Cir.
1971); Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford Divi-
sion of Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d 1157, 1160-1161 (8th
Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
433 F. 2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 36, 416
F.2d 123, 127 n.7 (8th Cir. 1969). This conclusion is fur-
ther strengthened by the disclosure that sixty-three blacks
were hired as brakemen from 1966 to 1970, including at
least five former porters. Obviously the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 had an effect on the hiring prac-
tices of Frisco and the acceptance of those revised hiring
practices by the BRT.
Even though Frisco adopted nondiscriminatory employ-
ment practices after the effective date of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the effects of its past discrimina-
tion carried over under the craft seniority system, espe-
cially after the discontinuance of its passenger service in
1967. At that time, the white brakemen on passenger trains
were able to use their seniority accumulated in passenger
service to bid on vacancies in freight service. But the
black train porters were not permitted to transfer any
portion of their seniority to any other craft, and were only
offered jobs in other crafts starting at the bottom of the
seniority ladder. Thus, for example, even though a train
porter had thirty years of experience, including substan-
tial experience performing head-end braking duties on
— A-10—
passenger trains, he was offered a position as a brakeman
junior in seniority to all other brakemen, including those
who might have been hired only a few weeks earlier.
This discrimination was evident not only in the rehiring
procedure offered by Frisco, but was bound to continue
until the death or retirement of all of the black train
porters who were transferring to brakeman. “Every time
a Negro worker hired under the old segregated system bids
against a white worker in his job slot, the old racial classi-
fication reasserts itself, and the Negro suffers anew for
his employer’s previous bias. Local 189, United Paper-
makers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980,
988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
Where an employer’s current policy serves to perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination, “although neutral on its
face, it rejuvenates the past discrimination in both fact
and law regardless of the present good faith. Marquez
v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford Division of Ford
Motor Co., supra, 440 F.2d at 1160; see Parham v. South
western Bell Telephone Co., supra, 433 F.2d at 427. There-
fore, [ulnder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral! in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). Barriers to
employment or advancement which are artificial, arbitrary
and unnecessary and cannot be justified by a showing of
business necessity, must be removed where they “operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification.” Id. at 431.
The conclusion is thus inescapable that there was past
discrimination by Frisco and by UTU, and its predecessor,
BRT, both by contract and in practice; that the discon-
tinuance of passenger trains by Frisco, and its refusal
(or inability) to permit the train porters to carry over any
part of their seniority, perpetuated that discrimination
— a
even though Frisco changed its hiring practices relating
to new employees; and that this perpetuation of the effects
of this past discrimination cannot be permitted to continue
absent a showing of compelling business necessity.
BUSINESS NECESSITY
“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id. at
431.
It is likewise apparent that a neutral policy, which is
inherently discriminatory, may be valid if it has over-
riding business justification. Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., supra, 431 F.2d at 249; see also, Local 189,
United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,
supra, 416 F.2d at 989. However, this doctrine of business
necessity, which has arisen as an exception to the amen-
ability of discriminatory practices, “connotes an irre-
sistible demand.” The system in question must not only
foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that
goal. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
40 USL.W. 3511 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1972) (Nos. 71-1000,
71-1010, & 71-1014). In other words, there must be no
acceptable alternative that will accomplish that goal
“equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.”
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. ad 791, 798 (Ath Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); accord, United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 446 F. 2d at 662.
Although Frisco and UT U argue strenuously that the
train porters should not be permitted to carry over their
3
seniority in bidding on braking job for safety reasons, we
are not convinced that this argument is necessarily valid.
Those train porters who did transfer to duties as brake-
men, without seniority, were not given any special training.
Their student runs were waived, and if they were able to
pass the physical examination, they started right out on
their new freight braking duties. Frisco conceded on oral
argument that they were performing these duties satis-
factorily.
As already noted, the train porters performed many
braking functions while working as porters. There are
some duties which are performed by freight brakemen that
were not performed by the train porters. However, there
was testimony that while deadheading on freights, the
train porters had an opportunity to observe the freight
brakemen in the performance of these duties, so they
have at least had the opportunity to learn by observation;
and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the train
porters are incapable of learning these additional duties
if Frisco offers them adequate training.
At the present time, Frisco has no ‘‘line of progres-
sion. It is not necessary for a brakeman to perform one
type of braking service prior to bidding on another type,
if he has enough total seniority as a brakeman. Conceiv-
ably, a brakeman can go right from braking in the yards
to through freight work, if he is willing to work long
enough in the yards before bidding on through freight.
After completion of the initial student runs, and after
passing the brakeman’s examination, seniority takes over
as the sole criteria in bidding on a particular braking
assignment. Length of service becomes synonymous with
qualified. This craft seniority system, as applied to the
facts of this case, perpetuates racial disparity and it can-
not be justified on the basis of business necessity, since
there exists a nondiscriminatory alternative means of
determining qualifications.
£18.
The Act imposes upon employers—with the assist-
ance and cooperation of labor representatives—an
affirmative duty to devise and implement pertinent
objective criteria for determining what applicants for
promotion of transfer are qualified to fill particular
vacancies. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., supra, 451 F.2d at 453.
