Appendix A — Consolidation Coal Co. v. South-East Coal Co.

Supreme Court brief1971

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 19,622 5

SOUTH-EAST COAL COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Appeals from

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, the United

Defendant-Appellant. | States District

- Court for the

No. 19,623 Eastern Dis-

SOUTH-EAST COAL COMPANY, trict of Ken-

Plaintiff-Appellee, | tucky.

Vv.

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,

Defendant-A ppellant. /

Opinion

Decided and Filed November 18, 1970.

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE and

BROOKS, Circuit Judges.

Brooks, Circuit Judge. These are appeals by de-

fendants-appellants, United Mine Workers of America

(UMW or Union) and Consolidation Coal Company

(Consol or Consolidation) ,1 from a jury verdict impos-

ing civil liability for alleged violation of Sections 1 and

1. In this action, unlike the situation which existed

in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d

655 (6th Cir. 1969), a coal company which allegedly

conspired with the Union to restrain trade was made a

codefendant.

ee ee ee ee ee ee ’

2a

Opinion.

2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2).

Plaintiff, South-East Coal Company (South-East), con-

tended that a conspiracy to restrain trade existed be-

tween UMW, Consol and other large coal companies and

the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA)

which was designed to force South-East and other small

coal producers in Eastern Kentucky out of the bitumi-

nous coal business. After a trial lasting six weeks, the

jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, South-East Coal

Company, in the amount of $2,410,452. This amount was

tripled ($7,231,356) as required by 15 U.S.C. § 15, and

attorneys’ fees of $335,000 were allowed, bringing the

total judgment to $7,566,356. We affirm.

On numerous occasions this Court has considered

similar alleged conspiracies between the UMW and large

bituminous coal producers and for a general explanation

and description of the nature of the contended conspir-

acy in this case, the following cases are particularly

illuminating. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381

U.S. 657 at 664 (1965); Tennessee Consolidated Coal

Company v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192 at 1193

(6th Cir. 1969); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265

F. Supp. 388 at 392, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) ; Pennington

v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 at 807 (6th Cir.

1963).

While recognizing that the present case is factually

distinguishable from the cited cases? and that differing

proof was employed by the plaintiff, South-East, in at-

2. A notable difference is that, unlike in the cases

cited above, there is in the present case no contention

made that the alleged conspiracy attempted to affect or

manipulate coal prices in the T.W.A. jsic.] bituminous

coal market.

3a

Opinion.

tempting to establish the existence of this conspiracy,

this opinion would, however, be unduly lengthened t-

an elaborate discussion of plaintiff’s case and pr of.

Therefore, the specific and unique facts involved in this

case which bear on issues raised on this appeal will be

considered in conjunction with those issues. Both ap-

pellants have taken issue with certain conduct at trial

which allegedly prejudiced them jointly, and these issues

will be consolidated for consideration. Issues raised by

appellants which explore alleged errors having only

singular significance wil! be dealt with individually.

I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS

A. THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO IMPOSE LIA-

BILITY

Consol and the Union argue that the District Court

erred in its charge to the jury on the necessary degree

or standard of proof which plaintiff must meet in order

for the jury to conclude that appellants violated the

Sherman Act. The Union, relying upon Lewis v. Pen-

nington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.. 1968)3 and Ramsey v.

3. The Lewis v. Pennington case has a rather in-

volved history. This Court first affirmed the District

Court holding against UMW in Pennington v. UMW, 325

F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court

that the Union’s exemption from the antitrust laws did

not apply in this situation but reversed on other

grounds. Pennington v. UMW, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). On

retrial in Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. 815 (1966),

the District Court found in favor of the Union reason-

ing that plaintiff failed to demonstrate by “clear proof”

any violation of the antitrust laws. This Court in Lewis

v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968) affirmed

the District Court. (Before Judges Edwards, Peck and

Combs, per J. Edwards). Certiorari was denied by the

Supreme Court in 393 U. S. 983 (1968).

4a

Opinion. a

United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969) ,4

contends that the District Court did not adequately or

accurately instruct the jury that to impose liability on

4. In Ramsey v. UMW this Court sat en banc. This

was an appeal from the District Court ruling dismissing

the action, 265 F.Supp. 388 (1967), because plaintiffs

could not show an antitrust violation on the part of the

Union by “clear proof’, although by the ordinary stan-

dard of preponderance of the evidence the Court sug-

gested that liability might be imposed upon the Union.

A three-judge panel of this Court heard this appeal on

April 8, 1969. Rehearing en banc was granted and that

opinion appears at 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), Chief

Judge Phillips and Judges Edwards, Peck and Combs

for affirming; opinion by Judge Edwards. Judges Weick,

O’Sullivan, Celebrezze and McCree for reversing; opin-

ion by Judge O’Sullivan. Certiorari was granted by the

Supreme Court, — U.S. — (March .., 1970).

One week before the en banc hearing in Ramsey, a

panel composed of Judges Weick, Peck and Combs

(opinion by Judge Weick) in Tennessee Consolidated

Coal Company v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192 (1969) affirmed

the jury finding of liability of the union for an antitrust

violation. (The West Kentucky Coal Company which

was joined as a defendant because it was an alleged co-

conspirator of the union was voluntarily non-suited.

Thus, here again, we had only the union beingsued.) This

Court observed regarding the District Court’s instruc-

tions that the Union was given the benefit of a more

stringent standard of proof by the fashion in which the

District Court instructed the jury on “clear proof” and,

therefore, was not prejudiced by the instructions even

if they were incorrect. The Court made the following

remark respecting Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia

Act: “Section 6 does provide that participation, author-

ization or ratification must be shown by clear proof.

Section 6 does not state that the unlawful acts must be

shown by clear proof.” Judges Peck and Combs were

among the judges in the divided court in Ramsey, supra,

which there held that all elements of the antitrust vio-

5a

Opinion.

the Union every essential element of the violation, ex-

cept damages, must be established by “clear proof’’.5

Consol joins in and maintains that it too should get the

benefit of this more stringent standard of proof. This

Circuit is somewhat in disagreement as to the proper

degree of proof required to hold a labor union liable for

violating the Sherman Act. In the en banc hearing in

lation except damages must be shown by clear proof.

Judge Weick, author of the opinion in Tennessee Con-

solidated Coal, joined those judges in Ramsey who felt

that only the authorization, participation, or ratifica-

tion by the Union of the unlawful acts need be shown by

clear proof. Certiorari in Tennessee Consolidated Coal

was denied by the Supreme Court, 38 U.S.L.W. 3335,

3342 (March 3, 1970).

o. The District Court gave an instruction on proof

by a preponderance of the evidence, see infra p. 14.

However, in its supplemental instructions to the jury,

the Court gave the following charge on “clear proof”:

“Members of the jury, the Court has already

charged you that the issue of alleged conspiracy in

this case must be decided upon clear proof, that is,

the plaintiff must produce clear proof of the alleged

conspiracy. Clear proof means clear, unequivocal,

and convincing proof that. the defendants partici-

pated in, actually authorized the alleged conspiracy

or ratified it after having actual knowledge thereof.

I want to give you that additional instruction as a

definition for one of the terms I used in my charge.”

Thus, the District Court did charge the jury that “clear

proof” of participation, authorization or ratification of

the alleged conspiracy by the defendants was necessary

to hold them liable. While it is concluded that the “clear

proof” standard is applicable only in holding a union

ratified or authorized the acts of its officials, the Dis-

trict Court’s instruction even if erroneous gave both

defendants the benefit of a more stringent burden of

proof for finding them liable.

6a

Opinion.

Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra, the Court di-

vided evenly on the issue. Four judges held that to im-

pose liability on a labor union for a Sherman Act viola-

tion Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act® requires

that every element of the unlawful act except damages

be shown by “clear proof”. Four judges construed this

section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to provide that

the “clear proof” standard applied only in proving

that the Union participated in, authorized or ratified

the unlawful acts of its officers with actual knowledge.

They concluded that after this was shown by “clear

proof” the remaining elements of the antitrust viola-

tion—formation of the antitrust conspiracy, the un-

lawful acts, causation and damages, and all the other

elements — required proof only by a preponderance of

the evidence.

Because a major coal company has been named a

defendant as a coconspirator with the UMW in this

antitrust case, a unique problem is presented with

respect to the standard of proof question. That prob-

lem is what standard of proof must be met by the plain-

tiff to hold a company liable for an antitrust violation

if it conspired with a labor union. If it is assumed that

6. Section 6 of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 106) pro-

vides:

“No officer or member of any association or

organization, and no association or organization

participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall

be held responsible or liable in any court of the

United States for the unlawful acts of individual

officers, members, or agents, except upon clear

proof of actual participation in, or actual authori-

zation of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts

after actual knowledge thereof.”

Ta

Opinion.

the correct standard of proof to be applied in holding

a labor union civilly liable for a Sherman Act violation

is “clear proof” of all essential elements, the question

then is: “Should a company which is fortuitously

joined as a coconspirator of a labor union in an anti-

trust case get the benefit of the stricter standard of

proof afforded the union?” There is no basis in either

the Sherman Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act to indi-

cate that to impose liability on a company, named as

a coconspirator of a labor union for an antitrust vio-

lation, anything more than a preponderance of the

evidence is necessary. To hold that a company should

get the benefit of this more strict standard, simply be-

cause it was named with a labor union as a coconspir-

ator in a scheme to restrain trade, would be to grant

such a company a more advantageous position than

other companies would have, which might violate the

antitrust laws but ere not joined with a union. The

law does not provide such an a~bitrary advantage.

The standard of proof applicable to a company in at-

tempting to show it violated the antitrust laws, regard-

less of whether it is joined as a coconspirator with a

labor union, is the preponderance of the evidence.

Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, 150 F.2d 877, 883 (7th Cir.

1945) ; reversed on other grounds, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).

Having concluded that the standard of proof

needed to be met to hold a company civilly for an anti-

trust violation is preponderance of the evidence,

another legal hurdle is encountered when, as in this

case, a company is joined as a coconspirator with a

union. Again, assume that the correct standard of

proof applicable to a labor union under these circum-

8a

Opinion.

stances is “clear proof”. Hypothetically, a situation

could exist where only a union and a single company

have conspired to restrain trade. Suppose that in this

hypothetical case it could be shown by a preponderance

of the evidence that the company did conspire to vio-

late the antitrust laws, however, while a preponder-

ance of the evidence also showed the union conspired,

it could not be shown by “clear proof”. Therefore, the

union would be exonerated and, by force of the fact

that a Sherman Act violation is an actionable wrong

only when committed under an unlawful conspiracy

by two or more, the company would also escape liabil-

ity. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company,

310 U.S. 150 (1940); Standard Oil Company of Cali-

fornia v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.

denied, 356 U.S. 975. Thus, the company by indirect

method would have received the benefit of the more

strict standard of proof. While the chances of a situa-

tion as this occurring are perhaps remote, this ex-

plains the type of problem which may result when

parties to an actionable wrong like conspiracy have

their respective ultimate liabilities gauged by different

standards of proof.

This leads to the question of whether all essential

elements of an alleged antitrust conspiracy against a

labor union must be shown by “clear proof”. The en

banc decision of this Court in Ramsey did not resolve

this controversy. Without a repetitive discussion of the

rationale behind this panel’s conclusion on this issue,

already extensively explored in Judge O’Sullivan’s

opinion in Ramsey, it is concluded that while “clear

proof” is necessary to show that the Union partici-

pated, authorized, or ratified the acts of its officers, the

9a

Opinion.

essential elements of the conspiracy necessary to re-

solve the ultimate issue of liability need be shown

only by a preponderance of the evidence. (See n. 4).

The jury charge on the standard of proof issue coi'!d

have been more clear, howeve.’, the parties were given

the benefit of a partial instruction which was more

stringent than required by this Court’s conclusion on

what is the proper standard of proof.’ Thus, the parties

were not prejudiced by the instruction even if it was

erroneous.

B. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RESTRAINT

UMW and Consol claim they were prejudiced by

the absence of an instruction to the jury that only

undue or unreasonable restraints of trade or competi-

tion are grounds for finding a Sherman Act violation.

Usually, to find that a violation of the Sherman Act

has occurred, the restraint of trade or competition

resulting from certain acts committed by the accused

parties must be “unreasonable”. See generally, Stand-

ard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911);

Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ;

Lewis v. Pennington, supra. However, there are sever-

al types of restraints of trade which are per se unreas-

able. See e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries

Company, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; United States v. Socony-

Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., supra; United States v.

Consolidated Laundries Corporation, 291 F.2d 563 (2nd

Cir. 1961). Other restraints, while reasonable on

their face, become unreasonable when they are accom-

panied with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden

7. See n. 5, supra.

10a

Opinion.

restraint. United States v. Columbia Steel Company,

334 U.S. 492 (1948).

In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, supra, an

alleged conspiracy existed which had as part of its pur-

pose the identical objective that plaintiff, South-East,

contends was the object of this particular conspiracy.

That is, that the “union entered into a conspiracy with

the large operators to impose the agreed-upon wages

and royalty scales upon the smaller, non-union oper-

ators, regardless of their ability to pay and regardless

of whether or not the union represented the employees

of these companies, all for the purpose of eliminating

them from the industry, limiting production and pre-

empting the market for the large unionized operators.”

Respecting this type of conspiracy the Supreme Court

observed at 381 U.S. 665, 666:

“TA] union may make wage agrcements with

a multi-employer bargaining unit and may in pur-

suance of its own union interests seek to obtain the

same terms from other employers. No case under

the antitrust laws could be made out on evidence

limited to such union behavior (Footnote omitted).

But we think a union forfeits its exemption from

the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it

has agreed with one set of employers to impose a

certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One

group of employers may not conspire to eliminate

competitors from the industry and the union is

liable with the employers if it becomes a party to

the conspiracy.”

The Supreme Court then made the following analogy:

“One could hardly contend, for example, that one

group of employers could lawfully demand that the

lla

Opinion.

union impose on other employers wages that were

significantly higher than those paid by the request-

ing employers, or a system of computing wages

that, because of differences in methods of produc-

tion, would be more costly to one set of employers

than to another. The anticompetitive potential of

such a combination is obvious, but is little more

severe than what is alleged to have been the pur-

pose and effect of the conspiracy in this case to

establish wages at a level that marginal producers

could not pay so that they would be driven from the

industry.” 381 U.S. at §g8.

The conclusion which can be drawn from this lan-

guage is that when a labor union and an employer enter

into a plan or scheme of the type which results in the

union losing its exemption from liability under the _nti-

trust law, that plan or scheme is by definition an un-

reasonable restraint ‘under the antitrust laws. [But see

the interpretation given this language by Judge Peck

in Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 813-814 (1968)

and by District Judge Wilson in Ramsey v. United Mine

Workers, 265 F.Supp. 388, 399 (1967) ]. Thus, if it could

be shown that in this case the Union entered into a con-

spiracy with certain large coal operators to impose

agreed upon wages and royalties upon smaller, non-

union coal producers, regardless of their ability to pay

and regardless of whether or not the Union represented

the employees of these smaller companies, all for the

avowed purpose of eliminating them from the business,

limiting production and pre-empting the market for the

larger, unionized coal producers, this conspiracy would

be a per se unreasonable restraint of trade or competi-

tion. While the District Court did not give an instruc-

12a

Opinion.

tion that only undue or unreasonable restraints of trade

or competition can be grounds for a jury to conclude

that there was an antitrust violation, in light of the

conclusion that if the alleged conspiracy in this case was

proved, it would be by definition unreasonable, no spe-

cific instruction on the reasonableness of the restraint

was necessary.

