Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Kennedy v. Commissioner

Supreme Court brief1972

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IN THE

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October Term, 1971 ~ s . E

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ROBERT E. KENNEDY, Petitioner

COMMISSIONE R OF IN’ PERN. \L R EVENUE,

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI | “4

TO THY UNITED STATES COURT OF |

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ©

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ae ROBERT E. KENNEDY - a

a “Counsel for Petitioner (pro se)

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5626 Loretto Avenue’

Philadelphia, Pa. 19124 : ze q

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THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 66 NORTH JUNIPER STREET, PHILA., PA. 19107 7 -

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_ APPENDIX

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals ee ae AQ

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| | Rulings and Decisions Under the Internal Revenue —_.

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’ TABLE OF CITATIONS

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og Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 ( We oe

' | Harvey sv. -C.LR.; 283° F:2d 491, - (CA. oh.

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Richard H. Sand y..C.1.P., T.C. Memo 1969, 155 :

a Reported 28 T.CM 774 (1969) \.2....0.0.5..-7

= +f ~~ Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407-(C.A. 9th

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|

TABLE OF CITATIONS— Continued }

Statutes: Pi sales we ;

Internitl Revenue Code of 1954, Title 26.. U.S.C.,

$62 (2) B; 162 (a) (2); 262, (Found at 26 U.S.C.A.,

- 1954 Ed., Vol. 1 (372), Vol. 2 (12), and Vol. 2

(763), et., seq.

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Virginia Law Review; “Note A.A House Is Not-A Tax

Home,” 49-V4.-L. Rev: 1275, 8635... .. . =: Paes, A 9

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‘IN THE

_ Supreme Court of the United vehee

~ October Term, 1971

_ ROBERT E. KENNEDY, Petitioner

U.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENU E,

Re ta nt

’

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE _

| UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT |

Huiatily coming forth by this paper, Petitioner Ken- ©

nedy does respectfully seek review of the herewith ap-

pended opinions delivered below in the United States Tax

Court and in the United States Court of: a cin For The

Third Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opjnion delivered in the Tax Court is T.C. Memo.

1970-58, and is reported at 29 T.C.M. 255. The opinior

delivered in the Court of Appeals is ‘No. 19,530 and is not

yet reported to petitioner's knowledge.

JURISDICTION

The statutory: provision believed .to confer on this

-court jurisdiction to review the judgement in question by

Writ of Certiorari- is Title 28, U.S.C.. Sec. 1254 (1),

(1970 ed., p.-7560). : Ye:

~ CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This case directl¥ involves the following statutes.which

are appended hereto: Internal Revenue Code of 1954,

Title 26, U.S.C., Secs, 62(2\B); ~162(aX2); and, 262,

(each respectively found at 26 “ S.C.A., 1954 Ed., Vol, 1°

(372), Vol’ 2, (12), and Vol. 2, (763)). Because of the

- conflict existing between the Courts of Appeals this case

does also directly invoke involvement of the Commission

of Internal Revenue's Revenue Rule 61 -95, found at 1961-1,

Cum. Bull, 749, and appended hereto. It is additionally

“hoped by the petitioner that this court might also-consider

subsidiary: constitutional provisions of a generally known.

nature, such as: freedom to’ interstate travel; .freedom

from forced servitude; and freedom to equally administered *

due process of tax law as being fairly comprised herein.

pephaitaiens INVOLVED ‘e-

The only question presented for review is whether

the petitioner’ is entitled to certain expenditures for travel,

meals, and lodging as ordinary and necessary: business

expenses incurred while traveling to a “tax home] away

“0 his “established home” /“previous tax home” /during

t known temporary period of only six month while in

Ce of a trade or business.

The question presented for review was originally

presented by the... petitioner as an amendment to his

1966 calendar year income tax return in the form of a

very detailed twenty-one page letter, dated June 13,-1968,

to the Commi8sioner’s | Internal Revenue Office. The

Commissioner did not act.on this amended ‘tax return

and therefore there is no record of administrative level

action rélating’to this question. -The question does not

involve the determination: of any deficiency whatsoever

in the petitioner's income tax liability, but does involve

the .determination of an overassessment. in tax. liability

‘and a possible tax refund to the petitioner. The question

‘Was acted upon, for the: first. time by the Tax Court as

part ofan all inclusive appeal by the petitioner from.

