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App. 1

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 66-395 -Cr-TC

18 USC 474 M/S $5,000 - 15 yrs, or both

UNITED STATES OF AMFRICA

V.

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

That on or about the 27th day of June, 1966, at Hal-

landale, Broward County, in the Southern District of

Florida, the defendant,

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

did, with intent to defraud the United States, make a

print of an obligation of the United States, to wit: a $5.00

Federal Reserve Note drawn on the Federal Reserve Bank

of New York, Series 1950E, Check Letter “P,” Face Plate

No. 399, Serial No. B34871063F, bearing facsimile signa-

ture of Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, and

Kathryn O’Hay Granahan, Treasurer of the United

States; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sec-

tion 474.

COUNT TWO

That on or about the 27th day of June 1966, at Hal-

landale, Broward County, in the Southern District of

Florida, the defendant,

App. 2

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

did, with intent to defraud the United States, make a print

of an obligation of the United States, to wit: a $1.00 Fed-

eral Reserve Note, drawn on the Federal Reserve Bank

of St. Louis, Missouri, Series 1963A, Check Letter “C,”

Face Plate No, 188, Serial No. H-06297830A, bearing fac-

simile signature of Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the

Treasury, and Kathry O’Hay Granahan, Treasurer of the

United States; in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 474.

COUNT THREE

That on or about the 28th day of June 1966, at

Hallandale, Broward County, in the Southern District of

Florida, the defendant,

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

did, with intent to defraud the United States, make a print

of an obligation of the United States, to wit: a $1.00 Silver

Certificate, Series 1957, Check Letter “B,” Face Plate

No. 398, Serial No. P88668 314A, bearing facsimile signa-

ture of Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury,

and Ivy Baker Priest, Treasurer of the United States; in

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 474.

COUNT FOUR

That on or about the 27th day of June, 1966,

at Hallandale, Broward County, in the Southern District

of Florida, the defendant,

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

did, knowingly, possess without authority from the Sec-

retary of the Treasury or other proper officer, obliga-

tions made in part after the similtude of an obligation

App. 3

issued under the authority of the United States, to wit:

a $5.00 Federal Reserve Note drawn on the Federal Re-

serve Bank of New York, Series 1950E, Check Letter

“P,” Face Plate No. 399, Serial No. B34871063F, bearing

facsimile signature of Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the

Treasury, and Kathryn O’Hay Granahan, Treasurer i

the United States, and a $1.00 Federal Reserve Note,

drawn on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Missouri,

Series 1963A, Check Letter “C,” Face Plate No. 183, Serial

No. H-06297830A, bearing facsimile signature of Henry

H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, and Kathryn O’Hay

Granahan, Treasurer of the United States, with the in-

tent to use said obligations to facilitate future sales of

counterfeited obligations of the United States; in viola-

tion of Title 18, United States Code, Section 474.

COUNT FIVE

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1966, at

Hallaudale, Broward County, in the Southern District of

Florida, the defendant,

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

did, knowingly, possess without authority from the Sec-

retary of the Treasury or other proper officer, obligations

made in part, after the similtude of an obligation issued

under the authority of the United States, to wit: a $1.00

Silver Certificate, Series 1957, Check Letter “B,” Face

Plate #398, Serial No. P88668 314A, bearing facsimile sig-

nature of Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury,

and Ivy Baker Priest, Treasurer of the United States,

with the intent to use said obligation to facilitate future

sales of counterfeited obligations of the United States;

in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 474,

App. 4

COUNT SIX

That on ox about the 3rd day of August 1966, in

Hallandale, Broward County, in the Southern District of

Florida, the defendant,

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN

with intent to defraud the United States, did knowingly

and unlawfully possess paper similar to that distinctive

paper which had previously been adapted to the making

of obligations of the United States, to wit:

1500 sheets of 20 lb white husky bond paper

814 xx i.

1000 sheets of 20 lb Sphinx Park Lane Bond

paper, 81%4” x 11” (canary),

500 sheets of 20 lb Georgia-Pacific blue bond

814 x i.

500 sheets of white bond paper, 84%” x 11”,

250 sheets, green bond paper 814” x 11”

without the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury

or some other proper officer of the United States; in

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 474.