C. INSTRUCTIONS ON A LABOR UNION’S EXEMPTION

FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS

The United Mine Workers argue that they were

prejudiced by the District Court’s failure to give its

proffered instruction on a labor union’s exemption from

the antitrust laws.8 The District Court gave the follow-

ing instructions respecting activities of a labor union

and their relationship to the antitrust laws:

8 The Union proffered the following instruction:

“3. In Section 6 of the Clayton Act, which

amended the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress de-

clared that ‘the labor of a human being is not a

commodity or article of commerce nor shall (labor)

organizations or the members thereof be held or

construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies

in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.’ The

entering into a wage agreement with employers,

which is a successful union activity, may have some

influence on price competition by eliminating that

part of such competition which is based on differ-

ences in labor standards. However, a labor union

to be effective must eliminate the competition from

goods produced under sub-standard labor condi-

tions. The elimination of price competition based on

differences in labor standar ls is a lawful union ob-

jective and the effect of such objective on price

competition is not violative of the antitrust laws.

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503;

UMWA v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664.”

13a

Opinion.

“Now, the law does not make it unlawful for

them to combine for the purpose of making a union

for the purpose of protecting their rights and fcr

having a bargaining agent, so you are not to con-

sider because the union is composed of a great many

miners, all of the miners in this Eastern Kentucky

who are members of it, that of itself is not unlawful.

The courts have expressly said so.

“The law has expressly said so in what is

known as the LaGuardia Act that was passed by

the Congress. That is not unlawf

“Then under the national law and under the

national policy, the labor laws, as we have produced

under what is known as the Labor Act, and the

LaGuardia Act and these other Acts of Congress,

they were allowed to bargain collectively. They

didn’t hire one man for so much and another for so

much, but the miners and other workers in other

industries were allowed to bargain collectively and

to select a bargaining agent.”

* * *

“A union may make wage agreements with a

multi-employer bargaining unit and may, in pur-

suance of its own union’s interest, seek to obtain

the same terms from other employers; but a union

forteiis its cxemption from the anti-trust laws when

it is clearly shown that it has an agreement with

one set of employers to impose a wage scale on the

bargaining unit.”9

9. ‘The correct statement per Pennington is “a cer-

tain wage scale on other bargaining units.” Apparently,

l4a

- Opinion.

“One group of employers may not conspire to

eliminate competitors from the industry, and the

union is liable with the employers if it becomes a

party to the conspiracy.

“This is true even though the union’s part in

the scheme is an undertaking to secure the same

wages, hours, or other conditions of employment

for the remaining employees and employer in the

industry.

“It is a legitimate aim of any national labor

organization to obtain uniformity of labor stanc-

ards, and it may be a consequence of such union

activity to eliminate competition based on differ-

ence in such standards.

“This, however, does not mean that the union

and the employers in one bargaining unit are free

to bargain about wages, hours, and working condi-

tions of other bargaining units or to attempt to

settle these matters for the entire industry.

“The union has a duty to bargain unit by unit

in order to best serve its obligations to its members.

“The Union should retain the ability to respond

to each bargaining situation as the individual cir-

cumstances might warrant without being straight-

jacketed by some prior agreement with favored

employers.”

this was a misspoken phrase, as the District Judge in the

remainder of the charge more than adequately conveys

the idea that the disallowed conduct is when an em-

ployer (or a multi-employer bargaining unit) combines

with a labor unit to impose certain labor standards or

conditions on other bargaining units or employers.

15a

Opinion.

These instructions, portions of which are taken from

UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), adequately

explained to the jury what types of conduct a labor

union may engage in without fear of antitrust violation

repercussion. The instructions also advised the jury

under what circumstances otherwise lawful union ac-

tivity would result in an antitrust violation. See gen-

erally, Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 8,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325

U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.

219 (1941); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra.

The Union complains that the expression “exemption”

was only used once in the instruction. It is interesting

to observe that even in UMW’s proffered instruction on

this subject (see n. 8) the expression “exemption” was

not used. While a party has the right to have his legal

ciaims of defenses stated to the jury by way of instruc-

tions, so long as the District Judge accurately states

these claims or defenses, there can be no grounds for

objection simply because the exact wording or phrasing

of the requesting party are not used.

The Union contends that the instructions in this

case were as fatal as those given in Cedar Crest Hats,

Inc. v. United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Inter-

national Union, 362 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1966). That suit

involved a labor union against whom charges of anti-

trust violations and unfair labor practices were made.

On appeal the union objected to the court’s instructions

which did not even mention that certain conduct en-

gaged in by a labor union does not fall within the scope

of activities violating the antitrust laws. A comparison

of the trial court’s instruction in that case (appearing

at 362 F.2d 322, 325-326) with the instructions given in

16a

Opinion.

the instant case, supra, respecting a labor union’s con-

duct in regard to the antitrust laws clearly indicates

that the instructions in question on this appeal were

both correct and fair.

D. EQUAL HYPOTHESIS RULE

Appellants contend it was error for the District

Court not to instruct the jury that “where proven facts

give equal support to each of two inconsistent infer-

ences, in which event, neither of them being established,

judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party

upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of

these inferences as against the other, before he is en-

titled to recover.” Pennsylvania Railroad Company v.

Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 339 (1933). It is argued

that such an instruction is a necessary component of

the law applicable to circumstantial evidence and was

properly given in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265

F.Supp. 388 at 432 (1967), and Tennessee Consolidated

Coal Company v. United Mine Workers (unreported Dis-

trict Court opinion) and respectively affirmed by this

Court in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655,

665 (6th Cir. 1969), and Tennessee Consolidated Coal

Company v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192, 1202-

1203 (6th Cir. 1969).

It appears that the “equal hypothesis rule” is

simply a negative way of phrasing the rule of law that

a plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof. Thus, if a

plaintiff does not come forth with evidence, when con-

sidered in light of opposing evidence, from which a jury

could infer the truth of an alleged proposition over its

contra-proposition, the plaintiff has not met his burden

of proof. When there are equal inferences which can

17a

Opinion.

be drawn from a particular set of facts — one inference

indicating liability, the other non-liability — it is the

judge’s obligation at the direct verdict stage of the trial

to find for the defendant. See Pennsylvania Railroad

Company v. Chamberlain, supra; Gulf Refining Com-

pany v. Mark C. Walker & Son Company, 124 F.2d 420,

426 (6th Cir. 1942). It would not be proper under these

circumstances for the trial judge to relinquish to the

jury this responsibility by simply giving them an in-

struction to the effect that if they could not draw either

an inference of liability or one of non-liability from the

facts presented, they should conclude non-liability.19

In this case the District Court’ fhstructed the jury

on the meaning of plaintiff having to sustain the burden

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. He stated:

“Now, in order to recover, the South-East Coal

Company must sustain the burden of proof; in other

words, if no proof was offered, there would be no

10. The Ramsey case relied upon by appellants was

a non-jury case. On appeal an observation — not an

instruction — made by the District Judge in his opinion

was quoted with approval. Since the “equal inference”

rule or doctrine is used by the trial judge in deciding

the question of whether a directed verdict should be

granted a defendant because plaintiff has not satisfied

his burden of proof, it is both logical and correct that

this rule entered the trial judge’s thinking in the non-

jury trial in Ramsey. It is doubtful that the equal in-

ference instruction given in Tennessee Consolidated to

the jury was correct. However, this apparently was not

assigned as error on appeal as no mention whatsoever

is made of that instruction or the propriety of its use

in the appellate opinion in the case. See Tennessee Con-

solidated Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 416

F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969).

18a

Opinion.

judgment for the plaintiff. It is his responsibility

to offer proof to establish the facts that he claims.

“And the defendant has the right, as you have

seen here, to offer proof to contradict those facts

or to explain those facts or to justify its conduct,

which may have been brought out by witnesses for

the plaintiff in support of its allegations.

“But it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to

sustain this burden of proof. Now, by ‘burden of

proof,’ it doesn’t necessarily mean the greater num-

ber of witnesses. Sometimes the burden of proof in

lawsuits can be.sustained by one witness as con-

trary to fifteen on the other side, and so you are

not to confuse the idea of ‘burden of proof’ with

numbers of witnesses or numbers of depositions or

other articles of evidence that might be offered.

“But it must convince you, before this plain-

tiff may recover, it must sustain its burden of proof

by proving every essential element of the claim, by

a preponderance of the evidence.

“Should it fail in its proof, under this rule you

should find for the defendant.

“To establish the preponderance of the evi-

dence means to prove that something is more likely

so than not so; in other words, the ‘preponderance

of the evidence’ means such evidence, when con-

sidered and compared with that opposed to it, has

more convincing force and produces in your minds

belief that what is sought to be proved is more

likely to be true than not true.”

19a

Opinion.

These instructions explained what South-East had

to prove and to what degree the jury must be convinced

of the truth of South-East’s assertions. It was not error

for the District Court to refuse to give the “equal hy-

pothesis” instruction requested by appellants.

E. INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE USE TO BE MADE BY

THE JURY OF CERT4"=N HEARSAY STATEMENTS

Consolidation raises as error the District Court’s

refusal to give a concluding instruction to the jury re-

garding the permissive use of certain statements which

were competent evidence as against the Union but were

hearsay as applied to Consolidation. The rejected in-

struction stated in part that:

“During the trial the Court has permitted the

introduction of evidence concerning the actions and

statements of each of the defendants with specific

admonition to the jury, however, that the members

of the jury must not consider that evidence against

the other defendants .... Inasmuch as there can

be no liability on the part of the defendants unless

a conspiracy is (proven) ... you must disregard all

of such evidence unless you first find by other and

disassociated evidence in the case sufficient .. .

proof that the conspiracy claimed by plaintiff ex-

isted. In such event you may then consider the

evidence subject to the admonition in concert with

all the other evidence in the case.”

A requested instruction similar to this was not

given in Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 550

(6th Cir. 1944), and it was held reversible error. This

case lends the strongest support for Consolidation’s

20a

Opinion.

position. However, since the Schmeller case was decided,

the logic and correctness of a jury charge that instructs

that certain hearsay statements as to one defendant

cannot be used by the jury in determining whether a

conspiracy exists between defendants until the jury has

first concluded that the defendants are guilty of an

unlawful conspiracy, has apparently been seriously

challenged. In addition, appellants’ reliance on Schmel-

ler is not entirely appropriate as part of the reason the

Court found error in the refusal to give the instruction

was that there were both substantive charges and a con-

spiracy charge involved. In the instant case we are

dealing only with a conspiracy charge. In Carbo v.

United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963), an

instruction almost identical to that offered by Consoli-

dation in this case was held to have been properly re-

jected as not a correct statement of the law. The Court

in Carbo observed:

“The situation is rendered confusing by the fact

that the admissibility of this evidence (concededly

relevant but challenged under a technical eviden-

tiary rule of competence) depends upon a disputed

preliminary question of fact which coincides with

the ultimate jury question upon the merits. (Foot-

note omitted). The declarations are admissible

against the defendants if they are co-conspirators.

If they are co-conspirators, they are guilty. The

problem presented to us is whether the preliminary

question (upon the resolution of which only inde-

pendent evidence is available) is to be resolved by

the jury or by the judge. Appellants’ view of the

law [which, except for the standard of proof is

identical to that asserted by Consolidation] ... is

21a

Opinion.

that the preliminary question is to be resolved by

the jury upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

“Yet if by independent evidence the defendant’s

position as a co-conspirator is to be established by

the jury upon their judgment beyond a reasonable

doubt, there is no occasion ever to resort to the

declaration at all. The district court in effect will

have told the jury, ‘You may not consider this evi-

dence unless you first find the defendant guilty.’ ”

[Bracketed explanation is this Court’s].

While Carbo and many of the cases which have

dealt with this problem are criminal in nature, therefore

requiring the jury to conclude the existence of a con-

spiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, the paradox of in-

structing a jury that certain statements can be used to

establish a conspiracy only after they have already

found the conspiracy to exist is just as illogical in civil

cases, although a lesser standard of proof is required.

Thus, it is concluded that the preliminary question of

the admissibility of evidence challenged under this tech-

nical evidentiary rule (this is clearly a question of

admissibility and not of sufficiency or weight of the

evidence, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471

(1962) ) is a matter for the judge not the jury to decide

and, therefore, the instruction was properly rejected by

the District Court. We deal here only with the propriety,

as a legal matter, of the District Court’s refusal to give

Consolidation’s proposed instruction, and the question

of whether the Court erred in admitting these state-

ments because no prima facie case was established will

be considered later, infra., see pp. 33-34.

Se et te ene Ed

Opinion.

INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE PROTECTIVE WAGE

CLAUSE AND “80-CENT CLAUSE” IN THE NATIONAL

AGREEMENT

Alleged errors in the District Court’s instruction

regarding the Protective Wage Clause (PWC)11 and

the “80-cent clause”’!> presents a legal problem the reso-

11. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416

F.2d 655 and Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company v.

United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192 for a discussion of

the PWC and the complete text of the clause.

12. The “80-cent clause” of the National Agree-

ment provided:

“UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

WELFARE AND RETIRMENT FUND OF 1950

(As Amended)

“Amend the first printed paragraph of subsection

A of this clause by striking out all of the second

sentence beginning with the word ‘During’ and end-

ing after the word ‘sale’ and inserting in lieu there-

of the following: ‘During the life of this agreement

there shall be paid into such Fund by each operator

signatory hereto the sum of forty cents (40 cents)

per ton of two thousand (2,000) pounds on each ton

of bituminous coal produced by such Operator for

use or for sale. On all bituminous coal procured or

acquired by any signatory Operator for use or for

sale, (i.e., all bituminous coal other than that pro-

duced by such signatory Operator) there shall, dur-

ing the life of this agreement, be paid into such

Fund by each such Operator signatory hereto or by

use or for sale. On all bituminous coal procured or

any subsidiary or affiliate of such Operator signa-

tory hereto the sum of (80 cents) [sic.] per ton of

two thousand (2,000) pounds on each ton of such

bituminous coal so procured or acquired on which

the aforesaid sum of forty cents (40 cents) per ton

had not been paid into said Fund prior to such pro-

curement or acquisition. The parties hereto mu-

23a

Opinion.

lution of which may be helped by a brief discussion of

the clauses and the role they played in the various na-

tional labor agreements in which they appeared. The

National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement entered in-

to between the Bituminous Coal Operators Association

(BCOA) and the United Mine Workers in 1950 was

amended in 1958 thereby incorporating the Protective

Wage Clause. The arrangement provided by the clause

was that the '’nited Mine Workers agreed, as bargain-

ing agent for the employees covered by the contract

(members of the UMW), that while the contract was in

effect it would not enter into, or be a party to any agree-

ment covering wages or working conditions which were

not on an equal basis with those provisions contained

in this contract. In return for this commitment, the

coal producing signatories to the NationalAgreement

(BCOA members) agreed “that all bituminous coal

mined, produced, or prepared by them, or any of them,

or procured or acquired by them or any of them under

tually agree that, if at any time during the term of

this agreement a court or tribunal of competent

jurisdiction determines by final decision that the

provision appearing in the sentence just preceding,

providing for the payment by signatory operators

of eighty cents (80 cents) per ton under certain

prescribed conditions, is invalid or in violation of

the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or

other federal or state law, the parties shall, at the

option of and upon demand by party of the second

part, without affecting the integrity of any other

provision of this section or any other provision of

the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement,

meet and engage in good faith negotiations to agree

upon a clause to be inserted irto this agreement in

rr ne of the provisions found invalid or

a Ng

24a

Opinion.

a sub-contract arrangement shall be or shall have been

mined or produced under terms and conditions which

are as favorable to the employees as those provided for

in this contract.”

The “80-cent clause” of 1964 amended the Welfare

and Retirement Fund provisions of the 1950 Nationai

Agreement. The Protective Wage Clause was dropped

from the Agreement in that year. Until this amendment

went into effect signatories to the National Agreement

had to pay into the Welfare Fund forty cents per ton

of coal they produced. The purvose of the amendment

was to obligate signatories who procured or acquired

bituminous coal for sale or use which was not produced

under an agreement requiring the paying of forty cents

per ton into the Welfare Fund (non-UMW produced

coal) to pay eighty cents into the Welfare Fund for each

ton of coal so procured. While the stated purpose of the

amendment was to protect work standards by equalizing

labor costs between employees of signatories and non-

signatories, the obvious effect was to discourage signa-

tories from purchasing or acting as sale agents for coal

companies which produced coal with non-UMW laborers.

