Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. United States

Supreme Court brief1971

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ROBERT seq VER, CLERK

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1970

"1340

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

Orcaniza“10n, ef al.,

Petitiorers,

—vV, Pomme

Untrep States: or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Marvin B. Secau

375 Park Avenue

New York, N. Y.

JamMEs M. CaTTERson, JR.

Ricuarp T. Noian

314 Main Street

Port Jefferson, N. Y.

Counsel for Petitioners

February 11, 1971

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Opinion Below 2

Jurisdiction 2

Questions Presented ... 2

Statutory Provisions Involved ‘3 3

Statement of the Case 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of

other Courts of Appeals as to the power of the

District Court to impose conditions on a grant

of a preliminary injunction 6

2. The decision below fails to establish meaningful

guidelines for District Courts dealing with injunc-

tions sought by executive administrative agencies

in labor disputes 9

ConcLUSION 11

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in

United States v. Professional Air Traffic Control

Organization, et al. ; la

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in

Umited States v. Moore, et al. ...... l6a

TAA Os ONLY SSE ETRE POE EO OER

PAGE

Opinion and Order of the United States Court of

Appeals 3la

Opinion of the United States District Court in

United States v. Professional Air Traffic Con-

trol Organization, Ct A). oo... ccececccececssececseeeeceeecoceee 34a

Opinion of the United States District Court in

Leyden v. Federal Aviation Administration,

et al. d2a

Order of the United States District Court 65a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-

Kansas-Texas R. Co., Inc., 363 U.S. 528 (1960) .......... 7,8

Leyden v. Federal Aviation Administration and George

M. Gary, 315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ....00........ 8

United States of America v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1020 (10th

Cir. 1970) 7

United States of America v. Plasch (7th Cir., July 10,

1970) 7

Statutes:

5 U.S.C. 7311 2, 3, 4, 11

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) 2

28 U.S.C. 1331 4

28 U.S.C. 1345 4

28 U.S.C. 1651 3, 6, 7, 8, 10

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1970

No.

— i

ProressionaL Aim Trarric CoNTROLLERS

OrcanizaTion, ef al.,

Petitioners,

—V.—

Untrep States oF AMER:CA,

Respondent.

it,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The petitioners Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Organization (“PATCO”), its officers, agents, servants,

members, George DiLeo, John Leyden, Robert C. Sturgill,

John Maher, Stanley Gordon, Edward Williams, Norris

Skaggs, Ronald Zeitler, Fred Seufert, and Alan Isacowitz

respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit entered in this proceeding

on December 10, 1970. ;

Upinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported,

appears in the Appendix hereto at p. la. The opinion of

the District Court for the Eastern District of New York

is reported at 313 F. Supp. 181, and at p. 34a of Appendix.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit was entered on December 10, 1970 and this petition

for certiorari was filed within ninety days of that date.

The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Whether a United States District Court has the

power to restrain pro tempore disciplinary action as a

condition to the grant of a preliminary injnnction sought

by a federal executive administrative agency against cer-

_ tain of its employees for an alleged violation of 5 U.S.C.

§7311.

2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in

directing the Federal Aviation Administration to with-

hold disciplinary action against certain of its employees

pending a judicial determination on the merits as to

whether a work stoppage in violation of 5 U.S.C. §7311

had in fact occurred.

ae Oe Seer “ ha, res CP PET OA eS

Statutory Provisions Involved

United States Code, Title 28:

§1651. Writs

(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions

and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued

by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.

United States Code, Title 5:

§7311. Loyalty and striking

An individual may not accept or hold a position in

the Government of the United States or the govern-

ment of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional

form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows

advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form

of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to

strike, against the Government of the United States

or the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees

of the Government of the United States or of indi-

viduals employed by the government of the District

of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike

against the Government of the United States or the

government of the District of Columbia.

Statement of the Case

On March 25, 1970 approximately 3,100 journeymen air

traffic controllers throughout the United States employed

by the Federal) Aviation Administration (hereinafter re-

ferred to as FAA) reported to their superiors that they

were too sick and fatigued to control the nation’s air traf-

fic in safety. Acting on behalf of FAA, the United States

of America moved in eighteen jurisdictions across the

nation to enjoin the controllers from continuing what was

termed an illegal work stoppage. Jurisdiction in the Dis-

trict Courts v.. s alleged by the Government to be based on

28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question) ; 28 U.S.C. §1345 (United

States as plaintiff) ; and 5 U.S.C. $7311 (loyalty and strik-

ing’).

g) i

The complaints uniformly alieged that the individual

defendant controllers, along with the Professional Air Traf-

fic Controllers Organization (hereinafter referred to as

PATCO) were engaged in a strike against the air traf-

fic control system operated by FAA resulting in immediate

and irreparable damage to the United States of America

and its citizens.

In all jurisdictions the FAA sought and received a tem-

porary restraining order which, inter alia, prohibited

PATCO and the individual defendants from engaging in,

continuing, or otherwise encouraging the strike; directed

the individual defendants to return to work; and directed

both the individual defendants and PATCO to take such

steps as were necessary to have other members of PATCO

resume their normal employment dutiex.

5

In the instant case, the United States made an applica-

tion to the District Court for the Eastern District of New

York for an injunction against PATCO, it officers, agents,

servants, members and the named defendants, the majority

of whom were officials of the New York Chapter of the

controllers’ organizution. A protracted hearing ensued and

at the close of the Government’s case, petitioner’s counsel

consented to a twenty-one day preliminary injunction.

Immediately thereafter FAA transferred all of the indi-

vidual petitioners to administrative duties at installations

other than those previously assigned and further caused

to be issued approximately seven notices of proposed re-

moval and three hundred thirty-three notices of proposed

suspension to the petitioners and other air traffic control-

lers who were subject to the preliminary injunction.

On May 5, 1970 the District Court modified its prelimi-

nary injunction to direct the FAA to restore all defendants

to the performance of their duties and to withhold any

further administrative actions against any employees sub-

ject to the Court’s injunction. In particular, paragraph III

of the Order of May 5th provides:

“That the Federal Aviation Administration be and

it hereby is directed until further order of this Court:

(a) To restore all defendants in the action who have

returned to work to the performance of the duties to

which they were assigned prior to March 25, 1970, not

later than May 18, 1970.

(b) To withhold any further administrative actions in

respect of suspensions, removals or any other sanctions

based upon the alleged work stoppage between March

6

29, 1970 and April 14, 1970, against any employees who

are defendants in these actions and subject to the tem-

porary injunction issued by this Court.” See pp. 67a-

68a of the Appendix hereto.

The United States appealed parsgraph III of the in-

junction and the Court of Appeals vacated that portion of

the District Court’s order. In so doing the Second Cir-

cuit held that the FAA had the power to discipline its em-

ployees without judicial interference and that the District

Court’s action in attempting to preserve the status quo

pending a final determination of the dispute was not au-

thorized by 28 U.S.C. $1651.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1.

The decision below conflicts with the decisions of other

Courts of Appeals as to the power of the District Court

to impose conditions on a grant of a preliminary injunc-

tion.

Section 1651 of Title 28 provides that federal courts

“may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of

their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages

and principles of law.”

The Second Cireuit Court of Appeals here held that

Section 1651 did not authorize the District Court to enjoin

the FAA from taking any disciplinary action against air

traffic controllers who allegedly participated in a work stop-

page. The Court held that the FAA has the power to disci-

pline its employees without judicial interference and an

injunction against such executive action was not necessary

7

to protect the Court’s jurisdiction over the action before it

nor tu preserve the status quo pending a final determina-

tion of the dispute.

In so holding, the Second Circuit conceded that its inter-

pretation of the District Court’s action conflicts with the

rationale adopted by two other circuits in affirming sub-

stantially similar actions taken by District Courts. United

States of America v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1970) :

Umited States of America v. Plasch (7th Cir., July 10, 1970).

See p. 31a of the Appendix hereto.

In both the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, the courts ad-

dressed themselves to District Court orders which tem-

porarily protected air traffic controllers from sanctions

sought to be imposed by the FAA and arising out of the

identical fact pattern present in the case at bar. The Tenth

Circuit considered the matter as a review of a trial court

order (as opposed to the review of an order of an admin-

istrative agency) and held that “the federal courts have

power to issue such writs and orders as are necessary to

protect their jurisdiction.” United States v. Moore, supra,

at p. 1023 (App. 21a).

Citing 28 U.S.C. $1651, the Tenth Circuit noted that the

purpose of the lower court’s order was limited to a preser-

vation of the status quo existing prior to March 25, 1970

until the final determination of the action seeking a per-

manent injunction and was supported by precedent in the

case of Brotherhoud of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-

Kansas-Texas R. Co., Inc., 363 U.S. 528. In upholding the

power of the District Court to enter the order, the Tenth

Circuit found that the lower court had not abused its dis-

cretion in so conditioning the preliminary injunction.

United States v. Moore, supra.

The Seventh Circuit referred to the opinion of the Tenth

Circuit and adapted its rationale also on the authority of

28 U.S.C. §1651 and the authority of Brotherhood of Loco-

motive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Tezas R. Co., Inc.,

supra. The Seventh Circuit held that the imposition of such

conditions by the District Court was not an abuse of dis-

cretion in protecting its duty to make a final decision in

the case in an atmosphere of calm and orderly judicial de-

termination. See p. 33a of the Appendix hereto.

Judge Waterman, of the Second Circuit, dissenting in the

instant case below, distinguished the instant case from

those where the court was being asked to review what the

Government had done in the past with regard to discipli-

nary actions on the ground that the instant case arose

from the Government’s challenge to present action taken

by its employees and a Government request for affirmative

present equitable relief. He reasoned that, in the case at

bar, the Government initiated the suit and it was the Gov-

ernment that asked for equitable relief. Citing Brother-

hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texzas

R. Co., 363 U.S. 531-532 (1960) the dissent concluded that

having sought equity the Government could be compelled

to do equity. Lastly, the dissent pointed out that the Dis-

trict Court had the power temporarily to enjoin the Gov-

ernment in exercising its disciplinary function where such

disciplinary procedures were being challenged as unconsti-

tutional in a connected case [Leyden v. Federal Aviation

Administration and George M. Gary, 315 F. Supp. 1398

(E.D.N.Y. 1970)], then pending before the same Judge.

See pp. 7a-15a.

This conflict between the circuits with regard to the power

of the District Court to condition its orders for affirmative

4 —

9

relief justifies the grant of certiorari to review the judg-

ment below.

The decision below fails to establish meaningful guide-

lines for District Courts dealing with injunctions sought

by executive administraiive agencies in labor disputes.

In iceberg fashion the question now before this Court

is but a fragment of the festering problem with which Dis-

trict Courts are now grappling in the field of federal labor-

management relations.

While U.S. Department of Labor statistics indicate that

as of June 30, 1970 the number of federal civilian employees

within the continental United States numbered 2,710,158,

it has been estimated that by 1980 this number will ex-

ceed 3,000,000. In the past year alone at least three federal

labor disputes (post office employees, federal printing office,

and air traffic controllers) have caused the executive branch

to resort to the federal judiciary to solve their problems.

A typical example is the instant case where the Govern-

ment moved for injunctive relief against air traffic con-

trollers simultaneously in eighteen jurisdictions across the

nation.'

That the judiciary in the main responded with alacrity

and understanding is typified by conditional orders initiated

? Alaska, California (Eastern, Central and Northern Districts),

Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois (Northern District), Kansas, Minne-

sota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York (Eastern District), Ohio

(Northern District), Pennsylvania (Western District), Texas

(Northern District), Utah, Virginia (Eastern D’strict) and the

District of Columbia.

10

not only in the Eastern District of New York, but in Chi-

cago (N.D. Ill.), Cleveland (D.C. Ohio), Denver (D.C.

Colorado), Pittsburgh (W.D. Pa.), and New Jersey, which

imposed restraints on executive action.

However, the guidelines by which and the extent to which

the executive branch must submit to the judicial branch

where the executive acts as plaintiff in cases such as these

has not been clearly defined. What rights and obligations

does the executive branch assume when it submits a con-

troversy as a plaintiff to the judicial branch? May the

executive obtain enforcemeut remedies? Was Judge Water-

man correct when he stated in dissent that “it [was] not the

act of a responsible government agency broadly to seek

court intervention hy injunction, obtain it, and then, hiding

behind the inherent equity powers of the Court, seek, by

executive action, to nullify unfairly the status quo the Court

created at the agency’s request.” (App. p. lla)

The present decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit leaves no room for district courts to effec-

tively address themselves to the solution of contemporary,

complicated and at times frustrating federal labor disputes.

