Appendices — Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co.

Supreme Court brief1971

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APPENDIX A.

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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF |

LAW OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT#COURT _

‘OF UTAH > oe

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. Defendant’s motion to dismiss came on for hearing the

4 8th day of May, 1969, before the Honorable Willis W. Rit- ”

ter, Chief Judge. Plaintiff and third party defendants were

represented by Brigham E. Roberts of the firm.of Rawlings,

Roberts & Black; the defendant was represented by Marvin

J. Bertoch and Thomas A. Quinn of the firm of Ray, Quin-

ney & Nebeker and by Sidney G. Baucom and Robert Gor-

don of the firm of Baucom, Gordon & Porter. © |

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-Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law were

‘presented and not excluded, and arguments ‘were made by

counsel. Having examined the depositions, affidavits and -

memoranda of law and listened to the arguments of coun-

_ sel, the Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law: : ;

FENDINGS OF FACT eee

1. The plaintiff owns a shopping center in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, with the exception of an area located:

within the center which-is owned by Eldredge Furniture

. Company. The plaintiff constructed the buildings located in

the shopping center and leases them. to approximately sev-_

enty different tenants, and has sold: one of the properties

to the Eldredge Furniture Company. |

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2. Since 1961, defendant has supplied electrical power

to the tenants’ and owners occupying the Cottonwood Mall

Shopping Center. !

3. Plaintiff in 1968 and 1969 installed a power plant

on the premises, and by this lawsuit seeks to compete’ with

the défendant in. ‘supplying parca power for use in the.

: shopping center. .

4, Defendant, having expended approximately $558,-

000.00 in capital investment to supply the center with elec-

tricity, is equipped and able and desires to continue to pro-

- . vide all.of the electrical power needed for present and fut-

' ure use in the shopping center.

‘5. The sole issue submitted to this Court be defend-

ant’s motion to dismiss, which the Court under Rule 12(b),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,. will treat as a motion for

summary judgment, is whether or not the plaintiff has the —

right under Title 54, Utah Code Annotated, to compete with

the defendant in the furnishing of electrical power in the

Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center.

6. The Cottonwood Mall aie < Center consists of

approximately seventy stores and Offices, which sell mér-

_chandise of various types and supply professional services

to thousands of members of the general public. The stores ~

include such large department stores as Z.C.M.I.-and J. C.

Penney Company, plus grocery stores, clothing stores, drug

stores, restaurants and various other types of stores com-

‘monly found in.a large shopping center. The premises in-

clude a large electrically lighted parking lot. In addition,

numerous persons other than Shoppers are attributed to and

—_

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use the facilities of the center for such activities as automo-

bile shows, Junior Achievement fairs, garden and flower

shows, boat shows, Go-Kart shows, stamp shows, Indian |

dancers, art and ceramic shows, bazaars, Halloween parades

and other similar activities classified by the manager of the

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Cottonwood Mall, Merchants Association as “traffic build

ing events”. Oelier activities are routinely allowed on the

premises such as high school seminary dances, dances spon-

sored by the Latter-day Saints Church stakes, square dances,

firemen’s balls and Easter sunrise services, all’of which are

- carried on when, the stores are not open and are not‘consid- _

ered by the manager .of the Cottonwood Mall eric sae

Association as “waffic building events”.

a = plaintiff were permitted to furdéith electric’ power

as it proposes to do, it would not be- providing electric

power “solely-for its own use, or the use of its tenants” in

contemplation of tolnata (20), Utah Code Annotated,. 1953.

Based on the foregoing Findings of: Fact, heed Court

makes the following Conclusions of Law:

| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. 54-2-1(20), 54-2. 1(29) and. 54-4-25(1), Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, are the controlling statutes.” They read as

follows: [The Court then. quoted the statutes. which. are set

forth in Appendix D). : ee

2. The plaintiff, if permitted to generate ne rare wae as

| electric — as it proposes to do, would be an “electric.

corporation” in contemplation of '54-2-1(20), Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, and would be a “public utility” in: con-

— of 54-2- 1(29), Utah —_ Annotated, 1953, and

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could not legally construct an electrical plant or system or

generate or distribute electritity without ‘first acquiring a

_ certificate of public convenience and necessity as required

|. by 54-4-25(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

| 3. Plaintiff has ‘not been granted a certificate of public

“convenience and necessity and is not entitled under the law

to be granted such a certificate.for the géneration or distri-

‘ bution of electricity to serve the Cottonwood Mall Shop

ping Center. :

