Opposition Brief — Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis
Supreme Court brief1972
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I. Whether the petition is defective in that it
prays for a writ of certiorari to be directed to
the Missouri Supreme Court, rather than to the
St. Louis Court of Appeals which rendered the
opinion, and possessed of the record to be re-
Pe NN I on cc tiicnccnccvccecceccs 10
Il. Whether Section 601, 46 U.S.C.A. prohibits the
City of St. Louis from requiring an employer
to withhold an earnings tax due from the wages
of its shipboard employees, where the business
utilizes two river recreational excursion boats
permanently based at the city which several
times daily load and unload all passengers there
but no other place and cruise on the Missis-
sippi River presumably slightly threading to
and fro of the imaginary boundary line at the
center of the shifting channel between the
States of Missouri and Illinois ................ 12
SR ERE a a 22
CITATIONS
Cases
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68
S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633 (1947) .......... 13, 14, 16, 21
Sot ee ee
3
Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634,
64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978 (1943) .................. 21
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 12
S.Ct. 806, 36 L.Ed. 672 (1801) ......... ccc cccces. 14
New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer,
235 U.S. 549, 35 S.Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 335 (1914) ..17, 20,21
Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis and John
K. Travers, Collector of Revenue for the City of St.
Louis, and Capt. Wm. F. Carroll, et al. (St. Louis
Ct. App. 1971) 472 S.W.2d 660 ...............0.. 11
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,.
209 U.S. 447, 28 S.Ct. 579, 52 L.Ed. 881 (1907) .... 17
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67
S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1946) ................ 21
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 US.
252, 48 S.Ct. 234, 72 L.Ed. 555 (1927) ............ 12
Williams v. Florida, 339 U.S. 79, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed
te ee or 12
Sonstitutional Provisions
Article IV, Section 4, Missouri Constitution ........ 10
Article V, Section 10, Missouri Constitution ........ 11
Statutes
ee UP sc cauccianaaevunacdbneiet nad al 3, 11
Sr ae EE a 06 e RRC UK Ess es daees 3, 4, 9, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21
Section 145.060 Revised Code of the City of St. Louis,
My -SGdu64650 060060 b60es b50eevdeseraekeaseaee .
iii
Rules
Rule 23, 1, (b) United States Supreme Court ........ 2
Rule 84.05 Missouri Supreme Court ................ 11
Rule 84.05 (b) Missouri Supreme Court ............ 11
Rule 84.12 (b) Missouri Supreme Court ............ 11
Miscellaneous
2 US. Code Congressional & Administrative News,
86th Congress—First Session, 1959, pp. 2530-2536 .. 17
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1971
No. 57,449
STRECKFUS STEAMERS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
CAPT. WM. F. CARROLL, CAPT. CARNELIUS RIEMER, CAPT. HARRY
GRIESHABER, THOMAS P.CHAPMAN, THOMAS McKIBBEN, MARVIN
CHAPMAN, ARTHUR JACKSON, GEORGE V. JOHNSON, MRS. BETTY
SCHWALLER, MRS. LILY COLD, MRS. LUCY FOSTER, WILLIE
COLEMAN, JOHN CARROLL, SPENCER T. JONES,
Defendants-Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS and JOHN K. TRAVERS, Collector of the
City of St. Louis,
Defendants-Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri
BRIEF
In Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
Supreme Court of Missouri
Comes now the City of St. Leuis, a municipal corpora-
tion of the State of Missouri, and John K. Travers, Col-
lector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, the
Detendant-Respondents, and respectfully make their re-
sponse to the Plaintiff-Petitioner and Defendants-Petition-
ers’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the State of Missouri.
.
a
eer Vie
OPINIONS BELOW
This is a declaratory judgment action originally brought
in the Cireuit Court of the Twenty-second Judicial Cir.
cuit (St. Louis City) where Michael F. Godfrey, Judge,
entered judgment for the Plaintiff (Plaintiff-Petitioner
here) and employee defendants of Plaintiff (Defendants.