It is true that Frisco could not have permitted a transfer
of train porter seniority to the brakemen’s roster without
breaching its agreement with UTU, but ‘‘[t]he rights as-
sured by Title VII are not rights which can be bargained
away—either by a union, by an employer, or by both act-
ing in concert. Title VII requires that both a union and
employer represent and protect the best interests of mi-
nority employees. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., supra,
444 F. ad at 799; see also, United States v. Hayes Inter-
national Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1972) ;
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 451 F.2d
at 454-455. The UTU is not immune from the duties im-
posed by Title VII; it is a party to this action, and it will
have to accommodate itself to revisions in its contracts
and its rules and regulations which may be necessary to
assure compliance with the Act.
Frisco’s abdication, to the union, of control over the
qualifications of its brakemen to perform particular brak-
ing duties, cannot now be used as a reason for denying
fair treatment to the train porters under the guise of
safety. Safety can be assured in other ways far more
certain and practical than those inherent in the craft
seniority system, and we feel confident that the trial court,
acting within the general guidelines provided herein, will
be able to fashion a remedy which will not only assure
the safety of the public and employees of Frisco, but will
also accord to qualified train porters their “rightful
place“ as brakemen. ra a
— A-14—
REMEDY
In determining an appropriate remedy, courts poxsess
wide discretion in fashioning decrees to insure compliance
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., supra, 433 F.2d at 428; see United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). What we seek, of
course, is a reasonable alternative that will eliminate or
reduce the effects of past discrimination, as well as protect
safety and efficiency.
The Government seeks a complete merger of the crafts,
or in the alternative to require Frisco to permit qualified
black train porters to bid on future vacancies in freight
braking jobs as they become available, and to exercise in
those jobs their total company seniority for all future
purposes for which resort to seniority would customarily
be made. This alternative remedy has been referred to as
‘rightful place relief, while the complete and immediate
merger of crafts has been referred to as freedom now’’
relief. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and
the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV L. REV. 1260, 1268-1269
(1967). The Government also seeks back pay equal to
the difference between what the member of the class
received as a Train Porter, or from other employment
if his position as Train Porter had been abolished,
and what he would have received as a Brakeman, from
July 2, 1965 to such time as he is allowed to use his
Train Porter seniority to bid on and secure a job as
a freight Brakeman (or until the date he voluntarily
retired or became physically unable to perform as
Brakeman).“
Frisco and UT U urge that no relief be granted, and have
suggested no alternative remedies even though they were
specifically requested to do so by this Court.
— A-15 —
At its earliest convenience, the trial court shall deter- 5
mine the ambit of the class, 10 and take additional evidence
pertaining solely to the remedy to be fashioned. Based
upon that additional evidence, and using the guidelines
hereinafter set forth, the trial court shall then fashion a
remedy which will accord the train porters their ‘‘rightful
place as Frisco brakemen, while making certain Frisco
will not be required to hire or assign any former train
porter who is not physically able, or not qualified, to per-
form the braking job to which he seeks to be assigned.
The general guidelines to be used in fashioning this
remedy are as follows:
I. Frisco must offer to employ all of the former train
porters as brakemen within six months from the date the
trial court’s decision becomes final. The trial court shall
determine or approve the means by which the train porters
are notified of their right to employment as brakemen and
the means by which they must accept. Frisco may be
permitted to offer all of the jobs at one time or as vacan-
cies become available, in which event offers shall be made
in the order of the porter’s accumulated train porter
seniority. No other new brakemen may be hired during
this period, until after all former train porters have been
given the opportunity to return to work as brakemen.
Each former train porter must pass the physical examina-
tion presently being given to brakemen of the same age.
And if any former train porter declines the offer to return
to work as a brakeman, when offered, fails to report for
10 The court shall determine which of the fifty-two train por-
ters, supra n.6, are entitled to affirmative relief in accordance with
this decision. It shall not automatically exclude those train por-
ters who had been furloughed by Frisco prior to July 1, 1965, but
remained on the train porter seniority roster.
11 For example, all train porters may be notified and required
to express interest within a reasonable set period. See United
rg — Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 532, 562 (W.D.
— A-16 —
work within a reasonable time after accepting the offer,
or fails the physical examination, he shall forfeit all right
to return to work as a brakeman.
II. Frisco shall create and implement a training pro-
gram for former train porters and make every reasonable
effort to train them to perform those braking functions
which they will be required to perform, on jobs they will
be entitled to bid into and hold, after applying the seniority
carryover hereinafter specified. Former train porters pres-
ently employed as brakemen by Frisco shall not be re-
quired to participate in this training program.
A. Frisco shall provide such instructive and safety re-
lated training as is necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances for a period to be determined by the trial
court, but in any event it shall not exceed six months from
the date the former train porter enters into service. Upon
the completion of that training program, Frisco shall deter-
mine, using reasonable, safety related, objective standards
which shall be subject to the approval of the trial court,
whether or not the former train porter is qualified’? to be
a brakeman, and if so whether there is any particular type
of braking duty which the former train porter should not
perform for safety reasons. During this training pericd,
the former train porters shall be paid on the same scale
as newly hired brakemen, and they may not use the carry-
over seniority hereinafter specified in bidding on assign-
ments.
B. If, after completion of the training program, a
former train porter is determined to be completely un-
12 It should be remembered that “qualifications” means the
capacity to perform rather than the possession of “immediately
marketable skills.” Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Re-
flections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039,
1054 (1969). A screening process could be created by which
these qualifications are determined and those bidding into particu-
lar jobs are evaluated. See e. g., United States v. Jacksonville Ter-
minal Co., supra, 451 F.2d at 459.