-4,. It was not < the: intention of the Utah Legislature in

adopting 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to allow

persons to avoid the supervision and regulation of the Pub-

: lic Service Commission in connection with supplying élec-

‘trical service to large shopping centers. It is a puspose of

Utah law involving public utilities to protect users of elec-

a tricity with respect to rates and-quality of service. The legis-

lature and the law intend that such protection be supplied

to such users 4s those — the Cottonwood Mall Shop-

ping Center. ate

_ 45. The rare is authorized by-law. to serve the.

users of electricity i in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Cen- ‘|

ter and is entitled utider ‘the law to provide the. exclusive

electrical service to all users of electricity in the Cottonwood |

Mall Shopping Center, and accordingly is not in violation

of any antitrust law and not illegally interfering with or

violating any of plaintiff’s —* in so 0 doing,

6. Defendant ‘i ‘is entitled to summary judgment against

. the plaintiff dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and for.. its

~ costs incurred herein. | |

"Dated this Lith dey of : Jaly, 1969.

A-5

DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT. COURT

| a OF UTAH |

Defendant’s motion to dismiss < came on for hearing on

the 8th day of:May,-1969, before the Honorable Willis W.

Ritter, Chief Judge. Plaintiff and Third party defendants

‘were represented by Brigham E.. Roberts of the firm of

Rawlings, Roberts: & Black; the defendant was represented

by Marvin J. Bertoch and Thomas A. Quinn of the firm of

Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, and by Sidney G. Baucom lows

Robert Gordon.

Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law. were

._ presented and not excluded, and arguments were made by

counsel. Depositions and affidavits having been received,

defendant’s motion, in accordance with the provisions of '

Rule ‘12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will be treat-

ed as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of under

the provisions of Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7

The Court, having examined the depositions, affidavits

‘and memoranda of law, and having listened to the argu-

ments of cee, and good cause appearing therefor,

And the é Coste saepreealy determines that there is no just

reason for delay, and the Court expressly directs that this |

Decree be entered as a final decree pursuant to the terms _

and provisions of — 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant, Utah

Power & Light Company, be, and i is hereby granted sum-

| A-6

mary judgment against plaintiff, thegomplaint of the plain-

tiff is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on its merits,

costs to be paid by the plaintiff. :

It appearing to the Court that through an oversight of.

the parties the Court did not make the determination of no

just reason for delay and the direction that the decree be ent-

ered as a final decree and the parties and the Court intend-

_ ing that the decree should have such effect, IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that this Decree be entered as of the 11th day of

July, 1969.

DATED this 23rd day of October, 1969.

.

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APPENDIX 3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _

TENTH CIRCUIT _—

March Term, 1971

COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING . ao oe

CENTER, INC., Appeal from the

a Utah corporation, United States

Plaintiff and Appellants, { District Court

a for the District

ae at of Utah

UTAH POWER & LIGHT mY

COMPANY, a Maine Corporation | No. 474-69

Defendant and Appellee, et al., |. ! :

Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, BROWN, Chief Judge*,

and SET H, Circuit Judge.

BROWN, Circuit Judge.

Parough the wide door of a federal antitrust suit we

back into an earth-bound, Utah-bound Erie problem of statu-

tory construction since the thrusters on the alternative due

process claim cannot orbit it to a constitutional apogee. In

more austere terms the question is whether a shopping cen- |

ter operator in sa electricity to the lessee merchants

* Of the Fifth Circuit,

Sitting by Designation

_becomies subject to regulation as a public utility. The Court

below answered i in the affirmative, and we affirm.

Cottonwood,’ owner and operator of a large showping

center in the trade area of Salt Lake City sued Power Com-

— pany” alleging that Power Company had attempted to mon-

opolize the market for electrical power at the center and had

interfered with existing contracts of Cottonwood to provide

electricity for ‘J. C. Penney, a tenant on ‘the Mall.. The basic

question is put in issue by the defense that Cottonwood lacks

the necessary Certificate of Public Convenience from the

Utah Public Sérvice Gommission and therefore cannot chal-

lenge these economic activities of Power’ Company.’ The

Court below gave summary judgment to Power Company on

‘the ground that Cottonwood would need a Certificate before

it could press its‘claims, for if it had no right to sell elec-

tricity, then by definition Power Company could not inter-

* fere with this “right.”

