Appendix — United Aircraft Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

Supreme Court brief1971

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uP -. COURT, 0. . Pitan

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ro THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ron THE SECOND CIRCUIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. Opinion ov tus Usirep Sates Cover or Arend

POR THE SECOND 0 FFF 2a

B. Decwion axp ben. ov run National Lanon Raxi-

ron. REE RRR IER ee Ne a AD pate 194

C. Dremion ov Taian 8 FF 21a

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UV Aincuayr Conpornation, Petitioner,

- National Lanon RAL Aron Boanp, Respondent,

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

fer the Second Circuit

UNITED WATER COURT OF APPEALS

YOR THE AECOND CIRCUIT

Nos, 167 and 168—September Term, 1970,

(Argued October 14, 1970 Decided November 16, 1970.)

Docket Now, 34798 and 34928

—

Uneven Aincuarr Convoration, Petitioner,

National Lanon NI A To Boarp, Respondent,

Diarnior 91, Iwremnationst, Association oy Machern

AnD Agnosvace Wonkens, AFL-CIO; Intervenor,.

Before:

Lumparp, Chief Judge,

Kauruax, Circuit Judge and Crank, Associate Justice.“

Petition of the United Aireraft Corporation to review

and set aside n decision and order of the National Labor

Relations Board, holding that United Aircraft violated

section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations

Act by refusing to furnish the unions involved with the .

names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees,

and directing United Aircraft to furnish the unions with

—— ow

* United States Supreme Court, retired, sitting by designation,

that information; and cross-petition of the Board for en-

forcement of its order.

Petition to review denied and Board's order enforced.

Joszru C. Weis, Washington, D. C., for peti-

tioner,

Eilat Moore, Attorney (Arnold Ordman, Gen-

eral Counsel, Dominick IL. Manoli, Asso-

ciate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Pre-

vost, Assistant General Counsel, and

Stanley J. Brown, Attorney, on the brief),

for respondent,

Mozart d. Ratner, Washington, D. C. (Plato

E. Pappa, on the brief), for intervenor,

Lumparp, Chief Judge:

We are called upon in this case to decide whether United

Aircraft Corporation violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of

the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to furnish

the unions involved with a list of the names and addresses

of all employees represented by the unions in six of the

Company's plants in Connecticut.

United Aircraft. Corporation is engaged in the manu-

facture of aircraft engines and parts, helicopters, and

electronic devices, Its Pratt and Whitney’ Division op-

erates plants in East Hartford, Manchester, Southington,

and Middletown; and its Hamifton Standard Division op-

erates two plants in Windsor Locks, Lodges 1746, 1746A,

700 and 743 are all local Lodges of the International As-

wociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-

CIO, affiliated with District 91, I. A. M., the charging party

in the instant case, which coordinates their labor relations

programs, All of these Lodges have for some years been

recognized as exclusive bargaining agents in contracts

covering the production and maintenance employees at the

various plants of the Company, Lodge 1746 represents»

units of these employees at the East Hartford and Man-

chester plants, Lodge 700 represents these employees at

the Middletown plant, Lodge 1746A represents these g-

ployees at the Southington plant, and Lodge 743 repre-

sents these employees at Windsor Locks,

On July 3, 1969, the unions filed a charge with the Na-

tional Labor Relations Board alleging that the Company

had violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its

refusal to furnish the unions with the home addresses of

the approximately 25,000 employees represented by the.

unions in the six plants, The Company agreed that it had

refused to furnish the unions with the employees’ home

addresses, but contended that under the ciroumstances its

refusal did not violate the Act, More specifically, the Com-

pany contended that such information was neither neces-

sary nor relevant to the union's proper performance of

their statutory duties and, further, that in the case of

Lodges 1746, 743, and 700, the union» were legally entitled

to recognition as the exclusive representatives of the em-

ployees involved,

The Board's trial examiner found to the contrary—hold-

ing, in substance, that the home addresses of the unit em-

ployees were necessary and relevant to the unions’ function

as bargaining agents, and that—in the case of Local

Unions 1746, 743, and 700—the unions were legally en-

titled to recognition as the exclusive bargaining represen-

tative of the employees in the units where they claimed

such status, By decision and order dated April 2, 1970,

the Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the trial

examiner, Accordingly, the Board ordered the Company

to cease and desist from refusing to furnish the union

with the home addresses of all the employees in their re-

spective collective bargaining units, and promptly to fur-

nish the union with those addresses,

ba ce 2e

United Aireraft now petitions this court to review and

set aside the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitions

kor enforcement, The unions have intervened on the side

of the Board. For the reasons set forth below, we deny

United Aireraft's petition for review and grant the Board’s

cross-petition for enforcement.

In the summer of 1960, after a stalemate in negotiations

between the Company and Lodges 1746 and 748 for new

contracts, most of the employees represented by those

‘Lodges went on strike, That strike was accompanied by

violence, threats, and physical damage to the non-strikers,

particularly, at their homes, In August 1960, the Company

and the unions finally agreed on the terms of new con-

tracts, and a strike settlement was reached.

In the fall of 1965, the Company and the unions entered

into negotiations to settle pending litigation and to enter

into new three-year contracts to replace those about to ex-

pire, In March 1966, the Company quéstioned-the unions’

majority status and refused to negotiate further unless

the unions could demonstrate their majority status by a

Board election. The unions responded with a charge of

a nection 8(a)(5) violation, and the Board’s General Coun-

wel filed both a complaint before the Board and a petition

for an injunetion in the United States District Court in

Connecticut,

(m August 5, 1966, the district court granted an injunc-

tion requiring the Company to recognize and bargain with

the unions, As a consequence of the court's order, the

Company entered into new two-year contracts with the

unions, Those contracts contained a „Savings clause“ to

the effect that if the Company was ultimately found not

to be obligated to bargain with the unions, it could termi-

nate, The district court then dissolved its order, In Oc-

tober 1966, Trial Examiner Ricci held a hearing on the

wel

General Counsel's complaint and found that by withdraw-

ing recognition from unions in March 1066 and refusing

to bargain, the Company had violated section 8(a)(1) and

(5): he ordered the Company to bargain with the unions,

On November 27, 1007, the Board Isnued a decision up-

holding the trial examiner's findings, That decision Was

promptly appealed by all parties to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,

On Beptember 29, 1968, the unions requested the Com-

pany to give them a Mist of the names and addresses of

all bargaining unit employees, and on September 30, the

Company denied the unions’ request, Nevertheless, on Oc-

‘tober 15, 1068, the Company sent a letter to the unions

proposing that when a local union desires to write letters

to all employees on matters related to contract negotia-

tions; the local deliver the sealed envelopes to the Cein-

pany and the Company would, by addressograph equip-

ment, put the names and addresses on the envelopes and

mall them, ‘The Company stated, however, that this offer

was subject to the availahvity of the addressograph equip-

ment and the Company first call on the equipment,

Nevertheless, the next month, the ugions took advantage

of the Company's offer and sent letters to all employees

by this means,

In November 1968, the 8 and the unions entered

into negotiations for the Pratt and Whitney Division for

new contracts to succeed the ones entered into in 1966,

The Company again questioned the unions’ majority status ;

and the unions agreed to submit sufficient dues check-

off cards to constitute a majority and, if that was not

enough, to have a Board-conducted election, The Com-

pany rejected this offer, proposing that they continuo to

‘' negotiate and that any agreement reached contain the

‘savings clause’’ giving it the option to terminate the oon -

tract in the event the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia should reverse the Board's decision and find

that the Company had no obligation to bargain with the

unions in March 1966, The Union, however, opposed in-

clusion of the ‘‘savings clause’ and asked the Company

‘‘unconditionally and unequivocally"’ to recognize the

unions as the exclusive bargaining representatives of the

employees involved, Finally, the Company signed three-

year contracts containing clauses of unconditional exelu-

nive recognition of the unions and omitting the ‘savings

clause,’ Both parties agreed, however, that by their ac-

tions they were not waiving any legal position previously

taken, )

In March 1969, the Company and the unions began nego-

tiations for new contracts for the Hamilton Standard Di-

‘vision, but this time the Company did not question the

unions» majority.

On May 29, 1969, while those negotiations were pro-

ceeding, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Cireuit denied enforéement of the Board's order of No-

vember 27, 1967, and found that in March 1966 the Com-

pany had a reasonably grounded good-faith doubt as to

the union's majority and hence had not violated the Act.

Lodges 1746 and 746, Int, Ass'n of Mach, and Aero, Work-

evs v. N. L. R. B., 416 F. ad 809 (D. C. Cir, 1969). But on

July 1, 1969, despite this decision, the Company signed

new contracts for its Hamilton Standard Division, con-

taining exelusive recognition clauses and omitting the

‘savings clause,’’ All contracts covering both the Hamil-

ton Standard and- Pratt and Whitney Divisions contained

provisions for dues checkoff authorizations, but no other

form of union security, | -

II.

