Appendix — Sklaroff v. United States

Supreme Court brief1972

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

. APPENDIX A

INTHE ° :

UNITED STATES COURT OF. APPEALS.

_ FOR THE FIFTH CYRCUIT.

ed

* 29200 :

a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *f:

ol | : -Plaintiff-Appeliee,

tpi Vs. ee

“MORTON. PAUL KANEtand MARTIN SKLAROFF,

i Ae Ree Be | - Defendants-Appellants.

| Appeals from the United States District | Court for the ;

PRES tod dea AB Southern District of Florida

pa : i sche we os

Sf gad Before BELL, THORNBERRY ‘al CLARK,

’ Cireuit Tudges. ;

CLARK, Circuit Judge: Morton Paul Kane and Martin:

Sklaroff were convicted by a jury in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida on

March 22; 19 , of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (1970).

: [conducting gal bling-connected telephone communications

‘App. 2 ae scars i aa

basin, Miami, Florida wid paatantiie Kentucky pie of

“eorispiracy to violate § 1952 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (1966)°

[transmission of bets and wagers by a wire commuhiecation -

_ .. facility in’ interstate commerce]. Kane was sentenced to |

__- concurrent five-year terms; Sklaroff was sentenced to..

concurrent two-year té?hs. On appeal,-this Coutt, without

* reaching the merits, vacated ‘the judgments and sentences ~

,.. and remanded the cause for further proceedings in light.

= Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 8% S.Ct. 961,

_ 22 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1969). Kane v. United States, = F. 2d °

_ 847 (5th Cir. 1969). ae cof ace

- Pursuant to our mandate, the district coyrt conducted -

‘an Alderman hearing and at its conclusion determined

' thatthe evidence -utilized to convict the defendapts was not

tainted by illegal electronic surveillance. A‘fter. the judg-

ments ‘of. conviction and the sentences were reimposed, -

Kane and Sklaroff moved for new trials. The district court .\ _

- refused to pass on these motions on the ground-that it had:

no jurisdiction to.hear~a motion for a new trial on this

_remand. The. pending second appeal. presents for decision

the issues raised by the Alderman hearing, the’ seven

griginad issues, and two additional issues on the Merits not ©

‘ raised i in the — request for review.!

‘THE ‘ALDERMAN ‘HEARING

¥

~~

is. 1961) the Federal Bureau ‘of Investigation (FBI)

- and the Internal Revenue Service began a \massive five-

Bas epiiae sans of gambling operations in\ the . Miami,

TA third delcndent, Gilbert Lee Beckley, was involved i in he orig-

inal appeal and was similarly resentenced on remand. His appeal oe.

‘such resentencing was dismissed in a,prior order. Hjs rights are not

inwolved here. ~ ic

\ ; cok ae

+ conversatidis monitored on the bugged premises of Frank .

| _ below in the Aldermian hearing was whether the evidence .

_ disclosed instances where no word of either defendant

. : Rosenthal. and McGrath premises | "which, were arguably

1 ee OE Spe oe oes

Floridazarea. As a p&rt.of this in depth inquiry, the:

"premises of gertain suspected gambler$.were placed under.

a form of electronic surveillance, known in the vernacular

as “bugging”. This involved. placing microphone gear in

the premises_ which. would pick up and transmit words

‘spoken there. No attachments were made to any telephones,

therefore, only the conversation: of th@persons on the ,

_ premises were overheard or recorded. TH Silene reveals

* that no surveillance was intended to be made of either Kane — :

or Sklaroff directly, rather they happenef. to:be parties to

Rosenthal and Edward McGrath. The Government admits

_ that these buggings were illegal; the question for the courte”

gathered by these illegal listening devices: tainted the con-

: victions of Kane and Sklaroft, etal ill

; Prior e the icinihiay at the direction of the court, the S

| Gownamint made available to the defendants transerip-

tions of recordgd conversations, called logs, in which the

_ defendants were known to have, been overheard. “Fhe

Government also furnished ‘logs to ‘ defendants which

were known to have beert overheard but where one of the

defendants may have been the a = ‘the other end of

‘the telephone. All other. logs obi d. by monitoring the °

relevant to-this case, but not furnished to the: defendants,

were turned. over to the trial judge for an in camera ‘deter-’ .