There is an imperative need for explicit guides so that dis-

trict courts may effectively shape their enforcement power

in dealing with this growing problem.

Moreover, the District Court below and both the Tenth

and Seventh Circuits have stated that it is within their

power both under 28 U.S.C. §1651 and under their inherent

general equity powers to condition the relief granted the

executive branch of Government in light of the facts of

the case before the Court. Judge Judd, in the District

Court, pointed up the importance of this issue when he

11

stated, “[i]f I thought they were not going to be put to

work I would have hesitated before ordering them back.”

It is clear that the issue sought to be reviewed does not

relate to judicial review of administrative agency dis-

ciplinary actions of its employees, but rather that of the

interplay between the judicial and executive branches of

the Government while controversies involving them are

before the courts.

In the light of a marked increase in labor unrest among

public employees and in view of Judge Waterman’s concern

with the apparently unrealistic and troublesome provisions

of 5 U.S.C. §7311 heretofore sought to be applied in such

disputes, it is clear that District Courts must have guide-

lines by which decisions in this aree can equitably and effec-

tively be made and enforced.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Marvin B. Secau

375 Park Avenue

New York, N. Y.

James M. Catrerson, JR.

Ricuarp T. Noian

314 Main Street

Port Jefferson, N. Y.

Counsel for Petitioners

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in

United States v. Professional Air Traffic Control

Organization, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circurr

—

No. 916—September Term, 1969.

(Argued July 15, 1970 Decided December 10, 1970.)

Docket No. 34968 °

ae

Unirep StaTes or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—V.—

ProressionaL AiR TraFFIC CoNTROLLERS ORGANIZATION

(“PATCO”), its officers, agents, servants, members, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees.

+

Before:

WarTeERMAN, Moore and Hays,

Circuit Judges.

—

Appeal from so much of a preliminary injunction issued

by the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York, Orrin G. Judd, Judge, as enjoined the

Federal Aviation Administration from instituting discipli-

nary action against certain employees who are members

of PATCO.

Injunction vacated in part.

>.

‘ ~ Seen

eee a Shee oF ee ir: a

2a

WuuiusM D. RucketsHavs, Assistant Attorney

General, Washington, D. C. (Carl Eardley,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Wash-

ington, D. C., Edward R. Neaher, United

States Attorney, Brooklyn, N. Y., Alan S.

Rosenthal and Robert E. Kopp, Attorneys,

Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.,

on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant in No.

34968.

JAMES M. CatTerson, Jr., Port Jefferson, N. Y.

(Catterson and Nolan, Port Jefferson, N. Y.,

on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees in

No. 34968.

Murray Gartner, New York, N. Y. (Herbert

Prashker, A. Thomas Hunt, Poletti, Freidin,

Prashker, Feldman and Gartner, New York,

N. Y., on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appel-

lants in No. 35072.

Nicuo.as Scopretta, New York, N. Y. (Marvin

B. Segal, Segal and Hundley, New York,

N. Y.), for Defendants-Appellees in No.

35072.

>

Hays, Circuit Judge:

I.

On March 25, 1970, commencing at 8:00 a.m., large num-

bers of air traffic controllers, employees of the Federal |

Aviation Administration (FAA), absented themselves from

their work. The air traffic controllers reported that they

were ill or gave other reasons for their absences. A number

of applications were made to the federal courts for in-

3a

junctions against the employces. The present appeal arises

out of such an application by the United States in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York against the Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Organization (PATCO), its officials and several hundred

aircraft controllers. The district court issued a prelim-

inary injunction which enjoined the air traffic controllers

from “in any manner continuing, encouraging, ordering,

engaging, aiding or taking any part in any strike, work

stoppage or slowdown or any interference with or obstruc-

tion to the movement or operation of any aircraft. ...”

Paragraph III of the injunction provides:

“That the Federal Aviation Administration be and

it hereby is directed until further order of this court:

(a) To restore all defendants in the action who have

returned to work to the performance of the duties to

which they were assigned prior to March 25, 1970, not

later than May 18, 1970.

(b) To withhold any further administrative actions

in respect of suspensions, removals or any other sanc-

tions based upon the alleged work stoppage between

March 25, 1970 and April 14, 1970, against any em-

ployees who are defendants in these actions and sub-

ject to the temporary injunction issued by this court.”

The United States appeals paragraph III of the injunc-

tion barring the FAA from taking any disciplinary action

against the aircraft controllers who participated in the

work stoppage.

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§1292(a)(1) (1964).

We conclude that the order contained in paragraph IIT

of the injunction must be vacated.

4a

II.

The FAA has the power to discipline its employees with-

out judicial interference. In McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337

F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1964), this court noted the “limited

permissible scope of judicial review in this area” and said:

“The taking of disciplinary action against government

employees, including the invocation of the sanction

of dismissal, is a matter of executive discretion, and

is subject to judicial supervision only to the extent

required to insure ‘substantial compliance with the

pertinent statutory procedures provided by Congress,’

- and to guard against arbitrary or capricious

ation. ...*

The FAA is directed by statute to perform a specific

task, requiring administrative expertise, in a manner con-

sistent with the public interest. 49 U.S.C. §1348 (1964).

It is for the FAA, not the courts, to gauge the need for and

the effect of disciplinary action when an unlawful work

stoppage occurs.

“It is not the business of courts to substitute their un-

tutored judgment for the expert knowledge of those

who are given authority to implement the general di-

rectives of Congress.” Air Lines Pilots Assoc. v.

Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960).

No proper ground is suggested for holding that the ac-

tion of the FAA in disciplining its employees could be con-

sidered arbitrary or capricious. Discipline based upon the

finding that the employees’ work stoppage was unlawful is

clearly within the power of the administrative agency. If

the ageney’s action in any individual ease should prove

5a

to be arbitrary or capricious it would be subject to admin-

istrative and eventually judicial review. See Norton vy.

Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

Appellees’ argument that the court was justified in pro-

hibiting the FAA from disciplining its employees because

of the possibility that the controllers were entitled to vari-

ous procedural protections which do not presently exist

in FAA regulations is wide of the mark. The FAA’s pro-

cedures for discipline of its employees have nothing to do

with the question that was before the court—whether the

controllers were engaged in an illegal work stoppaze and

if so, whether they should be enjoined from acting in con-

cert to continue that stoppage. Moreover, the nature of

the prohibition against the FAA demonstrates that the trial

court was not concerned with the general issue of pro-

cedural fairness.’ The order protects only participants in

the work stoppage. All other employees (including partici-

pants in the work stoppage charged with independent vio-

lations) are subject to disciplinary action. If the issue of

procedural fairness were properly before the court its

order would have halted all FAA discipline of employees.

Or the trial court could have simply required that t:e

procedural protections be afforded to all disciplined em-

ployees.

ITT.

Appellees further contend that paragraph TI! of the in-

junction is necessary to protect the court's jurisdiction

over the action before it, citing 28 U.S.C. $1651 (1964),

and to preserve the “status quo” pending a final deter-

1 These issues are pending before the same district court judge in

Louden V. FAA (69-C-1566), a suit which was commenced prior to the

instant controversy.

6a

mination of the dispute. Although two of our sister cir-

cuits have been persuaded by this rationale in affirming

substantially similar actions taken by district courts, United

States of America v. Plasch, —— F.2d —— (7th Cir. July

10, 1970) ; United States of America v. Moore, —— F.2d

—— (10th Cir. June 8, 1970) (but see dissenting opinion

of Breitenstein, C.J.); we respectfully decline to follow

their lead.

No action taken by the FAA against any of the individual

defendants in this case would have a detrimental effect on

the court’s jurisdiction. See 6 Moore’s Federal, Practice,

54.10[5] (1966 ed.). The court will continue to have sub-

ject matter jurisdiction and will retain personal jurisdic-

tion over the defendants. Disciplinary action by the agency

will not impair the ability of the court to make a proper

decision as to whether a permanent injunction should be

granted, if called upon to do so.

Section 1651 cannot be used to allow a court to deal

“with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.”

DeBeers Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220

(1945). 3

9 U.S.C. §7311 (Supp. V. 1965-69) provides in pertinent

part:

“An individual may not accept or hold a position

in the Government of the United States ... if he—

* * Ld * *

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right

to strike, against the Government of the United

oo eat

2 18 U.S.C. §1918 (Supp. V. 1965-69) makes criminal any violation of

5 U.S.C. §7311 (Supp. V. 1965-69) and provides sanctions of up to a

year and a day’s imprisonment, and a fine of up to $1000.

Seepage

ro

f

7a

The trial court determined that the government had

proven a prima facie ease of an illegal work stoppage.

In spite of the statute it enjoined the FAA from taking

any disciplinary action against the defendants based upon

the work stoppage.’ Paragraph III obviously flies in the

face of the statute. It must be vacated.

Pe.

7

Waterman, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

As noted by my brothers, prior to the commencement of

the two actions before us on this appeal, the first on March

30, 1970 and the second on April 1, 1970, an air traffie con-

troller, one John F. Leyden, commenced a class action on

December 10, 1969 in the Fastern District of New York

on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated air

traffic controllers employed by the FAA in the Eastern

Region against the FAA and its Eastern Regional Di-

rector.’ Leyden sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction

enjoining the Eastern Regional Director from acting as

an appeals official in connection with suspensions? of the

3 The FAA intends to dismiss only a small number of controllers who

were leaders in the strike and to suspend or otherwise discipline certain

others. It has been argued that sinc the statute appears to speak in

absolute terms (a striker “may not ... hold” a government position )

and the FAA does not intend to follow these absolute terms, the re-

straint against the agency is somehow justified. There is 2 substential

question whether this statute must be read in a manner which would

require the government to dismiss all controllers and thereby end air

travel service until replacements could be trained. But even if tho

statute were to be construed in such a manner, it seems obvious that an

order prohibiting the discharge of any of the efending employees

would be unlawful.

1 Leyden Vv. Federal Aviation Administration and George M. Gary, 69-

C-1566.

2 The suspensions in question were administered for “abuse of sick

leave” on June 19, 1969, when ruanszous FAA employees throughout the

country failed to report for work and claimed that they were ill and

unable to work.

8a

plaintiffs and enjoining the FAA from holding any hearing

or inquiry regarding plaintiffs’ appeals from disciplinary

action unless seven specific procedural safeguards were

afforded the plaintiffs. In that action, after the submis-

sion of affidavits, Judge Judd issued a preliminary injunc-

tion on August 5, 1970, restraining the Eastern Regional

Director from acting as an appeals official in any disci-

plinary action involving any of the plaintiffs and restrain-

ing the FAA from interfering with the right of plaintiffs

to record and transcribe proceedings before grievance ex-

aminers.’ On September i1, 1970, the Government answered

Leyden’s complaint, and on September 30 it filed a notice

of appeal from the August 5, 1970 injunction order.

My brothers’ essential mistake is in failing to realize

that the preliminary injunctions in the present actions,

which they would in part vacate, were molded, and prop-

erly so, in the light of the issues in the Leyden case which

was then, and is now, pending before the same judge. The

majority’s contention that the “FAA’s procedures for disci-

pline of its employees have nothing to do with the ques-

tion that was before the court... ” is, I submit, incorrect.

Judge Judd was primarily concerned, as one would think

the Government would also be primarily concerned, in

achieving “some degree of labor peace” in order to restore

normalcy to the nation’s airline traffic. The court found

that, after the air controllers had returned to work follow-

ing the entry of a temporary restraining order which the

Government had sought and had obtained, the FAA was

not treating the air controllers fairly. Judge Judd stated,

313 F. Supp. 181, 187:

The court hoped that continuing administrative re-

view by the government might bring some result short

3 315 F. Supp. 1398 (EDNY 1970).

9a

of amnesty that would satisfy the defendants that

they were being fairly treated. It seemed clear to the

court that there could be no mediation or amnesty

while the men were away from work, but that the

possibility existed of some meaningful negotiations

after they returned to work. In order to avoid any

risk of a new stoppage at the end of the injunction

period, the court a few days later submitted a proposal

to the parties for indefinite extension of the injunction.