This brings into play the Utah statutory structure of

utility regulation. which starts with the traditional require-

ment of a Certificate of Public Convenience* for a broad

‘Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc., a Utah corporation.

2Utah Power and Lght Company, a Maine corporation, -having fran-

chises and requisite certificates to furnish electricity to the public.

_ 3As an adjunct to this defense, Power Company sought and obtained a

preliminary injunction to prevent Cottonwood from interfering with Power

Company’s business relationships with its customers on the Mall, one of

whom was J. C. Penney Company.

“Utah Code Annotated § 54-4-25(1) (1969 Supp.) provides that:

“No railroad corporation, street railroad corporation, aerial

bucket tramway corporation, gas corporation, electric corporation,

telephone: corporation, télegraph corporation, heat corporation, |

automobile corporation, aircraft carrier. (corporation),- water cor-

poration or sewage corporation shall henceforth establish, or be-

gin construction or operation of a railroad, street railroad, aerial

bucket tramway, line, route, plant or system or of any extension

of such railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line, route,

plant or system, without having first obtained from the commission .

a certificate that present or future public convenience and neces-

. sity.does or will require such construction * * *”

(Emphasis added). -

D

scoring.

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range of business including an “electrical corporation”

which is broadly defined’ as is “public utility”® generally. .

The decision turns on. the exception whether Cottonwood.

' distributes the electricity “(i) through private property

alone, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, [ii] solely

for his own use, or the use of his tenants * * *,”* And we

zero in on factor [ii].

*In Utah Code Annotated § 54-2-1(20) (1969 Supp.) “electrical corpor-

ation” is defined: _

“Every corporation, cooperative association and person, their

lessees, trustees and receivers or trustees appointed by any court

whatsoever, owning, controlling, operating or managigg any elec-

trical plant, or in anywise furnishing electric power, for public

service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial or

industrial use, within this state except where electricity is gene-

rated on or distributed by the producer through private property

alone, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely for his own

use, or the use of. his tenants, or by an association of unit owners

formed under the “condominium ownership act, chapter 111, laws

of Utah, 1963. (57-8-1 to 57-8-35] and not for sale to others,”

The annotations to § 54-2-1 indicate the 1965 changes in this and other:

sections from their prior reading which we have indicated above by under-

History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 2\§1; CL. 1917, § 4782; L. 1925,

‘ch: 12, §1; R. S. 1933 & C, 1943, 76-2-1; L. 1948 (Ist S. .), ch. 7.

81; 1957, ch. 106, §1; 1959, ch. 94, §1; 1965, ch. 106, §1; 1969, ch.

a :

Compiler’s Notes. - m :

The 1965 amendment ‘inserted “co-operative association” after “cor-

poration,” “or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial of in-

dustrial use’ after “public service,” “i.e., property not dedicated to public

use” after “property alone” and “or by an association of unit owners formed

under the ‘condominium ownership act,’ chapter 111, Laws of Utah, 1963”

after “of his tenants” in subd. (20) and ‘substituted “electrical corporation”

for “electric corporation” after “gas corporation,” inserted “or electrical

corporation” after “gas corporation” and “or electricity” after “gas,” and

substituted “member” for “consumer” after “furnished to any” in the first

and second sentences of the first patagraph and added the proviso at the end

of the’second paragraph of subd. (29), and made minor changes in punctu-

ation. . : .

- Section 54-2-1(29) provides:

. “The term ‘public utility’ includes every * * * gas corporation,

electrical corporatian * * * where the service is performed for, or the com-

a

modity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corpor- |

ation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished

to any member or consumers within the state of Utah for domestic, commer-

cial or industrial use. And whenever any * * * gas corporation, electrical

corporation * * * performs a service for or delivers a: commodity to the

public; or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation selling or

furnishing gas or electricity.to any member or consumers within the state of .

