Opposition Brief — Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis

Supreme Court brief1972

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I. Whether the petition is defective in that it

prays for a writ of certiorari to be directed to

the Missouri Supreme Court, rather than to the

St. Louis Court of Appeals which rendered the

opinion, and possessed of the record to be re-

Pe NN I on cc tiicnccnccvccecceccs 10

Il. Whether Section 601, 46 U.S.C.A. prohibits the

City of St. Louis from requiring an employer

to withhold an earnings tax due from the wages

of its shipboard employees, where the business

utilizes two river recreational excursion boats

permanently based at the city which several

times daily load and unload all passengers there

but no other place and cruise on the Missis-

sippi River presumably slightly threading to

and fro of the imaginary boundary line at the

center of the shifting channel between the

States of Missouri and Illinois ................ 12

SR ERE a a 22

CITATIONS

Cases

Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68

S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633 (1947) .......... 13, 14, 16, 21

Sot ee ee

3

Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634,

64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978 (1943) .................. 21

Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 12

S.Ct. 806, 36 L.Ed. 672 (1801) ......... ccc cccces. 14

New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer,

235 U.S. 549, 35 S.Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 335 (1914) ..17, 20,21

Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis and John

K. Travers, Collector of Revenue for the City of St.

Louis, and Capt. Wm. F. Carroll, et al. (St. Louis

Ct. App. 1971) 472 S.W.2d 660 ...............0.. 11

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,.

209 U.S. 447, 28 S.Ct. 579, 52 L.Ed. 881 (1907) .... 17

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67

S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1946) ................ 21

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 US.

252, 48 S.Ct. 234, 72 L.Ed. 555 (1927) ............ 12

Williams v. Florida, 339 U.S. 79, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed

te ee or 12

Sonstitutional Provisions

Article IV, Section 4, Missouri Constitution ........ 10

Article V, Section 10, Missouri Constitution ........ 11

Statutes

ee UP sc cauccianaaevunacdbneiet nad al 3, 11

Sr ae EE a 06 e RRC UK Ess es daees 3, 4, 9, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21

Section 145.060 Revised Code of the City of St. Louis,

My -SGdu64650 060060 b60es b50eevdeseraekeaseaee .

iii

Rules

Rule 23, 1, (b) United States Supreme Court ........ 2

Rule 84.05 Missouri Supreme Court ................ 11

Rule 84.05 (b) Missouri Supreme Court ............ 11

Rule 84.12 (b) Missouri Supreme Court ............ 11

Miscellaneous

2 US. Code Congressional & Administrative News,

86th Congress—First Session, 1959, pp. 2530-2536 .. 17

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

No. 57,449

STRECKFUS STEAMERS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

CAPT. WM. F. CARROLL, CAPT. CARNELIUS RIEMER, CAPT. HARRY

GRIESHABER, THOMAS P.CHAPMAN, THOMAS McKIBBEN, MARVIN

CHAPMAN, ARTHUR JACKSON, GEORGE V. JOHNSON, MRS. BETTY

SCHWALLER, MRS. LILY COLD, MRS. LUCY FOSTER, WILLIE

COLEMAN, JOHN CARROLL, SPENCER T. JONES,

Defendants-Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS and JOHN K. TRAVERS, Collector of the

City of St. Louis,

Defendants-Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri

BRIEF

In Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

Supreme Court of Missouri

Comes now the City of St. Leuis, a municipal corpora-

tion of the State of Missouri, and John K. Travers, Col-

lector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, the

Detendant-Respondents, and respectfully make their re-

sponse to the Plaintiff-Petitioner and Defendants-Petition-

ers’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court

of the State of Missouri.

.

a

eer Vie

OPINIONS BELOW

This is a declaratory judgment action originally brought

in the Cireuit Court of the Twenty-second Judicial Cir.

cuit (St. Louis City) where Michael F. Godfrey, Judge,

entered judgment for the Plaintiff (Plaintiff-Petitioner

here) and employee defendants of Plaintiff (Defendants.