mination as to whether the Governmerit had furnished all

logs to the defendants as they. had any right to review under _

the standards.of. Aldermari. In addition to having such of

_ the logs as were made available to them at the hearing to —

| demonstrate taint, the defendants were allowed to question

three FBI agents and one former agent who had gathered

evidence for this prosecution, to determine whether their —

igformation as -to defendants’ activities came from elec-

tronic surveillance records or from independent, untainted

sources : > ;- . Rs :

é |

During the course of the hearing the defendants

moved to require the Government to produce additional

items from its files. Their requests covered an administra-

tive review file, such of the logs examined in camera by the

court as contained references to “unknown” voices, physical

‘surveillance notes of the FBI, and its interoffice memo-

randa called airtels. In opposition to this discovery the

Government argued that no administrative review file had

ever existed; that logs containing “unknown” voices could

not possibly have yielded evidence that was used against

the defendants or, alternatively, that the defendants did

not have the requisite standirig to demand. the production “

of such “unknown” voice logs; and that the produgsion of

surveillahce notes or airtels would be extremely burden-

some.to the Government, would be useless to the defendants,

would constitute rummaging through Gayernment files, and

would go beyond the requirements of Alderman. The trail

-court denied the defendants’ discovery motion in n toto, based

on the findings set out in the margin.”

%

- 21. Defendants claim no standing to any premises.

. 2. Defendants claim no standing to any -specific additional on

versations.

« 3. Mere presence on electronically surveilled premises, without

more, affords no standing. United States v. Cavello, 410 F.2d 563 (2

Cir. 1969).

4. The United States delivered to this Court all extant recordings

" OF transactions of recordings of electronic installations disclosed in its

) 5 <i

' On the present’ appeal Kane and Skarloff specifically

contend that the legs examined in camera should have

been made available to the defendants for their inspection

to determine reievancy, and the district court should

ee ee ee ee

government documents. “ .

a. in Maines Sneeienes

tn etter bo alll a vibe to sintew tegslty'ee

corded government records under Alderman; the proof?

i i a a at

determined that the United States has furnished defendants all record-

ings and transcriptions of conversations to which defendants have.

standing. Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).

5. The United States-has no additional logs reflecting the

of either of the ¢efendants en pootsions which wepe subject to ic

installations. ,

6. “These ase no iattw-eflles taumecenie among the various agents

reflecting’ additonal cectronic monitoring to which defendants hav

Pe, | Tene of the Govliaments ccidens: eugpesting the comnidiens

of defendants herein was the product of electronic surveillance gefleeted

in the records furnished defendants. Further. nothing appears in de-

‘ fendants” motions, memoranda, or testimonial gvidence to indicate any

such taint. :

8 The recordings of the Bubis telephone conversations admitted

in evidence at the trial were not the. product of electronic monitor-

ing. Hanna v. United States, 393 F.2d 700, 40! F.2d 405 (5 Cir. 1969),

cert. den. 391 U.S. 1015 (1969). There is no evidence that the record-

ings were the product of electronic monitoring of a defendant herein

for an “unreasonable™ length of time and, therefore, illegal. On the con-

trary, the case relied wpon by defendants held that such monitoring by

the telephone company for only the days here involved would have been

“reasonable” and legal. Bubis v. ‘Unijed States, 508 F-28 643 (9 Cir.

1967). —

“S Seles dis aah euitl nie Milian « United States, *

cupen, to dlechsuse <f estes cp physics! eqresilinnces conducted. by

agents.