fs

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B-10 ©

Cottonwood Mall is a large shopping center in the Salt

Lake City trade area. ‘The Center lies under one roof and

contains a complex of stores and buildings surrounding a

Mall. Cottonwood owns all of the property on the Mall as

well as.the parking area around the building except for the

Eldridge Furniture building that Eldredge is buying from

Cottonwood under a Utah Uniform Sales Agreement.’ Ex-

cept for the Eldredge building, all of the space in the Center

is presently leased to about seventy tenants under written

leases. The tenants share the expenses of lighting the park-

ing ‘lot and the exterior of the buildings, for painting the

automobile parking stalls, for sweeping and cleaning the

parking area, and for maintaining the green areas in the

Center. | : . ;

- Utah, for domestic, commercial or » indeasteiel use, for which any compen-

' sation or payment whatsoever is received, such * * * gas corporation, elec-

trical corporation * * * is hereby declared to be a public utility, subject

- thi — and regulation of the commission and to the provisions

is title.”

The: ‘underscoring indicates the el in this statute isi the original. See

Note 5, supra. The Compiler’s Notes state this as to gas:

“The 1959 amendment inserted provisions concerning selling

or “furnishing gas to consumers for domestic, commercial, ¢ or in-

dustrial use in subds. (18) and (29). “ .

7Eldridge subleases part of its building to Mor, ew ton

and to Ex-Cel-Cis Beauty Salon. “ee = py

7 ¢

- Bll

_ The merchants of Cottonwood Mall have organized a

non-profit corporation whose purpose it is to promote busi-

ness ‘on the Mall and to determine the extra-commercial pro-

motional activities that should be conducted there, ‘Fhese

activities will, in the jargon of the shopping center world,

generate traffic to the Center with the hope, if not expecta-

tion, that.many will then or later become customers of some.

or all of the merchants. ‘The Board; consisting of persons.

_ elected by the merchants (who pay. substantial dues. based

- on square footage) and of the President of Cottonwood

must approve any such outside activities on ‘the Mall. In the

‘past the Board has authorized a whole gamut of activities

including automobile shows, small car races, sidewalk sales,

garden shows, boat. shows, stamp shows, Indian dances, a

; circus, art displays, and handicraft shows.°® Also, the audi-

torium at the Center has been used by many religious, civic,

' social and political groups to hold gatherings, dances, and

the like, a large number of which took: place after store:

’ closing hours. © |

SCottonwood’s brief gives a more ‘complete list:

“These promotions include auto shows; a small one ring traveling

circus with one truckload of animals; a Gymkahana, consisting of small car

programs; garden shows; outdoor living shows; stamp

shows; Aztec Indian Dances; European Aft Display; the S

Tree; Halloween Parades; Snowmobile c Shows; Gladiola

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The controversy here arose when in 1968 — seven years

after the contract was made with Power Company — Cot-

tonwood decided to fufnish electrical power to the tenants

on the Mall as part of a total energy plan. It constructed an

energy. plant just to the south of the Center and has gone

through some elaborate procedures to make the system work.

able. The plant,’ as well as all ducts and wires from it to

the Mall, are on contiguous private property owned by Cot-

tonwood. Cottonwood hasgexpended about one and one-

half million dollars'® to provide this capacity ahd intends

to furnish the power only to itself and’to the tenants of Cot-

tonwood | Mail, not to other elements of the general pub-

-lic.”"' The charges for the electrical power, heating and air ~

conditioning will be included in the rental rates of the ten-

ants. |

We begin our analysis by recognizing that there are

few if;any Utah lampposts to light our Erie, way. But as this

‘ a facilities meet the definition “« “electric plant” in §

54-2-1(1 : ’

“The term ‘electric plant’ includes all coal estate and fixtures ead

personal pro perty owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection

with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery or:

furnishing of electricity for light, heat or power, and. all conduits, ducts or

other devices, materials, apparatus or property for containing, holding or

carrying conductors _, or to be used for the transmission of electricity

for light, heat ‘or power.” = oe

‘Power Company’s investment in the Coniat | ‘runs from one-half to

over oné million dollars, and its annual loss of revenues will be about one-

quarter ofa million dollars. were Cottonwood’s plan to be activated.

s eee expressly states it would not serve the Eldridge building

or its occupants. (See note 7, supra.)