Petitioners here). Such judgment was filed with an un.

reported memorandum opinion which is faithfully included

in the Appendix of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,

commencing at page -A-9- thereof. Appeals were duly

prosecuted to the Saint Louis Court of Appeals (now by

Constitutional amendment: Missouri Court of Appeals,

Saint Louis District; Amendment to Article V, August 4,

1970), by the Defendant-Respondents where the trial court

judgment was reversed and remanded with directions in

favor of Defendant-Respondents. Such judgment with the

Court’s opinion is officially reported at Streckfus Steamers

Inc. v. City of St. Louis and John K. Travers, Collector of

Revenue for the City of St. Louis, and Capt. Wm. F. Car.

roll, et al., No. 33787, June 15, 1971, 472 SW2d 660. There.

after, Plaintiff-Petitioner and Defendants-Petitioners duly

exhausted their procedural rights for rehearing or trans-

fer to the Missouri Supreme Court in the Saint Louis Court

of Appeals (both denied October 6, 1971), and their Ap-

plication for Transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was

denied on December 13, 1971. The Missouri Supreme

Court’s order of denial of the Application to Transfer is

not officially reported.

JURISDICTION

Defendant-Respondents urges the Court’s notice of the

insufficiency of the Plaintiff-Petitioner’s and Defendant-Pe-

titioner’s statement of the particular basis for jurisdic-

tion in compliance with Rule 23, 1, (b).

NEL EE DE LILO DOL NI SERIE SOLES ELT ARON SHE ORE

ve

Here the Plaintiff-Petitioner employer cannot assert an

‘immunity’? conferred by the terms of Section 601, 46

U.S.C.A. so as to come within the jurisdictional require-

ments of 28 U.S.C.A. 1257 (3). And the prior controlling

decisions of this Court negate the tenuous, colorable claim

of the repugnancy of the City ordinance (i.e. Section 145.-

060, Revised Code of St. Louis) to the United States Stat-

ute. The Courts of the State of Missouri have not de-

eided a Federal question of substance not heretofore

determined by this Court, and have not decided any Fed-

eral questions in a way probably not in accord with ap-

plicable decisions of this Court, as would appeal to the

sound judicial discretion of the Court under Rule 19.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I

Whether the petition is defective in that it prays for

a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Missouri Su-

preme Court, rather than to the St. Louis Court of Ap-

peals whieh rendered the opinion, and possessed of the

record to be reviewed on certiorari.

U

Whether Section 601, 46 U.S.C.A. prohibits the City of

St. Louis from requiring an employer to withhold an

earnings tax due from the wages of its shipboard em-

ployees, where the business utilizes two river recreational

excursion boats permanently based at the City which sev-

eral times daily load and unload all passengers there but

no other place and cruise on the Mississippi River pre-

sumably siightly threading to and fro of the imaginary

boundary line at the center of the shifting channel be-

tween the States of Missouri and Illinois.

FL Re Na ay ce ae tte ee

BIST US |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The case at bar presents the question of whether Streck.

fus Steamers, Inc. Plaintiff-Petitioner* herein, is required

to withold City of St. Louis earnings taxes from the wages

of all of its employees working on the Steamer Admiral

and on the motor vessel Huck Finn, both excursion boats

operated by Plaintiff-Petitioner on the Mississippi River

several times daily from and returning to their permanent

offices and docks in the City of St. Louis without stopping

and without discharging either passengers or cargo at any

other point (Tr. 3-5, 12).

Defendant-Respondent Collector of Revenue of the City

of St. Louis demanded the withholding of City earnings

taxes on November 9, 1968 (Tr. 2, 10), and Streckfus

Steamers, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory judgment

on July 2, 1969, requesting a resolution of the issues be-

tween the parties (Tr. 5-6). Certain individual Defend.

ants-Petitioners, representing all classes of employees on

the vessels, and the City of St. Louis and its Collector of

Revenue, Defendant-Respondents, requested the judgment

of the Trial Court on the issues presented (Tr. 9, 12),

Plaintiff-Petitioner Streckfus Steamers, Inc., contended

that all employees on its vessels are within the descrip

tion ‘‘seaman who is a member of the crew’’ and that

consequently the collection of earnings taxes by with.

holding from wages is barred by the following language

of Section 601, Title 46 of the United States Code Anno-

tated (Tr. 4):

‘‘No part of the wages due or accruing to a master,

officer, or any other seaman who is a member of the

crew on a vessel engaged in the foreign, coastwise,

* Parties are referred to by their present status, except in

several instances where clarity of identity is otherwise served.

— van

intercoastal, interstate, or noncontiguous trade shall

be witbheld pursuant to the provisions of the tax laws

of any State, Territory, Possession, or Commonwealth,

or a subdivision of any of them.’’

Defendant-Respondents contended that the statute is

inapplicable to the facts at bar because the vessels were

not engaged in ‘‘interstate trade’’ within the meaning of

the statute (Tr. 11, 12), and further contended that none

of the persons employed on board the vessels are seamen

within the statutory definition (Tr. 12).