Commissioner action that did involve the assessment of

tax liability deficiencies on other questions. The tax

Court considered this. question and rendered a ‘decision.

thereon unfavorable to the petitioner‘on August 5, 1970.

*,

Reta te ee

The petitioner timely appealed that decision to the Court. )

of Appeals For The Third Circuit. The statutory provision

believed to confer on the Tax Court jurisdiction over the

— is Title 26, U.S.C., Sec. 7442 ( 1970 Ed., 7350).

.

.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE _

° 4

As his statement of grounds: for séeking this Writ of

Certiorari the -petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals

‘has so-far sanctioned such a departure from. the ad-

ministering .of equally adjudicated tax law throughout the

entire United States, by the Tax-.Court, as to call for the

exercise Of this Court’s power of supervisipn. Fhe, peti-

tioner asserts that the Court of Appeals has so sanctioned

this departure in rendering its decision. in direct conflict

with two very significant decisions rendered by the United

‘States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit and at least

one very significant decision rendered by the Tax Court

Where appeal froni that Tax Court decision would have

been to the appeals court for the ninth circuit.

The date of the judgment in the Court of Appéals -is

\

>.

—Decemicr 22,1971 This date is also the date of entry. The

statutory provision Delievéd to have conferred jurisdiction

upon the Court of Appeals for review of the Tax Court’s

decision is Title 26, U,S.C., Sec. 7482 (a). (1970 ed.. p.

7362). A copy of this judgment is:appended.

The petitioner, Robert E. Kennedy (hereinafter ‘some-

times referred to as the petitioner, taxpayer, or Kennedy),

has maintained a residence at 5626 Loretto Avenue in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from his elementary school

days to the’present date, and has personally resided therein

some 18 of those 22 years from his referenced 1950 -

school days. Periods of absence include 2 years in 1959 and

1960 when Kennedy was drafted into the Army from Phila-

delphia and then returned there after his separation, and

\ment in January, 1966. Except for that time in the army,

rom 1957 petitioner has been employed as a commercial.

uirplane pilot and until 1966 had been able to find em-

ployment arid continue to personally peside in Philadelphia. -

Xs the result of his employment application to United Air

‘Lines in November, 1965, Kennedy's personal chrono-

' 22 years commencing with his.United Ai? Lines employ- *

od

‘hinr to personally reside in Philadelphia while assigned =

by United to be working 6ut of Chicago: 142 months -

logical residence diting cate ndar year 1966 in n question Was:

J days, ‘Phik idefphia; 3- months temporarily at United's

" school in Denver; 3 months personally residing in Chicago

where United initially assigned him; 1 month in. Phila:

delphia while United's mechanics were on strike: 2 months

in. Philadelphia while incurring expenses in C hicayo due ©

to circumstance unique to his employment that allowed

temporarily at United's school in Denver; and 1% months

personally residing. in San Francisco while maintiining,

and then also owning, his Philadelphia residence for his

own future use as well as providing the first real home in

America that his mother could call her own. Petitioner

continued to personally reside in San Francisc6, while

also maintaini

future use and his methia’s ongoing persohial use, during

1967 and up_ until August, 1968, when he returned to.

again personally reside in Philadelphia. Contract, law

governed where Kennedy could voluntarily, but not in-

voluntarily, be based.on the United Air Lines system

throughout the conjinental United: States. This contract

was between United Air Lines and the Air Line Pilots

Association: “Because of employment ‘circumstance, a

pilot's initial productive flying assignment base might be:

cither voluntary or. involuntary, but in either event a pilot

is required to remain-at his initial assignment for at least’

six months. Kennedy was, well aware of his employment -

circumstances and knew that he would not have to. remain

_ at his Chicago base for any period longer than the required

six‘months. He in fact did transfer r away from Chicago.

