Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1972
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Supreme Court af the Unite Bre 8
7 wren, CL
Octoser Tzrm, 1971 g. ROBERT SERVES.
No. 71-621
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN MOTORISTS IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, FEDERAL MUTUAL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY and LUMBERMENS MU-
TUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Petitioners,
—against—
AMERICAN BROADCASTING-PARAMOUNT
THEATRES, INC.,
Respondent.
—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—_—
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ee
CLARENCE F'rrmp
Counsel for Respondent
Office and P. O. Address
67 Wall Street
New York, N. Y. 10005
(212) HA 25140
Of Counsel:
Cuaritzes L. Kanes
Pavut A. GoLtmuysx1
November 29, 1971
ERK
2
at a te ECO ETE BEEN Pi OIE OI
TABLE OF CONTENTS >
QUESTION PRESENTED ..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -
ARGUMENT
CoNCLUSION
Cases Cited
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
American Broadcasting-Paramoun* Theatres, Inc.,
270 F. Supp. 619 (1967)
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Cv. v.
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
385 U. S: 931 (1966)
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Sieel
Corp., 394 U. S. 495 (1969)................
Int.rnational Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332
U. S. 392 (1947)
Kelly v. Kosuga, 385 U. 8. 516 (1959)
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356
U. S. 1 (1958)
United States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U. S. 38
(1962)
Rules Cited
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
52
Supreme Court Rules:
PAGE
@~
10
10
11
2,11
——<>——
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, AMERICAN MOTORISTS IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, FEDERAL MUTUAL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY and LUMBERMENS MU-
TUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Petitioners,
—against—
AMERICAN BROADCASTING-PARAMOUNT
THEATRES, INC.,
vase, compel a further statement by the respondent
to as “Kemper”), as well as distortions and omissions
“a
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after, on May 4, 1962 Kemper offered to sponsor the pro-
gram over its own tailored lineup of 95 stations, only
67 of which were carrying the program at a price of
$24,250 which Kemper computed by applying the 474%
per cent package price discount. What it did was to
eliminate 32 of the stations on the then going lineup and
substitute 28 stations which were more valuable and ex-
pensive than the 32 stations eliminated.
After the extensive negotiations and correspondence be-
tween the parties a written contract dated August 15, 1962
was signed pursvant to which Kemper agreed to sponsor
one program per week over a 26-week period beginning
October 17, 1962. The lineup referred to in the contract
was neither the original éne offered by ABC nor the one
appearing in the May 4, 1962 order letter, but rather a
compromise lineup which emerged from the negotiations.
Under Kemper’s sponsorship the program Evening Re-
port was broadcast on October 17, 26, 31 and on November
9, 1962 (270 F. Supp. 619, 636), after which Kemper de-
liberately and unlawfully breached the agreement.
Three telecasts wherein Kemper appeared as the spon-
sor occurred before September 9, 1962. Kemper paid for
such telecasts without objection and certainly without any
suggestion that the contract was in violation of any anti-
trust law. In fact, as late as two months after the cancel-
lation of the contract Kemper never complained of any
illegal tie-in sale and the first time the claim was as-
serted was in the answer Kemper interposed in the New
York State Supreme Court action which was brought for
non-payment of the November 9, 1962 telecast and for
damages for anticipatory breach of contract as to the bal-
4
ance of the contract term.* The charge by ABC that
Kemper’s belated assertion of an antitrust violation was
concocted was only casually noted by the Court of Appeals
when it said, “In light of the history of the Kemper-ABC
agreement one may suspect that the claim of Sherman
Act illegality was an afterthought to justify having broken
a contract that had turned sour” but otherwise was al-
most totally ignored from a realistic point (A. 12) although
perhaps technically correct. The fact remains that Kem-
per was able to reach back into the history of the nego-
tiations and pick out one item upon which it predicated
the charge that the antitrust laws were violated in that
Kemper at one period during the lengthy negotiations
said it did not want 32 stations in the “going lineup”.
Whether the latter was a matter of serious concern to
Kemper or mentioned only i- the early stages and dropped
because of the other beneficial results Kemper obtained
in the give and take of the bargaining, or whether it was
only a negotiating ploy to obtain a better contract, in the
final analysis were questions of fact which have been
found adversely to Kemper’s contentions.