At the trial on November 17, 1969, the facts adduced

were uncontroverted. The only witnesses who testified

were certain individual Defendants-Petitioners, called by

plaintiff, who were employed on the Steamer Admiral;

namely, a captain (Tr. 13), a chief engineer (Tr. 62); a

cafeteria worker serving food and cutting meat (Tr. 65) ;

a steward (Tr. 70); a band leader (Tr. 79); a dishwasher

(Tr. 81); a mate (Tr. 82); a concession stand worker (Tr.

90); and two deck hands (Tr. 76, 92).

Defendants-Respondents called no witnesses and intro-

duced the earnings tax ordinance of the City of St. Louis,

which was received in evidence without objection (Tr.

98, Defendants’ Exhibit A).

The Trial Court ruled the issues in favor of the conten-

tions of Plaintiff-Petitioner (Tr, 103-105). Defendants-

Respondents’ Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative

to Amend the Judgment was timely filed (Tr. 105-108)

and was overruled (Tr. 108). Notice of Appeal was timely

filed and the appeal was duly perfected to the St. Louis

Court of Appeals (Tr. 109-117).

Evidence

The principal witness was William F. Carroll, a steam-

hoat captain who operated the Steamer Admiral on ex-

cursion trips on the Mississippi River from its offices and

YER

RaREPORIESaAIH ri

&

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dock at the foot of Washington Avenue in the City of

St. Louis from mid-May to mid-September of each year

(Tr. 13-14). The Admiral makes day and night excursions

in the course of which it erosses the mid-channel of the

river back and forth and it returns to the City of §¢t,

Louis at the end of each trip (Tr. 15-16). As an excursion

vessel the Admiral carries no passengers from point to

point and carries no freight from point to point. It makes

no trips from the City of Si. ‘ouis as a port to any other

port up or down the Mississippi River (Tr. 18).

Captain Carroll testified “het the Huck Finn is also

an excursion vessel used for one hour narrated sight-see-

ing trips during the day from the City of St. Louis, re.

turning to the City of St. Louis without a stop. In eve.

nings, the Huck Finn is available exclusively for charter

excursion rides no longer than four hours and the vessel

returns to the City of St. Lanis at the end of each charter,

The Huck Finn, like the Adeiral, meanders across the

thread line of the river (Tr. 19-22)

Captain Carroll testified that th -teamer Admiral was

not in the ferry service acres. river and in no way

carried passengers or carge to any pert of call (Tr. 35-

36).- He stated that only the Delta Queen (not involved

in tax withholding) presently transports passengers from

port to port on excursions and that Plaintiff-Petitioner

Streckfus Steamers, Ine., started in that business but now

operates only local excursion vessels (Tr. 69-61).

The average number of passengers carried by the

Steamer Admiral day and night ranges between 1,800 and

2,000 per trip (Tr. 52-53), and it makes two trips per

day. It carries 200-225 employees, depending on the nun-

ber of waiters carried, and the categories of employees

include bartenders, musicians, deck hands, cooks, porters,

powder-room maids, bus-boys, and concession help (Tr.

16). The Admiral is designed to serve large numbers of

— oe

people and has facilities to feed as many as 4,000 persons

in one evening. The facilities include a snack bar, cafe-

teria service, and ‘‘bring your own”? food facilities. There

are several food service locations, one on the first deck

and three on the fourth deck; soft drinks, beer and hard

liquor are served (Tr, 22-24). Captain Carroll stated that

the passengers occupy their time by self-amusement: eat-

ing, drinking, conversation, card playing, and by dancing

to the music of a band which plays during both day and

evening trips. The boat also provides the facilities of

two gift shops, a card vending machine, a standard metal

machine, miniature pony and space-ship rides for children,

areade type machines, and pinball and photograph de-

vices (Tr. 25-27).

On the question of personnel employed on board, Cap-

tain Carroll testified that it would take approximately

twenty persons to operate the Steamer Admiral without

passengers, including a captain, mate, pilot, one or two

engineers, strikers, water tenders, firemen, and deck hands

(Tr. 37-38), and that of such persons only the captain,

mate, pilot, and engineers were licensed by the United

States Coast Guard (Tr. 40).

The total complement of employed personnel on board

the Admiral were stated to be two roof watchmen; five or

six bus boys on the fourth deck; five people in the dish

room; six in the cafeteria serving line; five in the kitchen;

two in the fourth deck snack bar; ten bus boy-porters on

the cabin deck; steward and assistant steward; two deck

supervisors; four powder-room maids; three people in the

concession stands; two people in the bar; sixteen persons

employed as cashiers, concession help, and porters on the

first floor; stx or seven persons in the engine room; eight

to ten deck hands, a mate; waiters varying to as many as

fifty on a given trip; eighteen cleaning women who clean

only when the boat is tied up at the wharf; and an aver-

age of ten members of the orchestra (Tr. 46-50).

