Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shelco, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co.

Supreme Court brief1972

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

iy = - U

e scat

3 MICBAEL RODAK, oR.cLERK |

, ty

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1971

No.

SHELCO, INC. ana THE SHELCO COMPANY, ©

Petitioners,

vs.

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and

HARRY G. SCHIERHOLZ & CO.,

Respondents.

SHELCO, INC. and THE SHELCO COMPANY,

“. Petitioners,

VS.

BOYLE-MIDWAY, INC., and

AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

W. PHILIP CHURCHILL

RONALD F. BALL

Fiso & NEAVE

277 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10017

EDWIN M. LUEDEKA

ROBERT B. JONES

Fircu, Even, Tasin & LuepeKa

135 S. LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Attorneys for Petitioners

__—

INDEX

Opinions Below .......--+-+eeeeseeeeeeeeceereees 1

Se 5 ong. 0s sie eide a siete vcvevedscegeveesss 2

Questions Presented ........-..++e-seseereeeeees 2

Cait TROUIIEE 6 S65 hos bee es Soca se sk cae sees 2

ee MeN Bid bn Che Ke eeSs cee aon ene 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ ...............+45- 7

I. The Action Of This Court Is Needed To Set

Proper Standards For Determination As To

What Constitutes A Proved Defense Of

Fraud On The Patent Office .............. 7

Il. Claims 31 and 32 Should Be Held Valid ... 11

III. The Court Of Appeals Decision Regarding

§§ 184 And 185, If Allowed To Stand, Could

Have Far-Reaching Adverse Effects On The

Pt TY is bans 6 HR RR Deis de nH 0 <0 12

I iowa aiek see ctanehdadaneeenesan 13

IE ikke xtisaectsPihdibks ca cieeas kes neeans la

1. Opinion And Order Of The Court Of Appeals

CRE Fie SE bith tdicew de vince ceweescne : la

3. Potithom Wwe Teeaeteey 3... see can cscs lla

3. Decision On Petition For Rehearing (June 5,

SE 5 shes dod ee ds RSA be eee Ke Ueda es sais 22a

. Findings And Conclusions Of The District

“ee ee weer eee eee eee weer eeeeee eee eeeee

li

CITATIONS

CasEs

PAGE

Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F. 2d 143, 148 (7

RG ES hb hen ae dhe os 038 LR q

Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments,

Inc., 356 F. 2d ST3 (7 Cir. 1964) 2.0.0.6. cs enccees 12

Corona Co. v. Dovan Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 373-4 (1928) ig

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322

pe IE Ks Fin ks Sod Cascade b a ead we ek 8

Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949) .......... 8

Monsanto Company v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F. 2d

592 (3 Cir. 1972), cert. denied June 19, 1972 ...... 89

Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F. 2d 779, 791-7 (CCPA, 1970) 9

Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Main-

tenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) ...... s

Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11 (19385) .............. ll

Umited States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-7,

UR CII ho bck S bk nb cen s Le edweccbecemeeen 4

STATUTES

ers a ED oc Sees ca ky cesecuagseeamenen 2

Be, OE kk sh ok a nes vs 0b4 4 ok 3, 12

MG es OE 55 fb UN a sd ks or ba Cae 2, 3, 7, 12, 13

OO OE ac. oso vik. vd cceee 2, 3,7, 12

IN THE

_ Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1971

No.

d SueEtco, Inc. and THe SHELco Company,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tur Dow CHEemicaL CoMPANy and

) Harry G. ScurerHouz & Co.,

Respondents.

of Suetco, Inc. and Tue SHetco Company,

g Petitioners,

vs.

BoyLe-Minway, Inc. and

oF American Home Propucts CorPoraTIoN,

4 Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

y TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners Sheleo, Inc. and The Sheleo Company

(hereafter ‘‘Shelco’’) pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue

4 to review a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit in this action.

Opinions Below

The Opinion and Judgment Order of the Court of Ap-

peals is reported at —— F. 2d —; 173 U.S. P. Q. 401;

printed in the Appendix hereto at pp. la-10a. The Order

2

2

3

2

2

of the Court of Appeals, filed June 5, 1972, denying Peti.

tioners’ Petition for Rehearing En Bane is printed in the

Appendix hereto at p. 22a. The Findings and Conelu.

sions adopted by the District Court are reported at 322 F

Supp. 485 and are printed in the Appendix hereto at pp.

23a-92a.

Jurisdicti

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered op

April 5, 1972. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S. C. § 1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Can the «alleged fraud on the Patent Office by a

patentee (not a party to the action and not an officer or

employee of the plaintiffs) be imputed to the plaintiffs who

took no part in and had no knowledge of the prosecution of

the applications resulting in the patent in suit? —

2. Is it proper as a matter of law to imply a conclusion

of fraud when the evidence is at most only ‘‘persuasive”

that the patentee had knowledge of a prior use by others,

and there is no evidence as to the materiality of such prior

use?

3. Should a patent be declared invalid under the provi.

sions of 35 U.S. C. §§ 184 and 185 when the first application

filed abroad was filed more than six months after the filing

in the United States, and differed from the original U. §.

application merely by including broader claims?

Statutes Invoived

35 U.S. C. §§ 184 and 185 read as follows:

‘*§ 184, Filing of application in foreign country

Except when authorized by a license obtained

from the Commissioner a person shall not file or

a5 Pw es

=> oS = &

"Re se Tt

3

cause or authorize to be filed in any foreign country

prior to six months after filing in the United States

an application for patent or for the registration of a

utility model, industrial design, or model in respect

of an invention made in this country. A license shall

not be granted with respect to an invention subject

to an order issued by the Commissioner pursuant to

section 181 of this title without the concurrence of

the head of the departments and the chief officers of

the agencies who caused the order to be issued, The

license may be granted retroactively where an appli-

cation has been inadvertently filed abroad and the

application does not disclose an invention within the

scope of section 181 of this title.

The term ‘application’ when used in this chapter

includes applications and any modifications, amend-

ments, or supplements thereto, or divisions thereof.

“4185. Patent barred for filing without license

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law any

person, and his successors, assigns, or legal repre-

sentatives, shall not receive a "'nited States patent

for an invention if that person, or his successors,

assigns, or legal representatives shall, without pro-

curing the license prescribed in section 184 of this

title, have made, or consented to or assisted another’s

making, application in a foreign country for a patent

or for the registration of a utility model, industrial

design, or model in respect of the invention. A United

States patent issued to such person, his successors,

assigns, or legal representatives shall be invalid.’’

Statement of the Case

These two actions for infringement of Perry patent No.

3,335,092 were consolidated for trial on the issue of validity.

The patent, entitled ‘‘Oven Cleaner and Method of Using

Same,’’ describes and claims a highly successful water

based caustic home oven cleaner packaged in an aerosol con-

tainer which is used to apply a clinging foam to the roof

and walls of a heated oven to effect excellent cleaning in a

matter of minutes. No prior art home oven cleaner achieved

these results,

4

The District Court wrote no opinion but simply me

chanically adopted the findings proposed by the respond.

ents (App. p. 23a), a practice criticized by this Court jp

United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 656-7, 6623

(1964).

Kenneth E. Perry, who developed this oven cleaner, had

his own company, Winfield Brooks. Perry treated his oye

cleaner invention as a trade secret and, with his own attor.

ney, handled the entire prosecution of his applications jp

the Patent Office. The patent in suit was assigned to plain.

tiff, Shelco, Inc., only a few days before the patent issued,

Shortly before trial, Shelco, Inc. sold its business to plain.

tiff, The Sheleo Company. Thus, Shelco had no dealings

whatsoever with the Patent Office and no control over the

Patent Office proceedings.

District Court Findings 168 through 195 (App. pp. 76a.

85a) are entitled ‘‘Fraud’’ and deal with the following four

points :

1. The evidence was said to be ‘‘ persuasive”? that

a prior art oven cleaner called ‘‘Beam’’ was known

to Perry (FF 179), but not disclosed by him to the

Patent Office.

2. Perry did not disclose to the Patent Office a

single sale of his own oven cleaner called ‘‘ Winbro

403’’ which was sold in bulk form in a 30-gallon

drum more than one year before his first applica-

tion (FF 108, 192).

3. Perry did not disclose to the Patent Office a

Foster D. Snell report dealing with tests of his prod-

uct on the shaved skin of rabbits (FF 187-9).

4. An affidavit filed in the Patent Office dealing

with comparative tests with certain prior art Perl-

man patents was allegedly misleading (FF 191).

The only Findings relating to acts of Shelco, as dis-

tinguished from Perry, are 180 and 194. FF 180 (App.

5

p. 80a) states erroneously that the existence of Beam was

kept from the Patent Office by Shelco and its predecessors.

The evidence is undisputed that Perry and his own at-

torney, not Skelco or its predecessors, handled the entire

prosecution in the Patent Office.

FF 194 (App. p. 85a) concludes that this suit was

brought in bad faith because ‘‘Shelco knew or reasonably

should have known’’ that material misrepresentations

knowingly and deliberately had been made to the Patent

Office.

Under section V (App. pp. 9a-10a), the Court of Appeals

opinion even goes beyond the conclusions of the District

Court which were written by the respondents, and does so

without discussing the evidence.

ao Se Fr FF

i i re

There is simply no evidence in the record, and the Dis-

trict Court Findings do not support, the imputations of

bad faith to Shelco in bringing these actions.

As for Perry’s alleged knowledge of the prior use Beam

oven cleaner, the evidence is not even ‘‘persuasive’’. A

salesman named Hannon, who worked for Perry for a few

months, did know about Beam, but the Finding (FF 178;

App. p. 79a) that Hannon testified on deposition that he

“could have’’ talked to Perry about Beam is a complete

misquotation of Hannon’s testimony and, admittedly,

clearly erroneous. Both Perry and his attorney testified

flatly that they had never heard of Beam until after these

lawsuits started.

All claims in the patent in suit specify an oven cleaner

and method of cleaning ovens consisting essentially of water

and a small amount of alkali metal hydroxide packaged in

an aerosol container so that the product is forced out of

the container by a propellant (FF 13, 17). The more spe-

cific claims include also a glycol (humectant) and a foam-

ing agent (surfactant). Claims 31 and 32 specify approxi-

mately 3% of sodium hydroxide as the cleaning agent, and

that the humectant shall be propylene glycol.

Neither Beam nor Perry’s Winbro 403 was in

an aerosol container with a propellant. Respondents’ oye,

cleaner expert testified at the trial that because of this dif.

ference, Beam, when squirted on the oven walls, failed ag ap

oven cleaner because the liquid ran off before it could do any

effective cleaning. He further admitted that such materials

packaged in plastic squeeze bottles, or in bottles with 4

finger-actuated pump spray, would always drip and run iz

the same manner. Thus, aerosol packaging in which the gas.

eous propellant under pressure ejected the material in the

form of a clinging foam made the difference between succes;

and failure for this type of oven cleaner.

The use of propylene glycol as a humectant, which js

required by claims 31 and 32, permits Perry’s oven cleaner

to be used without rubber gloves, even though it contains 3%

of caustic soda. The evidence shows that Dow rediscovered

the ‘‘safening’’ effect of this same composition after Perry's

oven cleaner had been on the market for two years, and

respondent Dow even filed a patent application on it in 1966,

extolling the safening effect of propylene glycol in such ap

aqueous caustic soda solution. The Court of Appeals opinion

expressly ignored Shelco’s contention about this combina.

tion, which was not taught by the prior art, and dismissed it

as ‘‘an inconsequential difference.’’

The evidence is undisputed that neither Beam nor Win.

bro 403 was substantially identical in structvre or funetion

to the invention claimed.

The failure to disclose the Snell report to the Patent

Office could not have been material in the Patent Office prose.

cution because the record shows that the Examiner already

knew that millions of cans of Perry’s oven cleaner Jifoam

had been sold, and patentability could not turn on the ques-

tion of the degree of its safety anyway. A second Snel

report, which Perry also did not disclose to the Patent Office,

covered tests by a number of women using the product as

directed, and this report shows the product to be completely

safe and non-irritating. The evidence further shows that

Perry’s product had been approved by Food and Drug and

the FTC.

PSBRRES EMSs BFFs. Se hss

t ceeal

a

se

BRESGSeRSEPSESS SE

7

The affidavit relating to the Perlman patents spelled out

in complete detail the exact procedures which were followed

in making the comparative tests, and no information was

withheld from the Patent Office Examiner. The fraud charge

here is based solely on the assumption that the Examiner

was either very stupid or could not read the affidavit and the

Perlman patents for himself. Nothing was withheld.

In section IV (App. pp. 8a-9a), the Court of Appeals

has held for the first time that a foreign application, filed

more than six months after the filing of the application in

the United States, violates 35 U.S. C. §§ 184 and 185, merely

because the foreign application as filed contained broader

claims than were presented in the U. S. application as

originally filed.

Perry’s original application was filed December 4, 1963

(FF 10; App. p. 25a). On April 20, 1964, Perry filed an

amendment which added new claim 11 of broader scope than

the original application claims 1 to 10 (FF 28; App. p. 33a).

A license to file foreign applications was obtained from the

Commissioner on January 8, 1964 (FF 167; App. p. 76a),

and Perry filed his first foreign application in Canada on

August 18, 1964 (FF 166; App. p. 76a). The Canadian

application included a broadened claim corresponding to

claim 11 which had been added by the amendment of April

20.

Thus, there was no disclosure of any scientific or tech-

nical information in the Canadian application which had not

been contained in the U.S. application filed more than six

months earlier.

Reasons For Granting The Writ

The Action Of This Court Is Needed To Set Proper

Standards For Determination As To What Constitutes A

Proved Defense Of Fraud On The Patent Office

In the last few years it has become more and more fash-

ionable for defendants to plead fraud on the Patent Office,

unsupported by proof. As a result, many of the lower

courts tend to substitute their own personal impressions for

clear and convincing proof of the elements of a fraud, sud

as a wrongful intent or the materiality of information with.

held.

This Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empir:

Co., 322 U. S. 238 (1944), Precision Instrument Mfg. Co, y,

Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. 8. a

(1945) and Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U. S. 318 (1949) has

correctly emphasized in the past the uncompromising daty

of parties dealing with the Patent Office to report all facts

concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the

applications in issue. There is no doubt that persons prose.

cuting applications in the Patent Office should be candid and

scrupulously honest in their dealings with the Examiner

In these older cases, either the wrongful intent or the repre.

hensible nature of the acts which constituted the fraud was

fully proved.

In many present-day situations, however, an intent to

mislead has been inferred where information known to the

applicant was not disclosed to the Patent Office merely be

cause it seemed to the lower court that the undisclosed infor.

mation might have been relevant. One such recent case is

the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Mos

santo Company v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F. 2d 592 (1972),

cert. denied June 19, 1972, in which Judge Kalodner cor

rectly pointed out in a dissenting opinion that there was no

clear and convincing proof that information not disclosed

to the Patent Office would have made any difference in the

granting of the patent in suit. Both lower courts in Mo

santo, without any proof of the fact, concluded that the

withheld information would have been material to patent

ability, and then implied an intent to defraud the Patent

Office. This conclusion was reached in spite of testimony by

the patent solicitor explaining why he did not consider it

pertinent to include in the affidavit filed in the Patent Offic

all of the 899 tests which had been made.

As aptly stated in Armour € Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.

9d 143, 148 (7 Cir. 1960) :

“It is easy to make charges of fraud, but the law

rightfully insists that before legal rights may be

based upon such charges, they must be established by

oe autien aoe evidence. The burden is on the

ig charges of fraud to establish same by

as and definite proof.’’

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in its only

decision dealing with fraud on the Patent Office, has also

followed this ‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ rule. See

Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F. 2d 779, 791-7 (1970). Some lower

courts, however, have overlooked or ignored these require-

ments, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in

Monsanto and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in this

case.

In the present case, both lower Courts have brushed

aside the requirements of clear and convincing evidence to

prove a fraud in the following respects.

The Court of Appeals first concluded (App. p. 9a) that

“(1) Perry’s purported invention was copied from the

Beam oven cleaner.’’ Even the District Court Findings

failed to support this conclusion. The District Court found

that the evidence was ‘‘persuasive’’ that Perry knew about

Beam, but, even that ‘‘persuasive’’ evidence was based on

a clearly erroneous finding (FF 178) which misquoted

Hannon’s deposition testimony (supra, p. 5).

i a |

o

ao rT Nm Pe eS ae OH

In addition, this conclusion ignores the undisputed fact

that Beam was not packaged in an aerosol container, and

because of this difference failed as a home oven cleaner

when tested by respondents’ oven cleaner expert.

Next, the Court concluded (App. p. 9a) that ‘‘(2) Perry

had deliberately withheld information from the patent exam-

iner which was relevant to the application.’’ This can only

refer to the undisclosed Snell report indicating that Perry’s

oven cleaner was irritating on the shaved skin of rabbits.

Neither the District Court Findings nor the evidence in the

case reveal how this could possibly have been material to

Sl i ee ee, ee

10

the patentability of the oven cleaner. The Court of A

in concluding this report to be ‘‘relevant’’, was substituting

its own impressions for proof.

The Court next concluded (App. p. 10a) that ‘‘(3) Perry

had deliberately misrepresented to the patent examiner

facts which were relevant to the application.’’ This cay

only refer to the affidavit covering tests relating to the cited

Perlman patents. The procedures used in these tests were

accurately and completely stated in the affidavit. The By.

aminer was technically trained and fully capable of reading

and understanding the teachings of the Perlman Patents,

Neither the District Court Findings nor the Court of Ap

peals decision suggests how these circumstances could

possibly constitute a misrepresentation of relevant faets

to the Examiner.