after six months, and knew. of the irrevocable fact of his

(vansfer away from Chicago within 11% months of his

reporting to Chicago. Kennedy accumulated numerous

and varied personal possessions prior-to 1966 at his home

_ in Philadelphia. Because he knew he would not be staying

in Chicago for any longer than a temporary. ‘period of

=

. ws

- 6

time Kennedy did not move this cumbersome miiterialis-

tic accruement -from Philadelphia. to Chicayo. ‘Thus,

maintaining his Philadelphia residence for his mother and

Kis possessions: while he also: maintained ‘a residence in

Chicago, Kennedy incurred duplicate lodging. expense,

with meals and travel expense also being allocable thereto

by law. Petitioner's ‘assignment to San Francisco is not at

issue, but that assignment is an example of an “indefinite”

assignment. Kennedy claims his Chicago assignment to be —

the “temporary” assignment “away fronr home” for which

he should be allowed his claimed deduction, as an amend-

ment to-his 1966 tax return, of $1276.01 as a “traveling

- expense” for Meals and lodging while at. and travel from

and to Philadelphia, his Chicago assignment. The Tax

Court disallowed these claimed traveling expenses in

Chicago. -and ‘the Court of Appeals affirmed that dis-

allowance in a. four line opinion saving that Kennedy's

somp OG pages of detailed argument wias Without merit.

In disallowing the claim the Tax Court said: -

“Under the circumstances Philadelphia cannot -

be regarded as his tay home during 1966-" (Italics

supplied. )

It is not necessary that Philadelphia be the Petitioner's

tax home” during 1966. The decision by the Tax Court

based “on that statement immediately preceeding the

court's statement of disallowance places the Tax Court in

conflict with decisions rendered in the Court of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit. and alse in conflict with its own

decisions when rendered under the’ jurisdiction review

reach of that Ninth Circuit.

* .

ARGUMENT. -

The Tax Court’s. statement that Philadelphia can not

be considered as Kennedy's “tax home,” followed’ by ‘the

Court's disallowance of the claim, is in itself in conflict

with the possibility that any taxpayer ‘could ever be al- |

lowed any such a claimed “temporary assignment away-—

from-home” traveling expense. For if a taxpayer is away

from his place of work he would not then be at his “tax

home” in order to earn any income upon which to claim -

such tax deduction. Yet we know that taxpayers are al-

lowed such a deduction when they are living at a “tempo-

rary” “tax home” away from a well “established home” from .

which it is not “reasonable” for them to make a lock/

stock/and barrel move to that known to be temporary

“tax home.”

See; Harvey v. C.LR., 283 F.2d 491, (CA. 9th Cir. 1960).

and Richard H. Sand v. C.LP.. T.C. Memo. 1969-155, re-

ported 28 T.C.M. 774 (1969). :

- The case of Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407

(C.A. 9th Cir. 1944) is the earliest case favorable to Kennedy

from the Ninth Circuit. That case can be distinguished

from Kennedy's own case in that both Kennedy and Wal-.

lace departed from well established homes, where they had

resided and worked, to take work in a more distant city for

what each knew to be only a temporary period of work

assignment in each taxpayer's respective city. The tempo-

rary period of work in each taxpayer's city became fact but

in each instance the taxpayers did not return to the city

and well established home that they had left in order to

take the temporary work assignment. In each instance the

city where the taxpayers Wallace and Kennedy wound up

after their periods of temporary assignment were un-

anticipated’ due to not such totally removed life, com-

plexities. While Wallace,.supra., is a similar-case and one’

of conflict between the circuits of appeals courts, its most

. ’ ay

8.

————tmportant-contribution to Kennedy's case is that it en

survived this court's substantially fair decision in Com-

missioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S..465 (1946). In discussing

the meaning of the word “home” at pp. 471/472 this court

stated: ~ _ |

“The meariing of the word ‘home’... has .

engendered much ‘difficulty and-litigation . . . have

consistently defined it as-ihe equivalent of the tax-

payer's place of business. See Barnhill .v. Commis-

_ sioner, supra. (C.C.A. 4). On the other hand, the

decision below and Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d

407 (C.C.A. 9), have fiatly rejected that view and have |

confined the term to the taxpayer's actual residence

See Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763 (C.C.A. 2).

We deem it unnecessary here to enter into or to

decide this conflict.

—theretoreswhile Kennedy feets that the decision in Flowers,

supra., is substantially fair and not usable directly against

him, it must be noted that this court.-has not decided that

situations found similar to the Flowers case should also be

applied to situations found similar to the Watlace case;

and that Kennedy's case is similar to the Wallace case and

in conflict with Courts of Appeals decisions in n the Ninth

-and the Third Circuits.