Except for the twenty persons required to navigate the

vessel (Tr. 37-38), none of the other employed personnd

had any duty pertaining to navigation. All employed per.

sonnel, however, were assigned emergency stations and

engage in weekly drills of 20 to 25 minutes duration (Ty.

16-17, 52), while moored at the dock.

Captain Carroll testified that hie duty hours on th

Steamer Admiral were from 8:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. and that

during that said period he spent from one to one and a

half hours before the vessel left the dock, and spent the

rest of his duty time during the trip on the river (Ty.

34). He testified that the turning point in the river on

excursion trips depended on conditions and was indefinite

(Tr. 57-59).

Witness Thomas P. Chapman, Chief Engineer, stated

that he supervised four firemen, two water tenders, two

strikers, two air-conditioning men, and one or two other

engineers (Tr. 62-63).

Witness Lucy Mae Foster, a cafeteria worker, testified

that the weekly emergency drills were performed on board

after the Steamer Admiral docked in the afternoon or

sometimes after night trips (Tr. 66-67). Witness Felix

M. Chapman, the steward, confirmed the fact that the

drills did not occur during a cruise (Tr. 73). He stated

that no emergency had occurred during a cruise during

the 19 years of his employment (Tr. 74-75).

Witness Cornelius John Riemer, a mate on the Admiral,

testified that the average number of employed personnel

per trip was about 140 persons, including approximately

fifty waiters, divided into the following categories: wait.

ers, roof watchmen, bus boys, cafeteria servers, kitchen

help, soda fountain employees, snack bar employees, sup-

ply boys, stock boy for soda and beer, dishwashers,

steward, assistant steward, dock supervisors, powder-room

maids, concession workers, bartenders, porters, engine

room personnel, deck hands, purser’s office employees,

captain's office personnel, and cashiers (Tr. 85-90).

The earnings tax ordinance of the City of St. Louis,

‘Defendants’ Exhibit A,’’ imposes a one per cent tax on

the wages of all employees subject to the tax who are

residents of the City of St. Louis, and on that portion

of the earnings of non-residents of the City of St. Louis

attributable to services performed as a result of employ-

ment within the City. No question is raised herein to the

applicability of the tax to any of the employees of Plain-

tiff-Petitioner, except for the issue of the applicability of

Section 601, Title 46 of the United States Code Annotated

as heretofore quoted (Tr. 4).

PE te eee i ee ee Ye

-—- 10

Whether the Petition Is Defective in That It Prays for,

Writ of Certiorari to Be Directed to the Missouri Supreme

Court, Rather Than to the St. Louis Court of Appeals

Which Rendered the Opinion, and Possessed of the Record

to Be Reviewed on Certiorari.

Here the Plaintiff and Defendant-Petitioners seek to

have his Court direct a writ of certiorari to a court which

has formerly declined to receive and pass judgment in

the matter. As appears from the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, at the caption of the pleading, page 1 ‘To the

Supreme Court of Missouri’’, and at page 2 (Petition),

‘Opinion Beiow’’, a writ is sought to be directed to the

Missouri Supreme Court. As it further appears from

several sources in the Petition (i.e. p. 1, p. 2, “‘Jurisdie-

tion’’, p. 3, ‘*Questions Presented’’, and p. 27, ‘‘Con-

elusion’’, infer alia), the Petitioners in fact assert federal

infirmities in the judgment and opinion of the St. Louis

Court of Appeals and not a judgment or opinion of the

Missouri Supreme Court. The Petitioners, precisely, ask

this Court ‘“** * * that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals * * *”

(Petition, pgs. 1 an 2).

The notice of the Court ix solicited to the fact that the

Petition (p. 2) accurately states that the Missouri Supreme

Cour: refused to transfer this cause from the St. Louis

Court of Appeals (see Appendix A-1). The Missouri Sv-

preme “ourt did not write an opinion but simply denied

the Petitioners’ Applieation for Transfer. This is not an

affrn.ance of the judgment or adoption of the opinion of

the St. Louis Court of Appeals and cannot be considered

an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Under

the Constitution of Missouri at Article V, Section 4, the

Missouri Supreme Court, in applications for transfer exer-

»

PEP Sis eS - es a a ae ee one : _ ; ee

an Tham

cises only superintending control over the St. Louis Court

of Appeals which is exercised in a formal manner accord-

ing to a limited set of decisional circumstances. Rule 84.05

(b) of the Missouri Supreme Court (Revised Statutes of

Missouri, 1969, Vol. 5) is referrable to the Court’s con-

stitutional superintending power and set out the limited

circumstances which must appear in order for the Court

to consider an exercise of its jurisdiction in such regard.