By the time comments were received on this problem,

it appeared there was no change of administration

policy which wa: calculated to take account of any

mitigating circumstances in connection with the work

stoppage, and there was evidence that transfers of

duty were being used in a punitive way and that the

limited nature of review of any disciplinary action

gave the defendants the idea that they would not be

fairly dealt with in the administrative procedure.

The court also found that the air controllers’ complaints

with working conditions were not de minimus, 313 F. Supp.

at 187:

The Court considers also that a substantial number

of relatively highly paid men with specialized skills

would not violate the law unless there was some provo-

cation that they thought justified it, even though their

belief in the justification might be erroneous.

There has been a reduction of compulsory overtime

since the work stoppage, which did not come until after

the work stoppage, and which suggests that the F.A.A.

may, as alleged, have been unduly slow in relieving the

pressure on the Controllers.

10a

I think I said before, and I say now, that those who

knowingly disobey a law must face the penalty for the

violation. They have no right to amnesty. Neverthe-

less, they are entitled to fair treatment in the admin-

istration of penalties, to consideration of mitigating

circumstances, and to a procedure that is such, as far

as the Court can assure, as to make the defendants

think it is fair.

Judge Judd listed some of the allegedly burdensome work-

ing conditions and quoted statistics which indicated that

air controllers as a class suffered an abnormally high in-

cidence of various physical disorders allegedly resulting

from the pressure of their work. He concluded, 318 F.

Supp. at 188:

The nature of the re-assignment of the men who

returned to work and the nature of the notices to the

public about the plans for disciplinary action and the

nature of the notice of proposed disciplinary proce-

dure do not indicate to me ‘hat the F.A.A. is consider-

ing the mitigating circumstances which are reflected by

these charges.

It seems to me rather incongruous in this case for

the government to ask the court to compel the defen-

dants to return to work and then immediately transfer

them to different jobs and serve notice of intention to

discharge. I said on April 13th that if the United

States of America seeks equity, it ean be compelled

to do equity. The complaint in the government activa

asks that the men be directed to resume their normal

employment. If I thought they were not going to be

lla

put to work I would have hesitated before ordering

them back. (Emphasis supplied.)

The air controllers were prompted to violate the law in

the first place by their poor working conditiens. They were

reluctant to return to work because of the specter of un-

fair treatment, a specter which the court found was not

without basis. Therefore, of course, the court could prop-

erly take into account the threat of heavy-handed treat-

ment by the FAA when it decided to grant the FAA the

relief the FAA had requested, and of course it could tailor

its relief to encourage labor peace. As Judge Judd noted,

the Government wanted the air controllers back on their

jobs. The administrative procedures governing the Gov-

ernment’s handling of the controllers’ actions were, there-

fore, crucial factors for the court to consider if labor sta-

bility were to be promoted, and if the controllers were to

be ordered back to work pursuant to judicial decree and

under the threat of the exercise of the court’s contempt

power. Inasmuch as the issues concerning the fairness of

the Government’s disciplinary procedures were pending in

Leyden, it made good common Sense to preserve the status

quo by telling the Government to withhold discipline until

the propriety of its disciplinary procedures had been de-

termined. It is not the<act of a responsible government

agency broadly to seek court intervention by injunction,

obtain it, and then, hiding behind the inherent equity

powers of the court, seek, by executive action, to nullify

unfairly the status quo the court created at the agency’s

request.

The majority also states that because “[t]he order pro-

tects only participants in the work stoppage,” “the trial

court was not concerned with the general issue of proce-

12a

dural fairness” p. 5. It suffices to say that obviously the

involved air controllers were most vitally concerned with

procedural fairness, and obviously were entitled to the as-

surance the court gave that they would not be subjected to

questionable disciplinary procedures following their re-

sumption of work until Leyden was judicially resolved.

The majority is elso mistaken on a number of subsidiary

points. McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337 F.2d 31 (2 Cir. 1964),

and Air Lines Pilots Assoc. v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2

Cir. 1960), cited by the majority as siving the courts only

a “limited permissible scope of judicial review” of dis-

ciplinary actions, are inapposite. In those cases the court

was being asked to review what the Government had done

in the past. The instant case arises from a government

challenge to present action taken by ius employees and a

government request for affirmative present equitable re-

lief. The question before Judge Judd was: In light of

what the Government intends afterwards to do if the court

orders an end to the work stoppage and the defendants

return to work, should an injunction issue, and, if so,

should conditions be attached to its issuance? The critical

difference that undermines the precedential value of the

cases cited by the majority is that here the Government

initiated the suit and it was the Government that asked

for equitable relief. Having sought equity it may be coin-

pelled to do equity. As stated in Brotherhood of Locomo-

tive Engineers Vv. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 363 U.S.

528, 531-532 (1960) :

If the District Court is free to exercise the typical

powers of a court of equity, it has the power to impose

conditions requiring maintenance of the status quo.

Conditions of this nature traditionally may be made

the price of relief when the injunctive powers of the

13a

court are invoked and the conditions are necessary to

do justice between the parties.

See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944);

United States Air Conditioning Corp. v. Fogel, 272 F.2d

879 (3 Cir. 1959). The fear of the air controllers that, if

they returned to their jobs, they would be subjected to

disciplinary procedures that do not comport with due

process is a proper subject for judicial review. As noted

above, these procedural Gestions, though inherent in the

posture of the present cases when they were initially before

Judge Judd, were also pending before him in Leyden.

Due to the seriousness of the national problem created by

the controllers’ work stoppage and the dire consequences

which would follow if a second stoppage should be precipi-

tated by any unfair treatment of the controll rs after they

returned to work, it surely was wise for the court to stay

the disciplinary hand of the FAA until the court could con-

duct a full inquiry into the questioned FAA procedures.

The majority also argues that the injunction against the

Government “flies in the face” of 5 U.S.C. §7311.4 With

deference, it is obvious that this conclusion is incorrect ;

the court merely ordered the Government to hold all disci-

plinary measures against the controllers in abeyance until

the issues in Leyden were resolved. It is perfectly clear

that the FAA cannot legitimately invoke $7311 in an un-

constitutional manner, and when, as here, disciplinary pro-

cedures are questioned as being unconstitutional, the court

has the power temporarily to enjoin the Government from

exercising its disciplinary function.

Finally, the FAA admits that it intends to dismiss only

a small number of controllers who were leaders in the

4 The statute is set out at the end of the majority opinion.

l4a

strike and to suspend or otherwise discipline certain others.

This proposed course of action is action which indeed “flies

in the face of the statute,” for 5 U.S.C. §7311 speaks in

absolute terms.’ The Congress has told the FAA that, if

the controllers are fornd to have participated in a strike,

the agency is compelled by the statute to discharge all

controllers who are found to have participated in that

strike. It is highly inconsistent for the FAA to cite §7311

to the judicial branch as a ground for vacating a judge’s

restraining order when the FAA itself unequivocally pro-

poses to ignore the legislative branch’s mandate. Although

the above interpretation of §7311 admittedly puts the FAA

in the dilemma of discharging all the controllers involved

in the work stoppage or dropping its contention that there

was such a stoppage, we cannot, as judges, scrap the mean-

ing of so clear a statute in order to resolve the agency’s

dilemma for it. That task belongs to Congress, which, in

light of increasing concerted action by public employees,

should enact a more realistic statutory provision. When the

5 This conclusion is strongly supported by the legislative history. The

original version of the provision was included in an act entitled “Ar

Act to prohibit the employment ... ” (emphasis added), 69 Stat. 624,

Public Law 84-330, passed August 9, 1955, and read:

No person shall accept or hold office or employment in the Gov-

ernment of the United States or any agency thereof ..., who

* * * * *

(3) participates in any strike or asserts the right to strike

against the Government of the United States or such agency ....

(Emphasis added.)

The 1966 codification, part of Public Law 89-554, gave the section its

present wording. Although “No person shall . . . hold” was changed to

“An individual may not . . . hold” the Committee Report is overly

explicit in stating that no substantive change was intended. Report

(No. 1380) from the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,

to Accompany H.R. 19104, pp. 19-21 (1966). Indeed, the Report states:

The words “may not” are used in fhe prohibitory sense, as “is not

authorized to” and “is not permitted to.” Id. at 20.

LEDER ARE

< Ded eR ee ene

cms RECORD ; Resetgccmiom

15a

FAA asks a court to adapt a troublesome statutory provi-

sion to a new situation, it is unseemly for the FAA to

argue that the equitable standards it would have the court

reach to apply to the situation should not also be equitably

applied to the parties the FAA has sued.

For all of the above reasons I would, without modifiea-

tion, uphold the preliminary injunctions® issued below.

6

Both the majority and I have referred to “injunctions” throughout

our opinions. However, between oral] argument and the presont decision,

the Air Transport Association’s appeal was dismissed on September 1],

1970 upon stipulation. Hence only the merits of the Goy>rnment’s caso

have been considered.

PLP O58 RIDE IE LE OL NON, ESR IRI

16a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in

United States vy. Moore, et al.

[427 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1970) ]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TentTH Circuit

Nos. 224-70, 225-70

June 8, 1970

~<—

Unitep States or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—_—_vV.—

Rosert D. Moorr, Branch Chairman,

PATCO, Rocky Mountain Chapter, e¢ al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

te

Unitep StatTes or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—V,—

Cuunton H. Asner ¢i al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

ere

Before Lewis, Chief Judge, and BreirENsTeIn and

Hickey, Circwt Judges.

He.

e-

17a

Hickey, Circuit Judge.

This matter presents the question of whether the district

court abused its discretion when it granted the defendants’

“Motion for Protective Orders and Stay of Administra-

tive Action” on April 27, 1970. Upon granting the motion,

the court issued the order here in controversy which stated

in part as follows:

“It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed:

“1. That the indefinite suspensions of F.A.A. employees

and defendants Rex B. Campbell, Gerald W. Phillips

and Robert D. Moore, now in effect, shall be withdrawn

by the ¥.A.A. and the said defendants return to pay

status immediately.

“2. The removal of F.A.A. employee J oseph M. Schrodt

effective April 21, 1970 shall be rescinded by the F.A.A.

immediately.

“3. That F.A.A. shall take no further administrative

actions, consisting of proposed suspensions or removals

from the rolls or other sanctions against any F.A.A.

employees who are defendants in these actions and sub-

ject to the Preliminary Injunctions issued by this

Court, based upon the alleged work stoppage between

March 25, 1970 and April 13, 1970.

“4. The F.A.A. shall not be precluded from taking or

initiating any administrative actions in ordinary con-

duct of its affairs with respect to its employees in these

actions apart from the provisions of the Preliminary

Injunctions.”

On April 28, the government filed its motion for a stay

of the order pending appeal. This court, by order dated

18a

April 29th set the matter down for argument on the merits

on May 7, 1970. We affirm.

For an adequate understanding of the problems pre-

sented by the appeal, a brief statement of the facts is neces-

sary.

On March 30, 1970 the United States on behalf of the

Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) filed a complaint

in the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado naming as defendants seventeen individual air

traffic controllers, ard the Professional Air Traffie Con-

trollers Organization (PATCO). The complaint charged

that on March 25, 1970, a large number of air traffic con-

trollers absented themselves from their work thereby en-

gaging in an illegal strike against the air traffic control

system thereby disrupting air traffic throughout the nation

resulting in immediate and irreparable damage to the

United States of America. ;

The F.A.A. sought and received a temporary restrain-

ing order which prohibited PATCO and the individual de-

fendants from engaging in or continuing or encouraging

the strike; directed the individual defendants to return to

work; and directed both the individual defendants and

PATCO to take such steps as were necessary to have other

members of PATCO resume their normal employment

duties. |

On April 6, 1970 the United States on behalf of the F.A.A.

commenced a separate civil action naming 103 additional

individual air traffic controllers as defendants. The al-

legations in this action were identical to the allegations con-

tained in the previous action and the F.A.A. secured a

similar temporary restraining order directed at these defen-

dants.

19a

Subsequently the temporary restraining orders were con-

tinued for an additional period of time to enable plaintiff

to secure service of process upon the defendants named in

the action. The two civil actions were then combined and

upon effectively completing the service of process and with

the consent of the defendants served, the temporary re-

straining orders previously issued were converted into a

preliminary injunction. An answer, together with a counter-

claim, was filed by the defendants and the matter is now at

issue before the district court.