- ®©In Kemper’s petition the footnote on page 5 refers to the
application before this Court for a writ of certiorari to the New
York State Court of Appeals in American Manufacturers Muiual
Insurance Co. vy. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc. 385 U. 8S. 921 (1966); which finally terminated the State
Court action. Kemper then says: ‘‘Thus this is not a case
where a promisor is attempting avoiding paying an agreed price
for a consideration the promisor had actually received’’ but the
latter statement must be placed in its proper context. Kemper’s
resistance is obvious from a mere listing of the various steps
taken in the litigation itself. Moreover, this action was filed at
the same time as the State pay dowrgpe While it may be in-
teresting to speculate about ef Fig aap hice A Bagge Sona
UD. 8S. 516 (1959), upon this back door approach, we need not
sills Go Geilien ts tore ot Oo Hatnes oh tak tendo
4.
ARGUMENT
The findings of fact made by the District Court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals remove from this case
any precedential significance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
factual findings of the District Court is (a) certainly not
in conflict with the decision of any other Court of Ap-
peals, (b) not one which has decided an important fed-
eral question, and (c) not one which has so far departed
from the usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court. On the
contrary, the “nearly 200 pages” of opinions which “re-
count every factual detail” (C. 2) indicate the careful
study made of the facts by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals and the indulgent opportunities afforded
Kemper to sustain the after-the-fact concocted charge of
an antitrust violation.
Kemper now seeks to avoid the effect of the adverse
findings of fact by a number of transparent distortive
contentions.
Kemper postulates its petition on the claim that there
were “repeated demands throughout a month” that ABC
eliminate from the ABC station lineup 32 of the 99 ABC
affiliated stations carrying Evening Report (pp. 3 and 4
of petition). The negotiations in fact lasted over a pe-
riod of six months beginning with January 25, 1962 (B. 4)
and ending with the signing of the contract dated Au-
gust 15, 1962 (B. 44). The District Court and the Cir-
cuit Court considered the demands in the context of the
overall negotiations and did not confine their considera-
tion of the facts to a period “throughout a month”.
Kemper also asserts that “ABC conditioned the sale
of Evening Report to Kemper over the desired stations
on Kemper’s purchase of Evening Report over the 32
unwanted stations” (p. 4 of petition). The fact is that
ABC had a news program already on the air over an
existing lineup of stations with other sponsors and it of-
fered Kemper the “going lineup” at a package rate. Kem-
per then submitted a counter-offer in a letter dated May 4,
1962 which the District Court found was “a radical de-
parture from ABC’s offer” (B. 53).
On page 14 of the petition Kemper says: “This Court
has made clear that what constitutes a combination within
the meaning of the Sherman Act is so much a matter of
law, rather than fact, that the Court will reverse not only
a District Court, but also a jury finding as to the existence
of a combination once certain facts are shown”. Assum-
ing the latter statement is correct, petitioners have failed
to bring themselves to the “once the facts are shown”
point.
Kemper then asserts on page 15: “The decisions be-
low would valiuate tie-ins unless there is a showing that
the buyer persevered to some undefined degree in de-
manding selectivity, even after the seller refused to break
the package into component parts.” In the first place the
statement assumes that there was a tie-in. Secondly, the
statement assumes that the buyer persevered to any de-
gree in demanding selectivity and, thirdly, it assumes that
the seller refused to break the package into its com.
ponent parts. On all these matters the District Court and
the Cireuit Court found petitioners’ case factually insuf-
ficient.
Kemper, on page 15, says: “Here the Cireuit and Dis-
trict Courts focused on such subjective factors as Kem-
per’s motives, the degree of Kemper’s desire not to buy
the unwanted stations, Kemper’s ‘real cbjectives,’ its dili-
a a a ene ee ii
gence in persevering and the reasonableness of its failure
to persevere after May 23, 1962.” Neither Court “focused
on such subjective factors” but rather considered the to-
tality of all the evidence, oral and written, direct and cir-
cumstantial, expressed and inferred, and subjective and
objective.
