Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wanamaker v. Riley

LIBRARY

SUPREME COURT. U. S.

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnite

October Term, 1971

~<a

No.

382 °

Petitioner,

Eno

GILES A. jain Pos

U8.«

JOHN C. RILEY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

—_

GILES A. WANAMAKER, Jr.

In Propria Persona

7 Bamfield Road

Rowayton, Connecticut 06853

(203) 838-6840

RALPH B. GUY, Jr.

United States Attorney

HAROLD HOOD

Assistant United States Attomey

Attomeys for Respondent

817 Federal Building

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(4253) LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.

Lew and Financial Printing

South River, N.J. New York, N.Y. Philadelphia, Pa.

(201) 257 -ARSN

Page

Petition for Writ of Certiorari ....... 1

Opinions and Orders Below ......-e+e- 2

Jurisdiction ....-.-ececcrcrercccece 2

Questions Presented ....-++++eee-e 2

Statement of the Case .. 1... ++ ee eee 3

Statement of the Facts... .. 6+ seee-e 4

Argument ... 6+ +e eee eee eeres 9)

Conclusion ....-2eeeeecececereres 10

Appendix A

Order Appealed From SoV¥wae ee ees la

Appendix B

Order Granting Motion for Summary »

Judgment 7 +. o - ° e e . on e e - * e e e 3a

Appendix C

Original Complaint .....+4-.s-e-e-ee-e 8a

it

Indez

Page

Tabie ef Citations

CASES CITED:

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S. Ct.

1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) ... 5, 6, 7,8

Bivins v. Six UnknownAgenis, U.S. ,

91S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619(1971) .. 10

Bridges v. I.R.S. 433 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.

i a a a a ee ee ee 9

Denman v. White, 316 F.2d 524 (1st Cir.

1963) e e e e eee ee ee @ e a o e e e 8, 10

Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir.

1965) ao t e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e es e if 9

Molevar v. Lindsey, 411 F.2d 597 (6th

Cir. 1969) o e e e e e e eo e oe e e * e e e e 5, 7, 8

Off v. United States, 35 F.2d 222(S.D.I11.

1929) e o a . e eeeeeee #@ @ e e e e e 7

Ruderer v. Meyer, 413 F.2d 175 (8th

Cir. 1969) ...... ee ae oe ee 7

State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1965),

cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 ........ 7

tit

Index

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED:

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts $8183, 189,195... 6

21 C.J.S., Courts §8189a, 189c ....... 7

Prosser, Torts, 8111 at 823 (3d Ed.

1964) @ e e oe e e e . e eo e @ @ e e eo e o 6 10

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1971

GILES A. WANAMAKER JR.,

Petitioner,

U8.

JOHN C. RILEY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of

the Supreme Court of the United States of America:

Your petitioner, Giles A. Wanamaker Jr., ap-

pearing in propria persona, hereby petitions this

Honorable Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-

cuit to review an Order affirming an Order Grant-

ing Motion for Summary Judgment by the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of

Michigan.

Opiniotis and Orders Below

The opinions and orders below were not officially

reported. The Order of the Urited States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, containing a reference

to Judge Wade McCree’s dissent therein, was filed

on June 17, 1971, and a copy is annexed hereto as

Appendix “A”, The Order for Summary Judgment

by the United States District Court(E.D. Michigan)

by Judge Fred W. Kaess was entered August 26,

1970 and a copy is annexed hereto as Appendix

ba ad

Jurisdiction

The order sought to be reviewed herein was

handed down and filedonJune 17,1971. There were

no orders or petitions respecting either a re-

hearing or an extension of time to petition for

certiorari. It is believed that this Court has

jurisdiction to review the order kelow pursuant to

U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 19, 28 U.S.C.A.

Questions Presented

1. Is an opinion by only four justices of the

United States Supreme Court, which advocates an

“absolute privilege against suitfor nearly all federal

government officials when making defamatory

statements but found to be acting within the “outer

perimeter” of their duties, controlling precedent

under the doctrine of stare decisis and thus en-

titled to be recognized as the law of the land?