During the time the civil actions were being filed in the

district court, the F.A.A. served notice of its intention to

impose sanctions upon many of the defendants for their

activities in connection with the alleged strike. The pro-

posed sanctions included permanent removal from employ-

ment and suspensions from duty either for a set period or

an indefinite period of time. Other sanctions were actually

imposed upon the defendants, including the withholding of

pay for the period of each defendant’s absence from work.

Following their return to work after the issuance of the

preliminary injunction by the court,’ the F.A.A. commenced

administrative action to carry out the proposed removal

and suspension of the various defendants. The basis of the

proposed agency action was the charge that these indi-

viduals had engaged in and participated in an illegal strike

against the government of the United States in violation of

5 U.S.C. §7311 and that they had failed to comply with

‘We note that we have been informed that certain of the defen-

dants may not have returned to work as directed by the restraining

‘ orders and preliminary injunctions. However this facet of the case

is not now before the Court. Criminal contempt charges have been

brought against certain of the defendants and are now pending in

the Federal District Court.

20a

an order issued by the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia in a separate action.

Effective April 20, 1970, several defendants were placed

in a status of indefinite suspension, a non-pay status, by

virtue of the administrative action. At least one defen-

dant was permanently removed as an employee of the

F.A.A.

The defendants then moved the court for Protective

Orders and a Stay of Administrative Action. The motion

was filed and argued on April 24, 1970. The court granted

the motion and as above noted, entered an order directing

that the indefinite suspensions and removal of the indi-

vidual defendants be withdrawn and that the F.A.A. take

no further administrative action, consisting of proposed

suspensions or removal or other sanctions against any

F.A.A. employees who were defendants in the action sub-

ject to the preliminary injunctions issued by the court.

[1] Although this order may not be a final order for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it clearly falls within § 1292

(a)(1) of that title which allows the courts of appeals to

review interlocutory orders which grant or deny issuance

of certain injunctions. Since this order effectively en-

joins the F.A.A. from taking certain action, we conclude

we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

The issue raised by the government is whether the order

of the district court was an abuse of discretion. The gov-

ernment’s argument in this regard is based upon several

punts.

Initially the government argues that a motion for inter-

locutory relief is not granted automatically, and that to

be granted such relief the defendant should be required

to satisfy the court that: (a) it is likely to prevail on the

j

|

a

. 4 iSigtaresene-co4:+

2la

merits; (b) without the relief it will be irreparably injured;

(c) that the issuance of the stay would not substantially

harm other parties; and (d) that the public interest would

be aided by the issuance of such a stay. Virginia Petroleum

Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm., 104 U.S.App.D.C.

106, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1968); Belcher v. Birmingham

Trust Nat. Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968). Unlike As-

sociated Securities Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Comm.,

283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960), the matter here before us

is not the order of an administrative agency but is the order

of a trial court, entered in aid of its jurisdiction in en-

forcing a prior preliminary injunction, the merits of which

are not involved in this appeal.

The federal courts have power ‘o issue such writs and

orders as are necessary to protect their jurisdiction. Title

28 U.S.C. § 1651 of the United States reads as follows:

“(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by

Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or ap-

propriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and

agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

In re Quick Charge, Inc., 69 F.Supp. 961, 969 (D. Okd.

1947), reversed on other grounds, International Brother-

hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers

of America, Local No. 886 vy. Quick Charge, Ine., 168 F.2d

513 (10th Cir. 1948), the court said:

“It is [a fundamental principle] that a court of equity

has the inherent power to issue such orders and injune-

tions that may be necessary to prevent defeat or im-

pairment of its jurisdiction. If these fundamental -

principles were not so inherent in the court, such a

court would indeed he a feeble arm of government and

for all practical purposes would be a nullity.”

22a

The government further argues that the district court

abused its discretion by ordering that the F.A.A. abstain

from censuring the named employee-defendants because

the defendants have not exhausted their administrative |

remedies. The order herein considered did not come into

existence as the result of administrative procedure, but is

the act of a trial court protecting its prior determination

which was in the nature of a inandate to return to work.

The order appealed from does enjoin the F.A.A. from

taking any administrative action against named defendants

for their participation in the work slow-down. However,

upon the conclusion of the initial lawsuit in the district

court, the F.A.A. will be free to impose against the defen-

dants whatever sanctions are authorized by the applicable

administrative regulations.

The purpose and effect of the court’s order is limited

to a restoration of the “status quo” that existed prior to

March 25, 1970, pending determination of the issues con-

tained in the civil actions seeking a permanent injunction.

The action taken by the district court has precedent to

support it. |

In Erotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al. v. Mis-

souri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., Inc., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct.

1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960), the district court’s similar

action was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following

language:

“Tf the district court is free to exercise the typical

powers of a‘court of equity, it has the power to impose

conditions requiring maintenance of the status quo.

Conditions of this nature traditionally may be made

the price of relief when the injunctive powers of the

court are invoked and the conditions are necessary to

23a

do justice between the parties. * * * ‘[The court] will

avoid * * * injury so far as may be, by attaching condi-

tions to the award * * *.’ Yakus v. United States, 321

U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 674, 88 L.Ed. 834. ‘{I]t is

the duty of a court of equity granting injunctive relief

to do so upon conditions that will protect all * * *

whose interests the injunction may affect.’ Inland ~

Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157, 59 S.Ct.

415, 417, 83 L.Ed. 557. Since the power to condition

relief is essential to ensure that extraordinary equita-

ble remedies will not become the engines of injustice,

it would require the clearest legislative direction to

justify the truncation of that power.” Supra, 363 U.S.

at 531, 532, 80 S.Ct. at 1329.

Because of the nature of the order appealed from, cases

concerning issuance of various preliminary injunctions by

district court judges are persuasive, Thus, in Flight En-

gineers’ Inter. Ass’n, ete. v. American Airlines, Ine., 303

F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962), it was held that the fact that a

hearing may ultimately result in a contrary decision does

not deprive the district court of its power to grant interim

preliminary relief to enable serious judicial controversy

to be settled in an orderly fashion.

“[The court may] preserve the status quo pending a

judicious, calm and orderly judicial determination of

this judiciable problem. That is the classic office of a

preliminary injunction. So much so is it that on review

of such an interlocuiory order, we do not examine

into the merits as such. The probable merits are looked

to only insofar as they bear on the question whether

the trial court abused its discretion in granting interim

relief.” Supra, 303 F.2d at 11.

24a

The district court was well within its authority when

it imposed conditions resulting in the restoration and pres-

ervation of the status quo pending determination of the

issues presented by the complaint which seeks the issuance

of a permanent injunction.

The order of the district court was in aid of its jurisdic-

tion over the parties and subject matter of the appellant’s

complaint. The court had jurisdiction over the appellees

named in the complaint. The district court was vested

with the authority to determine whether the appellees

were engaged in an illegal strike. Even though the parties

apparently agreed to the issuance of a preliminary injunc-

tion following service of the temporary restraining order,

a determination has not been made that the strike, or

work slow-down, was an illegal strike against the govern-

ment. The effect of the preliminary injunction was to

order the defendants back to work pending determination

of the complaint brought by the F.A.A. The action of the

F.A.A. in indefinitely suspending certain defendants and

removing others has the effect of placing the cart before

the horse, thereby circumventing the orderly process

chosen by them to determine the real issues.

[2] We therefore find that the district court was acting

within powers granted to it by Title 28 U.S.C. $1651(a),

to maintain jurisdiction over the parties involved in the law-

suit, and restore the status quo in aid of its jurisdiction.

The court granted the order to effect an orderly and equita-

ble disposition of the lawsuit. Accordingly, we find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion granting the

stay.

Affirmed.

te

25a

Lewis, Chief Judge (concurring).

I concur. it appears to me the United States is in no

tenable position to assert that the action of the district

court violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The

government chose to invoke the judicial power as an aid

to executive function, seeking and obtaining a temporary

restraining order later merged, by agreement, into a pre-

liminary injunction on representation of employee action

amounting to an illegal strike. The United States still per-

sists in seeking a judicial determination in this action that

the employee action was illegal and asks for a permanent

injunction based on such contention of illegality. The con-

tention has been consistently opposed both in law and fact

by the subject employees and the ultimate issue is unre-

solved and pending. And yet, when the mandate of the

judicial power was used effectively to bring the employees

back to work, the agency promptly applied stringent ad-

ministrative discipline to the subject employees premised

on an agency executive determination of the very issue that

the court now has before it. To me, such action can only

amount to an attempt to turn the judiciary on and off like

a light globe to suit the whims of the agency. The trial

court had every jurisdictional and discretionary right to

protect the integrity of the judicial issue and its order.

I agree with my Brother Breitenstein that practicality

may indicate that the administrative process may now best

serve to determine both the individual rights of the in-

volved employees and also the initial determination of

whether an illegal strike did oceur. But if this be so, the

government shouid seek to have the preliminary injunction

dissolved as having served its purpose and should with-

draw its petition for a permanent injunction.

>

26a

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the district court

abused its discretion and violated the principle of separa-

tion of powers when it issued the protective order forbid-

ding the FAA to take administrative disciplinary action

against certain of its employees.

Discharge, suspension, and other matters reiating to

their personnel are functions entrusted to federal admin-

istrative agencies. Judicial review of actions pertaining

thereto is limited to consideration of whether the appli-

cable procedures were followed and whether the action

taken was arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 7501;

McGhee v. Johnson, 10 Cir., 420 F.2d 445, 447; Bishop v.

McKee, 10 Cir., 400 F.2d 87, 88; Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S.

App.D.C. 217, 392 F.2d 822, 830; and Mancilla v. United

States, 9 Cir., 382 F.2d 269, 270, cert. denied 390 U.S. 982,

88 S.Ct. 1104, 19 L.Ed.2d 1280.

No precedent of which I am aware authorizes the federal

judiciary te enjoin disciplinary action by the federal execu-

tive branch or one of its agencies. The object of separation

of powers “is basic and vital,” O'Donoghue v. United States,

289 U.S. 516, 530, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356, and “deeply

rooted in the constitutional divisions of authority in our

system of Government,” Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310

U.S. 113, 132, 60 S.Ct. 869, 879, 84 L.Ed. 1108. See also

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579

and especially concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter,

593-595, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153. Judicial interference

with ordinary executive duties will produce nothing but

mischief. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 516, 39 U.S.

497, 516, 10 L.Ed. 559.

27a

The majority hold that the protective order effected a

permissible restoration and maintenance of the status quo

and was issued in aid of the district court’s jurisdiction as

authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651. These reasons, considered

either separately or collectively, do not warrant the judi-

cial encroachment on executive powers which results from

the protective order.

I find nothing in the decision in Brotherhood of Loco-

motive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.,

363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379, that is either

controlling or persuasive. First, neither that case, nor any

upon which it relies, related to a federal court injunction

against the exercise of federal executive discretion. The

issue of separation of powers was simply not present.

Second, the rationale of Locomotive Engineers reveals its

inapplicability to the present case. The Court there said,

“the power to condition [injunctive] relief is essential to

ensure that extraordinary equitable remedies will not be-

come the engines of injustice * * *.” 363 U.S. at 532, 80

S.Ct. at 1329. Accordingly, the Court held that restoration

or maintenance of the status quo is a proper tool where

the granting of equitable relief at the behest of one party

would occasion grave injustice to the other. We have no

such situation. The pertinent aspects of the status quo

are (1) the defendants were employees of FAA, and (2)

FAA had the power to discipline its employees. An in-

junction against collective actions of the defendants does

not of itself subject any of them to any disciplinary action.

The power of the FAA to discipline its employees in no

way depends on the equitable relief which it requested

from the court. In short, there is no relationship, as there

was in Locomotive Engineers, between the equitable relief

28a

requested and the situation to which the protective order

is directed.

The majority justify the order as one issued in aid of

the district court’s jurisdiction. In ordinary circumstances,

federal courts have both inherent and statutory power to

issue orders to ensure that their lawful orders are carried

out and obeyed. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Faubus v. United

States, 8 Cir., 254 F.2d 797, cert. denied 358 U.S. 829, 79

S.Ct. 49, 3 L.Ed.2d 68, and Mississippi Valley Barge Line

Co. v. United States, E.D.Mo., 273 F.Supp. 1, affirmed

Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S.

579, 88 S.Ct. 692, 19 L.Ed.2d 779. See also Federal Trade

Commission v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 86 S.Ct. 1738,

16 L.Ed.2d 802. Determination of the need for the order

under review to protect the court’s jurisdiction requires

consideration of the preliminary injunctions which the or-

der seeks to protect.