The case of Richard H. Sand supra., is very much

notable in conflict; not only because:it was decided by .the

Tax Court where jurisdictional review would come under

the Ninth Circuit, but also because Judge Dawson who

decided the Sand case was also the same judge who six

months later was to decide Kennedy's case. It would

appear that Judge Dawson is well aware of the conflict

existing between the Courts of Appeals for the: Ninth and

the Third Circuits and adjusts his memoranda findings of

fact and opinion according to the Circuit in whose juris-

diction the case is decided. While such a practice might be -

_ condoned in an effort to avoid unnecessary litigation,

Of FPP RE

i)

especially by those people who can afford the litigation

with reckless abandon such as the alk powerful Internal

Revenue Service, the practice certainly Gan lead to in-

equitable japplication of law, and did so in Kennedy’s case.-

In order to effect a favorable decision in the Sand case. it

appears that Judge Dawson considered the very broad life

of taxpayer Sand: and to effect an unfavorable decision in

Ke anedy’s case considered almost only the narrow life to.

Kenedy within the year of 1966. Judge Dawson did not

elicit, that information that he knew he could use. in

resolving this issue: vet he elicited much: information on a

question ‘involving clothing given to. charity. However,

Kennedy believes there was sufficient information on the

record so that. ‘if it had been considered, such. solicitation *

should not have been necessary. eee

The-case of Harvey v. C.LR.. supra., is also notable for

more than its substantial conflict between the Courts of '

~ Appeals Tor the Ninth and the Third Circuits. In one in-

stance it is notable because it establishes the “test” of

“reasonableness” for a taxpayer moving or not moving his.

established home to the location of a different * ‘temporary”

tax home Jocation. It is a test now established in the Ninth

Circuit and a test that this court has not had an opportunity

to review because the commissioner has seen to it that the

Harvey case was not appealed to this court (see Revenue

Rule 61-95 appended). It is more than just Kennedy's own

opinion that the Commissioner did not the Harvey case

before this court for reasons of fear that he would lose his

case and ‘gain a favorable decision for taxpayers. This

— is more credibly voiced by the Virginia Law Review

n “Note, A House ls Not A Tax Home.” 49 Va. L. Rey. 125,

163. Kennedy can not over estimate the import he places

upon the credibility of that Virginia Law Review work: had

this court's Rule 23, par. 3, not prohibited a supporting

annexed appendix, Kennedy would have liked to make that

whole Law Review work a part of this petition. Kennedy

most sincerely believes that the conflict of courts and the

10.

conflict of interests engendered in this Harvey case alone —

———should_eausethis- Court te-grant_this-petition for -Writ-of

Certiorari.

_ The sum of money represented by Kennedy's claim

for which review is sought. is somewhat insignificant,

especially when viewed against the cost to date in appeals

ts and in seeking review. However, Kennedy is sure that

this is one court that will not place any monetary value of a

case above justice; such has come to be the case with

kennedy. Kennedy also feels en obligation to his ‘fellow

‘airline pilots to gain justice in ap area that could from time

*to time adversely affeet them if he were to allow an in-

e. epngel decision to stand as precedent usable directly on

.f that 25,000 or there: tbouts pilot group.

There is still one more objective that Kennedy would

hope to gain if this petition is granted. Kennedy's own

brief before the Court of Appeals went into the “temporary

assignment away. from home”/ “tax home” situations

—_—_— “and eases te-anrextent almost comparable with the work by ma

the Virginia Law Review. Kennedy would present that

same afgument before this court and if this court should

agree and comment on certain aspects of Kennedy's

argument as it relates to possible types of temporary

assignments, then it could mean tax benefits for millions

of innocent city dwellers who incur an added expense in

getting to work during mass transportation strikes when

their homes become temporarily effectively removed from

those travel requirements normal to their daily routine

when there is no strike. At the moment of this petition

there is such 4 mass transit strike throughout the state of

New Jersey.

1]

CONCLUSION —

Wherefore, for the reasons set forth above, petitioner

prays that this: court grant his petition for Writ of Certi-

orarl.

