Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Stanbridge v. New York

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

£832. ee

WILLIAM STAN BRIDGE,

Petitioner,

—_—Vv—

STATE OF NEW YORK,

LS SS See

—— LL NE Ye

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

euutlliemenmemmnen

—~ emacs

THEODORE ROSENBERG, EsqQ.,

FRANK A. Lopnz, Esq,

Attorneys for Defendant-

Petitioner,

133 Schermerhorn Street,

Brooklyn, New York 11201

Tele: 212-857-0589

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PAGE

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CASES CITED

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 wo... 1, 2, 3, 4

Escobedo V. Tilinoia, 378 U.S. 478 ........cccccccossccoscccssssccseeee 7

Harrington vy. California, 395 U.S. 250 wees: 4, 6

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ll

People v. Stanbridge, 21 N.Y.2d 706; Petition for Cer.

tiorari No. 208 Misc., Oct. Term, 1968 .......0.0..........

Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S. 709 cocccccccccsccscssssssses..,

United States ex rel. Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508,

510, 511 (38rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct.

TO scinssstininiisntemnitnehimneaianilennebiianisioaseinnnltse dssbomicaee 4

STATUTES CITED

United States Code, Title 28:

SE: STUD - cibitaerceminaiintindaaienaiinbinticebencedennncs

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‘y-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,

Petitioner,

—_—_vVv—

STATE OF NEW York.

a i

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

(OURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Io the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:

William Stanbridge, petitioner herein, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari be issue to review the judgment

of the New York Court of Appeals which re-aftirmed a

judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassan County, convicting

ihe petitioner of the crimes of Manslaughter in the First.

legree and Robbery in the First Degree.

Opinions Below

The opinion aftirming petitioner's conviction is officially

nported (People vy. Stanbridge, 21 N.Y.2d 706). The opin-

im of the Court below reaffirming the conviction after

wtitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari had been

anted by this Court (Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S.

(9) and remanded to the Court below for further con-

ideration in light of Bruton y. United States, 391 U.S.

13 is as yet unreported but is set forth in Petitioner's

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Jurisdiction

The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals

affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction was ente

on January 8, 1970. The jurisdiction of the Court

invoked pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1257 |

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The constitutional provisions involved in this case |

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteeuth Amendments to the Uni

States Constitution.

Questions Presented

1. Whether, under the peculiar circumstances of |

instant case the reaflirmance of petitioner’s convictions

the Court below amounts to a disregard by that Tribu

of this Court’s decision which had_ to all intents a

purposes held that petitioner Stanbridge’s case came with

the purview of Bruton vy. United States, 391 Us. t:

and therefore entitled him to a new trial?

~. Whether, this Court should render a conclusive ¢

termination as to the constitutional propriety of Sta

bridge’s confession at this time in light of the opini

below which in part has for its premise that this Cou

has ostensibly passed upon the validity of petitioner's co

fessions and found them to have been voluntarily obtain

since such determination is fundamentally inconsistent wit

the overwhelming weight of authority of this Court wit

respect to the constitutional admissibility of an accused

incriminating statements?

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3

Statement

als re. The petitioner, William Stanbridge was jointly tried

tere! Hin the New York Supreme Court, Nassau County with

urt is # Robert Moll and John Closter for the crimes of Murder

57(2), Bin the First Degree and Robbery in the First Degree.

Petitioner was convicted of the crimes of Manslaughter

in the First Degree and Robbery in the First Degree. Pe-

titioner Was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from

3% to 70 years. The judgments had been affirmed by

virtue Oi a 5 to 2 majority by the Court below (21 N.Y.2d

706) (Petitioner’s Appendix B).

Se are

Snited

During the October, 1967 Term of this Court, pe-

titioner filed for a writ of certiorari. This application was

subsequently re-numbered No, 208 Misc. October Term,

1968.

f the

ns by

bunal

; and

vithin

123,

By letter dated October 15, 1968, the respondent was

requested by this Court for a further response in the

light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123.

The resppndent filed his response as requested and

vA (ef ietitioner an Answer thereto.