The preliminary injunctions enjoined the peeve

from “continuing, encouraging, ordering, aiding, engaging

or taking any part in” any work stoppage, from interfering

with the movement of air traffic, and from taking any ac-

tion which would interfere with the court’s jurisdiction.

These mandates were obeyed when the various defendants

returned to work. The disciplinary procedure contemplated

by FAA will not bring the affected defendants into a state

of noncompliance with the preliminary injunction. Termi-

nated or suspended employees will not be engaging in a

collective work stoppage. Their failure to work will re-

sult from FAA, not their own, action. In my opinion pro-

tection of certain employees against discipline is not needed

to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunctions.

Even if the effect of the preliminary injunctions was to

get the men “back to work,” the FAA disciplinary actions

29a

will not adversely affect the integrity of the injunctions.

Their purpose was to halt the work stoppage which impeded

air traffic. That purpose was achieved and air traffic has

returned to normal. The proposed action of FAA will not

undermine the accomplishment of that purpose. Nothing

is shown to indicate that it will create another air trans-

portation crisis. The FAA plans to exact sanctions, where

appropriate, which will not hamper the operations of the

air traffic control facilities. The proposed disciplinary ac-

tion will not impair the effect of the preliminary injune-

tions or any other action which the district court may take

on the issues of whether the work stoppage was an illegal

strike which should be permanently enjoined.

The termination or suspension of various defendants

will not affect the court’s jurisdiction over either them,

their codefendants, or the subject matter. The theory of

the defendants seems to be that judicial determination of

participation in the work stoppage must precede adiinis-

trative disciplinary action. In view of the executive discre-

tion in personnel matters, I am not persuaded. I agree with

the government that the 100 or more individual situations

should be initially filtered through the administrative proe-

ess with court review of arbitrary or capricious action.

My associates say that the FAA disciplinary action “has

the effect of placing the cart before the horse” and cireum-

vents the orderly process which the FAA chose to determine

the real issues. This position assumes that the imposition

of discipline and the lawsuits involve identical issues and

that, therefore, the former must await decision of the lat-

ter. I do not agree. The issue in the lawsuits is whether

there was an illegal strike. The resolution of this issue

will not foreclose the right of FAA to impose disciplinary

30a

sanctions subject to limited court review. A judicial deci-

sion that the work stoppage was not an illegal strike will

have no effect on the power or right of FAA to impose

such sanctions as it may deem necessary in the interests of

public safety and employee morale, i.e., the “efficiency of

the service.” See 5 U.S.C. § 7501 and Bishop v. McKee,

10 Cir., 400 F.2d 87, 88. It is not a question of the cart

before the horse because there are two different horses

and two different carts.

The defendants have made no attempt to show that they

are likely to prevail on the merits. Irreparable injury has

not been established. There is no claim that the protective

orders are needed to prevent substantial harm to other in-

terested persons or to the public interest. These conditions

should be met before a court enjoins administrative action.

See Associated Securities Corporation v. Securities and

Exchange Commission, 10 Cir., 283 F.2d 773, 774-775.

In support of its motion for a stay of the protective

order, the FAA filed in this court the affidavit of the Chief,

Air Traffic Branch, Denver area. The affidavit is not con-

troverted. The affiant states:

“The agency [FAA] has determined that the best

interests of the Government, the safety of the general

public and the welfare of their fellow workers would

best be served if 16 of the strikers are not returned

to their regular air traffic control duties.”

I respectfully suggest the doctrine of separation of

powers requires that the courts must recognize the powers,

duties, responsibilities, and expertise of the FAA with re-

gard to the protection of the public interest. The district

court abused its discretion when it substituted its judgment

for that of the FAA.

3la

Opinion and Order of the United States

Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tH Seventru Circurr

Chicago, Illinois 60604

July 10, 1970

Before

Hon. Lurner M. Swycerrt, Chief Judge

Hon. Rocer J. Kitey, Circuit Judge

Hon. Water J. Cummuines, Circuit Judge

ce oe

Unirep States or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 18574 vs.

Wim J. Prascn, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

—_<g—

This case comes before the Court on the Government’s

emergency motion for an expedited hearing on its motion

for summary reversal. The Government appeals from a

preliminary injunction entered May 4, 1970. The injune-

O25 ETE RIE TORT ELIE, ARNOT SI

32a

tion orders defendant Air Traffic Controllers to return to

their jobs, and restrains the Government from exercising

or threatening punitive sanctions against defendants for

the work stoppage. Only the latter part of the order is as-

sailed on appeal. A hearing on the permanent injunction

is scheduled for July 20.

The Court will proceed to consider the case as an ex-

pedited appeal under Rule 2, Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

The Government challenged a preliminary injunction

containing substantially the same terms in the Tenth Cir-

cuit eases of United States v. Moore, No. 224-70, and United

States v. Abnet, No. 225-70, decided June 8, 1970. The Court

upheld the injunction, but each judge on the panel filed a

separate opinion. Judge Hickey affirmed the injunction

against the Government as within the court’s power to pro-

tect its jurisdiction in the case. Chief Judge Lewis con-

curred, but stated that if the Government wished to pro-

ceed with administrative action against defendants, it

should seek to have the preliminary injunction dissolved

and withdraw its petition for a permanent injunction.

Judge Breitenstein dissented. He believed the district court

violated the principle of separation of powers by forbid-

ding the Federal Aviation Agency to take disciplinary ac-

tion against its employees.

The Government’s posture is somewhat different in our

ease from that in the Tenth Circuit. In its motion for sum-

mary reversal, the plaintiff states it has no objection to our

vacating the entire preliminary injunction, and says that it

unsuccessfully moved in the district court on June 22 for

dismissal of its complaint.

33a

The district court had power under 28 U.S.C. $1651 to

issue any writ necessary or appropriate in aid of its juris-

diction. The Supreme Court has upheld comparable action

in a labor dispute to restore the status quo pending deter-

mination of the petition for a permanent injunction.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-

Texas R. Co., 363 U.S. 528.

The Government argues that a court may restore the

status quo in a strike situation only by ordering an end to

the strike, without concern for what the employer does to

the employees. On the contrary, in a situation like this one,

the court may be able to end the “strike” only by providing

that the employees may not be discharged or suspended

pending a determination of all the issues. In this case re-

straining orders, which did not protect defendants from

punishment, did not succeed in getting them back to work.

Defendants returned to their jobs only when assured they

would not be punished while the case was pending.

The Court concludes that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in protecting its duty to make a final decision

in the case in an atmosphere of calm and orderly judicial

determination. See Flight Engineers Inter. Assn. v. Amer.

ican Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).

The Court affirms the present preliminary injunction,

unless within five days herefrem the parties stipulate to a

dismissal. In that event, the Court will vacate the prelimi-

nary injunction and order the district court to dismiss the

case.

34a

Opinion of the United States District Court in

United States v. Professional Air Traffic Control

Organization, et al.

[313 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District or NEw York

No. 70-C-410

April 7, 18, May 5, 1970

>

UnitEp StaTEs oF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Ve

ProressionaL AiR ‘TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ORGANIZATION

(PATCO), its officers, agents, servants, members, e¢ al.,

Defendants.

Jupp, District Judge.

MEMORANDA

In two actions for injunctions against work stoppages

by federal employees, oral memoranda were placed in the

record as occasion required, and are assembled here.

Following calls by several hundred air controllers in

many cities of the United States on March 25th and 26th,

1970, that they were too sick to work, Air Transport As-

sociation of America (ATA) and thirteen member airlines

brought the first action, 70-C-400, against Professional Air

a

|

t

'

35a

Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), its officers and

directors and various of its leaders in the metropolitan

area, and approximately 200 individual members, to enjoin

the work stoppage, to direct them to perform their statu-

tory duties and for damages.

The court on March 30th signed an order to show cause

for a preliminary injunction with a temporary restraining

order against any concerted refusal to work.

Two days later, the United States of America filed the

second injunction action, 70-C-410, against PATCO and

its officers and members and certain of its leaders in the

metropolitan area. The court issued an order to show cause

for a preliminar) injunction and a temporary restraining

order in terms basically similar to those in the ATA order.

The absence of the Controllers continued in spite of the

temporary restraining order. ATA presented an order to

show cause which the court signed on April 6th and which

was served on the Controllers personally that night, direct-

ing them to appear in court on April 7th (the adjourned

date for hearings on the preliminary injunction) and show

cause why they should not be punished for contempt of

court for violation of the ATA restraining order.

Memorandum on Standing of Plaintiffs in 70-C-400

(April 7, 1970)

[1] In connection with the motion of defendants in 70-C-

400 to dismiss the airlines’ complaint for lack of standing,

I have given considerable thought to the motions, and have

reviewed the materials that have been submitted to me.

The complaint charges an illegal conspiracy to violate

the United States statute which forbids anyone to hold a

SA et ee kh en Le pe aA a ee ee a eee a ees as

36a

position with the United States government while he par-

ticipates in a strike or asserts the right to strike or is a

member of an organization of employees that he knows

asserts the right to strike against the government. 18

U.S.C.A. §1918. This is one of the laws of the United

States which it is my sworn duty to uphold.

The complaint alleges that an illegal work stoppage has

occurred by concerted action of the defendants, based on

false assertions of illness, that this is a strike, and that it

has caused serious financial damage to the airline plaintiffs

and interferes with their normal operations.

One of the reasons for the federal statute against strikes

by federal employees is that the employees are performing

an essential service, for the benefit of the public, and also

for the segment of the public which the particular em-

ployees serve.

The tendency of recent judicial decisions has been to per-

mit private actions for violation of federal statutes.’ In

this case, the damages allegedly incurred by the plaintiff

airlines were readily foreseeable by defendants prior to

the work stoppage, and are so direct a consequence of the

allegedly illegal action that the persons who are directly

affected by the work stoppage should have the right to

sue for an injunction. I do not have to determine at this

time the plaintiffs’ right to damages against individual air

Controllers or against PATCO.

This is not a suit against the United States, but against

individuals and an organization who owe duties to the

United States and to the users of airport facilities. The

concept of privity no longer has much application to civil

* Borak v. J. I. Case Company, 317 F.2d 838, 848-849 (7th Cir.

1963) ; Office of Communication v. Federal Communications Com-

37a

actions.’ In any case, I will not treat any requirement of

privity as a bar to this action.

The right to mandamus against the individual airport

Controllers involves questions which I have not yet re-

solved. But the right to an injunction can be supported

by proof of concerted illegal action whose reasonably fore-

seeable effect is to cause harm to the airlines which can-

not be fully remedied by money damages.

The rights of Air Transport Association are not as direct

as those of the individual airlines. However, in a suit by

thirteen separate airlines, there is need for some centralized

control in the interest of efficient conduct of litigation. One

purpose and function of the Air Transport Association is

to promote and defend the interests of its several member

airlines. This seems to me to justify letting the Associ-

ation remain as a party as well as its component airlines.

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the complaint for lack

of standing is denied, without prejudice to future considera-

tion of the portions of the complaint which seek money

damages or mandamus.

Memorandum on Issuance of Temporary Injunction

(April 13, 1970)

The order which I am about to sign with the consent-of -

the defendants, disposes of the pending motions for pre-

liminary injunction temporarily, and I hope on a basis that

will not require further hearings.

More than forty years ago it was recognized that the

labor injunction frequently constituted an abuse of judi-

* Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966).

38a

cial power.’ It may be remembered that Circuit Judge

John J. Parker, an eminent jurist, was denied confirmation

-as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court because

he had upheld a “yellow dog” contract,‘ at a time when

United States Supreme Court decisions permitted prohibi-

tions against private employees belonging to a union.°

More than a generation ago, the labor injunction was out-

lawed in private matters except for very limited situations,

primarily where it could be used to maintain labor peace

while impartial mediation took place.°

[2j Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply

to strikes by United States government employees, the

court endeavored to apply its principles in this case at the

outset. Even the United States must do equity when it

seeks the aid of an independent court of equity.’

An injunction acceptable to both sides, conditioned on

impartial mediation, proved impossible because it was

_ pointed out that PATCO has not veen certified as a repre-

sentative of the air Controllers. At the close of the hear-

ing on Friday, April 10th, it was disclosed that one reason

8 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414 (D.N.D. 1923).

See also the dissenting opinions of Holmes, J. and Brandeis, J. in

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 343, 366-367, 42 S.Ct. 124, 133,

1142, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921).

4 International Organization, United Mine Workers of America v.

Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).