Finally, the Court concludes (App. p. 10a) ‘‘(4) Perry

and Sheleco, Inc. brought this lawsuit in bad faith becanse

they knew or reasonably should have known that the patent

was invalid.’’ This conclusion is again wholly unsupported:

by any proof. Perry obviously is not a party to this action

and did not bring this lawsuit. Shelco, Inc. had nothing

whatever to do with the prosecution of the applications in

the Patent Office, and there is simply no evidence in the

record suggesting that Shelco, Inc. knew the patent was

invalid when it brought this lawsuit. Furthermore, if Sheleo,

Inc. ‘‘reasonably should have known”’ that the patent was

invalid, that is insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the

‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’ requirements of the law

for proving a fraud.

The patent bar and the lower courts urgently need the

guidance of this Court on what should constitute proof of

unclean hands or fraud on the Patent Office, a subject whieh

this Court has not ruled upon directly since Corona Co. v.

Dovan Corp., 276 U. S. 358 (1928) at pages 373-4. Is knowl-

edge of a prior use by a patent applicant proved by evidence

which is merely ‘‘persuasive’’? Should a Court, without

proof, impute allegedly fraudulent acts to a plaintiff who

_had no knowledge of the prosecution in the Patent Office!

Is it proper for a Court to substitute its own impressions

for proof as to whether withheld information is material

to patentability? 4

oP

sav PR XS BEB Ew

-EBS&2 2S R&S PFPA BAS

aS ESEQPT SR SRR SS

ll

Until these questions are answered by this Court, the

patent bar bas no other choice than to inundate the Patent

Office with all of the information they know about a sub-

ject, no matter how trivial or immaterial it may be, in order

to avoid a possible later charge of fraud by inference.

Il.

Claims 31 And 32 Should Be Held Valid

Claims 31 and 32 require the combination of propylene

glycol in a dilute water based sodium hydroxide solution

packaged in an aerosol container including a propellant.

No prior art employs or suggests this combination. This

claimed combination, as pointed out in the patent specifi-

cation, permits the oven cleaner to be used by the house-

wife without wearing rubber gloves. There is no prior art

in the record from which this unexpected safening effect

could have been predicted. Respondent, Dow, more than

_ two years after Perry’s invention, rediscovered the ‘‘safen-

ing” effect of this combination and even filed its own patent

application on it. Naturally, the District Court Findings,

written by respondents, are silent on this evidence in the

record.

The Court of Appeals committed serious error in ex-

pressly ignoring the limitations of these claims (App., p.

8a). In doing so, both lower courts confused the different

functions of the claims and of the specification of a patent.

It is fundamental that it is the claims which ‘‘measure the

invention.’’ Smith v. Snow, 294 U. S. 1, 11 (1935). The

patent specification, as its only example, gives a formula

including 20% of propylene glycol. The patent specifica-

tion states that propylene glycol is ‘‘highly preferred’’ as

the humectant. The patent specification further points out

that such a combination is surprisingly less irritating to a

normal person’s skin, thus making it possible for this caustic

oven cleaner to be handled without rubber gloves.

It follows from the foregoing that if claims 31 and 32

are @valid, there can have been no fraud on the Patent

Office by Perry or anyone else.

12

The Cou OF Appeals Deion Rerrdng $8184 Aa

185, If Allowed To Stand, Could Ha

Dhaeinaetes the Peete

For the first time in any Court, this case holds that the

filing of a foreign application violates 35 U. S. C. § 1%

merely because it differed from the original U. S. applica.

tion by having one or more broader claims added to it.

The purpose of §4 184 and 185 was to prevent inad.

vertent disclosure of information which might prove detri-

mental to the safety and welfare of this country.* The

six-month period provided in § 184 before foreign appli-

cations could be filed without a license was designed tp

permit the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of

Defense, and other governmental agencies to invoke %

U. S. C. § 181 and place the patent application under a

secrecy order, if it contained information, the disclosure

of which abroad might be detrimental to the national secur.

ity. The Commissioner of Patents was authorized by the

statute to grant licenses to file foreign applications ina

shorter period if he determined that the information in the

application was not detrimental to the national security.

The Court of Appeals in this case relies upon its ow

decision in Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instrv-

ments, Inc., 338 F.2d 573 (7 Cir. 1964). In that case, the

applicant had filed two successive applications, the second

application plainly including in its specification subject mat-

ter which was not disclosed in the first application. The

Court held that the two applications represented two differ-

ent inventions, and that it was improper to file a foreign

application corresponding to the second application withont

obtaining a license or waiting the prescribed six months

after the filing of the second application.

* See the hearings before Subcommittee No. 4, Committee on

the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, Second

Session, on HR 6389 (1950).

Ta eS

oF eo eo ae ST ae TM

aaeese FeTrt aes Fs SA & w

13

The Court of Appeals in this case now goes further, say-

ing, in effect, that the slightest change in wording in the fil-

ing of the foreign application, i.e., any amendment or change

whatsoever, is a violation of § 184. Here again, the Court

has confused the specification and claims of the patent.

There is no dispute that the newly added claim which was

included in the Canadian application reads on the specifi-

cation of the original U. S. application as filed. The addition

of this broader claim did not include any information which

was not already included in the original application. In fact,

it has been the common practice of patent attorneys for a

great many years to redraft claims when filing foreign

applications. Indeed, this is necessary in most foreign coun-

tries because their patent laws require different forms of

claims than are used in the United States.

The impact of this decision, therefore, can only mean, if

it is allowed to stand, that the Commissioner of Patents will

in the near future receive a veritable flood of applications

for retroactive licenses permitted by § 184. This decision

should not be allowed to stand for this reason alone.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted to

resolve these questions important to the patent system.

Respectfully submitted,

W. Puuip CuurcHiy

Ronatp F. Bau

Fish & Neave

277 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10017

Epwin M. Luepexka

Rosert B. Jones

Fitch, Even, Tabin & Luedeka

135 S. LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Attorneys for Petitioners

Seid mG

tO FOTO

SMCS

Appendix

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE SEventH CIiBcuir

Nos. 71-1061 and 71-1062

SgpreMBER TERM, 1971 SgepTeMBER Session, 1971

Suexco, Inc., and THe Sretco Company,

Plaintiff s-Appellants,

vs.

Tue Dow CuemicaL Company and

Harry G. ScuierHouz & Co.,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Suetco, Inc., and Tae SHELCo Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

Boyte-Mivway, Inc. and AMERICAN

Home Propucts CorporaTION,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION.

Nos. 67-C-1393, 67-C-2190

Ricnarp B. Austin, Judge

April 5, 1972

Before Swycert, Chief Judge, Kirxy and Fatrcuip,

Circuit Judges.

Swycert, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a final

judgment in a patent infringement action which held that

2a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

the patent in suit, United States Patent No. 3,335,092

was invalid and which also awarded attorneys’ fees ang

costs to the defendants. The only issues raised are

whether the district court committed reversible errors

in holding the patent invalid and in awarding attorneys’

fees to defendants. We affirm the district court in both

respects.

The patent at issue relates to the purported invention

by Kenneth E. Perry of a chemical composition and a

method for its use for the cleaning of baked-on soil from

ovens. Although the patent contains thirty-two claims,

Shelco, Inc., the plaintiff and assignee of the patent, asserts

only the validity of Claims 5, 19, 31 and 32 on this appeal,

Reduced to its essential elements, the invention claimed

in Claim 19 amounts to an oven cleaning product that is

an aqueous solution at least 50 per cent water by weight

containing 3 per cent sodium hydroxide by weight as well

as an unspecified quantity of any compatible surfactant

and an unspecified quantity of either a glycol or glycerol

humectant, which soluticn is to be applied from an aerosol

container to a hot oven or grill. Claim 32 is the same except

that it specifies propylene glycol in an unspecified amount

as the humectant to be included in the product. Claim 5

claims the invention of a method of use of the produet

described in Claim 19 in which the product is to be aerosol-

sprayed upon an oven or grill which is ‘‘at an [unspecified]

elevated temperature,’’ leaving the product on the hot oven

for an unspecified time interval and then removing it. Claim

31 describes the same method for using the product set

out in Claim 32.

The district court held that Claims 1 through 6, 14, 16

through 19, 26 and 28 through 32 of the patent were invalid

on grounds of anticipation (35 U. S. C. § 102), obviousness

(35 U. S. C. § 103) and indefiniteness (35 U. S. C. § 112).

It further held that the patent was void in its entirety under

35 U. S. C. §§ 184 and 185 (filing application in a foreign

aoe =

aS ™~

ee ol —

3a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

country without a proper license to do so). Since Sheleco,

Inc, does not challenge the propriety of the district court’s

determination of invalidity as to any claims other than num-

bers 5, 19, 31 and 32, we limit our discussion to those

enumerated claims.

It is settled that, as a general rule, a purported inven-

tion is not anticipated ‘‘unless all of the same elements

are found in exactly the same situation and united in the

same way to perform an identical function’’ in a previously

known product. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweeheart

Plastics, Inc., 436 F. 2d 1180, 1182-83 (7th Cir. 1971);

Amphenol Corp. v. General Time Corp., 397 F. 2d 431,

438 (7th Cir. 1968). However, when the only features

distinguishing the purported invention from a prior art

product are insubstantial, the earlier may properly be said

to anticipate the later product. As we said in Deep Weld-

ing, Inc. v. Sctaky Bros., Inc., 417 F. 2d 1227, 1234 (7th

Cir. 1969), ‘‘{I]t is sufficient for anticipation ‘if the gen-

eral aspects are the same and the difference in minor mat-

ters is only such as would suggest itself to one of ordinary

skill in the art.’ ”’ tat

The record here reveals the existence of three prior art

products which, we believe, justify the district court’s find-

ing that Perry’s purported invention was anticipated.

The first such product which anticipated Perry was an

oven cleaner made and sold by Capitol Packing Co. of

Melrose Park, Illinois to Bissell, Inc. of Grand Rapids,

Michigan. The unpatented oven cleaner bought and dis-

tributed by Bissell was first sold in November 1962, some

eleven months prior to Perry’s December 4, 1963 applica-

tion. The formula pursuant to which the Bissell product

was made from its beginning was expressed as follows

(in percentages of its weight) :

Sodium orthosilicate ...... T%

Sole-terge 325 ...........

SHHCHeCCOCEC HOCH LOE 8

4a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

The evidence before the trial court established tha}

sodium orthosilicate is a physical mixture of sodium

hydroxide and sodium metasilicate in a proportion of 40-6

respectively by weight so as to generate a concentration

of 2.8 per cent free sodium hydroxide by weight in the

foregoing formula. It was also established that the remain.

ing ingredients of the Bissell product included compatible

surfactants and a glycol humectant. According to the ip

structions for its use, Bissell was sprayed from an aerosol

can upon a cold oven. However, the district court specif.

cally found that Bissell was suitable for use on a hot oven

We agree that Bissell anticipates Perry. The only dif-

ferences between Bissell and the Claims 5 and 19 produet

and method are a miniscule difference in the amount of

free sodium hydroxide (2.8 per cent in Bissell and 3 per

cent in Perry) and the recommended application to a cold

oven in Bissell and to a heated oven of unspecified tempers-

ture in Perry. Those differences were inconsequential, and

Bissell anticipated Perry’s broader Claims 5 and 19. The

use of propylene glycol as specified in Claims 31 and 32 as

the humectant is an inconsequential difference which does

not survive the anticipatory aspects of Bissell.

Perry’s purported invention is also anticipated by an

unpatented oven cleaner made and sold by Beam Chemical

Company from 1957 to the present. Beam was sold with

a glass or plastic spray bottle and with instructions to

apply it to a warm oven. The formula used by Beam o

April 8, 1960 and for some time before and after that date

produced a solution containing more than 50 per cent water

by weight, about 2.8 per ceni sodium hydroxide by weight,

compatible surfactants and a glycol or glycerol humectant

which, occassionally during the period 1957 through 1962,

was sometimes propylene glycol. Thus, the only real dis

aI SS NOS” — VT eS I i a a et tl

i

J

y

D

i

/

r

.

t

.

"

5a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

tinction between Beam and Perry was that Perry was

aerosol-dispensed while Beam was dispensed by a so-called

Windex-type sprayer. That difference is inconsequential

as the district court found and as evidenced by Perry’s

statement in his patent that, ‘‘The same results were

achieved by spraying the cleaner of the example on a hot

oven with a conventional pressure atomizer.’’ Beam there-

fore anticipated the patent in suit.

Finally, Perry’s product was sold and used more than

one year prior to the application, thereby calling into

effect the statutory bar of 35 U.S. C. § 102(b). In October

1962 Perry made and sold a 30 gallon drum of the oven

cleaner claimed in the patent without including the furfuryl

alcohol ‘‘catalysts’’ required by some claims of the patent.

The solution was more than 50 per cent water by weight

and contained 3 per cent sodium hydroxide, a humectant

and a surfactant. Also, not later than December 1962,

Perry made a 20 gallon batch of the same oven cleaner

which was placed in plastic squeeze bottles and used for

testing purposes, except for one such bottle which was

given to a home economist with Vaugn Electric Co. of

Somerville, Massachusetts, to cultivate future orders for

the oven cleaner. No confidentiality restrictions were im-

posed. The sale of this oven cleaner (called ‘‘Winbro 403”’

at the time of the sale) and the giving of one bottle to

Vaugn Electric’s home economist constituted a public use

or sale of the invention more than one year prior to the

application. That transaction barred the granting of the

patent pursuant to section 102(b). Frantz Mfg. Co. v.

Phenia Mfg. Co., Nos. 18975 and 71-1069 (7th Cir., March

16, 1972).

Il

Had the applicable prior art described in the foregoing

not anticipated the Perry oven cleaner, t.e., had it not been

sufficiently identical to anticipate, it is clear that Perry’s

6a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

purported invention would have been obvious by the teach.

ings of the above described oven cleaners. Given a prior

art which included Bissell and Beam, the obviousness of

Perry cannot be questioned. Moreover, the prior art tend.

ing to establish obviousness is even more extensive than

that which established anticipation.

The oldest example of the prior art which renders Perry

obvious is a paragraph in a home reference work entitled

Hen ey’s Formuuas, Processes anp TraDe Secrets (1948)

which stated:

To Clean A Gas Stove—An easy method of remoy-

ing grease spots consists in immersing the separable

parts for several hours in a warm lye (sodium

hydroxide], heated to about 70°C. (158°F.), said lye

to be made of nine parts of caustic soda and 1

parts of water [5% sodium hydroxide and 95%

water]. These pieces, together with the fixed parts

of the stove, may be well brushed with this lye and

afterwards rinsed in clean, warm water. The grease

will be dissolved, and the stove restored almost to its

original state.

Several prior art items were patented in the United

States, of which only two were considered by the patent

office. Those two were United States Patents Nos. 3,031,488

and 3,031,409 issued April 24, 1962 to one Perlman. They

covered an anhydrous, reduced caustic oven cleaner which

contained 2 to 3 per cent of sodium or potassium hydroxide,

surfactants and glycol humectants. The *409 patent also

taught that spraying some such compounds from an aerosol

package produces a foam. Although the °408 and "408

patents du not require application to a heated oven, the

products described by both patents were suitable for such

application.

At least two other patents not considered by the patent

office properly constitute relevant prior art with regard

_— Ff = = ~~

ee Fr = SV Sr FF EF EU

ee i el

-

7a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

to the Perry patent. United States Patent No. 3,079,284,

issued February 26, 1963 to one Boucher, disclosed an oven

cleaner more than 50 per cent water including sodium hy-

droxide in amounts as low as 5 per cent which was to be

applied to an oven which was then heated for catalytic

effect. United States Patent No. 2,992,995, issued July 18,

1961 to one Arden, disclosed an aqueous cleaning solution

with sodium hydroxide in as low an amount as 4 per cent

where items to be cleaned were dipped in the solution heated

to temperatures over 200°F. The latter patent also divulged

the use of glycols and glycerols as humectants.

The district court also found that the separate work of

John J. Sullivan and John W. Seljan constituted prior art

which was relevant to Perry and rendered it obvious. We

agree, but we do not discuss those items of prior art since

their effect is cumulative.

Based on the prior art described above, one skilled in

the art of liquid oven cleaners would know or could easily

discover that aqueous solutions for such purposes can be

effective at concentrations of caustic less than 10 per cent

by weight, that surfacants and humectants are useful in-

gredients therein, that glycol and glycerol humectants are

common in such solutions, that they may be sprayed from

aerosol cans or plastic or glass atomizers of various types,

that some such solutions spray as a foam from aerosol cans

and that heat is a useful catalyst in the cleaning reaction

produced by the application of such products to burned-on

oven soil. We believe, as did the district court, that a person

ordinarily skilled in the art of liquid oven cleaners would

find Perry’s product and method obvious.

Il

A review of the patent office file relating to the applica-

tion which became United States patent No. 3,335,092,

together with a reading of the patent itself, justifies the

district court’s determination that the patent is void for

8a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. $112. The patent states

no invention over the prior art. We believe that the reason

no such statement can be found in the patent is because there

was no invention involved. Conflicts between Perry’s testi

mony herein and the claims and specifications of the patent

make clear that what it is that was supposed to have been

invented remains unclear. Perry’s patent states that the

method of application of the oven cleaner as between con.

ventional atomizers and aerosol cans is unimportant ag to

the result. At trial, however, Shelco, Inc. claimed that soly-

ing the problem of aerosol packaging of caustic oven cleaner

solutions was the invention. But the patent neither describes

the nature of such a problem nor its solution and therefore

fails for indefiniteness since no other invention has been as-

serted or identified in the patent. Shelco has also half-

heartedly asserted that the invention consists of the use of

20 per cent propylene glycol as a humectant in the cleaning

solution. We ignore that contention since the patent does

not identify the use of propylene glycol as the invention, nor

does it specify the amount of propylene glycol to be used,

and it specifically states that the ‘‘invention’’ it encom-

passes includes compositions similar to the example which

contain no humectant at all.