Petitioners here). Such judgment was filed with an un.
reported memorandum opinion which is faithfully included
in the Appendix of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
commencing at page -A-9- thereof. Appeals were duly
prosecuted to the Saint Louis Court of Appeals (now by
Constitutional amendment: Missouri Court of Appeals,
Saint Louis District; Amendment to Article V, August 4,
1970), by the Defendant-Respondents where the trial court
judgment was reversed and remanded with directions in
favor of Defendant-Respondents. Such judgment with the
Court’s opinion is officially reported at Streckfus Steamers
Inc. v. City of St. Louis and John K. Travers, Collector of
Revenue for the City of St. Louis, and Capt. Wm. F. Car.
roll, et al., No. 33787, June 15, 1971, 472 SW2d 660. There.
after, Plaintiff-Petitioner and Defendants-Petitioners duly
exhausted their procedural rights for rehearing or trans-
fer to the Missouri Supreme Court in the Saint Louis Court
of Appeals (both denied October 6, 1971), and their Ap-
plication for Transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was
denied on December 13, 1971. The Missouri Supreme
Court’s order of denial of the Application to Transfer is
not officially reported.
JURISDICTION
Defendant-Respondents urges the Court’s notice of the
insufficiency of the Plaintiff-Petitioner’s and Defendant-Pe-
titioner’s statement of the particular basis for jurisdic-
tion in compliance with Rule 23, 1, (b).
NEL EE DE LILO DOL NI SERIE SOLES ELT ARON SHE ORE
ve
Here the Plaintiff-Petitioner employer cannot assert an
‘immunity’? conferred by the terms of Section 601, 46
U.S.C.A. so as to come within the jurisdictional require-
ments of 28 U.S.C.A. 1257 (3). And the prior controlling
decisions of this Court negate the tenuous, colorable claim
of the repugnancy of the City ordinance (i.e. Section 145.-
060, Revised Code of St. Louis) to the United States Stat-
ute. The Courts of the State of Missouri have not de-
eided a Federal question of substance not heretofore
determined by this Court, and have not decided any Fed-
eral questions in a way probably not in accord with ap-
plicable decisions of this Court, as would appeal to the
sound judicial discretion of the Court under Rule 19.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I
Whether the petition is defective in that it prays for
a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Missouri Su-
preme Court, rather than to the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals whieh rendered the opinion, and possessed of the
record to be reviewed on certiorari.
U
Whether Section 601, 46 U.S.C.A. prohibits the City of
St. Louis from requiring an employer to withhold an
earnings tax due from the wages of its shipboard em-
ployees, where the business utilizes two river recreational
excursion boats permanently based at the City which sev-
eral times daily load and unload all passengers there but
no other place and cruise on the Mississippi River pre-
sumably siightly threading to and fro of the imaginary
boundary line at the center of the shifting channel be-
tween the States of Missouri and Illinois.
FL Re Na ay ce ae tte ee
BIST US |
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case at bar presents the question of whether Streck.
fus Steamers, Inc. Plaintiff-Petitioner* herein, is required
to withold City of St. Louis earnings taxes from the wages
of all of its employees working on the Steamer Admiral
and on the motor vessel Huck Finn, both excursion boats
operated by Plaintiff-Petitioner on the Mississippi River
several times daily from and returning to their permanent
offices and docks in the City of St. Louis without stopping
and without discharging either passengers or cargo at any
other point (Tr. 3-5, 12).
Defendant-Respondent Collector of Revenue of the City
of St. Louis demanded the withholding of City earnings
taxes on November 9, 1968 (Tr. 2, 10), and Streckfus
Steamers, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory judgment
on July 2, 1969, requesting a resolution of the issues be-
tween the parties (Tr. 5-6). Certain individual Defend.
ants-Petitioners, representing all classes of employees on
the vessels, and the City of St. Louis and its Collector of
Revenue, Defendant-Respondents, requested the judgment
of the Trial Court on the issues presented (Tr. 9, 12),
Plaintiff-Petitioner Streckfus Steamers, Inc., contended
that all employees on its vessels are within the descrip
tion ‘‘seaman who is a member of the crew’’ and that
consequently the collection of earnings taxes by with.
holding from wages is barred by the following language
of Section 601, Title 46 of the United States Code Anno-
tated (Tr. 4):
‘‘No part of the wages due or accruing to a master,
officer, or any other seaman who is a member of the
crew on a vessel engaged in the foreign, coastwise,
* Parties are referred to by their present status, except in
several instances where clarity of identity is otherwise served.
— van
intercoastal, interstate, or noncontiguous trade shall
be witbheld pursuant to the provisions of the tax laws
of any State, Territory, Possession, or Commonwealth,
or a subdivision of any of them.’’
Defendant-Respondents contended that the statute is
inapplicable to the facts at bar because the vessels were
not engaged in ‘‘interstate trade’’ within the meaning of
the statute (Tr. 11, 12), and further contended that none
of the persons employed on board the vessels are seamen
within the statutory definition (Tr. 12).