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, pro se’

4

« 5626 Loretto Avenue

Philadelphia, Pa. 19124

DS

Se

APPENDIX

| . C: Memo. 1970-58

UNITED STATES TAX COURT i ae

ROBERT. E. KEN NEDY, uo Iw. } COMMIS-

SIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Re spondent

Docket No.-3882-69 SC. ’ ‘Filed March 5, 1970.

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, pro se.

DAVID W. WINTERS, for the respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

DAW SON, Judge: Respondent determined an income

‘tax deficiency of $147 against the petitionerferthe year

1966. Respondent's notice: of deficiency dated — 30,

1969, reflects the following: :

Statutory deficiency. f . $147.00

Overpayment Claimed (not refunded) $447.64 +

Eliminate—Federal gasoline tax (8.93) 438-71

Net overpayment ) ' ($291.71)

By error respondent mailed to petitioner a refund check

for: 1966 in the amount of $495.87, representing an over- --

payment of $439.04 plus interest. Petitioner laimed in

his petition an ‘additional deduction of $1,276.01 which :

Was not Claimed in his Federal income tax return for 1966.

The issues presented for decision are: (1) Whether |

petitioner maintained a tax home in Philadelphia while he

worked for United. Air Lines in Chicago, so that he m may

deduct claimed traveling expenses; (2) whether petitioner

is entitled to deduct the cost of new clothing as a business

expense; (3) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct the

A2

~—,

Respondent allowed the deduction.

vatuc of this off Clothing given to a Charitable organization; ~

(4) whether petitioner is entitled to deduct . “strike

expenses’; and (5) whether petitioner qualifies for a tax

credit for highway use of gasoline under section 6421(c)-

(3)( Aji), Internal Revenue Code of 1954.!

FINDINGS OF FACT

some of the facts were orally stipulated in the record

and are so found.

Robert E. Kennedy (herein called _ petitioner)

resided in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,. at the time he

filed his petition in this proceeding. He filed his Federal

income tax return for the. year 1966 with the district

director of-internal revenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Petitioner is a commercial airline flight officer. In

November 1965, he applied for a position as a flight officer

with United Air Lines. United employed him on January

10, 1966, and sent him to school at-its flight.training center

Federal income tax return petitioner claimed unreimbursed

7- While he was in Denver.

In April 1966, United assigned petitioner to his first

flight domicile in Chicago, Hlinois, where he lived im an

apartment. Petitioner did not choose Chicago? and would

have preferred another assignment. By the. terms of his

‘in Denver, Colorado, until April 9, 1966. On his. 1966.

contract with United petitioner was obligated to stay in’ ,

Chicago for at least six months. but after that pekiod he

could request transfer to another location.. His request

would be granted if a vacancy existed at the otHer location

and if a vacancy existed at the other location and if the -

vacancy was not filled by a transferee with more seniority.

In 1966 United was expanding so rapidly, and vacancies

were so numerous, that petitioner expected little or no

1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code

of 1954 unless otherwise indicated. “-

- A3

difficulty in -transferring out—ot—hiease-—hr-fact-—attet

six months, he’ was able to transfer to. another location he

. . e ¢ *.

preferred, : :

+ On October. 22, 1966, petitioner was transferred to

San Francisco in response to his first request. He remained

there until August 1968, when he was transferred to New:

York. At the time of-trial petitioner was flying out of New

York, while living in Philadelphia.

- For 16 vears prior to his joining United petitioner had.

resided at his uncle’s home at 5626 Loretto Avenue. Phila-

delphia, Pennsylvania. In September 1966, he purchased *

this house from his uncle. 1 am ute

While petitioner. was stationed ‘at Denver, Chicago,

and San Francisco during 1966, he left various possessions

« in the Philadelphia house. For example, he left tools, books, -

some furniture, clothing which was too large, automobile

and airplane parts, and model electric trains. He also left

A — aa wirheld-in Philadelphia two-airptanes worth several

thousand dollars. |

In his petition the petitioner claimed a deduction of

~ $1,276.01 for traveling expenses, including amounts

expended for meals and lodging mammal

At the time of his: November 1966 interview with

United, petitioner was 40 pounds overweight. Anticipating

that his weight could affect his prospects of being employed -

by United, petitioner began losing weight. By January

10, 1966, petitioner had lost 15 pounds, and by the end of his

training he had lost‘a total of 38 pounds. Although United

did not order petitioner to lose’ weight, it did inform him

— that he was overweight, and_ petitioner kept United

informed of his weight loss.. Because of the importance of

physical health to airline pilots, petitioner's weight loss was

necessary to his employment.