The legality of the Protective Wage Clause, in

terms of the antitrust laws, was considered in the Ram-

sey and Tennessee Consolidated Coal cases. In Ramsey,

responding to the allegation that the PWC was a per se

violation of the Sherman Act, the Court (all judges con-

curred in this portion of the opinion) observed that the

clause was capable of two opposite constructions. How-

ever, the proper interpretation to be given the clause

was the one “that does not result in a violation of the

law.” Ramsey at 659. In Tennessee Consolidated Coal

the jury’s general verdict imposing liability on the Un-

SRT M NNN Tie PRE wast CEFF Tk

BRL GALE RO LANE

DDE LL LALA ILL LOS EET, SATII

25a

Opinion.

ion concluded that the PWC required the Union not to

bargain with non-signatory operators except upon the

terms and conditions of the National Agreement, 416

F.2d 1192, 1197 (6th Cir. 1969). The jury also found in

response to special interrogatories that “prior to and

apart from” the National Agreement as amended in 1958

the UMW did not conspire with signatory coal operators

to impose the terms of the National Agreement on non-

signatories. It should be noted that except for several

minor alterations in the 1950 National Agreement made

by the 1958 amendment, the addition of the Protective

Wage Clause by the amendment constituted the major

change in the National Agreement. On appeal on Ten-

nessee Coal, this Court stated that the contract, the

PWC, was ambiguous and that all circumstances sur-

rounding the contract and the practical construction

given it by the parties could be used by the jury in de-

termining the meaning of the contract. While it cannot

be said with absolute certainty upon which theory or

basis the jury chose to impose liability in the Tennes-

see Coal case, it seems that the jury felt that the PWC

was the crux of the Union’s illegal conduct.13

The legality of the “80-cent clause” in terms of the

antitrust laws has not been considered by an appellate

court. When the “80-cent clause” was incorporated into

the National Agreement, charges that it violated Sec-

tion 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act were

raised. See Lewis v. National Labor Relations Board,

13. The Tennessee Coal case was decided a week

after the Ramsey case. However, it is not clear what

effect Ramsey has on the findings of the jury in Ten-

messee Coal. Certiorari was denied in Tennessee Coal

but granted in Ramsey.

26a

Opinion.

350 F.2d 801 (D.C.Cir. 1965); United Mine Workers v.

National Labor Relations Board, 399 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.

1968). A final determination of this question has not

been made.

Appellants maintain that the instruction with re-

spect to these clauses failed to “adequately or accu-

rately” explain the significance of these provisions and

the proper legal interpretation that should be given

them. Specifically, they contend that the District

Court’s instructions were in contradiction in so far as

they instructed the jury that the contracts or national

agreements containing these clauses were legal, but that

they, the jury, could conclude that an antitrust violation

occurred if they found that the agreements were en-

tered into with the intention of driving certain coal

producers out of business. It is argued that this is

paradoxical and that either the agreements were legal

or illegal. South-East contends that the instructions

were accurate and more than adequate because they

admitted the legality of the clauses in the national

agreements, but based their claim of antitrust violation

on the theory of the existence of an “intentional preda-

tory conspiracy” as developed by Mr. Justice White’s

opinion in Pennington. Neither of th-3e positions is a

wholly correct interpretation of the law as stated in

Pennington. .

In Ramsey the Supreme Court’s decision in Penning-

ton was examined with particular attention or agree-

ment between an employer and a labor union might pro-

duce grounds for concluding that an antitrust violation

occurred. It was in Ramsey that it was decided that

“the language of the agrement (PWC) did not per se

constitute an illegal conspiracy.” In addition, Penning-

USVI ESRD RSE

RHA LE a

x

SRSA LRT TRO He ME Le SS a Bere

27a

Opinion.

ton was construed to have held that “a conspiracy be-

tween employers and labor formed with the intention

of driving competitors out of business is a violation of

the Sherman Act” and that “ ‘predatory intent’ (as used

by Mr. Justice White, 381 U.S. at 668 . . .) is merely

shorthand employed to describe this anti-competitive

conspiracy.”

Reviewing the Ramsey decision’s interpretation of

Pennington four conclusions may be drawn applicable to

the present dispute. First, the National Agreement con-

taining the Protective Wage Clause, is on its face, a

valid labor contract which seeks to implement the per-

fectly legal goals of uniformity of wages and working

conditions. Second, if this agreement was made or en-

tered into by the union in pursuance of its own self inter-

est, ther [sic.] are no grounds for concluding a violation

of the antitrust laws. Third, if however the employers

and union entered into this contract with the conscious

knowledge or intent that it would be used to drive com-

petitors out of business (more than the incidental ef-

fects caused by the adoption of a uniform wage agree-

ment which may result in certain operators not being

able to function profitably), then a violation of the

antitrust laws has occurred. Fourth, it is this either

expressly or impliedly agreed-upon use of the valid con-

tract, that is, that it will be used to drive competitors

out of business, that comprises the agreement or con-

spiracy which is illegal for purposes of the antitrust

laws. Without deciding the question of the legality of

the “8(-cent clause” suffice it to be said that these

conclusions are also applicable to that provision.

The District Court gave the following instruction

with regard to the National Agreement, the nature of

28a

Opinion.

an illegal conspiracy and what South-East was required

to show before the jury could impose liability on the

defendants:

“In order to establish a conspiracy or unlaw-

ful arrangement as claimed by the plaintiff in this

case it is not necessary that the plaintiff should

offer proof of a direct arrangement or executed

written contract that they are entering into a con-

spiracy.

“It is not necessary that the agreement, if any,

was the result of formal action on the part of the

defendants. The real question to be determined is

whether or not there was a meeting of the minds

or a common understanding and purpose in the

requirement of the execution of the labor agree-

ment with the intention of doing injury to the

plaintiff.

* sd sd * * * 5

“The thing which you will have to decide and

which I will probably refer to again, there is noth-

ing unlawful about that contract in itself; but if it

was entered into with we intention on the part of

the signatories — the two defendants here — to

injure the plaintiff, if they had that in mind, that

‘we are going to go into this contract because we

know it will put South-East out of business; they

can’t meet the conditions; we are too big, too strong,

and they cannot compete with us, cannot get miners

to work for them, and they cannot sell their coal on

the market because they do not have sufficient sales

agency, so we will deliberately enter into this and

they can’t meet it; we will thereby profit by putting

xe

i

eA SP atten h seas

on ake, pe ee

Taina ile oe eed boas

.

Stes Five.

Fe a oe eae mre

Aa tue TO

se AS

a at SE ey os se

i

Lae Pe ee

eee

SU

oe

Lar eth

4

~

3

4

|

&

‘a

“st

a

sl

1

:

:

|

29a

Opinion.

competitors out of busines or seriously hampering

his operation.’

“So, the issue is: Did these two signatories have

that thing of putting the South-East Coal Com-

pany out of business in mind, the time they signed

the contract?

* * a + ” ” *

“You are instructed that if you believe there

was an industry-wide collective bargaining agree-

ment, whereby employers and the union agreed on

the wage scale that exceeds the financial ability, of

some small operators, including the plaintiff, to

pay, and that the agreement was made for the

purpose of forcing some employers, including the

plaintiff, out of businesss, or injuring its business,,.

and you believe that the defendants, the Consolida-

tion Coal Company and the United Mine Workers,

deliberately entered into and participated in such

an arrangement, and that the result of such an

arrangement was the sole cause of damage, if any,

to the plaintiff, then you will find for the plaintiff.

“If you do not so believe, you will find for the

defendants.”

It was not necessary for the District Court to go

into more detail ahout the significunce of the PWC or

the “80-cent cluase.”14 The charge properly instructed

14. During closing arguments counsel for UMW

objected to certain statements made by counsel for

South-East about the National Agreement. The District

Court at that time gave further instructions to the jury

about the PWC. The colloquy was as follows:

30a

Opinion.

the jury on the relationship between the Nationa! Agree-

ment and the antitrust laws and what must be shown

in this regard to impose liability.15

The Court: “As I understand counsel’s argu-

ment, he is drawing a deduction from these cir-

cumstances. He does not argue, and the jury is

instructed, if it has been given that impression,

that it is not proper.

“There is nothing wrong per se, that is, of

itself, with the execution of this contract. I should

instruct them on that as a general instruction.

“In other words, you are not to consider that

simply because there was an agreement between

BCOA and the UMW that that of itself established

a violation of the antitrust laws.

“I got the impression that he was using those

figures to establish his claim that the results proved

the basis on which he relied.”

South-East’s Counsel: “The circumstances at

the time of making these contracts, they have got

to be used to prove an antitrust claim.”

Appellants’ Counsel: “I submit to the Court

that the same words that were used at the bench

as being objectionable were used by this counsel to

the same effect, that this jury would have to con-

sider the consequences of this type of bargaining,

eliminating from the whole industry certain people

and causing a good deal of harm.”

The Court: “The jury is instructed that the

execution of the contract itself is not per se a vio-

lation of law.”

Appellants’ Counsel: “Okay.”

15. Appellants also claim error in the instruction

because of remarks made by the District Judge which

were incorrect statements of certain dates involving

passage of the PWC and “80-cent clause.” In the suple-

mental [sic.] instructions the District Judge corrected

himself and no prejudice resulted from the error.

RAT SRE a He Tr dD A es

La APSA ah WEES AES!

ee he een Ree

CSAC Haan DRY NRSC

eI TE ES

31a

Opinion.

G. THE DEFENSE OF IN PARI DELICTO ASSUMPTION OF

RISK OF THE CONSPIRACY, WAIVER OF RIGHTS ARISING

FROM THE CONSPIRACY AND ESTOPPEL.

Appellant Consclidation Coal claims error in the

District Court’s instruction on its various defenses.

Particular emphasis is assigned to the alleged error in

the District Court’s instruction on the defense of in pari

delicto. With reference to this defense, the District

Court charged the jury that:

“Now, the defendants here say that, admitting

all of these things for the sake of argument, as we

put it, whatever damage came to the plaintiff, that

he was a part of it.

- eee

BOS GT ea ATi RE EI LE

i “He can’t claim anything against the coal op-

4 erators because this arrangement which they had

P with the UMWA had his approval and endorsement,

‘ that he was a member of the BCOA — Bituminous

Coal Operators Association — that drew up the

contract, and that he was a sponsor of it and, there-

fore, if he got hurt by it, if it was wrong, he was

helping in a wrong, “impari delicto’ (sic) they call

it. That is equal guilt.

Fy eR?

re EO > Lae

“A person who is of equal guilt cannot claim

that he has been wronged by other people who

assisted or collaborated with him on the same pro-

ject.

“The defendants have entered the defense of

‘in pari delicto’ — this means that the defendants

say that if an unlawful conspiracy existed, plaintiff

was equally responsible with defendants in the

formation of said conspiracy.

SECA EES WS Se

32a

Opinion.

“Under this defense, the Court charges you that

if the plaintiff was a co-initiator of the conspiracy

and equally responsible therefor, plaintiff is not

entitled to recover damages for that period of time

that the plaintiff remained a party to the con-

spiracy.

“Now, a person may be a party to such an ar-

rangement, be ‘in pari delicto,’ but he can withdraw

from that: You are not once brushed with tar that

you can’t get rid of.

“So, even though you may believe that he did

do this, that he was in this arrangement, entered

into this contract for the purpose of putting other

operators out of business, yet, if you believe that

he withdrew from and he got out of it and if you

find that the defendants were more responsible than

the plaintiff for the formation of the conspiracy,

plaintiff may recover, even though it was a party

to the conspiracy, even though South-East Coal

Company was a party to the conspiracy.

“Even though you may find that plaintiff was a

party to the conspiracy and if you find that plain-

tiff withdrew from the conspiracy and sought to

avoid the effects of the conspiracy, it may recover

damages arising in the period of the case subse-

quent to such withdrawal.”

This charge more than adequately instructed the

jury with respect to the defense of in part delicto, and

the effect South-East’s participation in the conspiracy

would have on the amount of damages recoverable if

termination of its part in the conspiracy did not occur.

The only difficulty with the instruction is that perhaps

33a

Opinion.

it should not have been given at all. Recent cases have

tended to indicate that for reasons of public policy the

defense of in pari delicto is not available to a defendant

in certain types of antitrust cases. See Perma Life Muf-

flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134

(1968) ; Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade,

Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967); Sahm v. V-1 Oil

Company, 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968). However, since

it has been concluded that the instructions given on

this defense were correct, it is not necessary to reach

the question of whether the type of antitrust conspiracy

involved in this case falls into the category of those anti-

trust conspiracies in which the defense of in pari delicto

is available.

Consolidation’s request for instructions on its de-

fenses of assumption of risk of the conspiracy, waiver

of rights arising from the conspiracy and estoppel were

properly rejected by the District Court. While these de-

fenses might be proper in certain negligence and con-

tract cases, there is no evidence that Congress intended

that these defenses could be set up by analogy as a de-

fense in an antitrust case. Furthermore, even if these

defenses were available, it appears that they would be

subsumed in the more inclusive defense of in pari de-

licto.

H. INSTRUCTIONS DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF Bap

BUSINESS JUDGMENT.

Consolidation also claims that the District Judge

negated one of its primary contentions with certain

remarks made in the instructions. The primary con-

tention allegedly negated by the District Judge’s state-

ments was that much of the injury South-East sought

as

34a

Opinion.

recovery for did not result from the antitrust conspir-

acy but rather was caused by a “serious mistake in

judgment in building a cleaning plant costing $5 mil-

lion and at a point some one hundred twenty-five miles

from the mine .. .” The remarks made by the District

Judge concerned only in a very general fashion the

importance of a cleaning apparatus in processing bitum-

inous coal and the expensiveness of such a device [sic.]

There was copious testimony at trial on both sides of

the issue of whether the building of the cleaning plant

by South-East was or was not a mistake in business

judgment. The alleged prejudicial statements on this

matter were made at the very beginning of the charge

during a general discussion of the bituminous coal in-

dustry when the meaning of certain jargonistic words

and phrases used in the coal industry and at the trial

were explained to the jury. Towards the end of the

instructions, the judge charged the jury on appellant’s

bad business judgment theory of the cause of South-

East’s injuries. He stated:

“The defendants take the position that the

(conspiracy did not cause plaintiff’s injuries) ...

(but the injuries were) the result of either mis-

management, over expansion, economic conditions,

or a combination of these, with possibly other

circumstances, to none of which either of these

defendants had any part.

“That is the theory of the defendants here,

that by building this cleaning plant at Irvine,

that there was a significant miscalculation of iis

cost of construction, more than a million dollars

it anticipated to cost; that it was 125 miles in haul

35a

Opinion.

from the mines to that plant, which was an addi-

tional expense and contrary to good coal produc-

tion management, and that by loss of the sale of

coal through no fault of Consolidatio Coal Com-

pany, but through the failure of the plaintiff to

exercise orthodox business acumen; that that is

what caused this plaintiff to lose money, and that

through its own failures and no reason to accuse

either of these defendants to have committed

wrongful acts; the financial problems of the plain-

tiff arose from its own actions and its own failure

to exercise good business judgment in the face of

advice on the part of Consolidation Coal Company,

according to Mr. Tucker, I believe, who was the

witness — is that his name?

Appellants’ Counsel: “Cassidy.”

The Court: “The last witness who testified.

Well, anyway, one of the witnesses for the defendant

[said] that he was concerned about the building of

this tipple and this cleaning plant, and advised the

plaintiff, through its president, Mr. LaViers, and

possibly others, that importation from Canada and

other places and the use of gas and oil was going

to reduce the coal demands thirty-three and a third

per cent from locality, or more. Notwithstanding

that, this plaintiff proceeded to its development

and expansion, and that these defendants were in

no way responsible for it. But, due to these cir-

cumstances alone, if he had any loss, it was caused

by that.” ,

If there was a negation of one of appellant’s

theories by the passing remarks made by the District

36a

Opinion.