— A-17 —
qualified, he shall not be entitled to carry over any past
seniority credit, and he shall be subject to all contracts
and rules presently in effect, giving the company the right
to terminate the services of unqualified brakemen. Until
such time as all former train porters, who accept the offer
to return to work and pass their physical examination,
have completed their training and have been determined
to be qualified or unqualified, the same rules relating to
training and determination of qualifications shall be ap-
plied to all newly hired brakemen as are applied to the
former train porters. Once the training program for
former train porters has been completed, Frisco may
abandon this training program.
III. Once the training program of a former train porter
has been completed, and he has been determined to be
qualified, or qualified for certain assignments but not
others, that former porter shall be entitled to seniority
credit as a brakeman for 100% of the time spent in train-
ing plus 50% of his former seniority as a train porter. 1s
Former train porters presently in service as brakemen
shall be entitled to seniority credit as brakemen for 100%
of the time they have spent as brakemen plus 50% of their
former seniority as train porters. This seniority may then
be used for all purposes for which brakeman seniority is
presently used, except it shall not be used to force Frisco
to assign a former train porter to a job for which he has
18 The figure of 50% carryover seniority takes into considera-
tion: a) the percentage of time spent by the train porters in per-
forming braking duties, and the disputed testimony relating thereto;
b) the fact that some train porters may have preferred the work
of train porter to the work of a brakeman; and c) the fact that
blacks were illegally denied the right to become brakemen from
1928 until 1966. No mathematical equation is possible in such cir-
cumstances, and this Court has reached this figure in an effort to
accord the former train porters their “rightful place” on the
brakeman’s seniority roster once they have been found to be quah-
fied to be brakemen. See e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
331 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, ... U.S. (May 22, 1972) (No. 71-
1265), where this Court also adopted a percentage type remedy.
— A-19 —
§ aye 2244
e
1 111 116 HH | 10 111 1161
i iH 1 l 1 5 il
: 7 : i=% Es 1117711 skis
e
117 441 TAH it i
Court's conclusion, the porters are to be granted carryover
seniority not because of the color of their skin bat
would not exist but for the discrimination which is finally
being redressed. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
446 F.2d 652, 663 (2nd Cir. 1971). In the final analysis,
allegations of reverse discrimination contend only that the
hardships accruing from past wrongs should continue to
fall exclusively upon those already discriminated against.
The answer to that contention is self-evident.
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court.
Haawer, Circuit Judge, with whom Lar, Circuit Judge,
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
We concur in Sections I, II. and III of the majority
opinion, and with all of Section IV thereof, except that
wh Shes
resulting from an unlawful employment practice.’’
Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation, 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th
Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
Limes, Inc, 444 Fd 1194 (7th
; Robinson v. Lovie
Siomissed
3
Furthermore, back pay should not be denied because it
is difficult to compute the sum that each porter is entitled
to. District Courte have commonly been called upon to
perform equally difficult tasks which they have carried
out wisely.
Srepaenson, Circuit Judge, with whom Vax Oosreruovr,
Senior Circuit Judge and Menarry, Circuit Judge,
We would affirm on the basis of Judge Harper’s well-
considered opinion which is reported at 52 F.R.D. 276
(E.D. Mo. 1971). We are satisfied that the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
and that the law has been correctly applied.
Neither the anti-preference section ( 200062 (j)) nor
the provision safeguarding seniority systems (6 2000-2
(H)) operate to prevent courts from eliminating present
discriminatory effects of past descrimination which is pre-
served through the use of neutral employment policies.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (CA2 1971);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421
(CA8 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l
Ass’n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (CA8 1969) and Local 189,
United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (CA5 1969). See Note, Title
VII. Seniority Discrimination And The Incumbent Negro,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 1260 (1967). It is equally clear, how-
ever, that courte, with their broad authority to fashion
remedies under the Act should not emasculate valid sen-
iority systems so long as they are conceived out of busi-
ness necessity and not out of racial discrimination. Local
189, supra, at 989, 993-994; Whitfield v. United Steel-
workers of America, Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (CA5 1959)
and United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F.Supp. 40,
66-68 (N.D. Ala. 1968). See Note, Employment Discrimina-
— A-23 —
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971); Kovarsky, Current Remedies
for the Discriminatory Effects of Seniority Agreements,
24 Vand. L. Rev. 683 (1971) and Yaeger, The **Unquali-
fied’’ Minority Worker, 59 Geo. L. J. 1265 (1971). Cf.
Griggs, supra.
A careful review of the record convinces us the findings
of the district court preclude reclassification of the train
porters as freight brakemen with carry-over seniority.
Not only is there a functional difference between the crafts
of train porters and brakemen, but Frisco’s seniority
system is based on a recognition that a brakeman’s job
is complex and hazardous, requiring related experience
in safety and repair work at the various levels of job
progression. Reclassification with carry-over seniority,
under these circumstances, could occur only at the expense
of safety and efficiency.
Litigation involving the train porters and their economic
status has been before this Court almost continuously since
1946.2 A review of this litigation discloses that although
these blacks and their predecessors were originally locked
into the train porter craft by joint Frisco-Union discrimi-
natory practices, their plight in the last two decades has
been predominantly economic in origin. The advent of
the diesel engine, the dramatic decline of the railroad in-
dustry and the elimination of passenger service in 1967
all have combined to wreck havoc upon train porters,
rendering them virtually an extinct occupational species.
