Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.

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Supreme Court af the Unite Bre 8

7 wren, CL

Octoser Tzrm, 1971 g. ROBERT SERVES.

No. 71-621

AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSUR-

ANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN MOTORISTS IN-

SURANCE COMPANY, FEDERAL MUTUAL IN-

SURANCE COMPANY and LUMBERMENS MU-

TUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Petitioners,

—against—

AMERICAN BROADCASTING-PARAMOUNT

THEATRES, INC.,

Respondent.

—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ee

CLARENCE F'rrmp

Counsel for Respondent

Office and P. O. Address

67 Wall Street

New York, N. Y. 10005

(212) HA 25140

Of Counsel:

Cuaritzes L. Kanes

Pavut A. GoLtmuysx1

November 29, 1971

ERK

2

at a te ECO ETE BEEN Pi OIE OI

TABLE OF CONTENTS >

QUESTION PRESENTED ..

STATEMENT OF THE CASE -

ARGUMENT

CoNCLUSION

Cases Cited

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.

American Broadcasting-Paramoun* Theatres, Inc.,

270 F. Supp. 619 (1967)

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Cv. v.

American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,

385 U. S: 931 (1966)

Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Sieel

Corp., 394 U. S. 495 (1969)................

Int.rnational Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332

U. S. 392 (1947)

Kelly v. Kosuga, 385 U. 8. 516 (1959)

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356

U. S. 1 (1958)

United States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U. S. 38

(1962)

Rules Cited

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

52

Supreme Court Rules:

PAGE

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10

10

11

2,11

——<>——

AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSUR-

ANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN MOTORISTS IN-

SURANCE COMPANY, FEDERAL MUTUAL IN-

SURANCE COMPANY and LUMBERMENS MU-

TUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Petitioners,

—against—

AMERICAN BROADCASTING-PARAMOUNT

THEATRES, INC.,

vase, compel a further statement by the respondent

to as “Kemper”), as well as distortions and omissions

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after, on May 4, 1962 Kemper offered to sponsor the pro-

gram over its own tailored lineup of 95 stations, only

67 of which were carrying the program at a price of

$24,250 which Kemper computed by applying the 474%

per cent package price discount. What it did was to

eliminate 32 of the stations on the then going lineup and

substitute 28 stations which were more valuable and ex-

pensive than the 32 stations eliminated.

After the extensive negotiations and correspondence be-

tween the parties a written contract dated August 15, 1962

was signed pursvant to which Kemper agreed to sponsor

one program per week over a 26-week period beginning

October 17, 1962. The lineup referred to in the contract

was neither the original éne offered by ABC nor the one

appearing in the May 4, 1962 order letter, but rather a

compromise lineup which emerged from the negotiations.

Under Kemper’s sponsorship the program Evening Re-

port was broadcast on October 17, 26, 31 and on November

9, 1962 (270 F. Supp. 619, 636), after which Kemper de-

liberately and unlawfully breached the agreement.

Three telecasts wherein Kemper appeared as the spon-

sor occurred before September 9, 1962. Kemper paid for

such telecasts without objection and certainly without any

suggestion that the contract was in violation of any anti-

trust law. In fact, as late as two months after the cancel-

lation of the contract Kemper never complained of any

illegal tie-in sale and the first time the claim was as-

serted was in the answer Kemper interposed in the New

York State Supreme Court action which was brought for

non-payment of the November 9, 1962 telecast and for

damages for anticipatory breach of contract as to the bal-

4

ance of the contract term.* The charge by ABC that

Kemper’s belated assertion of an antitrust violation was

concocted was only casually noted by the Court of Appeals

when it said, “In light of the history of the Kemper-ABC

agreement one may suspect that the claim of Sherman

Act illegality was an afterthought to justify having broken

a contract that had turned sour” but otherwise was al-

most totally ignored from a realistic point (A. 12) although

perhaps technically correct. The fact remains that Kem-

per was able to reach back into the history of the nego-

tiations and pick out one item upon which it predicated

the charge that the antitrust laws were violated in that

Kemper at one period during the lengthy negotiations

said it did not want 32 stations in the “going lineup”.

Whether the latter was a matter of serious concern to

Kemper or mentioned only i- the early stages and dropped

because of the other beneficial results Kemper obtained

in the give and take of the bargaining, or whether it was

only a negotiating ploy to obtain a better contract, in the

final analysis were questions of fact which have been

found adversely to Kemper’s contentions.