Judge at the beginning of the charge to the jury, it

obviously was more than compensated for by the ex-

planation of appellant’s position just quoted. It is con-

cluded that appellants were not prejudiced by certain

complained of statements made by the District Judge

in his instructions to the jury.

Il. ALLEGED ERRORS IN EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

A. EVM@ENCE OF EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE

ALLEGED ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY

The appellants challenge the District Court’s ruling

on certain evidence offered by South-East which con-

cerned economic conditions in the coal industry in East-

tern Kentucky. The evidence was principally statistical

and related to such things as: the reduction in the num-

ber of miners employed in the coal industry, diminution

of population in certain coal producing areas, wage

scales in the bituminous coal industry, quantitive fluc-

tuations in coal production in various years, income and

losses of certain bituminous coal producing companies.

The objection raised to this type of evidence was that it

inordinately emphasized alleged “effects and conse-

quences” of the antitrust conspiracy, thereby mislead-

ing the jury to believe that the existence of an anti-com-

petitive conspiracy or agreement could be inferred from

these conditions. It is argued that this Court’s decisions

in Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968),

and Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th

Cir. 1969), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pen-

nington v. United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),

specifically rejected the theory that an antitrust con-

spiracy can be proven by effects and consequences. The

argument is not clear, but it appears that objection is

37a

Opinion.

not made to the admissibility of this type of evidence,

rather that this type of evidence standing alone cannot,

as a matter of law, serve as the basis for concluding that

an antitrust conspiracy exists.

In Pennington v. United Mine Workers the Supreme

Court stated that a labor union, having concluded a

wage agreement with one set of employers, may uni-

laterally seek to impose the same terms on other em-

ployers even though it is believed that “[s]ome em-

ployers cannot effectively compete if they are required

to pay the wage scale demanded by the union.” Penning-

ton v. United Mine Workers, at 655, n.2. It was also ob-

served that “[s]uch union conduct is not alone sufficient

evidence to maintain a union-employer conspiracy

charge under the Sherman Act. There must be addi-

tional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy.”

Pennington v. United Mine Workers, Id. The textual ma-

terial, not the language of the footnote quoted above,

appears in Lewis v. Pennington and Ramsey v. United

Mine Workers. Appellants’ argument apparently relies

upon the language quoted above from the Supreme

Court’s Pennington decision. They construe this lan-

guage to mean that evidence of the effects and conse-

quences of an alleged conspiracy, e.g. statistics showing

marginal p:oducers are losing money and going out of

business, reduction in the number of individuals em-

ployed as coal miners, et cetera, are insufficient to prove

an antitrust conspiracy.

It cannot be said definitely that appellant’s inter-

pretation of the language in Pennington is either right

or wrong. While this Court find. :t difficult to construe

that particular language in Pennington as appellants

have, some support for appeliants’ interpretation of

38a

Opinion.

that language can be found in Mr. Justice soldberg’s

dissenting opinion in Pennington appearing in Local

Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher

Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Company, Inc.,

381 U.S. 676 (1965) at 714-715. Even though the lan-

guage in Pennington is not decisive, there is a logical

basis for appellants’ position. The “effects and conse-

quences” theory is basically a casual argument. That is,

a cause (the antitrust conspiracy has produced certain

results or effects (reduction in the number of people

employed in the mines, financial losses by marginal

producers, et cetera.). This type of argument has one

chief flaw: The difficulty in isolating a single factor

causally responsible for identifiable effects. Often there

are intervening and superseding causes which if shown

destroy the validity of the argument. The “effects and

consequences” theory appellants question appears to

simply reverse the usually logical progression from

cause to effect by first pointing to certain conditions

and thea concluding what caused these conditions. In

any event, the problem of isolating a particular cause

which definitely produced certain effects is still present.

The law cannot be that an antitrust conspiracy can be

proven by alleged effects and consequences of the con-

spiracy alone. If the only evidence a plaintiff could pro-

duce of an alleged antitrust conspiracy is statistics

showing that they and other producers in an industry

are losing money while some producers make money;

that overall production in the industry is down while

profits of certain companies are up; and that employ-

ment has dropped off in the industry, the defendants

should have a verdict directed for them at the close of

plaintiff's case. Plaintiff would not even have made out

a prima facie case for recovery.

39a

Opinion.

Regardless of how accurate these statements might

be, they do not apply under the facts of this case. Re-

viewing the record, it becomes obvious that contrary to

appellants’ conte:tion South-East’s case does not rest

solely on alleged effects and consequences to prove the

existence of the antitrust conspiracy. South-East pre-

sented evidence of statements made by UMW and Con-

solidation officials tending to show that there existed an

implied or expressed agreement between the Union and

Consolidation, there was evidence of past courses of

dealing and performance between itself and Consolida-

tion which were interrupted or changed as a result of

Union activity; there was evidence concerning what hap-

pened at bargaining sessions between South-East and

the Union which indicated that some agreement other

than the National Agreement (the Bituminous Coal

Wage Agreement) existed between the Union and cer-

tain producers.

While the question of the sufficiency of this evi-

dence will be dealt with later, the importance of in-

dicating that South-East introduced other evidence

from which the existence of an agreement to restrain

trade or competition could be inferred, is to show that it

did not rely solely on alleged effects and consequences

of the antitrust conspiracy to prove its claim. If the

only evidence South-East introduced was the statistical

evidence referred to earlier, then the case should never

have been submitted to the jury. However, this was not

the only proof they offered. Evidence of the type which

appellants object to-is admissible and can be considered

by the jury in drawing its conclusion on the issue of

liability if there is other evidence which supports the

claim. See generally, Local 175 of the International

40a

Opinion.

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. United States, 219

F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955); Standard Oil Company of

California v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.

denied 356 U.S. 975. Therefore, while appellants’ argu-

ment might be correct as far as it goes, it does not ap-

ply to the facts of this case.

B. EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY PER-

SONALIZED SOUTH-EAST CLAIMS THEREBY PREJUDIC-

ING APPELLANT

Consolidation maintains they were prejudiced be-

cause certain evidence admitted and statements made at

the trial tended to personalize South-East’s claim that

is, gave the impression that it was the claim of the La-

Viers’ family which controls and operates the company.

It is contended that this left the jury with the idea that

this was a David versus Goliath type controversy, with

the LaViers family representing the small South-East

Coal Company battling the combined giant forces of

Consolidation Coal Company and the United Mine Work-

ers of America. Thus, appellants argue that because of

this characterization, the jury’s sympathies had to be

with the underdog South-East Coal.

South-East Coal Company, for all intents and pur-

poses, is a family-owned and family-run coal company.

Mr. Harry LaViers, Senior, and his son, Harry LaViers,

Junior, were the controlling forces behind South-East

and made the decisions, either good or bad, for the com-

pany. The company, compared to Consolidation, is a

small producer of coal and its actions are earmarked

with the LaViers’ name. While there was some person-

alization of the company’s claim by occasional] inter-

changing of the name plaintiff with Harry LaViers,

*

e+ *

is

©

*

es

ie

a)

:

F

EB

3

s

~

e

a

e

y

4la

Opinion.

Senior or Junior, this was no more excessive than might

be expected under the circumstances. In addition ap-

pellants, partially as a result of the defense of in pari

delicto, tended to contribute to any personalization

which may have taken place.

Conceding that some personalization of South-

East’s claim did occur, it is still difficult to accept ap-

pellant’s argument that this converted the dispute into

a small company versus large company controversy, or

appellant’s assumption that a jury’s sympathies always

rest with the underdog. Without some additional evi-

dence that appellants were in fact prejudiced by these

characterizations, the record does not support these as-

sertions, and it is concluded that no injury resulted.

C. ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN HEARSAY STATEMENTS

During the trial, South-East introduced into evi-

dence portions of answers made by the United Mine

Workers to written interrogatories. The Union was

asked to admit to the authenticity of certain speeches,

editorials and statements made by Union officials which

were appended to the Union’s answers to the interroga-

tories, and then parts of these documents were read to

the jury. Consolidation objected to and now challenges

the admissibility of these statements on the grounds

that they were hearsay as against them. (Consol’s ob-

jection to the District Court’s refusal to give its re-

quested instruction on this matter was discussed earlier.

See, I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS: Sec-

tion E. Instructions Respecting the Use to be Made by

the Jury of Certain Hearsay Statements, supra, at p.

15). Consol’s principal contention is that statements of

this type are not to be admitted until “[t]here is inde-

42a

Opinion.

pendent evidence establishing, prima facie, that such

others were members of the conspiracy.” Standard Oil

Company v. Moore, supra.

The general rule is that this type of evidence is ad-

missible, however, subject to exclusion if no prima facie

case of the existence of the conspiracy is established.

The question of conditional admissibility is for the trial

judge to determine. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d

718 (9th Cir. 1963). There is no error in conditionally

admitting the statements before a prima facie case was

established by independent evidence if subsequently such

a case is proven, because the trial judge has wide dis-

cretion over the order of proof. Pennington v. United

Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir. 1963), re-

versed on other grounds, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Flintkote

Company v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368, 378 (9th Cir. 1957),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835. At the close of plaintiff’s

case there had been established by independent or dis-

associated evidence a prima facie case, thus the require-

ment for having conditionally admitted the statements

was met.

D. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellants contend that the jury verdict, and the

District Court’s denial of their motions for directed ver-

dict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are in

error, as the verdict “is not supported by clear evidence,

but is contrary to undisputed facts and applicable legal

principles.” Appellants’ argument with regard to the

“clear proof” standard has already been discussed. See,

I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS, Section A.

The Standard of Proof Required to Impose Liability,

supra, at pp. 3-7. Furthermore, appellants’ arguments

SRE SONS gor = -

| hea CARE. Ook HES Bake alm gt ON T e Aalt afe

eae ee Tes 4

OWA ks

Re ee

pean cy

rads

43a

Opinion.

on applicable legal principles have also been dealt with,

See I. ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS, pp.

3-28, and what remains is the issue of sufficiency of

the evidence.

4 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, little

j if any advantage would be gained by an itemized review

i of plaintiff’s case. Much of the evidence introduced at

: trial was similar to that used at the trials in Tennessee

E Consolidated Coal v. United Mine Workers and the re-

F trial of the Pennington case in Lewis v. Pennington. Yet

E there was additional evidence introduced at the trial

b having particular significance to South-East’s claim

bi and which tended to emphasize that South-East’s case

i was unique from either Tennessee Consolidated Coal or

; Lewis. (A single example is the evidence of the circum-

a stances surrounding the cancellation of the sales agency

\ contract between Consolidation and South-East in which

: Consol acted as sales agent for South-East’s coal.)

yl While some of the evidence introduced was circumstan-

: tial, which in and of itself might not support the jury’s

i verdict, there was also direct evidence which, when

coupled with the circumstantial evidence, raised plain-

tiff’s case from one of mere suspicion or conjecture to

a level where reasonable minds might have concluded

liability upon the part of the appellants. After review-

ing the record, it is concluded that there was substan-

tial credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The

District Court’s decision on this matter was correct and

appellants’ motions for directed verdict and judgment

notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied.

SPT

ee erat

EEO

DR SIE

SVE

SEE

SS Ly.

ar

tes

44a

Ill. ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES WITH RESPECT

TO THE JURY

A. Mr. LAVIERS’ SR. CONVERSATION WITH Two JURY-

MEN

Consolidation contends that the District Court com-

mitted reversible error in not declaring a mistrial be-

cause of a conversation Mr. LaViers, Sr., of South-East

Coal, had with two members of the jury outside of court

during the trial. The conversation took place in a coffee

shop in the hotel where some of the witnesses, jurors,

attorneys and parties in the trial were staying. Mr.

LaViers was seated by a waitress at a table which was

situated next to another table where two jurors were

eating breakfast. The District Judge, after examining

Mr. LaViers,!©® found that appellants were not preju-

16. The Court made the following examination of

Mr. LaViers in ascertaining what took place in the

coffee shop:

(Reporter’s note:) “The following occurred at

the bench in the immediate presence of counsel and

the Court, and in the absence and out of the hear-

ing of the jury:

“The Court: I want to clarify this other situa-

tion before we get into anything else. This is out of

the presence or hearing of the jurors, at the bench,

in connection with the statement made to the Court

by Mr. Schmidt, counsel for the defendant Consoli-

dation Coal Company, with reference to two of the

jurors, Mr. Hill and Mr. Osborne, who were seen in

conversation with Mr. Harry LavViers, Sr., at the

Coffee Shop of the Phoenix Hotel about 7:30 to

8:00 o’clock this morning, October 11, 1968.

“Now, then, do you want to make any further

statement? I am just asking.

Off the record.”

45a

Opinion.

diced by this unintentional contact and declined to grant

a mistrial.

Appellants maintain that the case of United States

v. Harry Barfield Company, 359 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.

1966), controls, and a mistrial should have been granted

on the basis of that authority. Reviewing the decision in

United States v. Harry Barfield Company, it appears

that several facts instrumental to that decision are

lacking in the present case. In the Barfield Company

case the prejudicial out-of-court conversation took place

in an elevator between the president of the company

and two jurors. The president of the company made an

effort to approach the jurors and then “cemented” the

contact by volunteering information that his wife and

her family dealt with the drug store owned by one of

the jurors. The Court observed:

(Reporter’s note:) “An off-the-record discus-

sion took place at the bench.

“The Court: Come here, Mr. LaViers, please.

Mr. LaViers, it has been reported to the Court that

this morning in the Coffee Shop at the Phoenix

Hotel, you, in the presence of Mr. Schmidt and Mr.

Rowntree—

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. Rowntree was not present.

“The Court: No.

“Mr. Rowntree: As I stated, I was there earlier.

“The Court: Yes. I don’t know who else was

there. But you were seated near or standing near

or in the company — not ‘in the company,’ I don’t

want to use that term — but in contact with Mr.

Hill and Mr. Osborne, who are members of the jury.

Now, do vou recall that incident?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

“The Court: Would you mind stating just what

it was?

Opinion.

“By way of summation it is clear that the tax-

payer president approached the jurors. They did not

approach him. He sought to identify with juror

Lockhart through the fact of knowing about his

drug business. He then sought to cement the iden-

tity by giving the juror his wife’s name which led to

a conversation regarding his wife’s family. He ap-

parently also managed to find out that the juror

from the radio station had known his brother.”

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Yes. Mr. Rowntree had gone

down to breakfast prior to my coming down. When

I came into the Coffee Shop, I looked for him and

found that the table where he was seated only had

one chair and I was looking around for some other

table to sit at, and the head waitress came and said,

‘Well, just sit down here’ — which was right across

the aisle from Mr. Rowntree — and I sat down on

the bench and ordered my breakfast.

And Mr. Hill was sitting next to me, and he

asked me, he said, ‘Do you know Mr. Oscar Evans

who lives in Paintsville?’

And I said, ‘Well, he doesn’t live in Paintsville

now; he has gone to Florida — but I do know Mr.

Evans.’

And he said, ‘Well, I used to board at his house.’

And he said he was quite a character.

And I said, ‘Yes, f agree with that,’ and, ‘I

knew him very well.’

And then I believe that part of the breakfast,

not the main part, was served, and Mr. Hill then

asked me if I knew Mr. Nelson Howard who lived

in Paintsville; and I said yes, ‘I know Mr. Nelson

Howard; he came from Gallatin County; he was in

the automobile business there and later was in the

coal business, I know him.’ Mr. Hill said he used

to work for him. I said, ‘Weli, he was quite an

aggressive merchant when he was there, he made a

47a

Opinion.

(See the dissenting opinion by Judge Colman in the Bar-

ficld Company case, at p. 124, questioning the majority’s

characterization of these facts.)

In the present case Mr. LaViers was seated by a

waitress next to the jurors. He did not seek them out.

