Opposition Brief — Allen v. VanCantfort
Supreme Court brief1971
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Gu the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OcrosEer TERM, 1970
No. 1542
Denzi. R. ALLEN, PETITIONER
v.
RottanD F. VanCantrort
Deantoni
ON PRTITION FOR A WRIT OF OERTIORARI TO THB UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPHALS FOR THE FIRST OIROUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN. OPPOSITION
Petitioner, then a lance corporal in the United
States Marine Corps, was, on June 5, 1968, charged
before a general court-martial, convened at Da Nang,
South Vietnam, with five specifications of premedi-
tated murder, in violation of Article 118, U.C.M.J.,
10 U.S.C. 918. The convening authority had directed,
before the trial, that the case be treated as non-capital
(Pet. App. 34, 53). Petitioner then entered a plea of
guilty with respect to all five specifications and
was sentenced to twenty years’ confinement at
hard labor, a reduction to Pay Grade E-1 and
dishonorable discharge from the service. On ap-
peal to the United States Navy Court‘of Military Re-
, Ay!
423-850—71
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view, the conviction was affirmed, and the United
States Court of Military Appeals denied a petition
for further review (Pet. App. 32, 55-61).
Petitioner then instituted the present habeas corpus
proceedings, seeking to set aside his conviction essen-
tially on the grounds: (1) that his military counsel was
ineffective in the manner in which he elected to pre-
sent an insanity defense, and (2) that the acceptance
of the guilty plea was in violation of military law
because the crimes charged were capital offenses.
These contentions were exhaustively analyzed and
properly rejected by both the district court (Pet. App.
40-71; 316 F. Supp. 222) and the court of appeals
(Pet. App. 31-39; 436 F. 2d 625) ; we rely here on the
comprehensive opinions below.
In asserting the incompetence ° ‘of counsel in ar-
ranging the guilty plea without raising the defense
of insanity—a defense which his counsel knew could
be presented on appeal under military law and which
he planned so to raise and did in fact raise on appeal
(Pet. App. 36-38, 52-61)—petitioner relies on assert-
edly conflicting cases dealing with incapacity to stand
trial (Pet. 14-18). Those cases, however, are inap-
posite; there is in this case no evidence which raises
a serious question of petitioner’s competence to stand
trial under the standard of Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, or of his capacity to agree to the guilty
plea or confess his guilt. — mg
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case,
the court below properly found (Pet. App. 36) that
the strategy adopted by petitioner’s trial counsel “not
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only fails to shock the conscience but appears to have
been eminently sound,’ particularly in view of the
fact that the evidence against petitioner, including
his own confession, was overwhelming and the fact
that his “chances of obtaining a favorable report from
the military psychiatrists available in Vietnam ap-
peared to be remote” (Pet. App. 36).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Erwin N. Griswo.p,
Solicitor General.
May 1971.
tw,
*Even if, as petitioner maintains (Pet. 21), counsel could
have had petitioner sent to the United States for psychiatric
evaluation, and then returned to Vietnam to stand trial (rather
than enter a guilty plea), his decision not to do so was one
of trial strategy. Counsel cannot now be faulted for electing
the alternative course—equally proper under military law—of
having his client plead guilty and then having him returned to
the United States, where petitioner could submit to psychiatric
evaluation and raise his insanity defense for the first time on
appeal before the United States Navy Court of Military
Review.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: teT!
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