IV

35 U.S. C. § 184 prohibits the filing of an application for

a patent in a foreign country prior to six months after the

filing of an application in this country where the subject

matter of the application is the same and the invention was

made in this country except when authorized by a license

from the commissioner of patents to apply for a foreign

patent. 35 U.S.C. §185 provides that « United States

Patent shall be invalid where a foreign application for the

same invention was made without the proper license. The

district court determined that the instant patent was invalid

pursuant to 35 U.S. C. §§ 184 and 185. We agree.

arm” e aes ST lUTCUC COrCrOUCrRrlCUhNNrUCUCU OC OCC]! UL C8 ll eR SES TO Se ee

..4

“—

aeen se © f& B® *

9a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

The basis for the district court’s determination that

Perry violated 35 U.S. C. § 184 was its specific finding of

fact that the only license applied for with respect to the in-

vention claimed was issued in January 1964. At that time

Perry’s application for a United States patent, upon which

the license was based, claimed that the presence of a furfuryl

alcohol catalyst was essential to the invention. The license

specifically stated that subsequent amendments to the

original United States patent application were not author-

ized by it for filing abroad. Not until April 20, 1964 did

Perry file any claim with the U.S. Patent Office which did

not require the presence of the catalyst. However, Perry’s

original foreign application claimed invention in oven-clean-

ing compositions which did not include the catalyst and thus

exceeded the license.

It is clear to us, therefore, that Perry violated the pro-

visions of 35 U. S. C. § 184 and that the district court’s

declaration of the invalidity of the patent pursuant to 35

U. S. C. § 185 was justified. Beckwith Instruments, Inc.

v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 338 F. 2d 573 (7th Cir. 1964).

V

35 U. S. C. § 285 authorizes district courts to award

attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in ‘‘exceptional

cases.’ The basis for the district court’s determination

that this was an exceptional case was its finding that

Perry had practiced fraud on the patent office in several

respects and that he and Shelco had otherwise acted im-

properly in that:

(1) Perry’s purported invention was copied from the

Beam oven cleaner;

(2) Perry had deliberately withheld information

from the patent examiner which was relevant

to the application;

10a

Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

(3) Perry had deliberately misrepresented to the

patent examiner facts which were relevant to the

application ;

(4) Perry and Sheleo, Inc. brought this lawsuit ip

bad faith because they knew or reasonably should

have known that the patent was invalid.

Fraud on the patent office or bad faith in asserting

the validity and infringement of a patent is ample justifi.

cation for holding that a patent case is an exceptional

one within the intendment of 35 U. S. C. § 285. Monolith

Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum € Chem. Corp,

407 F. 2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969); see Townsend Co. y,

M.S.L. Indus., 359 F. 2d 814 (7th Cir. 1966). Our inquiry

must therefore be directed to whether the district court's

determinations of fraud and bad faith were clearly errone-

ous. Fev. R. Crv. P 52(a); see Townsend Co. v. MSL.

Indus., supra at 817.

After reviewing the evidence upon which the district

court based its findings, we conclude that the findings of

fraud and bad faith on the part of Perry and Sheleco, Ine.

cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. That being the case,

the district court acted properly within its discretion in

declaring this case to be ‘‘exceptional’’ and thereupon

awarding attorneys’ fees to the defendants.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true Copy:

ee

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

lla

Petition for Rehearing

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Sevents Crrovuir

Nos. 71-1061 and 71-1062

Sxuetco, Inc., and Taz SHetco Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

Tue Dow CHemicaL Company and

Harry G. Scurernorz & Co.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Sue co, Inc., and Toe SHEetco Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

Boyie-Mmway, Inc. and AMERICAN

Home Propucts Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION.

The Honoraste Ricwarp B. Austin, Judge

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Shelco, Inc. and The Sheleo Company, Appellants, peti-

tion for a rehearing of the following issues:

1. Did the lower Court err as a matter of law in

holding that Shelco brought this lawsuit in bad faith?

2. Did the lower Court err as a matter of law in

holding that Perry (the inventor who was not and is

12a

Petition for Rehearing

not a party to this lawsuit) practiced fraud on the

Patent Office in obtaining the patent in suit?

3. Did the lower Court err as a matter of law ip

holding invalid claims 31 and 32 of the Perry patent

in suit?

This Court’s affirmance on these first two issues lets stand

an award against Shelco (not Perry) of attorneys’ fees and

expenses which the defendants assert are over $400,000

(App. 132-137). It also exposes Shelco (not Perry) to pos.

sible treble-damage liability on defendants’ anti-trust coun-

ter-claims which are premised on averments of Sheleo’s

purported bad faith in bringing this suit and Perry’s pur-

ported fraud on the Patent Office (App. 14-16 and 25-27),

Sheleo also petitions for a rehearing en banc of these

issues under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro.

cedure, which authorizes rehearing en banc ‘‘when consider.

ation by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain

uniformity of its decisions.’’ This Court’s decision on these

first two issues is in direct conflict with and overrules, sub

silentio, this Court’s previous decision in Scott Paper Com-

pany v. Fort Howard Paper Company, 432 F. 2d 1198 (7 Cir.

1970).* In Scott Paper, this Court held:

1. ‘‘A finding that a patent was procured by fraud or

unclean hands must be based on ‘clear, unequivocal and con-

vineing’ evidence’’ (432 F. 2d at 1204) ;-and

2. No finding of fraud or unclean hands in the procure-

ment of a patent will be made unless ‘‘the non-disclosed

prior art is almost identical with the patentee’s invention”.

(432 F. 2d at 1205).

We respectfully submit there is no credible evidence, let

alone clear and convincing proof, to support a finding of bad

* See also this Court’s decision in Wen Products, Inc. v. Port-

able Electric Tools, Inc., 367 F. 2d 764 (7 Cir. 1966).

13a

Petition for Rehearing

faith on the part of Shelco, or a finding of fraud on the part

of Perry, findings restated on pages 8 and 9 of this Court’s

opinion. The opinion does not discuss the evidence on those

findings, notwithstanding that Dow’s brief admits that key

finding 178, as to whether or not Perry had knowledge of

Beam in 1962, is based upon evidence that ‘‘is not clear’’

(p. 18, footnote).

Furthermore, even if the evidence here supported the

charge that the patentee, Perry, had been guilty of fraud,

the decision holding Shelco liable for attorneys’ fees (alleg-

edly over $400,000), despite the complete lack of any pro-

bative evidence that Shelco knew or even could have known

of the alleged fraud by Perry, is completely without prece-

dent and totally unjust.

If this decision is allowed to become the law of this Court,

the floodgates will be opened to claims for recovery against

patent owners based on charges of fraud by a patentee even

if the patent owners, at the time of bringing the suit, were

completely unaware of the asserted facts on which such

allegations of fraud are based.

I.

Shelco Did Not Bring This Suit In Bad Faith

There is no evidence that Shelco had any knowledge of

the fraud charged against Perry. Charge ‘ (4)’’ on page 9

of this Court’s decision incorrectly states that Perry and

Shelco, Inc. brought this lawsuit in bad faith. Shelco is

erroneously equated with Perry throughout Section V of

this Court’s opinion. The Court appears to have overlooked

the fact that Perry, the patentee, is not one of the plaintiffs

and is not a party to this suit. Perry is not, and never was,

an officer or employee of Shelco. The record is entirely clear

that the plaintiff, Sheleo, Inc., and its predecessor, The

l4a

Petition for Rehearing

Sheleo Company had no part in the preparation or prosecn.

tion of the applications which resulted in the patent in suit

(App. 488-490). There is not one scrap of evidence to sug.

gest that Shelco or its President, Carpenter, had any knowl.

edge in 1967 when Shelco brought these suits either

(a) that the patent was invalid as stated in this

Court’s decision, or

(b) that the patent was obtained as a result of

fraud or material misrepresentations.

The undisputed facts are that from 1963, Shelco had a

contract (App. 1082-96) with Perry’s company, Winfield

Brooks, which treated Perry’s oven cleaner invention as a

trade secret even from Shelco. The Patent Office proseen-

tion was handled by’Perry and his own attorney, Sewell

Bronstein (App. 489). The commercial Jifoam oven cleaner

was made up in bulk by Winfield Brooks who shipped it to

aerosol packagers who, in turn, packaged and labeled the

product in aerosol containers for Shelco. Shelco’s part of

the operation was purely a matter of advertising, promotion

and sales (App. 486-7, 580-1). The patent in suit was as-

signed to Shelco only a matter of days before the patent

issued.

Of the 195 findings of the District Court (which were

written by defendants’ counsel), only FF 168-195 relate to

the fraud issue. Of these, FF 180 and 194 are relevant to

Shelco, as distinguished from Perry and Winfield Brooks.

FF 180 incorrectly says the existence of Beam was kept

from the Patent Office by Perry, Shelco and its predecessors.

Shelco had no dealings whatever with the Patent Office and

no control over the Patent Office proceedings (App. 489).

Points (1), (2) and (3) at pages 8 and 9 of this Court's

opinion in no way relate to Shelco.

FF 194 is not really a fact finding but a conclusion, totally

unsupported by the other findings of the District Court or

15a

Petition for Rehearing

by the evidence. Further, even if Shelco ‘‘reasonably should

have known’’ (as stated in FF 194), this is not sufficient as

a matter of law to prove by clear, unequivocal and convinc-

ing evidence that Shelco brought this suit in bad faith.

Therefore, Shelco, when it brought suits in 1967 against

Dow, et al and against Boyle-Midway, et al, did not act in

bad faith. Even if Perry had been guilty of fraud, which

he was not, there is no basis whatever for imputing such

fraud to Shelco here so as to charge them with over $400,000

in attorneys’ fees and expose Shelco to possible treble-dam-

age anti-trust liability for allegedly bringing this suit in

bad faith.

Il.

Perry Did Not Obtain The Patent In Suit By Fraud

This Court’s decision relies on three prior uses as ‘‘anti-

cipations’’ under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The first, a Bissell oven

cleaner, was used only on a cold oven and was packaged in

a container which instructed the housewife to ‘‘Be sure oven

is cool.’”’ (PX 68, DX 106). Bissell, therefore, clearly was

not an anticipation of the method claims (this was flatly ad-

mitted in Dow’s brief at page 26). Furthermore, it came to

light immediately before trial and after discovery in this

litigation was closed (App. 171), and there is not even

a contention that it was previously known to Perry. Thus,

Bissell could not be involved in the fraud charges.

The second prior use relied upon by the Court as an

‘anticipation’? was Beam, which was never packaged in an

aerosol container as required by the patent claims until

after the patentee’s product was on the market. In fact,

Beam was never successfully packaged in an aerosol con-

tainer. This was tried in 1964 after plaintiffs’ Jifoam was

on the market, but the Beam cans leaked, burst their seams

and even exploded (App. 189-190, 199-203). The evidence is

16a

Petition for Rehearing

undisputed that the use of an aerosol dispenser, because jt

resulted in a foam, made the difference between success and

failure in a home oven cleaner, even though this Court's

decision dismisses this difference as ‘‘inconsequential”’,

The third prior use called an ‘‘anticipation’”’ was the

sale by Perry’s company, Winfield Brooks, of 30 gallons of

‘*Winbro’’ cleaning solution packaged in bulk in a drum and

sold to a local government cafeteria with no instructions

how to use it (FF 108, DXs 83A-B, App. 1543-4, 280-1),

Some unidentified man gave Mrs. Hall of Vaughn Electric

some oven cleaner to experiment with prior to December

1962, but in a plastic bottle without any spray applicater

(App. 205-6). There is no finding and no evidence of any sale

of any ‘‘Winbro”’ oven cleaner packaged in an aerosol con-

tainer as required by the patent claims until after December

4, 1962, the cut-off date for any statutory bar (4 102(b)) to

the Perry application, filed December 4, 1963.

The decision recognizes (p. 3) that an invention is not

anticipated ‘‘ ‘unless all of the same elements are found in

exactly the same situation and united in the same way to

perform an identical function’ in a previously known prod-

uct’’, and yet dismisses aerosol packaging as ‘‘insubstan-

tial’? and ‘‘inconsequential’’. The undisputed evidence is

that aerosol packaging for a home oven cleaner with the

resulting foam makes the difference between success and

failure. Boyle-Midway tested Beam in a Windex-type

(non-aerosol) bottle in 1958 and concluded that it ‘‘fails

as an oven cleaner because it is a very mobile liquid. It

runs off vertical and inverted surfaces before it has much

chance to react .. .’’ (emphasis added; DX 579, App. 1660).

Boyle-Midway’s oven cleaner expert at the trial admitted

that oven cleaners sprayed from squeeze bottles would

always drip and run:

“*Q. And you mean that no matter what you spray from

them, they are going to run?’’

‘*A, They will, sir, yes.’’ (App. 474)

ae

17a

Petition for Rehearing

Boyle-Midway’s brand manager, Treumann, testified

that in 1963-64 the major threat to Easy-Off paste oven

cleaner was ‘‘the true aerosol’’ product (App. 555).

Two years ago in the Scott Paper case, this Court held

that failure to reveal prior art which was held by the Court

to invalidate the patent in suit for obviousness, but was not

‘almost identical with the patentee’s invention’’, did not

constitute the required proof of fraud by clear, unequivocal

and convincing evidence.

The decision here is now saying that, contrary to the rule

of Scott Paper, a failure to reveal prior art to the Patent

Office is automatically fraud, even when the prior art is not

substantially identical in structure and function.

Heretofore, this Court has held that each element of the

fraud, including intent to deceive and materiality of the

withheld information, must be proven by clear, unequivocal

and convincing evidence. The present decision ignores this

requirement.

The claims of Perry’s patent were allowed by the Patent

Office on the argument that aerosol packaging was an impor-

tant feature of the invention. This Court may differ with the

Patent Office and with appellants as to the importance of

this feature which turned failure into success. But Perry

believed in the importance of aerosol packaging, and the

Court is not justified in its inference that Perry intended

to deceive the Patent Office by not revealing his prior bulk

sale of Winbro 403. Perry did not even make the invention

claimed in his patent until the early part of 1963, less than

a year before he filed.

The Conclusion That Perry Copied His Invention From

Beam is Contrary to the Evidence

The charge on page 8 of the Court’s opinion that Perry’s

‘invention’? was copied from Beam is not even supported

18a

Petition for Rehearing

by the fact findings in this case and is contrary to the

evidence. One does not have to be a chemist to see froms

comparison of Perry’s original oven cleaner formula with

the alleged 1962 formula of Beam (Addendum B, our maiz

brief) that one was not copied from the other. Perry's

claimed invention was an oven cleaner ‘‘consisting essen.

tially’’ of certain stated ingredients and packaged in ap

aerosol container, with the important and vital result that

it sprayed a foam. Beam was not such a product (FF 62).

Further, there is no evidence, much less clear and con-

vineing proof, that Perry even knew about Beam in 1962

or 1963, and the evidence is to the contrary.

Perry testified that he had never heard of Beam until

after this lawsuit started (App. 357, FF 177).

Perry’s patent attorney, Bronstein, swore that he had

never heard of Beam until after this lawsuit started (App.

627).

There is no doubt that Hannon, a salesman who worked

briefly for Perry in 1962-63, knew there was an oven

cleaner called Beam. There is equally no doubt that

Hannon, who in this period had all of the dealings for

Winfield Brooks with Mrs. Hall and Vaughn Electric, fur-

nished to Mrs. Hall in February 1963 a data sheet that had

instructions which had been copied from a Beam label.

However, there is no evidence whatsoever that Hannon

ever revealed the existence of Beam to Perry. The only find-

ing of fact on this point, FF 178, states Hannon “‘testified

that he ‘could have’ talked to Perry about Beam.’’ Dow has

admitted this finding to be erroneous (Dow brief, footnote

p. 18). In the portion of Hannon’s deposition to which this

finding refers (App. 234; see also the full deposition testi-

mony at 648), Hannon was not even being asked about

Beam. Finding 179 concludes the evidence is ‘‘persuasive”

that Hannon revealed Beam to Perry, but the evidence to

such effect is not only not persuasive, it is completely

19a

Petition for Rehearing

jacking. A fortiori, it is not ‘‘clear, unequivocal ond con-

yincing’’ as the law requires to prove fraud.

IV.

Claims 31 and 32 Should Be Held Valid

A. The Court’s opinion expressly ignores Sheleo’s con-

tention about the importance of using propylene glycol as

required in claims 31 and 32, stating at page 7: ‘‘ We ignore

that contention since the patent does not identify the use

of propylene glycol as the invention, nor does it specify the

amount of propylene glycol to be used, and it specifically

states that the ‘invention’ it encompasses includes compo-

sitions similar to the example which contain no humectant

at all.”’

This statement fatally confuses the functions of the

specification of a patent and the patent claims. It is the

daims which ‘‘measure the invention’’, Smith v. Snow, 294

U.S. 1, 11 (1935). It is the function of the specification of

the patent to describe the invention so that ‘‘any person

skilled in the art . . .”’ can ‘‘make and use the same’’ and

“set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of

carrying out his invention’’, 35 U. S. C. § 112.

The Perry patent fully complies with these respective

requirements. Claims 31 and 32 specify propylene glycol as

the humectant and the specification of the patent gives a

complete example of the preferred embodiment, containing

20% propylene glycol. The patent also states that ‘‘the use

of propylene glycol is highly preferred”’ (col. 3, lines 44-45).

In ignoring the requirement of these claims for the use

of propylene glycol because the patent states in the specifi-

cation that humectants can be omitted, the Court has com-

mitted a serious error of law.

20a

Petition for Rehearing

Claims 31 and 32 specify the combination of propylene

glycol and dilute aqueous sodium hydroxide in an aerosol

container with a propellant. No prior art uses or suggests

this combination. This claimed combination permits th

oven cleaner to be used without rubber gloves. Dow re

discovered the ‘‘safening’’ effect of this same

and even filed a patent application on it in 1965 (App. 1187.

93). Dow’s accused oven cleaner copied this feature of

Perry’s invention, together with all of the other elements

of the claimed combination. This combination is patentable

and these claims should be sustained.

B. In section IV, this Court now holds for the first time

that a foreign application filed more than 6 months after

the U. S. application violates 35 U. S. C. §§ 184 and 1%,

merely because the foreign application contained broader

claims than the U. S. application. There is no precedent

for such a holding and it ignores the intent of the statutes

as explained in Blake v. Bassick Company, 245 F. Supp.