Furthermore, it was a juror who aproached Mr. LaViers

with a question about whether he knew certain individ-

uals. Obviously, Mr. LaViers could have simply ignored

the juror, but the law does not require that when a per-

son becomes a party in a lawsuit that he must renounce

all social amenities and rudely ignore people who ask

him questions. The juror’s questions were answered by

Mr. LaViers in a straight-forward polite fashion, with-

lot of money and decided he would go into the farm-

ing business and bought a couple of farms down in

Bourbon County, and I understand, lost what he

had of his investment in these farms.’

I guess the rest of the breakfast was served

about that time. I don’t recall that there was —

there was some gentleman came in on the other

side, and they turned to him to speak to him. I don’t

recall any further conversation.

There was nothing about this lawsuit.

“The Court: Do you want to ask him a ques-

tion?

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. LaViers, there were other

places to sit down in the Coffee Shop besides next

to Mr. Hill and Mr. Osborne when you sat down?

Isn’t that true?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Well, yes, sir, there are

other tables for four and tables for two and the

tables at the bench are for two, cad the head wait-

ress came along and tossed a menu down and just

said, ‘Sit down here,’ and I sat where she put the

menu. I didn’t seek out this seat.

“Mr. Schmidt: You saw them sitting there?

48a

Opinion.

out any attempt to ingratiate himself to the juror. There

was no discussion of the case. The facts of Barfield Com-

pany which were of principal significance in that deci-

sion are lacking here and the case is clearly distinguish-

able from the present dispute. While, of couse, these

types of contacts must be scrupulously avoided if at all

possible, the fact that in this case the contacts were

brought about by a coincidence of circumstances, there

was no intentional “seeking-out,” and no discussion of

the case occurred, the District Court’s denial of the mo-

tion for a mistrial was proper and clearly not an abuse

of discretion. United States v. VanBuskirk, 304 F.2d 871

(6th Cir. 1962).

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Oh, yes, I saw them sitting

there.

“Mr. Schmdit: Was it in your mind that, even

so, it wouldn’t hurt to develop some sort of a social

rapport with these gentlemen?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: No, Mr. Schmidt, that was

not in my mind. I am by nature a person who talks

to people in the elevator or wherever it might be,

and JI would be untruthful and unrealistic if I didn’t

say I do engage in conversations.

“The Court: How many minutes would be [sic. ]

assume, or how much time, I should say, would you

assume your conversation or what you stated to

the Court, or anything in addition to that, was con-

sumed with either of these men?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Oh, tiere were snatches of

conversation, I imagine about ten or fifteen min-

utes. I was eating breakfast.

“The Court: That covered the whole period?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Weil, not the whole period

of breakfast, but the period of the conversation.

“The Court: Do you want to ask him anything

further?

49a

Opinion.

B. ALLEGED ERROR IN THE DISTRICT COURT’S REFUSAL

TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL BECAUSE OF CERTAIN CON-

DUCT OF A JUROR

Appellants contend that they were denied their

constitutional right to trial by an © npartial jury because

the District Court refused to grant a mistrial upon learn-

ing of certain alleged misconduct of a juror. Two mat-

ters are alluded to as indicating that the partiality of

one juror was questionable. First, an incident occurred

during trial which allegedly was misconduct on the part

of the juror. An attorney for the Union developed the

following facts: the juror and his wife attended a social

function in Lexington, Kentucky, during the trial. It

appeared that the juror’s wife was a soroity sister and

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: Mr. Rowntree has continu-

ously cautioned me about this.

“The Court: Well, you see the point is, I mean,

The Court accepts your statement that you didn’t

say anything about the case.

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: We didn’t talk anything

about the case, Your Honor.

“The Court: But, you see, the difficulty is that

this more or less currying of favor with a juror —

while I realize it isn’t currying a favor deliberately

—but it has brought questions to people’s minds.

I realize some people are just naturally friendly, and

Kentuckians are just that way — I know them

pretty well — but we mustn’t do anything like this.

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: I would be very, very happy

to avoid them.

“The Court: The Court is confident that you

didn’t do anything intentionally. That is the ruling

of the Court.

TES do you have anything you want to ask

50a

Opinion.

close friend of the wife of a lawyer who practiced in

the coal mining area of Eastern Kentucky. The juror

was also a close friend of the lawyer. These people met

at the social function, and the juror mentioned that a

third lawyer who practiced in the same coal mining re-

gion was an attorney for the Union in the trial in which

he was a juror and that this attorney was “a very able

lawyer”. Then the juror’s wife made some comment

about the present case being difficult “in following a

conspiracy or in following just what they were driving

at with all the reading and all.” It was not at all clear

whether the juror’s wife mentioned the word “con-

spiracy” or not. On these facts a motion was made to

subpoena the juror and the people involved in this inci-

dent and examine them. The District Court concluded

that “nothing (had) been shown here to justify an in-

vestigation of this juror” and overruled the motion.

Appellant cites Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.

140 (1892), as controlling and requiring that under

these circumstances an examination of the juror should

have been granted. Under the facts in Mattox, it was

obvious that an examination of the jurors should have

taken place. In that case allegedly a court bailiff, pres-

“Mr. Rowntree: No.

“Mr. Schmidt: May I ask him a question?

“The Court: Yes, sir.

“Mr. Schmidt: Mr. LaViers, you have seen

each of those gentlemen sit at the same table every

morning?

“Mr. LaViers, Sr.: No, sir, they have not, as

far as my knowledge, sat at that same table. They

do sit in the Coffee Shop there at various places,

but I don’t recall seeing them at that particular

place, Your Honor.”

5la

Opinion.

ent when the jury was deliberating the verdict in a

murder case, stated, so that the members of the jury

could hear him, that “this is the third fellow he (the

accused has killed.” In addition, during deliberation the

jury or part of it was read a newspaper account of the

trial that included the following remarks:

“If he (the accused) is found guilty of murder

he will be a lucky man, for the evidence against him

was very strong, or at least appeared to be to an

outsider. The case was given to the jury at noon

yesterday, and it was expected that their delibera-

tions would not last an hour before they would re-

turn a verdict.

“It (the evidence) was so strong that the

friends of Mattox gave up all hope of any result but

conviction.”

Under these alleged circumstances, the court should

have ordered an examination of the jury to determine

the accuracy of the purported misconduct. However, by

no stretch of the imagination can it be argued that the

facts surrounding the present incident of alleged mis-

conduct approximates those in Mattox. While questions

of jury improprieties are matters of degree, it cannot be

said that the District Court abused its discretion in not

ordering an examination of the juror and the other par-

ticipants in the present incident without further repre-

sentation or a stronger indication that some misconduct

prejudicial to appellants’ constitutional right to an im-

partial trial did in fact occur.

The second matter that appellants point to which

they contend shows partiality upon the part of this

SRC

Se TIN

92a

Opinion.

juror is that his insurance agency underwrote a real

estate bond for the son of a former official of and pres-

ent minor stockholder in South-East Coal Company. The

juror was challenged for cause, but the District Court

overruled the challenge. The examination of the juror

showed that a $5,000 surety bond must be posted with

the Commonwealth of Kentucky before a real estate

broker can sell real estate. The juror’s insurance agency

underwrites the bond for the son of a former official

and present minor stockholder in South-East Coal. The

bond was first written several years before this litiga-

tion was commenced and simply has been renewed each

year. Until informed, the jurer did not know for a fact

if he wrote the bond for the son or the father and, obvi-

ously, knew neither personally. Upon questioning, he

stated that the fact he wrote the bond would not affect

his judgment in any way. This case is distinguishable

from Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continen-

tal Casualty Company, 393 U.S. 145 (1968), cited by ap-

pellants to support their position that their challenge

for cause of this juror should have been granted. In

Commonwealth Coatings an individual acting as an

arbitrator under a private contractual agreement had

been an engineering consultant for one of the parties in

the dispute and collected over $12,000 in fees in four

years. The Supreme Court set aside an award made by

the panel of three arbitrators holding that an arbitrator

should disclose to the parties any dealings which migh’

create an impression of possible bias. Factually and

legally, the present case is different. Here a juror had

only remote indirect contact with a party in a lawsuit.

Even if the business contacts were more direct, all that

Commonwealth Coatings requires is a disclosure of

53a

Opinion.

these dealings. In the present case, the nature and ex-

tent of the juror’s business contacts were disclosed and

the District Court, upon examination of the juror, con-

cluded that he coulg impartially hear the evidence and

return a verdict free of any prejudice that might result

from his business dealings. The District “ourt’s refusal

to grant the challenge for cause of this juror was not an

abuse of discretion. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245

(1910) ; Coz v. General Electric Company, 302 F.2d 389

(6th Cir. 1962).

IV. DAMAGES

A. THE JuRY AWARD oF DAMAGES

South-East sought damages allegedly resulting

from the anti-competitive conspiracy in this case for a

three and one half year period from April 26, 1962, to

December 31, 1966. Two methods of computing these

damages were used to arrive at a dollar amount.!7 The

first method was a simple comparison between operating

profits and losses18 during the period 1952-1958, an ar-

bitrary base period, with the operating profit and losses

17. Computation of injuries by the first method

produced a damages figure of $3,082,816. The damages

figure produced by the second method was $2,896,713.

The jury awarded damages of $2,410,452 or approxi-

mately $700,000 less than the damages computed by the

first method and $500,000 less than computed by the

second method.

18. Figures reflecting operating profit and losses

rather than net income were used because these figures

do not include such things as percentage depletion al-

lowances which are treated as return of capital, interest

payments (expenses) or income, capital gains and losses

and dividend income.

54a

Opinion.

for the period South-East sought recovery. A method

similar to this was used in determining the antitrust

damages in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 US.

251, 258 (1946), and Ford Motor Company v. Webster’s

Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 885-886 (1st Cir. 1966).

The second method was more complex and was de-

signed to meet certain objections appellants had to the

first method. This method used various financial and

managerial figures for the years 1964 and 1965 for a

comparison with similar figures in 1962, 1963 and 1966.

Thus, statistics during the actual damages period (1964

and 1965). Thus, statistics during the actual damages

period (1964 and 1965) acted as a basis for computing

damages for the entire period. Supporting this theory,

South-East introduced six financial exhibits showing, in

part: the effects higher mining costs and decreased pro-

duction in 1962, 1963 and 1966 had on earning compared

to the base years 1964-1965; the effect on earnings of

two strikes in 1962-1963 and 1966 as compared with

earnings in 1964-1965; lower price realization on coal in

1964-1965 than in the remaining years of the damage

period; and the alleged effect the conspiracy had on

South-East’s price realization per ton of coal compared

with the average price realization of the industry for the

period 1962-1965. South-East maintains that by using

this approach appellant's challenge to the validity of

using figures for 1952-1958 for the comparison, because

allegedly during the damage period internal and external

economic conditions were less favorable than during

1952-1958, are effectively negated.

Appellants raise numerous issues regarding the

validity of South-East’s theories of damages. Mention

55a

Opinion.

of four of the challenges will give some idea of the gen-

eral nature of appellants’ attacks. Respecting South-

East’s first method of computing damages, appellants

contend that using the profit average of 1952-1958 for

the comparison is unfair as “internal and external eco-

nomic factors’’, i.e. less favorable mining conditions and

a general overall depression in the coal market, varied

between the years used as a basis and the actual dam-

ages period. The second method is challenged on the

grounds that use of new equipment during 1964 invali-

dates the comparison of the financial and managerial

date with the base period 1962-1963. The third objection

is that both methods claim losses for Consolidation’s re-

fusal to handle South-East’s coal and that these losses

cannot be recovered from the Union. Finally, appellants

complain that South-East’s computed losses which were

in part a result of its inability to get sufficient railroad

cars to ship its coal and, therefore, were in no way at-

tributable to the alleged conspiracy.

It appears that most of appellants’ challenges to

South-East’s claims of damages are directed at the ac-

curacy of the amount of damages and not the fact of

damages. There was a general issue raised as to the lack

of evidence showing that the proximate cause of South-

east’s damages was the conspiracy; that is, the suffici-

ency of evidence showing the fact of damages. How-

ever, reviewing the record, it is clear that there was

sufficient credible evidence from which the jury was

justified in inferring the necessary causal relation be-

tween the conspirators’ anti-competitive conduct and the

claimed damage or injury. Zenith Radio Corporation

v. Hazeliine, 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969). The antitrust

cases are legion which reiterate the proposition that, if

56a

Opinion.

the fact of damages is proven, the actual computation

of damages may suffer from minor imperfections. See,

Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Com-

pany, 282 U.S. 555 (1931); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-

tures, supra; Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine,

supra; Ford Motor Company v. Webster’s Auto Sales,

Inc., supra; Atlas Building Products Company v. Dia-

mond Block & Gravel Company, 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th

Cir. 1959); North Texas Producers Association v.

Young, 308 F.2d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 1962); Flintkote

Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir. 1957).

Appellant’s principal grounds for objection to the

jury verdict is that internal and external economic con-

ditions and decisions of the management resulted in

South-East’s losses, and not the conduct of the alleged

conspiracy. But the question of whether certain of

South-East’s losses were attributable to the conspiracy

or other economic factors was for the jury’s considera-

tion and determination. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v.

Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904; as is the question of

the credibility of the witnesses used in showing dam-

ages, Atlas Building Products Company v. Diamond

Block & Gravel Company, supra at 959. It is concluded

that there was sufficient credible evidence to support

the jury’s verdict as to the fact of damages and the

amount of damages was computed as precisely as capa-

ble under the circumstances.

B. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Appellants object to the award of attorneys’ fees as

unreasonable. A party seeking review of an award of

attorneys’ fees in an antitrust case has the burden of

CRATER

| Pnemnaheneinindinaaebeentate aed

as

Co SAR IY

eta

Yom pe

57a

Opinion.

clearly demonstrating error in the factual basis of the

award or an abuse of discretion. See, Armco Steel Cor-

poration v. State of North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 213

(8th Cir. 1967) ; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpora-

tion v. Coldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 221 (9th Cir. 1964). In

this case appellants have not shown either an error in

the factual basis of the award or an abuse of discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge. (Concurring.) I do not in-

terpret the opinion in this case to conflict with the opin-

ion of Judge Edwards, in which I concurred, in Ramsey

v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d 655 (6th

Cir.), cert, granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3379. I concur in the

opinion prepared by Judge Brooks.

59a

Memorandum.

APPENDIX B

[See Jt. App. pp. 248 et seq. ]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

RICHMOND

No. 303

SouTH-EAST COAL COMPANY

Vv.

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

and CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY

Memorandum

Filed April 1, 1969

This action arises under the antitrust laws. After

a trial extending over some four weeks, the jury re-

turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, South-East

Coal Company, of $2,410,452.00 in damages. Pursuant to

section 15 of Title 15, United States Code, judgment was

entered for three times this amount.

The record is before the court on the separate

motions of the defendants, United Mine Workers of

America and Consolidation Coal Company, for a directed

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

or in the alternative, for a new trial. They set forth

numerous grounds in support of their motions, including

allegations that the evidence was insufficient to support

the verdict, that the verdict was contrary to the law and

the evidence, that the court made various errors with

regard to the admission of evidence, that the court erred

in failing to admonish the jury not to consider certain

evidence, that the court erred in permitting a witness

60a

Memorandum.

to use certain papers to refresh his recollection, that

the court erred in failing to declare a mistrial because

of an out-of-court conversation between an agent of

plaintiff and two jurors, that the court erred in failing

to declare a mistrial because of the argument of plain-

tiff’s counsel, that the court erred in failing to sustain

the challenge for cause to one of the jurors, that the

damages were grossly excessive and speculative, that the

court made numerous errors in instructing the jury, and

other allegations of error. I do not intend in this memo-

randum to examine each of the arguments of the de-

fendants individually or in detail. Nor will I attempt

an exhaustive discussion of every issue raised in the

excellent and very comprehensive briefs submitted by

the parties. Instead I will discuss the various groups of

issues in a general fashion.

This case, taken as a whole, was conducted in ac-

cordance with the guidelines set out in United Mine

Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, and

Lewis v. Pennington, 6 Cir., 400 F.2d 806, cert. denied

37 L.W. 3209.

I.