The Company employs large numbers of people whose

homes are dispersed over a wide geographical area. Of

the 17,000 employees at the East Hartford and Manches-

ter plans, only a little over 6,000 live in towns closer

than seven miles from the plant, The rest live in some

118 different towns in Connecticut, in 27 towns in Massen-

chusetts, and in various places in other states; Similarly,

only 641 of the 3,000 employees in the Bouthingtoh plant

and 693 of the 1,700 employees in the Middletown plant

live in there towns, The rest aro seattered over a radius

of more than 40 miles from the plants, The same wide

dispersion can be found among the 5,000 employees at the

Windsor Locks plants, ~~ |

When the Company has had serious labor relations

problems in the past, it has resorted to the mils to reach

the employees with its point of view, Thus, the Company

has sent several letters to its employees pertaining to oui -

lective-barguining contracts proposals, After negotiations

with Lodges 1746 and 743 broke down in 1966, it mailed

a series of letters to the employees at the affected plants,

explaining and seeking to justify its aetion, Finally, in

November 1968, after refusing the union's request for the

home addresses of its employees, the Company utilived

the mails to explain its position on the refusal to the

employees,

The unions, too, use the mails to communicate with om-

ployees, but they can only reach those of their members

for whom they have up-ta-date addresses, Moreover, they

have no record whatever of the addresses of the roughly

10,000 other unit employees who are not union members,

The unions have found that, under these cireunstancer,

the most feasible meant of vommuniestion with all en-

ployees, members as well as nonmembers, is through hand-

bills which are distributed to the employees a» they enter

the plants at the beginning of the shifts, During 1968, the

unions distributed handbills on about 45 or 60 occasions,

In 1964 the president of Lodge 1746 requested the Com-

pany to permit its handbill distributors (who are usually

‘Compatiy employees) inside the plant to avoid bad weather,

The Company refused, but offered to permit the Union to

- ume ite raekn for the handbills, providing no conflicting

une of the racks wa» planned, This offer was explored and

Lodge 743. did use the racks at one of the Windsor Locks

plant for some time, But the other Lodges, after ascer-

taining that the rack» would only be open at the end of the

whifts and that ad@ance notice was required to avoid con-

filets over the use of the racks, declined the Company's

offer,

The collective-bargaining contracts obligate the Com-

any to make space available on its bulletin boards for the

posting of union notices, but they limit the subject matter

of the notices which can be posted, and prior approval by

Company official in required,

The unions’ necoss to employees at the plants through

shop stewards and union stewards le severely limited by

the strict enforcement of the Conipany’s non-solieitation

rulo and its ban on solicitation of employees for union

membership or dues conducted upon the premises of the

Company dlubing all paid time, whether or not the em-

ployee is working, Thus, the unions’ stewards have the

opportunity to discuss union matters with the employees

only before and after work and during lunch periods; and

because the employees have thirty-minute lunch breaks

which are staggered every fifteen minutes, the opportuni-

tion for conversation between stewards und employees are

further limited, ; e ,

It was in light of all these circumstances that the unions»

requested the Company in September 1968 to furnish them

“with the names and addresses of all members of the bar-

wulning units which they respectively represented, After

the Company refused to do so, the unions filed an unfair

Inbor practice charge with the Board's General Counsel?

und on July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a complaint

alleging that the Company's action had violated § 8(a)(5)

und (1) of the Act, On November 28, 1969, Trial Examiner

Vowe found that the Company had so violated the Act, and

10a

on April 2, 1970, the Board upheld the trial examiner's

findings and conclusions and ordered the Company to fur-

nish the unions with the addresses,

III.

The Company's first claim on this appeal is that it had

no obligation to bargain with the unions so as to require

it to give the unions the employees’ addresses, because its

status as exclusive bargaining representative of the em-

ployees was due to the coercion and taint of the district

court's injunction and the Board's decision, both of which

rested on a finding later reversed by the District of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals, The trial examiner found that the

Company's 1966 grant of recognition to the unions and the

consequent contracts were indeed attributable to the com-

( pulsion of the court's injunction, Hence, since the unions’

initial request for addresses and the Company's refusal to

provide them came in September 1968, while the coerced

1966 contracts were still in effect and before the new nego-

. tiations began, the Company’s initial refusal was not an

unfair labor practice, But, as the trial examiner correctly

found, the unions’ request was an ongoing one and the

Company's grant of recognition in the 1968 negotiation _

was not coerced, We hold therefore that the Company's

continuing refusal to provide addresses after having been

given proof in the 1968 negotiations of the unions’ major-

ity status cannot be justified by the coercion of the prior

contract,

The trial examiner found that the unions in the various

plants acquired majority status at least by the last day of

the month during which the total number of dues checkoff

cards furnished to the Company by. the particular lodge

reached fifty percent of the employees, These dates were,

for the various plants, October 31, 1968, November 30,

1968, and December 31, 1968, This finding is supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and the Company does

not dispute it. Rather, the Company claims (1) that its

lla

grant of recognition to the unions during the 1968 nego-

tiations was direetly coerced by the Board's 1967 decision

which was then in effect but which was later found by the

Distrigt of Columbia Court of Appeals to be incorrect, and

: by

of the 1968 negotiations, the Company still had

to. recognize them or to bargain with them concerning

address lists, because that majority was obtained

through the unwarranted assistance given

by the district court and the Board,’ We

these contentions, -

The Company's argument that its 1968 grant of

nition was covrced by the Board's 1967 decision has no

merit, for, as the Company itself concedes, the unions had

gained a majority by late 1968 and it was the Company's

knowledge of that majority, a» evidenced by the dues

checkoff cards in its hands, that led it to enter into the

1968 negotiations,

The Company is estopped from raining its second argu-

ment--that the unions’ majority was a result of the court's

and the Board's unlawful assistance, The Company failed .

to charge such ‘taint'’ when the unions claimed in the late

_ 1968 and carly 1969 negotiations that their dues checkoff

cards established their majority status; it rejected the

unions’ offer to prove their majority in an election; it ao.

copted in the 1968 and 1969 contracts the unconditional and

unequivocal recognition of the unions as the exclusive

bargaining agent; and it yielded to the unions’ demand

that the ‘savings olause“ be omitted from the new con-

tracts, thereby knowingly waiving its option to terminate

in the event of a favorable decision in the Distriet of Co-

lumbia case, All of these actions indicate that in the 1968.

and 1969 negotiations the Company accepted the fact that

' The Company's argument does not apply to the Southington

‘plant where it has never questioned the particular Lodge's

majority,

the unions were the exclusive bargaining representatives

and that their majority was not tainted, Moreover, when

the Company signed a new contract with Lodge 743 at the

Hamilton Standard Division on July 1, 1069, it already

knew of the District of Columbia Circuit's May decision,

and it nevertheless accepted the omission of the ‘savings

clause’’ and the inclusion of the clause granting uncondi-

tional recognition to the union as exclusive bargaining

representative, If a‘‘taint’’ charge was to be made at all,

it surely should have been made at least at that time, To

permit an employer to save his doubts for use at his con-

venience, as the Company here seeks to do, could subvert

the bargaining process and the policies of the Act,

Furthermore, the Company's assertion, if accepted,

would render unlawful and unenforceable all the 1968 and

1969 contracts between the Company and the unions; and

the Company itself has not only not disavowed or sought

to terminate those contracts even after the District of

Columbia decision, but has insisted that they ‘are valid

and in force. Thus the Company's argument of taint seems

to us to be a make-weight, which it wishes to use in this

case to escape the enforcement of its obligation to furnish

addresses, while, at the same time, it refuses to accept all

the consequences of its claim—that is, that the contracts

are unenforceable for all other purposes as well,

IV,

The Company's second claim is that the record evidence

fails to establish the *‘necossity’’ or ‘relevance’’ of provid-

ing the unions with the home addresses of employees, We

reject that claim,

It is, of course, well settled that the duty to bargain in

good faith imposed upon the employer by section 8(a) (5)

includes an obligation to provide the employees’ bargain-

ing representative with information that in necessary and

* the proper performance of its duties, including

y jer

—

the effective administration of the collective bargaining

agreement in force, NV, L. It. .. v, Aome Industrial Co., 385

U.S, 482 (1007); V. L. M.. v, Truitt Mig, Co., 361 U.S. 149

(1956); Fafnir Bearing Co, v. V. L. A. I., 30 F.9d 716 (2d

Cir, 1966), We held in Prudential Insurance Company of

America v. V. I. It. ., 412 F. au 77 (ad Cir, 1969), that the

names and home addrosnon of all bargaining unit employ.

oon constituted, in the elreumstances of ** case, informa-

tion that war necessary and relevant 0 proper per-

formanee of the unions’ duties, We stated that since 1

union is under a statutory obligation to represent nonmem-

hor employees, as well as mombers, the union must be able

to communicate with all employees, We found that in that

case the names and addronson of all bargaining unit em-

ployees were vital to such communication, and honco wo

required the employer to furnish the union with thone

names and addresses, Bee Standard Oil Company of Cali.

fornia v. V. I. It. B., 909 F.2d 639 (Oth Cir, 1968), where the

Ninth Cireuit came to the same conclusion on facts very

sindlar to those in the instant ease.” Bee also Excelsior

Underwear, Ine, 156 N. I., R. R. 1286 ( 1966); and V. L. N. .

v. Wyman-Clordon Co,, 384 U.S, 759 (1960),

In thin case, the trial examiner found that address

were both necessary and relevant to the unions’ perform.