635 (N. D. Til 1965).

Petition for Rehearing

The Court’s decision in this case, if not modified, will

overrule its prior decision in Scott Paper Company v. Fort

Howard Paper Company, 432 F. 2d 1198, 1204 (7 Cir. 1970),

which required proof of each element of an alleged fraud

to be by ‘‘clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.’’ It

will also hold liable for attorneys’ fees and possible anti-

trust treble-damage claims a patent owner who had no

knowledge of any alleged fraud.

The Court should grant the requested rehearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Frrou, Even, Tasrw & Luepexa

135 South La Salle Street

Telephone : FR 2-7842

Attorneys for Plaintiff s-

Appellants

Of Counsel :

W. Pani Cuvurcen.

Ronan F. Bau

Fiso & Neave

277 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10017

22a

Decision on Petition for Rehearing

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tae Sevents Crecurr

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Nos. 71-1061 and 71-1062

Monday, June 5, 1972

Before:

Hon. Lutner M. Swycert, Chief Judge

Hon. Rocer J. Kizey, Circuit Judge

Hon. Tuomas E. Famcump, Circuit Judge

On Petition ror REHEARING

Suetco, Inc. and THe SHetco Company,

Plaintiff s-A ppellants,

vs.

Tur Dow Cuemica, Company and

Harry G. Scutrernouz & Co.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Seco, Inc. and THe SHetco Company,

Plaintiff s-A ppellants,

vs.

Boy.e-Mipway, Inc. and AMERICAN

Home Propucts Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion that it be heard en banc filed in the above-entitled

cause on April 26, 1972 by plaintiffs-appellants, no judge in

regular active service having requested a vote thereon, nor

any judge having voted to grant the suggestion, and the

panel having voted to deny a rehearing,

Ir Is Onverep that the petition for a rehearing in the

above entitled cause be and the same is hereby denied.

Findings Adopted by the District Court

Judge Austin’s Letter, September 23, 1970

Rnited States District Court

Hor the Northern

District of Blinois

Chesbes of Chicage GOU04

Richard B. Austin September 23, 197

gdwin M. Luedeka, Esquire

anderson, Luedeka, Fitch, Even & Tabin St i Veo, Leb% as 4

135 South La Salle Street wet Acscomg te -

icago, Illinois 60603 ne oe :

ner loocngy svivy | OP

Merriam, Marshal], Shipiro & Klose Form taney | OP

p

Lv

(FFENRZO TO

Chicago, Illinois 60603

36 West Monroe Street j in

oW

Messrs. D. D. Allegretti and

George P. McAndrews

Bair, Freeman & Molinare

135 South La Salle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

IN RE: SHELCO, INC. vs. BOYLE-MIDWAY,

et al., Nos. 67 C 1393, 67 C2130

Gentlemen:

The court has reviewed the evidence, exhibits and briefs

of the parties in the above cause and finds the issues

for the defendants.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law tendered by

the Gefendants accord with those which this cecurt would

have entered é€ thet finding of fact #179 has been

deleted and conclusion of law #18 has been amended to

delete therefrom the words “snould be", and as so changed

said findings and ccnclusions are adopted as the Findings

of Fact and Conciusions of Law of the court.

These Findings and Conclusions have this day been signed

and entered. Counsel are requestéd to bring an appropriate

Judgment Order within 20 days from date hercof.

Sincerely, “*

: ad Sg Se

Lf ee

Richard B. Auatijn

24a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

{Entered September 23, 1970}

Tue Parties, Issues, anp JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiff, Sheleo, Inc., is a Massachusetts Corpora.

tion having its principal place of business at Wellesley

Hills, Massachusetts. Plaintiff, The Sheleo Company, is a

Delaware corporation having its principal place of busi-

ness at Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts. The Shelco Com.

pany is a wholly-owned subsidfary of The Clorox Company,

an Ohio corporation authorized to do business in Illinois,

(PL. Pretrial Brief 7)

2. On December 4, 1969, The Sheleo Company acquired

substantially all of the assets of Shelco, Inc., including the

right, title, and interest in U. S. Patent No. 3,335,092 (the

patent in suit). Shelco, Inc. was the owner of the patent

in suit prior to December 4, 1969. (Pl. Pretrial Brief p. 7)

Sheleo, Inc. was the sole plaintiff until January 14, 1970,

when, on plaintiff’s motion, The Sheleo Company was joined

as a party plaintiff on condition that it be bound by all

proceedings in the case with the same force and effect as

they are applicable to Shelco, Inc. (9-10). The Shelco Com-

pany also agreed in open court to assume any liabilities

of Shelco, Inc. arising from this case (18-19). Hereinafter,

unless otherwise indicated, the plaintiffs will be referred to

as ‘‘Sheleo.’’

3. Shelco, Inc. became the owner of the patent in suit

by way of an assignment from Winfield Brooks Company,

Inc., the assignee of the patentee, Kenneth E. Perry (Pl.

Pretrial Brief 7). There is a continuing relationship be.

tween Shelco, Winfield Brooks, and Mr. Perry, as follows:

Mr. Perry is the President of and owns the controlling

interest in Winfield Brooks, and he is a Director of and,

through Winfield Brooks, owns approximately 35% of

Shelco, Inc. (811, 1082, 1127-29). Winfield Brooks makes

and Shelco sells the oven cleaner (‘‘Jifoam’’) which is the

commercial embodiment of the Example of the patent in

25a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

suit. (1087, 1092, 1302; Stipulated Statement of Uncon-

tested Facts p. 3).

4. Defendant, The Dow Chemical Company, (hereafter

“Dow’’) is a Delaware corporation having a regular and

established place of business in Chicago, Illinois. De-

fendant, Harry G. Schierholz & Co. (hereafter ‘‘Schier-

holz’’), is an Illinois corporation having a regular and es-

tablished place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

5. On August 10, 1967, Sheleo, Inc. filed a complaint

(C. A. No. 67 C 1393) charging Dow and Schierholz with

infringement of U. S. Patent 3,335,092, entitled ‘““Oven

Cleaner and Method of Using the Same.’’ Dow is the mannv-

facturer of an oven cleaner (‘‘ Dow All New Oven Cleaner’’)

charged to infringe this patent and Schierholz is Dow’s dis-

tributor for this oven cleaner in the Chicago area.

6. On December 21, 1967, Shelco, Inc. filed a complaint

(C. A. No. 67 C 2190) charging defendants Boyle-Midway,

Inc. (hereafter ‘‘Boyle-Midway’’) and American Home

Products Corporation (hereafter ‘‘AHP’’) with infring-

ment of the same patent by manufacture and sale of Boyle-

Midway’s ‘‘ Easy-Off’’ oven cleaner.

-

7. All defendants have filed counterclaims seeking a

declaration of invalidity of the patent and attorneys’ fees

and Dow has further counterclaimed for treble damages

under the antitrust laws.

8. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject

matter. Venue in this District is proper.

9. By order of October 1, 1969, C. A. Nos. 67 C 1393 and

67 C 2190 were consolidated for trial on the sole issue of

validity of the patent in suit.

Tue Patent in Suit

10. On December 4, 1963, Kenneth E. Perry filed his

original application for the patent in suit (DX 74). A first

26a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

revised application was filed July 6, 1964 (DX 75) anda

second revised application was filed on August 26, 1965

(DX 76). The August 26, 1965 application matured ints

U.S. Patent 3,335,092 on August 8, 1967 (DX 77).

11. The patent relates to a composition for cleani

ovens, grills and similar surfaces and to a method for apply.

ing the composition. Dow and Schierholz are charged with

infringement of composition and method claims, specifically

Claims 1-6, 14, 16-19, 26, and 28-32. American Home Prod.

ucts and Boyle-Midway are charged with infringement of

the same claims with the exception of 31 and 32. (Stipa.

lated Statement of Uncontested Facts, p. 3; PL Pretrial

Brief, p. 10).

12. The sole composition example of the patent in suit

reads :

‘* EXAMPLE

Proportion,

Ingredient : per cent

NaOH (in the form of a 50% solu-

tion or 50° Baume) ............ 13.0

Ammonium salt of the sulfate ester

of an alkylphenoxy polyoxy eth-

ylene ethanol, sold under the

trade name Alipal CO-436 by

Antara Chem. Co. (surfactant) 1.0

Sulfonate surfactant sold under the

trade name Benax 2Al by Dow

0 Eo reer er egree 0.1

Promyprene @tyeel .. 2. be ewes. 20.0

Purcery: SONG. ................ 1.4

Tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol ...... 0.7

Water (including water of NaOH

SE a Selo de ses ks do cow Ses 73.8

' Exclusive of water in solution.’’

27a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

Mr. Perry, the inventor, summarized his invention as

being:

‘‘the development of the best oven cleaner on the

market that could be—that was basically a safe

aqueous caustic oven cleaner applied to a hot oven

through an aerosol can, gaining the benefits both of

the ingredients and the application through an aero-

sol can,...’’ (1249)

13. The composition claims, broadly, call for a liquid

oven cleaner for application as a spray to a hot oven, con-

‘sisting essentially of water in an amount of over 50% by

weight of the composition, and an alkali metal hydroxide in

an amount of from 1-10% of the composition packaged in

an aerosol container with a propellant (e.g. Claim 16). Both

sodium hydroxide and potassium hydroxide are classified

as alkali metal hydroxides (51, 1254-55).

14. Certain narrower claims specify that the alkali

metal hydroxide be sodium hydroxide in an amount of 3%

and further call for the presence of any amount of a humec-

tant and any amount of a surfactant (e.g. Claim 28).

15. A humectant, in the context of this patent, is a sub-

stance used to retard evaporation of the composition. (DX

77, Col. 3, lines 41-44 ; 59 ; 3358 ; 3385-86). No specific amount

of humectant is specified by any of the claims. The specifi-

cation says the amount of humectant may be as little as 1%

or may be omitted altogether. (DX 77, Col. 3, lines 53-56,

70-73). The humectant can be either a glycerol (a polyhy-

dric alcohol known commercially as glycerine), a glycol (an

alcohol having two hydroxyl groups), or any alcohol having

more than two hydroxyl groups. (DX 77, Col. 3, lines 41-

44; 60-65 ; 1623-24; DX 624; 3351-55).

16. The term ‘‘surfactant’’ is a shorthand term for a

surface active agent (39). In the context of this patent, a

28a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

surfactant is a wetting agent (40; 2373). The surfactant

can be one (or more) selected from the groups classified

as anionic (carrying a negative charge in solution), cationic

(carrying a positive charge in solution), or nonionic (carry.

ing a neutral charge in solution) (65-66; DX 77, Col. 3, lines

62-70). No specific amount of surfactant is called for ip

any of the claims, nor in the specification. (DX 77, Col. 4,

lines 3-6).

17. The method claimed by the patent is to spray the

composition on a hot oven, leave the composition on the

hot oven for an interval of time, and then remove the com.

position (e.g. Claim 1). Some claims state that the oven

should be at a temperature of at least 140°F. (e.g. Claim 6).

18. While both the composition and method claims refer

to the composition as being sprayed from an ‘‘aerogol

container’? by a ‘‘propellant,’’ the patent specification

states that the ““same results were achieved by spraying

the cleaner . . “on a hot oven with a conventional pressure

atomizer’’ ( Dx 77, Col. 3, lines 38-40).

19. In the patent in suit, the reduced caustic (3%) is

said to have the advantage of making the cleaner safer, less

corrosive, and easier to store (Col. 1, lines 48-52; Col. 2

lines 3-5). The spray is said to make the cleaner less messy

to apply and easy to remove (Col. 1, lines 44-48; Col. 2,

lines 14-17). The application to a hot oven is said to be

more convenient in that the oven may be cleaned without

waiting for it to cool (Col. 2, lines 63-67), and the elevated

temperature speeds the reaction to the point where the

cleaning can be done in 5 to 20 minutes, a fractior of the

time required by paste cleaners (Col. 2, lines 50-56; 18-26).

It is to be noted that while the patentee says thaf heat is

essential to his invention (1318; 1325-26) Shelco maintains,

under oath, that the composition is covered by the patent

claims whether used on a hot or cold surface (PI.’s Ans. to

Interrog. 79.10, 805).

_ 29a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

: 20. In written arguments and sworn affidavits submitted

| to the Patent Office during the pendency of Perry’s third

. application, Perry made the following statements:

‘‘This demonstrates the deep-seated opinion of those

| skilled in this art prior to applicant’s invention that

| (1) caustic oven cleaners should, under no circum-

) stances, be applied to a hot oven and (2) the aerosol

packaging of aqueous solutions of sodium hydroxide

3 for oven cleaning was too hazardous to be acceptable,

| two misconceptions which applicant proved to be

untrue.’’ (DX_76, p. 89)

‘‘However, recently, after JIFOAM [Perry’s oven

cleaner] disproved the prevailing belief of those

skilled in the art that (1) aerosol packaging of aque-

ous solutions of sodium hydroxide is too hazardous

and (2) applying a caustic solution to a hot oven is

too hazardous, . . . ’’ (emphasis added) (DX 76,

p. 91)

: ‘Thus, after applicant had disproved the prevailing

beliefs that aerosol packaging of aqueous solutions

of sodium hydroxide for oven cleaners was too haz-

ardous to be practical and that application of alkaline

oven cleaners to a hot oven was also too hazardous,

...’’ (DX 76, p. 94)

sary to overcome the prejudices of those skilled in

this art, as evidenced by the Consumer Reports,

against aerosol packaging of aqueous sodium hydrox-

ide oven cleaners and against application of alkaline

oven cleaners to a hot cven.’’ (DX 76, p. 96)

]

}

| ‘In achieving this commercial success, it was neces-

]

}

“So far as I know, I am the first to have thought of

aerosol packaging a sodium hydroxide-water or so-

dium hydroxide-water-glycol oven cleaner and am the

30a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

first to have thought of applying such aerosol ove,

cleaner to a hot oven at a time when others in this

field were of the opinion that it would be dangerong

and unsatisfactory to do either.’’ (DX 76, p. 94)

21. Although Perry’s testimony, continuing his ap.

proach before the Patent Office, contends for a very broad

scope of invention, the advance over the prior art now

asserted by Shelco is that Mr. Perry was the first to teach

that an aqueous solution oven cleaner with reduced caustic

(less than 10% free alkali metal hydroxide) and a large

percentage (20%) of propylene glycol could be stored in

aerosol metal cans and sprayed on a hot oven to produce a

foam which would achieve quick, effective, and safe cleaning,

(21-32; Pi. Pretrial Brief 3-5, 16-24). This is considerably

narrower than the position urged on the Patent Office and

the patent’s broad assertion that the advance was over

prior art oven cleaners which were applied as thick, messy

pastes having a high (10%) free alkali metal hydroxide

content and which were all applied to cold ovens (Col. 1,

lines 20-43; Col. 2, lines 3-17). It is also considerably nar-

rower than the claim language which, for example, does not

speak of metal aerosol cans, nor foam, nor any proportion

of humectant or propylene glycol, nor, in many cases, even

a reduced caustic.

22. Without a surfactant, an aqueous caustic in an

aerosol container with a propellant will not foam or adhere

to a hot oven wall. (Lover 2165-2166). Most of the claims

of the Perry patent do not call for the use of a surfactant

(the foaming agent). (Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14

16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, and 30). Mr. Perry, the

inventor, echoing his Patent Office arguments, testified:

‘*@. Then a 3 percent aqueous caustic, with an

acrosol can, applied to a hot oven is within your

invention?

3la

Findings Adopted by the District Court

‘‘A. In the broad claims, it would be so, sir.’’

(Perry 1341).

Hence the term ‘‘spraying’’ found in the method claims is

not limited to the spraying of a foam but was intended to

‘cover any form of spray. That this was the intention of

the inventor is shown by the statement in the patent that

“The same results were achieved by spraying the cleaner

of the example on a hot oven with a conventional pressure

atomizer.’’ (Col. 3, lines 38-40). There are frequent refer-

ences in the patent to ‘‘spray or foam’? (e.g., Col. 5, line

59) which only confirm the broad intended meaning of the

term ‘‘spraying’’ found in the method claims.

23. From the above findings, it is apparent that in its

examination of the prior art the court must look primarily

for art teaching the use of freely flowing aqueous solutions

of free alkali metal hydroxides in amounts not more than

10% by weight that were suitable for spraying on a hot

oven. In view of Finding 21 and 22, the vehicle by which

the spray is dispensed is not critical; nor is the form of the

spray (that is, whether it foams). With respect to the

narrow claims, the Court, in addition, must look for the

presence of a surfactant and a humectant, though the

amount of either is immaterial. With respect to the humec-

tant, the Court must further look for the use of glycols,

glycerols or other polyhydric alcohols as the humectant

and, with respect to two claims (31, 32) it must look for

the use of propylene glycol as the specific humectant, though

in no particular percentage. In view of the absence of any

teaching in the patent that a high percentage (such as 20%)

of propylene glycol functions as a particular safening agent,

or that propylene glycol serves this function better than

any other humectant specified in the patent, the prior art,

contrary to Shelco’s contention, need not be examined for

this teaching. The prosecution history of the Perry patent

also casts light on the scope of inquiry into the prior art

necessary for resolving the issues herein.

32a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

Perry’s Onrerxat Appiication; His Two Revissp

Appiiacations; anp His Canadian anp

Great Brrrarn AppLicatTions

z4. While the scope of the prior art to be looked for has

been defined by Finding 23, the Court must also determing

the effective filing date for the claims in issue; that is, the

cut-off date for ‘‘prior’’ art. The prosecution history of

the Perry patent casts light on this factor.

25. On June 4, 1963, Perry made a disclosure of his

oven cleaner formula to his patent attorney. (DX 63) The

disclosure stated: 4

‘*For the oven cleaner, the ratio of tetrahydrofar.