See Rayback, A History of American Labor (1959) 319.

> E.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38

S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1918).

6 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§101-115, effective March 23,

1932.

7 See Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 339-40,

45 S.Ct. 112, 113, 69 L.Ed. 313 (1924); Deseret Apartments, Inc.

v. United States, 250 F.2d 457, 458 (10th Cir. 1957).

rea ann

OE va ie cay Shit BIG WEL se

39a

why PATCO’s petition for certification has not been

granted is that F.A.A. has challenged its status. On the

preceding day, the regional Vice President of a rival or-

ganization admitted that PATCO now claimed over 400

members from the New York area while the rival orge ni-

zation’s membership had declined from 350 to 135.

The federal law makes it a crime for a government em-

ployee to participate in a strike or to belong to an organi-

zation which claims the right to strike, while he is a gov-

ernment employee.®

The labor injunction therefore comes back into the pub-

lic employee situation as a milder means of enforcement

than the criminal penalty for strikes, but it comes back in

a procedure where the employees do not have the right to

a jury trial and where they are not subject to the require-

ment of proof beyond a reascnable doubt which would exist

in the enforcement of a criminal statute.

[3] The labor injunction, even as a substitute for cri 1i-

nal enforcement, should be used only as a last resort.

[4] The present order, which substitutes a temporary

injunction for the previous ex parte restraining order, di-

rects the air Controllers to return to work, with a con-

comitant requirement that their empleyer, the Federal

Aviation Administration, shall permit them to return with-

out any conditions.

The order is based on the consent.of the defendants, be-

cause I am entering it before they have presented any evi-

dence. It is limited to a three-week period, so that we can

determine what the developments are during that period,

®18 U.S.C. §1918.

40a

and whether it will be necessary to take more testimony

on the motions for preliminary injunction.

The order is based on the need for urgent resolution of

the present work stoppage, and the possibility that long

hearings may be necessary to establish whether the indi-

vidual defendants are in contempt of the temporary re-

straining order and whether there are circumstances which

might mitigate any penalties for violation of the order.

The order is based on the fact that more than three full

days of testimony have resulted in showing that the follow-

ing facts have been established prima facie to the satisfac-

tion of the court, subject to possible rebuttal by the defen-

dants:

1. PATCO is an Iowa corporation organized to repre-

sent air Controllers in respect of their compensation and

working conditions, and having a place of business within

the Eastern District of New York.

2. Since March 25, 1970, the number of absences from

work by air Controllers on account of alleged illness has

increased from the normal average of 4% to a total of more

than 60% at the facilities in the New York area.

3. Officers of PATCO publicly announced their inten-

tion to stop work on March 25, 1970 unless their demands

upon F.A.A. were met, and they encouraged the air Con-

trollers to claim that they were ill and to stay away from

work. Background of those demands has not yet been set

forth in the evidence because I have not heard the defen-

dants’ case.

4. The work stoppage represents a concerted action on

the part of the air Controllers in the New York area.

i tele aa alas

Pe ee ee ae ee

aT ee ee ee eee Se ere

4la

5. There have been substantial reductions in the num-

ber of flights in and out of the New York area as a result

of the work stoppage.

6. The maintenance of normal flight conditions is im-

portant to the public interest, to the national defense, and

to the member airlines of plaintiff Air Transport Associ-

ation, Inc.

7. The public and the plaintiffs in 70-C-400 are suffer-

ing irreparable damages as a result of the work stoppage,

which still continues.

Therefore, I conclude that there is probable cause to be-

lieve that the defendants have violated their statutory duty

to refrain from strike action, and that there is no adequate

legal remedy. to protect the plaintiffs’ interests.

I believe that what I am doing is within my power be-

cause I think I can impose conditions that are appropriate

on the granting of the relief that the plaintiffs request, and

it is the best way to resolve the situation. Accordingly,

I am signing one order in 70-C-400 and another in 70-C-410

with the same terms.

Memorandum on Granting of Preliminary Injunction

(May 5, 1970)

I have called this session pursuant to a proposal which

I submitted to the parties at a hearing on April 16th, be-

cause I thought it important to achieve a greater degree

of labor peace and to do it on terms that don’t have a near

termination date. (The proposal contemplated extension

of the temporary injunction to continue until the deter-

mination of the action, granting of procedural rights to

42a

the air Controllers in F.A.A. disciplinary proceedings, and

a change in the timetable for further proceedings in the

case. )

I have considered all the papers that were submitted and

the arguments made this morning and have gone through

the file from the beginning, and I now want to put in the

record this Memorandum of Decision.

In three days of hearings the plaintiffs preserted evi-

dence which the court described as establishing a prima

facie case of concerted refusal to work in violation of the

federal anti-strike statute.

After discussion between the court and the parties, a

temporary injunction was signed on April 13th, with the

consent of the defendants, which enjoined the continuance

of the work stoppage and directed the individual defen-

dants to return to work. The government did not consent

to the order because it included a direction that the F.A.A.

should permit the individual Controllers to return to work

without condition. The ATA did not consent to the order

because it was limited in time and because ATA wished

to complete the plaintiff’s case by putting each defendant

on the stand to answer questions about his reasons for not

working.

The court considered that this was not necessary for the

plaintiff’s prima facie case and that even proceeding im-

mediately to the defendants’ case would not permit the

conclusion of the hearings and restoration to work as

quickly as the form of temporary restraining order that

was signed.

The government stated that the question whether it exer-

‘eised administrative proceedings or deferred them was un-

der review, and the court stated that the injunction did not

SRP ried Rene

ER WEE ai. 5 OR SHO IED EBLE TS

WRN hii ai 0 a nae aT

43a

prevent disciplinary proceedings. The men returned to

work within twenty-four hours after the temporary injunc-

tion was signed.

The court appointed a board of medical examiners to

examine any men who claimed still to be unable to return

to work. It made a report on 28 men and found 13 fit for

duty without condition and gave a medical description of

the others. The reason for my making the temporary re-

straining order for three weeks only, with some extensions

since, was that the Controllers requested “amnesty as one

of the terms for disposing of the matter and that amnesty

had reportedly been extended to Post Office workers re-

cently after a shorter strike.

The court hoped that continuing administrative review

by the government might bring some result short of am-

nesty that would satify the defendants that they were be-

ing fairly treated. It seemed clear to the court that there

could be no mediation or amnesty while the men were away

from work, but that the possibility existed of some mean-

ingful negotiations after they returned to work. In order

to avoid any risk of a new stoppage at the end of the in-

junction period, the court a few days later submitted a pro-

posal to the parties for indefinite extension of the injune-

tion. ‘

By the time comments were received on this problem,

it appeared there was no change of administration policy \.

which was calculated to take account of any mitigating cir-

cumstances in connection with the work stoppage, and

there was evidence that transfers of duty were being used

in a punitive way and that the limited nature of review of

any disciplinary action gave the defendants the idea that

they would not be fairly dealt with in the administrative

procedure.

44a

The court still considers it clear that a strike by federal

employees is illegal, treating the statute as constitutional,

and that there is a prima facie case of an illegal work

stoppage. The preliminary injunction was based on that

assumption.

Individual affidavits from the defendants now assert

that the men were not acting in concert, and that each one

was suffering from extreme nervous exhaustion and fatigue,

and some from additional illnesses, which were caused by

the working conditions imposed on them by the F.A.A.

[5] These affidavits would create real issues as to find-

ings of contempt against any individuals, but the court

deems it possible that 200 people would not all experience

the same degree of exhaustion on the same day and recover

on the same day. Therefore it believes that the facts

shown in the affidavits don’t prevent a finding of probable

success of the plaintiffs in obtaining an injunction, and

that it is proper to extend the temporary injunction without

hearing the individual Controllers.

The reports of defendants’ counsel concerning their con-

sultation with their clients after the proposal which I made

on April 16th indicate that they will acquiesce in the form

of preliminary injunction that I proposed, without requir-

ing that the defendants’ case be heard.

The court considers also that a substantial number of

relatively highly paid men with specialized skills would not

violate the law unless there was some provocation that they

thought justified it, even though their belief in the justifica-

tion might be erroneous.

There has been a reduction of compulsory overtime since

the work stoppage, which did not come until after the work

stoppage, and which suggests that the F.A.A. may, as al-

ce

45a

leged, have been unduly slow in relieving the pressure on

the Controllers.

[6] I think I said before, and I say now, that those who

knowingly disobey a law must face the penalty for the vio-

lation. They have no right to amnesty. Nevertheless, they

are entitled to fair treatment in the administration of pen-

alties, to consideration of mitigating circumstances, and

to a procedure that is such, as far as the court can assure,

as to make the defendants think it is fair.

I think it was said in the Amos Treat case that the pro-

cedure should have “the very appearance of complete fair-

ness.” ®

[7] Even if a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, the

court has a duty to consider individual circumstances be-

fore determining whether to impose any penalty.

There are mitigating circumstances shown here, even

in the affidavit of ATA’s counsel, which recites in quota-

tions from the Corson Report on air traffic service” that

“No single cause accounts for this crisis in the relation be-

tween F.A.A.’s management and the organizations repre-

senting its employees. Yet our observations suggest that

among the most important is the failure of F.A.A.’s man-

agement at all levels to truly understand the role of the

employee organizations anc to accept them as not only

legitimate, but hopefully as collaborators in building under-

standing, satisfaction, and an esprit de corps,” and which

recommends among other things that the F.A.A. “Expedite,

—

* Amos Treat & Co., Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 113

U.S.App.D.C. 100, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (1962).

*° Air Traffic Controller Career Committee Report, Jan. 1970,

pp. 108-10.

46a

in good faith, the resolution * * * of all existing labor-man-

agement problems.” ;

Since this extract from the Corson Report is submitted

by the plaintiffs, I think it is a factor that can be considered.

Also, the government has shown me a complaint which

was filed in January in the District Court for the District

of Columbia by PATCO against Secretary Volpe," which

alleges that the effect of the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion in not hiring additional staff and the burden of ex-

panding air traffic had resulted in hours of service and con-

ditions of service that cause exhaustion and enervation.

The allegations in the complaint, which I presume are still

to be determined, state that the air traffic Controllers gen-

erally, to the extent of 67.6 per cent. suffered pains over

the heart and chest, to the extent of 81.1 per cent. vomited

blood or coughed up blood or have done so since becom-

ing air traffic Controllers, to the extent of 64.9 per cent.

have many headaches, and that they—Paragraph 14—“are

subject to an extraordinary and rapid deterioration of their

physiological and psychological functions, and are caused

to be in a state of poor heaith, frequently by the age of

forty,” many years sooner than would be the case if they

were not subject to the conditions complained of.

The nature of the re-assignment of the men who re-

turned to work and the nature of the notices to the public

about the plans for disciplinary action and the nature of

the notice of proposed disciplinary procedure do not indi-

cate to me that the F.A.A. is considering the mitigating

circumstances which are reflected by these charges.

The nature of administrative proceedings for discipline

is at issue in another action in this court, where the rep-

1 Civ. 101-70.

47a

resentatives of the air Controllers ask for a determination

that they are entitled to various procedural protections

which don’t exist in the present F.A.A. regulations.

In Leyden v. Federal Aviation Administration, 69-C-1566,

they ask for the right to a recording and transcription of all

proceedings, to production of all witnesses and evidence in

support of charges, to confrontation and cross-examina-

tion of all witnesses, and to present both oral and docn-

mentary evidence on their behalf, among other things.

This has been disputed by the government and remains

for decision.

[8] It seems to me rather incongruous in this case for

the government to ask the court to compel the defen-

dants to return to work and then immediately transfer them

to different jobs and serve notice of intention to discharge.

I said on April 13th that if the United States of America

seeks equity, it can be compelled to do equity. The com-

plaint in the government action asks that the men be

directed to resume their normal employment. If I thought

they were not going to be put to work I would have hesi-

tated before ordering them back. I have been told that

there is no power to enjoin administrative discipline, but

I disagree. |

One precedent is the similar case in the District of

Colorado, where Chief Judge Arraj ordered the Federal

Aviation Administration to take no further administra-

tive action concerning any sanctions based on the work

stoppage.” My proposed order may go farther in relation

to the consideration of transfers which may be punitive

rather than administrative.

72 United States v. Moore, et al. (D. Colo.), C-2175 and C-2186,

order dated April 27, 1970.

48a

Judge Parsons in Chicago entered a similar order,** al-

though it was not quite as broad.