At the trial on November 17, 1969, the facts adduced
were uncontroverted. The only witnesses who testified
were certain individual Defendants-Petitioners, called by
plaintiff, who were employed on the Steamer Admiral;
namely, a captain (Tr. 13), a chief engineer (Tr. 62); a
cafeteria worker serving food and cutting meat (Tr. 65) ;
a steward (Tr. 70); a band leader (Tr. 79); a dishwasher
(Tr. 81); a mate (Tr. 82); a concession stand worker (Tr.
90); and two deck hands (Tr. 76, 92).
Defendants-Respondents called no witnesses and intro-
duced the earnings tax ordinance of the City of St. Louis,
which was received in evidence without objection (Tr.
98, Defendants’ Exhibit A).
The Trial Court ruled the issues in favor of the conten-
tions of Plaintiff-Petitioner (Tr, 103-105). Defendants-
Respondents’ Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative
to Amend the Judgment was timely filed (Tr. 105-108)
and was overruled (Tr. 108). Notice of Appeal was timely
filed and the appeal was duly perfected to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals (Tr. 109-117).
Evidence
The principal witness was William F. Carroll, a steam-
hoat captain who operated the Steamer Admiral on ex-
cursion trips on the Mississippi River from its offices and
YER
RaREPORIESaAIH ri
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pee” ae
dock at the foot of Washington Avenue in the City of
St. Louis from mid-May to mid-September of each year
(Tr. 13-14). The Admiral makes day and night excursions
in the course of which it erosses the mid-channel of the
river back and forth and it returns to the City of §¢t,
Louis at the end of each trip (Tr. 15-16). As an excursion
vessel the Admiral carries no passengers from point to
point and carries no freight from point to point. It makes
no trips from the City of Si. ‘ouis as a port to any other
port up or down the Mississippi River (Tr. 18).
Captain Carroll testified “het the Huck Finn is also
an excursion vessel used for one hour narrated sight-see-
ing trips during the day from the City of St. Louis, re.
turning to the City of St. Louis without a stop. In eve.
nings, the Huck Finn is available exclusively for charter
excursion rides no longer than four hours and the vessel
returns to the City of St. Lanis at the end of each charter,
The Huck Finn, like the Adeiral, meanders across the
thread line of the river (Tr. 19-22)
Captain Carroll testified that th -teamer Admiral was
not in the ferry service acres. river and in no way
carried passengers or carge to any pert of call (Tr. 35-
36).- He stated that only the Delta Queen (not involved
in tax withholding) presently transports passengers from
port to port on excursions and that Plaintiff-Petitioner
Streckfus Steamers, Ine., started in that business but now
operates only local excursion vessels (Tr. 69-61).
The average number of passengers carried by the
Steamer Admiral day and night ranges between 1,800 and
2,000 per trip (Tr. 52-53), and it makes two trips per
day. It carries 200-225 employees, depending on the nun-
ber of waiters carried, and the categories of employees
include bartenders, musicians, deck hands, cooks, porters,
powder-room maids, bus-boys, and concession help (Tr.
16). The Admiral is designed to serve large numbers of
— oe
people and has facilities to feed as many as 4,000 persons
in one evening. The facilities include a snack bar, cafe-
teria service, and ‘‘bring your own”? food facilities. There
are several food service locations, one on the first deck
and three on the fourth deck; soft drinks, beer and hard
liquor are served (Tr, 22-24). Captain Carroll stated that
the passengers occupy their time by self-amusement: eat-
ing, drinking, conversation, card playing, and by dancing
to the music of a band which plays during both day and
evening trips. The boat also provides the facilities of
two gift shops, a card vending machine, a standard metal
machine, miniature pony and space-ship rides for children,
areade type machines, and pinball and photograph de-
vices (Tr. 25-27).
On the question of personnel employed on board, Cap-
tain Carroll testified that it would take approximately
twenty persons to operate the Steamer Admiral without
passengers, including a captain, mate, pilot, one or two
engineers, strikers, water tenders, firemen, and deck hands
(Tr. 37-38), and that of such persons only the captain,
mate, pilot, and engineers were licensed by the United
States Coast Guard (Tr. 40).
The total complement of employed personnel on board
the Admiral were stated to be two roof watchmen; five or
six bus boys on the fourth deck; five people in the dish
room; six in the cafeteria serving line; five in the kitchen;
two in the fourth deck snack bar; ten bus boy-porters on
the cabin deck; steward and assistant steward; two deck
supervisors; four powder-room maids; three people in the
concession stands; two people in the bar; sixteen persons
employed as cashiers, concession help, and porters on the
first floor; stx or seven persons in the engine room; eight
to ten deck hands, a mate; waiters varying to as many as
fifty on a given trip; eighteen cleaning women who clean
only when the boat is tied up at the wharf; and an aver-
age of ten members of the orchestra (Tr. 46-50).