Government

10. The convictions of defendants were not tainted by the use of :

ny a

=

s

Renae a ys

' must show, that the conversation contained the individual’s

_ own ‘voice or that the eavesdropping occurved on the in-

‘dividual’s own: premises. A voice whose identity is not -

‘known to the listening party does not, without more,

establish standing’ on behalf of any person. .A defendant

who proposes to establish that he has standing to ebtain

a recording containing the voice‘of.an unknown person. has

the burden of producing evidence that would indicate’ to

the judge making the in camera review that he is the

unknewn party whose conversation has been monitored,

or that the recording came from his premises. The defend-

ants here failed to produce such evidence. They argue that

- placing such_a burden upon them denies due process by

‘freighting them with an impossible requirement — one —

they cannot meet without an inspection of the logs them- -

‘selves. Certainly this argument has plausibility if con-

- sidered solely from the defendants’ point of view: It is

' easy to conjecture that if they had full access'\to all govern-

ment records they might, by. knowing the time, place and

content of certain logs which appear innocuous, establish

that their voices were those which are now unknown. How-

ever, we read Alderman’s definition of standing as pre-

scribing the outer limits of a defendant’s right to view

illegal wiretaps. To follow the defendants’ entreaties in

this case would.push us beyond those outer limits.** If their

assertions were honored, the defendants would: effectively

divest: the court of its specifically established prerogative -

of determining standing. ee

As explicated in Taglianetti v. United States ,394 U:S.

«316, 89° S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969), the problem

in Alderman was that the in camera procedures described

.

2*United,States v. Mirro, 135 F.2d 839. 841 (7th Cir. 1970). -

_ App. 7. Es

there were inadéquate % pare Fourth Amendment .

‘rights. However, these holdings make it explicity clear -

‘ that Alderman did not rule all-in camera proceedings: de- °

; ficient. : were’ the = camera eee did not entail the

The route we must follow is not insgnsitive to the

problem of safeguarding the rights of an accused from

possible disingenuous assurances by the Government that

it has done its duty of making available to the accused

“and the court all the illegal surveillance materials that

are arguably relevant tq the case. It recognizes that ‘there

are many means by which’ a Government agent committed -

to devious conduct may try to enshroud his illegal actions

_ from even the most vigilant accused. For insganee,- the-

tapes could be erased and the logs burned, as soon as all

relevant information had been gleaned frot: them. How-\".

every the balance has been struck -on broader. interests. |

The accused cannot be granted the right to rummage

through the Government’s files. Taglianetti,- supra. We

_ view the Alderman limits as seeking to strike a just bal-

ance between the right of a defendant to eliminate tainted :

evidence from higgtrial process with the due preservation

of the right of thé people to deter criminal conduct. The

Court’s solution is t6 leave to the integrity of the trial

judge the duty to decide in camera only. ‘issues relating

diffi¢ulties found —— in Alderman. The record de- -

veloped below demongtrates that the procedures ampeeyes

by the trial courgpVere correct.’ ‘ ;

a

* ‘Nothing i in Alderman . . requires an sins proceeding and

- full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic sur-

veillance.” Taglianetti, supra, 394 U.S. at 317, 89 S.Ct. at 1103. See

alse Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1041-45 (10th Cin 1970).

74S ee U.S, v. Clay, 420 F.2d 165, (Sth Cir. 1970), rev: on other

grounds, — US. , 91 S.Ct. 2068, L.Ed.2d (1971).

ml

~

.

bd -

.

te standing and @Phrow open to the light of adversary

- pecedaren all indees an to relevance of evidence which .

“his informed judgment wells Aim the defendant has a

right to review. ects ic seit Chahenal on saneed

Se Get Se ee Oe Yet pete

possible. dn

-d _ Production. of Rewnis oe

The same ateen ¢ pmeunrial coed faith dis- 5

cussed above. arises othe waenenh te the defendants” request.