A TRUE BILL

CHARLES E. JENKINS

FOREMAN

WILLIAM A. MEADOWS, JR.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: Michael J. Osman

Assistant U. S. Attorney

App. 5

APPENDIX B

(TITLE OMITTED)

NO. 66-395-CR-TC

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COMES NOW the Defendant, MORTIMER NORMAN

KORAN, by and through his undersigned attorney, and

files this his Motion to Suppress any and all evidence

which the prosecution intends to introduce against the

Defendant in the forthcoming trial of the above entitled

cause, which evidence was obtained as a result of an

illegal arrest and/or unlawful search and seizure contrary

to the Constitution of the State of Florida and the Con-

stitution of the United States of America.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant MORTIMER

NORMAN KORAN, prays that this Motion be granted.

GERALD KOGAN

GERALD KOGAN

Attorney for Defendant

1201 Biscayne Building

Miami, Florida 33130

Phone 371-2661

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy

of the above and foregoing was mailed to WILLIAM A.

MEADOWS, U. S. Attorney, P. O. Box 1070, Miami,

Florida, this 8th Day of September, 1967.

GERALD KOGAN

Gerald Kogan

App. 7

APPENDIX C

(TITLE OMITTED)

NO. 66-395-CR-TG

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

COMES NOW the Defendant, MORTIMER NORMAN

KORAN, by and through his undersigned attorneys, and

moves the Court to grant him a new Trial for the follow-

ing reasons:

1. The Court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion

For Acquittal made at the conclusion of the Government’s

case.

2. The Court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion

For Acquittal made at the conclusion of all evidence.

3. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the

evidence.

4. The verdict is not supported by substantial

evidence.

5. The verdict is contrary to the law.

6. The verdict is contrary to both the law and the

evidence.

7 The Court erred in denying the Defendant’s

Motion To Suppress all tape recorded telephone conversa-

tions held between the witness, ART RIVERS, and the

Defendant, as well as recordings made as the result of

non-telephone conversations that took place between the

witness, ART RIVERS, and the Defendant, and between

the informer and the Defendant.

App. 8

8. The Defendant was substantially prejudiced and

deprived of a fair Trial by reason of the following: The

attorney for the Government in his opening statement

alluded to other crimes committed by the Defendant,

which said crimes were irrelevant to the instant case, and

further in permitting testimony by the Government wit-

nesses pertaining to telephone conversations by the De-

fendant concerning other crimes and the arrest of De-

fendant on other crimes, irrelevant to the instant case.

9. The Court erred in denying Defendant’s Motions

For Mis-Trial.

GERALD KOGAN and

H. ROBERT KOLTNOW

Attorneys for Defendant

1201 Biscayne Building

Miami, Florida 33130

By /s/ GERALD KOGAN

I HEREBY CE cIFY that a copy of the foregoing

Motion for New Trial was mailed to WILLIAM A.

MEADOWS, U.S. Attorney, P. 0. Box 1070, Miami, Flor-

ida, this 20th day of September, 1967.

/s/ GERALD KOGAN

App. 9

APPENDIX D

(TITLE OMITTED)

NO. 66-395-Cr-TC

ORDER

This cause came on to be heard upon the defendant’s

Motion for New Trial, [and upon the Court having re-

served ruling upon the defendant’s Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal at the close of all the evidence in this cause.]

The Court having heard argument of counsel and being

otherwise duly advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for

New Trial be, and the same is, hereby denied, [and the

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal be and the same is,

hereby denied. ]

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 24

day of October, 1967.

TED CABOT

United States District Judge

ec: U.S. Attorney (Osman)

Gerald Kogan, Esq.

Atty for defendant

Chief Probation Officer

App. 11

APPENDIX E

(TITLE OMITTED)

NO. 66-395-CR-TC

On this 27th day of October, 1967 came the attorney

for the government and the defendant appeared in person

and by Gerald Kogan, Esq., counsel,

It is adjudged that the defendant upon his plea of

“not guilty, and a verdict of guilty,” has been convicted

of the offense of printing and possessing a counterfeit

obligation of the United States, with the intent to use

said obligation to facilitate sales; in violation of Title 18

USC, Section 474 as charged in Counts Three & Five of

the Indictment, and the court having asked the defendant

whether he has anything to say why judgment should not

be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary

being shown or appearing to the Court,

It is adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged

and convicted.