Except for the twenty persons required to navigate the
vessel (Tr. 37-38), none of the other employed personnd
had any duty pertaining to navigation. All employed per.
sonnel, however, were assigned emergency stations and
engage in weekly drills of 20 to 25 minutes duration (Ty.
16-17, 52), while moored at the dock.
Captain Carroll testified that hie duty hours on th
Steamer Admiral were from 8:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. and that
during that said period he spent from one to one and a
half hours before the vessel left the dock, and spent the
rest of his duty time during the trip on the river (Ty.
34). He testified that the turning point in the river on
excursion trips depended on conditions and was indefinite
(Tr. 57-59).
Witness Thomas P. Chapman, Chief Engineer, stated
that he supervised four firemen, two water tenders, two
strikers, two air-conditioning men, and one or two other
engineers (Tr. 62-63).
Witness Lucy Mae Foster, a cafeteria worker, testified
that the weekly emergency drills were performed on board
after the Steamer Admiral docked in the afternoon or
sometimes after night trips (Tr. 66-67). Witness Felix
M. Chapman, the steward, confirmed the fact that the
drills did not occur during a cruise (Tr. 73). He stated
that no emergency had occurred during a cruise during
the 19 years of his employment (Tr. 74-75).
Witness Cornelius John Riemer, a mate on the Admiral,
testified that the average number of employed personnel
per trip was about 140 persons, including approximately
fifty waiters, divided into the following categories: wait.
ers, roof watchmen, bus boys, cafeteria servers, kitchen
help, soda fountain employees, snack bar employees, sup-
ply boys, stock boy for soda and beer, dishwashers,
steward, assistant steward, dock supervisors, powder-room
maids, concession workers, bartenders, porters, engine
room personnel, deck hands, purser’s office employees,
captain's office personnel, and cashiers (Tr. 85-90).
The earnings tax ordinance of the City of St. Louis,
‘Defendants’ Exhibit A,’’ imposes a one per cent tax on
the wages of all employees subject to the tax who are
residents of the City of St. Louis, and on that portion
of the earnings of non-residents of the City of St. Louis
attributable to services performed as a result of employ-
ment within the City. No question is raised herein to the
applicability of the tax to any of the employees of Plain-
tiff-Petitioner, except for the issue of the applicability of
Section 601, Title 46 of the United States Code Annotated
as heretofore quoted (Tr. 4).
PE te eee i ee ee Ye
-—- 10
Whether the Petition Is Defective in That It Prays for,
Writ of Certiorari to Be Directed to the Missouri Supreme
Court, Rather Than to the St. Louis Court of Appeals
Which Rendered the Opinion, and Possessed of the Record
to Be Reviewed on Certiorari.
Here the Plaintiff and Defendant-Petitioners seek to
have his Court direct a writ of certiorari to a court which
has formerly declined to receive and pass judgment in
the matter. As appears from the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, at the caption of the pleading, page 1 ‘To the
Supreme Court of Missouri’’, and at page 2 (Petition),
‘Opinion Beiow’’, a writ is sought to be directed to the
Missouri Supreme Court. As it further appears from
several sources in the Petition (i.e. p. 1, p. 2, “‘Jurisdie-
tion’’, p. 3, ‘*Questions Presented’’, and p. 27, ‘‘Con-
elusion’’, infer alia), the Petitioners in fact assert federal
infirmities in the judgment and opinion of the St. Louis
Court of Appeals and not a judgment or opinion of the
Missouri Supreme Court. The Petitioners, precisely, ask
this Court ‘“** * * that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals * * *”
(Petition, pgs. 1 an 2).
The notice of the Court ix solicited to the fact that the
Petition (p. 2) accurately states that the Missouri Supreme
Cour: refused to transfer this cause from the St. Louis
Court of Appeals (see Appendix A-1). The Missouri Sv-
preme “ourt did not write an opinion but simply denied
the Petitioners’ Applieation for Transfer. This is not an
affrn.ance of the judgment or adoption of the opinion of
the St. Louis Court of Appeals and cannot be considered
an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Under
the Constitution of Missouri at Article V, Section 4, the
Missouri Supreme Court, in applications for transfer exer-
»
PEP Sis eS - es a a ae ee one : _ ; ee
an Tham
cises only superintending control over the St. Louis Court
of Appeals which is exercised in a formal manner accord-
ing to a limited set of decisional circumstances. Rule 84.05
(b) of the Missouri Supreme Court (Revised Statutes of
Missouri, 1969, Vol. 5) is referrable to the Court’s con-
stitutional superintending power and set out the limited
circumstances which must appear in order for the Court
to consider an exercise of its jurisdiction in such regard.