ant

PS ee eee

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is a case in which there is no specific “state law,”'? we need,

not be dismayed since the Federal Court may look to all re-

sources'® including “the decisions of other states, federal

decisions or the general weight of authority,” the goal be-

‘ing “that the federal court reach the result that would prob-

‘ably be reached were the question to be litigated in a state

court.” 1 Barron and. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-

cedure, § 8 at 40 (Wright ed. 1961). |

The analysis begins with the long-age, but still pertin-

ent, declaration of the Utah Supreme Court on the under-

lying policy of public utility regulation. In Gilmer v. Public

Utilities. Commission, 1926, 67 Utah 222, 247 P. 284, that

Court pointed out that though competition was usually a_

desirable goal, the states. had found the case to be otherwise

in the public utility field. The states felt it more suitable to

put these activities under closely controlled, state granted

monopolies. “This means that in construing these statutes —

which of course expressly cover the physical operational ac-

“

' 12To paraphrase ‘our decision: in Manual of Omaha Ins. Co. y. Russell, ©

10 Cir. 1968, F.2d 339, cert. denied, 1969, 394 US. 973, 89.-S.Ct. 1456, 22

,L.Ed.2d 733: This “is ora what [Utah] would decide on a question they

have never decided. 402 F.2d at 343 and the appended note 13.

“This is a little less difficult than the. problem -_posed in Judge

Friendly’s celebrated Erie ‘comment: ‘Our Principal task in this di-

versity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York

courts would think the California courts would think on an issue

about which neither has thought.’ . Nolan v. Trans-ocean Air Lines,

2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 280, 281, rev’d. 1961, 365 U.S. 293, 81 S.Ct.

555, 5 L.Ed.2d 571, on remand, 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 904.”

See also Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 5 Cir., 1968, 394 F.2d 656,

_ 657; Martinez v. Rodriguez, 5 Cir., 1969, 410 F.2d 729, 731. :

'3See Stool v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 404 F. 2d 562; Insurance Co.

of North America v. English, 5 Cir., 1968, 395 F.2d 854; Stevens Industries,

Inc. v, Maryland Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 411, cert. denied, 1968,

392 US. 926, 88 S.Ct. 2285, 20 L.Ed.2d 1386. .

- B4

tivities of Cottonwood — we must give a liberal reading to-

provisions subjecting the activity to regulation while simul-

taneously giving a more narrow scope to the exceptions.

Two factors lead us.to the conclusion that Utah would

hold Cottonwood to be subject to regulation and hence not

within the sole tise of tenants exception. The first is the his-

torical development Of the statutory structure. The second is

- the nature of the activities in which the beneficial use of the

electric power goes way beyond that of the tenants alone.

Substanti4l changes have been made in the 1917 ver-:

sion'* of § 54-2-1(20) as note 5, supra reflects. The ‘key |

Company v. Public Service Commission,.1940, 98 Utah 466, —

100 P.2d 571. Following the reasoning: of Public Utilities

Commission v. Nelson, 1925, 65 Utah 457, 238\P.:237, Gar-

_ kane held that a public utility is a business that\held itself

out to serve the public gesierally and- not one - t limited

except where electricity is generated on or distributed by the producer -

Se Eee gape Sees See Ee Os Ga eer Oe eee OS

tenants and not for sale to others.” a

-* “The-19f7 statute was re-enacted several times prior to 1965. Somewhere

down the line, “public service” beiineumcanon ‘or “public use.”

- '5FollowingGarkane closely is San Miguel Power Association v. Public

Service Commission, 1956, 4 Utah 2d 252, - P.2d 511. |

interpretation of this section of the statute is Garkane Power __

B-15

i

—— e

Commission did not wiale to these cooperatives even Para

access to the cooperatives was Open to almost anyone who

applied ane who el a very nominal fee. :

- But in our Erie effort of divination this is of little help. -

First Garkane dealt with the “furnishing electrical power for

public use” section of the 1917 version of § 54-2-1(20). See

note 14, supra. Here the comgoversy hinges on the excep-

tion to the statute concerning distribution ‘ ‘solely for his °

own [the distributor’ s] use, or, the use of his tenants.”