‘fe ene tes a eee The trial judge re

quired the FBI to seared its files to determine whether

- they contaimed any tainted information. The argument of

the deferiGants that this was improper “mecessarily asserts

that they should have deer allowed to‘ search through the |

complete Government fi files which were or might have been

used as a dasis for imvestigating and prosecuting this

case, This procedure has mot omly been negated in, Taglia-

netti but alse in Alderman when the Supreme Court held

thatthe scope of the begring “must be. left’ to the in-

formed discretion, goad wns. and fairness ss'of the trial

-Judge.” 394 U.S. at ISG SB ACL. at & We do not believe

that the trial judge adused his dis ittietion in defining the

limits of the inquiry im this case. He was in a better posi-

tion than we to judge the extent of th legal evidence v

to make a determination as to whether or not further

inquiry was needed te diserer any extant but unrevealed

illegal evidence. Ih other woids. the trial judge Was in

", Desg position two get a “feel” for the case in tetms of deffn-

ing the-seope of the heart rimg. The trial judge could prox

take j inte account the ample OEE cumity the defendants

te probe the souree of those items of evidence offe

convict them and the plamsiiiity of\ed Government's ac

|

- _ing logs. Alderisio argued that these airtels showed the

App. § 9°

count of the ledinliadans source’for every such aspect of,

‘the evidence. See Baker v. United States, 430 F.2d 499 7 :

{D.C..Cir.1970). ~ \ oth *

The Tth Circuit is in agreement with our conclusion.

United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1970).

‘Hoffa argued that the trial court erred in denying the

production of similar airfels. The 7th Circuit held that

although. Alderman required all surveillance records to

which a defendant has standing be turned over to him

without in camera screening, disclosure was limited. to

those materials ‘otly. It was further determined that the

district court acted within the ambit of its discretion in

ruling that the defendant ‘neither needed nor was entitled

to anything more than the specified conversations which

_ were ‘Produced and examined.

Defendants have called .to our attention the recent

case of United .States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d 20 (10th .

- Cir. 1970). Prior to the hearing, the Government turned |

- over to Alderisio all logs to which he had Alderman stand-

ing. In addition, the Government furnished to. Alderisio

‘some airtel summaries of original logs. which contained

conversations. not noted or -transeribed in the correspond-

Governmenit’s asserted disclosure of complete records (logs,

airtel excerpts, and one complete airtel). did not satisfy.

the Alderman disclosure requiremept. A defense. request

for amplified scrutiny of FBI ‘Sfes «was denied by /the

. district court. The 10th- Circuit did order the cause re-

manded, but only for the limited purpose of requiring the

court te make an in camera comparison of,all airtels with

the relevant logs to determine if the Govertment had dis-

closed all extant surveillance materiais. The 2 pellate court

i

App: 10

did no order that arty additional ‘eundlibiiie material be

available to the defendant. Rather, the rationale of

Alderisio is that the issue of “completeness”. should be de-

‘cided. by the court in camera and only in thee t the

' district cow-t should hold that the Governme t had failed

to ful! . - could the defendant obtain afd review the

und: a.ttels arid logs for relevancy.\There is no

gsus . eornpleteness” in the case at bar. Oty. holding

Ba. che ‘istrict judge should rule on questions f stand-

ing in cayiera before the defendants are allowfd to de-

termine relevancy. Thus it appears that.the Aldérisio ‘case.

supports rather than detracts from the vitali

holding.* ad eas : ere

| _-We wiiets that the district court did not err in

‘limiting the scopf of the hearing both as to production

' of the logs in question and the airtels and surveillance

notes. We have received the finding of the district court

that the convictions were mot tainted by illegal evidence

and determin e that finding to be clearly correct. In addi- -

tion, we a { with the district ‘court that it had no juris-

diction te consider motions for new trial. Such considera-

tion would have been contrary to the limited purpose: of

the remand mandate. Finally, the defendant Kane argues

- that’ the trial judge erred in not requiring a pre-sentence

report to be submitted prior to the entry of sentence. On -

this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 627 (7th Cir. 1969) Kine

v. United Statés, 410 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1969).

+» prejudice can be shown since the trial, judge heard a

_ dence as to all of the mitigating circiimstances. Then too

- it must be noted that even the present sentences are not

beyond correction or reduction: See Fed. R. Crim.P. 35.

“See, Mirro, supra n. 2a at 841.

A

of our

| App. 11 - See /.