_furyl alcohol and furfuryl alcohol is essential. It can

be varied somewhat but neither can be eliminated or

replaced with like alcohols.’’ (Emphasis added).

26. On December 4, 1963 Perry’s patent attorney filed

Perry’s first application for patent (DX 74, p. 1-15), serial

328,114. The first seven claims of the ten claims of the

original application, as filed (DX 74, p. 13, 14) were limited

to an oven cleaner composition which included a catalyst

designated as furfuryl alcohol and tetrahydrofurfury] aleo-

hol. The remaining three claims were limited to a method

of using the oven cleaner composition having the catalyst

defined in the first seven claims. In other words, each

claim of Perry’s original application contained the limita-

tion to furfuryl alcohol and tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol.

The claims were appropriately and necessarily drawn in

this limited way in view of Perry’s communication to his

attorney disclosing his invention.

27. Perry’s disclosure further specified his invention

and taught the necessity of the furfuryl alcohols in his

oven cleaner:

‘*The present invention is based on the surprising

discovery that a mixture of furfuryl alcohol and

33a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol catalyzes and enhances

the cleaning action of the sodiwm hydrozide, espe-

cially at elevated temperatures, to such a great extent

that the amount required can be reduced to less than

14 and such reduced amount has a markedly greater

and faster cleaning power.’’ (DX 74, p. 3, lines 21-

27) (emphasis added)

28. On April 20, 1964, more than one year after the

sale to Vaughn Electric, Kenneth E. Perry filed an amend-

ment to his original application, Serial No. 328,114 adding

a new Claim 11 which was not restricted to an oven cleaner

composition containing the catalyst. (DX 74, p. 16) Claim

11 reads:

‘| . , Amethod of cleaning ovens comprising spray-

ing on the oven while it is hot, a composition in the

form of a foam and containing as an essential ingre-

dient, an alkali metal hydroxide, leaving said com-

position on the hot oven for an interval of time and

wiping the composition off said oven.’’ (DX 74, p. 16)

This claim was rejected by the Patent Office on April 2,

1965 ‘‘as failing to point out the invention in the methods

claimed, since the necessary furfuryl-tetrahydrofurfuryl

alcoholic mixture has not been set forth’’. (DX 74, p. 19,

paragraph 7). (Emphasis added) Perry abandoned this

original application without response. (DX 74, p. 21).

28a. Perry filed a first revised application (DX 75) on

July 6, 1964 in order to get the broadened disclosure of new

Claim 11 under oath. (DX 75, p. 15). The Patent Office, in

the first revised application, believed that claim 11 was still

faulty :

‘sa

7. Claims 11-13 are rejected as indefinite and as

failing to point out the alleged invention since the

34a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

necessary hydrofurfuryl-tetrahydrofurfuryl aleo.

holic mixture has not been set forth.’’ (DX 75, p. 19,

March 2, 1965).

In response to this rejection, Perry directly misrepresented

a critical fact:

‘Original claim 11 has been incorporated into the

specification. Such original claim was a part of the

original disclosure.’’ (DX 75, p. 33)

29. In subsequent arguments in Perry’s first and second

revised applications before the United States Patent Office

and in companion cases before the Canadian and Great

Britain Patent Offices, Mr. Perry argued that the “‘broad

concept’’ of his invention—not limited to the use of the

catalyst—was first disclosed on the date be filed Claim 11,

April 20, 1964, which was more than one year after the sale

of his oven cleaner. For example, on August 23, 1966 the

Canadian Patent Office rejected all claims in the corre.

sponding Canadian application (originally identical to the

U. S. application, as amended by the addition of Claim 11),

which were not limited to the use of the furfuryl-tetrahy-

drofurfury! alcohol catalyst:

‘* According to the disclosure page 3, lines 21 to 27,

the invention of the present application is based on

the use of a mixture of furfuryl and tetrahydrofur-

furyl alcohols, which catalyzes and enhances the

cleaning action of the sodium hydroxide at elevated

temperatures. (Emphasis added)

Therefore claims 1, 12, and 13 are rejected as not

being supported by the disclosure and must be can-

celled.’’ (DX 608, p. 417)

30. Perry argued that the disclosure of claim 11 (which

was filed with the original Canadian Application but was

not included in the U.S. application until the amendment

of April 20, 1964—more than one year after a sale of

Perry’s invention) provided disclosural support for the

non-catalyst claims:

35a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

“This broad concept of applicant’s invention is

clearly set forth in claim 11 as originally filed with

the application, with no reference being made therein

to the presence of a catalyst in the cleaning composi-

tion. This broad concept of the invention and ap-

plicant’s intent to claim the matter broadly is all the

more clearly realized upon reference to originally

filed claim 12, [not in original U. S. application, until

amendment of April 20, 1964], which is dependent

upon claim 11 but further recites the presence of the

catalyst in the broad cleaning composition of claim

11. This is a crystal clear teaching that the invention

is not limited to the presence of the catalyst. It is

also clearly stated on page 11 of the original dis-

closure that the invention is not limited to the des-

cription of the specification but only to the composi-

tions and methods claimed in the claims, among

which is clatm 11. Thus, when the original disclosure

is viewed as a whole, which it must be, it discloses

that the invention in its broadest aspect does not re-

quire a catalyst and that use of such catalyst is a

narrower aspect of the invention as is the use of the

humectant.’’ (DX 608, pp. 412, 413) (Material in

brackets added) (Emphasis added)

‘Thus the catalyst merely enhances and improves

the overall broad inventive concept. In order to

distinguish between the broad aspect (as per original

claim 11) and the narrower aspect (the use of catalyst

and/or humectant) of the inventive concept this par-

agraph [of the Canadian disclosure] has been

amended to refer to such narrower aspect as a part

of the invention.’’ (Emphasis added) (DX 608, pp.

413, 414) (Material in brackets added)

31. The earliest effective filing date to which Perry is

entitled for the broad non-furfuryl alcohol limited claims

(all of the claims here in issue) is not December 4, 1963, the

36a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

date of his first application, but April 20, 1964, the date on

which claim 11 was added to the first application.

1On June 25, 1969, this Court denied a Motion For §

Judgment under 35 U. S. C. §102 (b) based on the sale of 1200 eans

of Perry’s oven cleaner to Vaughn Electric Company (DX 58; 821;

DX 82) more than one year prior to the April 20, 1964 date. This

Court was of the view, at that time, that Perry wasentitled to the

December 4, 1963 date for all claims in his patent. Evidence sub.

sequently received during the trial of this case shows that the April

20, 1964 date is the correct one.

The Plaintiff, in response to the Motion For Summary Judg.

ment filed by AHP and Boyle-Midway, quoted the sworn testimony

of Mr. Perry taken during his pretrial deposition :

‘*Q. Did you understand at the time you signed this oath

[accompanying the original Perry application filed Decem-

ber 4, 1963] that you had to have a furfuryl alcohol in your

material for your invention?

‘*A. I don’t believe I understood it had to be that. It

was preferred.’’ (Pl’s. brief, p. 12.)

On Motion For Summary Judgment, Mr. Perry’s sworn testi-

mony was entitled to full credit as that of one skilled in the art.

As of the time of the Motion For Summary Judgment, Mr. Perry

had denied under oath that he had made a written disclosure of his

invention to his patent attorney. (1320-1322) Subsequently, under

Order of Court, Plaintiff produced Mr. Perry’s invention disclosure

to his attorney, which reads:

‘*For the oven cleaner, the ratio of tetrahydrofurfuryl al-

cohol and furfuryi alcoho] is essential. It can be varied

somewhat but neither can be eliminated or replaced with

like aleohols.’’ (DX 63, 525).

Mr. Perry’s admissions in the Canadian and Great Britain ap-

plications as to the significance of claim 11 are also highly revealing

and consistent with his disclosure to his patent attorney. In Dever

Corporation v. Houdaille Industries, Inc., 382 F. 2d 17 (7th Cir.

1967), the Court stated:

‘*The fact that he made an admission to the Canadian Patent

Office as to the date of his patent disclosure contrary to that

which he previously made to this Court, in which he now per-

sists, relates to his credibility and presents a matter for con-

sideration by the trier of the facts."’ (At p. 20)

Finding 30 is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's recent de

cision in General Foods Corporation v. Perk Foods Co., 419 F. 2d

944 (7th Cir. 1969) ; 164 U. S. P. Q. 1. The matter is further dis

cussed under the heading ‘*‘ Fraud’’.

37a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

Prior Art Patents

32. The patent in suit relates broadly to the art of

cleaning compositions and, specifically to compositions for

cleaning cooking residue from ovens. Prior art cleaning

compositions have traditionally utilized an alkali as their

active (cleaning) ingredient. (40-41) Alkalis are basic sub-

stances which are characterized by the predominance of hy-

droxyl ions (OH-) when dissolved in water, as opposed to

acidic substances which are characterized by the predomin-

ance of hydrogen ions (H+). The presence of these ions

can be detected and expressed on a scale known as the pH

scale wherein ‘‘7’’ indicates neutrality; ‘‘7’’ to ‘‘14’’, in-

creasing alkalinity; and ‘‘7’’ to ‘‘0’’, increasing acidity.

(47-48) The most commonly used alkali is sodium hydroxide

(NaOH), but other alkalis, such as potassium hydroxide

(KOH) or sodium metasilicate, (alone or mixed physically

with 40% NaOH and sold as sodium orthosilicate) were also

commonly used as the active ingredient in cleaning formu-

lations, including oven cleaners. (40-41 ; 50-52; 55).

33. The cleaning reaction, generally speaking, is the

reaction of the base alkali (frequently referred to as a

“‘eaustic’’ because of its high pH and consequent corroding

effect on skin, eyes, and metals) with the fatty acids and

other compositions which comprise the baked-on residue.

(DX 72, Tab. 1, Col. 2, lines 9-15) This reaction produces

an alkali metal salt commonly known as soap. (1731, 1746-

1747) This soap-making reaction is described by the term,

“‘saponification.’? (DX 72, Tab. 1, Col. 2, lines 9-15). The

soap does not stick to the oven surface and can be wiped off,

leaving a clean surface. (DX 77, Col. 3, lines 34-36).

34. In addition to the alkali cleaning ingredient, it has

also been common in the prior art to add certain other in-

gredients to oven cleaners,‘such as humectants, surfactants,

ammonia, and others, to enhance, in one way or another, the

alkali cleaning action. (DX 2; 358-60; DX 3; DX 556; PX

32; DX 72).

38a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

35. Perlman patents 3,031,408 and 3,031,409,

issued April 24, 1962 are prior art references which

the aerosol packaging of a reduced caustic oven cleaner

(preferably 2-3% sodium or potassium hydroxide). (Dx

72, Tabs. 6 & 7). This cleaner also contained compatible

surfactants and glycols which functioned as humectants,

(1226-31; DX 77, Col. 2, lines 32-41) The °409 Perlman

patent also taught that the spraying of the cleaner as a foam

can be accomplished by, but is not inherent in, aerogo}

packaging. Of the 32 examples disclosed in the patent, 16

produced a non-foaming spray. (DX 85, pp. 14-16) But

Perlman says, the same ‘‘exceptionally good cleansing ae.

tion’’ may be obtained from the spray as from the foam,

(DX 85, p. 12) A similar result was suggested by the pat-

ent in suit wherein it is said the same results were obtained

from a ‘‘conventional pressure atomizer’’ as from a foam.

producing aerosol package containing a composition having

a surfactant. (DX 77, Col. 3, lines 38-40).

36. The Perlman oven cleaning compositions were not

water-based, but were to be applied to an oven surface which

had been wetted with water prior to the application of the

cleaner (DX 72, Tab. 6, Col. 4, lines 18-21, Tab. 7, Col. 3

lines 54, 71-73). The patents per se do not disclose the use

of the compositions on a hot oven, but Dow’s expert, Dr.

Colburn, testified that they are chemically suitable for ap-

plication to a hot oven, and the file history of the ’409 Perl-

man patent, page 30, states that the ‘‘glycol or glycol ether

is utilized to raise the flash point of the mixture and insure

safe use of the cleansing composition upon heated oven

surfaces’’ (99, DX 85; DX 86).? It is thus apparent that

the Perlman cleaners were suitable for use on a hot oven

2 Mr. Perry’s attorney was aware of the ‘‘heated oven surface”

language in the Perlman file wrapper (DX 86) although there is no

evidence that Perry, or his attorney, called this fact to the attention

of the Patent Office when they were attempting to distinguish over

Perlman.

39a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

and were intended to be so used if the housewife desired.

In fact, the file history of the patent in suit disclosed (DX

75, pp. 34-45) that Mr. Perry applied two of the Perlman

compositions and the commercial embodiment of the Perl-

man patents (an oven cleaner known as ‘‘Hep’’) on a

heated oven surface without difficulty and obtained better

results on a hot surface than a cold surface.

37. Boucher patent 3,079,284 (not considered by the

Patent Office), which issued February 26, 1963, is a prior

art reference which discloses an oven cleaning composition

with more than 50% water and containing sodium hydroxide

in an amount as low as 5%, sprayed on an oven which is

then heated to increase the ‘‘efficiency of the chemical re-

action of the cleaning agent with the soil to be removed,

eg., the saponification of charred fats, or the like.’? The

use of heat is said to permit a lower concentration of sodium

hydroxide thereby making the cleaner less irritating to the

skin. Boucher states that the cleaning reaction produces

‘a soapy residue on the surface in which the remaining

-soil is suspended and which may be easily wiped off to leave

the desired clean surface.’’ Boucher also-discloses the use

of ammonia as commonly used oven cleaner additive (DX

72, Tab. 1).

38. Cleveland patent 1,370,188 (not considered by the

Patent Office) which issued March 1, 1921 is a prior art

reference which discloses a 5% sodium hydroxide aqueous

solution which is to be sprayed hot onto a surface to re-

move paint. The function of the sodium hydroxide is ‘‘to

enter into combination with the oil of the paint and convert

it into soap which dissolves and is washed away, thus caus-

ing the pigment to become loose and in turn be washed

away by the water.’’ Thus, the cleaning reaction known

as saponification is common to both oven cleaning and strip-

ping of oil-based paints (DX 72, Tab. 3).

39. Phillips British patent 825,960 which issued Decem-

ber 23, 1959 discloses an oven cleaner containing an aqueous

40a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

solution of sodium hydroxide in an amount as low ag 5%,

This oven cleaner contained a wax-like substance that ep.

abled the packaging of the cleaner in solid stick form. The

patent also teaches the use of surfactants and the inclusion |

of up to 15% propylene glycol (one of the humectantg of

the patent in suit) (DX 72, Tab. 4).

40. Arden patent 2,992,995 which issued July 18, 1961,

is a prior art reference which discloses an aqueous solution

of sodium hydroxide in an amount as low as 4% for cleap.

ing purposes. This cleaner is to be used at temperatures

over 200°F. in the form of a dip (that is, the cleaner js

heated rather than the object to be cleaned). This reference

also discloses the use of glycerol and glycol as evaporation

retarding humectants (DX 72, Tab. 5).

41. Although not a patent, a publication entitled Hen.

ley’s Formulas, Processes, and Trade Secrets (1948) (Dx

611, Tab. 14), a reference book for the home, carries the

following instructions:

‘*To Crzan a Gas Stove—An easy method of remoy-

ing grease spots consists in immersing the separable

parts for several hours in a warm lye, [sodium hy-

droxide] heated in about 70°C. (158°F.), said lye to

be made of nine parts of caustic soda and 180 parts

of water. [5% sodium hydroxide and 95% water]

These pieces, together with the fixed parts of the

stove, may be well brushed with this lye and after-

wards rinsed in clean, warm water. The grease will

be dissolved, and the stove restored almost to its

original state.’’ (Material in brackets added)

42. The prior art patents and the Henley publication

described above illustrate that it was common practice to

use alkalis such as sodium hydroxide as the cleaning agents

for oven cleaning compositions; that aqueous solutions of

sodium hydroxide in the range of 4 to 5% were common

4la

Findings Adopted by the District Court

in oven cleaners; that the use of heat, either applied to the

cleaning composition or the object to be cleaned was known

to be desirable in speeding the saponification and other

chemical cleaning reactions ; that surfactants are commonly

added to oven cleaning compositions; that humectants are

commonly added to oven cleaning compositions; that

glycerols and glycols, including propylene glycol are com-

mon, interchangeably-used humectants in oven cleaners;

and that oven cleaners packaged in aerosol cans were used

in either foam or spray applications.

Oven CLEANER Prion Art Not APPEARING

IN Patent Orrice Recorps

A. John J. Sullivan’s Activities

43. In the early 1950’s, a young chemist, John J. Sulli-

van of Boston did chemical consulting work for a Connecti-

eut concern, the Wolcott Company (1542). The President

of Wolcott, a Mr. Frank Wolcott, had been the original

United States developer and merchandiser of the paste-

type oven cleaner ‘‘ Easy Off’’ which was later acquired by

Defendant Boyle-Midway. After selling his paste oven

cleaner formulation and business to Boyle-Midway, Mr.

Wolcott developed an aerosol valve stem brush type appli-

ecator which would allow the safe, controlled application of

a detergent foam to an oven surface (1542, 1552). (See DX

533.)

44. Mr. Sullivan’s original formulation work with

water-based caustic oven cleaners parallels in time his

working association, first with Mr. Wolcott’s brush appli-

cator, and subsequently with a sponge-type applicator (DX

339) promoted by Mr. Frank Hoar of Essex Laboratories

and a Mr. Frank Sugrue, President of Shield Chemical

Company until 1958* (1566).

*This is the same Shield Chemical Company that first aerosol

packaged Perry’s patented composition (1530-32).

42a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

45. The first caustic cleaner which Sullivan experi.

mentally packaged in an aerosol container (in 1954) wag

a whitewall tire cleaner containing 15 to 16 per cent by —

weight glycol, 34 per cent potassium hydroxide, 4 or 5 per

cent silicate, 4% per cent surfactant, and the remainder

water (1548, 1585, DX 543). This heavy-duty detergent

product was not put on the market in aerosol form becange

aerosol can and valve technology was not at that time suff.

ciently advanced to make the product attractive from either

a technical or price standpoint (1549).