The majority opinion in effect directs a merger of the
crafts, albeit the results of a complete merger are tempered
by minimum qualifications’? and **50% seniority.““ This
1 See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418,
443-448 (CA 5 1971).
2 See United States v. St. Lowis-San Francisco Railway Co., 52
FRP. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (cases cited at 277-278).
— 4 —
remedy destroys a valid senority system based on func-
tional distinctions, a result which appears to us is not
contemplated by the Act. In addition it obviously creates
a climate for endless litigation.
Vax OosterHovut, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion upon all issues ex-
cept the determination at division IV which holds that no
back pay will be awarded. I base my dissent on the dis-
senting opinion prepared by Judge Stephenson and upon
the following additional observations.
Judge Harper points out at pp. 284-85 of 52 F. R. D. that
28,000 to 8,000, and that many employees have suffered
from the decline of employment. He properly determined
that Negro train porters have not been discriminated
against since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act and
that the elimination of their jobs was caused by the au-
thorized termination of passenger service. See Howard
v. St. Lowis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 361 F.2d 905,
907-908.
Judge Harper appropriately observes:
I this court were to grant the proposed relief, it
would place the Negro train porters in a favored posi-
tion only because of the color of their skin. The craft
system has always been present within the raliroad in-
dustry. When freight brakemen positions were elimi-
nated by the diesel engine, the brakemen could not
bid on the train porter positions regardless of the
seniority they possessed. Now, the court is confronted
by the reverse situation. In effect, the train porters
seek superseniority: Such is not the intent of the
Civil Rights Act. 52 F. R. D. 276, 285.
—_y =
The Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, decided in 1952, enjoined
discrimination against employment of Negroes by reason
of race. It cannot be fairly assumed that the railroad
would continue to discriminate in violation of the injunc-
tion. I find no substantial evidence of any discrimination
since 1952. In a subsequent action, Howard v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Co., supra, at p. 911 of 361 F. ad, we
accept the District Court’s finding of absence of discrimi-
nation stating: The record fails to establish a pattern
of discrimination, or collusive action between Frisco and
Brotherhood.
I find no substantial evidence in the record which reflects
that any of the train porters applied for or were denied
brakemen’s positions.
There is substantial evidence that the train porter’s
position was a less hazardous and less burdensome job
than that of brakemen and carried regular and more de-
sirable hours. Judge Harper points out:
The record indicates that some Negro train porters
preferred assignments to the train porter craft, for
in the train porter craft the train porter was not
subject to the physical labor that the brakemen per-
formed at the freight level. The testimony of train
porters Howard (Deposition pp 34-5) and Bagley
(Deposition pp 130-1) shows the above to be true.
52 F. R. D. 276, 284.
Train porters who as a matter of free choice sought
train porter positions and who made no effort to apply
for a brakeman job are not entitled to an artificial sen-
iority which will disrupt the long existing brakemen’s
seniority system.
Judge Harper on the basis of the evidence before him
determined that Frisco went out of its way to find em-
ployment for the train porters and that Frisco on its own
— A-26 —
accord provided the only relief that could possibly be
ordered. He further properly found that granting the
requested relief would inflict inequities upon the brake-
men and disrupt the long-established seniority system.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all
respects.
Judge Mehaffy and Judge Stephenson join in this dissent.
A true copy.
Attest:
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
, . A
of the Civil Rights Act effects a change in che long-standing uni-
form holdings of the courts that under the Railroad Labor Act the
mediation board has exclusive jurisdiction to make class or craft
— the Gace this teone is ust uately
discussed in the majority opinion, I deem it inappro-
to discuss the issue.
20953
APPENDIX B
United States of America, by Ramsey Clark,
Attorney General,
v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.
and
United Transportation Co., Successor to
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
No. 67 C 243(A).
United States District Court
E. D. Missouri, E. D.
March 9, 1971
Memorandum and Order
Harper, District Judge.
Invoking Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S. C. A., § 2000e et seq.), the United States charged the
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company (hereinafter
referred to as Frisco) and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen (hereinafter referred to as Brotherhood) with
having engaged in a ‘‘policy and practice’’ of discrimi-
nation against Negroes on account of their race. The
amended complaint contains several allegations of dis-
crimination. However, at the pre-trial conference the
parties agreed to limit the issue to the alleged racial dis-
crimination against the craft formally known as train
porters.! The plaintiff contends that the Negro train
+ Passenger service was terminated by Frisco in 1967. There-
after, the train porters craft was not recognized by Frisco.
~~
porters performed the same substantial duties as those
duties performed by their alleged white counterparts, the
railway brakemen. The plaintiff then avers that the train
porters were artificially classified as porters and not
brakemen due to their Negro race. They maintain that
the above unlawful classification of train porters was
established by Frisco and was perpetuated by Brother-
hood. As a result of this alleged racially discriminatory
practice, the negro train porters have been denied equal
employment opportunities, advancement and compensation
as compared to the white brakemen. The plaintiff, under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, seeks to have this court
reclassify the former train porters as brakemen and to
have former train porters carry over their seniority into
the brakemen craft.
This case represents but another segment in the never
ending encounters between the Negro train porters and
the brakemen. The first case was commenced in 1946,
Howard v. Thompson, 72 F.Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947),
appealed Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,
191 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1951), and reviewed on grant of
certiorari in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. How-
ard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283 (1952); the
second case was Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co., 215 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1954); and the third case
was Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 244
F.Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mo. 1965), appealed Howard v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 361 F.2d 905 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. den. Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co., 385 U.S. 986, 87 S.Ct. 598, 17 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966).