STali-

inion The respondent contended then as he did in the Court

“out B telow that inasmuch as there were purportedly cross-im-

cOn-

lined

with

with

sed's

plicating confessions made by the respective defendants in

this case, the Bruton rule was inapplicable. In a word,

yetitioner contended then and now, that since neither of

his co-defendants had testified at trial before the jury

thereby foreclosing him from any cross-examination what-

wever coupled with the inescapable fact that the evidence

to convict petitioner consists of his constitutionally tainted

confessions which demonstrates that the State’s evidence

igainst Stanbridge is indeed slim in the extreme he is

entitled to the benefit of the Bruton rule. Moreover, while

the co-defendants made confessions in which they incrim-

PRP HES LEONE LEE PET EL IE IE EN LOTR SHE ME _—

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4

inated Stanbridge, Stanbridge’s statements (State's Ex.

hibits 23 and 27 in Evidence) were basically exculpatory

and therefore, in drastic variance with the statements of

his co-defendants. Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson y.

Yeager, 399 F.2d 508-510-11 (8rd Cir, 1968) cert. denied,

89 S. Ct. 620

Shortly after the decision of this Court in Harringtoy

Vv. California, 395 U.S. 250, petitioner transmitted tel-

egram to this Court contending that the harmless error

criterion as outlined in that case would not conclude Stan.

bridge from the benetit of the Bruton rule in view of the

paucity of evidence adduced against Stanbridge coupled

with the fact that there was a sharp variance betwee,

Stanbridge’s exculpatory statements and Moll's incrimina-

tory statements. (Petitioner’s Exhibit C—his brief jy

the Court below reproduced here and styled Appendix ¢

infra).

After carefully considering this case for more than

two years, the respective briefs of counsel specifically ad-

dressed to the Bruton issue, petitioner's lengthy telegram

following the Harrington decision, this Court unanimously

granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Cour

below and remanded petitioner to that Court for further

consideration in light of Bruton y. United States, supra.

(Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U.S. 709).

In light of the foregoing impressive chronology it seemed

apparent to petitioner that this Courts’ determination re

cating the judgment below predicated upon the Bruton

rule* simply meant he came within the purview of the

rule and was entitled to a new trial.

* Although petitioner Moll had petitioned this Court at the

same time as Stanbridge the Court did not grant Moll’s petition

where the evidence to convict was much more convincing than

against Stanbridge.

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Ex. Accordingly, petitioner moved in the Court below for

tory Ban order granting a new trial. This, notwithstanding

‘of B the awareness of the existing New York Court of Appeals

IY. Bf decision in People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (1969) which

ied, Bisa 4 to 3 holding to the effect that a Bruton violation

ould be construed harmless error per se in the case of

ross-implicating confessions. Parenthetically, we reiterate

that this is not a bona fide cross-implicating confession

situation. Cf. United States er rel Johnson vy. Yeager,

supra. Instead, the Court below accepted the suggested

approach expressed by the respondent and set the case down

for reargument.,

ton

tel-

‘Tor

‘an-

led

eel The decision reaffirming the conviction based upon

ha- B People v. McNeil, supra, then followed. This Court. re-

nanded petitioner’s case to the Court below despite MeN cil,

which had been decided two months previous to the grant

fcertiorari. Obviously, finding nothing in McNeil to with-

hold the benefit of Bruton from petitioner.

The Cour} below is seemingly incapable of seeing bevond

its decision in People vy. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550, which holds

vithout qualification that where there are cross-implicating

wnfessions per se, a Bruton violation can dissipate as

lamless error. See, New York Code Crim. Pro. See. 542.

This is conclusively demonstrated by the concurring memo-

randum of Chief Judge Fuld and Associate Judge Burke

in the Court below:

“Although we still subscribe to the view set forth

in the dissenting opinion in People vy. MeNeil (24

N.Y.2d 550)—which would require a reversal here—

we are constrained by the majority's decision in

that case to vote for affirmance. (See, also, con-

curring opinion in People v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d

935, 936).” (Petitioner’s Appendix A infra).