- ®©In Kemper’s petition the footnote on page 5 refers to the

application before this Court for a writ of certiorari to the New

York State Court of Appeals in American Manufacturers Muiual

Insurance Co. vy. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,

Inc. 385 U. 8S. 921 (1966); which finally terminated the State

Court action. Kemper then says: ‘‘Thus this is not a case

where a promisor is attempting avoiding paying an agreed price

for a consideration the promisor had actually received’’ but the

latter statement must be placed in its proper context. Kemper’s

resistance is obvious from a mere listing of the various steps

taken in the litigation itself. Moreover, this action was filed at

the same time as the State pay dowrgpe While it may be in-

teresting to speculate about ef Fig aap hice A Bagge Sona

UD. 8S. 516 (1959), upon this back door approach, we need not

sills Go Geilien ts tore ot Oo Hatnes oh tak tendo

4.

ARGUMENT

The findings of fact made by the District Court and

affirmed by the Court of Appeals remove from this case

any precedential significance.

The decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

factual findings of the District Court is (a) certainly not

in conflict with the decision of any other Court of Ap-

peals, (b) not one which has decided an important fed-

eral question, and (c) not one which has so far departed

from the usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far

sanctioned such a departure by a lower court. On the

contrary, the “nearly 200 pages” of opinions which “re-

count every factual detail” (C. 2) indicate the careful

study made of the facts by the District Court and the

Court of Appeals and the indulgent opportunities afforded

Kemper to sustain the after-the-fact concocted charge of

an antitrust violation.

Kemper now seeks to avoid the effect of the adverse

findings of fact by a number of transparent distortive

contentions.

Kemper postulates its petition on the claim that there

were “repeated demands throughout a month” that ABC

eliminate from the ABC station lineup 32 of the 99 ABC

affiliated stations carrying Evening Report (pp. 3 and 4

of petition). The negotiations in fact lasted over a pe-

riod of six months beginning with January 25, 1962 (B. 4)

and ending with the signing of the contract dated Au-

gust 15, 1962 (B. 44). The District Court and the Cir-

cuit Court considered the demands in the context of the

overall negotiations and did not confine their considera-

tion of the facts to a period “throughout a month”.

Kemper also asserts that “ABC conditioned the sale

of Evening Report to Kemper over the desired stations

on Kemper’s purchase of Evening Report over the 32

unwanted stations” (p. 4 of petition). The fact is that

ABC had a news program already on the air over an

existing lineup of stations with other sponsors and it of-

fered Kemper the “going lineup” at a package rate. Kem-

per then submitted a counter-offer in a letter dated May 4,

1962 which the District Court found was “a radical de-

parture from ABC’s offer” (B. 53).

On page 14 of the petition Kemper says: “This Court

has made clear that what constitutes a combination within

the meaning of the Sherman Act is so much a matter of

law, rather than fact, that the Court will reverse not only

a District Court, but also a jury finding as to the existence

of a combination once certain facts are shown”. Assum-

ing the latter statement is correct, petitioners have failed

to bring themselves to the “once the facts are shown”

point.

Kemper then asserts on page 15: “The decisions be-

low would valiuate tie-ins unless there is a showing that

the buyer persevered to some undefined degree in de-

manding selectivity, even after the seller refused to break

the package into component parts.” In the first place the

statement assumes that there was a tie-in. Secondly, the

statement assumes that the buyer persevered to any de-

gree in demanding selectivity and, thirdly, it assumes that

the seller refused to break the package into its com.

ponent parts. On all these matters the District Court and

the Cireuit Court found petitioners’ case factually insuf-

ficient.

Kemper, on page 15, says: “Here the Cireuit and Dis-

trict Courts focused on such subjective factors as Kem-

per’s motives, the degree of Kemper’s desire not to buy

the unwanted stations, Kemper’s ‘real cbjectives,’ its dili-

a a a ene ee ii

gence in persevering and the reasonableness of its failure

to persevere after May 23, 1962.” Neither Court “focused

on such subjective factors” but rather considered the to-

tality of all the evidence, oral and written, direct and cir-

cumstantial, expressed and inferred, and subjective and

objective.

Based upon the entire record which both Courts had be-

fore them it was clear to them as it is to anyone review-

ing the evidence that Kemper’s claim, that it only wanted

67 stations in the “going lineup” which it accepted only

because its “perserverance” had failed, is contradicted and

rendered incredible in light of the following salient facts:

(a) The negotiations lasted over a period of about six

months (B. 4, 44);

(b) In January, 1962 Kemper was ofiered, at a pack-

age rate, the sponsorship of a news program which

was already on the air five days per week with

other sponsors for certain days over a “going line-

up” of stations (B. 5);

(c) On May 4, 1962, Kemper submitted a counter-offer

of an “ordered station lineup” which was a radical

departure from ABC’s offer (B. 53) and which was

prepared for bargaining purpeses by Kemper’s em-

ployee, De Mark, “from the top of his head”, but it

was not a major concern; price was the important

factor (B. 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 42, 50, 58 and

67) ;

(d) Kemper never made an offer for the 67 stations

it now claims it wanted (B. 74);