The problem also has been dealt with in Nunn v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co., 248 F.Supp. 304 (E.D. Mo. 1966);
and in Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 414 F.2d
73 (8th Cir. 1969). This court takes judicial notice of
the extensive prior litigation between the train porters
and the brakemen.
—— — .
— A-29 —
The craft of train porters was recognized by Frisco
from 1918 until 1967. For a number of years prior to
their elimination by Frisco, the train porters were repre-
sented by the Association of Railway Trainmen and Loco-
motive Firemen. The duties performed by the train por-
ters were only on passenger trains and consisted of
passenger-assistant tasks and some braking work on the
head end of passenger trains. The craft known as brake-
men was represented for years by the Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen.? The brakemen craft performed brak-
ing duties on both passenger and freight trains. There
were only a very small number of Negroes in the brake-
men craft when the Civil Rights Act was passed.® Also,
it is undisputed that Frisco has always dealt separately
with the unions that represent the various crafts of which
there were some eighteen.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, supra,
the Supreme Court prohibited the brakemen union from
forcing the Railroad by means of a threatened strike to
discontinue the train porter jobs and replace them with
brakemen. The Supreme Court held: First, the brake-
men’s union is prevented by the Railway Labor Act from
eliminating Negro train porter jobs in favor of brake-
men; second, the reclassifying of train porters as brake-
men is committed by the Railway Labor Act to the Na-
tional Mediation Board. In Howard v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway Co., 361 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1966), the
train porters sought to be classified as brakemen. In
denying relief, the Court of Appeals followed the decision
of the Supreme Court in H oward, supra, and held that the
2 In 1969, the United Transportation Union succeeded to and
assumed the rights and obligations of the Brotherhood.
3 In 1928, Frisco entered into an agreement with the Brother-
hood which excluded Negroes from being employed in train, engine
or yard service, except as train porters. This agreement was re-
scinded in 1949.
=e =
district court had no jurisdiction to raclassify or place
the craft of train porters into the craft of brakemen. In
substance, the train porters’ last complaint and this cause
of action commenced by the United States are the same.
The record in this case reveals that the reason this suit
was instituted was the fact that the courts held against
the train porters in 244 F.Supp. 1008; 361 F.2d 905; and
385 U.S. 986, 87 S.Ct. 598, 17 L.Ed.2d 448. In both in-
stances the plaintiffs maintain that the train porters per-
formed the essential duties of a brakeman, and that Frisco
has refused to classify them as such because of their
Negro race. This problem had never been presented under
the Railway Labor Act. The present litigation does, how-
ever, differ in two respects from the past case on this
subject: First, this action is commenced by the United
States and not a private individual, and second, this ac-
tion is brought after the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In the Howard cases the courts have uni-
formly held they have no authority to reclassify crafts
under the Railway Labor Act. However, the factual al-
legations within the plaintiff’s amended complaint allege
a racially inherent discriminatory practice that the plain-
tiff contends is expressly prohibited by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.
[1] Frisco and Brotherhood raise the following affirma-
tive defenses: Res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the
failure to join indispensable parties. All of these de
fenses are rejected by this court. The defenses of res
judicata and collateral estoppel must be viewed in terms
of the Civil Rights Aci of 1964, and in particular, Title
VI, 5 703(a)(2) and 5 703 (e) (2) (42 U.S. C. A., § 2000e-2).
The pertinent portions of this part of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act provide:
**Section 703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer—
.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 703(c) It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for a labor organization—
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its mem-
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer
for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an appli-
cant for employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, cr national origin; or’’
The factual allegations of this complaint are in part
similar to those expressed in Norman v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad, supra. There, as in this case, the complaint
alleges racial discrimination by the unlawful refusal of
a railroad company to classify the train porters as brake-
men. It is contended that the above refusal denied to the
train porters a higher rate of compensation and advance-
ment. In Norman, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the Howard cases, and then rejected the Rail-
road’s position that the prior refusal to classify train
porters as brakemen operated as a bar to the present
action. The court stated, 414 F.2d at 84:
‘‘[T he train porters in a class action contended that
they were relegated to the class of train porters solely
because of race. We stated at 906 of 361 F.2d that
the District Court ‘failed to find hostile racial dis-
crimination.” We viewed the issue on appeal as
whether ‘the District Court has jurisdiction and
industry is subject to the Railway Labor Act. In consid-
ering both of the above acts, the court stated at 82-83:
““* * * The Railway Labor Act is not basically a fair
employment practice act nor has it been utilized as
This court in Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad
Company, 310 F.Supp. 1333, at page 1339 (E. D. M 1969),
followed Norman, supra, and stated with regard to an
— 18
“Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, disputes of this nature were unquestionably
solely within the province of the Railroad Adjustment
—A-33—
Board. Title VII of the Act has created an additional
remedy, without eliminating the prior one, and plain-
tiff has stated a cause of action under the Act.”
the plaintiff are not barred by either res judicata, or, in
131 Turning to the case on its merita, basically the court
is called upon to decide two issues: (1) Should the mem-
the merging of seniority units in order to eliminate the
present effects of past discrimination. Both Local 189
court stated at 989 of 416 F.2d:
ze record supports the district court 6 hold.
ing that job seniority is not essential to the safe and
efficient operation of Crown’s mill. The defendants’
chief expert witness, Dr. Northrup, made it clear that
he considered mill seniority ‘disastrous’ only to the
extent that it allowed all men in a slot to bid on the
basis of their time at the mill. He stated that mill sen-
iority in that sense would create labor unrest because
its main effect would be to allow whites to ‘jump’
other whites and Negroes to ‘jump’ other Negroes.”