2. Assuming arguendo an absolute privilege

against suit for federal employees is recognized

under the circumstances of this case,

3

a) was defendant-respondent acting in his of-

ficial capacity in making the defamatory state-

ments attributed to him?

and

b) was a fair and adequate evidentiary hearing

or other opportunity to determine the issue of

official capacity afforded the court and the

parties at the trial court proceeding?

Petitioner contends that the answers to the

questions are “No.”

Statement? of the Case

Petitioner-plaintiff filed the complaint, a copy

of which is annexed bereto as Appendix “C”, in the

instant matter on May 5, 1969, in the circuit court

of Macomb County, Michigan, alleging defamation

by slander (Count 1) and abuse of process (Count

3) against Respondent-defendant John C. Riley, and

defamation by libel (Count 2) against former de-

fendant Robert Hlatky. The action was removed

to the United States District Court for the East-

ern District of Michigan by the United States At-

torney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. on the

grounds that respondent was acting in his role

as an Official of the United States government.

Petitioner subsequently consented to the dismissal

of the action as to defendant Hlatky.

Respondent’s motion for summary judgment was

granted by the District Court upon the finding

that respondent was acting within the ‘outer peri-

meter’ of his duties as an official of the United

LARA BIT Fp PETITE NOR OE TOY LM TL OE

States government, and was therefore accorded

an absolute privilege against such actions. Peti-

tioner appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit from only so much of the judg-

ment as applied to the slander count (Count 1);

with McCree, J. dissenting, the District Court

was upheld.

Petitioner comes now petitioning this honorable

Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Statement of the Facts

On January 26, 1968, petitioner, an attorney

then residing and practicing in Michigan, and a

major in the Air Force Reserve, was one of

approximately 185 members of the 305th Air

Rescue and Recovery Squadron, a reserve unit

based at Selfridge AFB, Michigan, who were in-

voluntarily recalled to extended active duty for

an unknown length of time in the aftermath of

the Pueblo incident in which a U.S. Navy ship

and its crew were captured by the North Koreans.

Respondent, who was employed at Selfridge Air

Force Base as the supervisor of approximately

70 civil service employees of the 305th, known

as Air Reserve Technicians, was a reserve lieu-

tenant colonel and commander of the unit.

According to the pleadings and the record, on

or about December 24, 1968, and at other times,

respondent made a number of defamatory state-

ments to citizens of Michigan concerning petitioner,

including but not limited to the following: “Major

Wanamaker is a traitor to his country.” “He is

a modern-day Benedict Arnold and is a disgrace

TES PAP IRL IL FIG ERE LS Na RP PG PLE ES ARE IEE AE OLEGORG EEL: AAI PEO La OEE AP AE ee

to the uniform.” “I want to bar him from the

practice of law.”

The record shows that respondent inhis Answer

to the Complaint denied making the foregoing state-

ments, but his answer to certain interrogatories

reflects that he does not recall making them. In

his affidavit in support of the motion for summary

judgment filed with the District Court, respondent

stated that any statements concerning petitioner

were made in his (respondent’s) capacity as an

Air Force officer.

Argument

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI (A) TO DECIDE AN IMPORTANT

QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT

BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT; (B) TO RE-

SOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN COURTS OF AP-

PEALS ON THIS MATTER; AND (C) TO REVERSE

THE SANCTION OF A DEPARTURE FROM AC-

CEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS. ~

A) On the “authority of Barr v. Matteo, 360

U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1434 (1959)

and Molevar v. Lindsey, 411 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.

1969)” (see Appendix ‘A’, p. 1a), the Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a 2 - 1 decision

upheld the District Court’s summary judgment or-

der, which also cited Barr as its authority. It

is the contention of petitioner that the opinion in

Barr relied upon by the courts below is not

settled ‘aw and that the summary judgment should

not have been granted.