Where the court elects to exercise its jurisdiction, Rule

$4.05 (b) operates to lodge the ease in the Missouri Su-

preme Court for judgment. This, of course, did not occur

here.

While the application to the Missouri Supreme Court

was necessary in order for the St. Louis Court of Appeals

to become the final, highest court of the State in which a

decision could be had in accordance with the dictates of

28 U.S.C. 1257 (on refusal of the Missouri Supreme Court

to exercise jurisdiction), this is not to say that the judg-

ment and opinion of the Court of Appeals then becomes

the jucgment and opinion of the Supreme Court, and there-

fore a writ of certiorari, in order to reach the record of

the deciding court vught to go to the Supreme Court. To

the contrary, under Missouri law the transcript in the

cause remained in the St. Louis Court of Appeals (where

no order of transfer oceurs ax here) according to the Mis-

souri Constitution, Article V, Section 10, and Missouri

Suprewe Court Rule 84.05.

Further, the transeript contains the whole reeord (i.e.

pleading, proceedings, evidenee, orders, and judgments,

Rule 84.12 (b)) necessary to a determination of all ques-

tions before the appellate court (i.e. St. Louis Court of

Appeals). The transeript of the record was never before

the Missouri Supreme Court and is not now in such court.

Con-equently, certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court

would not funetion to bring the judgment and opinion

Petitioners wish to be reviewed to this Court.

ee

== 13

This point is elementary and has been so treated by the

Court in its past handling of such factual circumstances.

In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 79, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 I,

Ed2d 446, the writ was directed to a lower Florida appel.

late court and that lower court’s judgment was affirmed,

The Court made clear the reason for its action by the

explanatory footnote No. 5, to the opinion (lc. L.Ed2d

449). Earlier, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester,

276 U.S. 252, 48 S. Ct. 234, 72 L.Ed 55, the Court illucidated

the rule for its dismissal stating:

“But as the supreme court of Alabama, by denying

the petition for certiorari, on the face of the record

did not pass on the merits, the writ of this court in

No. 183 was properly directed to the court of appeals,

and that in No. 189 is dismissed.”

The proper action indicated by the status of the case

as it presently exists before this Court appears to be an

entry of an order denying the petition for certiorari be.

cause of lack of jurisdiction.

II. Whether Section 601, 46 US.C.A. Prohibits the

City of St. Louis From Requiring an Employer to Witb.

hold an Earnings Tax Due From the Wages of Its Ship.

board Employees, Where the Business Utilizes Two River

Recreational Excursion Boats Permanently Based at the

City Which Several Times Daily Load and Unload All

Passengers There But No Other Place and Cruise on the

Mississippi River Presumably Slightly Threading to and

Fro of the Imaginary Boundary Line a: the Center of the

Shifting Channel Between the States of Missouri and

Illinois.

In their Petition, Petitioners urge upon the Court a view

which avoids all reasonable consideration of the intent

or purpose of Congress in enacting Section 601, 46 U.S.C.

ee

ee ee ee re oe Siete taal ~

— 13 —.

(pertinent part). The Petitioners attempt to force their

self-assumed meaning of the statute through a blind ap-

plication of a talismanie test never adopted by this Court

and very pointedly rejected by it. Misunderstanding of the

pronouncements of this Court have led to the Plaintiff's

misreading and incomprehension of the judgment and

opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The test the

Plaintiffs would have this Court apply involves a simple

geographic determination of whether their navagational

operations on the Mississippi River “thread” the center of

main channel] so as to technically enter the Illinois side.

They urge such a test regardless of its strained, academic

character, or its lack of any real consequence upon the

flow of commerce and without any real consideration given

to the settled, historic treatment of interstate commerce

by Congress and this Court.

Respondents suggest that the Petitioners’ approach

really presents no matter worthy of the interest of this

Court. As we will endeavor to make clear following, this

Court has made abundantly plain and has left no room

for serious question that the regulation of interstate com-

merce is a delicate matter, grounded in common sense

and highly respective of practicality. We respectfully

submit that the St. Louis Court of Appeals has been

solicitously faithful to the true and controlling teachings

of this Court, and the question raised by the Petitioners

is the product of their failure to intelligently apply such

teachings.