46. By late 1956 and early 1957, Sullivan’s efforts were

again directed toward aerosol packaging of a heavy duty

detergent system (1551, 1552). After several trial and

error approaches to such a product, Sullivan developed an

aerosol-loaded oven cleaner designated as OC No. 1. The

components of this oven cleaner included 91% per cent free

potassium hydroxide, 2.7 per cent by weight of TWEEN

80 and 2.7 per cent by weight of SPAN 80. Tween and

Span are trademarked ingredients which together fune.

tioned in the oven cleaner as a humectant-surfactant sys-

tem. The remainder of the:material in the aerosol package

was water and the propellants Freon 114 and Freon 12

(1553-1555, DX 556).

47. In January 1957, Sullivan placed OC No. 1 (at that

time designated W-6) in an aerosol can and allowed it to

stand at room temperature for a period of eight months.

This test showed the product to be in excellent .condition

with sufficient pressure still in the can to allow a foam to

dispense from the container (1608, 1609, DX 555).

48. The amount of KOH flake (caustic potash) by

weight in OC No. 1 is listed in Sullivan’s lab books as 113

percent. The evidence shows that commercial grade caustic

potash is from 90 to 92 per cent pure potassium hydroxide

(1618).

43a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

49. Thus, Sullivan added approximately 10.1 per cent

by weight of pure potassium hydroxide to his OC-1 oven

cleaner. The evidence also shows that when the potassium

hydroxide is brought into mixture with the water and the

Span 80 and Tween 80, a saponification reaction occurs be-

tween the Span 80 and Tween 80 and the potassium hy-

droxide. After the reaction, which takes only 15 or 20

minutes, there is theoretically an amount of free potassium

hydroxide in the OC-1 solution of approximately 9.6 per

zent (1618, 1619).

50. This theoretical figure of a percentage of potassium

hydroxide less than 10 per cent was supported by inde-

pendent experiment of Dr. Robert M. Lazo, whose expertise

in the chemical field was thoroughly established (3345, 3346).

Dr. Lazo prepared a 600 gram sample of OC No. 1 which

contained 11.3 per cent commercial grade caustic potash,

2.7 per cent Span 80 and 2.7 per cent Tween 80, with the re-

mainder of the solution being water. By actual measure-

ment, the OC-1 formula was determined to contain free

potassium hydroxide in the amount of 9.83 per cent by

weight (3348).

51. Dr. Lazo described the Span 80—Tween 80 surfac-

tant-humectant system as containing polyhydric alcohols,

which means alcohols containing three or more hydroxyl

groups (3353, 3369). Span 80 is a non-water soluble Sorbitan

Mono-oleate. Tween 80 is a water soluble Sorbitan Poly-

oxyethylene Mono-oleate (3362, 3368).

52. By January 9, 1959, Sullivan had shelf-life tested his

OC No. 1 formula in drawn aerosol cans for two years. He

found no leakers whatsoever in the drawn or two-piece can

(with no side seam) (1656-1658, DX 568).

53. Sullivan’s OC-1 oven cleaner was on sale from 1957

up to and including the time Mr. Perry made his alleged in-

vention. Sullivan loaded the OC-1 formulation in sample

44a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

aerosol cans for Essex for subsequent submission to

tential customers, including Bon Ami and others.

this period of time the product was submitted to customers

with Risdon brand break-up buttons for spray foam appli.

cation as well as with the alternate sponge applicator (1660.

1661, DX 569). The OC-1 formula was suitable for applics.

tion to a heated oven surface and, in fact, was so used by

Dr. Terry at Bon Ami (1816-1817).

54. Essex Research, with whom Sullivan had dealt, dis.

solved after having financial difficulties in late 1959. After

that date, Sullivan dealt directly with customers, including

Bon Ami and others in his effort to sell his aerosol loaded

OC No. 1 oven cleaner (1661, 1662). In Sullivan’s words,

his attempts to sell his oven cleaner were thwarted by can.

tious marketing men in the field who wanted a hand lotion

that would do an oven cleaning job (1577).

55. Sullivan personally offered his OC No. 1 product to

the Fuller Brush Company in 1960, 1961 and 1962 (1575),

Sullivan quoted prices to various prospective customers

and employed salesmen and manufacturers representatives

from 1960 through 1962 in an effort to find a customer will

ing to market his oven cleaner (1576). Sullivan’s oral testi-

mony was well corroborated by contemporaneous documents

kept by him in the regular course of business.

56. Sullivan’s records show a price quotation to Arm-

strong Laboratories prior to Perry’s invention date, for up

to a half million pound shipment of the OC-1 formula for

aerosol loading by Armstrong (1686, 1687, DX 576).

57. Contemporaneous with his work on the development

of OC No. 1, Sullivan also formulated a whitewall tire

cleaner suitable for either aerosol spray foam or mechanical

pump application. The product contained one per cent by

weight caustic soda, two per cent D-66, a surfactant, and five

per cent diethylene glycol, a humectant, with the remainder

45a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

of the formula being water (1650-1651, DX 566). A modifi-

cation of this formula was made which contained one per

cent caustic soda, one per cent D-66 ten per cent diethylene

glycol and the remainder water. A test of this formula

showed that the foam generation and stability of the product

were excellent. Fifteen gallons of this whitewall tire cleaner

were sold to a Mr. Ed Devine of Crystal C and C Co. (1652,

1653, DX 567).

58. The activities of John J. Sullivan constitute the

placing of an aqueous caustic surfactant humectant aerosol

oven cleaner, suitable for application to a heated oven sur-

face, in the form of a spray foam, and an aqueous caustic

surfactant humectant aerosol loaded whitewall tire cleaner,

onsale prior to 1962. This was before Perry’s earliest work

on the invention of his patent and more than one year before

the filing date of his first application on December 4, 1963.

There is no evidence that Sullivan, who testified at the trial.

ever suppressed, abandoned, or concealed his products or

his work in this area. On the contrary, there is evidence of

continuous sales activity on the OC-1 oven cleaner, by and on

behalf of Sullivan, during the 1957-1963 period.

B. The Oven Cleaner of the Beam Chemical Company

59. From 1957 to 1961 or 1962, Mr. M. A. Becker was

President and Mr. Ralph Lemorande was Vice President of

the Beam Chemical Company of Oconto Falls, Wisconsin, a

manufacturer of various cleaning compositions. From 1961

or 1962 to 1965, Mr. Lemorande was President and Mr.

Becker was Chairman of the Board of the Beam Chemical

Company (267-68 ; 522-23).

60. Mr. Lemorande’s work at Beam in the period 1957-

65 included formulating compositions, packaging, shipping,

sales, correspondence, and total involvement in the opera-

tions of the company (264; 571-73). Mr. Becker was in-

volved in the distribution, financing, purchasing, and devel-

opment of the company (584-85).

46a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

61. Beginning in 1957 and continuing to the present, the

Beam Chemical Company has manufactured and sold gg

oven cleaner, first under the name ‘‘Beam Oven and

Cleaner”’, and, by 1958, under the name of Beam “Wipy

Away”’ (322-23; DX 24). The name ‘Wipe Away”’ was not

used by Beam after about March 1962 (324-28; DX 26).

62. ‘‘Beam Oven and Grill Cleaner’’ was sold in giag

bottles in 1957-58 and was applied in the form of a

from a ‘‘Windex”’ type dispenser (298-99; DX 17; 427-29).

63. Beginning at least in 1958 and continuing

out the period that the name was used, Beam “Wipe

Away’’ was sold in plastic ‘‘squeeze’’ bottles having an air

space inside the bottle and a dip tube extending through the

air space into the cleaner. The cleaner was applied by

squeezing the bottle, causing the cleaner to be forced up the

dip tube to one orifice of the nozzle and causing the air in

side the bottle to be forced out another orifice of the nozzle,

thereby mixing with the cleaner and causing it to be pro

pelled from the container in the form of an atomized spray

(DX 24, 25; 327-28; 430; 533-35). The Windex-type dis

penser and the plastic squeeze bottle are each examples of a

conventional pressure atomizer (317-18; 1479-81; 1792-93).

64. The glass bottle oven cleaner sold by Beam hada

glue-on label which contained the following directions for

use :

“1. Hold bottle upright and squeeze to spray

liquid on soiled surfaces. Works faster on warm

surfaces. (Non-inflammable)’’

**2. Wipe clean with damp cloth when soil is

soft, time may be 5 to 20 minutes depending on

amount of soil.’’

**3. Can be used for soaking purposes by adding

3 oz. to each gallon of hot water.’’ (DX 19)

4ia

Findings Adopted by the District Court

65. The plastic squeeze bottles in which Beam ‘‘ Wipe

Away”’ was sold in 1958-59 carried the same directions for

use as set out in Finding 64 (DX 24).

66. Prior to 1962, the Beam Chemical Company also sold

its oven cleaner in gallon containers. The label for such

containers in the period 1959-61 contained the following di-

rections :

““Apply on warm or hot surfaces—wipe clean with

damp cloth’’.

For containers such as deep-fat fryers, the directions stated

that ‘Wipe Away’’ could be used as a dip, in which case

it was to be diluted, put in the container to be cleaned, and

“heat to approximately 200° F.’’ (DX 22; 313-15).

67. The label for the gallon containers also stated, how-

ever, that for use on ovens the cleaner should be applied

as a spray by using a ‘‘polyethylene bottle or pressure

sprayer’’; that is, the purchaser could either use the squeeze

bottle (DX 24) which was packed by Beam in each case of

four gallons or purchase a squeeze bottle or some other type

of pressure sprayer to apply the oven cleaner (DX 22; 435-

36; 722-23).

68. Representative sales of Beam oven cleaner in one

area (Boston) in the period 1959-60 are shown by invoices,

packing slips, and bills of lading forming Defendants’ Ex-

hibits 31 A-C and 32 (344-54).

69. Advertisements for sale of Beam ‘‘ Wipe Away”’ ap-

peared in the November 6, 1958 edition of the Green Bay

Press-Gazette and the February 23, 1958 edition of the Mil-

waukee Journal (DX 21, 21A; 309-12).

70. In 1958 Beam ‘‘ Wipe Awav’’ was demonstrated on

live television by Mr. Lemorande, personally. During these

demonstrations Mr. Lemorande would spray the oven

cleaner on warm surfaces to demonstrate its cleaning ability

and method of application (408-09).

4

48a 4s

Findings Adopted by the District Court

71. A printed publication in the form of a circular date

May, 1961, distributed by Cirelli Foods of Brockton, Mass

chusetts, one of the stores in which Beam ‘‘ Wipe Away”

was sold, contains the following statement concerning Beay

**Wipe Away’’ (DX 29; 335-36) :

‘*Beam Wirt Away cuts burnt-on grease and cook

ing deposits of all kinds! It is very easy to use, just

spray it on——and wipe it off with a damp cloth;

it will leave no residual. Wipe Away may be used

on warm surfaces (in ovens and on grills it is better

to allow units to cool to approximately 200°), and

will clean surfaces instantly without having to wait

for them to cool down completely.’’

Mr. Lemorande testified that this digest accurately set forth

the directions for use of Beam Wipe Away (337-38).

72. Mr. Lemorande was familiar with the composition

of the oven cleaner sold by Beam in the period 1957-65 and

personally did the mixing of the ingredients (351-52). On

April 8, 1960, Mr. Lemorande made a typewritten copy of

the formula then being used for Beam oven cleaner (DX 2;

354-55). The formula is as follows:

Per Gallon of Concentrate

4 oz. Sodium Hydroxide ( Wet.)

\% oz. Sodium Metasilicate ”

4 oz. Trisodium Phosphate =

3 oz. Glycerine (Volume)

2 oz. Triethanolamine o

\% oz. Perma Kleer -

3.5 oz. Triton 102 (BM2) o

1.5 oz. Dowfax >

2 oz. CMC Hercules ( Wet.)

1 oz. Tamol N. -

1.5 oz. QS Triton 15* -

* Triton QS 15 was a handwritten addition to the formula made

sometime after April 8, 1960 (360).

49a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

The ‘‘Per Gallon of Concentrate’’ statement in the formula

means that water is added to the formula shown to make

one gallon of oven cleaner (357). Glycerine is a humectant

and Triton 102 and Dowfax are surfactants (358-60; 78-

79). The amount of glycerine exceeds the 1% referred to by

Perry as being satisfactory (76-77; DX 77, Col. 3, lines

53-56).

73. Expressed in terms of weight percent of the Beam

oven cleaning composition, in the period 1957-65, the water

content was in excess of 50%, and the sodium hydroxide

content did not vary outside the range of between 3.5 to 5

ounces per gallon (362; PX 2; 143-44). The 4 ounces of

sodium hydroxide in the formula set orft in Finding 72,

expressed in weight percent of the composition, is about

28% (72-73).

74. In the period 1957-65, the Beam oven cleaner at all

times contained a humectant and a surfactant (DX 2). The

humectant was usually glycerine but on occasion during

1957-62 it was propylene glycol (361). The surfactants

were of the nonionic (e.g. Triton 102) and anionic (Dow-

fax) type (359-60; 78-79).

75. Prior to 1962, the Beam Chemical Company oven

cleaner was a freely flowing liquid which contained sodium

hydroxide and water in the amounts called for by each

claim of the patent in suit in issue.

76. Prior to 1962, the Beam oven cleaner contained a

humectant and surfactant of the types called for in those

claims of the patent in suit which specify either a surfactant

or a humectant.

77. Prior to 1962, the directions for applying the Beam

oven cleaner were to apply it by spraying on a hot surface

as called for by each method claim of the patent in suit.

78. Prior to 1962, the Beam oven cleaner was dispensed

as a spray propelled by air from a conventional pressure

50a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

atomizer in the form of a plastic squeeze bottle or a plunger.

actuated ‘‘ Windex’’ type bottle (298-300; 435-36). The pat

ent in suit calls for the spraying of the oven cleaner from

an aerosol container by a propellant, and states that th

cleaning results are the same whether the cleaner is sprayed

on a hot oven from a conventional pressure atomizer (whid

uses air as the propellant) or from a conventional metal cap

packaged in known manner and containing a conventional

volatile liquid propellant such as butane.

79. The Beam oven cleaner described in Findings 75-78

was publicly used and demonstrated, sold, and offered for

sale on a large scale more than one year prior to December

4, 1963, the date of first application leading to the issuang

of the patent in suit.

80. Aerosol spray-type metal cans and propellants were

well known in the prior art as appears from the patent

(DX 77, Col. 3, lines 29-31). No particular (much less sor.

prising or unobvious) advantage has been shown to result

from the combination of the oven cleaner and a conventional

aerosol spray-type metal can, nor is any problem in making

this combination shown to have existed or to have been

solved by the disclosure of the patent. There is no limita

tion in the claims which would indicate a problem. Ifa

problem relating to the aerosol packaging of an aqueous

caustic composition is alleged to have existed in the art

and to have been solved by the patentee, it must be disclosed

and the best method of solving it then known to the patentee

must also be disclosed pursuant to 35 U. S. C. 4112. No

such disclosure appears in the patent in suit. Instead, the

patent clearly and unequivocally states that the cleaner (in

addition to being packaged and sprayed from a conventional

pressure atomizer) was ‘‘packaged in a known manner”

in a metal can, using a “‘conventional propellant.’’ (em-

phasis added).

81. The testimony shows that the idea of packaging the

Perry oven cleaner in an aerosol can was not Perry’s but

5la

Findings Adopted by the District Court

was suggested by Vaughn Electric Company, a firm that had

been previously supplied with the Perry oven cleaner in

Beam-type squeeze bottles by Mr. Hannon, Mr. Perry’s

salesman (1088-89; 1158; DX 56). There is no evidence that

either Mr. Perry or the aerosol packer, Shield Chemical

Company anticipated or solved any problem, nor that they

were suprised at the result of the aerosol packaging,nor

that the combination performed other than would be the

natural and expected result of the combination of conven-

tional elements.

82. Plastic squeeze bottles and ‘‘Windex’’ pressure

sprayers as used by Beam, were also well known in the

prior art. Perry packaged his oven cleaner in Beam-type

squeeze bottles as well as metal cans prior to his application

for patent (1046-47; DX 54), and it appears from the

patent (Col. 3, lines 29-40) that he obtained the same results

from either type of spray dispenser. Perry was unable to

name any structure other than the Beam-type sprayer which

could have been the basis for his flat representation in the

patent that the same results were obtained with a conven-

tional pressure atomizer as with an aerosol dispenser (2543-

2547).

83. The selection of means by which to apply the oven

cleaner in the form of a spray is a matter of choice, as is

shown by the patent specification (see Finding 22) and the

claims are broad enough to cover both metal cans and

squeeze bottles. The combination of the oven cleaner and

either a conventional metal can or squeeze bottle does not

constitute invention, nor was the combination an invention

of Perry (even if it were inventive).

C. The Work of Seljan

84. John W. Seljan was a man whose background in-

cluded actual experience cleaning grills and ovens. His

first experience with cheniical formulating came when he

was employed by the Cee-Bee Chemical Company in Cali-

52a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

fornia in the 1940’s (836, 838). Among other products, th

Cee-Bee Chemical Company made industrial cleaners fo

metal plating industries and the aircraft industry (84),

85. One such formulation included 5 per cent potassiyn

hydroxide by weight, 1/10 of 1 per cent sodium chroma

employed as a rust inhibitor, and 1% of 1 per cent Tritm |

X-100 employed as a wetting agent (surfactant). The rm

mainder of the solution was water (841-843). This formu,

was used with a steam cleaning spray apparatus with the

formula being sprayed from one nozzle and the steam which

was used to heat and rinse the metal, sprayed from a

adjacent nozzle alternately with the formula (843, DX 516),

The system was used to clean an oily preservative from

the metal (849).