ance of its dution, and there in substantial evidence in the

record to support his findings,

"In both situations union membership included only a amall

majority; in both there was no union neourity clause in the con-

tragt in both the Company had practioed untl unſon activity and

the union had the need to counteract it; in both the homes of the

employeon were mattered over a wide area (here even more than

in Standard Oil) and in both the alternative means of communica. -

lun were found to be Inadequate, In Standard Oil, the court

upheld the Board's conclusion that the furnishing of employee

ald ee wan relevant and nous’ to the union's performance

OF its responsibilities in collective bargaining and contract admin-

istration, and it required that the employer furnish the requested

list of addresses,

14a

A. Necessity

In view of the wide dispersal of employee homes, it is

clear that the unions need an effective means of communi-

cation, The severity of the problem is increased by the

relatively low percentage of union membership, which limits

both the effectiveness of tho intraunion modes of com-

munication and the reliability of the membership as a

representative sample of employee sentiment on a particu-

lar topic, We reject the Company's contention that the

existing means of communication—handbilling, the use of

company distribution racks, bulletin boards, shop stewards

and union stewards, and the Company's offer to mail union

/eommunications to the employees’ home addresses—are

„ wdequate to fulfill union functions,

1, Handbilling, The union is able to hand leaflets to

employees as they come and go from work, But as we

stated in V. I. H. . v. United Aircraft Corp., 824 F.2d 128,

130 (2d Cir,), cort, denied, 376 U.S, 951 (1963), „Sidewalk

and street corners are subject to the vicissitudes of climate

and often foree solicitation at awkward times, as when

employees are hurrying to and from work.“ Where, as

here, the unions are attempting to reach over 20,000 em-

ployees at ix plants, the logistical problems of handbilling

are overwhelming, The union needs enough handbillers at

the many plant entrances with enough flyers for that partic-

ular entrance, Since the Company does not allow non-em-

ployee handbillers at the inner gate locations most suitable

for thin activity, the unions must use employees, who have

4% stop distribution in time to get to work, Hence, late-

comers are missed, ax are all employees who work irregular

hours or are absent on that date, Finally, since handbill-

ing le necessarily done at shift changes when great num-

hors of employees are entering and leaving the plants, it in

inevitable that many people are missed,

2, Distribution Racks, The Company's offer to open

up ite distribution racks to union literature was subject

lo three conditions: that advance notice would bo ro-

l5a

quired when the racks were to be used, that they could

be used only when the Company had no use for them,

and that they would be locked until the end of the shift.

The first two conditions clearly prevent the unions from

relying on these racks in an emergency, and the latter

condition, which prevents distribution until the employees

are leaving the plant, renders the method impractical.

The unions have found that the beginning of the shift

is the best time for distribution, since employees are more

likely to take a flyer; in addition, they can read the flyer

at lunch break. After work, employees are more likely

to be in too much of a hurry to stop for leaflets,

3. Bulletin Boards, The collective—bargaining agree-

ments severely limit the subject matter of the notices

that may be posted on bulletin boards and require prior

approval by a Company official. Twice in a short period

before the hearing in this case, the Company refused to

post a notice tendered by the unions, On the first oc-

casion the Company took the position that a notice con-

cerning a ‘‘golf league’’ was ‘‘recreational’’ rather than

‘*social’’ and hence not permitfed by the agreement. On

n second occasion, the Company refused to post notices

concerning shop steward elections, a subject expressly in-

cluded in the contract, assertedly because the signs were

too large and because they contained small maps of the

plants which allegedly created security problems, Al-

though the union offered to block out the maps, the

Company still refused either to post the notices or to

arbitrate the dispute. Moreover, as the trial examiner

noted, even if the Company had not placed these restric-

tions upon the unions’ use, ‘bulletin boards by their

very nature do not provide an effective means of com-

municating with employees on important matters.“ The

message must be short and simple because of space limita-

tions and the little time available for reading to employees

hurrying by; in addition, the notice must compete for

attention with other notices,

16a

4. Shop Stewards and Union Stewards, The remaining

in-plant method of communication is the shop stewards

and the union stewards, The stewards, however, are

obviously not an appropriate mean’ for placing a sub-

stantial message before the entire employee complement

more or loss simultaneously, Because the Company strietly

enforces a ban on solicitation of employees for union

membership or dues, and on carrying on union business,

upon the premises of the Company during all paid time,

whether or not an employee is working, stewards can

reach employees only before and after work and during

lunch; and since lunch breaks are staggered, this oppor-

tunity is further limited,

5. The Company's Offer to Mail Communications for

the Unions, Under the circumstances here, the only method

which affords an effective means of reaching virtually

every employee with a substantial message under con-

ditions which allow thoughtful consideration is direct mail.

As has been stated, however, the unions are presently un-

able to use that method effectively," _

Although the Company did offer to mail union commu-

nications to the employees’ home addresses, that method

is plainly unsatisfactory, The Company's offer allows

it to preempt the mailing equipment, This would be eru-

cial in times of emergency when the unions might well

want to use the mails, for this is the very time when the

Company would want to do so as well and would preempt

the equipment, Moreover, the offer limits the subject

matter of the letters which it will mail for the unions to

matters relating to contract negotiation,’’ ‘leaving the

Company ax sole judge of what could be mailed, For

instance, while the Company did mail out a copy of the

unions’ contract proposal in November 1968, itt refused

to send out a survey concerning the employees’ interest

in an automobile insurance plan, The unions’ duties ax

exclusive bargaining representative do not end at ‘matters

* See p. 469 supra, .

17a

relating to contract negotiations“; they also include other

matters such as this insurance plan.‘

Thus we find that none of the alternative methods sug-

gested by the Company is adequate to achieve the unions’

objective of reaching all the bargaining unit employees,

Moreover, as we held iw the Prudential case, since each

of the five alternative methods is inadequate by itself to

achieve the desired goal, their aggregation cannot cure

the defect.

B. Relevance

In Prudential, we held that [als the exclusive bargain-

ing representative of all the agents within the unit, the

Union has a statutory duty to represent fairly the in-

terests of the. .. nonunion agents as well as the Union

members ... [and] data without which a union cannot

even communicate with employees whom it represents is,

by its very nature, fundamental to the entire expanse of a

union's relationship with the employees.“ 412 F.2d at 84.

The Company argues that, although the unions’ avowed

purpose may be relevant, the true motivation for the

unions’ demand is either to solicit for union membership

or to go to the homes of those who did not strike in

1960 and to continue to visit violence upon them. But

ux we stated in the Prudential case, the ‘‘complaint that

the Union may use this information to solicit new mem-

bers within the unit is simply of no moment. As the

Board has so appropriately indicated, there is no clear

distinetion between informing nonmembers about the bene-

fits it has obtained and hopes in the future to secure for

Other such matters specifically mentioned at the hearing in-

cluded advising employees as to their rights under the pension

plan; how to collect. on group insurance; information on the han-

dling of grievances; decisions of arbitrators, the Board, and the

courts; and clarification of employee rights under the collective

bargaining agreement, as well a workmen's compensation, social

security, and medicare,

thom and its solicitation of their support, In any case,

union solicitation in itself hardly an-evil—ospecially where,

as here, the union is already the exclusive bargaining rep-

resentative of the employees it in soliciting, Prudential

Ina, Co, v. VN. L At. ñ., supra, 412 F.2d at 85, There in no

evidence that the unions woul use the list of addresses

to go to the employeos’ homes for violent purposes,

Finally, in thin case as in Prudential, ‘supplying the

requested list is no onerous burden; it entails no disrup-

tion of the employees“ work as is ordinarily involved in

allowing union organivers on the premlsen or permitting

union experts to make an independent time study of

the operations,“ Prudential Ina, Co, v. V. I. It. ;., supra,

412 F. ad at 85, 1

The Company's final claim is that the union 's demand

for addresses violates the employees’ right to privacy,

especially in view of the unjons’ violence against non-

strikers in 1960, That claim, however, has little merit in

the circumstances of thin case, In determining whether

the disclosure of addresses to a union violates the om-

ployees’ right to privacy, the crucial factor appears to be

the likelihood of a clear and present danger to the em-

ployees involved, The trial examiner here found little

likelihood of a cloar and present danger to the nonstriking

employees, and there in substantial evidence to support

his finding, Although there was evidence of violence in

the past, it took place ten yours ago, and there has been

no evidence of harasament since that time; the threatening

statements were merely personal and not attributable to

the unions; and no employee testified to present foar of -

violence,

Petition for review denied and Board's order enforced.

19a

APPENDIX B

Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board

(Dated April 2, 1970)

_ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-— THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Case 1-CA-6492

Unirep Arncrart Corporation (Pratt & Watney AIRCRAFT

and Hau Stanparp Divisions)

and

District 91, InrerRNaTionaL ASSOCIATION OF MacHINists &

Agnospace Workers, AFL-CIO

DECISIONANDORDER ~—s«

On November 28, Reo, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose is-

sued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding

that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in cer-

(nin unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease

and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as

set forth in the attached Trial Examiner’s Decision. There-

after, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner’s

Decision and a supporting brief, The Charging Parties

filed cross-exceptions and a reply to Respondent's brief.