Petitioner, in his slimmer form, needed a new ward-

robe. He spent $722.82 for new clothes, and claimed $500

of such. amount as a business expense on his 1966 Federal

7

Ad

uniforms. 64

Petitroner directed his mother to give some of his ill-

fitting clothes towcharitable organizations, which she did...

Petitioner did not prove that the value of this clothing

excecded $100. ae:

From July 8, 1966, until August 19, 1966. United’s

income tax return. None of. this amount was spent for

‘flight operations were shut.down by a-mechanics’ strike..

From July 18 until August 19. 1966. petitioner was placed

on furlough without pay. Petitioner went to Philadelphia,

looking for some sort of temporary work. Since petitioner

sull had to maintain his apartment in Chicago; he thought

he was.“entitled to ‘something equal to per diem, and so

forth, and I guess that is basically what my strike expense

was.” On his 1966 Federal income tax return petitioner

deducted $289 for “strike expenses.” )

Petitioner's, 1966 Federal ncome—tix Tetum Was

fond

dated June-7, 1967, and was received by. the district direc- |

and the claim were not timely filed.

A5

OPI NION |

1. Claimed Traveling Expenses. Generally, amounts

expended for food and lodging are “pe rsonal, living or

family expenses”, and aré nondeductible under section 262

of the Code and section 1.262-1(.byx3) and (5), Income

Tax Regs. However, in certain circumstances, such amounts

are deductible as-ordinary and necessary business expenses

under section 162(aX2).2 An essential requirement is

that such expenses be paid or incurred “while away from

home in the- pursuit of a trade or business.” See Commis- *

sioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).

For purposes of -section 162(aX2), “home” means

the taxpayer's principal place of employment ‘and ‘not.

‘where his personal residence or house is "located, if it is

located in a different place from his- principal place of

employment. See Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287

(1967); Ronald D. Kroll, 49 T.C. 557 (1968); Mort L.

Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927). If a taxpayer accepts tem-

porary work away from his principal place of employment.

he is “away from home.” E. G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949):

Harry F. Schurer, 3.T.C. 544 (1944). If he accepts work

at a new location for an indefinite or indeterminate’

period, the new location becomes his new “home” for tax

. purposes. Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483 (C.A.

4th Cir. 1957), affirmed: per curiam, 358 U.S . 59 (1958);

2. Sec. 162. Trade or Business Expenses.

(a) In General.There shall be allowed as a niet

all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred

during the taxable ve ar in carrying on trade or business:

including —

(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended

for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish

or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from

home in the pursuit of a trade or business, and

AG

Ronald D. Kroll, supra at 562. Naturally, because of his

mobility, a bachelor will often have greater difficulty

than a married man in Showing that it is unreasonable for

him to maintain a residence near his trade or business, or

that a duplication of expenses is other than a personal whim-

(Rev. Rul. 60-489, 1960-1 C.B. 60, 68.)

The petitioner contends that because he was assigned.-

contrary to his request, to C hicago, and because he intended

to transfer from there after six months, his work in Chicago

‘was only temporary. It is entirely irrelevant that petitionér.

did not care for his Chicago assignment. No doubt many -

taxpayers with permanent employment would prefer a new

job, a different city or a more pleasant climate. What is

_ significant.kere is that the petitioner had only one principal

place of employment and that was Chicago until he was

transferred to San Francisco. The impermanence of an as-

signment alone does not make it “temporary.” Cf. Floyd

Garlock, 34 T. C. 611, 616 (1960). Petitioner had no trade

or business in Philadelphia in 1966. It is true that he left-a

: few personal possessions at his uncle's house in Philadelphia.

and that he left two airplances there. It is also-true that he

bought his uncle’s house in September of that year. But

these actions were personally, not business, motivated. The

evidence shows that petitioner had no immediate plans for

- returning to work in Philadelphia. His few possessions _.