Based upon the entire record which both Courts had be-
fore them it was clear to them as it is to anyone review-
ing the evidence that Kemper’s claim, that it only wanted
67 stations in the “going lineup” which it accepted only
because its “perserverance” had failed, is contradicted and
rendered incredible in light of the following salient facts:
(a) The negotiations lasted over a period of about six
months (B. 4, 44);
(b) In January, 1962 Kemper was ofiered, at a pack-
age rate, the sponsorship of a news program which
was already on the air five days per week with
other sponsors for certain days over a “going line-
up” of stations (B. 5);
(c) On May 4, 1962, Kemper submitted a counter-offer
of an “ordered station lineup” which was a radical
departure from ABC’s offer (B. 53) and which was
prepared for bargaining purpeses by Kemper’s em-
ployee, De Mark, “from the top of his head”, but it
was not a major concern; price was the important
factor (B. 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 42, 50, 58 and
67) ;
(d) Kemper never made an offer for the 67 stations
it now claims it wanted (B. 74);
(e) Kemper during the entire period was represented
by an advertising agency, had an employee who was
its own advertising manager and “the individuals
(f)
(g)
(h)
8
engaged in the negotiations were not novices—
rather, they were experienced in negotiations of
this type.” (B. 76);
In the negotiations Kemper had the dominant bar-
gaining position for the following reasons:
(1) ABC was “distinctly third” among the three
networks in the area of news (B. 65);
(2) The program was difficult to sell and in fact
was a “Turkey” (ie., unsuccessful) (B. 65) ;
(3) ABC was having trouble selling the program
as late as July of 1962 and the closer to air
time the more advantageous it was to get a
good deal, particularly when Kemper knew
ABC had not sold ali the availabilities (B. 65) ;
and, in fact, the sponsorship contract was not
signed until August 14, 1962, or about one
month before air time;
After Kemper had obtained various concessions
from ABC the so-called “unwanted stations” were
not mentioned (B. 10, 11, 14, 16, 29, 31, 37, 44) and
“the primary emphasis was on additional markets”
(B. 50,52) ;
Even after the sponsorship contract was signed, if
Kemper had in fact been coerced, it could have re-
pudiated the contract.
Kemper, aside from squirming to avoid the effect of the
findings of fact, also shifts its position as is readily ap-
parent from the argument made on page 17 of the peti-
tion that “the decision below is squarely con rary to the
many decisions of this Court that have found that eco-
nomic pressure is not necessary to proof of an illegal tie-
in”. This desperate attempt to reach for an issue is al-
sities nanenenamnentiieinettoniamabmenemmaemen ee
most duplicitous. Kemper itself vehemently urged in
Point I of its brief filed with the Court of Appeals that
economic coercion was exercised over it in procuring the
contract and devoted seven printed pages to a discussion
of that very contention which it summed up in its cwn
words as follows: ‘Whether Kemper should have nego-
tiated further turns on whether ABC’s response to
Kemper’s demand to eliminate 32 of the 99 stations from
the ‘Evening Report’ lineup was coercive”. Kemper also
argued before the Court of Appeals that the District
Court erred in that “It approached the coercion issue as
if it were dealing with that kind of coercion that would
void a contract at common law” (page 18 of Kemper’s
brief to the Court of Appeals dated April 7, 1971).
Kemper spoke of coercion in “the antitrust tie-in sense”
and as “economic coercion”. When the District Court
found and the Circuit Court answered Kemper’s argu-
ment by stating that there was no coercion in any sense,
Kemper now changes its tune and argues before this
Court that economic pressure is not a necessary element
in a tie-in.
Kemper goes on and simply concludes that there was
an illegal tie-in which should have been ruled as a per
se violation. It then relies upon inapplicable and inap-
posite cases decided by this Court based upon totally
different factual situations. In Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1 (1958), this Court noted
that “the essential prerequisites for treating the defend-
ant’s tying arrangements as unreasonable per se were
conclusively established below” (p. 8). In the present
ease the District Court and the Court of Appeals not cnly
found no “essential prerequisites” but actually found no
factual basis whatever for concluding, as Kemper does,
that there was a tie-in.
In International Salt Co:-Inc. v. United States, 332 -
U. S. 392 (1947), it was similarly held that there existed ”
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the “essential prerequisites” for concluding that the con-
tracts in question which required lessees of patented ma-
chinery to purchase salt from tlie lessor despite certain
ameliorating clauses did “not avoid the stifling effect of
the agreement on competition” and also gave the lessor
“a priority on the business at equal prices. A competitor
would have to undercut appeilant’s price to have.any hope
of capturing the market” (p. 397). It thus becomes al-
most wearisome to repeat. that no such contractual or
factual considerations were found by the courts below to
have existed in the present case. Both of the aforesaid
cases were government antitrust prosecutions where per
se violations were involved.
The Court of Appeals in its opinion discussed United
States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U. S. 38 (1962) and
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel. Corp.,
394 U. S. 495 (1969) and held both distinguishable on the
facts. Moreover in Fortner this Court merely held that
sufficient evidence was present to require a trial. The
negotiations conducted by the parties in the instant case
were on a different footing and the Court of Appeals
commented as to the offers and counter offers made dur-
ing the negotiations that “bartering ploys are not general-
ly the concern of antitrust laws” (C. 12).
Taking quotations from other cases decided by | this
Court as Kemper does throughout its petition serves no
useful purpose because they must be viewed in the con-
text of each opinion.
The fact remains that Kemper never reached the first
plateau of establishing the “essential prerequisites” to
sustain a tie-in charge. It failed to show that Kemper
was subject to tie-in conditions of any kind, legal or il-
legal, reasonable or unreasonable, and it failed to show
factually that it was subject to coercion of any type. The
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