The defendants contend that carryover seniority is pre-
cluded by business necessity. In United States v. H. K.
Porter Company, 296 F.Supp. 40 (N. D. Alas. D. 1968), the
preclude the merger of independent units. In the Porter
case the court stated at 67:
On the other hand, based on the evidence which
it has heard on the point, the court finds that the
requisite skills and abilities differ in substantial
measure from department to department, that satis-
factory job performance in one department is not an
accurate predictor of satisfactory job performance in
another department, and that the departmental] struc-
ture of this plant is in fact based on the particular and
distinctive type of work performed by each of the
departments.”
The above mentioned cases are not in conflict. The cases
uniformly hold that business necessity precludes merger.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Local 189, supra,
at page 993 of 416 F.2d, said:
We see no necessary conflict between Porter’s hold-
ing on this point and our holding in the present case.
The resolution of the court's first issue necessitates a re-
view of the duties of a train porter and those of a brake-
man.
In beginning a determination of the classification issue,
this court is confronted with extensive prior litigation be-
tween the train porter and brakeman crafts. A review of
the Howard cases leaves unanswered the essential duties
that a train porter and brakeman performed. Moreover,
it is equally apparent from an examination of the Howard
cases that the respective courts have never considered if
a distinction exists between the duties of a passenger
brakeman and those duties performed by a freight brake-
man. It would appear that the past Howard cases dealt
at most only with the difference between the train porter
and a passenger brakeman. With the termination of pas-
senger service in 1967, the position of passenger brake-
seeks reclassification and carryover seniority for the train
porters, this court must determine if the train porter pos-
sesses the requisite skills and abilities in the freight
brakeman’s craft based on the record in this case.
perform the same essential braking duties on the head end
of passenger trains as those performed by the brakemen
on both passenger and freight trains. Several of the train
porters stated in their depositions that ninety-five percent
of their duties consisted of braking duties. From a review
of the credible evidence in the record, this percentage esti-
mate is without a basis and is hereby rejected by this
court.
— A.35 —
Mr. Falls, a former train porter, and a witness for the
plaintiff, stated in his deposition (pp 21 through 24) that
he performed the following duties as a train porter:
Looked after and checked on the lighting, heating and air-
conditioning on passenger trains; kept up the general
appearance of the passenger coaches by picking up debris,
bottles, cups, and sweeping the aisles and under the seats;
assisted passengers boarding and department from trains;
helped passengers with their baggage, called out train
stations, advised them with respect to making connections,
and answered any remaining questions the passengers
might have; picked up hatchecks for the passengers; sold
pillows to the passengers; kept the restroom on the pas-
senger trains clean; and checked for items the passengers
may have left behind after the passengers departed the
train. The testimony of the other train porters also indi-
cates that they performed the above mentioned duties.
At the trial, Nelson Burton, a former train porter, and
a witness for the plaintiff, testified that in addition to those
duties listed by the witness Falls, he also took meal or-
ders and prepared accident reports on any passengers who
might be injured. Mr. Brookshire, a brakeman and a wit-
ness for the plaintiff, testified that the primary duty of a
train porter was to assist and care for the train passenger.
Train porter Howard, who in 1914 was hired by Frisco as
a freight brakeman after passing tests, and later requested
and was granted a transfer to the train porter craft (Depo- ;
sition pp 36-38), testified that he was on many occasions ;
reprimanded in connection with his handling and taking
care of passengers. The evidence presented by the plaintiff
in itself establishes that the primary function of a train
porter was that of providing for the care and comfort of
the passengers.
The defendants maintain that the craft division between
train porters and brakemen is based upon functional dif-
ferentiations. From a review of the record, it is evident
— A.37 —
that the duties of a train porter are essentially different
from those duties performed by either a passenger or
freight brakeman.
The record discloses that the average brakeman begins
his employment in the yards or on local freight, progresses
to through freight, and then prior to 1967 might after
many years advance to passenger trains. The witnesses
Burst and Wilson, brakemen for Frisco, testified that
freight work involves long hours, irregular working
schedules, and much physical labor. The physical labor
consists of switching cars, kicking cars, working hand-
brakes, repairing mechanical difficulties, and loading and
unloading train goods. In addition, Burst, Wilson and
McClellan stated that the repair of train equipment was
a major problem on freight trains only. This was due
primarily to the length of freight trains. The repair work
on the freight trains includes: Fixing air hoses, replacing
broken knuckles (or train couplings), repairing brake
beams, and other train equipment. While the record dis-
closes that the train porter did minimal switching work
and other minor duties of a brakeman, it is unmistakably
clear from the testimony of plaintiff’s own witness (Brook-
shire) that such duties were only performed on rare occa-
sions, and such consisted of throwing switches and flagging
blocks. There is no testimony of any train porter repair-
ing train equipment such as a freight brakeman repairs.
The plaintiff, mainly likens the train porter to the pas-
senger brakeman. Although the duties of these two former
positions are different, the position of the plaintiff over-
looks the many years of seniority that the brakeman had
to acquire at the freight level before securing the pas-
senger brakeman position. Mr. Wilson testified that he
spent the better part of twenty years working irregular
shifts at the freight level.