The defendants contend that there was insufficient

evidence or a lack of “clear proof” to support the verdict

of liability.

To prove a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust

laws, the plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence

The proof may rest, as it frequently does, on circum

stantial evidence. Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramoun’

Film Distributing Corp., 3 Cir., 320 F.2d 285, 299, af

firmed 378 U.S. 123, reh. denied 379 U.S. 872, reh. denies

382 U.S. 1001; Eagles v. Harriss Sales Corp., 4 Cir., 36!

6la

Memorandum.

F.2d 927. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328

U.S. 781, 809-10, the United States Supreme “ourt clearly

stated: “The essential combination or conspiracy in vio-

lation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of

dealing or other circumstances as well as in an exchange

of words.” €

Fully aware that reasonable inferences, but not

speculations, are a sufficient basis for finding antitrust

liability (Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, E.D.Tenn.,

265 F. Supp. 388, 432), this court is of the opinion that

the existence of a conspiracy, including the requisite

“predatory intent’, even under the stringent clear proof

test.

I.

The defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to

prove, by clear proof or otherwise, that it was injured

by a conspiracy on the part of the defendants, that plain-

tiff’s proof of damages was too speculative and con-

jectural to have been submitted to the jury, and that

the damages awarded were grossly excessive, not sup-

ported by the evidence, and the result of passion, pre-

judice and unaccountable caprice on the part of the jury.

At the trial, plaintiff introduced proof of damages

under two theories. First, plaintiff attempted to show

damages by comparing its operating profits from 1952

through 1958 with its operating losses in the period of

alleged damage, May 1, 1962, through December 31, 1966.

Second, plaintiff attempted to show damages by ana-

lyzing the business during the damage period.

It is well settled in actions brcught under the anti-

trust laws that, although a verdict may not be based on

mere speculation or guesswork, the jury may make a

62a

Memorandum.

reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant

data and on probable and inferential proof. Exactitude

in the proof of damages is not required. Bigelow v. RKO

Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264. Indeed, precision is

often impossible in an action of this nature. “The deter-

mination of damages in an antitrust suit, however,

almost invariably requires a certain amount of specula-

tion, no matter how informed.” Perma Life Mufflers v.

International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 152 (Marshall,

J., concurring). It should also be noted that elementary

concepts of justice and public policy require that a

wrongdoer must bear the risk of uncertainty which his

wrong has created. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,

supra at 265.

Defendants complain of numerous aspects of plain-

tiff’s damage evidence as being misleading and inac-

curate. But the accuracy of plaintiff’s testimony is a

matter going to its weight, not its admissibility. Ford

Motor Co. v. Webster’s Auto Sales, 1 Cir., 361 F.2d 874,

886.

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s losses were the

result, not of a conspiracy, but of its own bad business

judgment and changes in the market and its methods of

operation. There may well have been many factors which

contributed to plaintiff’s losses. But it is not necessary

for a plaintiff in an antitrust suit to show that the con-

spiracy is the sole, or even the most substantial, cause

of damage. It is enough for a plaintiff to get to the jury

if he shows that the conspiracy is a substantial cause.

Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 1 Cir., 333

F.2d 798, 805-06, cert. denied 379 U.S. 931, reh. denied

379 U.S. 984; Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts

Corp., supra at 143-44 (White, J., concurring).

63a

Memorandum.

On pages 3518-3520 of the Transcript, this court

adequately instructed the jury with regard to defend-

ants’ theory that any losses suffered by plaintiff were

not the result of the aileged conspiracy and hence not

to be included in any award of damages.

Ii.

The defendants make numerous contentions with

respect to alleged errors and prejudicial statements

made by the court in its instructions and with respect

to the refusal of the court to give their suggested in-

structions.

The defendant, United Mine Workers, submitted 26

numbered requested charges, and the defendant, Con-

solidation Coal Co., submitted 74 numbered requested

charges. Either of these sets of requested instructions,

if given in toto, would have contained errors and would

have been grossly one-sided, even though both con-

tained a great many correct statements of the law. A

court, in charging the jury, should not make statements

of the law in the abstract, without any relevance to the

issues to be decided, in order to avoid confusing the

jury. Moreover, a court is not obligated to use appro-

priate and applicable suggested charges if it gives a

charge embodying the same rule but in different lan-

guage. Tyree v. New York Central R.R. Co., 6 Cir., 382

F.2d 524, cert. denied 389 U.S. 1014; Westmoreland v.

Memphis Transit Co., 6 Cir., 305 F.2d 71.

The charge to the jury must be considered as a

whole. This court is of the opinion that the charge, so

considered, favored neither the plaintiff nor the defend-

ants and presented to the jury a sharp, clear issue for

64a

Memorandum.

their determination. This language from Cobb v. Union

Railway Co., 6 Cir., 318 F.2d 33, cert. denied 375 US.

945, is applicable:

“Flaws can be found in almost any charge by

separating certain paragraphs from the whole to

determine whether it gives the jury a correct under-

standing of the propositions which they are to de-

cide and the pertinent principles of law which shall

guide them in their decision.” 212 F.2d at 37.

IV.

Defendants complain that the court in its instruc-

tions erroneously characterized the Protective Wage

Clause to their prejudice and failed to give adequate

instructions with regard to the Protective Wage Clause

and the 80 Cent Clause.

By examining certain portions of a charge to a jury

out of their context in the whole charge and in the trial,

one can frequently find flaws. This is especially true in

the case of such a protracted trial as this was. Therefore,

as noted above, the charge must be considered as a whole

to determine whether the substantial rights of the

parties were prejudiced. Cobb v. Union Railroad Co.,

supra.

This court is of the opinion that the charge to the

jury, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately presented

the substance of the Protective Wage Clause. Any in-

accuracies in the instructions were inconsequential and

certainly rectified by the court’s admonition to the jury:

“You are not to accept what I may say (in commenting

upon the evidence) as necessarily true.” Transcript 3492.

65a

Memorandum.

The Protective Wage Clause is capable of two rea-

sonable constructions, and the one should be adopted

which does not result in a violation of law. Lewis v. Pen-

nington, supra; Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, supra

at 412. Consequently, the jury was instructed twice that

the contract between the United Mine Workers and the

coal operators was not in itself unlawful. Transcript

3507, 3512. Nevertheless, the execution of the contract,

including the Protective Wage Clause, was evidence in

the case which the jury could consider along with all

the other evidence.

V.

It is contended that the court failed to instruct

the jury properly on the defense of in pari delicto. The

most recent decision by the Supreme Court on this de-

fense is Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts

Corp., supra, which produced six opinions, none of

which was supported by a majority of the Court. The

instructions in the instant vase follow what appears to

be the law as reflected, however obscurely, in Perma

Life Mufflers, namely that if the plaintiff was a co-

initiator of the conspiracy and equally responsible

therefor, plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the per-

iod that it remained a party to the conspiracy. Tran-

script 3515-3516. It is doubtful that an instruction on

the defense of in pari delicto should have been given at

all. If anything, the instruction given was unduly fav-

orable to defendants.

66a

Memorandum.

VI.

It is contended that the court should have granted

a mistrial during the course of the trial because of an

improper contact between Mr. Harry LaViers, Sr., pres-

ident of South-East Coal Co., and two members of the

jury. The contact occurred one morning in the hotel

coffee shop when the head waitress seated Mr. LaViers

at a table next to one occupied by the two jurors. They

engaged in brief bits of conversation, but nothing was

said about this lawsuit and Mr. LaViers did not

intentionally attempt to curry favor with the jur-

ors. Transcript 1770.

The determination of whether irregularities or al-

leged misconduct of this nature should require a new

trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial

judge. United States v. Van Buskirk, 6 Cir., 304 F. 2d

871; Thomas v. Nuss, 6 Cir., 353 F. 2d 257, 259. The

court should not grant a new trial because of an ir-

regularity not attended with any intentional wrong

where it appears to the court’s satisiaction that the in-

terests of none of the litigants were prejudiced. Cali-

fornia Fruit Exchange v. Henry, W.D.Penna., 89 F.

Supp. 580, affirmed 184 F. 2d 517. This court is satis-

fied that the contact between Mr. LaViers and the two

jurors did not influence the verdict in any way.

The case of Noble v. McAllister Dairy Farms, 52

Ohio Ops. 52, cited by defendant Consolidation Coal Co.,

is factually distinguishable from the instant case. To

the extent that the statement of law from Henry, sup-

ra, set out above, conflicts with any of the broad propo-

sitions stated in Noble, I decline to follow Voble.

67a

Memorandum.

The defendants allege error in failing to sustain

their challenges of juror Arnspiger. This juror had writ-

ten a real estate bond for a stockholder and retired di-

rector of plaintiff (or for his son) but was not person-

ally acquainted with him. He stated that this fact would

not influence him.

The competency of a juror is for determination by

the trial court, which is vested with a wide discretion

in determining competency. Cox v. General Electric Co.,

6 Cir., 302 F. 2a 389, 391. In view of the circumstances

surrounding Mr. Arnspiger, it was within the court’s

judicial discretion to retain him on the jury. The dictum

in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas

Co., 37 L.W. 4037, decided November 18, 1968, does not

require a new trial in this case.

In sum, this court is of the opinion that the ver-

dict was supported by competent evidence and that the

trial was free from any error which would warrant a

new trial. The motions of the defendants for a directed

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

or for a new trial, should be overruled.

An order in conformity with this Memorandum is

this day entered.

Mac SwWInForp, Judge

A True Copy Attest

Davis T. McGarvey, Clerk

U.S. District Court

By HELEN M. JENNIVE

es “te S

3

3

+

§,

x

Pa,

Fangs

~~

Wate

69a

Instructions to the Jury.

APPENDIX C

[Appendix C consists of the District Court’s In-

structions to the Jury in South-East Coal Company v.

Consolidation Coal Company and UMWA.]

Instructions to the Jury

[1824] Now, I feel it is important to give you some ex-

planation of the background of the coal industry in Ken-

tucky, and very briefly. I do not want to detain you any

longer than necessary in this charge, but I want you to

be able to feel that you can do so, to decide this case to-

day. You are not under any compuncti~n to do so. You

may come back tomorrow or as many days as you think

is appropriate.

I realize it has taken a long time to try it. There is

quite a lot of evidence, both from the witness stand and

by way of depositions and transcripts; quite a number

of exhibits that you will want to consider, but the issue

in this case is very narrow and before I conclude my

charge to you, I will draw the issue very sharply for you.

You will not have any difficulty in recognizing what it

is that you have to decide.

I believe, in the light of all the evidence and all the

inferences which may be drawn from it, that you can

arrive at a fair and just verdict.

The coal industry is a fascinating and interesting in-

dustry. As has been brought out here in the evidence, it

rh KOE

70a

Instructions to the Jury.

goes back a long way. The United Mine Workers, or the

workers, who are the men that produce the coal, who go

into the pits and actually produce the coal and the oper-

ators who have risked their capital in the industry, have

made a distinct contribution to our whole economy.

[1825] They are entitled, as the law provides, to be pro-

tected in those rights. They are entitled, both as the

plaintiff here is entitled to be protected, and the defend-

ants are entitled to be protected, and so long as they are

all observing the law and the responsibilities of their

business, then the economy will be protected itself, and

the people of the United States and of the world, because

this is a worid proposition. Much of this coal that we

dig here in Kentucky is exported and it is, after all, a

world proposition. But all of us will profit by a healthy

condition of the coal business.

Eastern Kentucky has a coal field and western Ken-

tucky has a coal field, which we are not concerned di-

rectly in this lawsuit, and those of you who have never

visited these coal fields or any coal fields, some of the

language used in this trial might be a little obscure and

you might not feel that you clearly understand just

what it is all about when they talk about tipples and

“sweetheart contracts” and “coal contracts” and produc-

tion and organization of coal companies and organiza-

tion of coal mines.

I am going to very briefly explain some of these

things to you.

A “tipple” is -he place where the coal comes out of

the ground and where it is loaded into cars to be hauled

to market. Now, you understand the old system, many

71a

Instructions to the Jury?

years ago coal was brought directly out of the ground,

placed into coal curs and hauled away by the railroad

companies. It was sold as it was, either good, bad, or in-

different, but you understand modern conditions, coal is

brought out of the ground and a great portion of it is.

loaded into trucks and it cannot be sold as it may appear

or at least a part of it cannot be sold as it comes out of

the ground, but it must be cleaned.

This is a highly competitive business. There are

other coal fields in other States and other places and

foreign markets even, and so the coal must be cleaned

afi [1826] taken care of and made more salable. So,

when we speak of a cleaning plant, sometimes the terms

are interchanged — “tipple” and “cleaning plant” are in-

terchanged — and to the lay people it may rot be clear.

But these cleaning plants are tipples where this coal

is brought and put into the cleaning plant and cleaned

and graded and then loaded into freight cars or trucks

for sale. This is a major proposition. It is not just a mat-

ter of — you may have driven through the mountains of

Kentucky and seen a little wooden tipple, and somebody

says “There is a tipple halfway up the mountain,” where

coal is being brought out and being brought down by a

conveyor system, which, in itself, is still in operation.

But, under modern methods, it is frequently re-

quired that this coal be processed and that these coal-

cleaning plants or washing plants, as they are some-

times called, are involved in the production just the

same as digging the coal or bringing it out or blasting

it out or by stripping methods or whatever it may be.

The cleaning of the coal or processing of the coal

is a part of the coal production. So, when I say “tipple”

72a

Instructions to the Jury.

as used here, I mean the last place that the coal is be-

fore it is hauled to market.

Now, you have also heard the term here“ sweet-

heart contract.” I am not sure that you clearly under-

stand. It sounds very romantic, I am sure, but in this

sense, where there was an agreement and there was an

agreement under this 1958 coal wage agreement, that

the United Mine Workers entered into this contract na-

tionwide thing, as they claim, to make everyone who

produced coal to pay what is known as a Welfare Fund.

The Welfare Fund was 40 cents that was put on every

ton of coal that was produced by the miners.

Now, that Welfare Fund went into the retirement

plan and various other social benefits to the miners

themselves, the building of the hospitals that some of

you may have some experience and knowledge of, or

taking care of these [1827] miners and their families in

illness and their general welfare to see that they were

given a better condition of living in that respect.

So that Welfare Fund or that 40 cents was an at-

tachment on each ton of coal that was produced, and

naturally as is a business arrangement, cost produc-

tion is included and involved in fixing the price of the

coal.

So that cost was added to the retail or wholesale

price of the coal from the producer to the wholesaler

or retailer. Now, that had to be, as it is contended, on a

national basis in order for these companies to compete

with each other from the various coal fields in the

United States.

The United Mine Workers is not just a Kentucky

organization, it is a national organization that was

Instructions to the Jury. -

begun back in 1890, as a combination of the miners for

their self-preservation and for the benefits which they

felt by union they could have which as individuals they

might not have.

So that national wage agreement included not only

the wages, not only the standards which were set by

the contracts that had been in effect since 1950, but in

1958 it added this Welfare Clause to it. That Welfare

Clause is the thing that you have heard referred to as

the Protective Wage Clause. They have used that term. I

sometimes think lawyers are so familiar with their case

that they may not realize what they say doesn’t al-

ways have significance to jurors.

But that Protective Wage Clause in the 1958 con-

tract was to the effect that the operaors would not

handle coal from any company that was not under

that contract.

Now, that is what it means in short, that this Pro-

tective Wage Clause — take the Consolidation Coal

Company, and use it as an example. It produced coal.

I don’t know whether it does now or not. It used to.

It used to own mines in Eastern Kentucky. I am not

sure that it does own any now. I believe it does own

some mines in Virginia. At any rate, it used to be a big

actual miner of coal in Eastern Kentucky. It sold its

own coal and it also bought coal and resold it. It bought

coal from other [1828] producers, independent pro-

ducers, such as it was. It bought coal from captive

mines. In other words, it was in the coal business, in

the coal production business and the coal handling -

business and the coal sale business. So there were other

companies such as this, and this contract provided that

T4a

Instructions to the Jury.

these companies would not handle anybody’s coal unless

it was a coal producing company that had signed one of

these national wage agreements with the United Mine

Workers.