SIS AAR ITAA A SA ETE RS OR MIE REID PES POT BID, IE LEELA BN I TY

Five separate opinions were announced in Barr,

The decision of the court consisted of two con-

curring opinions, one by Mr. Justice Harlan in

which three other justices joined, as well as an

opinion by Mr. Justice Black in which he specifi-

cally disassociated himself from Mr. Justice Har-

lan’s opinion, although concurring in the result,

360 U.S. at 576. Four justices dissented in three

separate opinions. Thus, an opinion by only four

of the justices, in which an absolute privilege

against lawsuits was advocated for a large number

of federal employees when found to be acting in

the course of their duties, seems to have been

escalated into a binding rule of law when in fact

the so-called ‘rule’ is neither settled law nor is

entitled to binding precedent under the doctrine

of stare decisis.

A mainstay of the Anglo-American legal system

and its reliance on judicial precedent, the doctrine

of stare decisis holds that the determination of

a point of law by a court will generally be followed

by a court of the same or lower rank if a sub-

sequent case presents the same legal problem.

20 Am, Jur.2d, Courts $183. The stare decisis

effect is limited to a judicial opinion of a major-

ity of the court on a point of law in a final deci-

sion, supra, $189, and

. » - where the members of the court unani-

mously or by majority vote reach a deci-

sion but cannot, even by a majority, agree

on the reasoning therefor, no point of law

is established by the decision and it cannot

be a precedent covered by the stare decisis

rule. Supra, $195.

See also State v. Smith, 422 SW 2d 50 (Mo.

1965), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895, and Off v.

United States, 35 F.2d 222 (S.D. Ill. 1929). Ac-

cording to Corpus Juris Sequndum, where a major~

ity of a court concurs merely in the result, the

principles enunciated in the opinion cannot be con-

sidered as within the rule of stare decisis ...

21 C.J.S., Courts §189 a.

Only an opinion which is concurred in by at

least a majority of the court of last re-

sort constitutes a precedent; if fewer than

the majority concur there is no ruling opin-

ion except as to the disposition of the case.

id at §189 c.

In the circumstances of the instant case, there-

fore, the reliance upon the courts below upon Barr

and upon Molevar v. Lindsey, supra, is misplaced,

as the four justice opinion in Barr is not entitled

to binding precedent, and the opinion in Molevar,

citing Barr as its authority, cannot express the

law of the Sixth Circuit. As this important ques-

tion of federal law has not been settled by this

honorable Court, petitioner respectfully urges ~_

this petition be granted.

B) A conflict between Courts of Appeals is

apparent in an examination of Kelley v. Dunne,

344 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1965). In that case the

First Circuit does not foliow the absolute priv-

ilege rule as is articulated in Molevar v. Lind-

sey, supra, Ruderer v. Meyer, 413 F.2d 175 (8th

Cir. 1969), and other cases.*Chief Judge Aldrich

establishes a “balancing” criteria involving the

weight of the relative importance in each case

of the public interest (absolute privilege for the

federal employee) as opposed to the private in-

terest (the ability to obtain a measure of redress).

“In such a situation we see no compelling need

to superimpose, absolutely, the public interest

upon private rights.” (emphasis added), 344 F.2d

129 at 133.

That the First Circuit has reserved the full

adoption of the absolute privilege rule is further

seen in this citation from Denman v. White, 316

F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1963):

We intimate no view as to whether the

privilege accorded a government official by

Barr ... would permit a collateral per-

sonal attack upon the party he is seeking

to answer when the latter’s character is

not directly inissue. id at 526.

The First Circuit, therefore, has not adopted

the absolute privilege rule as articulated by the

Sixth Circuit in Molevar v. Lindsey, supra, and

the instant case. Petitioner respectfully prays

that this Honorable Court grant this petition to

resolve that conflict.