(e) Kemper during the entire period was represented

by an advertising agency, had an employee who was

its own advertising manager and “the individuals

(f)

(g)

(h)

8

engaged in the negotiations were not novices—

rather, they were experienced in negotiations of

this type.” (B. 76);

In the negotiations Kemper had the dominant bar-

gaining position for the following reasons:

(1) ABC was “distinctly third” among the three

networks in the area of news (B. 65);

(2) The program was difficult to sell and in fact

was a “Turkey” (ie., unsuccessful) (B. 65) ;

(3) ABC was having trouble selling the program

as late as July of 1962 and the closer to air

time the more advantageous it was to get a

good deal, particularly when Kemper knew

ABC had not sold ali the availabilities (B. 65) ;

and, in fact, the sponsorship contract was not

signed until August 14, 1962, or about one

month before air time;

After Kemper had obtained various concessions

from ABC the so-called “unwanted stations” were

not mentioned (B. 10, 11, 14, 16, 29, 31, 37, 44) and

“the primary emphasis was on additional markets”

(B. 50,52) ;

Even after the sponsorship contract was signed, if

Kemper had in fact been coerced, it could have re-

pudiated the contract.

Kemper, aside from squirming to avoid the effect of the

findings of fact, also shifts its position as is readily ap-

parent from the argument made on page 17 of the peti-

tion that “the decision below is squarely con rary to the

many decisions of this Court that have found that eco-

nomic pressure is not necessary to proof of an illegal tie-

in”. This desperate attempt to reach for an issue is al-

sities nanenenamnentiieinettoniamabmenemmaemen ee

most duplicitous. Kemper itself vehemently urged in

Point I of its brief filed with the Court of Appeals that

economic coercion was exercised over it in procuring the

contract and devoted seven printed pages to a discussion

of that very contention which it summed up in its cwn

words as follows: ‘Whether Kemper should have nego-

tiated further turns on whether ABC’s response to

Kemper’s demand to eliminate 32 of the 99 stations from

the ‘Evening Report’ lineup was coercive”. Kemper also

argued before the Court of Appeals that the District

Court erred in that “It approached the coercion issue as

if it were dealing with that kind of coercion that would

void a contract at common law” (page 18 of Kemper’s

brief to the Court of Appeals dated April 7, 1971).

Kemper spoke of coercion in “the antitrust tie-in sense”

and as “economic coercion”. When the District Court

found and the Circuit Court answered Kemper’s argu-

ment by stating that there was no coercion in any sense,

Kemper now changes its tune and argues before this

Court that economic pressure is not a necessary element

in a tie-in.

Kemper goes on and simply concludes that there was

an illegal tie-in which should have been ruled as a per

se violation. It then relies upon inapplicable and inap-

posite cases decided by this Court based upon totally

different factual situations. In Northern Pacific Railway

Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1 (1958), this Court noted

that “the essential prerequisites for treating the defend-

ant’s tying arrangements as unreasonable per se were

conclusively established below” (p. 8). In the present

ease the District Court and the Court of Appeals not cnly

found no “essential prerequisites” but actually found no

factual basis whatever for concluding, as Kemper does,

that there was a tie-in.

In International Salt Co:-Inc. v. United States, 332 -

U. S. 392 (1947), it was similarly held that there existed ”

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the “essential prerequisites” for concluding that the con-

tracts in question which required lessees of patented ma-

chinery to purchase salt from tlie lessor despite certain

ameliorating clauses did “not avoid the stifling effect of

the agreement on competition” and also gave the lessor

“a priority on the business at equal prices. A competitor

would have to undercut appeilant’s price to have.any hope

of capturing the market” (p. 397). It thus becomes al-

most wearisome to repeat. that no such contractual or

factual considerations were found by the courts below to

have existed in the present case. Both of the aforesaid

cases were government antitrust prosecutions where per

se violations were involved.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion discussed United

States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U. S. 38 (1962) and

Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel. Corp.,

394 U. S. 495 (1969) and held both distinguishable on the

facts. Moreover in Fortner this Court merely held that

sufficient evidence was present to require a trial. The

negotiations conducted by the parties in the instant case

were on a different footing and the Court of Appeals

commented as to the offers and counter offers made dur-

ing the negotiations that “bartering ploys are not general-

ly the concern of antitrust laws” (C. 12).

Taking quotations from other cases decided by | this

Court as Kemper does throughout its petition serves no

useful purpose because they must be viewed in the con-

text of each opinion.

The fact remains that Kemper never reached the first

plateau of establishing the “essential prerequisites” to

sustain a tie-in charge. It failed to show that Kemper

was subject to tie-in conditions of any kind, legal or il-

legal, reasonable or unreasonable, and it failed to show

factually that it was subject to coercion of any type. The

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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