The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial

yxaminer’s Decision,

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor

Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection

with this case to a three-member panel.

The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam-

iner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error

was committed, The rulings are hereby affirmed. The

Board has considered the Trial Examiner’s Decision, the

— Da

exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this ase,

and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions», and recommen-

dations of the Trial Examiner, :

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 10(¢) of the National Labor Rela-

tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board

hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the

Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, United Air-

craft Corporation (Pratt & Whitney Alroraft and Hamilton

Standard Divisions), its officers, agents, successors, ANd un-

signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examin-

er's Recommended Order, :

Dated, Washington, D. C., April 2, 1970,

Faank W. MoCuisoon, Chairman

Joux H. Fax xi, Member

Howaap Janxina, In,, Member

National Lanon Revations Boarp

* (Anal.) *

APPENDIX C

Decision of Trial Examiner ~

UNITED STATES OF AMBRICA

unrom THE NATIONAL BABOR RELATIONS BOARD

DIVIBION OF TRIAL BXAMINERS

WARHINOTON, b. o.

Cane 1-0A.6402 ie.

Vn Aimenavr Componation (Paar & Warrwny Alncnayr

und Hamiuton Sranpanp Divimonn)

and

Dinthior 11, INTERNATIONAL ATN OF Manni &

Awnonpack Wonnns, AFI

Thomas M. Harvey, of Boston, Mans.,

for the General Counsel,

Joseph C, Wella, of Washington, D. C., :

for the Respondent, ig

Mozart G, Ratner, of Washington, D. O.,

for the Cliurging Party,

TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION

Statoment of the Cane

OW Vows, Trial Bxaminors This case was tried at

Wont Hartford, Connectiout, on J uly 22-24, 1969, pursuant

4% u charge fled by District 91, International Association

Of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, on October

16, Ihen, and a complaint issued-on July 3, 1969, The com-

Plaint allogod in substance that the Rosponlent had vio-

lated Mootion n) (h) and (1) of the Act by refusing, in

Noptomber and Octobor 1968, and thereafter, the requests

Of La 1746, 1746A, 743 and 700 of International Asso-

ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,

22a

that each Lodge be furnished with the names and home ad-

dresses of all the employees in ench of their respective col-

lective-bargaining units, The Respondent filed an answer

admitting the refusal to furnish the requested information

but denying any legal obligation to furnish such informa-

tion, All parties were represented by counsel and fully

participated in the trial. Since that time all parties have

filed comprehensive briefs which have been fully considered,

Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observa-

tion of the witnesses, I make the following:

Findings and Conclusions

I, The Respondent’s Business

The Respondent, a Delaware corporation having its prin-

cipal office at East Hartford, Connecticut, is engaged in the

manufacture and distribution of aircraft engines, helicop-

ters, aircraft accessories and parts, electronic devices and

components thereof. The Respondent operates several

plants in the State of Connecticut, including plants located

at East Hartford, Manchester, Middletown and Southington

(Pratt & Whitney Division), and two plants at Windsor

Locks (one known as the Windsor Locks plant and the other

known as the Building #3 plant). Previously, the opera-

tions carried on in the Building #3 plant had been per-

formed in a plant at Broad Brook, Connecticut, called the

Broad Brook plant. In addition, the Respondent operates

plants in the States of Florida, New York and California,

In connection with its operations in the State of Connecti-

cut, the Respondent annually purchases and receives from

outside the State of Connecticut goods and materials valued.

in excess of $1,000,000, and also ships from its plants in the

State of Connecticut to, points and places outside the State

of Connecticut goods and materials valued at in excess of

#1,000,000, Upon these facts which are admitted by the

Respondent, I find that the Respondent is engaged in com-

merece within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the

Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to as-

vort jurisdiction herein,

II. The Labor Organisations Involved

Lodges 1746, 1746A, 743 and 700 of International Asao-

ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,

uve all affiliated with District 91, a District Lodge chartered

by the International, All four local lodges and District

Lodge 91, the Charging Party herein, are labor organiza-

tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

III. The Unfair Labor Practices

The Respondent's refusal of the Lodges’ request for

the addresses of employees in their respective

burgaining units, in violation of Section

8(n)(5) and (1) of the Act,

A. The Facts

1, Background; history of bargaining relations

u. The bargaining history prior to the 1960 strike

Aw indicated above, the Respondent's operations are car-

ried on in two main divisions, the Pratt & Whitney Division

und the Hamilton Standard Division, Involved in this ease

are six units of employees at various of the Respondent's

plants in both divisions, The partion stipulated at the hear-

ing that each of these six units discussed below constituted

appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining

within the meaning of Section bb) of the Act.

In the Pratt & Whitney Division, the Board certified

Lodge 1746 as the collective-bargaining representative of

the employees in the Kast Hartford, Conneatiout, plant fol-

lowing an eloction in 1045, Certifieation of Lodge 1746 as

tho exclusive representative of the employees of the Man-

_ chester plant followed an election among these employees

Jdu

in 1957, Lodge 1746A was certified by the Board as the

collective-bargaining representative of the employees at the

Respondent's Southington plant in 1951, The record does

not reveal the origin of the bargaining relationship between

the Respondent and Lodge 700 representing the employees

at the Respondent's Middletown. plant, However, the ree-

ord indicates that Lodge 700 has had contracts covering the

employees of the Middletown plant going back some years,

as has Lodge 1746A for the employees at the Respondent's

Southington plant, Lodge 1746 han mad collective-bargain-

ing contracts covering the employees at the Respondent's

East Hartford and Manchester plants going back, with few

interruptions, almost to the dates of the original certifica-

tions,

In the Hamilton Standard Division, Lodge 743 was certi-

fled by the Board as the exclusive bargaining representa-

tive of the employees at the Respondent's Windsor Locks

plant in 1941, and at the Respondent's Broad Brook plant

in 1954. The employoos in these two plants also have been

covered by colloctive-barguining contracts between the Ro-

spondent and Lodge 743 almost continuously since their

original certification,

b. The strike; the actions and counter actions commenced

by the Respondent and Lodges 17-46 and 748

The negotiations betwoon the Respondent and Lodges

1746 and 743 for new contracts to sucoeed thone expiring

in the latter part of 1959 and the early part of 1960 cover-

ing the employees of the Respondent's Must Hartford, Man-

chester, Windsor Locks and Broad Brook plants beoame

stalemated, and on June 8, 1960 the employees of these four

plants went out on strike, Lodges 1746A and 700, repre-

senting the employoos at the Respondent's Southington and

Middletown plants, respectively, renched an agreement with

the Respondent concerning the terms of successor contracts

and the employees at these planta did nat participate in the

strike,

The strike In which Lodges 1746 and 743 engaged oom -

mencing on June 8, 1960, was attended, as the Board has

found, by ‘mas plekoting and violence’? (United Aireraft

Corporation, 134 NLRB 1632), A fow days after the strike

hogan the Respondent commenced actions againat Lodges

1746 ancl 743 and District Lodge 91 in the Connecticut Su-

perior Court, Hartford County, seeking injunctive relief

und large sume in damages, The Respondent also filed un-

fnir labor practioos charges against Lodges 1746 and 743.

Upon the basis of these charges the Board's Regional Di-

rector Initiated proceedings in the United States District

Court for the District of Connectiout seeking an injunction

nuninst the Lodgow under Section 10(j) of the Act. In both

the State and Federal Court proceedings the parties on-

fered into stipulations about the middle of June 1960 where-

hy the Lodges agreed to cease thelr mass picketing and

other egal activition,

Ann result of those stipulations the mass picketing and

Violonoe at the picket lines subsided, However, the Lodges

thereafter continued to engage in violence away from the

picket lines agaist non-strikers, An was stated much later

in the opinion of Judge Gaffney of the Connoctiout Superior

Court, Hartford County, in sustaining the action for dam.

Aon brought by the Respondent against Lodges 1746 and

74% vonulting from tortious conduct during the strike (68

LRM 248s, 2404) ;

Aw such they [the night riders) damaged automobiles

of non-wtriking employees, They flooded the cellars of

tholr houses, they burned their hedges, they threw paint

hombs through their house windows, They tried to

burn a barn behind a hause where many non-atrikers

lived, Tay burned one of the non-atriking employee's

vutomobile,

Uitinately, on August), 1060, Lodges 1746 and 749 agreed

on the forma of new contracts, and a strike settloment agree-

wont Was renched on August 11, 1960,

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employees of the Middletown plant. Ana a 3-year contract,

effective December 5, 1968, was thereafter signed by the Re-

ee oy ae epee ae ae

Southington plant.

In the negotiations commencing in March 1968 between

the Respondent and Ledge 743 fer successor contracts cov-

ering the Windsor Locke and Building #3 plants in the

Hamilton Standard division, the Respondent did not que--

tion the Lodges’ majority-status in these two units. At the

bargainiig meeting on March 19, 1969, Ostro, the union

uegotiator, asked whether, in view of the number of em.

pleyees on checkoff the Respondent was challenging Lode

743s status as exclusive bargaining representative. The

only reply of Nathaniel Morse, the Respondent's Industrial

Relations Director, was have you heard any, meaning

any such challenge, to which the union negotiator replied

no.“ After several months of bargaining, successor con-

tracts covering the employees at the Windsor Locks and

“uilding +3 plants were signed on July 1. The contracts

were made effective as of April 21, 1969.