THE SEVEN ORIGINAL ISSUES

In the original appeal, defendants raised the seven

issues set out and numbered in the margin.’ On the present

appeal, the court has only heard arguments of counsel on _

the Alderman issue, discussed above, ‘and on the newly

raised issues discussed in the final section of our opinion

here. As to the issues presented on the former appeal, we

have determined that oral argument is not necessary. Our

discussion. of the Alderman hearing is dispositive of Issue

5 and the question of the Rosenthal bug in Issue 4. Issues:

*1. It was error to receive in evidence the tape recordings of the .

conversations overheard on thé Bubis wiretap. ;

2. The Wall testimony, being-entirely dependent upon an_identifi-

cation. made through the Bubis tapes, was thus tainted by the illegal

wiretap and should have been excluded, as should, consequently, all of

. the: credit card evidence of which the Wall testimony was the corner-

stone. ee 7 a

3. The Hanna search warrant was admittedly based on informa- .

tion from the illicit Hanna wiretap, ‘so that the receipt in evidence of the

material seized under that warrant was error.. : ; ‘

4. The warrants for all the other coordinated Miami scares were

based on information from the Hanna wiretap and the illegal Rosenthal

_ bug, so that the receipt in evidence of the material seized under all of

the said warrants was error. Binet, en te ”

, 3. Assuming arguendo that the record does not disclose such taint

of the evidence by illégal eavesdropping as to require reversal of the

convictions, teversal is nevertheless required because of the erroneous

_ Festrictions imposed on. pretiial’and voir dire inquiry into the govern-

ment’s illegalities. | ‘

* Q. The. FBI’s four hours of telephone answering) in one of. the ©

raided premises was an unconstitutional search, so that it was error to

receive the testimony of Agent Scranton as to the contents of the com-

munications taken theough that search. __ irks a re

7. The government’s charts purportedly summarizing the evidence

were improper under this Court’s standards and should have been ex-

cluded from evidence. _ .

Rule 18, 5th Cir.; one Isbell Eriterprises, In, ¥, Cities Casualty

Co. of N.Y., et al., 431 F.2d 409, Part I (Sth Cir. 1970). ae

-

J .

.

’ ’

: App. 2

F st are concerned with the so-called Hanna .and Bubis

tapes. These tape recordings came into existence when two -

‘different telephone companies tapped into. two telephone

lines which they had reason to- believe were being used

fraudulently. A description of the circumstances under

which the Hanna recordings were made and. the establish-

ment oftheir legality is contained in Hanna v. United

States’ 404 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968).. Based upon this

- precedent, Issue 3 and the remainder of Issue 4 are with--

- out merit. However, Issues 1 and 2, involving the admis-

sibility of the Bubis tapes themselves and testimony ° de-

‘pendent upon evidence obtained from such tapes, eall for °

- some discussipn. The 9th Circuit in Bubis v. United States,

384 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1967) ordered the use of these

tapes suppressed in the trial of Bubis on the ‘ground that —

they covered three months of wiretapping by the telephone

- company and that this period constituted such an unrea-

sonable amount of time for the telephone company to

‘ascertain whether or not Bubis was making long distance

-. galls without. paying the tolls, that its use in a criminal

proceeding could not be condoned. It does not follow, how-

ever, that the. portion of these same\tapes: introduced in.

the instant trial should. have been suppressed. Assuming,

without deciding for this Circuit, that we\yould hold three

: months to be such an unreasonable amount, of time for a

private company to monitor, equipment it believed was being

: {misused and that we-would bar the use of such’ monitoring |

in a criminal case, we decline to hold that all use of the

- tapes so obtained would be proscribed. Only the first four

‘ days of the Bubis- wiretapping was utilized in the trial

below. Certainly it would be intonsistent to assert tliat. the

court must refuse to consider evidence gathered in four

days tite hol, as as unreasonably intrusive and at the\ mer

same time hold, as We did, arn six weeks was net-an-tn-

\

we .

»

App. 13. _—

| reasonable period for ‘the company to ‘monit r Hanna’s ©

telephone. We limit our ruling here to ‘holding that without

regard to whether the subsequent dctivities in Bubis’ case |

‘were reasonable,-such subsequent wiretapping does not

precludée.use of the tapes recorded during the first four.

days of that period. In addition, it should be borne in mind sae

that we consider the issue-as it relates .to the defendants

here and not to Bubis, himself because, at best, these de-

fendants possess doubtful standing to protest to the un-

reasonableness of the -wiretapping since only the voice of

the non-appealing defendant, Beckley, was overheard in

the four-day period used here.’*We conclude that it “was

not error to admit the Bubis tapes as against these de-

. fendants. |

”

?