W. W. Francis, a former brakeman, a supervisor of
brakemen, and presently a personnel officer of Frisco,
niin
testified that the primary duty of a train porter was to
look after and care for the comfort of the passengers.
Francis stated that the train porter was not qualified to
be a freight brakeman as the train porter had utterly no
experience on freight trains. The train porter performed
some minor duties of a brakeman on occasion, but for
the most part the train porter did not possess experience
in moving, switching, braking and kicking freight cars,
nor in making train repairs. Experience was essential in
order to insure safety and efficiency. Moreover, the train
porter had no familiarity with switch lists. Mr. Francis
noted that experience and initiative are essential to the
freight brakeman as trains were longer and involved a
minimum amount of supervision.
H. J. Lovelady, a superintendent of terminals at Kansas
City, Missouri, stated in his deposition at page 53:
I would say primarily that (the care of pas-
sengers) was the duty of the train porter, the load-
ing and unloading of passengers, furnishing pillows
at points, and I guess change diapers if anybody
wanted their kids changed. But primarily, care and
convenience of the passengers’ welfare was his job.
If it was necessary, clean the floor, sweep the floor
of the coach; as I say, the primary, taking care of
the passengers.“
C. L. Lester, a former train porter who moved to the
brakemen’s craft after Frisco terminated passenger serv-
ice in 1967 (since that time Lester has passed his con-
ductor’s test), stated in his deposition at pages 10 and 11:
„Now, referring to your employment for the
Frisco as a train porter, what run did you work on!
„A. Runs 709 and 710.
„Now, during the course of your employment
as a train porter did you also have occasion to ride
— A-39 —
on other of the Frisco’s passenger trains and observe
the duties performed on those trains?
. Yes, I did.
Mr. Lester, was it your observation by riding
those other trains, and comparing the service per-
formed by the train porters on those trains with the
service that you performed on your run, that the run
that you had was the hardest run with the most stops?
A. It was.
. On the run that you were working on as a
train porter on 709 and 710, Mr. Lester, what period
of time was involved from beginning to end to com-
plete that run?
A. To begin with it was over five hours, at the
ending period was around four hours and fifty
minutes.
„. And approximately what was the mileage cov-
ered by that run?
A. 134 miles.
„L. Now, Mr. Lester, of the five hours or four
hours and fifty minutes, whichever it took to complete
your run, what was the greatest period of time that
you would be occupied performing duties other than
duties directly connected with the care, comfort and
convenience of the passengers?
A. About thirty minutes, average thirty minutes
per day working headin.
„. Mr. Lester, in your experience and through
your observation, being employed bp the Frisco Rail-
road, what was the primary purpose for the em-
ployment of a train porter on a passenger train?
A. Well, my first instruction was that the pas-
sengers were first, the care of the passengers was first.
. And is it a fact that you had many duties to
perform on a run in connection with the passengers?
A. Yes, we did.“
A
— A-40 —
J. K. Beshears, a former brakeman and now a vice-
president of personnel at Frisco, testified that the primary
duty of a train porter was passenger assistance. The view
of Mr. Beshears was shared by both Mr. Brookshire, a
brakeman and witness of the plaintiff, and Mr. Wilson,
a brakeman.
In the opinion of this court, the record discloses that
the train porter’s primary duties always differed from
those of any passenger brakeman or a freight brakeman.
Although both the train porter and brakeman performed
some braking and switching duties, this hollow comparison
and attempt to equate the crafts overlooks the following
factors: First, the primary duty of the train porter craft
as opposed to the brakeman craft; and second, the fact
that the train porters were never employed in the freight
area.
There is no doubt that the train porter performed some
braking and switching duties on passenger trains. How-
ever, it is equally apparent from a review of the evidence
that such braking duties were minor and incidental to the
train porter’s primary duty of providing for the care and
comfort of the train passenger. All of the former train
porters elaborated on the many facets of passenger care
that they were expected to perform. As passenger volume
declined, the train porter’s duties no doubt declined. How-
ever, the depositions of company officials, brakemen and
former train porters establish that a valid functional
classification did exist between train porter and brake-
man. The train porter’s primary concern rested with the
care of the passenger. On the other hand, the passenger
brakeman’s responsibility rested with the safety of the
trains.
In addition to the plaintiff’s failure to distinguish the
primary duty of a train porter and brakeman, the record
discloses that the train porter has no experience in the
—_—S
freight train area. The train porter has never been em-
ployed on freight trains. Moreover, the train porters were
excluded from employment in the freight area by the very
terms of their labor agreement with Frisco. It is evident
from the record that passenger service is relatively free
from equipment repair; however; the repairing of equip-
ment is a major problem on freight trains. Also, the
record reveals that the train porters have performed only
some of the brakeman’s duties, and only on rare occasions
has the train porter performed these duties. The record
reveals that a brakeman’s job is a hazardous one. One
mistake in switching a freight car could endanger the
lives of many railroad men.“
From the brakeman’s first day with the railroad his
duties on local and through freight trains involve not only
supporting the delivery of cars and the loading and un-
loading of goods, but also the corresponding duty of
assuring train safety by checking for and repairing me-
chanical difficulties. Much of his work is outside in all
types of weather.