You have heard the term used here “captive mines.”

Well, a captive mine is a mine, just to use an example,

like Inland Steel at Wheelwright. They have a big tipple

there. I think that tipple cost five or six milion [sic. ]

dollars. They have a big cleaning plant. Those things

are so enormous we think of a building costing four or

five million dollars, but we have got a great big build-

ing, and that is what this is.

As a matter of fact, I have seen that tipple there

at Wheelwright, and it has a provision that picks up a

freight car, the whole freight car and shakes it just like

that, and that is a modern method which is used in the

production of coal for sale.

So those companies, like Inland Steel, or like other

companies that use a lot of coal in the production of

stel, own their own mines, but very frequently there are

types of coal or kinds of coal that they cannot use in

their manufacturing process, or they may have for a

time being an overproduction. So they sell that coal and

they might sell that coal, as it has been testified to here,

by some of the witnesses, to companies as the defend-

ant, Consolidation Coal Company, for resale. Sometimes

the captive mine owners have to buy coal, and it just

depends on the circumstances and the particular need

which might arise at a given time. But that is what is

meant by a captive mine. That is a mine that is not in

the business primarily of producing coal for sale, but is

in the coal mining business for its own coal, and to use

75a

Instructions to the Jury.

its own coal and only sells its oversupply, or that which

it cannot for some reason or other use in its business.

[1829] Going back to this question of the sweetheart

contract that I brought up a few minutes ago, a sweet-

heart contract is a special dispensation to a coal produc-

ing company because of a circumstance which that com-

pany, says, “I cannot survive if I have to pay this 40-

cents Welfare clause provision, if I have to observe it. I

cannot pay that much additional and have that much

additional price on my coal and sell it,” or, “I cannot

meet some of these other conditions,” whatever they

might be, some of the conditions maybe as to the wages,

the cost of labor, or for some reason a company or an

individual will say, “Well, I cannot sign that contract.”

Then it is contended that the union, who is seeking

to have these contracts executed by all coal producers

for the benefit of all of the miners as a group, will say

to that person, “Well, you go ahead and sign it anyway.

We won’t insist on it.” In other words, it is showing

favoritism, for one reason or another, to a particular

group or individual group of companies or individual

coal producers.

Now, that is what they mean when they say a

“sweetheart contract.”

As I say, as it has been brought out here, it is quite

an educational thing to me, and I am sure it is to you,

this development which we have seen here from this

witness stand in the progress of this case. This coal

is sent from Kentucky to the northwest, up to what is

known as the Lake Region, to Minnesota, all up into

the Great Lakes Regions. It wasn’t brought out here,

76a

Instructions to the Jury.

but I would assume wherever there is steel mills there

is a demand for it, and where there is other industry

that has to have energy from heat, that coal is used

and sold.

It was the business of Consolidation Coal Company,

the defendant here, to acquire that coal from producers

and transport it and sell it, as it would seem from our

case here, primarily up in the northern part of our

country. So that is the matter which up to this point

has been brought out here.

[1830] As I said before, I don’t want you to think

because of this length of time that we have had to try

this case, the number of witnesses and the number of

exhibits, and the number of figures, the hundreds of

figures used here, and the testimony that has been read

here for hours at a time from transcripts and from

depositions, that you are so confused that you don’t

know what it is all about. It does sound like such a

magnanimous big operation that it is hard to find out.

But the issue in this case, notwithstanding all of that,

is very, very sharp. I assure you that before you go

out of that jury box that you will understand what it

is you have to decide.

Now, you wil! have to apply your recollection, as

far as you are capable of doing it, to what was said.

In other words, you can’t remember all the details

and everything that was said, but you gather from

these witnesses, from their demeanor, from the things

they say and the inferences that may be drawn, one

after another, and from these depositions, an idea about

this case. You get an idea. There is an atmosphere

77a

Instructions to the Jury.

about a lawsuit, and you are not expected as jurors to

just take it step by step by step. That is an impossi-

bility.

So you are to use your recollection of that evidence.

You are to get an idea from the whole picture of this

thing that this case should be decided one way rather :

than another Now, that is a common-sense approach

to it. By discussing it together, you arrive at a fair and

just verdict, and I am sure you can do that.

I am depending upon you. I am trusting you to do

it. You don’t realize possibly, but this court is the

most important thing in the world. What you do here in

this cas@is going to reflect credit or discredit upon this

court. To me there is nothing that compares with it

in the whole idea of free government, that a procedure

should be had where citizens come in and ask their fel-

low citizens under defined rules of law and under a

Constitutional guarantee of justice to decide an issue

of fact. It is just as simple as [1831] that. But they

are dependent upon each of those jurors to have an

understanding and appreciation of the seriousness of

their job, not that it is impossible, it isn’t, but that they

should have an understanding and an appreciation.

What you decide is striking at the very foundations

and roots of our government, because if justice fails,

nothing else matters. To me there is nothing to com- | 7

pare with the responsibility that rests upon me as the Sr

presiding Judge of this Court, upon these lawyers, who

are officers of the Court, upon you, who are the jurors,

who actually, after all, are going to make the decision.

TERS PAREN BESTS TREE IRIN ARTEL EL I

PRET TSR eee ee ae

RMN ALI LVR TM

So, consequently, each of you carries with you the

integrity of this Court when you go into your jury

78a

Instructions to the Jury.

room. I will enter the judgment. But my judgment must

be based upon your verdict. If your verdict is unfair

or unreasonable or unjust, then my judgment will be

that way, and that will be my responsibility. If your

verdict is fair and just, it is a reflection upon your intel-

ligence, upon your integrity, and upon the ideals which

we think are sacred in the administration of justice.

Now, your verdict must be unanimous. By unani-

mous verdict, it means it must be the verdict of each

juror. You cannot arrive at your verdict by holding a

primary election in the jury room or taking a majority

or any other percentage of the number of jurors. It

must be the verdict of each juror. Each juror must

make up his or her own mind as to what the verdict

should be.

That, however, does not mean to recommend or

aggrandize; doesn’t mean that you are to go into the

jury room and take an uncompromising view without

first considering the reasons, recollections, and argu-

ments of your fellow jurors.

You may be assured, aud I don’t suppose any of

you ever knew each other before, but you may be as-

sured from me that each person on that jury is just as

anxious to be a fair juror as you are. No one has any

ulterior purpose of [sic.] motive.

[1832] What each one wants to do is, I am sure, to

decide this case and reflect upon this Court and to do

justice and to reflect credit upon himself or herself as

a juror.

I have never served on a jury, but I have known a

lot of people who have, and I have had them tell me

79a

Instructions to the Jury.

sometimes you go to the jury room and some one or two

or more of the jurors will immediately announce what

the verdict should be, and that everyone will have to

agree with them or “we will Stay here all day” or “all

night,” or some other such extravagant statement, mis-

taking, I am afraid, hard-headedness and stubbornness

and stupidity for strong-mindedness.

So, I don’t want you to fall into that trap. I do what

you to exercise certain of your own free will as to what

the verdict should be and stand up for your theories and

argue about them, but realize that the jury is composed

of twelve people, not two or three or seven or nine, with

the idea that twelve disinterested citizens of this dis-

trict can take a given set of facts and, with certain rules

of law, can apply those rules of law to those facts and

come up with the right answer.

I don’t know why there are twelve people on the

jury. I don’t know why there are twelve of so many

things, but that figure has come on down through the

corridors of time, this idea of twelve.

There are twelve months in the year; Christ had

twelve disciples; and there are twelve in a dozen of

oranges — and I don’t know why that rather odd num-

ber exists, but it has carried in our whole historical

understanding of things and plays a significant part.

Twelve months in the year, various things that are

brought in to us, that number.

So, I hope that you will, when you go to the jury

room, realize after all this must be a relative give-and-

take matter. They didn’t just ask one person to decide

the case; they asked twelve.

80a

Instructions to the Jury.

[1833] I would not require you to make a verdict, I

couldn’t if I would, and I wouldn’t if I could but I do

want to impress upon you the importance of making a

verdict, if you feel that you can conscientiously do so.

This case has taken this length of time to try. I

don’t want you to sacrifice any principle on an expedient,

and I am sure we have to be practical about things, and

it has taken a long time to try; and unless you can make

a verdict, we will have to go through this again—which

is expensive, both in money and in time, and an awful lot

of people, including jurors, as you know, who would have

to sit here and hear it all again.

So, if you feel that you can reasonably and honor-

ably do so, I hope that you will return a verdict. After

all, it can be decided, and I am sure that you realize that

and will do so, if you feel you can conscientiously make

a verdict.

Now, in the Federal Rules—which is not true in the

State courts, and possibly some of you have served on

juries in State courts; in the State court, the judge gives

written instructions, in Kentucky, and the lawyers have

those instructions and use those instructions many

times, very frequently in arguing their case to the jury,

instructions in writing—in the Federal Courts the case

is concluded, insofar as the introduction of evidence and

the arguments of counsel are concerned, and then the

trial judge gives a charge to the jury, as I am doing

now, and gives the law and the rules of law which must

guide the jury in determining the case.

It is the privilege of the judge, in so doing, to com-

ment upon the evidence.

8la

Instructions to the Jury.

Now, I do not propose to, and certainly would not

presume on you to undertake to review all of this evi-

dence in this case. I couldn’t do it if I wanted to. I can’t

remember it that well, and I would not presume upon

your time or your patience by undertaking to go into a

long exhortation and recitation of what various wit-

nesses may have referred to or said during this trial.

[1834] But, if I should comment upon the evidence, if

I should make reference to it, you are not to consider

whet I may say as all of the evidence. You are not to

consider what I may say as all of the important evi-

dence. You are not to consider what I may say as all

of the important evidence on a given point.

You are the triers of the facts and it will be for you

to recall what that evidence was and draw your own

deductions and inferences from it.

You are not to accept what I may say as necessarily

true. I certainly would not intentionally make a mistake,

tell you or give you a wrong statement, but you are the

triers of the facts, and it will be for you to recall what

that evidence was and what proper inferences may be

drawn from it.

Now, this is a damage statute. Plaintiff here, Mr.

LaViers and his son and his company, South-East Coal

Company, which has been described to you here in some

detail, are seeking to recover damages for an alleged

wrongful act, committed, as they say, and as they claim,

by the coal operator, Consolidation Coal Company, and

the coal producer—that is, the laboring organization

that brought the coal out of the ground—and that, as

Mr. LaViers contends and clainis, that he has been dam-

aged by that arrangement which is, according to all al-

82a

Instructions to the Jury.

legation, wrongful and unjust and unlawful arrange-

ment, and he is entitled to recover the losses he has

sustained as a direct result of that unlawful agreement

between these two defendants.

Now, in order to recover, the South-East Coal Com-

pany must sustain the burden of proof; in other words,

if no proof was offered, there would be no judgment for

the plaintiff. It is his responsibility to offer proof to

establish the facts that he claims.

And the defendant has the right, as you have seen

here, to offer proof to contradict those facts or to ex-

plain those facts or to justify its conduct, which may

have been brought out by witnesses for the plaintiff in

support of its allegations.

[1835] But it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to

sustain this burden of proof. Now, by “burden of proof,”

it doesn’t necessarily mean the greater number of

witnesses. Sometimes the burden of proof in lawsuits

can be sustained by one witness as contrary to fifteen

on the other side, and so you are not to confuse the

idea of “burden of proof” with numbers of witnesses

or numbers of depositions or other articles of evidence

that might be offered.

But it must convince you, before this plaintiff may

recover, it must sustain its burden of proof by proving

every essential element of the claim, by a preponder-

ance of the evidence.

Should it fail in its proof, under this rule you

should find for the defendant.

To establish the preponderance of the evidence

means to prove that something is more likely so than

83a

Instructions to the Jury.

not so; in other words, the “preponderance of the evi-

dence” means such evidence, when considered and com-

pared with that opposed to it, has more convincing

force and produces in your minds belief that what is

sought to be proved is more likely to be true than not

true.

In determining this fact, you should consider the

testimony of ail witnesses, both those who appeared on

the witness stand and those who gave their testimony

by deposition, or whose testimony was offered by

transcript, regardless of who called the witness in other

words, consider all the evidence, not just the plaintiff’s

evidence, not just the defendant’s evidence, but con-

sider all of the evidence.

You are to give consideration to all exhibits re-

ceived in evidence, regardless of who may have pro-

duced them.

Such an anti-competitive conspiracy — and that is

what this is; in other words, it is claimed by the plain-

tiff here that this arrangement was restraining com-

petition, was monopolizing the field of coal production,

and that you either had to belong to it or you were

likely to be put out of business or suffer substantial

financial loss — and [1836] such an anti-competitive

conspiracy as claimed by the plaintiff must be estab-

lished by clear proof.

Now, that is the law.

On this part of the case, I want you to give consid-

eration to that in connection with the other things that

I shall advise you. Now, this is based upon a claim by

the plaintiff that the defendants have been guilty of a

84a

Instructions to the Jury.

violation of law and are, therefor, answerable to this

plaintiff in damages under the provisions of the law.

That is somewhat repititious of what I just got through

saying to you, but I may appear to be a little repititious.

It is rather an involved matter to get all I must say to

you into these instructions, and sometimes I may ap-

pear to be repititious for fear that I may have over-

looked some matter and repeat it.

The law on which this claim is based is known as

the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. This anti-trust law goes

back to 1890. It was passed during Harrison’s adminis-

tration in 1890. It didn’t have any teeth in it until the

Clayton Act was passed in 1912.

The Clayton Act provides for the punishment for

violation of this law, and so the Sherman law is an old

law, and so is the Clayton law, but about twenty-two

years apart in their enactment.

The right to invoke the provisions of the Sherman

Anti-Trust Law is provided in what is known as the

Clayton Act. Don’t get confused, members of the jury,

with the Clayton Act and Sherman Anti-Trust Law —

all these things that sound so legal.

Don’t think, “Well, I don’t quite understand that,”

because I will clarify the whole thing before you leave

your jury box.

The pertinent part of Section 1 of the Sherman

Act is as follows:

“Every contract, combination, in the form of trust

or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations, is declared to be illegal.”

85a

Instructions to the Jury.

[1837] The pertinent part of Section 2 of the Sherman

Anti-Trust Act is as follows:

“Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to

monopolize or combine or conspire with any other per-

son or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or

commerce among the several States or with foreign na-

tions shall be deemed guilty of a violation of law.”

Section 15 of the Clayton Act provides that: “Any

person who shall be injured in his business or property

by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws

may sue therefor in any district court of the United

States.”

I am not reading from the Act now; this is my own

copy. A conspiracy between employers and labor founded

with the intent of driving competitors out of business is

a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Law.

Now, as I say, this Sherman Antitrust Law and

Clayton Act and these things sound very legalistic. But

it is a simple proposition. It is a matter for the protec-

tion of the people in their free exercise of their will, and

I am sure you can well recognize, if there had been no

antitrust laws, probably none of these people here in

this courtroom now, in this lawsuit, would have been in

existance. If there had been no antitrust law, this coun-

try would have been like they said Japan was at the be-

ginning of the second World War. In Japan everybody

worked for one of seven big corporations, whether you

were a doctor, lawyer, dentist, teacher, or whatever you

might be. You had to be working for one of seven big

outfits, because they had monopolized all the fields that

there were, and there was no possibility of an individual

competing in those fields. So we can understand this

————

86a

Instructions to the Jury.