86. Seljan left Cee-Bee Chemical in 1952 and started

his own chemical business called Coast-to-Coast Chemical

Co., located in Gardena, California. From California

Seljan moved his business to Dallas in 1955 and to Green

Bay, Wisconsin in 1957 (854). While in Green Bay, Seljan

became aware of the Beam Chemical Co. and its oven cleaner

product (855, 56). Seljan immediately formulated an oven

and grill cleaner to compete with Beam which he sold in

gallon jugs accompanied by a Windex-type spray bottle

which could be filled from the gallon jug (857, 58; DX 517,

517-A). The formula used for this oven and grill cleaner

was a mixture of 1 Ib. sodium hydroxide in a gallon of water

with approximately 14 per cent Triton X-100, a surfactant,

and 2 per cent ethylene glycol, a water evaporation retard-

ant (858, 859).

87. When Seljan formulated his oven cleaner in Green

Bay, he was aware of the fact that Beam Wipe-Away was

sold for application to warm ovens and grills (863). He

selected a water evaporation retardant (ethylene glycol)

for his formula to prevent its evaporation from the oven

surface (861). His knowledge of the humectant properties

53a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

of ethylene glycol stemmed from his knowledge that it was

commonly used in automobile radiators to prevent evapora-

tion of the hot water (861). Seljan sold his oven cleaner

from July of 1957 through the first part of 1958. In all,

he sold about 400 gallons of the formulation (861, 862).

88. In November of 1958, Seljan returned to California

where he manufactured a product called Dip-Away for oven

cleaning. Seljan mixed his Dip-Away formula in a small

metal drum in his backyard. This formula contained from

15 to 18 per cent potassium hydroxide,® a dye to give color

to the formulation, and ethylene glycol to prevent evapora-

tion of the solution from the surface to be cleaned (864-866).

The ethylene glycol used was between 1 and 3 per cent by

weight of the solution (875). He supplied customers with

directions for use of his oven cleaner which included in-

structions to spray the aqueous caustic solution onto a

heated oven surface. He did this in response to his eus-

tomers’ employees’ experience that spraying was a con-

venient method of appiication (876).

89. During 1959, Seljan personally went to kitchens and

restaurants to demonstrate the use of and sell his product

(875, 876). From August 17 through August 20, 1962,

Seljan demonstrated his product at the National Restaurant

Association Convention in San Francisco attended by some

39,000 people (880, 898; DX 501). During the demonstra-

tion, Seljan used an electric heating element to heat the

encrusted stainless steel pans which were to be cleancd.

The pans were heated to approximately 200°, the Dip-Away

‘The patent sets an upper limit of 10 per cent for the alkali

metal hydroxide. The stated purpose is to avoid stringent labeling

requirements. Mr. Seljan testified that he ‘‘ jacked it up to make it

stronger’’ (928), and improved both the speed and performance

of his product (928). Mr. Seljan seemed to adapt quite readily to

the labeling requirements raising serious questions as to the validit Vv

of the 10 per cent, or any other per cent, limitation as an inventive

feature.

o4a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

was sprayed on the pans and the grease and dirt

served to dissolve in three to five seconds (885, DX

During the demonstration in San Francisco in Augus

1962, approximately 2,000 advertising brochures setting

forth the spray-heated surface method of application werp

distributed to various people there (898, DX 502),

90. Seljan marketed his product Dip-Away (later

changed to Dip-R-Spray) in gallon containers (DX 506, 876,

877). The gallon containers were packaged four one-gallon

containers to a case and each case included a plastic

bottle (877). Prior to the August show in 1962, Seljan had

sold between 1500 and 2000 such cases of Dip-Away, Jp

each of these cases a label instructed the consumer to ag

the product on a warm or hot oven (910). The small cop.

tainer into which the contents could be poured (DX 517)

included a Windex finger action spray member (911).

Seljan was still successfully marketing his product at the

time of his deposition on January 8, 1969 (923).

91. After Seljan had been exposed to the needs of the

industry for an aqueous caustic oven cleaning product and

after he had been exposed to Beam’s answer to these needs

in Wisconsin, he was, within a short time, able to mann-

facture a product with similar components which worked

in a similar fashion. The fact that Mr. Seljan had no formal

education in chemistry but was immediately able to develop

and market a srecessful aqueous caustic, surfactant, humee-

tant, oven cleaher for spray application to & heated oven

surface is strong evidence of lack of invention in the Perry

product.

D. The Bissell Oven Cleaner

92. In November, 1962, Capitol Packaging Co. of Mel-

rose Park, Illinois made and sold to Bissell, Inc. of Grand

Rapids, Michigan, an aqueous caustic oven cleaner which

was packaged in a conventional aerosol spray-type metal

can with a conventional propellant (DX 3, 5, 6, 7, 8).

55a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

93. The formula for the oven cleaner referred to in

Finding 92 was developed at and by Capitol Packaging Co.,

(170-72) and in the time period from the first sale in Novem-

ber, 1962 until 1966 the formula, expressed in weight per-

centage of the composition, was as follows (DX 3; 83-85) :

Sodium orthosilicate

Sole-terge 325

Safrol

94. Sodium orthosilicate is a physical mixture (as op-

posed to a chemical union) of soduim hydroxide (NaOH)

and sodium metasilicate (Na2SiOs) in the respective weight

proportions of 40-60 (55-57; 129-130). This fact is sup-

ported by testimony, calculations and tests performed by

Dow’s chemical expert, Dr. Colburn, and by a recognized

chemical text, The Condensed Chemical Dictionary (Sixth

Edition) (130-31; DX 93). Based on both his formula cal-

culations and his analysis of an aqueous solution of the

product, Colburn testified that a 7% aqueous solution of

sodium orthosilicate contains 2.8% free sodium hydroxide

(58-59).

95. Dr. Colburn further testified that both TS-2S and

Solterge 325 are surfactants, the latter also containing about

one-quarter free diethanolamine which is a humectant con-

taining two hydroxyl groups and therefore a glycol (84; DX

91; 2497-98 ; 3356-57). Safrol is a perfume (84).

96. The formulation of the oven cleaner sold to Bissell

by Capitol Packaging Co., in November, 1962, thus con-

tained over 50% water, 2.8% free sodium hydroxide, a sur-

factant, and a humectant. -

97. The oven cleaner sold to Bissell by Capitol Packag-

ing Co., in November 1962 was packaged in a conventional

56a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

aerosol spray-type metal can containing, as propellants, 64

Freon 12 and 6% methylene chloride (DX 3). Freon 12 and

methylene chloride are and were, in 1962, conventional pr.

pellants. Mr. Perry told the Patent Office that ‘‘the inyep.

tion does not lie in any particular kind of propellant as long

as it propels;...’? (DX 75, p. 31):

98. Contrary to Shelco’s contention that Perry was the

first to overcome the alleged fear in the art that an aqueoys

sodium hydroxide solution could not be stored in a metal aer.

osol can without leakage, it appears from the testimony of

Mr. Burkholder, Bissell’s director of quality control from

1962 to the present, and Mr. Weiner, President of Capitol

Packaging from 1955 to 1966, that no problem of can}

was experienced by either Bissell or Capitol Packaging (246;

3288-89). This testimony is supported by the fact that a

product manufactured according to the formula set out in

Finding 93 was marketed by Bissell in a conventional metal

aerosol can continuously from its introduction in November,

1962 until sometime in 1966, when the formula was modified

(3287-88 ; 3297). It is also supported by Mr. Weiner’s testi-

mony that prior to November 1962, the formulation set ont

in Finding 93 was packaged in a conventional metal aerosol

can and tested for shelf-life for a period of from nine

months to one year without evidence of leakage problems

(227). In addition, Mr. Burkholder identified DX 106 asa

can of Bissell oven cleaner made in 1963 (3290-91). This

ean showed no signs of leakage.

99. Bissell did experience some occasional minor in-

stances of can leakage, but similar can leakage was experi-

enced by Shelco as well (246; 1110-11). There is no testi-

mony that such leakage was due to anything other than

inadequacy in the can’s side-seam soldering or other can

construction defects (1110-11; 3179-80).

100. As demonstrated in Court by Dow, the Bissell oven

cleaner of DX 106, which was made in 1963, but contained

57a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

the same formula and propellants as used in November,

1962, was sprayed from the can and was deposited on a

metal surface in the form of a stable foam (3292). The

Court has evaluated the later spraying from the same con-

tainer by Shelco, again in the form of a stable foam, and

Perry’s characterization of the spraying as ‘‘a classic ex-

ample of a plugged valve,’’ and finds such an attempted

criticism of a seven-year old product to be inconsequential

(3392).

101. Dow also conducted a demonstration in Court of

the foam characteristics of Shelco’s oven cleaner. This

cleaner also sprayed from the can and was deposited on the

metal surface in the form of a foam, but after a short period

of time the foam had slid down the test panel onto the floor

(2174-75).

102. The Bissell directions for use contained on DX 10/3

do call for the oven to be cool and the pilot light to be off.

Nevertheless, Dr. Colburn testified that the Bissell aerosol-

packaged oven cleaner, as sold by Capitol Packaging Co. in

November, 1962, contained nothing, from a chemical stand-

point, which would interfere with its use on an oven heated

to ‘say, 180 degrees Fahrenheit’’ (89; 123). Dr. Colburn

freely admitted that the chemicals methylene chloride and

freon decompose to some degree when exposed to a flame,

and that one of the many decomposition products ‘*may or

may not be a poisonous gas called phosgene’? ( 123-24). He

testified that if this gas were produced, it is in very small

amounts (124). There is no testimony that the Bissell

oven cleaner would produce any poisonous gas if exposed

toa flame. To the contrary, Dr. Colburn testified that he

personally had tested oven cleaners containing propellants

such as methylene chloride on hot ovens (for purposes not

related to this litigation or any cf the defendants in this

case) (126). It should also be noted that the propellant

used in Sheleo’s cleaner (butane) is highly flammable by

58a

Sovast

PORS

ie)

Findings Adopted by the District Court

itself (2542), but apparently this does not prevent its tse

as the propellant in the oven cleaner composition, = —_

103. The court finds that the Bissell cleaner sold by

Capitol Packaging Co. in November, 1962 was suitable for

use on a hot oven. In addition to the supporting testimony

of Dr. Colburn, this finding is also corroborated by My.

Burkholder’s testimony that he knew of no problem or

complaints arising from the use of methylene chloride or

Freon 12 as the propellants in the Bissell cleaner (3289),

and the fact that Perry himself could not name one speeifie

complaint arising from his extensive use of concentrated

methylene chloride solution (up to 70%) in paint cleaners

and degreasers (2494-97).

104. While Shelco now expresses great concern over

the possible production of small amounts of phosgene, the

patent does not warn against the use of either of these

propellants, and the claims were intentionally drafted broad

enough to cover their use. (See Finding 97.)

105. Sheleo’s position, as stated in answer to Dow's

interrogatories is that the composition claims of the patent

in suit are infringed by the manufacture or sale of an oven

cleaner product which comes within the language of its

composition claims, regardless of whether the product is

actually used on a hot or cold surface (804-05). Thus, the

expression ‘‘for application to a hot oven’’, contained in

all of the composition claims, interpreted most favorably

for Sheleo, can mean no more than that the composition

must not contain any material which would make the cleaner

obviously objectionable for application to a hot oven.

106. The Bissell oven cleaner made and sold by Capitol

Packaging Co., in November, 1962 was an aerosol metal

can-packaged oven cleaner containing over 50% water,

2.8% sodium hydroxide, a surfactant, and a humectant, as

called for by the composition claims of the patent in suit

It was suitable for application to a hot oven.

59a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

107. The manufacture and sale of the Bissell oven

cleaner by Capitol Packaging Co., more than one year

before Shelco’s first filing date constitutes a prior public

use and sale of the invention covered by the composition

daims of the patent in suit.

BE. The Winbro 403 Oven Cleaner

108. In October, 1962, the patentee made and sold a

batch of oven cleaner under the designation ‘‘ Winbro 403”’

(DX 54, 55, 82, 83A, 83B ; 821-22). This cleaner was made

from the formula set out as the Example in the patent,

without the furfuryl alcohols. It contained over 50%

water, 3% sodium hydroxide, a humectant, and a surfactant

as called for by all of the claims. This oven cleaner was

sold in bulk form in a 30 gallon drum (821; DX 83A, 83B).

109. In October, 1962, the patentee also made a 20 gallon

batch of the oven cleaner described in Finding 108 (820).

This 20 gallon batch was packaged in plastic squeeze bottles

of the type used to package the Beam oven cleaner (821).

It was used for test purposes, and, in addition, a bottle of

this oven cleaner was given to Dorothy Hall, a home econo-

mist for Vaughn Electric Co., of Somerville, Massachusetts,

prior to December, 1962 (822; 615-16). This bottle was

given to Mrs. Hall without any restriction as to confidenti-

ality (620-21).

110. The October 1962 bulk sale of 30 gallons of Winbro

403 (the cleaner which is the example of the patent in suit

without the furfuryl alcohols), more than one year before

the filing date of Perry’s first application, constitutes a

“public use or on sale’’ of the composition invention

coverel by the non-catalyst claims of the patent in suit,

within the meaning of 35 U. S. C. §102(b). The package

in which the cleaner was sold is immaterial. The combina-

tion of a known package and the cleaner is a matter of

choice which is not only obvious under 35 U.S. C. § 103, but

60a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

which may be disregarded as an inconsequential differeny

under 35 U.S. C. § 102(b). This is particularly true whey

as here, the idea for the aerosol-packaging of the

cleaner originated not with Perry but with Vaughn Electr,

Company (Finding 81).

111. The 20 gallon batch of Winbro 403 packaged »

Beam-type plastic squeeze bottles, constitutes a ‘‘publie ne

or on sale’’ of the composition covered by the non-catalyst

claims of the patent in suit, for the same reasons set out in

Finding 110.

F. The Work of Boyle-Midway

112. Dr. Myron Lover, the holder of a Ph.D. in Chen

istry (954), was employed by Boyle-Midway in its researd

and development department beginning in 1951 (956). This

was prior to the time when Boyle-Midway acquired th

Easy-Off brand paste oven cleaner from Frank Wolcott.

113. Boyle-Midway’s first serious efforts toward de

veloping an aerosol oven cleaner were largely prompted

when the successful marketing of an aerosol caustic spray

foam product under the trademark HEP began to eat into

the sales of Boyle-Midway’s Easy-Off paste oven cleane

(DX 581). This product was the commercial embodiment

of the Perlman patents (2018). Dr. Lover was assigned

the project to develop and did develop a non-caustic aerosd

formula for consumer panel testing against HEP. In May

of 1962, Dr. Lover’s formula 222-97 was tested against the

HEP aerosol bomb (1986, 1987, DX 583). The results of

the test showed that the Boyle-Midway product lost out to

HEP by a score of almost 2 to 1 on all performance char-

acteristics (DX 582, p. 2, 1962). Boyle-Midway manage

ment, who until that time had been reluctant to markets

spray caustic, then concluded, on the basis of HEP’s market

success, that a spray caustic was a necessary answer to the

challenge of HEP-type oven cleaners.

6la

Findings Adopted by the District Court

114. Dr. Lover, who was responsible for oven cleaner

formulation at Boyle-Midway, received a directive from his

~~ management in the early summer of 1962 to develop a

caustic spray-type oven cleaner to compete with HEP (1963,

1964).

115. Within weeks of the instruction, Dr. Lover, as-

sisted by William Ball, a technician working under his

direct supervision, developed a series of formulas contain-

ing sodium hydroxide, water, and a propellant. In addition,

some contained a humectant (glycerin), and some contained

surfactants (1992, DX 584). This work, recorded on July

23, 1962, represented Dr. Lover’s first effort to obtain an

aqueous caustic spray oven cleaner (1992, 1994, DX 584).

116. Shortly thereafter, a formula (262-5C) developed

by Dr. Lover containing sodium hydroxide, a surfactant

(Deriphat 151), a fatty acid (Dresinate TX), another sur-

factant (QS-30), glycol ether (2LM) and water was tested

by Mike Liccione, an employee of Boyle-Midway, at his

home. Liccione reported that the product was satisfactory

for cleaning his oven (DX 585, 1998).

117. On October 1, 1962, some crystallization in formula

262-5C was observed (DX 589). On October 2, 1962, this

problem was solved by lowering the over-all concentration

of the solids and adding more water proportionally (DX 90;

2007).

118. As a result of this solution, a formula was adopted

which showed no crystallization after two months storage

at room temperature (DX 590). This formula, after being

re-labeled 262-91, was assigned the manufacturing standard

number 6-53 (PX 53, 2119). The formula contained 9.07

per cent by weight of a 50 per cent solution of sodium

hydroxide (roughly 4.5 per cent sodium hydroxide), 2.03

per cent of Deriphat 151 (an amphoteric surfactant manu-

factured by General Mills), 79.99 per cent by weight of de-

mineralized water, 2.43 per cent Triton QS-30 (a phosphate-

62a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

type organic surfactant), 1.62 per cent Dresinate TX 4

fatty acid), and 4.86 per cent Ucar 2LM (a di

glycol monomethyl ether) (PX 53, 2092-2098), the latte

being a humectant having but one (OH) group and hepp

not properly identifiable as either a glycol, a glycerol or,

polyhydric alcohol (2160). The same would be true of at.

propylene glycol monomethyl ether (2160).

119. In response to a request by Dr. Lover (DX

2021), a one thousand can plant batch of the formula wy

run on December 12, 1962 (DX 597, 2025). The 1,000 ex

batch was run in tinplate, seamed containers with

solder, as supplied by Continental Can Company. Pr

cision brand valves and buttons were used (DX 599, 2038),

120. By February 26, 1963, Dr. Lover’s formulatig:

work was considered complete and the product was turned

over to the In-line Product Laboratory and taken out of

Dr. Lover’s hands (2042, 2043, DX 601).