Issue 6 asserts that the. action of an FBI agent in

“answering the telephone’on one of the raided-premises and ~ |

posing as a bookie constitutes a ‘search proscribed by the

Fourth Amendment and violates"47 U.S:C:A. § 605 (1962).

The agent was properly onthe premises pursuant to a

valid search warrant. Gambling paraphernalia described in. —

the warrant was seized and defendant Sklaroff was

arrested. .However, for four hours following the raid.the

_ agent answered the telephone, taking’ bets and dispensing

gambling information. At trial he was allowed to testify

as to the contents of- the calls. |

‘ United States v. ae 332 F.2d-193 noe a ce

is dispositive of the Statutory point,. and we.deem further . _

' discussion unnecessary. The censtitution question, how-

_ ever, is not so easy. Pasha appears to be the only case

dealing with the issue that i is squarely 4 in point on the facts.

7See Alderman, supra, = I, 394 U.S. qt 171-173. - -

App. 14 eee

| 4,

ie In summsty y fashion, Pasha relied exelusively upon the

Li sie, holding i in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48

a /. S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) that “telephone conversa='

> ~~ __. tions intercepted by police officers were not protected by.

the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.”

332 F.2d at 197, The holding in Olnistead has, of course, ©

_ been overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 |

~ -§.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Katz doés not how-

ever, necessarily contra this ease. The thrust of Katz was

_ to dispel the notion that in order for Fourth Amendment ,

guarantees to arise there must be a trespass upon a con- |

q , stitutionally protected area. It emphasized that a person’s

ay . vexpectation of privacy is ‘the compelling consideration.

‘Unlike Katz, the defendants here were not. being overheard. -

Therefore, they could. not, have had. an expectation. of

privacy as to a conversation in-which they did not partici-

-* pate. In addition it is important to note that the agent -

as never impersonated the defendants, arid the testimony does ;

not show that any caller was under the misapprehension

_ that he was speaking to one of the defendants. The defend-

~ ants: cannot claim soméone else’s right ‘of: privacy.

» 6

» The évidence Soi from the iddonons calls i is anal-.

ogous to the seizure of evidence not described in a search ~

warrant. Evidence not described in a valid search warrant

but having a nexus with ‘the crime under investigation

may be seized at the samé time the described evidence is f

-. seized. Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.

1958) ; United States v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963 (8th Cir.”

1969) ; Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.

*- 1961). The test is whether the agent had probable cause -

to “believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular

. apprehension or conviction.” Warden, Maryland Peniten-

tiary v: Hagen, 387 U. S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1 1642, 1650,

\

- @: / App. 15

a Bd: 2-782 ( 1967). . Of ‘hen ourse the warrant here. could

. not have described. pny words to be seized from ‘telephone’.

calls, that had not’ yet been made, but, with equal certain- -

: ty, -an- agent An these- circumstances had probable cause.

. to believe that other evidence of gambling could be obtained

_ by answering’a ringing telephone. in premises that had . .

already yielded warrant authorized evidence of gambling...

| ss “We should ‘not be understood as holding this was not a.

:form of search which must’ be tested by Fourth Amend-

ment-standards of reasonableness. What we find is that |

under these circumstances this search did not exceed those |

standards. The dfficey had a. duty to gather and preserve |

this contemporaneous evidence of criminal activity occur- “

ring in his presence. If a number of the calls had _—:

innocent calls or if the search had been conducted for 2. .