. did not tie him there; and he had no family to consider in

choosing his principal place of employment. His choice of

transfer from Chicago was San Franciscg; not Philadelphia.

Under the circumstances Philadelphia cannot be regarded

as his tax home during 1966. Consequently, we hold that

the claimed traveling expenses in C hicago must be dis-

allowed. ‘ |

2. New Clothes. During 1966 petitioner lost weight,

as required for his new job with United. He claimed a $500

deduction for the new clothes he purchased. All were ordi-

nary street clothes. It is well settled that only clothes

such as uniforms, which are required for employment and

A7

which are not suitable for general or personal wear,

’ qualify as business expenses under section 162. See, ¢.g..

Jerome Mortrud, 44 T.C. 208 (1965); Betsy Lusk Yeamans,

30 T.C. 757 (1958). Accordingly, we hold that fespondent

properly disallowed the claimed deduction as a personal

expense.

3. Old Clothés Donated. As indicated in our findings

of fact, the petitioner's mother gave-his old clothes to

‘charitable organizations. However, in view of petitioner's

sketchy testimony, we have found the value of the clothing

to be approximately $100. Cohen v. Commissioner, 39

F.2d.540 (C.A. 2, 1930). .

' 4. Strike Expenses. Petitioner seeks to deduct $289 as’

“strike expenses.” According to his testimony, the money

was paid for rent, food and other necessities while he was

not working during the mechanics’ strike at United Air

‘Lines. Clearly these are ordinary living expenses and are

: not deductible. (Section 1.262-1(b), Income Tax Regs.)

With regard to this claimed deduction the petitioner

- testified: “I didn’t know any ground for it, and | still

don’t know any ground for it.” Neither do we.

5. Nonhighway Federal Gasoline Tax Credit. Peti-

tioner claimed a credit of $8.93 for taxes paid on non-

highway use gasoline under section 6421. To be entitled

to the credit petitioner was required to file a timely return.

Section 6421(cX3XAXii). He testified that on April

17, 1967, the last day for filing, he mailed to respondent a

letter requesting an extension of time for filing his Federal

income tax feturn for 1966. Petitioner retained no copy —

of the letter and respondent has no record of receiving it.

In addition, he attached a Form 2688 to his late return.

Under. the circumstances we are unable to accept his

testimony on this point. Since his return was not mailed

until June 7, 1967, and his application for an extension of”

time to-file the return was also untimely, petitioner is not

entitled to the credit.

To reflect our ‘conclusions on the disputed issues,

_ decision will be entered under Rule 50.

~ AS

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, Petitioner,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ©

: | Respondent.

Docket No. 3882-69 “SC”

DECISION

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court filed March 5,

1970. and incorporating herein the facts recited in the

respondent's computation as the findings of the Court, it is

ORDERED and DECIDED: That there is a deficiency

in income tax due from the petitioner for the taxable year

1966 in the amount of $128.00. :

(Signed) HOWARD A. DAWSON, JR.

Judge.

Entered: Aug. 5, 1970

A 9

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE THirp CIRCUIT

No. 19.530

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, Appellant

U. |

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

Tax Court No. 3882-9 SC

AppEAL From tHe Unitep States Tax Court

Submitted November 18, 1971

Before BicGs, Abams and. Rosenn, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

(Filed December 22, 1971)

Per CURIAM:

_.. We have examined with care the appellant's conten-

tion on this appeal aind find’ them to be without merit. We

- will affirm the dgcision of the Tax Court upon the thorough

opinion of Judge Dawson, 29 T.C.M. 255.

A True Copy:

Teste :

s

Clerk of the United Staces Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit.

EE RE EE

A10

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE. Tuirp Circun :

No. 19.530

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, Appellant

Uv.

_ COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

(Tax Court Docket No. 3882-69)

ON APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE TAX COURT

. OF THE UNITED STATES

Present: BiGcs, ApaAMs and Rosenn, Circuit Judges

: | JUDGMENT. var

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the

Tax Court of the United States, and was argued by counsel.

_ On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered,

adjudged and decreed by this Court that the decision of

the said Tax Court in ‘this cause be, and the same is’

hereby affirmed with costs taxed against appellant.

ATTEST: .

THOMAS P. ?