”~

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Pe Es | PREIS ESET NINE NIN BEI OT BS OPER EEC LEN

6

We had unsuccessfully urged to have the Court below

apply the more realistic criteria enunciated by this Cour

in Harrington y. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) ( Nee,

Appellant's Brief in the Court below, Point 1, at pp. 2-5),

During the oral argument below the members of tly.

Court almost uniformly took issue with the respondent's

manifestly absurd argument that years after conviction

Stanbridge was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine

Moll and Closter at a “Huntley’* styled hearing where

the sole issue was one of voluntariness and therefore, the

Bruton violation at trial could be overlooked.

As one learned member of the majority below so cog:

ently pointed out during oral argument—had Moll ani

Closter somehow managed to blurt out testimony, clearly

inadmissible at this post-trial hearing, that their state.

ments incriminating Stanbridge were untrue in what

manner would this benefit Stanbridge with a jury which

hax long since rendered their verdict convicting the peti-

tioner?

Even Judge Bergan writing for the majority below

seems to recognize, as indeed he must, this vast distinction

but he nevertheless and seemingly rather inconsistently

relies upon this post-trial proceeding as a major factor

to withhold from Stanbridge the benefit of a rule to which

he is clearly entitled.*

* People Vv. Huntley, 15 N.Y. 2d 72, sets forth the procedure

to be followed in New York to determine the voluntariness of

confessions. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368. Although Judge

Bergan alludes to this procedure he eschewed comment upon the

irrefutable fact that the confessions of Moll and Closter were

received wunredacted of prejudicial references to Stanbridge

(Petitioner’s brief in the Court below Point IV; Appendix C..

* We are annexing herewith petitioner’s brief in its entirety

in the Court below relative to this Court’s remand styled

“Appendix-C” infra.

TAIL PIC P ER a ~

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It is quite remarkable how the quantum and character

{ the evidence against Stanbridge has improved in the

iew of the respondent and seemingly Judge Bergan since

jis Court's unexpected promulgation in Bruton. In argu-

ug before the very same Court below in People vy. McQueen,

is N.Y.2d 337, in favor of a prospective application of

teobedo ¥. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, respondent alluding to

etitioner’s case correctly stated that the only real evidence

gainst Stanbridge is his confession. Therefore, if Escobedo

vs applied to cases then on appeal such as petitioner’s

is would invalidate his confession and he probably could

wt be successfully retried. Since Bruton the evidence has

wmehow elevated to a “devastating” mountain of circum-

santial evidence.*

Il

A major factor relied upon by Judge Bergan below is

the fact that this Court did not reopen the issue of Stan-

widge’s confession. He, therefore, unilaterally concludes

‘um this that as a matter of law it must be held to be a

‘ee and voluntary confession properly received as evidence

against Stanbridge. This finding, of course, is contrary to

the venerable teaching of this Court to the effect that this

‘ourt will only decide questions sufficient to a determina-

‘jon of a cause of action and meticulously avoids the pass-

ing upon of Constitutional questions unnecessarily. Having

‘und a clear Bruton violation it was understandably un-

wessary to pass upon the validity of Stanbridge’s con-

ssion. However, in view of Judge Bergan’s opinion joined

« the majority of the Court below as to the admissibility

*The majority opinion below relies for the result reached

son that Court’s McNeil decision which is inconsistent with

this Court’s Harrington criterion. A post-trial proceeding which

tently cannot cure the prejudice of a Bruton violation; and

inally, a confession already held unconstitutionally obtained by

two members of the Court below and which under a long line of

ases emanating from this Court is clearly constitutionally tainted.

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8

of Stanbridge’s confession it would seem to be the logical

approach and fair to both sides to have a determination ax

to the admissibility of petitioner’s statements at this time.