While a survey of the cases provides background and

enlightenment for accurate perception of the controlling

rule in this case, Respondents believe that the opinion

by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Centra] Greyhound Lines

v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, 92 L.Fd. 1633,

is the latest, most instructive and authoritative pro-

nouncements by the Court and unmistakably decisive of

oS eeerhenien ae

atte

the questions raised in this case. There the Court ex.

pounded upon and clarified the holdings in Lehigh Valley

R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 12 S. Ct. 806, 3%

L.Ed. 672.

The Court will recall that in the Central Greyhound

Lines v. Mealey (i.e. Central Greyhound) the company

contended first that it was not subject to a tax imposed

on its operations by the State of New York. The New

York Tax Commission had decided that the State’s fran.

chise tax, measured by gross receipts derived from trans.

portation between points within the State but over routes

that utilized the highways of Pennsylvania and Ney

Jersey, was applicable to all the receipts. Forty-three

percent (43%) of the operations were outside of New

York State. The basis of this claim was, like here, that

since the transportation crossed state lines it was inter.

state commerce and therefore New York could not con.

stitutionally tax such gross receipts. (A secondary claim

urged that if taxation was not unconstitutional, New

York could only tax so much of the gross receipts as

were attributable to the mileage covered in New York.)

In deciding that not every burden on interstate com.

merce is unconstitutional this Court went to great pains

to illucidate the precepts governing the Federal-States

relationship and the State-to-State implications.

In cogent language the Court established the context

of inquiries as to whether a specific action of a state

offends the Commerce Clause or a particular exercise of

power of Congress under the Clause. As Mr. Justice

Frankfurter phrased it (92 L.Ed. 1637):

This case serves to remind once more that courts

do not adjudicate abstractions, such as ‘‘What is

interstate ecommerce?’’ Also, it again illustrates that

even if it be found that certain transactions in fact

constitute interstate commerce, such conclusion does

—

not answer the further inquiry whether a particular

assertion of power by a State over such transactions

offends the Commerce Clause.

The Court pointed out that determinations as to

whether a State’s exercise of power is proper or not, must

depend upon something more substantial and objectively

important than the geographic fact that state lines are

crossed. The observations of the Court are worth recalling.

In objecting to the erroneousness of the “‘language”’ of

some prior decisions which, while actually taking into ac-

count the practicalities of the considered situations, spoke

in such a way as to disregard the fact of the existence of

interstate commerce, where in truth it existed but was

of such a minor character as to be inconsequential as com-

pared to the overwhelming domestic, state character. The

Court adopting its prior consistent teachings: (92 L.Ed.

1639)

** * Regulation and commerce among the States both

are practical rather-than technical conceptions, and,

naturally, their limits must be fixed by prgetical

lines, Galveston, H & S.A.R. Co. vy. Texas, > US

217, 225, 52 L. Ed. 1031, 1036, 28 S. Ct. 638. But to

label transportation across an interstate stream

‘‘local commerce’’ for some purposes when it is ‘‘in-

terstate commerce’’ in other relations, see, e.g. Cov-

ington & C Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 US 204, 38

L, Ed 962, 14 S. Ct. 1087, 4 Inters Com 649. is to use

loosely terms having connotations of constitutional

significance. To call commerce in fact interstate ‘local

commerce’? because under a given set of cireum-

stances, as in the Lehigh Valley Case, a particular

exertion of state power is not rendered invalid by

the Commerce Clause is to indulge in a fiction, * * *

Again to make its holding so clear that future confusion

would not likely reoccur the Court repeated: (92 L.Ed.

Se alti eat tae ane

_

* * © The kind of confusion to which the Lehigh

Valley opinion has given rise results from employing

a neediess fiction—calling commerce local which ip

fact is interstate—as a matter of stating that a par.

ticular exercise of State power is not invalid even

though it affects interstate commerce. The difficult

task of determining whether a phase of commeree,

concededly interstate, is subject to a particular in.

. cidence of State regulation, through taxation or other.

wise, is not lessened by calling interstate commerce

local commerce in order to sustain its local control,

To state this persistent and protean problem of our

federalism in the form of a question—begging fiction,

is not to answer it. * * *

With the destruction of any automatic decisional sig-

nificance for the phase ‘‘interstate commerce’’ the Court

then addressed the real or controlling aspects of resolving

the sometimes thorny question of substantial burden on

interstate commerce.

The Court isolated a number of factors as important

to resolution of such questions, a fair understanding of

the Court’s meaning instructs that such isolated matters

are not intended to be exhaustive but sharply illustrative.