Sherman Antitrust Law, which is for our own protection

and the protection of all of these litigants, just as well

on one side as the other, meaning that the Government

said, the people of the United States said, by enacting

these two laws, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act,

that you have no right to go into a field of endeavor and

enter nto agree-[1838]ments with each other and mo-

nopolize the fields so that there is no competition, be-

cause when there is no competition, then you can name

your own price. In other words, if there was only one oil

company in our country, instead of numerous oil com-

panies — they may have interlocking directors, or some-

thing of that kind, and I am not going into that now —

but if there was only one oil company and you could

only buy gasoline when you drove up to a filling station

from one company, they could put the price at anything

they wanted to, either take it or leave it. You had no

place else to go. So that is what these laws are. That is

what the purpose of it is. That is what the enactment

was entered into with the idea of protection and leaving

a competitive field in all industry and in all business.

Now, the plaintiff here is claiming that these two

institutions entered into a conspiracy with each other to

monopolize the coal industry.

In order to establish a conspiracy or unlawful ar-

rangement as claimed by the plaintiff in this case it is

not necessary that the plaintiff should offer proof of a

direct arrangement or executed written contract that

they are entering into a conspiracy.

It is not necessary that the agreement, if any, was

the result of formal action on the part of the defendants.

‘he real question to be determined is whether or not

ee

Instructions to the Jury.

87a

there was a meeting of the minds or a common under-

standing and purpose in the requirement of the execu-

tion of the labor agreement with the intention of doing

injury to the plaintiff.

You are instructed that if you return a verdict for

the plaintiff it must be against both of the defendants.

In other words, you cannot return a verdict against one

of the defendants and not against the other. Under the

record of this case, they are either both guilty or neither

of them is guilty of the charges made by the plaintiff.

[1839] To bring this matter down to this particular

case, and the evidence, it is the plaintiff’s claim here,

admitting there is a contract, they did enter into a con-

tract, but it is the plaintiff’s claim here that this con-

tract between the defendant union, the coal producers,

the miners, that beginning in 1950 they had what is

known as a collective bargaining arrangement, the min-

ers and all those engaged in the production of coal.

Now, the law does not make it unlawful for them to

combine for the purpose of making a union for the pur-

pose of protecting their rights and for having a bargain-

ing agent, so you are not to consider because the union

is composed of a great many miners, all‘of the miners in

this Eastern Kentucky who are members of it, that of

itself is not unlawful. The courts have expressly said so.

The law has expressly said so in what is known as

the LaGuardia Act that was passed by the Congress.

That is not unlawful.

But in 1950 they entereg into a contract using the

United Mine Workers, and under the law they have a

88a

Instructions to the Jury.

right, the workers have a right to have a bargaining

agent.

In other words, it used to be if you ran a coal mine

you hired Dick, Tom and Harry as they came up to the

window, and you hired them and gave them whatever

you could hire them for, and whatever they would agree

to take, and you hired them as individuals.

Then under the national law and under the national

policy, the labor laws, as we have produced under what

is known as the Labor Act, and the LaGuardia Act and

these other Acts of Congress, they were allowed to bar-

gain collectively. They didn’t hire one man for so much

and another for so much, but the miners and other

workers in other industries were allowed to bargain col-

lectively and to select a bargaining agent.

Now, these miners in this field selected the United

Mine Workers and joined the United Mine Workers, and

had [1840] the United Mine Workers as their bargain-

ing agent, and so their agency through its leadership

met with the coal operators, the producers, such as the

Consolidation Cal Company here, and others of similar

type, and entered inot [sic.] a contract in which it said

all of the miners who work for this company will get the

same thing, and that we will not hire anyone who is not

a member of your union. That is what is known as a

ciosed shop. We will not let non-union members work in

our mine. We will agree to pay our workers with this

contract so much, so many benefits, and various things.

Now, that went into effect in 1950. It was, I believe,

a two-year contract. Anyway, however long it was to

last, it had to be from time to time amended, and was

89a

Instructions to the Jury.

amended from time to time until the contract of 1958.

The 1958 contract had this Protective Wage Clause

Which they said added an additional clause, that they

will not purchase coal from any producers that are not

under the 1958 contract, and they entered into that

agreement with the Defendant Consolidation Coal Com-

pany.

The plaintiff, South-East Coal Company, signed

that contract, and it is shown here that Mr. LaViers,

who was the president or officer in that company, had

gone along with that, whether wanting to or not. It is

said that he did do it. I believe he testified to that. And

that contract provided for the Welfare Clause.

It produced a lot of confusion in the industry in the

eastern part of Kentucky, the miners insisting that all

coal operators should sign this contract and that all of

. them should have the same benefits, both the big com-

panies and the little companies, the big operators and

the little operators, and it caused a great — I don’t want

to go back tu the instances which maybe you recall hav-

ing read — but there was quite a lot of confusion in

eastern Kentucky growing out of the efforts of the

UMW to have all miners sign this agreement. That is

this agreement, in 1958, containing this Protective Wage

Clause.

[1841] Some of the contract—or some of the operators

said they couldn’t sign it, wouldn’t sign it. Problems

arose from that. They sought to operate then by this

non-union labor and some union labor and some who

were willing to work without a contract.

But the majority of the miners said, “We will not

work without a contract,” and so it created considerable

90a

Instructions to the Jury.

difficulty. Now, that is where this “sweetheart” con-

tract business came into being.

In order to go on, and miners want to work, they

don’t want to lay off, they may get some benefits when

they are not working but they want to work, and oper-

ators want to work, and everybody wants to work.

It is just a question of how much you are going to

get paid and how many benefits, as workers, you are

going to have or what consideration the operators are

going to have.

So, t*at continued under this contract. These

“sweetheart” contracts, where they signed the contract

and were told by the UMW that they wouldn’t be en-

forced, that they wouldn’t try to collect that off of

them, and that created some confusion, some losses.

Mr. LaViers said, as he testified, he paid in several

hundred thousand dollars on two or three or more mil-

lion dollars into the Welfare Fund, and that he was un-

able to continue with it because his business could not

afford to carry that and he, therefore, notified the Con-

solidation Coal Company, which was his sales agency,

the purchaser of his coal, primarily, or handler of his

coal, and he notified the Union that in sixty days he

would cancel the contract, which was provided in the

provisions of the contract, and he did that and proceed-

ed then to work or to operate these mines with non-

union labor, or those who were members of the Union

who were willing to work or cross the picket-lines or

whatever efforts were made on behalf of the UMW to

discourage his operation.

[1842] Now, it is not the signing of the contract be-

tween the UMW and the Consolidation Coal Company.

Yla

Instructions to the Jury.

There is a written contract, the one of 1958 and one of

1964. Mr. LaViers cancelled his contract in 1962 and

was not Operating under a wage agreement or any con-

tract with the UMW.

In 1964 another contract was written in which the

provision was that the parties said the Welfare Fund

must be paid on each ton of coal mined and that those

who had not been operating under the contract would

pay 80 cents a ton.

Mr. LaViers here says, admitting that contract to

be a lawful contract between the parties, that under

the terms of the anti-trust law their arrangement mon-

opolized the field, and that he was unable to meet the

conditions of the contract and to compete with this, as

he says, “unlawful arrangement” betweeu the workers

and management, represented by the UMW and the

Consolidation Coal Company in this lawsuit.

The thing which you will have to decide and which

I will probably refer to again, there is nothing unlawful

about that contract in itself; but if it was entered into

with the intention on the part of the signatories—the

two defendants here—to injure the plaintiff, if they

had that in mind, that “we are going to go into this

contract because we know it will put South-East out

of business; they can’t meet the conditions; we are too

big, too strong, and they cannot compete with us, can-

not get miners to work for them, and they cannot sell

their coal on the market because they do not have suf-

ficient sales agency, so we will deliberately enter into

this and they can’t meet it; we will thereby profit by

putting competitors out of business or seriously ham-

pering his operation.”

92a

Instructions to the Jury.

So, the issue is: Did these two signatories have

that thing of putting the South-East Coal Company out

of business in mind, the time they signed the contract?

[1843] Conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by

direct testimony and it is settled law that they may be

inferred from the action of the parties.

Circumstantial evidence of the existence of the con-

spiracy may be sufficiently strong to raise a factual

question on which you may base your verdict, even

though there is no direct evidence that a conspiracy

existed.

As jurors, it is your function to observe the wit-

nesses while testifying and to appraise their credibility,

to draw inferences from the facts established; to re-

solve conflicts in the evidence and to reach ultimate

conclusions of fact.

I don’t know whether I have given you the defini-

tion of a conspiracy or not. I have it here some place;

anyway, I will give it to you. If I have to repeat it, I will

ask your indulgence.

A conspiracy sounds like a legal term, a legalistic

term. It is a common-sense, every-day word, as a matter

of fact.

Conspiracy, I think, is pretty well understood by

each of you, generally understood, but in this case a con-

spiracy is an agreement between two or more persons

to do an unlawful and commit an unlawful act or commit

a lawful act in an unlawful way. In other words, it is

simply this: Two or more people, or in this case, cor-

porate entities, agree to enter into an arrangement to

put the plaintiff out of business, or seriously hamper

93a

Instructions to the Jury.

its Operatious, which is, under the law, a wrongful act,

for which the defendants may be held accountable in

damages.

The South-East Coal Company claims—I have it

right here. I am sorry. I was just about to read it when.

I took off and said it, but I will read it again.

The South-East Coal Company claims that it has

been injured and thereby damaged by the unlawful joint

acts of the defendants, United Mine Workers of America

and the. Consolidation Coal Company. This alleged

wrongful action is that the two defendants had been

guilty of a conspiracy against the plaintiff.

[1844] A conspiracy is an arrangement or an agree-

ment or plan between two or more individuals or, as in

this case, corporate entities, to commit an unlawful act,

or to commit a lawful act, in an unlawful way.

In other words, the plaintiff claims that this coal

Company, through its officers and agents, had a plan

or an agreement, the officers and agents of the labor

union, to require all coal producers in Eastern Kentucky

coal fields to execute a contract with the United Mine

Workers requiring the payment of 40 cents a ton for

each ton of coal produced by the coal operator, with

the knowledge that the plaintiff could not meet the re-

quirement of the 40 cents per ton, and economically sur-

vive in the coal-producing business.

You are instructed that if you believe there was an

industry-wide collective bargaining agreement, whereby

employers and the union agreed on the wage scale that

exceeds the financial ability of some small operators,

including the plaintiff, to pay, and that the agreement

was made for the purpose of forcing some employers, in-

SRR NRE REN RS etST

TEETER NEVE LAN EAN IES Se MAE:

RELI HAAR REE RT Ne REEMA KAT

94a

Instructions to the Jury.

cluding the plaintiff, out of business, injuring its busi-

ness, and you believe that the defendants, the Consolida-

tion Coal Company and the United Mine Workers, delib-

erately entered into and participated in such an arrange-

ment, and that the result of such an arrangement was

the sole cause of damage, if any, to the plaintiff, then

you will find for the plaintiff.

If you do not so believe, you will find for the de-

fendants.

The contract ahout which you have heard so much

during the introduction of evidence was executed origi-

nally in 1950, between the United Mine Workers as a

bargaining agent for its coal miner membership. This

contract is referred to in the evidence as the National

Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950. This contract

was re-executed from time to time, with varying

changes, and finally culminated in the contract effective

April 2, 1964, which is the bassi [sic.] of this lawsuit

and is the contract which the plaintiff here says that

it is unable to comply with.

[1845] This contract has this clause:

“During the life of this agreement there shall be

paid into such Fund by each operator signatory hereto

the sum of forty cents per ton of two-thousand pounds

on each ton of bituminous coal produced by such opera-

tor for use or for sale. On all bituminous coal procured

or acquired by any signatory operator for use or for sale,

that is, all bituminous coal other than that produced by

such signatory operator, there shall, during the life of

this agreement, be paid into such Fund, by each such

operator signatory thereto, or by any subsidiary or affil-

95a

Instructions to the Jury.

iate of such operator signatory hereto the sum of eighty

cents per ton of two thousand pounds on each ton of such

bituminous coal so procured or acquired, on which the

aforesaid sum of forty cents per ton had not been paid

into said Fund prior to such procurement or acquisition.”

In viher words, it is claimed by the plaintiff that

the defendants fixed the wages and Welfare Fund roy-

alties so high in 1950 by the National Bituminous Coal

Wage Agreement and the amendments thereto that the

small companies, including this plaintiff, could not pay

them and continue to operate successfully.

And that the defendants knew that the small com-

panies, including the plaintiff, could not pay the fixed

wages and Welfare Fund royalties, and that thereby the

trade and competition offered by the small companies,

including the plaintiff, to the larger coal producing

companies, including the defendant Consolidation Coal

Company, would be eliminated by putting the small

companies, including the plaintiff, out of business.

It is for you to determine from all the evidence and

all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the

evidence whether or not these defendants had such an

agreement or meeting of the minds for the intent and

purpose of unreasonably restraining trade and monop-

olizing the coal industry in the eastern Kentucky local-

ity by driving [ 1846] the small companies, including the

plaintiff, out of business.

You are instructed that the execution of the written

contract is not of itself or per se a violation of the law.

In order for the contract to be unlawful you must

believe that its execution by the defendants was for the

96a

Instructions to the Jury.

purpose and with the intention, among other things, of

destroying or injuring the business of the plaintiff.

A union may make wage agreements with a multi-

employer bargaining unit and may, in pursuance of its

own union’s interest, seek to obtain the same terms

from other employers; but a union forfeits its exemp-

tion from the anti-trust laws when it is clearly shown

that it has an agreement with one set of employers to

impose a wage scale on the bargaining unit.

One group of employers may not conspire to elimi-

nate competitors from the industry, and the union is

liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the

conspiracy.

This is true even though the union’s part in the

scheme is an undertaking to secure the same wages,

hours, or other conditions of employment for the re-

maining employees and employer in the industry.

It is a legitimate aim of any national labor organ-

ization to obtain uniformity of labor standards, and it

may be a consequence of such union activity to eliminate

competition based on differences in such standards.

This, however, does not mean that the union and the

employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain

about wages, hours, and working conditions of other

bargaining units or to attempt to settle these matters

for the entire industry.

The union has a duty to bargain unit by unit in or-

der to best serve its obligations to its members.

The Union should retain the ability to respond to

each bargaining situation as the individual circum-

97a

Instructions to the Jury.

stances might warrant without being strait-jacketed by

some prior agreement with favored employers.

In other words, the plaintiff heie contends that they

had given him, as a smaller operator, certain conces-

sions and [1847] not require [sic.] the stringency of the

contract which they had with all the operators who were

able to live under that contract, and that he could have

survived and, to the best interests of himself and mem-

bers of the UMW who worked for him.

Wage differentials should not be the basis for af-

fording to one operator a competitive advantage over

another.

To sum up what I have said, if you believe from all

the evidence and all reasonable inferences that might

be drawn from the evidence that the defendant Con-

Solidation Coal Company, as the employer, and the de-

fendant United Mine Workers, as the employee, with

the intention of putting the plaintiff out of business,

entered into an industry-wide agreement that exceeded

the financial ability of the Plaintiff, then you are in-

structed that the defendants are guilty of violating the

anti-trust laws, and that you should find for the plain-

tiff.

Now, the defendants here say that, admitting all of

these things for the sake of argument, as we put it,

whatever damage came to the plaintiff, that he was a

part of it.

He can’t claim anything against the coal operators

because this arrangement which they had with the UMW

had his approval and endorsement, that he was a mem-

ber of the BCOA—Bituminous Coal Operators Associa-

tion—that drew up the contract, and that he was a spon-

98a

Instructions to the Jury.

sor of it and, therefore, if he got hurt by it, if it was

wrong, he was helping in a wrong, “impari delicto” they

call it. That is equal guilt.

A person who is of equal guilt cannot claim that he

has been wronged by other people who assisted or col-

laborated with him on the same project.

The defendants have entered the defense of “in pari

delicto”—this means that the defendants say that if an

unlwful conspiracy existed, plaintiff was equally respon-

sible with defendants in the formation of said conspir-

acy.

Under this defense, the Court charges you that if

the plaintiff was a co-initiator of the conspiracy and

equally responsible therefor, plaintiff is not entitled to

recover [1848] damages for that period of time that the

plaintiff remained a party to the conspiracy.

Now, a person may be a party to such an arr

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.