Where the court elects to exercise its jurisdiction, Rule
$4.05 (b) operates to lodge the ease in the Missouri Su-
preme Court for judgment. This, of course, did not occur
here.
While the application to the Missouri Supreme Court
was necessary in order for the St. Louis Court of Appeals
to become the final, highest court of the State in which a
decision could be had in accordance with the dictates of
28 U.S.C. 1257 (on refusal of the Missouri Supreme Court
to exercise jurisdiction), this is not to say that the judg-
ment and opinion of the Court of Appeals then becomes
the jucgment and opinion of the Supreme Court, and there-
fore a writ of certiorari, in order to reach the record of
the deciding court vught to go to the Supreme Court. To
the contrary, under Missouri law the transcript in the
cause remained in the St. Louis Court of Appeals (where
no order of transfer oceurs ax here) according to the Mis-
souri Constitution, Article V, Section 10, and Missouri
Suprewe Court Rule 84.05.
Further, the transeript contains the whole reeord (i.e.
pleading, proceedings, evidenee, orders, and judgments,
Rule 84.12 (b)) necessary to a determination of all ques-
tions before the appellate court (i.e. St. Louis Court of
Appeals). The transeript of the record was never before
the Missouri Supreme Court and is not now in such court.
Con-equently, certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court
would not funetion to bring the judgment and opinion
Petitioners wish to be reviewed to this Court.
ee
== 13
This point is elementary and has been so treated by the
Court in its past handling of such factual circumstances.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 79, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 I,
Ed2d 446, the writ was directed to a lower Florida appel.
late court and that lower court’s judgment was affirmed,
The Court made clear the reason for its action by the
explanatory footnote No. 5, to the opinion (lc. L.Ed2d
449). Earlier, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester,
276 U.S. 252, 48 S. Ct. 234, 72 L.Ed 55, the Court illucidated
the rule for its dismissal stating:
“But as the supreme court of Alabama, by denying
the petition for certiorari, on the face of the record
did not pass on the merits, the writ of this court in
No. 183 was properly directed to the court of appeals,
and that in No. 189 is dismissed.”
The proper action indicated by the status of the case
as it presently exists before this Court appears to be an
entry of an order denying the petition for certiorari be.
cause of lack of jurisdiction.
II. Whether Section 601, 46 US.C.A. Prohibits the
City of St. Louis From Requiring an Employer to Witb.
hold an Earnings Tax Due From the Wages of Its Ship.
board Employees, Where the Business Utilizes Two River
Recreational Excursion Boats Permanently Based at the
City Which Several Times Daily Load and Unload All
Passengers There But No Other Place and Cruise on the
Mississippi River Presumably Slightly Threading to and
Fro of the Imaginary Boundary Line a: the Center of the
Shifting Channel Between the States of Missouri and
Illinois.
In their Petition, Petitioners urge upon the Court a view
which avoids all reasonable consideration of the intent
or purpose of Congress in enacting Section 601, 46 U.S.C.
ee
ee ee ee re oe Siete taal ~
— 13 —.
(pertinent part). The Petitioners attempt to force their
self-assumed meaning of the statute through a blind ap-
plication of a talismanie test never adopted by this Court
and very pointedly rejected by it. Misunderstanding of the
pronouncements of this Court have led to the Plaintiff's
misreading and incomprehension of the judgment and
opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The test the
Plaintiffs would have this Court apply involves a simple
geographic determination of whether their navagational
operations on the Mississippi River “thread” the center of
main channel] so as to technically enter the Illinois side.
They urge such a test regardless of its strained, academic
character, or its lack of any real consequence upon the
flow of commerce and without any real consideration given
to the settled, historic treatment of interstate commerce
by Congress and this Court.
Respondents suggest that the Petitioners’ approach
really presents no matter worthy of the interest of this
Court. As we will endeavor to make clear following, this
Court has made abundantly plain and has left no room
for serious question that the regulation of interstate com-
merce is a delicate matter, grounded in common sense
and highly respective of practicality. We respectfully
submit that the St. Louis Court of Appeals has been
solicitously faithful to the true and controlling teachings
of this Court, and the question raised by the Petitioners
is the product of their failure to intelligently apply such
teachings.
