Opposition Brief — Johnson v. Texas

Supreme Court brief1971

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Supreme Court, U.S.

4a FILED

- 3341

> OcT 14 19M

eee aie E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

IN TEE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1971

MATTHEW DONALD JOHNSON,

Petitioner

Vv

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent

Eh semaine

MARION ERNEST McMILLAN

as Petitioner

v. :

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

CRAWFORD C. MARTIN

Attorney General of Texas

Nota WHITE

First Assistant Attorney General

ALFRED WALKER

Executive Assistant

Rosert C. FLOWERS

Assistant Attorney General

GILBERT J. PcNna

Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

P. O. Box 12548, Capi.ol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

VABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE oo Ginn ec kane eee a ie ee eee 1

I oe ies ey oa eR EET Se 2

I I onc go cs ee ae ee eke wed 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....... . 2

ee ee eee 3

Argument and Authorities .................0.......... 4

SES 0g RLY Seles Rte tL pa ne Oe 8

re re eet eres 9

I Ps a ok ss eK ee S see eae Oe emai 10

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Brown v. State, 353 S.W.2d 425... they ha lee: 7

Brinkiey v. State, 320 S.W.2d 855 ...... .............. 7

Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) ............ 5

Johnson v. State and McMillan v. State,

467 S.W.2d 247 et AN Apes art OUR Le tga 1

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ............. 5

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) __.. eon 5

Streight v. State, 138 S.W. 742 (62 Tex. Crim. 453) ...—s 6

State Statutes

Article 31.04, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal

Procedure ATURE aa ee tee Ce =) 6

Article 7.03, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal

Procedure AREER FR EAC | “WZ

Statutes

United States

28 U.S.C., Section 1257 (3) TeV E Te ee 2

Constitutional Provisions

Fourteenth Amendment a ine Bete 8 es 2

Fifth Amendment ace eee LA ae Ge aiehan ol 8

| IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1971

MATTHEW DONALD JOHNSON,

Petitioner

Vv

STATE OF TEXAS,

;

TG: \ cain

MARION ERNEST McMILLAN

Petitioner

Resnondent

Vv.

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Now comes the State of Texas, Kesponaent herein

and files this response in reply to Petitioner’s petition

for Writ of Certiorari heretofore filed herein.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of

Texas, is reported at 467 S.W.2d 247, and also appears

in the appendix to Petitioner’s petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

IS RR AD REP AR has i Ts. ST OT Ws He

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of

Texas was entered on April 14, 1971. Motion for Re-

hearing was denied without a written opinion on June

9, 1971, this Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.8.C., Section 1257, (3). Accordingly, the jurisdic-

tional requirements would appear to be satisfied, al-

though Respondent refutes Petitioner’s contention that

any right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United

States has been denied him.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether under the circumstances of this case it

was a denial of due process to refuse a change of venue.

2. Whether it was a denial of due process, under the

circumstances, to refuse voir dire examination of each

venireman separate from the others.

3. Whether it was a denial of due process, under the

circumstances, to restrict voir dire questioning about

black power and militancy.

4. Whether Texas procedure with respect to jury

prejudices and misconduct, as applied in these cases,

was a denial of due process.

5. (McMillan only) Whether the trial of McMillan

for a felony was double jeopardy after he had already

been placed under a peace bond.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Of concern here is the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-

tution which provides:.

Er wee

‘¢... nor shail any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of

ass”

The other state statutes involved appear as an ap-

pendix at page 14 of Petitioner’s application for Writ

of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners were convicted of injuring property be-

longing to another, the extent of the injury being over

the value of fifty dollars ($50.00) ; the punishment as

to each Petitioner, ten (10) years.

On July 1, 1968, at about 10:30 p.m., a group of 30

to 50 Negro people, many of them dressed in a manner

somewhat different from the dress of the ordinary cus-

tomer, entered the O.K. Super Market one at a time.

Petitioners McMillan and Johnson were the first of the

group to enter the store. They went to all parts of the

store while Petitioners walked to the back. At this

point, the employees heard glass breaking in the area

in which the Petitioners were standing.

Merchandise in the store was scattered, broken, mu-

tilated, and commingled by the persons who had en-

tered the store. Describing the scene, an employee

stated :

‘‘There was milk and eggs all mixed together with

cereal and sugar, watermelons and mustard, just

most anything you could imagine was busted and

broken.”’