It is adjudged that the defendant is hereby com-

mitted to the custody of the Attorney General or his

authorized representative for imprisonment for a period

of FIVE (5) YEARS as to each of Counts Three and Five,

or until otherwise discharged by due process of law, said

period of confinement to run concurrently with each other.

App. 12

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy

of this judgment and commitment to the United States

Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy

serve as the commitment of the defendant.

TED CABOT

United States District Judge

A True Copy. Certified this 27th day of October,

1967.

JOSEPH I. BOGART

Clerk

MELVIN R. STEIN

Deputy Clerk

App. 13

APPENDIX F

(TITLE OMITTED)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE is hereby given that MORTIMER NORMAN

KORAN, Defendant, by his undersigned attorneys, hereby

appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit from the Final Judgment entered in this

proceeding on the 27th day of October, 1967, wherein the

and Count Five of the Indictment herein, after a plea

of not guilty to each of said Counts and a Jury Trial,

with a sentence as follows:

Five Years as to Count Three, and

Five Years as to Count Five, concurrently.

DATED this 27th day of October, 1967.

GERALD KOGAN and

H. ROBERT KOLTNOW

Attorneys for Defendant

1201 Biscayne Building

Miami, Florida 33130

By H. ROBERT KOLTNOW

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing

Notice of Appeal was mailed to WILLIAM A. MEADOWS,

U.S. Attorney, P.O. Box 1070, Miami, Florida, this 27th

day of October, 1967.

H. ROBERT KOLTNOW

id ats Dilip le all Re a nd Ne Reh te a

App. 15

APPENDIX G

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 25446

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN,

Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

(January 27, 1969)

Before GEWIN and BELL, Circuit Judges, and

BOOTLE, District Judge.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge: Mortimer Norman Koran

was convicted in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida on Counts Three and Five

of an indictment charging substantive offenses relating

to counterfeit currency.' Count Three charged Koran with

'The pertinent parts of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 474 (1964), pro-

vide respectively:

Whoever has in his possession or custody, except under

authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper

officer, any obligation or other security made or executed,

in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or

other security issued under the authority of the United States,

with intent to sell or otherwise use the same; or

App. 16

printing a one dollar silver certificate and Count Five

charged him with possession of the certificate. He was

sentenced to five years imprisonment on each count, the

sentences to run concurrently. We affirm the judgment

of conviction.

Appellant Koran urges that his fourth amendment

rights were violated by the introduction at his trial of

evidence obtained through the use of electronic listening

and recording devices. The evidence challenged consisted

of (1) the testimony of an investigator, (2) the tape

recordings of certain telephone conversations, and (3) the

tape recordings of certain non-telephonic conversations.

The investigator, Secret Service Agent Rivers, testified

that he overheard a conversation between the appellant

and a government informer, Schatzabel, in which the

appellant discussed plans for printing a large quantity

of counterfeit currency. The conversation took place in

the appellant’s printing establishment while Agent Rivers,

stationed a short distance away, listened to the conversa-

tion over a radio which received transmissions from a

device concealed in Schatzabel’s shirt pocket. The tapes

of telephone conversations which were received in evi-

dence were recordings of communications between the

appellant and Schatzabel and between the appellant and

Agent Rivers, who acted incognito as a prospective buyer

of counterfeit merchandise. These conversations were re-

Whoever prints, photographs, or in any other manner makes

or executes any engraving, photograph, print, or impression

in the likeness of any such obligation or other security, or

any part thereof, or sells any such engraving, photograph,

print, or impression, except to the United States. .. .

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not

more than fifteen years, or both.

The jury returned a verdict of “not guilty” on three additional

counts.

App. 17

corded by a device attached to the telephone used by

Schatzabel and Rivers, both of whom consented to the

recording of the conversations. The non-telephonic tapes

were recordings of two conversations between Agent

Rivers and appellant Koran which took place beneath a

bridge. On both occasions, Rivers was equipped with a

transmitter when he met with the appellant. The con-

versations were recorded by another agent who was posted

nearby.

Prior decisions of this court, as well as decisions of

the Supreme Court, have approved the use of evidence

obtained by the methods employed in this case.? The ap-

pellant contends, however, that the Supreme Court in

Katz v. United States’ charted a new course which de-

mands disapproval of such investigative techniques. He

points particularly to the Court’s pronouncement in Katz

that “[w]hat a person knowningly exposes to the public,

even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth

Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve

as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may

be constitutionally protected.”* The appellant asserts that,

since he was unaware of the presence of electronic listen-

ing and recording devices, he did not knowingly expose to

the public his private conversation.

2Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United

States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Harris v. United States, ........ | fee

(5th Cir. 1968) ; Handsforth v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.

1968) ; Dryden v. United States, 391 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Dancy

v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (Sth Cir. 1968); Beatty v. United

States, 377 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 389 U.S. 347

(1967) ; Hurst v. United States, 370 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1967).

3389 U.S. 347 (1967).

+389 US. at ........ ; 19 L.Ed2d at 582.

App. 18

This court has previously concluded that Katz leaves

undisturbed the established law applicable to the methods

of investigation employed in this case.’ And in a recent

opinion, the Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion,°

emphasizing the language of Mr. Justice White’s concur-

rence in Katz:

When one man speaks to another he takes all the

risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including

tne risk that the man to whom he speaks will

make public what he has heard. ... It is but

a logical and reasonable extension of this prin-

ciple that a man take the risk that his hearer,

free to memorize what he hears for later ver-

batim repetition, is instead recording it or trans-

mitting it to another.’

Government agents in Katz had attached electronic listen-

ing equipment to the top of a telephone booth. When the

defendant used the booth in making calls, the agents

overheard his end of the conversations. The Supreme

Court held that, since the search did not comply with

constitutional standards, the evidence of the conversations

was not admissible.

The attempt to equate the case sub judice with Katz

must fail. It is true that appellant Koran did not wish to

SDryden v. United States, 391 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir 1968);

Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1968); Long v.

United States, 387 F.2d 377, 378 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967). See Harris v.

United States, ........ | | pone (Sth Cir. 1968) [No. 24303, August

1, 1968]; Handsforth v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1968).

6Holt v. United States, ........ | eee (10th Cir. 1968) [No.

9859, September 16, 1968].

7389 U.S. at ........ n.l; 19 L.Ed.2d at 589 n.1.

App. 19

expose his words to the public. However, this fact alone

does not suffice, for no criminal desires public exposure

of his surreptitious activity. The crucial fact here is that

the appellant knowingly took the risk that his conversants

might expose his statements. Therefore, he cannot now

complain that his conversants did in fact expose the con-

versations. In Katz, on the other hand, exposure of the

defendant’s private conversation was unaided by his con-

versant. Instead, exposure resulted from circumstances

unrelated to the risk which the defendant knowingly took

when he spoke to his conversant. Thus we think it clear

that the appellant’s reliance upon Katz is misplaced.®

The appellant argues that Agent Rivers’ testimony

relating to the conversation he overheard between the

appellant and Schatzabel as they talked in the appellant’s

shop was nevertheless improper because it was un-

supported by testimony from Schatzabel, who did not

testify. This contention is without merit. The absence of

supporting testimony from Schatzabel would have sig-

nificance only if there existed a complete lack of evidence

identifying the appellant as the party with whom

Schatzabel conversed. Although Agent Rivers from his

listening post could not visually observe the participants

in the conversation, the record establishes beyond dispute

that the appellant was one of the parties.

®We are, of course, aware that our analysis of Katz is in conflict

with a Seventh Circuit decision. In United States v. White, ........ F.2d

caine (7th Cir. 1968) [Nos. 16021 & 16022, March 18, 1968], the court

held that mere existence of the need to use informers and secret devices

to obtain information from a defendant is a clear indication that the

defendant seeks to exclude the uninvited ear and, consequently, that

this method of investigation violates the defendant’s fourth amendment

rights. As indicated by our discussion, we do not believe the reach

oi Katz extends so far as the Seventh Circuit suggests.

App. 20

The statute which the appellant was convicted of

violating proscribes the printing of currency and the

possession of counterfeit currency “except under author-

ity from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper

officer.”® The appellant contends that the Government

did not prove his lack of authority and, therefore, failed

to prove all the elements of the offense charged. While

the Government offered no direct proof of the appellant’s

lack of authority, it did present evidence from which the

jury could reasonably infer that he had no authority.”

Agent Rivers, for example, testified:

He [the appellant] indicated to me had

something to [show] me and I said well, let me

look at it. He said, well, ’'m not going to show it

to you out here in the open.

I says well, let me look at it. So he handed it to

me and I opened it up and it was a $1.00 Silver

Certificate oversized.