While a survey of the cases provides background and
enlightenment for accurate perception of the controlling
rule in this case, Respondents believe that the opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Centra] Greyhound Lines
v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, 92 L.Fd. 1633,
is the latest, most instructive and authoritative pro-
nouncements by the Court and unmistakably decisive of
oS eeerhenien ae
atte
the questions raised in this case. There the Court ex.
pounded upon and clarified the holdings in Lehigh Valley
R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 12 S. Ct. 806, 3%
L.Ed. 672.
The Court will recall that in the Central Greyhound
Lines v. Mealey (i.e. Central Greyhound) the company
contended first that it was not subject to a tax imposed
on its operations by the State of New York. The New
York Tax Commission had decided that the State’s fran.
chise tax, measured by gross receipts derived from trans.
portation between points within the State but over routes
that utilized the highways of Pennsylvania and Ney
Jersey, was applicable to all the receipts. Forty-three
percent (43%) of the operations were outside of New
York State. The basis of this claim was, like here, that
since the transportation crossed state lines it was inter.
state commerce and therefore New York could not con.
stitutionally tax such gross receipts. (A secondary claim
urged that if taxation was not unconstitutional, New
York could only tax so much of the gross receipts as
were attributable to the mileage covered in New York.)
In deciding that not every burden on interstate com.
merce is unconstitutional this Court went to great pains
to illucidate the precepts governing the Federal-States
relationship and the State-to-State implications.
In cogent language the Court established the context
of inquiries as to whether a specific action of a state
offends the Commerce Clause or a particular exercise of
power of Congress under the Clause. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter phrased it (92 L.Ed. 1637):
This case serves to remind once more that courts
do not adjudicate abstractions, such as ‘‘What is
interstate ecommerce?’’ Also, it again illustrates that
even if it be found that certain transactions in fact
constitute interstate commerce, such conclusion does
—
not answer the further inquiry whether a particular
assertion of power by a State over such transactions
offends the Commerce Clause.
The Court pointed out that determinations as to
whether a State’s exercise of power is proper or not, must
depend upon something more substantial and objectively
important than the geographic fact that state lines are
crossed. The observations of the Court are worth recalling.
In objecting to the erroneousness of the “‘language”’ of
some prior decisions which, while actually taking into ac-
count the practicalities of the considered situations, spoke
in such a way as to disregard the fact of the existence of
interstate commerce, where in truth it existed but was
of such a minor character as to be inconsequential as com-
pared to the overwhelming domestic, state character. The
Court adopting its prior consistent teachings: (92 L.Ed.
1639)
** * Regulation and commerce among the States both
are practical rather-than technical conceptions, and,
naturally, their limits must be fixed by prgetical
lines, Galveston, H & S.A.R. Co. vy. Texas, > US
217, 225, 52 L. Ed. 1031, 1036, 28 S. Ct. 638. But to
label transportation across an interstate stream
‘‘local commerce’’ for some purposes when it is ‘‘in-
terstate commerce’’ in other relations, see, e.g. Cov-
ington & C Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 US 204, 38
L, Ed 962, 14 S. Ct. 1087, 4 Inters Com 649. is to use
loosely terms having connotations of constitutional
significance. To call commerce in fact interstate ‘local
commerce’? because under a given set of cireum-
stances, as in the Lehigh Valley Case, a particular
exertion of state power is not rendered invalid by
the Commerce Clause is to indulge in a fiction, * * *
Again to make its holding so clear that future confusion
would not likely reoccur the Court repeated: (92 L.Ed.
Se alti eat tae ane
_
* * © The kind of confusion to which the Lehigh
Valley opinion has given rise results from employing
a neediess fiction—calling commerce local which ip
fact is interstate—as a matter of stating that a par.
ticular exercise of State power is not invalid even
though it affects interstate commerce. The difficult
task of determining whether a phase of commeree,
concededly interstate, is subject to a particular in.
. cidence of State regulation, through taxation or other.
wise, is not lessened by calling interstate commerce
local commerce in order to sustain its local control,
To state this persistent and protean problem of our
federalism in the form of a question—begging fiction,
is not to answer it. * * *
With the destruction of any automatic decisional sig-
nificance for the phase ‘‘interstate commerce’’ the Court
then addressed the real or controlling aspects of resolving
the sometimes thorny question of substantial burden on
interstate commerce.
The Court isolated a number of factors as important
to resolution of such questions, a fair understanding of
the Court’s meaning instructs that such isolated matters
are not intended to be exhaustive but sharply illustrative.