C) In the dissenting comment to the Opinion

below, Circuit Judge McCree would have remanded

the matter to the District Court ... “for an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the ut-

terances were made ‘within the outer perimeter’

of the duties ...” Appendix p.1A. Petitioner

contends that, in the circumstances of this case,

without such a hearing petitioner-plaintiff has been

precluded from an effective inquiry into the factual

ALLIS RAPA gh NBN a PUES EOSIN et GIN AY SM ON NATE RI ONCE YE IN LORE CAE IO ERIE EB ch AION CEL MORE DEAE RME —a ae

issue of whether the statements were made in an

official capacity. “Since ... motions for sum- _

mary judgment requir(e) construction in plaintiff's

favor,” Kelley v. Dunne, supra, at 130, “Defend-

ant officers may not rely, of course, on bare

conclusory allegations on this issue, for this will

not sustain a summary judgment in their favor.”

Bridges v. I.R.S., 433 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir.

1970). :

The record in the instant case shows that

respondent-defendant’s motion for summary judg-

ment contained the following conclusory allega-

tion as a part of respondent’s affidavit: “9...

That any statements made by me concerning Ma-

jor Wanamaker were made solely in my capacity

as an Officer in the United States Air Force and

as Majer Wanamaker’s Commanding Officer.”

Petitioner-plaintiff introduced a number of affi-

davits showing that the utterances were made in

casual conversations, in personal contexts, in civ-

ilian clothes, after duty hours, and on a holiday.

One affidavit, by a Michigan attorney, states that

respondent-defendant, while dressed in civilian

clothes, made ithe following statement: “Come

inside, Mac, I want to discuss something per-

sonal. It’s (obscenities ...) important to me

or I wouldn’t take up your time on a holiday...

Al Wanamaker has embarrassed me personally.

He’s a traitor to his country and a modern day

Benedict Arnold. I want to bar him from the

practice of law. If you’re smart Mac, you’ll

help me pretect my tail and cover up this mess.”

Petitioner contends that the record contains

sufficient evidence to rebut respondent’s bare self-

5 Aen ARR ERTIES IR TEE OLE LE LEL LY ISOLDE NADL IO LG ES PELE IEA

10

serving affidavit, introduced with no support. In

Denman_v. White, supra, a similarly claimed

privilege was upheld on motion, but with affi-

davits from two generals, one an immediate

commander of defendant, together with a copy of H

the appropriate Air Force regulation authorizing

the. activity. No such support was pro.erred

here. It remains the respondent-defendant’s bur-

den to show his entitlement to executive immun-

ity, and there is no presumption to aidhim. Pros-

ser, Torts, $111 at 823 (2d Ed. 1964), Respond-

ent-defendant’s affidavit, if it is relied upon ex-

clusively in its present form, creates a presump-

tion that the statements were within the scope

of duty unless plaintiff can prove otherwise,.. .

an impossible burden. See Barr, supra, at 579,

Chief Justice Warren’s dissent.

Petitioner respectfully contends that the re-

fusal of the Court of Appeals below to remand

the proceedings for an evidentiary hearing sanc-

tioned a departure from accepted and usual judi-

cial proceedings in that a bare conclusory affi-

davit, with no supporting affidavits or material,

defeated petitioner’s reply to the motion even

though it was amply supported by three affidavits,

any one of which were sufficient to put the matter

into issue. An unsupported affidavit by the re-

spondent thus becomes the basis for an outcome

— determinative decision by the trial court.

For the foregoing reasons, together with the

parallel rationale expressed by the court and the

concurrence in Bivins v. Six Unknown Named

TENET IE a NTE REN EON —_— & one

11

Agents, US. » 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L.

Ed. 619 (1971), this petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be granted, and the Court should

reverse the determination of the court below on

the basis that there is no settled or binding

rule of absolute privilege controlling the instant .

matter, that the alleged utterances were made

outside of respondent’s scope of duty, or, al-

ternatively, that there should have been an evi-

dentiary proceeding to determine the scope of

duty issue at the trial court,

Respectfully submitted,

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.

In Propria Persona

abi eaitas: ste vewtenl Lies iny his thm a tnt

la

APPENDIX A

Order Appealed From

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Filed June 17, 1971

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

vs.