All of these contracts covering the employees in both the

Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard divisions con.

tained the exclusive recognition provisions and the other

provisions mentioned in connection with the discussion of

the 1965 and 1966 contracts. In addition these contract:

contained new provisions granting various benefits not pre-

\ ously accorded the Respondent’s employees. None of the

contracts contained Article XIII. the “Savings clause,’’ giv-

ing the Respondent the option of terminating the contract

upon 10 days notice, depending upon the outeome of the

case then pending in the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Cireuit. It is to be noted that at the time

of the actual signing of the Windsor Locks and Building

+° contracts, the Court of Appeals decision upholding the

Respondent’s position, had been outstanding for about a

month, the Court of Appeals decision having been *

on May 29, 1969.

. eafannd to Cumaiah the Ledges

with the addresses of its emplovecs

By letter dated September 19, 1968, signed by the presi-

* im 1964 and 1965 on which Ledges 1746 and 743 hed pre“

iously requested that they be furnished with the addressex

—— in their respective bargaining units

and, after to the forthcoming negotiations, as-

sertec that lists names and addresses of all emp

in the bargaining units were indispensable to the perform.

that the Wen there invelved was entitled to a list of the

names and addresses of all the employees in the bargaining

unit. In the letter, the Ledges quoted from the Court's

of the employees is essential in order to enable the bar.

gaining agent adequately to perform its statutory duty

fairly to represent the interests of all the employees in the.

unit, nonunion employees as well as union members.

In a letter to District 91 dated September 30, 1968, the

Respondent declined to furnish the addresses, without ex.

pressly saying so. Instead it advanced various reasons to

why the Ledges were in error in requesting the addresses.

The Lodges replied to this letter by letter dated October 10,

1968, in which they attempted 25...

* Standard Oil Co. of California v. NLRB, aad

N 0

vanced by the Respondent and gave further reason~ sup-

porting their request for the addresses.

In its to District 91 dated October 15, 1968, the

— —— te

dresses to allow the Ledge to use its mailing facilities for

the purpose of mailing letters to all unit employees n

unters related to contract negotiations. This offer aud

the Lodges’ response is discussed more fully below.

m November 29, 1969, the Respondent's continuing r.

fusail to furnish the addresses of unit employees. was re-

ferred to in the contract negotiations with Ledge 1746. In

the negotiations on the following day the Ledge explicitly

stated that by entering into the contract, ‘‘the union does

not intend to waive, and has not waived, any statutory

rights . . . heretofore asgerted in litigation . . . such as

.. . addresses of bargaining unit employees. |

At the hearing in this case on July 24, 1969, Industria!

Relations Director Morse testified that the Respondent’

poliey, which has been in effect for 30 years, is to refuse to

release the address of any employee to any organization or

any person for any purpose, without the permission of the

employee.

3. The Ledges’ need to have employees’ addresses in

order to communicate with unit employees

Justin Ostro, the Lodges chief negotiator, was a repre-

sentative of the International assigned to District 91 and

the four Lodges here involved. Ostro testified that the

Lodges needed the employees’ addresses so as to be able to

communicate with not only members of the Lodges, but also

to give information to the employees, among other things,

about impending elections, both union and civil, new serv-

ices afforded by the Lodges, the interpretation of contract

provisions, and the rights of the employees with respect

to group insurance, pensions, workmen’s compensation,

social security and medicare. - Other subjects concern-

investigate grievances or alleged unfair practice

charges. Finally, Ostro testified that reaching aa

by mail at their homes enabled the Lodges to place the ma- .

terial in the employees’ hands at a time when they would

lave time earefully to consider it. The Ledges experience

uns heen, according to Ostro, that when the material di-

-ominated inchudes business reply envelopes, a larger num

her of employees participate when the materials are mailed

directly to the employees’ hemes than when any other

methed of distribution is ‘used. 8

and the Lodges

— of communtedting aith the Deagentest’s.

OEE

In view 0 Go cap tp eae —„

cmployees and the wide dispersal of their homes com-

munication with all of them is nessssarily 2 dilieult, under-

taking. As of the end of 1968 there. were almost 17,800 em

—— — Bast Hartford end Manchester

plants. An exhibit prepared by the Respondent (Resp. Exh.

1) shows that only a little over 6,000 of these employees

live in towns which are closer than 7 miles from the plant.

The rest live in some 118 different towns in Connecticut, in

°T towns in Massachusetts, and in various places in Rhode

—

iste

over 500, The Windsor Locks employees lived in 105 dif-

_ ferent towns in Connecticut and 65 towns in Massachusetts.

‘mly 821 of the 4,500 Windsor Locks employees lived closer

than 7 miles from the plant. The rest of the employees

were dispersed over an area having a radius of more thah

45 miles from the plant.

b. The Respondent ' methods of communicating

withemployees $=

The Respondent hes traditionally weed various means of

communicating with employees. In addition te the hand-

book ‘You and Your Company which is given to all em.

ployees at the time of their hiring, the Respondent puts out —

semimonthly house organs to the employees of both divi-

their way home. 8

For many years the Respondent has used bulletin board-

as a means of communicating with its employees. At the

‘last Hartford plant Respondent has for a long time had

-: (ally constructed glassed-in locked bulletin boards about

3 feet high and 8 feet wide erected at prominent places in

the plants. These bulletin boards are divided into separate

~ections, a section for the Respondent’s general notices,

and smaller seetions for eredit union notices, Aireraft Club

not ices and union notices. In the Hamilton Standard divi-

sion the bulletin beards are apparently smaller. The col-

loctive-hargaining contracts covering the employees in both

divisions in reeent years have provided that employer-ap-

proved notices concerning union meetings, elections, and

union social affairs could h posted on the company bulletin

hoards. 5

The Respondent has traditionally used the mails to com-

municate important Messages to its employees. While this

means of communications has not been used with great

frequency in the past, it has been used with some regularity

by the Respondent when it has had serious problems in cen-

order to enable them to communiente with non-member.

„ well as members about contract proposals and negotia-

tions. This procedure, the Respondent explained, would

enable it to adhere to its longstanding policy of protecting

— —— —

Industrial Relation- Director Morse testified in effect

that the Respondent would continue to communieaté wit!)

its employees by mail whenever it decided that this would

be the most effective means of communicating with the em-

42a 9

I means ased by the Lodges to commumecate

with employers

hamdbalis, the Lodger al- passed out copies of the District

91 monthly publication, the ‘New Union News"’ to the

employees as they entered the plants.

The Lodges prefer the beginning of the shift for the

distribution of union literature, se Gicorge Cope, a busines»

represvntative ef District 91, testified, for the reason that

cmployees whe arrive early have time to read before

—tarting to work, ethers can read them during lunch

i i!

Wal k

The letter then went on to offer,

whenever a Ledge wished to write letters to all employees

in the bargaining units on matters related to contract ne-

Lodges

_gotiauens,’’ to permit the use of its addressograph equip-

and,

these

22 in aeeeineat det te

by the Ledges

the mailing

—

the fortheoming negotiations, as indicated in handbill- di-

tributed by the Ledges.

Le. u;

ate if

Hh 1151

Hit +

Ail

& |

furnishes the Ledges periadically with lists of the depart.

ments to which each employee is assigned. Another factor

limiting the ability ef the * stewards to com-

nunicate with employees is the Reapeadent's strict enforce.

ment of its ne-solicitation rules and of the contract ban 0)

~oltcitation of unien dues and memberships during working

_ hours. This limits-the union stewards’ opportunity te dis-

£4333 2344

10 1 1 f

21 : af

a HEH

48a

rather than a social activity within the seope of ‘the topies

permitted by the contract. On the second occasion Lodges

1746, 1746A and 743 had specially printed notices prepared

regarding shop steward elections, The Respondent refused

to permit the posting of these notices with the explanation

that they were too large for posting within the existing

union space on the bulletin boards, The Respondent also

asserted that the inélusion on the notices of very small

seale maps of the plants created security problems. Even

after the Lodges pointed out that the Southington and

Windsor Locks maps revealed no information of a security

nature and offered to block out maps on the notices for

those two plants, the Respondent still refused to permit

the posting of the notices at these two plants. The Re-

spondent persisted in its refusal throughout all four steps

of the grievance procedure and finally refused to agree to

arbitration of the dispute.

Even if the Respondent had not placed restrictions upon

Lodges’ use of its bulletin boards, bulletin boards by their

very nature do not provide an effective means of com-

municating with eniployees about important matters. At

the Respondent’s plants a large number of notices usually

remained posted at the same time—notices posted by the

Respondent, the credit union, the Aircraft Club and the

Lodges. Among this galaxy of notices it was difficult for

the Lodges to attract attention to their notices, as Inter-

national Representative Ostro testified. Employees tend

to hurry past the notices on the way out of the plant after

work, as Ostro further testified, and the only time em-

ployees normally glance at the bulletin boards is on their

way in to work and during lunch hours, which affords em-

ployees comparatively little exposure to the messages

which the Lodges would like to convey. In my opinion

bulletin boards fall far short of constituting an adequate

medium of communications with the employees as a whole.