These factors included circumstances such as: The reason-
able benefits another State confers upon the transporta-
tion while within its borders; the trifling in quantity pro-
portion of transactions within the other State’s territory;
and whether the State’s exaction is constitutionally a fair
demand where such state has a special relation in the
transaction. (See: 92 L.Ed. 1640.) Supportive of the con-
tinuity of Central Greyhound with prior decisions actually
relying on such reasonable considerations, even while col-
orably relying on the impermissibly inedequate ‘‘inter-
state commerce’’ tesi, the Court cited the existence of
these factors in prior cases. (See: 92 L.Ed. 1640-1641.|)
RRR AO He Meters corgey a cee es
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FASE Se AR A MRR CSAS EE
LIRA CHALSREM, ERC SOG SI MN OE My
— -
Here, while it is true that the reach of a statute (46
US.C.A. Sec. 601) rather than a constitutional test of the
statute is involved, still the power exercised by Congress
in this area is referrable to the Commerce Clause and the
specific intent of Congress is to be properly settled by im-
puting an object or purpose to further proper regulation
and control within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.
This is to say, Congress does not operate in a vacuum
without regard for its past clearly discernable plan and
the settled constructions placed upon its acts by this
Court. (New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Soh-
mer, 235 U.S. 549, 35 S. Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 335: United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447,
28S. Ct. 579, 52 L.Ed. 881.)
Applying these principles to the case at hand it is urged
that Section 601, 46 U.S.C. must be considered from the
standpoint of Congress’ legitimate interest in regulating
interstate commerce and the exercise of State powers in
relation thereto so as to promote and maintain the free
flow and intercourse which is the object of the Commerce
Clause.
Initially, as the St. Louis Court of Appeals recognized
and expressly documented, the immediate purpose of Con-
gress in enacting Section 501, 46 U.S.C.—amendment
thereto—was ‘‘* * * to prevent multiple withholdings
from the wages of seamen who might be in ports of dif-
ferent states when they received their pay. * * *? (See:
Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 472 SW2d
660, le. 663). Further, as the St. Louis Court of Appeals
cites (same le. supra), the substantiation of this Con-
gressional intent is recorded at 2 U.S. Code, Congressional
and Administrative News, 86th Congress—First Session
1959, pp. 2530-2536.
Therefore, proper evaluation of the exercise of the
power asserted by the City of St. Louis necessarily in-
are ie
— 18 —
volves the discovery of whether the vice protected agains
by the Statute (ie. 46 U.S.C. 601) is induced or workeg
by the City’s act. The Plaintiffs’ ‘‘interstate commerce”
automatic test sweeps with too all-inclusive dimensions
and totally negates that refined accommodation with the
iegitimate interests of the States that Congress has always
carefully respected.
Here, the travel across the State boundary of Illinois
is first a presumptive crossing, and occurs simply becaxse
the two States’ boundaries are defined by the center-line
of the main navigation channel. This channel continually
shifts with the vagarities of the river flow and obstrue.
tions. As before discussed, to make such a factor decisive
is to ignore the insistence of this Court upon rationality,
There is no aspect of the Plaintiff-Petitioner’s business
intentionally directed to travel in Illinois.
Further, the base of operations is located within the
City of St. Louis. The Company offices, its administration
and the control of all its operations are situated in and
directed from St. Louis. The nature of its business in.
volves ‘‘transportation’’ only in a limited sense; pas.
sengers do not partake of its facilities to be transported
from one place to another interstate or inirastate. The
vessels are simply the type of ‘‘excursion boats’’ common
to metropolitan areas near navigable waters devoted to
shipboard picnics and relaxation. The patrons are aboard
for a relatively short time (a matter of hours) and sueh
excursion rides are repeated several times daily. The em-
ployees too, have a distinct and substantial relationship
to the City of St. Louis. They daily report for work to
the site of the Company offices in St. Louis (where both
vessels are moored). At the conclusion of their working
hours they depart from the same location within the City.
The vessels of the Company never stop at another port
— on
at any time in the course of their repeated daily excur-
sions. No goods are carried; no passengers are either
taken on or discharged other than at the office and mooring
jocation within St. Louis. The City of St. Louis is the
only authority which renders fire, police, water and other
such services and facilities to the Company, its properties
and its employees. By their own admission, the Petitioners
establish that in the long history of their operations no
other state authority has attempted to exercise any tax
collecting system other than Missouri and the City of
St. Louis.