Q Did you have any conversations with him

regarding that $1.00 Silver Certificate that he

handed you on that occasion?

A Yes. He indicated I should get in the car

with him to look at this thing in private, which

I did.

9See note 1 supra.

10Since we conclude that the Government presented sufficient evi-

dence to support a finding that the appellant lacked authority, we do

not reach the —— raised in the briefs of whether proving lack of

authority is a burden carried by the Government or a defense which

the defendant must raise.

Pe ee ls th STAD a Lae She Raat nid ahs Se

App. 21

He stated that he had this at home and he

had made it the night before and said he made

it oversized just to show its detail which would

prove his being a good printer.

If the jury believed the broad thrust of the testimony of

the witnesses — which it obviously did — the inference

was compelled that the appellant had no authority to

print currency or to possess counterfeit currency.

Appellant Koran next contends that the trial court

erred in permitting references during the prosecutor’s

opening statement and in the evidence throughout the

trial to the appellant’s unlawful printing of title cer-

tificates and driver’s licenses as a part of the same venture

which produced the counterfeit currency. Generally, evi-

dence of crimes not charged in the indictment is inad-

missible. However, we believe that the evidence in question

falls within a widely recognized exception to the general

rule which permits such evidence if it tends to prove a

common scheme, plan or design on the part of the de-

fendant so closely related to the offense charged that it

may serve to establish the offense or to establish an intent

in the mind of the accused to commit the offense."

The prosecutor, in his opening statement, also made

reference to the appellant’s arrest for counterfeiting title

certificates and driver’s licenses. In response the appellant

moved for a mistrial. The court denied his motion but

offered to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s

comment ; defense counsel, however, preferred not to have

the instruction. The appellant contends that a mistrial

was mandatory. We think, however, that the court was

clearly within the bounds of its discretion in denying the

motion.

Pardo v. United States, 369 F.2d 922, 924, (5th Cir. 1966);

Robinson v. United States, 366 F.2d 575, 578 (10th Cir. 1966).

App. 22

The appellant makes one contention which is relevant

only to his conviction on Count Five of the indictment,

the possession count. The statute under which he was

convicted makes unlawful the possession of a counterfeit

obligation which is after the similitude of an obligation of

the United States. The appellant argues that the oversized

silver certificate which he is convicted of possessing was

not “after the similitude” of a United States silver cer-

tificate.'? However, it is unnecessary for us to reach this

contention since the sentences under both counts run con-

currentiy and since we have concluded that the conviction

under the printing count is free of error."

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

12See note 1 supra. The statute makes unlawful the printing of

anything “in the likeness” of an obligation of the United States, without

reference to “similitude.” The appellant has not raised the likeness

question but, even if he had, it would have been to no avail.

The legislative purpo:e is clear that Congress intended, in

protecting the currency, to tolerate no manipulation in the

making of impressions of government obligations or securities,

whether the copies or impressions might be good or bad, and

regardless of the purpose for which they might be made.

. . . [T]here is no need of proof that such impressions were

calculated to deceive.

Webb v. United States, 216 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1954).

'3Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) ; M‘shan v.

United States, 345 F.2d 790, 791 (Sth Cir. 1965). Whether the “Con-

current sentence” doctrine enunciated in Hirabayashi has continiung

validity in light of subsequent decisions will be argued before the Su-

preme Court on March 24, 1969. See Benton v. Maryland, 37 U.S.L.W.

3219 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1968) (No. 201).

App. 23

APPENDIX H

(TITLE OMITTED)

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript

of the record from the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, and was argued by

counsels

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of

tM said District Court in this cause be, and the same is

hereby, affirmed.

January 27, 1969

App. 25

APPENDIX I

(TITLE OMITTED)

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(March 28, 1969)

Before GEWIN and BELL, Circuit Judges, and

BOOTLE, District Judge.

PER CURIAM: The Petition for Rehearing DENIED

and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active

service on the Court having requested that the Court be

polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35 Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the

Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

App. 27

APPENDIX J

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No.

MORTIMER NORMAN KORAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Upon Consideration of the application of counsel for

petitioner,

) It is ordered that the time for filing a petition for

writ of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the

same is hereby, extended to and including May 27, 1969.

S/ HUGO L. BLACK

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States

Dated this 24th day of April, 1969.