These factors included circumstances such as: The reason-

able benefits another State confers upon the transporta-

tion while within its borders; the trifling in quantity pro-

portion of transactions within the other State’s territory;

and whether the State’s exaction is constitutionally a fair

demand where such state has a special relation in the

transaction. (See: 92 L.Ed. 1640.) Supportive of the con-

tinuity of Central Greyhound with prior decisions actually

relying on such reasonable considerations, even while col-

orably relying on the impermissibly inedequate ‘‘inter-

state commerce’’ tesi, the Court cited the existence of

these factors in prior cases. (See: 92 L.Ed. 1640-1641.|)

RRR AO He Meters corgey a cee es

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FASE Se AR A MRR CSAS EE

LIRA CHALSREM, ERC SOG SI MN OE My

— -

Here, while it is true that the reach of a statute (46

US.C.A. Sec. 601) rather than a constitutional test of the

statute is involved, still the power exercised by Congress

in this area is referrable to the Commerce Clause and the

specific intent of Congress is to be properly settled by im-

puting an object or purpose to further proper regulation

and control within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.

This is to say, Congress does not operate in a vacuum

without regard for its past clearly discernable plan and

the settled constructions placed upon its acts by this

Court. (New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Soh-

mer, 235 U.S. 549, 35 S. Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 335: United

States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447,

28S. Ct. 579, 52 L.Ed. 881.)

Applying these principles to the case at hand it is urged

that Section 601, 46 U.S.C. must be considered from the

standpoint of Congress’ legitimate interest in regulating

interstate commerce and the exercise of State powers in

relation thereto so as to promote and maintain the free

flow and intercourse which is the object of the Commerce

Clause.

Initially, as the St. Louis Court of Appeals recognized

and expressly documented, the immediate purpose of Con-

gress in enacting Section 501, 46 U.S.C.—amendment

thereto—was ‘‘* * * to prevent multiple withholdings

from the wages of seamen who might be in ports of dif-

ferent states when they received their pay. * * *? (See:

Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 472 SW2d

660, le. 663). Further, as the St. Louis Court of Appeals

cites (same le. supra), the substantiation of this Con-

gressional intent is recorded at 2 U.S. Code, Congressional

and Administrative News, 86th Congress—First Session

1959, pp. 2530-2536.

Therefore, proper evaluation of the exercise of the

power asserted by the City of St. Louis necessarily in-

are ie

— 18 —

volves the discovery of whether the vice protected agains

by the Statute (ie. 46 U.S.C. 601) is induced or workeg

by the City’s act. The Plaintiffs’ ‘‘interstate commerce”

automatic test sweeps with too all-inclusive dimensions

and totally negates that refined accommodation with the

iegitimate interests of the States that Congress has always

carefully respected.

Here, the travel across the State boundary of Illinois

is first a presumptive crossing, and occurs simply becaxse

the two States’ boundaries are defined by the center-line

of the main navigation channel. This channel continually

shifts with the vagarities of the river flow and obstrue.

tions. As before discussed, to make such a factor decisive

is to ignore the insistence of this Court upon rationality,

There is no aspect of the Plaintiff-Petitioner’s business

intentionally directed to travel in Illinois.

Further, the base of operations is located within the

City of St. Louis. The Company offices, its administration

and the control of all its operations are situated in and

directed from St. Louis. The nature of its business in.

volves ‘‘transportation’’ only in a limited sense; pas.

sengers do not partake of its facilities to be transported

from one place to another interstate or inirastate. The

vessels are simply the type of ‘‘excursion boats’’ common

to metropolitan areas near navigable waters devoted to

shipboard picnics and relaxation. The patrons are aboard

for a relatively short time (a matter of hours) and sueh

excursion rides are repeated several times daily. The em-

ployees too, have a distinct and substantial relationship

to the City of St. Louis. They daily report for work to

the site of the Company offices in St. Louis (where both

vessels are moored). At the conclusion of their working

hours they depart from the same location within the City.

The vessels of the Company never stop at another port

— on

at any time in the course of their repeated daily excur-

sions. No goods are carried; no passengers are either

taken on or discharged other than at the office and mooring

jocation within St. Louis. The City of St. Louis is the

only authority which renders fire, police, water and other

such services and facilities to the Company, its properties

and its employees. By their own admission, the Petitioners

establish that in the long history of their operations no

other state authority has attempted to exercise any tax

collecting system other than Missouri and the City of

St. Louis.