Neither-this part of § 54-2-1(20) nor its 1917 predecessor

has ever been the subject of uk phar cca in Utah.

i seule ‘whatever-light Sain had cast on -* ;

legal concepts of “public” and “private” that underlie this _

whole area was doused by the 1956 revision (see note 5,

supra) of the definition of “electrical a oe Fiest,.: .

the — made specific reference to a “cooperative associ-

ation.” Next, and more signifiant, the. festrictive notion of

furnishing electric power “for public service” was greatly

expanded. This was done by adopting for electricity what

had been promulgated for gas in 1959 (see historical note

in note 6, supra) to subject to regulation one “furnishing

electrical power, * * * to its customers or members for do-

mestic, commercial or industrial use * * #7 © \

At least tials as Garkane tried to define what “for.

public service” means, the 1965 statute seems clearly to over-

rule it. For*Garkane expressly dealt with a company sup-

plying electricity “to its customers or members.”’'*

'6The specific addition of condominiums as an exception adds weight

to our conclusion. Quite apart from highly refined legalistic concepts in this °

modern tax-born structure, there is a considerable parallel in terms of inter- .

locking mutual interests between condominium’ participants and the shopping

center relationship. : .

ae — “sold or furnished.” yeep note.

_. But we think the legislature meant it to be more than

a legislative. repeal of Garkané. It brought gas and electric-

_ity in harmony and as reflective of a purposeful broadening.

of regulatory coverage, the changes were carried forward

. into the — of ' ‘public ae (See note 6, supra).

On the stbdigeadtceeed facts coceaiit by this record we

. think also that Utah would not ‘consider the power furnished ~

solely for ithe “use of [the] tenants.” At the outset, ‘like

“ - Mordecai at the gate, there is awenl and his brood. of sub-

‘lessees. ‘True, Cottonwood disclaims a purpose to serve him.

But Eldredge gets all the benefit from the common 1iPhting .

of the interior Mall, the parking lot.and all other areas not

es only open to the public bit to which all hope and pray the

public i in droves will come. Eldredge customers, both real

and ‘prospective, likewise share ih the cool, regulated at- .

. mosphere which Cottonwood power turns into an air-con-

ditioned Mall. Eldridge i is a direct “user” of the only bene-

ficial function that power can supply to these: premises —

light and air gonditioning i in the public areas. Cottonwood

»

cannot flee, the statute. because it in effect gives power away

to Eldridge,, fog a the.power is nonetheless “furnished.”"’

‘But.we need not rest on this unusual fact alone. The

whole activity of the merchants. and operator of the Mall

: demonstrates that for the purposes of this utility statutory

. scheme, the power is not furnished “solely for the use of the .

tenants” (see note 5, supra). Not by accident, but. by the

sheerest deliberation, Cottonwood and the member-mer-

~~ chants have made others — members of the public singly or.

in organized groups - —a ee object of the things which

~ lien « nd

.¢: WA sale is not comaieel a re. 54-2- 1(20). Proven 3 need only be

“furnished.” (See note 5, supra). U Wt gr 3 tility” soresner exists for

=

6

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- >

power supplies — light and air conditioning in the Mall

and. light i in the parking areas. .To be sure, all of this is not

offered in the name of sweet charity. But at least to the

extent that someone is attracted to the Center without ever

making a purchase, or making a purchase from. all of the

contribytory establishments, the beneficial enjoyment af-

_. forded i is for the persons other = Cottonwood or tenants -

or both.

A utility structure is: not based upon collateral legal

concepts of property ownership. The law, as it adapts itself

to\ the .changing interests of an irrepressible. society, ¢an -

measure things i in a realistic way. Thus, to the great delight

of ptomoters, entrepreneurs, mortgagé lenders, building

contractors and merchants, the modern shopping center is a

part of the community. It seeks to seek and serve the public.

- And the law at appropriate times’ recognizes. its public char-

acteristics, whatever se the nature of inal. title.'* .

With all of these factors — (i) legislative esas

bringing i in the concept of furnishing. electricity to gonsumers

(ii) the, presence of Eldridge and. (iii) widespread direct en-

joyment by the public of the power furnished on a non-re-

munerative basis — we do not think Utah would permit

this intrusion into the field of a public utility by one who

18See Amalgamated Food Emslovees’ ‘Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley

Plaza, Inc., 1968, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603; ‘Diamond v.