The record indicates that some Negro train porters pre-
ferred assignments to the train porter craft, for in the
train porter craft the train porter was not subject to the
physical labor that the brakeman performed at the freight
level. The testimony of train porters Howard (Deposition
pp. 345) and Bagley (Deposition pp. 130-1) shows the
above to be true. Moreover, the train porter work schedule
was on a regular basis (the brakeman’s work schedule was
irregular at the freight level). The attempt by the plain-
tiff to equate the train porter craft with the brakeman
craft completely ignores the experience in safety and re-
pair work that the brakeman has obtained at the freight
train level. The duties of a train porter and brakeman
are essentially different.
Judicial notice of F. E. L. A. cases reveals many injuries to
— A-43 —
This court concludes that service as a train porter
does not equip the train porter with the requisite skill
and ability to perform a freight brakeman’s position in
either a safe or efficient manner. The crafts of train porter
and brakeman are based upon functional differentiations,
that is, distinctive types of work performed by each craft.
Most of the members of the various crafts (age per-
mitting) in the Railroad industry could probably with
training meet the requirements of the other erafts, but
the train porter's absent training does not meet the
qualifications of the brakeman’s craft.
As to the second issue, this court concludes that the
Negro train porters have not been discriminated against
since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1965. A
brief reference to the testimony regarding railroad in-
dustry problems will be helpful.
Mr. McClellan, a conductor for Frisco, stated that the
diesel engine replaced the steam engine between 1946 and
1948. This eliminated forty to fifty percent of the freight
crews. In 1967, the last two sets of passenger trains were
discontinued by Frisco. Mr. Francis, a personnel officer
with Frisco, informed the court that this eliminated 190
positions, of which less than ten percent were train
porters. The drastic decline in railroad employment was
emphasized by Mr. Beshears who is one of Frisco’s vice-
presidents. Mr. Beshears testified that Frisco’s employ-
ment has dropped from a high of 28,000 to the present
total of approximately 8,000 employees due to the diesel
engine, technology advancements and the ceasing of pas-
senger service. Many employees have suffered from the
decline in employment. The figures speak for themselves.
Frisco's passenger service was terminated with the ap-
proval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. If this
court were to grant the proposed relief, it would place the
Negro train porters in a favored position only because
of the color of their skin. The craft system has always
— A-43 —
been present within the railroad industry. When freight
brakemen positions were eliminated by the diesel engine,
the brakemen could not bid on the train porter positions
regardless of the seniority they nossessed. Now, the court
is confronted by the reverse situation. In effect, the train
porters seek superseniority. Such is not the intent of the
Civil Rights Act.
Furthermore, it is the opinion of this court that the re-
quested relief sought by the plaintiff is inappropriate as
the anticipated collateral effects of granting carryover sen-
iority in this case would create inequities. See United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.Supp. 977, 994-996
(W.D.N.Y.1970). The granting of the requested relief
would create the following inequities: First, the proposed
seniority carryover remedy would disrupt the brakemen
seniority system, and moreover, since promotion to con-
ductor is based to a great extent upon freight service se-
niority, the remedy would alter the rightful expectations
of the present members of the brakemen craft as to future
promotional opportunities; and second, the proposed rem-
edy would assure the former train porters of positions,
but would overlook the railroad’s history of declining em-
ployment.
This court concludes that adequate relief has already
been accorded to the train porters. Mr. Francis testified
with regard to the fifty-six former train porters that the
plaintiff claims to be entitled to relief under this cause
of action. After researching the company records, Mr.
Francis noted that eighteen of the named individuals had
performed no compensated service since July 2, 1965 (the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act). In addition, ten
of the porters were shown to have accepted retirement
benefits. Of the remaining twenty-eight train porters, all
but one were offered positions with the railroad in other
crafts. Frisco was not able to contact the one who had
= nem
only worked part time the years before. Twelve of the
train porters accepted employment in other railroad crafts.
Most of these, but not all, accepted freight brakemen po-
sitions. A number of the twelve have since been promoted,
The remaining fifteen train porters who were offered po-
sitions refused, and for the most part stated they had to
see their lawyer (plaintiff’s attorney in the last Howard
case). Almost all of these were offered positions as brake-
men.
The actions of Frisco in attempting to place these former
train porters should be commended. Mr. Beshears testi-
fied that he instructed the district managers to give the
train porters preference as to employment and to waive
many of the normal employment requirements. These are
not the facts that necessitate the use of this court’s in-
junctive power. Unlike Local 189, United Papermakers
and Paperworkers, etc. v. United States, supra, and Quarles
v. Philip Morris Incorporated, supra, Frisco furnished on
its own accord the only affirmative relief that this court
could have ordered under the circumstances of this case.
This court is cognizant of the fine efforts that Frisco has
made to eliminate all taints of racial discrimination, and
finds a present company policy and practice that is com-
parable to the company in Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, 433 F.2d 421, at 429 (8th Cir. 1970),
in which Judge Bright stated:
In view of this evidence, we agree with the trial
court that no injunction seems necessary or appropri-
ate in this case at the present time. Title VII aims
at securing voluntary compliance with the require-
ments for equal employment opportunities. In en-
acting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress placed
great emphasis on private settlement and the elimi-
nation of unfair practices without resorting to the
court’s injunctive powers.“
3
Frisco has acted in good faith. This merger is pre-
cluded both by business necessity and by the collateral
effects the proposed remedy would have on the present
and former employees of Frisco. No injunction is war-
ranted.
This memorandum opinion is adopted by the court as
its findings of fact and conclusions of law and the clerk
wil] prepare and enter the proper order dismissing the
action and giving judgment to the defendants herein.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.