As the St. Louis Court of Appeals pointed out (472
S.W.2d lc. 663), these circumstances do not give rise to
any imposition or harassment of seamen. There is no
rational possibility, under the unique lack of any relation-
ship to any other State or even local authority outside
of the City of St. Louis, within Missouri that other or
additional withholdings will occur. Certainly the long so
unencumbered history of the Petitioner’s operations deci-
sively demonstrate this. The most reasonable and efficient
means of collecting the earnings tax owed by the employees
of the Company, is withholding at the accounting offices of
the place of employment. (There exists no question that
such tax is owing.)
These incidents of the circumstances surrounding the
Petitioners’ operations and employment are urged as
clearly demonstrating the de minimis relationship to inter-
state commerce and the total absence of any substantial
burden on such commerce. And as before said, there is
abundant support for the conclusion that, under the
unique circumstances of the case, withholding at the sole
and only place of payment of wages is a reasonable and
effective procedure, fair and unburdensome for both the
employee and the employer, and a viable means of dis-
iributing the cost of government equally.
APRA YT kt
= =
Objectivity is truly subverted by a contention that Cop.
gress intended to exercise its power to thwart the fai,
reasonable and unburdensome means used here. Respective
of employees burden, one has but to consider the alterna.
tive to the employee, namely, making minute periodic pay.
ments directly to the City himself, to comprehend the ip.
terest of the employee. No sensible construction of Section
601, 46 U.S.C.A. supports working such a result,
The Petitioners attempt to create a problem where
none exists through their outside the record assertions re.
garding the widely adverse implications of permitting the
Court of Appeals decision to stand. However, the whole
history of the Petitioners’ operations and the total absence
of any real proof belie such ‘‘boot-strap’’ argument. (See
Petition: pgs. 14, 21, 23 and 25-27). The plain fact is that
no other jurisdiction has construed its laws to require
withholding from the Company employees’ wages. The
whole of the argument respecting the State of Illinois,
flies in the face of the facts and is so speculative as to
merit no serious consideration. There is simply no truth
to the assertion that ‘‘many carriers which operate on
the Mississippi River’’ will be ‘‘affected’’ by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals decision. In fact it is hardly conceivable
that any besides the Petitioners could be affected because
of the unique nature of this case. Should there be others
so situated at other locations of parallel circumstances, a
like result would be also just.
Petitioners attempt to attack the St. Louis Court of
Appeals decision through the device of attributing to
that Court a crucial reliance on People of the State of New
York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Company v. Sohmer, 23)
US 549, 35 S.Ct. 162, 59 L.Ed. 355. After such misplaced
attribution the Petitioners then attempt to negate suh
constructed authority.
—
A careful and fair analysis of the Court of Appeals
opinion demonstrates that the Court construed Section
601, 46 U.S.C.A. in the light of the documented intent
of Congress and the teachings of this Court.
As before discussed at some length, this Court has
illucidated its prior decisions clearly instructing that
such term ‘‘interstate commerce’’ is not a magic touch-
stone that automatically solves interstate commerce re-
lationships and that the substantial practical considera-
tions must be carefully considered. This is precisely the
course of the Court of Appeals. The first Cornell case
(supra) was discussed as was the case cited by the Peti-
tioners, Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U-S.
634, 64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978, solely to illustrate the
proper perspective in viewing the relationship of factual
circumstances to interstate commerce. As before pointed
out, this Court has approved such approach, even though
critical of some of the expressions utilized in reaching
the result. (Central Greyhound Lines, Inc, v. Mealey,
(cite supra); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
2118, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010.) More to the point,
the Petitioners’ criticism results from a misapprehension
of the basis of decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
APP rw pe teen nanan
— 22 —
CONCLUSION
Defendant-Respondents respectfully pray this Honor.
able Court to deny Plaintiff and Defendant Petitioner
Petition for a writ of certiorari; such Petition secks jp
review a court which is not possessed of the record anj
therefore the Petition ought to be dismissed; and th
claims of the Petitioners are opposed to the settled prin.
ciples of law which were faithfully applied by the &
Louis Court of Appeals in its judgment and opinion
Respectf{glly submi
ar ty P. FREEMAN
Associate City Counselor
City of St. Louis, Missouri
Room 314, City Hall
1200 Market Street
4 yp ~_—_~
St. Louis, Missouri 63103
Attorney for
Defendant -Respondents
Of Counsel
ROBERT C. McNICHOLAS
City Counselor
City of St. Louis
WILLIAM R. O’TOOLE
Attorney at Law
Room 1026, Buder Building
7 North Seventh Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
‘
Ba
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.