; Clerk

December 22, 1971

All

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S

SEC. 62. ADJUSTED GROSS cel DEFINED.

For purposes of this subtitle, the term “adjusted

gross income” means, in the case of an individual,

gross income minus the following deductions:

(2) Trade and business’ deductions of

employees.—

(B) Expenses for travel away from

home.—The deductions allowed by part VI.

(sec. 161 and following) which consist of-

expenses of travel, meals, and lodging

while away from home, paid or incurred by

the taxpayer in connection with the per-

formance by him of services as an em-

ployee-

SEC. 162 [as amended by Sec. 4(b), Revenue Act of

1962, P.L. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960]. TRADE OR

BUSINESS EXPENSES. | .

(a) In General.—There shall be allowed as a>

deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses

paid or incurred during th: taxable year in carrying

on any trade or business, including—

z x

a ae

(2) traveling expenses (including: amounts

expended for meals ai lodging’ other than’

amounts which are lavish or extravagant under

- the circumstances) while away from home in the .

pursuit of a trade or — and

SEC. 262. PERSONAL, LIVING, “AND FAMILY

EXPENSES. |

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this

chapter, no deduction ‘shall be allowed for personal,

living, or family expenses.

A-< i « LGR IE NG OO Es, oe LB Re a OP RES

~ A12

RULINGS AND DECISIONS UNDER THE INTERNAL

REVENUE CODE OF 1939 AND OTHER PUBLIC

LAWS:

SUBPART A.—RULINGS AND DECISIONS UNDER THE"

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1939

Rulings and decisions. published in Part II, Subpart A,

of the Internal Revenue Bulletin are based on the applica-

tions of provisions of the Internal Revenue ‘Code of 1939

and unless otherwise noted therein are published without

consideration to any application of the provisions of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Federal Firearms Act.

or other public laws.

J

SUBTITLE, A.—TAXES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDIC-

DICTION OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

CHAPTER 1.—INCOME TAX

~“

SUBCHAPTER B.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Part II—COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME °

SECTION 23(a)—DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS

INCOME: EXPENSES

Regulations 118, Section 39. 23(a)—2: _—- Rev.*Rul. 61-95!

Traveling expenses. SNe

‘ (Also Part I, Section 162; 26 CFR 1.162-2.)

The Internal Revenue Service does not. agree: with

‘the test for determining the deductibility of meals and

lodging as | traveling expenses = was applied in the

1Based on Téchnical Information ili 314, dated April 18, 1961.

— 740

ed

AlS

recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit in John J. Harvey v. Commissioner, -283

Fed. (2d) 491 (1960).

The question involved in that case was whether an:

aircraft worker who was transferred by his employer to

Edwards Air Force Base to work for an uncertain period of

time and who was continuously employed there. for more

than a year was traveling away from home for the purpose

of deducting, under section 23(a)(1)(A) of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1939, expenses incurred for his meals and

lodging during that period.

750 |

Fhe Ninth Circuit rever sed the Tax Court and held that

the taxpayer was “away from home” while at Edwards Air

Force Base. The decision was based on the reasoning that

since there was no reasonable probability kngwn to the tax-

payer that he would be employed at Edwards for a long

period, it was not reasonable to expect him to move his

permanent abode'even though his employment there was

indefinite in the sense that its termination could not be fore-

seen within a fixed period:

While a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of

‘the United States was not filed in the Harvey case, the

‘Service does not agree with the test which the Ninth Circuit

applied in determining whether a taxpayer is at home or is

away ffom home while working at his new station and will

continue to apply its usual “temporary v. indefinite” test as

explained in Revenue Ruling 60-189, C.B. 1960-1, 60, at

63-64. Under: this test, a taxpayer is not traveling away

from home unless, at. the time his employment at'a new

duty station is begun, the termination of his employment

here within a reasonably short period of time is foresee--

&

be OF LIOG. * Tait VE ae

Ald

able. This position was approved in 1957 by the Fourth

Circuit in Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 Fed. 2d) 483, af-

. ~ firmed 358 U.S. 59, Ct. D. 1832, C.B. 1958-2, 916, and in

1959 by the Fifth Circuit in

v. Commissioner, 264 |

Fed. (2d) 309. ;

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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