As the St. Louis Court of Appeals pointed out (472

S.W.2d lc. 663), these circumstances do not give rise to

any imposition or harassment of seamen. There is no

rational possibility, under the unique lack of any relation-

ship to any other State or even local authority outside

of the City of St. Louis, within Missouri that other or

additional withholdings will occur. Certainly the long so

unencumbered history of the Petitioner’s operations deci-

sively demonstrate this. The most reasonable and efficient

means of collecting the earnings tax owed by the employees

of the Company, is withholding at the accounting offices of

the place of employment. (There exists no question that

such tax is owing.)

These incidents of the circumstances surrounding the

Petitioners’ operations and employment are urged as

clearly demonstrating the de minimis relationship to inter-

state commerce and the total absence of any substantial

burden on such commerce. And as before said, there is

abundant support for the conclusion that, under the

unique circumstances of the case, withholding at the sole

and only place of payment of wages is a reasonable and

effective procedure, fair and unburdensome for both the

employee and the employer, and a viable means of dis-

iributing the cost of government equally.

APRA YT kt

= =

Objectivity is truly subverted by a contention that Cop.

gress intended to exercise its power to thwart the fai,

reasonable and unburdensome means used here. Respective

of employees burden, one has but to consider the alterna.

tive to the employee, namely, making minute periodic pay.

ments directly to the City himself, to comprehend the ip.

terest of the employee. No sensible construction of Section

601, 46 U.S.C.A. supports working such a result,

The Petitioners attempt to create a problem where

none exists through their outside the record assertions re.

garding the widely adverse implications of permitting the

Court of Appeals decision to stand. However, the whole

history of the Petitioners’ operations and the total absence

of any real proof belie such ‘‘boot-strap’’ argument. (See

Petition: pgs. 14, 21, 23 and 25-27). The plain fact is that

no other jurisdiction has construed its laws to require

withholding from the Company employees’ wages. The

whole of the argument respecting the State of Illinois,

flies in the face of the facts and is so speculative as to

merit no serious consideration. There is simply no truth

to the assertion that ‘‘many carriers which operate on

the Mississippi River’’ will be ‘‘affected’’ by the St. Louis

Court of Appeals decision. In fact it is hardly conceivable

that any besides the Petitioners could be affected because

of the unique nature of this case. Should there be others

so situated at other locations of parallel circumstances, a

like result would be also just.

Petitioners attempt to attack the St. Louis Court of

Appeals decision through the device of attributing to

that Court a crucial reliance on People of the State of New

York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Company v. Sohmer, 23)

US 549, 35 S.Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 355. After such misplaced

attribution the Petitioners then attempt to negate suh

constructed authority.

—

A careful and fair analysis of the Court of Appeals

opinion demonstrates that the Court construed Section

601, 46 U.S.C.A. in the light of the documented intent

of Congress and the teachings of this Court.

As before discussed at some length, this Court has

illucidated its prior decisions clearly instructing that

such term ‘‘interstate commerce’’ is not a magic touch-

stone that automatically solves interstate commerce re-

lationships and that the substantial practical considera-

tions must be carefully considered. This is precisely the

course of the Court of Appeals. The first Cornell case

(supra) was discussed as was the case cited by the Peti-

tioners, Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U-S.

634, 64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978, solely to illustrate the

proper perspective in viewing the relationship of factual

circumstances to interstate commerce. As before pointed

out, this Court has approved such approach, even though

critical of some of the expressions utilized in reaching

the result. (Central Greyhound Lines, Inc, v. Mealey,

(cite supra); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.

2118, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010.) More to the point,

the Petitioners’ criticism results from a misapprehension

of the basis of decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals.

APP rw pe teen nanan

— 22 —

CONCLUSION

Defendant-Respondents respectfully pray this Honor.

able Court to deny Plaintiff and Defendant Petitioner

Petition for a writ of certiorari; such Petition secks jp

review a court which is not possessed of the record anj

therefore the Petition ought to be dismissed; and th

claims of the Petitioners are opposed to the settled prin.

ciples of law which were faithfully applied by the &

Louis Court of Appeals in its judgment and opinion

Respectf{glly submi

ar ty P. FREEMAN

Associate City Counselor

City of St. Louis, Missouri

Room 314, City Hall

1200 Market Street

4 yp ~_—_~

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

Attorney for

Defendant -Respondents

Of Counsel

ROBERT C. McNICHOLAS

City Counselor

City of St. Louis

WILLIAM R. O’TOOLE

Attorney at Law

Room 1026, Buder Building

7 North Seventh Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

‘

Ba

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis · 409 U.S. 841 | Frix