121. On or about March 5, 1963, 200 cans of formuk

6-53 from the plant production run were distributed &

employees and friends of employees of Boyle-Midway, and

of Whitehall Laboratories, in various parts of the country

(2133-2139). They were used in a blind, paired comparison

test with HEP oven cleaner. There is no evidence that th

panel members were under any injunction of secrecy or that

their use or disposition of the oven cleaner was restricted

in any way.

122. The results of the blind, paired. comparison test

(DX 603) showed that the Boyle-Midway formula 6-53 in

the aerosol container was superior to the HEP aerosd

product marketed at that time (DX 603, p. 3). A mm

agement decision to go to full production for national mar-

keting was made. Arrangements were made to have a

outside contract filler produce the Easy Off spray oven

cleaner (2052).

63a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

123. In the Fall of 1963, while arrangements for pro-

daction were going forward with an outside contract filler,

several cans of the original 1,000 can plant batch run in

December of 1962 were found to be leaking (DX 605, 2061).

As a result, production was ordered halted (PX 39, 1925)

for a reexamination of the product. This reflected Boyle-

Midway management’s cautious attitude in marketing

caustic products for use by a housewife. The evidence is

conclusive that Plaintiff experienced similar leaker prob-

lems. The patent in suit neither describes such a problem

nor suggested any solution (1464).

124. Formula 6-53 was developed prior in time to

Perry’s work; it was publicly used in March 1963 without

injunction of secrecy; and it was never abandoned, sup-

pressed or concealed. Its use was discontinued for reasons

not pertinent to the Perry patent, as indicated by a letter

from C. K. Thompson, a vice-president of Boyle-Midway,

to W. K. Eastham, another vice-president, dated January

16, 1964 (DX 606), in which it was suggested that formula

6-53 be marketed in a seamless can. Only the less-preferred

aesthetics of the 2-piece can (certainly not within Perry’s

invention) prevented this (1972-73). lait

125. Dr. Lover did not participate in any further oven

cleaner formulation work at Boyle-Midway. He left the

field of oven cleaner work in January 1964 and had no

contact with the field since that time until this trial. Sub-

sequent work on oven cleaners at Boyle-Midway was done

by individuals not previously experienced in oven cleaner

formulating. Dr. Lover testified in person at the trial and

his testimony was credible. It is not necessary to determine

whether Dr. Lover qualifies under 35 U.S. C. 4 102(¢) asa

prior inventor of the subject matter of the Perry patent.

(No patent application was filed on Dr. Lover’s 6-53 for-

mula.) In any event, he qualifies as a ‘‘person having

ordinary skill in the art’’ (35 U. S. C. § 103) “‘at the time

the invention was made’’, and his work makes it clear that

64a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

aerosol-packaged, alkali metal hydroxide, water,

humectant formulations for cleaning ovens (suitable for

use on heated oven surfaces) were obvious to him at that

time.

OBVIOUSNEsS

126. The use of humectants (including the interchange.

ability of propylene glycol and glycerine) and surfactants

in cleaning compositions was well known, prior to Perry's

invention, as was the use of aqueous solution oven cleaners

having less than 10% sodium hydroxide.

127. It was well known in the prior art that heat would

speed a chemical reaction, including the chemical reaction

between oven soil and an alkali. (See, e.g., Finding 41,

DX 503; 2064; DX 72, Tabs 1, 3, 5.) It was likewise well

known in the prior art that aqueous alkali metal hydrorid

solutions, in the concentration claimed by the patent, could

be sprayed on a hot oven to speed up the cleaning operation,

as shown by Beam and Dip-Away (DX 19; DX 22; DX

503).

128. It was well known in the prior art that an aqueous

alkali metal hydroxide solution, in the concentration claimed

by the patent in suit, could be packaged in and sprayed

in the form of a foam from an aerosol spray-type metal

can, as shown by Capitol Packaging and Bissell, John Sull-

van, and Dr. Lover (Findings 92-107 ; 43-58; 112-125).

129. In view of Findings 127 and 128, the subject matter

claimed by Perry would have been obvious to one skilled i

the art at the time the alleged invention of the patent in

suit was made. The formulations herein set out were sub-

ject to determination by common analytical methods (61-

82; 88; 531-32; 3347-48).

130. Likewise, it would have been an obvious matter of ,

choice at the time the alleged invention of the patent in suit

65a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

was made to have added or substituted a propylene glycol

or glycerine humectant to the oven cleaners of Bissell, Sulli-

van, or Dr. Lover, and it also would have been obvious to

apply the Bissell, Sullivan or Lover oven cleaner, like Beam

and Dip-Away, to a hot oven, adjusting the type of con-

ventional propellant, if such were considered desirable.

131. When this case first came before the Court at a

pretrial conference in chambers, Shelco stressed the unique-

ness of the application to a hot oven. When the Beam and

Dip-Away products were discovered, the importance of a

foam from an aerosol dispenser was stressed. When the

Sullivan, Bissell, and Lover aerosol oven cleaners were put

before the Court, Plaintiff began to talk of specific con-

centrations of ingredients not found or distinguished. in

the claims and of non-claim attributes such as superiority

against side seam leakage. When Sullivan and Bissell

were shown to have no substantial leakage problems, then

Plaintiff stressed commercial success.

132. There is no claim in the patent which calls for

a foam, nor is there any statement in the patent as to the

superiority of a foam as opposed to a spray. In fact, the

patent repeatedly refers to a ‘‘foam or spray’’ and if any

distinction was intended, every one of the claims is specif-

ically limited to a spray and not to a foam. The use of a

foaming aerosol oven cleaner was not new with Perry. The

Perlman patents (HEP) specifically disclose aerosol oven

cleaners which foam (DX 72, Tabs 6,7). The Bissell, Sulli-

van, and Lover products foamed (Finding 128). Mee is

there language in the patent which states that propylene

glycol (in any amount, much less the 20% used in Jifoam)

isa unique safener. The patent merely states that ‘‘prop-

ylene glycol can be replaced by any compatible humec-

tant”’, and that any such humectant, generally, ‘‘inherently

reduces the irritating effect of the caustic on the skin.”’

(DX 77, Col. 3, lines 41-52). At Col. 2, lines 32-43, the

66a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

patent states that the use of humectants ‘‘such as a glycerg

or glycol’’ reduces the irritating effect of sodium hydroxid

(Emphasis supplied).

133. Where differences, if any, between the subject

matter covered by the patent in suit and the prior art exist,

they are inconsequential, and are such that the Subject

matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the

invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in

the art.

ComMeErciaL Success

134. In support of the patent, Shelco has relied heavily

on two separate aspects of commercial success of its oven

cleaner, Jifoam, as evidence of invention. The first is

Shelco’s contention that Jifoam was quickly accepted in the

marketplace and grew from nothing to an important factor

in the market in a short period of time (3138). The second

is Shelco’s related contention that because of Jifoam’s

success in the market, Dow and Boyle-Midway were forced

to switch from the oven cleaners they had previously pro-

duced to products which come within Shelco’s patent (2685).

The activities of Dow and Boyle-Midway in this respect are

also said by Shelco to evidence both long-felt need and m-

successful attempts to produce a satisfactory oven cleaner

prior to Jifoam (2644-47).

135. Commercial success is not relevant where, as here,

the Court determines that there was no invention. Never

theless, the Court, for completeness, makes the following

findings with respect to Plaintiffs’ alleged commercial suc-

cess.

136. Before commercial success can be considered as

evidence of unobviousness, the Court must determine that

the alleged commercial success (here, of the product Jifoam)

was attributable to the invention claimed by the patent

67a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

—

aheaiiate to be used by defendants and not some other

factor.

137. It is undisputed that Jifoam now does contain and

always has contained, a mixture of furfuryl and tetrahydro-

furfury] alcohols (1242-44; DX 523). Perry’s original pat-

ent application set out the invention as being:

‘‘based on the surprising discovery that a mixture

of furfuryl alcohol and tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol

catalyzes and enhances the cleaning action of the

sodium hydroxide, especially at elevated tempera-

tures, to such a great extent that the amount required

can be reduced to less than 4% and such reduced

amount has a markedly greater and faster cleaning

power.’’ (DX 74, p. 3, lines 21-27).

All of the claims in that original application were limited

to oven cleaners having a mixture of furfuryl alcohols, and

‘the disclosure of invention to Perry’s patent attorney states

that, ‘‘the ratio of tetrahydrofurfury] alcohol is essential.

It can be varied somewhat but netther can be eliminated or

replaced with like alcohols.’? (DX 63, emphasis added).

138. In the patent as issued, Perry changed the furfuryl

alcohol from a necessary component of his composition to

a desirable one but still emphasizes their importance:

‘“‘The present invention is based in one of its aspects

on the surprising discovery that a mixture of furfuryl

alcohol and tetrahydrofurfuryl alcohol catalyzers

(sic) and enhances the cleaning action of the sodium

hydroxide at elevated temperatures.’’ (Col. 2, lines

27-31).

- Fifteen of the claims in the patent in suit are still limited

to the furfuryl alcohols, sometimes described therein as a

catalyst. None of these are asserted against defendants

68a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

in this case (Claims 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21,2

23, 24, 25, and 27). Plaintiff does not allege that any gf

the defendants in this case use any of the furfuryl aleoho}

in the accused oven cleaner compositions.

139. Shelco introduced Jifoam to the market regionally

in New England with a saturation television, radio, an

other media advertising campaign (1120). Over two million

dollars were spent in so advertising Jifoam between 1993

and 1966 (799-800). Brochures distributed to the trade ip

the course of that carmpaign emphasized the importanee of

the new ‘‘catalyst’’ contained in Jifoam. An example js

contained in DX 523, which reads:

‘<< Jifoam’ is a new and radical departure fron

‘conventional oven cleaners. It derives its almost

instant cleaning ability from the incorporation of a

catalyst that when heated in admixture with the base

to above 140°F. saponifies grease and dirt faster

than the strongest caustic mixtures on the market,”

(Emphasis added).

140. Sheleco now says that the emphasis on the catalyst

in the advertising campaign was merely a ‘‘sales gimmick”,

(1123-24) but it is the frequent use of this type of high

budget sales gimmick that makes undisccrning reliance

on commercial success a dubious test of invention or unoby-

ousness. In this ease, the period of time involved corres.

ponded with an upsurge of housewife demand for conven-

ience packaging of household products generally (3182-83).

The market for aerosol oven cleaners was not created by

Plaintiff’s product, although consumer interest may have

been heightened by Plaintiff’s intense advertising campaign.

[Plaintiff admitted that similar advertising campaign]

Plaintiff admitted that similar advertising campaigns by

the defendants of their products cut deeply into Plaintiff's

sales (1154-56).

69a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

141. In view of the above findings, the Court cannot

fnd that any commercial success that Jifoam may have

enjoyed was attributable to an inventive feature present

in any claim of the patent asserted in this suit, and there-

fore such commercial success is not relevant to this case.

142. Plaintiff admits that Boyle-Midway does not use

propylene glycol (2646), and since Plaintiff also admits

that it cannot even show that Boyle-Midway ever did a com

plete analysis of Jifoam (2645), there is nothing in the

record to support to [sic] charge that Boyle-Midway

‘eopied’’ Plaintiff’s product.

143. It is undoubtedly true that Jifoam’s early success

in the New England market did not go unnoticed by Dow’s

marketing personnel. As Mr. Foster, Dow’s Brand Mana-

ger, testified, Duw was always seeking to improve its

products and to meet or better its competition (3044-45).

It is also true that Dow modified its oven cleaner after

Jifoam was on the market. This modified cleaner does not

contain furfuryl alcohols and, unlike Jifoam, does contain

ammonia (3042-43). It is not a ‘‘copy’’ of Jifoam.

144. The evidence shows, and Shelco admits, that Dow,

in the common practice of monitoring oven cleaner competi-

tion, knew of Jifoam in late 1963 (PX 102) and had ana-

lyzed Jifoam by early 1964 (PX 104; 2645). Jifoam was

one of several oven cleaners being so monitored (see, e.g.

PX 105). Dow’s modified oven cleaner was put on the

market in 1965 (2645). During the period from 1963 to

1965, as before and after, Dow carried out a systematic

research and development program with respect to im-

provement in oven cleaners (see, e.g., DX 102; DX 103; PX

94-96; Dow’s Answer to Interrogatory 57, 3340-41; PX 117,

119).

145. It is axiomatic that once Dow knew of Jifoam, its

subsequent actions cannot be evidence of ‘‘prior attempts

and failures’’ pertinent to the issue of obviousness. It is

70a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

also the fact that dozens of the Dow oven cleaning form

tions which Shelco says were unsuccessful fall wi

claim language of the patent in suit, a matter which will

discussed under the issue of indefiniteness.

146. The evidence shows that while the large national

brand companies initially demonstrated reluctance to

market a sprayable caustic oven cleaner, the reluctance way

market oriented—not formulation or method oriented, |

was motivated by consumer concern lest the spray might

be inadvertently directed into the user’s eyes rather tha

onto the oven surface (an event which could cause perm.

nent eye damage) (DX 103-05; DX 107-14; DX 578; 1948

49). The market experience of Beam, Dip-Away, Bisgdl

and, most particularly, HEP, demonstrated the acceptability

of marketing a spray caustic oven cleaner,

147. Sheleo makes much of the fact that Dow criticized

Jifoam as being unsafe (PX 103). The fact is that that

criticism was based on a toxicological test run by Dow (Dx

99) which showed that Jifoam did cause permanent eye

damage to the eyes of rabbits and ‘‘is a rather severe eye

irritant’’ as well as being ‘‘corrosive to the skin.” Be

cause of this test and repeated adverse toxicological tests

on Jifoam (3061-62; 3599-3600; DX 100, 109; PX 126) and

other caustic compositions (DX 102-05; PX 97; PX 115),

Dow steadfastly resisted the temptation to market a caustic

spray, despite pressure from its marketing personnel (362-

21). It was not until Dow developed a product that passed

the eye tests of its toxicological laboratory in 1965 that Dow .

permitted the: marketing of its modified caustic oven

cleaner (PX 115; PX 132; DX 113). This modified cleaner

was not a duplication of Jifoam. Jifoam never passed the

toxicological laboratory eye damage tests at Dow (DX 109).

148. In view of the above findings, the evidence of De

fendant’s ‘‘attempts and failures’’ relied upon by Sheleo

are immaterial to the issue of invention of the patent in

Tla

Findings Adopted by the District Court

suit. The attempts were not related to efforts to duplicate

any inventive feature of Jifoam—at best they were to avoid

shortcomings in the well known spray caustic formulations

then used—including those used by Perry.

OVERCLAIMING

149. The claims of the patent in suit call for the use of

“g propellant—sufficient to force said composition [the

oven cleaner] out of said [aerosol] container as a spray.’’

(DX 77; Claims 1, 16). Perry told the Patent Office, ‘‘—the

invention does not lie in any particular kind of propellant

so long as it propels.’’ (DX 75, p. 31).

150. Methylene chloride was at the time Perry filed his

first application (DX 74) and has continued to be, a pro-

pellant used with aerosol containers (88, 121, DX 3). Freons

such as Freon 12 and Freon 114 are also propellants used

with aerosol containers (86-88, DX 3, PX 32). Therefore

an oven cleaner and method for using the same, otherwise

within the scope of the claims in suit, which has as a pro-

pellant methylene chloride, Freon 12 or Freon 114, falls

within the scope of the claims in suit.

151. Perry asserts that the use of the conventional pro-

pellant ingredient, methylene chloride in the Bissell prod-

uct, makes Bissell unsuitable for use on a hot oven (2378-

83). This unsupported testimony is contradicted by Dr.

Colburn (89-90). If, however, Perry’s testimony is ac-

cepted, the claims in suit, all of which include this pro-

pellant, are invalid for overclaiming since they cover in-

operative subject matter.

152. The same can be said of Plaintiff’s criticisms of

Dr. Lover’s 6-53 formula. The modest leaking problems

encountered with the 6-53 formula when using seamed cans

are precisely the type of leaking problems encountered by

Plaintiff. If Plaintiff's argument that the 6-53 formula

72a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

(with Freon 12 and Freon 114) was inoperative (due to the

leakers), then the claims in suit, all of which read thereon,

are invalid for overclaiming since they cover inoperatiye

subject matter.

153. A number of the claims in suit (DX 77, Claims 2,

5, 19, 28, <7, 32) call for a ‘‘surfactant’’. Perry told the

Patent Office, ‘‘—nor, does the invention lie in any partic.

lar surfactant, so long as it has the surface active proper.

ties inherent in surfactants.’’ (DX 75, p. 31). Perry noy

asserts that the surfactants in the 6-53 formula would not

perform as good foaming agents (2438-2440).

154. This assertion is contradicted by Dr. Lover (2039.

42). If the assertion is accepted, the claims calling fora

‘*suriactant’’ are invalid for overclaiming since they cover

inoperative subject matter.

155. Other claims in suit call for the presence of a

‘*humectant,’’ which can be a glycerol, glycol or any alcohol

having more than two hydroxyl groups (Finding 15). Sull-

van’s OC No. 1 formula containing Span 80 and Tween

are within this meaning and scope of the term ‘‘humectant”

as it appears in the claims in suit (3369). If, as Perry

contends, the formula would not be suitable for use ona

hot oven, the claims which generically call for a ‘‘humee.

tant’’ or ‘‘polyhydric alcohol humectant’’ are invalid for

overclaiming since they cover inoperative subject matter.

156. Sheleco also contends that dozens of Dow oven

cleaner formulations were tried in the lab, but were unsue-

cessful, for one reason or another (Pl. Pre-trial Brief, p.

33-35; DX 101-102; PX 117). However, these Dow oven

cleaner formulations are within the scope of the claims of

the patent in suit. 1f Shelco’s contention with respect to

these formulations is accepted, the claims read on inopera-

tive subject matter and are therefore invalid for over-

claiming.

73a

Findings Adopted by the District Court

156A. It follows from the foregoing (Findings 149-156)

that t

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.