prolonged: period of time, then the standards of nae gs “ti

ness could be t sgressed. But the record before us shows’

the agent it no innocent calls; rather, all of the 58 »

calls receWed during the four-hour period, concerned

‘gambling. One further caveat is appropriate. We in nowise

intend to trench upon the rule which. holds that in every o

search :an officer, should obtain a warrant as. soon as

practicable. We simply cannot fault the. polieg, conduct

disclosed ere. Sa teks |

an

. In. ‘am 7 the defendants concern themiselvés with

charts prepared by the Government purporting to sum- ,

. Marize the evidence and argue that these charts should - —

‘ have been excluded. We disagree. The charts wete based

~ upon competent evidence already before ‘the jury, and the

primary evidence utilized to construct the charts was avail- »

able to the defendants ‘for comparison An order that the

-“eorrectnéss of the: summary: could be tested. In addition‘

_ the agent who prepared the charts. was available for. cross-_

ee . . ‘

ne, - a de . ® « - . © a .

“* e a . . ;

Si . ‘ a : , ‘ Pe

- ‘ ‘ : : }

’ . sco . ° ' .

.

- 1971). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in

allowing these charts into evidence. Sea@-Baines v. United

States, 426 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1970) ; McDaniel v. United ©

_ States, 343 F.20°785 (5th Cir. 1965).

2 .

- App. 16 P

cnienination. Viniity thn Jory wes Given’ deeved testrio--

. tions concerning their consideration of the charts. See

Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 876-77 (5th Cir.

THE NEW ISSUES . ‘. :

‘Sins euattiy Gh abbh es peel ee eile &

be considered on the return of a remanded cause, especially

matters which could cause prejudice.by @elay in their ~

assertion, we deem it more appropriate to’ dispose of those

. raised here on their meri ther than to hold that they

come too On this the defendants contend for

- the first t a portion pf the evidence admitted at

trial-eventuated from a search warrant issued upon prob-

able cause that the Wagering Tax Act was being violated. ,

This Act, of course, was found to be fatally defective on

Fifth Amendment grounds. M . United States, 390

U.S.-89, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L. 889 (1968) and Grosso _

v. United States, 390 U.S,42, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906

:- (1968). The defendants thus argue that Marchetti-Grosso .

vitiates this s¢arch warrant and precludes the introduetion

_~ eof any evidence gained therefrom. This gontention was

_ decided adversely to the defendants in United States v.

f° . Seaglioné, .. F.2d‘ (5th -€fr. 1981) [No. 29279

: July 9, 1971]. 7

5 ? - . : :.

_ ‘The last additional point of error urged by -the de-

+ ° . fendants pertains to the admission of ‘the defendants’ ‘in-

come tax returns in order to‘show that. their major source

Ft Re. oe ee Tene

2

e a

Py :

-App. 17 :

deduction for 4 wagering tax stamp which was couched in

o these words: “Stamp tax license.” Defendants argue that

the purchase of the stamp described was compelled ‘in

Violation: of their Fifth Amendment rights under the

Marchetti-Grosso rationale, and thus the returns which

‘e discolsed that they bopght this stamp should not have been.

admitted. This contention is without ‘merit. First of all,

the stamp deduction was only one-item on the complete F

return and it was never specifically brought to the atten-~

tion of the jury. The only way the jury could have been

apprised of the existence of the deduction was by reading

the detajls in the returns. Even had the jury pursued this.

course, we cannot say they would have concluded that-the

defendants were thereby stating they were gamblers. Thus .

our case is distinguishable from Nolan v. United States, -

395 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1968), relied upon sp heavily by

the defendants. In addition, these defendants certainly

Were not compelled to claim a deduction for the stamp. , ‘

Their action in doing so was voluntary and was in po way

compelled by law. Defendants are not ‘constitutionally

excused from any resulting prejudice.

The judgments of conviction are

ee AFFIRMED.

© . .

~ . —"

.

a

.*

.

-

*

-_ "y

.

1° J

* .

*

.

.*

_.«

a ©

. .

*

*

- -

.

.

¢ *

ae

.

.

S

-

.

* .

. App. 19

APPENDIX B

‘ [TrrLe OMITTED] a ¥

No 29200

_- ON PETITION FOR REHEARING :

Before BELL, THORNBERRY and CLARK, Circuit

PER CURIAM: _

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed -

on behalf of Martin Sklaroff in the above entitled and

numbered cause be and the same is hereby DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.