JOHN C. RILEY, |

Defendant-Appellee

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, WEICK and

McCREE, Circuit Judges.

Appellant is a Major in tne Air Force Reserve

and has been on duty at Selfridge Air Force Base

in Michigan since his unit was activated. He

brought an action for damages for defamation

against his commanding officer, a Colonel in the

Reserve, the action arising out of utterances made

by the Colonel at the Base, concerning appellant’s

activities as a dissident, which activities ques-

tioned the call to active duty and were reported

in the press, on television and through other news

media.

The District Court granted summary judgment

on the ground that the utterances of the command-

ing officer were absolutely privileged.

2a

Order Appealed F rom

We affirm on the authority of Barr v. Matteo,

360 U.S. 564 (1959), and Molever v. Lindsey,

411 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1969).

Judge McCree dissents. While he recognizes

the existence of absolute privilege of the com-

manding officer, he would remand for an evi-

dentiary hearing to determine whether the ut-

terances were made “within the outer perimeter”

of the duties of the commanding officer.

Entered by order of the Court.

s/ James A. Higgins

Clerk

a Satyinkt a eM

3a

APPENDIX B

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Order entered August 26, 1970

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

JOHN C. RILEY AND ROBERT HLATKY,

Defendants.

At a session:of said court held in the Federal

Building in the City of Detroit, Michigan,

on the 26th day of August, 1970,

Present: The Honorable FRED W. KAESS,

United States District Judge.

This case involves a three-count complaint

against two defendants. Count One charges de-

fendant Riley with defamation by slander. Count

Two charges defendant Hlatky with defamation by

libel, Count Three alleges abuse of process on

the part of defendant Riley.

Count Two having previously been dismissed

with the consent of counsel, the present motica

for summary judgment concerns only Counts One

and Three,

44

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

It is the position of the United States, on be-

half of the defendant John C. Riley, that any

defamatory statements alleged in Count One of

the complaint, as well as any actions taken by

him to discipline the plaintiff alleged in Count

Three, were clearly within the perimeter of de-

fendant’s duties as a commanding officer of the

United States Air Force; and that, as such, they

were absolutely privileged, thus precluding any

recovery by the plaintiff in this action.

The plaintiff counters by maintaining that there

is no federal absolute privilege in favor of the

defendant; and that, assuming arguendo there is

such a privilege, it is not available in the instant

case because the statements and actions of the

defendant Riley were outside the perimeter of

his duties.

This kind of case, as frequently has been

observed, touches upon the conflict between two

considerations of high importance, namely, on

the one hand the protection of the individual

citizen against damage caused by oppressive or

malicious action on the part of government offi-

cers; and on the other, the protection of the pub-

lic interest by shielding responsible governmental

officials against the harassment and inevitable

hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits

brought on account of action taken in the exer-

cise of their official responsibilities. Barr v.

Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle,

177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339

U.S. 949.

— van

5a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

This court, too, has struggled with this con-

flict reflecting upon the various cases cited by

counsel which involve a variety of factual situa-

tions.

The court concludes, however, that the case

at bar falls within the rule laid down in Barr v.

Matteo, supra — that the defendant’s plea of ab-

solute privilege must be sustained.

Relative to Count Three, the action taken was

cleariy within the perimeter of the defendant’s

duties as the commanding officer of the 305th

Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron stationed at

Selfridge Air Force Base. As the commanding

officer, defendant Riley was responsible for the

maintenance of proper discipline and it was surely

within his discretionary power to request an in-

vestigation and subsequent court martial action

against those under his command, “despite the

allegations of malice.” Gregoire v. Biddle, supra,

at p. 525.

The question of sianderous statements in Count

One is a close one, but the court holds that such

statements were made within the discretionary

authority of the defendant. That the defendant

was not required by law or by direction of his

superiors is not controlling, for the same consid-

erations which underlie the recognition of the

privilege as to acts done in connection with a

mandatory duty apply with equal force to discre-—

tionary acts. In this instance, the statements

complained of, as stipulated by the plaintiff in

open court, were made by the defendant to other

6a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

military personnel while on the premises of

Selfridge Air Force Base. While the language

used was stronger than necessary, defendant Ri-

ley’s statements are within the outer perimeter

of his duty to maintain discipline and inform

those under his command of proscribed conduct.