[9] Judge Lambros in Cleveland told me on April 9th

that he had told the United States Attorney that the F.A.A.

must not suspend the men who returned to work." It

seems to me that the men in New York should have the

same rights as those in other states.

The facts alleged by Mr. Catterson in support of the

order to show cause which I signed on May Ist, give ample

support for a similar order here, pending a determina-

tion of what the F.A.A. is doing and what the rights of

the men are.

Section 705 of Title 5 of the United States Code permits

a court to issue a stay in aid of judicial review.

I recognize, as Mr. Morse said, that the Supreme Court

in the Goldberg against Kelly decision mentions that gov-

ernment employment might be terminated without a prior

evidentiary hearing.” But it did not say that there was

no right to an evidentiary hearing. In fact, it said there

is a constitutional right to present evidence orally and to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and that

18 United States v. Plasch, et al. (N.D. ill.), 70-C-746, order

dated April 9, 1970.

14 United States v. Professionai Air Traffic Controllers Organ-

ization, et al. (E.D. Ohio), C-70-320.

Since the various actions against air traffic controllers in sixteen

different districts did not involve common pretrial discovery, they

did not fit within the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation. By analogy to the procedures suggested

in conflicting class actions, however, it seemed appropriate to resort

to “Informal spontaneous consultation and cooperation between

the concerned judges and courts.” Manual for Complex and Multi-

district Litigation (West Pub. Co. 1969) p. 65.

18 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 8.Ct. 1011, 1018 and n. 10 (1970).

49a

an impartial decision is essential.** It is not clear that

there is any impartial decision-maker in F.A.A. disciplinary

procedure on suspension under 30 days, which may carry

penalties of up to $1,000 or more.

The application of the Goldberg decision to this case,

and the answers to the questions raised in the Leyden case,

are not clear, and the need for clarification of those ques-

tions justifies a restraint on disciplinary proceedings un-

til the procedural rights of the defendants are determined.

Judge Zavatt in the first Leyden case” said there was no

proof of irreparable injury. But this is a different case,

with more substantial penalties, and such a great number

of individuals that equity jurisdiction would exist to avoid

multiplicity of actions by deciding the procedural rights

first. For the same reason the government’s case on ex-

haustion of administrative remedies does not apply here.

I don’t base equity jurisdiction only on multiplicity of ac-

tion, but I cite it as one factor to be considered.

Another factor is the special character of the defen-

dants’ employment, where there is no other possible em-

ployer to use the same skills while they are suspended or

if they are discharged. So that there is more risk of irrep-

arable damage involved here. Although the preliminary

injunction runs for the duration of the action, my proposed

restraint on the F.A.A. will run only until further order

of the court. And I will entertain further applications in

reference to it as soon as the District Court complaint in

the District of Columbia and the Leyden case are decided,

or before if there is good reason shown.

*° 397 U.S. at 269, 270, 271, 90 S.Ct. at 1021, 1022.

7 Leyden v. Boyle, 69-C-1244, order dated October 22, 1969.

50a

I have considered the case which was cited in a supple-

mental memorandum last night or this morning from the

United States Attorney, McTiernan v. Gronouski, which

is a Second Circuit case, cited as 337 F.2d 31, but that is

a different case. That involved an appeal from a decision

after dismissal, and the court pointed out that while dis-

ciplinary action involved executive discretion, it was sub-

ject to supervision to require compliance with statutory

procedures and to guard against arbitrary and capricious

action."* We have here to determine both the meaning of

the Congressional direc ‘on and the question whether the

F.A.A. is being arbitrary.

Finally, on this point I cite the decision of Judge Burger,

the week before he became Chief Justice, where he found

that “The administrative conduct reflected in this record is

beyond repair,” and he proceeded to exercise powers that

really belonged to the Federal Communications Commis-

sion, but which it had shown itself to be ineapable of per-

forming properly. That case is the Office or Communica-

tion of United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications

Commission, D.C.Cir., 425 F.2d 543, decided June 20, 1969,"

and confirmed on a petition for rehearing en banc on Sep-

tember 5, 1969, with a memorandum which was even more

critical of the administrative agency.

It is too early to say whether the actions of the F.A.A.

are beyond repair, but Judge Burger’s case shows the ex-

tent of the court’s power to protect against improper pro-

cedure or agency action.

The order I propose to maintain the status quo is well

within that power.

18 337 F.2d at 34.

1° Also reported in full in 16 R.R.2d 2095.

5la

[10] Just another comment: I was told before that the

court was wrong in seeking mediation before issuing the

temporary injunction. In consider that it is always proper

for a court to point out to litigants the disadvantage of —

fighting a case to the finish and to encourage conciliation.

I think that is especially true here, where there was little

evidence of meaningful negotiations before the work stop-

page began.

I have prepared a preliminary injunction which I am

going to modify in one respect in the light of what Mr.

Halloran said.

The injunction restrains PATCO and all F.A.A. em-

ployees, until the final determination of these actions, from

taking part in any work stoppage, slowdown, ete., or ob-

structing the orderly continuance of air traftic, provides

for a penalty of $250. per man for the first day of any

violation of the injunction and $125. per man for any sub-

sequent days, subject to hearings before the penalty is

imposed, directs the F.A.A. to restore the defendants who

have returned to work to the duties to which they were as-

signed before the work stoppage, and directs the F.A.A.,

but only until further order of the court, to withhold any

further administrative action in respect of sanctions based

upon the alleged work stoppage. The court retains juris-

diction in the premises.

I will sign two copies of this injunction, one to be filed

in each case.

52a

Opinion of the United States District Court in

Leyden v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al.

[315 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

. Eastern District or NEw York

No. 69-C-1566

August 5, 1970

<>

Joun F. Leypen, Individually and on Behalf of all Other

Similarly Situated Air Traffic Control Specialists Em-

ployed by the Federal Aviation Administration in the

Eastern Region,

Plaintiffs,

Ve

FeperaL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION and GrorGE M. Gary,

as Director, Eastern Region, Federal Aviation Admin-

istration,

Defendants.

oe

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Jupp, District Judge.

In this action for an injunction against alleged improper

conduct of disciplinary proceedings by the defendants, a

motion was brought on by order to show cause to obtain

a preliminary injunction

53a

(a) to prevent defendant George M. Gary from act-

ing as an appeals official in connection with suspen-

sions of the petitioners, and

(b) to prevent the Federal Aviation Administration

(F.A.A.) from holding any hearing or inquiry regard-

ing plaintiffs’ appeals from disciplinary actions unless

seven specific procedural safeguards were afforded, and

also for other and further relief.

The action was brought on behalf of plaintiff and other

air traffic control specialists employed by F.A.A., who were

alleged to be a class. The complaint recited that an F.A.A.

official issued fifty or more letters of suspension, ranging

from three to fifteen days each, to air traffic controllers

working at the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center

and the New York Common IFR Room, all charging abuse

of sick leave, and that the results of any suspension will

become part of the permanent personnel files of each plain-

tiff. Plaintiffs filed notices appealing their suspensions.

Thereafter, defendant Gary appointed ten grievance ex-

aminers to conduct informal interviews and transmit find-

ings of fact and recommendations to him as the appeals

official. The total loss of pay to plaintiffs from the sus-

pensions is over $10,000.

The complaint recites that the grievance examiners will

not permit a verbatim transcript of proceedings before

them, will not permit confrontation or cross-examination

of witnesses, and may receive evidence from the F.A.A.

in the absence of the plaintiffs, and that the final findings

will not be available to plaintiffs, Alleging that the decision

to suspend the plaintiffs was made by defendant Gary, the

complaint asserts that he may not also serve as appeals

54a

official. It asserts that the Regulations of the F.A.A. for

appeals, and the. restrictive procedures proposed by the

grievance examiners, deprive plaintiffs of their constitu-

tional right to due process of law.

In addition to asking for an injunction against defendant

Gary acting as appeals official, the complaint asks the pro-

tection of the following procedural rules:

(a) Recording and transcription of all proceedings ;

(b) Production of all witnesses and evidence in sup-

port of charges ;

(c) Confrontation and cross-examination of such

witnesses ;

(d) The right of plaintiff to present oral and docu-

mentary evidence;

(e) Placing the burden of proof on F.A.A.;

(f) Making the proposed findings and the record

available to plaintiffs before it is submitted to the

appeals official; and

(g) The right to question the grievance examiner

concerning his qualifications and concerning his prior

knowledge of the matter.

In support of the order to show cause, plaintiffs’ affi-

davits recite that plaintiff Leyden was treated for gastritis

by his personal physician on the evening of June 19, 1970,

and was advised to take medication and rest, that he never-

theless reported at 2:30 a. m. because after he reported his

illness his watch supervisor stated that he was extremely

short-handed; but that he was thereafter given notice of a

three-day suspension for “abuse of sick leave” for reporting

55a

four hours late and for failing to substantiate that he was

incapacitated by sickness. An affidavit of counsel describes

an interview with one of the grievance examiners, who told

him that his decision would be based in part on private

interviews with witnesses, and that he had already ex-

amined a file prepared by investigators of the security and

compliance branch of the F.A.A. Many other air traffic

controllers in the metropolitan area had also reported sick

and not available for duty on the same evening, and had

turned in medical certificates attesting to their illness.

Counsel also recites that the Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Administration publicly stated to a group of con-

trollers that he himself had directed the filing of the specific

charge which was made.

The only answering paper is an affidavit by defendant

Gary reciting that unusually large numbers of employees

had failed to report for duty on June 19, 1969 at F.A.A.

_ facilities throughout the country, on the ground that they

were ill and not able to work, that he had discussed with

his staff a plan for appropriate measures to staff facilities

where mass absenteeism required, that he discussed the

matter with his counterparts at other regional headquar-

ters, that he knew that the Administrator of F.A.A. had

ordered a formal investigation concerning the nature, extent

and bona fides of the alleged illnesses, and that he had

received reports as to the number of interrogations con-

ducted at the New York Center and the Common IFR Room

but not of the facts developed by the interrogations. He

recited that he considered that his reviewing the investi-

gators’ reports or discussing sanctions with facility chiefs

or grievance examiners prior to the reports of the grievance

examiners would be incompatible with his responsibilities

as the appeals official.

56a

The papers show a sufficient number of persons affected,

a sufficiently common interest, and a suitable named plain-

tiff to justify maintaining the action as a class action.

F.R.Civ.P. 23.

Defendants’ time to answer the complaint was extended

by stipulation for sixty days after February 6, 1970, but

no answer has yet been filed; nor have any interrogatories

or notices of depositions been filed.

All the suspensions but one have been served, but none of

the appeals has yet been considered.

Plaintiff asserts that his three day suspension resulted

in a loss of compensation of $187. This would indicate

that a thirty day suspension might result in a penalty of

from $1,200 to $1,800.

F.A.A. Appeals Procedures

The Regulations of the Civil Service Commission provide

a specified procedure for suspensions of thirty days or

less, 5 C.F.R. Sees. 752.301-304. A different procedure is

provided in connection with discharge, suspension for more

than thirty days, furlough without pay, and reduction in

rank or compensation (5 C.F.R. Sees. 752.201-203) and ap-

peals from such actions (Sees. 771.201-226). The F.A.A.

Regulations are modeled on the Civil Service Commission’s

Regulations for agencies.

In the case of suspensions for thirty days or less the

F.A.A. Regulations permit the suspension to take effect

immediately (See. 203(b) (1)), but provide for an admin-

istrative appeal, which gives rise to a “grievance inquiry”

by an “impartial grievance examiner” (Secs. 322, 411-13).

The F.A.A. Regulations direct that the grievance ex-

aminer must be someone who had no previous connection

57a

with the case, who has received training in conducting

grievance inquiries and who is “sufficiently high in the or-

ganizational structure to command respect” (Section 413).

The grievance examiner is required to familiarize himself

with the case through management records and personal

interviews with those directly concerned, including either

individual or group discussions, as well as from the em-

ployee’s written request for an inquiry (Sec. 413). The

grievance inquiry is to be conducted in “as informal manner

as possible consistent with getting the facts.” (Sec. 416).

The employee and his representative have the right to

make a personal presentation to the grievance examiner

(Sec. 416). They may also furnish a list of witnesses they

desire, and the examiner will determine which witnesses

to hear (Sec. 415(a)). The grievance examiner makes find-

ings of fact and recommendations which he forwards to

the appeals official (Sec. 418), who makes a written decision

and provides copies for the employee and the official who

made the original decision (Sec. 408(e)).