With respect to the Lodges’ use of the mails to com-

municate with employees, at best this enables the Lodges

Even with respect to members, the mails are not a com-

pletely satisfactory means of reaching them, sinee the

enable them to reach not only nonmembers, but also more

members than they are presently reaching.

Finally the Respondent asserts that the Lodge can com-

munieate with their constituents through their stewards.

It points out that at the East Hartford plant there are

about 500 stewards, including almost 100 shop stewards

who are paid for handling grievances, It is true, as found

above, that the 85-100 shop stewards are allowed up to 2

hours pay per week for handling grievances, The General

Counsel replied that even 100 stewards for 17,000 em-

ployees provides too thin coverage and he points to various

other factors diseussed hereinabove, which limit the ‘ability |

of the stewards to communicate with employees, including

the unavailability or inaccessability of stewards in certain

departments on some shifts and the Respondent's strict

enforcement of non-solicitation rules and contract provi-

sions which effectively prohibit any discussion of union

business during working hours. Considering all the factors

diseussed above, I conclude that while the stewards serve

as one channel of communications with employees, they are

unable to reach more than a small fraction of the em-

ployees in the plant.

In my opinion, when measured against the effectiveness

of direct mailings to the home addresses of unit employees,

none of the methods currently used by the Lodges of come

municating with employees, cither singly or in combination,

furnish an adequate means of reaching all unit employees,

both members of the Lodges and nonmembers.

B. Conelusions

1. The Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining -.,

representatives of the employees in their

respective bargaining units

Before reaching the principal question in this case—

whether the Respondent violated its obligations unler See-

tion 8(a)(5) of the Act in refusing to furnish the Lodges

with lists of addresses of all the employees in the various

bargaining units here involved—-the threshold question of

the Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining representatives

so as to be entitled to request the lists of addresses must

first. be disposed of, that is, with the exception of the ma-

jority status of Lodge 1746A. Lodge 1746A’s status as

the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees

at the Southington plant has not been questioned by the

Respondent in this proceedjpg or before.

I have found that by.the time the negotiations were con-

cluded on November 30, 1968, for the new 3-year contracts

between the Respondent and Lodges 1746A, 1746, and 700

covering the employees at the Respondent's plants in tho

Pratt & Whitney division, East Hartford and Manchester,

. Southington and Middletown, the Respondent had in its

possession current dues-checkoff authorizations signed by

a majority of the employees in each of these plants.

have further found that months before the conelusions

the negotiations between’ the Respondent and Lodge 743 i

April 1969 covering the employees at the Windsor Locks

and Building æ& 3 plants in the Hamilton Standard Divi-

sion, the Respondent had in its possession current dues-

checkoff authorizations signed by a majority of the em-

ployees at each of these plants. In view of my finding

that the Lodges’ request for the addresses of unit em-

ployees was a continuing request, the foregoing evidenee

concerning the extent to which employees had signed cheek-

off authorizations would normally be conclusive of the

Lodges’ status as exclusive bargaining repfesentative of

all the employees in all six bargaining units at all times

pertinent in this case.

However, the Respondent contends that the dues checkoff

authorizations relied upon by the Lodges as establishing

their majority status cannot be regarded as having been

voluntarily executed in view of the assistance allegedly

conferred upon the Lodges by the Respondent by its recog-

nizing and entering into a collective-bargaining contract

with the Lodges in the negotiations begun in 1965 and by:

its similar action in the negotiations begun in 1968,

According to the Respondent, it granted recognition in-

voluntarily on both occasions, The first time, so the

Respondent asserts, it accorded recognition to Lodges

1746 and 743 as a result of the entry by the District

Court, at the request of the Board, of an order under

Section 10(j) of the Act requiring the Respondent ‘to

recognize and bargain collectively with these Lodges,

(This order, as found above, was issued in aid of the

pending unfair labor practice proceeding based upon the

Respondent's withdrawal of recognition ‘from Lodges

1746 and 743 on March 11, 1966.) On the second oc-

casion, in 1968 negotiations, the Respondent says that

it acted under the compulsion of the Board's own bar-

gaining order entered on November 27, 1967, which was

522 —

entered in the proceeding based on the Respondent 's March

11, withdrawal of recognition. The Respondent urges that

singe the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Cireuit in its May 29, 1969, decision set aside the Board’s

order of November 27, 1967, its grant of recognition to the

Lodges in the 1966 and 1968 negotiations was improper,

that the Lodges were unlawfully assisted by these coerced

grants of recognition, and that for this reason the dues

checkoff authorizations obtained by the Lodges in their

1968 membership drive cannot be regarded as having been

executed voluntarily.

While it is fair to state that the Respondent's grant of

reognition to the Lodges in the negotiations beginning in

1966 was attributable to the compulsion of the District

Court 's order, it is not reasonable, in my opinion, to at-

tribute the Respondent's recognition of the Lodges in the

negotiations beginning in sees be the Board’s order of

November 27, 1967.

The Lodges had been carrying on a membership drive

all during 1968. The number of dues checkoff authoriza-

tions turned over to the Respondent steadily inereased in

all plants as to which the Respondent raises a question

concerning majority status from approximately 20 per-

cent of the employees in January 1968 to over 50 percent

in December 1968,

As found above, by the time the negotiations with Lodge

743 commenced in March 1969, the Respondent for several

months had been checking off union dues from the wages of

a majority ut the employees at both the Windsor Locks and

Building #3 plants. When Lodge 743 inquired at the

start of these negotiations whether the Respondent was

challenging its majority status, the — replied in

the negative.

While the Respondent at the outset of the nogotiations

with Lodges 1746 and 700 in November 1968 challenged

their majority status, after the Lodges offered additional |

53a

dues-checkoff authorizations to prove their majority status,

and offered to submit to a Board condueted election if the

the Respondent entered into comprehensive

for new contracts.

In my opinion it was knowledge of the Lodges’ s teailily

increasing strength among the employees at all the plants

here involved, as evidenced by the dues-checkoff authoriza-

tions in its hands, which impelled the Respondent to enter

into the negotiations beginning in 1968, rather than any

compulsion flowing from the Board's order of November

27, 1967. This evidence of the Lodges’ majority status

was of a kind which the Respondent was entitled to accept

The new contracts ultimately entered into by Respondent

and the Lodges were not mere extensions of the previous

contract», Portions of there contracts were substantially

rewritten and new benefits not previously aceorded the em-

ployees were granted by the Respondent, The new con-

tracts did not inelude the ‘savings clause“ formerly con-

tained in Article XIII of the previous contracts giving the

Respondent the option of terminating the contracts upon

10 days notice if the Court of Appeals set aside the Board

order of Noveniber 27, 1967, although the Respondent up

until the very end of the negotiations bad insisted that any

new contracts should also contain the ‘savings clause.

The Respondent has treated the new contracts which it

had entered into with the Lodges as being in full, force

The Respondent did not raise as a barrier to the negotiations

the pending proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia for the District of Columbia Circuit in which it was seek-

ing the reversal of the Board's order of November 27, 1969, al-

% though it had reason to anticipate that the Court's devision would

be fortheoming in the near future, (The cause had been argued on

October 15, 1968), *

her respects, the Respondent's position is, a» 1

understand it, that the contracts are valid and enforceable.

ime has the Respondent taken any steps, or at-

to take any. steps to terminate the contracts as a

whole, On the con „ as late as May 2, 1969, when the

Respondent filed its appeal from the Regional Director's

refusal to issue a complaint upon its charge, alleging

refused to bargain collectively with it

tions which it assumed in entering into the 1968 contract.

To summarize, the Respondent recognized and entered

into the negotiations for new contracts after having re-

ceived from the yees in the units involved a steadily

increasing number Of dues-checkoff authorizations, By the

time the agreements were reached the Respondent had in

its possession dues-checkoff authorizations from a majority

tions. The new contracts arrived and contained subsan-

tial revisions of the old contracts and offered the employees

new benefits. In the new contracts, the Respendent re-

treated from its prior position that the savings clause’’

must be included, and consented to the inclusion of an un-

In view of all these facts I conclude that the Board’s

order of November 27, 1967, was not a factor of any sig-

nifieanee in the Respondent's decision to go ahead with

the 1968 negotiations und that the Respondent must be

deemed to have actéd upon its own responsibility in enter-

ing into these negotiations and in concluding the new con-

tracts with the Lodges, This being true, the Respondent

cannot be heard to say that recognition of the Lodges in

1968 and 1969 was granted under the improper

n most flagrant breach of the duty to bargain collectively

in good faith. 5

The Respondent is mistaken, in. my opinion, in relying

upon the Court of Appeals decision of May 29, 1969, setting

aside the Board's order of November 27, 1967, as justifying

its challenge in this proceeding of the Lodges’ majority

status. The Court of Appeals held that when the Respond-

ent withdrew recugnition from Lodges 1746 and 743, afte

the collapse of the negotiations in Mareh 1966, it had

reasonable grounds for doubting the Lodges’ majority

status and had acted in good faith, and that consequently

the Board had been in error in finding an illegal refusal

to bargain on this occasion and in issuing a bargaining

order to remedy this alleged unfair labor practice. This

decision with respect to alleged March 1966 unfair labor

practices, which incidentally does not constitute a holding

that Lodges 1746 and 743 iu fact lacked majority status

in March 1966, has no bearing on the Lodges’ majority

status in October 1968 and thereafter. The Lodges’ claim

of majority status at this time was based upon newly ob-

tained dues-checkoff authorizations which were turned

over to the Respondent during these and the preceding

months, As stated above, employers are entitled to rely.

upon such evidence of majority status in determining

whether or not to grant recognition. The Court of Appeals

decision does not in my opinion warrant the Respondent's

belated challenge of the Lodges majority status.