Five minutes after they entered the store, the group

left. Petitioners were the last to leave. A partial listing

of the destroyed merchandise, which had a value in

pom, Sone

Detect nae

Y ORNS OURS PRELIM RAD

excess of fifty dollars, includes: 3 one-gallon jugs of

milk, 2 five-pound bags of sugar, 2 one-quart containers

of mustard, over seventeen ‘pounds of tomatoes, several

cartons of eggs, four boxes of detergent, many bottles

of pickles, two quarts of cooking oil, many watermel-

ons, and 12 one-pound packages of oleo. An employee

saw Petitioner Johnson break two bottles of grape

juice and drop a watermelon twice. He also saw Peti-

tioner McMillan take a gallon bottle of milk out of the

dairy container and drop it, breaking the container.

Later the same evening, after the store was cleaned

up, Peticioners re-entered the store, bought some beer

and McMillan commented, ‘‘These white people sho

keep a nice clean store.’’

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Petitioners’ first contention is that the trial court

erred in refusing a change of venue and that the trial

judge favored the State in the venue hearing by admit-

ting affidavits in lieu of witnesses. The testimony in-

troduced by Petitioners at the venue hearing showed

that Petitioners had been the subject of items on a

news program of one of the major television stations

in Dallas approximately four times in the preceding

month; that a television newsman had read about them

in the local newspapers eight to twelve times in recent

months; that the Petitioners were newsworthy because

they had opinions diverging from that of the majority

of the public and because they had obtained an option

to purchase a chain of grocery stores, one of which was

the supermarket where the offense took place. Further

testimony indicated that publicity, both in the news-

papers and on television had shown tbat McMillan was

a

a field secretary for the Student Non-Violent Coordi-

nating Committee; that SNCC had a widespread rep-

utation for being militant in black affairs; that there

was publicity involving the incident at the supermar-

ket out of which these charges arose; and that Petition-

ers’ unusual manner of dress and hair style tended to

cause a feeling of resentment among people in Dallas.

Petitiovers also showed that they might be associated

in the eyes of the public with destruction of property,

interruption of business activities and conduct leading

up to riots. All the defense witnesses testified that they

were of the opinion that Petitioners could not receive

a fair trial in Dallas County. However, they all testi-

fied that they could be fair and impartial jurors in

Dallas County in spite of all the publicity with which

they had come in contact.

In connection with the change of venue contention,

it is well to observe that it was shown that Dallas Coun-

ty has a population of over one million persons. Fur-

ther, this record shows efforts on the part of the trial

court to restrict pre-trial publicity.

Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Gropm

v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) and Sheppard v.

Macwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), cited by Petitioners are

readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

There is no showing in this record that there were

inherently suspect outside influences affecting the com-

munity’s climate of opinion as to defendants which

would result in a probability of unfairness. These Pe-

titioners were tried by an impartial jury and Petition-

‘ers failed to show that the population was so saturated

with prejudice that no impartial jury could be se-

Jected.

— =

At the close of the evidence in the hearing on the

motion for change of venue, the State introduced seven

affidavits stating that the Petitioners’ witness did not

have sufficient knowledge on which to base their opin-

ions that the Petitioners could not obtain a fair and

impartial trial in Dallas County. Petitioners. objected

to the introduction of these affidavits into evidence; the

objection was overruled. Such affidavits controverted

the source of knowledge of the Petiticiuers’ witness, as

is permitted by Art. 31.04, V.A.C.C.P. No affidavits

were offered by the Petitioners.

Petitioners next contend that the unusual nature of

the case required individual voir dire examination,

and in light of the record the trial judge’s refusal was

error and a denial of due process. In Streight v. State,

138 S.W. 742 (62 Tex. Crim. 453), reversed «n other

grounds, the Texas Court of Criainal: Appeals held

that in an extreme case it would be reversible error

for the trial court, on motion, to refuse to exclude the

veniremen from the courtroom during the selection of

a jury. That case involved much more pre-trial pub-

licity and prejudice than does the case at bar.

Petitioners next contend that the trial court erred

by not allowing defense counsel to ask prospective

jurors certain questions on the voir dire examination.