Bland, Calif, Sup. Ct, 1970, ———Cal. Roptr, ~P.2d — [39

US.L.W. 2342, December 16, 1970], reversing the opinion of the California

Court of Appeal at 87 Cal. Rptr, 97, P.2d . Logan Valley only

* addressed itself to speech activities that directly related . to the business ac-

tivities of the ping center. The lower Court opinion in Diamond con-

firmed Logan V. to its facts. The reversal by the California he ae

tie poe will be permissible 1 in a large Teun center. We do not pass on ~

any such. issues, nor do we intimate any ultimate disposition of them, when

or as any come before us later.

* B18

would be unregulated both from the standpoint of what it .

could do to its customers and, more so, the damage it could

do to the public good by an uneconomic duplication of fa-

cilities and a raid on. Power Company’s customers to the de-

triment of all public power’ users. Nor do we think Utah

‘would be persuaded by the cases from other states'® which

involve different statutes and much less precise policies.

Statutory escape failing, Cottonwood naturally turns to

the Constitution to assert the statute violates the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Or in more classical

constitutional terms, Cottonwood claims that the State can-

not by a subject private economic activity to pub-

lic regulation.*° ons

~

But beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 1877, 94 U.S..

113, 24 L.Ed. 77, the Courts have moved in a direction of

_giving the _—, almost limitless power to regulate -

19See, e.g. Dental: Assoc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n.,

1965,.418 Pa. 430, 212 A.2d 237; City of Sun Prairie v. Public Service

Comm’n., 1967, 37 Wis. 2d 96, 154 N.W. 2d -360. These are for the most

part apartment-tenant situations. They deal with the “service to the pub-

lic” concept as in Garkane and not with the exception or the new broaderied

. coverage of § 54-2-1(20) ‘(see note 5, supra).

20 Although not so‘presented here this can take a double form — (i) as

sees its own Constitution, the statute is an unwarranted invasion of

private property, but (ii) if upheld by Utah it offends the federal constitution.

As to (i) we see no likelihood Utah would so hold. Although State v. Nel-

son, 1925, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237 got what some might regard as a resusci-

tating transfusion after the 1965 amendments (see notes 5, 6, supra) from

Medic-Call, Inc, v. Public Service Commission, 1970, 24 Utah od 2 273, 470

P.2d 258, the narrow, re it dow any there scrutinized bears no resembl-

org: tee BR fee aco U 21958, 252 Rad 1, really sates the problem,

1967, 384 F.2d 118.

Utah recognizes that a cooperative is a business “affected with a public inter-

est,” Gaerkane, supra, 100 P.2d..0t 574, and. thesefoce subject 0 seguiation

-. ander the 1965

B-19

. private commercial activity. The handwriting on the wall is

plain: i. = ; |

_ “The day is gone when this Court uses the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

strike down state laws, regulatory of business and

industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,

! - improvident, or out of harmony with particular

. school of thought. See Nebbia v. New York, 291

“U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940, 54 S.Ct. 505, * * * West

Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379, 81 L.Ed.

703, 57 S.Ct. 578, # *

_ Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 1955, 348 US.

483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, —, 99 L.Ed. 563, 572. Nebbia

made it plain that it was the nature, and not the ownership, _

of the business that made it susceptible to state regulation. .

And to meet the due process requirement, the State must not

face the heavy burden it does in First Amendment cases.

“So far as the requirement of due process is con-

cerned, and in the absence of other constitutional re.

‘striction, a state is free. to adopt whatever economic

policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public —

welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation

. adapted to its purpose. The courts are’without auth- -

-Ority either to declare such policy, or, when it is de-

clared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws

passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a

proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary

‘nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process -

are satisfied, * * *,”

Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537, 54 S.Ct. at

, 78 L.Ed. at 957.-"

” There is little doubt that Utah has borne this burden

here. At ‘this date we feel it unnecessary to explain why a

restriction of competition in the utility industry is a. “proper —

a

Oe ee a hee ee

spud

_ legislative purpose.” When we think of the overlapping

power systems,. duplicative operations, and higher consumer

prices that would occur if every enterprise of this or « of a.re-

Jated nature were not subject to state regulation, it id cer-

tain that for Utah the laws have a reasonable relationship to

the end. | 3

There it ends and so-does Cottonwood’ s total energy

plan.”' |

a

AFFIRMED.

”

o

2' Power Company concedes the preliminary injunction evaporates with

this affirmance so we do not reach this point.

a

C21

APPENDIX .