An appeals official, except the Administrator, may not

make the final decision on a grievance upon which he made

an earlier decision (Sec. 512(b)). The papers reveal a

dispute as to whether defendant Gary took part in the

decision to suspend any of the plaintiffs. Where an appeals

official is ineligible, the regulations (§ 512(b)) provide:

“Such grievances shall be adjudicated by an appeals

Official at the next higher administrative level.”

The procedure outlined above is consistent with the

statutory requirements for removal or suspension of per-

sons in the competitive service (5 U.S.C. §7501(b)). The

statute expressly states:

58a

“Examination of witnesses, trial or hearing is not re-

quired but may be provided in the discretion of the

individual directing the removal or suspension without

pay.”

Instead of appealing and requesting a grievance inquiry,

an employee may appeal the initial suspension to the Civil

Service Commission, but the F.A.A. will not accept an

appeal if the employee has appealed to the Commission

(See. 323). An appeal to the Civil Service Commission

can be based only on the ground that the F.A.A. has not

followed correct procedures or that there has been dis-

crimination on account of political reasons, sex, marital

status or physical handicap (See. 321(d) (2)).

Thus an employee threatened with a suspension of thirty

days or less has the choice of an agency procedure without

a hearing or a Civil Service Commission procedure that

does not reach the merits.

In case of suspensions for more than thirty days there

is a different procedure, with a hearing officer appointed

to take testimony, prepare a record and submit findings

to the appeals official together with the entire appeal record.

See Appendix I to F.A.A. Handbook on Adverse Actions,

Appeals, and Grievances.

Still different provisions apply to “preference-eligible”

employees, but the complaint does not assert that any of

the plaintiffs are in that category. 5 U.S.C. § 7512.

One court has stated, with respect to air traffic con-

trollers, that:

“T do not believe that due process enters into the con-

tract between the United States and its employees.”

Herriges v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Mont.,

July 2, 1970).

59a

While this court does not take so dim a view of a federal

employee’s rights, it is necessary to examine the restric-

tions which affect a court’s powers.

Jurisdiction

The action cannot be sustained on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction, since 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) requires

that more than $10,000 be in controversy, and this amount

cannot be made up by consolidating smaller individual

claims. Cf. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053,

22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969); Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170,

176-177 (2d Cir. 1969), rev’d. on other grounds, 397 U.S.

397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).

Plaintifis suggest that jurisdiction may be based on 28

U.S.C. § 1337, relating to actions “arising under any Act

of Congress regulating commerce.” Whether this section

covers the rights of an employee of an agency regulating

commerce need not be decided, for there is another basis

of jurisdiction, and any obstacles to judicial action would

affect section 1337 jurisdiction as well.

Plaintiffs also refer to 28 U.S.C. $1346 as amended,

(the Tucker Act), which gives district courts jurisdiction

of contract actions, and would include suits to recover

compensation owed to employees of the United States.

This section may provide review of final action of the

agency, but it is not an appropriate basis for an injunction

action prior to any final agency decision.

The Administrative Procedure Act remains as the most

appropriate basis of jurisdiction. That Act, in 5 U.S.C.

$702, sets forth that any person adversely affected by

action of any federal agency is entitled to judicial review.

Daub v. United States, 223 F.Supp. 609 (E.D.N.Y.1963).

60a

In aid of such review, courts may stay administrative ac-

tion, 5 U.S.C. § 705. Hamlin Testing Laboratories, Inc.

v. United States Atomic Energy Comm., 337 F.2d 221 (6th

Cir. 1964).

The government finds an obstacle to A.P.A. review in

5 U.S.C. §554(a) (2), which excludes the application of

that section to cases involving “the selection or tenure of

an employee.” This does not mean that employees are

deprived of all judicial review, but only that they are not

entitled to the specific procedural rights in the agency which

§ 554 affords, in adjudications required by statute to be

determined on the record. Significantly, §554 is part of

Chapter 5 of Title 5, headed “Administrative Procedure,”

while § 702 is part of Chapter 7 of Title 5, headed “Judicial!

Review.” Other actions against employees have been re-

viewed, after the employee was given more protection than

defendants are said to ofter here. Deviny v. Campbell, 90

U.S.App.D.C. 171, 194 F.2d 876 (1952). The case of Bare-

field v. Byrd, 320 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1963), relied on by

defendants, really turned on the specific prohibition of judi-

cial review of decisions concerning veterans’ benefits. 38

U.S.C. § 211(a).

The Supreme Court, moreover, has given a narrow con-

struction to a general prohibition against judicial review,

and held that it was not intended to deprive courts of

power to correct actions that are plainly illegal. Oestereich

v. Selective Service System, 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21

L.Ed.2d 402 (1968). Cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,

90 S.Ct. 832, 837-838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

Moreover, courts will require that agencies live up to

their own procedures, and enforce this rule even against the

Army. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968) ;

umn sivneree tr

6la

Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 335, 540, 79 S.Ct. 968, 973,

3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959). Appointment of an ineligible ap-

peals official would be a violation of F.A.A.’s own pro-

cedures.

Even if jurisdiction exists, the defendants assert that

it should not be exercised until administrative remedies

have been exhausted. However, the doctrine of exhaustion

is not a rigid one. Hammond v. Lenfest, supra, 398 F.2d

at 714; Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F.Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y.1950).

In a class action to determine the procedure to be followed

by the grievance examiners, there is ground for determining

basic rules in advance, without waiting for the final deci-

sions and requiring perhaps fifty separate reviews.

On balancing harm from the granting or denial ofa

preliminary injunction, the scales tip toward the plaintiff’s

side. Delay in hearing the appeals will not prejudice the

defendants, while the plaintiffs have made an adequate

showing of harm to them, in prosecuting multiple appeals

which may be determined under improper procedure. Plain-

tiffs also have shown enough possibility of success on some

or all the issues to permit granting a preliminary injunction.

Particular Claims Asserted

Plaintiffs’ first claim is that they should be afforded a

recording or transcription of the proceedings before the

grievance examiner. The Court of Claims has upheld the

right of a hearing official, in the interest of saving time

and money, to decide that a transcript will not be made at

government expense, and to substitute a satisfactory sum-

mary of the record. Horn v. United States, 177 F.Supp.

438 (1959). Here the plaintiffs are not assured even the

right to review a summary of the record.

62a

In another district, air controllers have been denied the

right to have their own reporter present to make a tran-

script. Sparks v. Federal Aviation Agency, 305 F.Supp.

673 (E.D. La. 1969); see also Sparks v. United States, 310

F.Supp. 1261 (E.D.La.1970). The theory of that ruling was

that the hearing oflicer was entitled to maintain as much

informality as he saw fit. When a $10,000 penalty is

visited on a group of men, it is sma’! comfort to be as-

sured that it was done in an informal manner. The First

Amendment to the United States Constitution assures the

right “to petition the Government for a redress of griev-

ances.” In order to make an effective presentation of their

grievances, it may be important for plaintiffs to show ex-

actly what took place in the appeals procedure. No reason

but administrative whim has been asserted for denying

plaintiffs the right to make their own transcription of the

appeal proceedings.

Plaintiffs’ next three claims, the right to produce their

own evidence, to confront witnesses, and to know the evi-

dence against them, are expressly denied by statute. 5

U.S.C. § 7501(b). The complaint does not expressly chal-

lenge the constitutionality of this provision. If it did, it

would be necessary to convene a three-judge court to con-

sider the case. 28 U.S.C. § 2282.

Plaintiffs’ fifth claim, that the burden of proof should

be on F.A.A., has not been directly disputed by defendants.

If there is no judicial review, there is no way of telling

whether the burden of proof has been sustained, but the

issue is not appropriate for decision at this time.

Plaintiffs’ sixth claim, that they should see the findings

and record before they are submitted to an appeals official,

relates to a detail of procedure. At some stage, the evidence

used to prove the agency’s case must be made available to

63a

the employee. Greene vy. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 476, 79 S. Ct.

1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). If judicial review is

available at the end, any deficiency in the evidence or

findings may result in upsetting the determinations. The

agency takes that risk, but the court will not at this stage

direct that tentative findings must be submitted in every

case.

Effective administration requires that discipline of em-

ployees for minor offenses be not judicialized so far that

supervisors will be reluctant to correct infractions. The

balance between the constitutional rights of the employee

and the needs of prompt discipline must leave some discre-

tion in the employing agency. Where that balance lies in

this case cannot be fully determined until defendants have

answered the complaint and the issues have been explored.

Plaintiffs’ final claim is the right to question the griev-

ance examiners concerning their qualifications and their

prior knowledge of the matter. This may be accomplished

by depositions in this action, and does not require any

injunctive relief.

It is therefore ordered

(1) that this action be maintained as a class action;

(2) that defendant George M. Gary be restrained from

acting as an appeals official in respect of any of the )plain-

tiffs until the issues in this action have been determined:

(3) that the defendant Federal Aviation Agency and

any grievance examiners acting under its authority be

restrained from interfering with the rights of plaintiffs to

record and transcribe all proceedings before such griev-

ance examiners, by tape recorder, stenographie or other

reasonable means selected by plaintiffs ;

ey PS

64a

(4) that the request for a temporary injunction be denied

in all other respects, but without prejudice to plaintiffs’

rights to depose the designated grievance examiners;

(5) that defendants’ time to answer the complaint be

extended until September 15, 1970; and

(6) that the case be set for pretrial conference at 2 p. m.

on Thursday, October 8, 1970.

65a

Order of the United States District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District or New York

~~ —

70-C-400

Am Transport ASSOCIATION OF America, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

PROFESSIONAL AiR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

Orcanization (“PATCO”), e¢ al.,

Defendants.

A

70-C-410

Unitep States oF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

—against—

PRoFEssionaL Air TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

Orcanization (““PATCO”), et al.,

Defendants.

66a

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter coming on for further hearing by the court

pursuant to the retention of jurisdiction in the “Order

for Temporary Injunction and Otber Provisions” dated

April 13, 1970 and upon the affidavits, orders and memo-

randa filed subsequent thereto and the arguments of coun-

sel, and upon the papers on file in the case entitled John F.

Leyden, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al.,

69-C-1566, and the court having dictated into the record

a memorandum of decision;

Now, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

I. That the defendant, Professional Air Traffic Con-

trollers Organization (“PATCO”), its officers, agents, ser-

vants, employees and the individual defendants named in

the full captions (except those against whom either action

has been discontinued or severed and those who were not

found fit to return to work after examination by the im-

partial medical board appointed by the court), and any and

all employees of the Federal Aviation Administration,

whether or not affiliated with “PATCO” and all other per-

sons, in active concert or participation with the defen-

dants, or any of them, be enjoined until the final deter-

mination of these actions,

(a) From in any manner continuing, encouraging,

ordering, engaging, aiding or taking any part in any

strike, work stoppage or slowdown or any interference

with or obstruction to the movement or operation of

any aircraft in air commerce or air transportation at

any traffic facility operated by the Federal Aviation

Administration, or interference with or obstruction to

67a

the application of the safety standards or procedures

established by the Federal Aviation Administration

for the regulation and control of air traffic in the United

States of America;

(b) From in any manner interfering with or ob-

structing the orderly continuance of air traffic in the

United States;

(c) From taking any action which would interfere

with this court’s jurisdiction in the premises; provided

however, that nothing in this order shall be construed

to require an individual employee to render labor or

service without his consent or t. make the voluntary

quitting of his labor or service by an individual em-

ployee, on his own initiative and not in concert an il-

legal act.

II. That any violation of this order shall be subject to

a penalty of at least $250 per man for the first day of any

violation and $125 per man for any subsequent days, sub-

ject to hearing on the facts of violation and any other

relevant circumstances.

Ill. That the Federal Aviation Administration be and

it hereby is directed until further order of this court:

(a) To restore all defendants in the action who have

returned to work to the performance of the duties to

which they were assigned prior to March 25, 1970, not

later than May 14, 1970.

(b) To withhold any further administrative actions

in respect of suspensions, removals or any other sanc-

tions based upon the alleged work stoppage between

68a

‘\

March 25, 1970 and April 14, 1970, against any em-

ployees who are defendants in these actions and sub-

ject to the temporary injunction issued by this court.

IV. This court shall retain jurisdiction in the premises.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

May 5, 1970

/s/ Ornzin G. Jupp

Orrin G. Judd

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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