I conclude that each Lodge acquired majority status at

least by the last day of the month during which the total

number of dues-cheekoff authorizations furnished the Re-

spondent by the Lodge reached a number in excess of 50

percent of the employees in the unit. The Respondent's

records show and I find these dates to be as follows:

Lodge 1746, East Hartford and Manchester units,

| November 30, 1968,

4iodge 700, Middletown unit, October 31, 1968,

Lodge 743, Windsor Locks unit, November 30, 1968,

Lodge 743, Building #3 unit, December 31, 1968,

As stated above, there is no question in this case about

Lodge 1746A’s majority status in the Southington unit at

any time pertinent herein.

57a

Prudential Insurance Co. v. V. L. R. B., 412 F. 24 77 (C. A.

6), eert. denied November 17, 1969, — U.S. ——, and

Standard Oil Co, of California v. V. L. R. B., 309 F. 2d 639

(C. A. 9), both involve the same question as is presented in

this case, i. e., whether an employer is required to eomply

with a union 's request for a list of the names and addresses

of all the employees in a bargaining unit of which the

union is the exelusive bargaining representative. Both

Courts coneluded, in the cireumstances there

that the obligations of employers under Section 8(a)(5)

of the Act inelude the duty to furnish such address infor-

mation upon request to the exclusive bargaining repre-

sentatives of their employees. More recent decisions of

the Board to the same effect are Southern Counties Gas

Co., 174 NLRB No, 11, and General Electric Co., 176 NLRB

No, 84, The validity of a Board direction to an employer

to furnish employees’ names and addresses in an election

context has been upheld by the Supreme Court. V. L. R. B.

v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767. See also J. P.

Stevens & Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., decided October 3, 1969 -

(C. A. 5), 72 LRRM 2433, 2438,

The Sixth Cireuit in Prudential after referring to the

general obligation of employers ‘‘to provide the employees’

statutory bargaining representative with information that

is necessary and relevant to the proper performance of

its duties“ and citing ‘‘wage data“ as an example of a

type of information which is ‘presumptively relevant to

the proper performance of a bargaining agent's duties,

stated with respect to the address information sought in

that case, as follows (412 F. 2d at 84): >

;

Prudential and Standard Oil eases, and in my opinion

more closely parallel those in the Standard Oil ease,

that the exelisive bargaining representative of em-

a statutory duty fairly to represent all of the

ees in the bergaining unit, nonunion employees a»

union members, Fulfillment of the statutory duty,

rt stated, requires that the bargaining representa-

tive have effective means of communicating with the hene-

ficiaries of its statutory obligation, including nonunion |

employees, with respect to such matters as their prefer-

enees and priorities in contract negotiations, their experi-

ence and recommendations with respect to the operation

the grievance-arbitration machinery, and their thoughts

the wisdom of striking over a particular issue’’ (399

„ 2d, at 641). The Court in Standard Oil, adopting the

reasoning of the Board, held that in view of the relatively

low union membership in the unit, the absence of a union-

security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, the

The parallel between the facts of the Standard Oil case

and this ease is apparent. Thus, here’ as in the Standard

Oil the Lodges had a relatively low membership in

the t, having as members only a little more than 50

of the employees in each of the units, leaving a

very substantial minority of nonmembers to whom the

Lodges owed the duty of fair representation. In this case

employees at their homes: almost an impossibility from a

practical standpoint, Here, as in the Standard Oil case,

the alternative means of communicating with employees

open to the Lodges were not adequate, I have found

Respondent's bulletin boards, the activities of its stewards

or its mailings to members, either singly or in combina-

The mechanics of the furnishing of the Lodges with the

requested list of addresses present no serious problem. The

Respondent has mechanical addressing equipment for all

60a

its plants. As found above, in November 1968, the Re-

spondent, in an effort to counter the Lodges’ request for

addresses, voluntarily offered the use of its mailing facil-

ities to the Lodges for certain limited types of mailings.

Lodges 1746, 1746A and 700 accepted this offer on one

occasion. In one respect, in connection with the Respond-

ent’s furnishing the Lodges with information concerning

newly hired employees, it would simplify matters for the

Respondent to furnish addresses, since it would enable the

Respondent to stop blocking out the addresses on the

‘*Put-on’’ forms.

The Respondent seeks to justify its action in refusing

the lists of addresses requested by the Lodges on two main

grounds. I have dealt with and rejected the first conten-

tion—that the various methods of communicating with em-

ployees which have been utilized by the Lodges in the past

together with the additional methods offered by the Re-

spondent and declined by the Lodges constitute an ade-

quate means of communicating with all the employees—in

connection with my discussion of the facts. There remains

the Respondent’s second contention that it is entitled to

withhold the addresses in order to protect the employees’

right of privacy at their homes, particularly in view of the

violence which occurred at the homes of nonstrikers during

the 1960 strike.

The Charging Party contends that} vis-a-vis the statu-

tory collective bargaining representative, address informa-

tion is no more entitled to be kept private than wage in-

formation; that an employer is no more permitted in one

case than the other to assert employees’ alleged individual

interest in privacy to justify nonperformance of its statu-

tory obligation to furnish data necessary to the carrying

out of the bargaining agent’s statutory functions. Logic,

in my opinion, supports the Charging Party’s position.

In the Prudential case in the Sixth Circuit the employer’s

policy with respect to furnishing employee addresses was

Gla

identical with Respondent's in this case. The Sixth Cir-

cuit’s decision requiring the furnishing of address informa-

tion answers the Respondent's ‘*privacy’’ contention in the

typical situation. See also British Auto Parts, Inc. v.

M. L. It. l., 405 F. 2d 1182, 1183 (C. A. 9); M. L. R. B. v. Hanes

Hosiery Division, Hones ( ‘orp., 384 F. 2d 188, 191 (C. A. 4),

cert, denied, 390 U.S, 950; N. L. H. EB. v. Beech-Nut Life

Savers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S. D. N. V.), aff' d 406

F. 2d 253, 259 (C. X. 2); X. L. Il. B. v. Wyman- Gordon Co.,

394 U.S. 759, 766. -

The question remains whether the violence which oc-

curred at the homes of nonstrikers during the 1960 strike

in which members or representatives of Lodge 1746 and

743 allegedly engaged justifies a different outcome in this

cuse, Assuming that this violence can be properly at-

tributed to Lodges 1746 und 743, I question whether, in a

reasonable balancing of the competing considerations, these

acts 8 years before should be regarded as calling for the

indefinite suspension of the Respondent's statutory obli-

gation to furnish. information which is relevant to the

bargaining agent 's performance of its statutory fuctions.

There is no evidence in this case of any present threat by

agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 to engage in acts of violence

at the homes of nonunion employees, Though the Lodges

may have misconducted themselves in the past, they have

‘a locus penitentine, and the Respondent is not thereby

relieved indefinitely of its obligation to furnish relevant

information, Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94

F. 2d 862, 872-873 (C. A. 2), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576.

See also NV. L. N. B. v. Duncan Foundry d Machine Works,

decided January 16, 1968 (CA. 7), 67 LRRM 2516, 2517,

and Howell Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., 400°F, 2d 213, 216

(C. A. 5), in which the production of employees’ names and

addresses was required under the Board’s Excelsior rule

despite evidence of some contemporary violence. And see

° Excelsior Underwear ( 0. Inc., 156 NLRB 1236.

62a

N.L.R.B. v. Q-T Shoe Manufacturing Co., 409 F. 2d 1247,

1250 (C. A. 3); N. L. R. B. v. Delaware Valley Armaments,

Inc., decided October 23, 1969 (D.C. N. J.) Cf. Sign and

Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. N.L.R.B., decided Septem-

ber 23, 1969 (C.A.D.C.), 72 LRRM 2274, 2281-2282.

Accordingly, I conclude that the violence allegedly en-

gaged in by agents of Lodges 1746 and 743 in 1960 does not

justify a different result in this case, and that the Respond-

ent was obliged under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to furnish

the address information sought by the Lodges.

3. The Respondents violation of

Section 8(a)(5) and (1)

of the Act

The Lodges’ requests for the lists of addresses of the

employees in the various bargaining units which gave rise

to the instant proceeding were made by the Lodges in

letters to the Respondent dated September 19, 1968 and

October 10, 1968. These requests were in effect renewed in

the bargaining negotiations between Lodges 1746 and 700

and the Respondent on November 29 and 30. (As found

above, earlier requests for the addresses of unit employees

had been made in 1964 and 1965.) Under all the circum-

stances I find that the Lodges’ requests for the addresses

of unit employees were of a continuing nature.