Such internal statements constitute a part of the

defendant’s official duties and consequently come

under the protective shield of absolute privilege.

As a fina! consideration the court quotes the

final paragravh of the Supreme Court’s opinion

in Barr v. Matteo, supra:

We are told that we should forbear from

sanctioning any such rule of absolute priv-

ilege lest it open the door to wholesale

oppression and abuses on the part of un-

scrupulous government officials. It is per-

haps enough to say that fears of this sort

have not been realized within the wide area

of government where a judicially formulated

absolute privilege of broad scope has long

existed. It seems to us wholly chimerical

to suggest that what hangs in the balance

here is the maintenance of high standards of

conduct among those in the public service.

To be sure, as with any rule of law which

attempts to reconcile fundamentally antag-

onistic social policies, there may be occa-

sional instances of actual injustice which

will go unredressed, but we think that price

a necessary one to pay for the greater good.

And there are of course other sanctions

than civil tort suits available to deter the

7a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

executive official who may be prone to

exercise his functions in an unworthy and

irresponsible manner. We think that we

should not be deterred from establishing

the rule which we announce today by any

such remote forebodings.”

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

s/ Fred W. Kaess

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing

Petitioy were served upon counsel for the respond-

ent by depositing same properly addressed with

postage prepaid in the United States Mail on this

day of September, 1971.

8a

APPENDIX C

Original Complaint

Complaint of Petitioner in the Circuit Court for

Macomb County, Michigan - filed May 5, 1969

State of Michigan

In the Circuit Court For the County of Macomb

Giles A. Wanamaker Jr.,

Plaintiff

No. X-69-1991

vs. Noe

John C, Riiey and

Robert Hlatky,

Defendants

NOW. comes the plaintiff in the above entitled

matter, GILES A. WANAMAKER, J”., in proper

personam, and for a cause of action says:

COUNT 1 DEFAMATION (SLANDER)

1. THAT plaintiff is a resident of the City

of Northville, County of Oakland, State of Michi-

gan.

2. THAT defendant RILEY is aresident of the

City of Utica, County of Macomb, State of Michi-

gan and that defendant HLATKY is a resident

of Selfridge AFB, County of Macomb, State of

Michigan.

9a

Original Complaint

3. THAT on certain occasions in November

of 1968 and on certain occasions subsequent and

in particular on December 24, 1968, in the pres-

ence of others, defendant RILEY made defamatory

statements concerning plaintiff, including but not

limited to the following: “Major Wanamaker is

a modern Benedict Arnold. ...... Major Wan-

am*ker is a traitor to his country.......

(a crime punishable by death in both Federal and

State jurisdictions).

4. THAT the above and other statements were

made wilfully, falsely and with the malicious in-

tent to do serious and permanent damage to plain-

tiff, such statements being made in Macomb Co,

5. THAT as a proximate result of defendant

RILEY’S malicious slander, plaintiff has suffered

permanent and substantial damage to reputation,

present and future earning capacity, professional

status, military career, and has endured great

mental suffering and anguish.

(Counts II and III having been dismissed with the

consent of petitioner, they are omitted from

this Appendix)

WHEREFORE plaintiff claims judgment against

defendant RILEY in the sum of five hundred

thousand dollars ($500,000.00) compensatory dam-

ages and five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00)

exemplary and punitive damages together with

costs of this litigation and claims judgment against

defendant HLATKY in the sum of one hundred

thousand ($100,000.00) dollars compensatory dam-

ae

10a

Original Complaint

ages and one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) dol-

lars punitive and exemplary damages together with

costs of this litigation.

s/ Giles A. Wanamaker, Jr.

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.

in proper personam

435 Welch Road

Northville, Michigan

349-0504

Date: May 5, 1969