‘DOCKET ENTRIES OB, UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DATE FILING a PROCEEDINGS

3/12/71 Opinion, Lewis, Brown*, Seth (5th Circuit) Judg-

ment: Affirmed: .

3/24/71 Motion for ext. of time to 4/10/71 to file Petition

_ for Rehearing — Orig. only — Cert of Service

3/24/71 : Time for filing petition for ‘rehearing granted to

4/10/71 (HKP) :

4/ 7/71 Appellants’ motion for ext. of time to srs)n

to file petition for. aero — Orig. _ 3’cc. —

* Cert. of Service, me,

4/ 7/71 Order:- Appellants granted to 4/25/ 71 to file

MA petition for rehearing — Lewis.

4/22/71 Petition for Rehearing — Orig. and 3 cc. — — Cert.

of Service (4/ 23/ 71 — petition submitted to

panel) —

5/10/71 Order: - Petition for rehearing denied. (Lewis,

| Brown, Seth). .

> .

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

_ APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.

* Upon consideration of petition of Appellants for Re- °

hearing, it is ordered that said Petition be and is. hereby

denied.

DATED May 10, 1971. -

|

b-22

APPENDIX D.

STATUTES WHICH THIS CASE INVOLVES

These section numbers relate to Utah Code

Annotated -1953 1969 pocket ‘ea aorea

“54-425. Certificate of convenience and necessity

prerequisite to construction and operation — Certificates is-

sued to electrical corporations brought under act — Air car- .

riers. — (1) No railroad corporation, street railroad corpor- . -

ation, aerial bucket tramway corporation, gas corporation,

electric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph cor-

poration, heat corporation, automobile corporation, aircraft

carrier (corporation), water corporation or sewage conper-

ation shall hence forth establish, or begin construction or.

operation of a railroad, street, railroad, aerial bucket tram-

way, line, route, plant or system or of any extension of such

railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line, route,

plant or system, without having first obtained from the

commission a certificate that present or future public con-

venience and necessity does or will require such construc-

tion; > . . .

&

““54-2-1(20) The term ‘electrical corporation’ includes —

every corporation, cooperative association and person, their _

lessees, trustees and receivers or trustees appointed by the

court whatsoever, owning, contfolling, operating or man- -

aging any electric plant, or in anywise furnishing electric

power, for public service or to its consumers or members for

domestic, commercial or individual use, within, this state ex-

°

S

D-23

cept where electricity is generated on or distributed by -the

producer through private property alone, i.e., property not.

dedicated to public yse, solely for his own use, or the use of ©

his tenants, or by an association of unit owners formed

under the ‘condominium ownership act,’ chapter Ill, laws of

"Utah, 1963, [57-8-1 to 57-8-35 ] and not for sale to others.”

*54-2-1(30) The term ‘public utility’ includes every

common carrier, gas corporation, electrical corporation, tele-

phone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corpora-

. tion, sewerage corporation, heat corporation and warehouse-

man where the service is performed for, or the commodity

delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas

corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or elec-

tricity is sold or furnished to any member or consuniers with-

in the state of Utah for domestic, commercial or industrial

use. And whenever any common carrier, gas corporation,

electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph cor-

poration, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat cor-

poration or warehouseman performs a service for or delivers

a commodity to the public;-or in the case of a gas corporation

or electrical corporation selling or furnishing or. elec-

tricity to any member or consumers within the state of Utah,

for domestic, commercial or industrial use, for which any

compensation or payment whatsoever is recived, such com- -

mon carrier, gas corporation, electrical corporation, tele-

phone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corpora-

_ tion, heat corporation, and warehouseman i is hereby declar-

ed to be a public utility; subject to the jurisdiction and regu-. |

lation of the commission and to the provisions of this:

title a. :

E24"

-APPENDIX E.

=

~ CON STITUTIONAL PROV ISIONS INV OLVED

IN THIS: CASE ~

a

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT

XIV, SECT ION 1. 7

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States;

. and subject to the .jurisdictionghereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the State vgperein they reside. No State

_ shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-

leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any pérson of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor.deay to any person within

its jurisdiction = _— —— of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF F UTAH, ARTICLE

I, SECTION 7 ae 22.

Sic. a “No. person ‘shall be deprived of life, a |

or property, — due process of law.”

‘Sec. 22. “Péivate'property shall not be taken or lice

aged for public use without just compensation.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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