I have found that Lodge 1746 achieved majority status

in the East Hartford and Manchester units by November

30, 1968, that Lodge 700 reached such status in the Middle-

town unit by October 30, 1968, and that Lodge 743 acquired

its majority in the Windsor Locks unit by November 30,

1968 and in the Building #3 unit by December 31, 1968.

There never has been any question in this case about Lodge

1746A’s status in the Southington unit. I have further

found that under the circumstances of this case the Re-

spondent was obliged under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act

to furnish the address information requested. It follows

63a

that the Respondent's continuing refusals, after havi

been given proof of each Lodge’s majority status, to

furnish the requested address information violated Section

8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.

With respect to Lodges 1746, 700 and 743, the 5

occurred on the dates set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Regarding Lodge 1746A, the Respondent's violation oc-

curred commencing on September 30, 1968, when the Re-

spondent wrote District 91 its first letter refusing to fur-

nish the addresses of unit employees,

Conclusions of Law

1. All produetion and maintenance employees of the

United Aireraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aireraft

Division, at the East Hartford plant (including the DE

Lab and the Willgoos Lab), including inspectors, crib at--

tendants, material handlers, factory clerks and working

leaders, but excluding timekeepers, engineering and tech-

nical employees, laboratory technicians, foremen’s clerks,.

salaried office and clerical employees, medical department

employees, first-aid employees, plant protection employees,

executives, plant superintendents, division superintendents,

general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, group super-

visors, watch engineers, and all other supervisors as_de-

He iv the Mational Labor Relations Act, as amended,

constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-

tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of

the Act.

2. All production and maintenance employees of the

United Aircraft Clorporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft

Division, at its Manchester, Connecticut plant (Cheney

Mills Buildings 1, 2, 3, 19, the Finishing Mill, and the

Weaving Mill) including inspectors, crib attendants, ma-

terial handlers, factory clerks and working leaders, but

excluding all timekeepers, professional employees, engi-

neering and technical employees, laboratory technicians,

64a

foremen 's clerks, office and clerical employees, medical de-

partment employees, first-nid employees, plant production

employees, executives, plant superintendents, division su-

perintendents, general foremen, foremen, assistant fore-

men, group supervisors, watch engineers, and all other

supervisors as defined in the National: Labor Relations y

Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-

poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-

tion 9(b) of the Act,

3, At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge

1746, International Association of Machinists and Aero-

space Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated

exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-

ployees in the units described in paragraph 1 and 2 above.

_ 4. All production and maintenance employees of the

United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division,

at the Middletown Connecticut plant, including inspectors,

crib attendants, material handlers and working leaders,

but excluding all timekeepers, engineering and technical

employees, professional employees, laboratory technicans,

foremen's clerks, salaried office and salaried clerical em-

ployees, medical employees, firdt-aid employees, plant pro-

tection employees, executives, plant superintendents, di-

vision superintendents, general foremen, foremen, assist-

ant foremen, group supervisors, watch engineers, and all

other supervisors, constitute a unft appropriate for the

purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of

Section 9(b) of the Act.

5. At all times on and after October 31, 1968, Lodge 700,

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exelu-

sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees

in the unit described in paragraph 4 above.

6. All production and maintenance employees of United

Aircraft Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Division, at its

Southington, Connecticut, plant, including inspectors, crib

} 6

650 a 58

attendants, material handlers, factory clerks and working

leaders, but excluding timekeepers, engineering and tech-

nical employees, apprentices, trainees, laboratory techni-

cians, foremen's clerks, salaried office and clerical em-

ployves, medical department employees, first-aid employees,

plant protection employees, executives, plant superintend-

ents, division superintendents, general foremen, foremen,

assistant foremen, group supervisors, watch engineers, and

all other supervisors, constitute a unit appropriate for the

purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of

Section 9(b) of the Act, *

7. At all times on and after September 19, 1968, Lodge

1746A, International Association of Machinists and Aero-

space Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated

exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-

ployees in the unit deseribed in paragraph 6 above.

8. All production and maintenance employees of the

United Aireraft Corporation, Hamilton Standard Divi-

sion, at the Windsor Locks plant, including working

leaders and all hourly-rated technicians in the chemical,

rubber, metallurgical, vibration, and electronics labora-

tories, but excluding executives, professional employees,

salaried technicians in the Engineering Department, fore-

men’s clerks who have access to confidential information,

draftsmen, plant protection employees, medical department

employees, salaried office and salaried clerical employees,

outside servicemen, truckdrivers, watch engineers, group

supervisors and all other supervisors as defined in the

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, constitute a

unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining

within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.

9. At all times on and after November 30, 1968, Lodge

743, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers, AFL-CIO, has been the duly designated exelu-

sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees

in the unit described in paragraph 8 above.

66a

10. All production and maintenance employees of United

Aireraft Corporation, Hamilton Standard Division, at the

Building #3 plant, Windsor Locks, including working

leaders and hourly-rated technicians iy the electronics

laboratory, but exeluding executives, * & ional empjoy-

ees, salaried technicians in the Engineering Department,

foremen 's clerks who have access to confidential informa-

tion, draftenwn, plant protection employees, medical de-

partment employees, salaried office and salaried factory

clerical employees, timekeepers, outside servicement, truck-

drivers, watch engineers, group supervisors and all other

supervisory employees as defined in the National Labor

Relations Act, ax amended, constitute a unit appropriate

for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-

ing of Section 9(b) of the Act,

11. At all times on and after December 31, 1968, Lodge

743, International Association of Machinists: and Aero-

space Workers, AFL-CIO, had been the duly designated

exclusive\collective-bargaining representative of the em-

ployees in the unit described in paragraph 10 above.

12. By denying the requests of the Lodges for the ad-

dresses of all of the employees in the respective bargaining

units on and after the dates specified in paragraphs 3, 5,

7, 9 and 11 above, the Respondent has engaged in unfair

labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of

Sections 8(n)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

The Remedy

Having found that the 1 in violation of its

duty under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, refused to furnish

the Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees in

the units represented by them, my recommended order will

direct the Respondent promptly to furnish each of the

Lodges with the home addresses of all the employees in

their respective collective-bargaining units. My recom-

„

—

eee

—

67a

mended order will further direct the Respondent to bar-

gain collectively with the Lodges, upon request, concerning

the manner and form in which such information shall be

furnished the Lodges in the future and the intervals at

which such information shall be brought up to date.

Upon the 2 findings and conclusions and the

entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(¢) of the Act,

there is hereby issued the following:

5 Recom mexpep Orpen |

The Respondent United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt &

Whitney and Hamilton Standard Divisions), its officers,

agents, successors and assigns, shall;

1, Cease and desist from:

(a) Refusing to furnish Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and

743, International Association of Machinists and Aero-

space Workers, AFL-CIO, with the home addresses of all

the . in their respective collective-bargaining units,

2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found

will effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Promptly furnish each of the Lodges, Lodges 1746,

1746A, 700 and 743, International Association of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the home ad-

dresses of all of the employees in their respective -collec-

tive-bargaining units. ö a ie

(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with each of the

Lodges concerning the manner and form in which the home

addresses of the unit employees will be furnished the

Lodges in the future and the intervals at which such in-

formation shall be brought up to date.

le) Post at its Kast Hartford, Manchester, Middletown,

Southington, Windsor Locks and Building #3, Windsor

Locks, plants copies of the attached notice marked Ap-

68a

pondix.“ “ Copies of said notice, on forms provided by

the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed

by an authorized representative, shall be posted by the

Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-

tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-

ous places, including all places where notices to employees

are customarily posted, Réasonable steps shall be taken

by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not

altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-

_ ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what

steps have been taken to comply herewith."

Dated at Washington, D. C.

Owstuv Von

Owsley Vose

* Trial Examiner

—

—— 5

*In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the

Board, this provision shall be modified to read: ‘‘Notify said

Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this

Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.“

In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section

102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Rela-

tions Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Rec-

ommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the

Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its

* findings, ‘conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be

deemed waived for all purposes, In the event that the Board's

Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Ap-

peals, the words in the notice reading ‘*POSTED BY ORDER

OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD!“ shall be

changed to read ‘‘ POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING

AN ORDER OF TilE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BO A RD. * 2

| 69a

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posten BY ORDER OF THE NaTIONAL Lanes Re.ations Boarp

AN AGENCY oF THE Urn Srarns Government

WE WILL NOT in the future ref the requests of

Lodges 1746, 1746A, 700 and 743 In rnational Associa-

tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, for

the home addresses of all of the employees in their re-

spective collective-bargaining units,

WE WILL promptly furnish Lodge 1746, Lodge 1746A,

Lodge 700 and Lodge 743, Internationa} Association of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, with the

-home addresses of all of the employees in their respective

collective-bargaining units,

WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with each

of the Lodges concerning the manner and form in which

the home addresses of the unit employees will be fur-

nished the Lodges in the future and the intervals at which

such information shall be brought up to date,

(Representative) (Title)

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE

| DEFACED BY ANYONE

This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive

days from the date of posting and must not be altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material.

Any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with

its provisions, may be directed to the Board’s Office, 20th

Floor John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge &

New Sudbury Sts., Boston, Mass. 02208 (Tel. A. C. 617, 223.

3500).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.