In the examination of one prospective juror, Petition-

ers’ counsel asked the following question: ‘‘Do you

allow your daughter to wear mini skirts?’’ The juror

answered: ‘‘Yes, she wears —.’’

The court also refused to let the defense question a

venirewoman, who was subsequently a juror, about her

political affiliations, whether she was a Democrat or

Republican. Petitioners have failed to show that the

—

trial court abused his discretion in refusing to allow

those questions and have failed to show how those ques-

tions were relevant to exercising their peremptory

challenges.

Petitioners were allowed to question one venireman,

who subsequently became a juror, at some length about

his understanding of the term ‘‘Black Power.’’ Upon

the State’s objection, the court then instructed that the

venireman be interviewed at the bench rather than -

have the entire jury panel hear the questions. Defense

counsel then refused to ask any more questions regard-

ing ‘‘Black Power’’ and, instead, he began to question

the venireman regarding the range of punishmer. in

the case.

Petitioners’ counsel later questioned another venire-

man, subsequenlty a juror, regarding his idea of what

the term ‘‘Black Power’’ meant. The State objected

and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel,

however, continued questioning regarding the juror’s

definition of the term ‘‘Black Power.’’ Under the cir-

cumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

This does not present a federal question for review.

Petitioners next contend that the hearing on the mo-

tion for new trial was a nullity because the same was

not held within the 20 days provided by statute, citing

Brown v. State, 353 S.W.2d 425 and Brinkley v. State,

320 S.W.2d 855. Their motion for new trial was based

on jury misconduct and had an affidavit of a juror at-

tached thereto. Petitioners reason that when the mo-

tion was overruled by operation of law, it was auto-

matically reversible error. At the hearing on the motion

for new trial, Petitioners refused to participate due to

their contention that the hearing was a nullity.

—_

In this case, the court gianted the State a continu-

ance of the hearing in order to have more time to secure

evidence that jury misconduct had not, in fact, oc-

curred. At the hearing, the court considered testimony

and affidavits from the remaining eleven jurors, who

stated that such misconduct did not occur.

In the interest of justice, the action of the court was

proper in order to show that the affidavit attached to

Petitioners’ motion for new trial did not reflect the

true facts. This does not present a federal question.

Petitioner McMillan contends that he was subject

to double jeopardy because he had a hearing by a Jus-

tice of the Peace on a peace bond. In Texas a peace

bond is conditioned that ‘“‘he will not commit such of-

fense, and that he will keep the peace towards the per-

son threatened or about to be injured, and toward all

others named in the bond for any period of time, not

to exceed one year from the date of the bond.’’ (See:

Tex. Code of Crim Proe., Art. 7.03.*) It is clearly a

preventative measure taken to insure that the defend-

ant will not repeat the act or acts threatened under

penalty of paying the amount of the bond. This is based

on future acts and is not punishment or determination

of criminal activity. It is by no means a criminal trial

within the purview of the jeopardy provision of the

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above stated, Respondent says that

there is no violation of due process presented. The Pe-

tition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

*Attached as Appendix “A”.

ca on

a,

: Respectfully submitted,

| CrawrForp C. Martin

| Attorney General of Texas

Rosert C. FLOWERS

Assistant Attorney General

cme eee

Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Gilbert J. Pena, Assistant Attorney General of

Texas, attorney for Respondent, do herebv certify that

a copy of the above and foregoing Response In Oppo-

sition To Granting Of Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Court Of Criminal Appeals Of Texas has been

deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,

on this the -_ day of October, 1971, to the following

address: Frank P. Hernandez and Vincent W. Perini,

710 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75202.

GILBERT J. PENA

Assistant Attorney General .

APPENDIX “A”

Art. 7.03 [80] [125] [115] Accused brought before

magistrate

When the accused has been brought before the mag-

istrate, he shall hear proof as to the accusation, and if

he be satisfied that there is just reason to apprehend

that the offense was intended to be committed, or that

the threat was seriously made, he shall make an order

that the accused enter into bond in such sum as he may

‘ in his discretion require, conditioned thai he will not

commit such offense, and that he will keep the peace

toward the person threatened or about to be injured,

and toward all others name in the bond for any period

of time, not to exceed one year from the date of the

bond. Acts 1965, 59th Leg,., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

— 10—

>

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