A ruling at this time may well save the petitioner and

the State the extraordinary expense of a protracted re-tria|

which would practically have for its entire evidentiary coy.

tent Stanbridge’s statements having already been held COn-

stitutionally defective by Chief Judge Fuld and Associate

Judge Burke (21 N.Y.2d 706). (See, also, Petitioner's

Petition for Certiorari, No. 208 Mise., Oct. Term. 196s.

pp. 6 through 30 inclusive, concerning the propriety of

Stanbridge’s statements. )

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE ROSENBERG, Esvy.,

FRANK A. Lopez, Esgq.,

Attorneys for Defendant-

Petitioner,

133 Schermerhorn Street,

Brooklyn, New York 11201

Tele: 212-857-0589

Qe

APPENDIX

TUUMNITINAAR

TAA AAAI TE

PEP TEST i le MN a Na a

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APPENDIX A

Opinion of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

STATE OF NEW YORK

COURT OF APPEALS

67

THE Peopie &c.,

Respondent-Appellant,

va.

Roserni Mou,

Appellant,

and

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE and JOHN CLosTER,

Appellants-Respondents.

a

BERGAN, oJ:

In the murder of a policeman following close upon the

wbbery of a store, William Stanbridge, a participant in

wth crimes, has been convicted of manslaughter in the

int degree, a substantially lesser charge than the murder

ist degree on which he was tried. He was also convicted

robbery, larceny and assault charges arising from the

tore robbery. ;

Stanbridge confessed his participation in the crimes.

le had two accomplices, Robert Moll and John Closter,

tho also confessed. There was a joint trial in which the

mfessions of each defendant were received, each only

wainst the one confessing, with adequate limiting instrue-

ions to the jury as to the others. This court in 1967

firmed all three convictions with a dissenting opinion by

fudge Burke in which Chief Judge Fuld joined ( People

Moll, 21 N.Y.2d 706).

4

~~

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Appendiz A

On June 19, 1969 the Supreme Court of the Cnited

States on petition of Stanbridge vacated the judgment of

conviction as to iim and remanded the case to this court

“for further consideration in light of Bruton vy. United

States, 391 U.S. 128” (Stanbridge v. New York, 395 Ux.

709).

The decision in Bruton turned entirely on the absence

of confrontation of witnesses required by the Constitution

in a criminal trial. This absence was noted when a w.

defendant’s confession implicated the complainant and was

received in evidence at a joint trial.

In such a situation, the human nature of juries being

what it is, the Supreme Court felt the protection of judicial

instruction to the jury not to consider that A’s confession

said about B was an inadequate safeguard.

So the rule of Delli Paoli v. United States (352 Us

232), resting on the supposed protection of careful judicial

instruction, was overruled. The essence of Bruton as laid

down by Justice Brennan is this: “Here the introduction

of Evans’ confession posed a substantial threat to peti

tioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him, ani

this is a hazard we cannot ignore. Despite the concededly

clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans’ inadmis

sible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context

of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as

an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right

to cross-examination” (391 U.S., p. 187).

Further consideration of the present case with the

Bruton doctrine in mind requires this court to see both

the extent to which there was an absence of confrontation

against Stanbridge when the whole record is looked at:

and if the rule of Bruton had been violated, whether the

other evidence in the case was so strong as to subordinate

the effect on Stanbridge of confessions of co-defendants to

a minor role so as to say the error was harmless within

Harrington v. California (395 U.S. 250 [1969]).

fe

th

~~”

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Appendiz A

Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harrington, felt that

“the deterrent effect of” Bruton and some other cases “will

ie significantly undermined” by Harrington (395 U.S., p.

45). A State court must, however, take the two cases

the way they have been laid down and follow them both

in good faith and as far as possible.

On confrontation with the confessing co-defendants,

there was full adversary opportunity for Stanbridge’s

lawyer to examine these defendants as to the statements

made by them involving Stanbridge. All three defendants

wstified at the Huntley hearing; none testified at the trial.

Counsel for Stanbridge cross-examined Closter, one of the

defendants; he had opportunity to cross-examine Moll

mt did not do it.

The complete absence of confrontation found in Bruton,

therefore, did not exist here; and although there is a dif-

ference between the cross-examination afforded at a trial,

absent here because defendants did not testify, and that

afforded at the Huntley hearing where they did testify, the

wailability of a means to test truth seems significantly to

distinguish this case from Bruton where there was no such

wailability of cross-examination or confrontation.

This court, considering the effect of Bruton, has noted

the difference in effect where co-defendants testify at the

trial and are subject to crossexamination (People Vv.

Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696). It has applied the same rule

where opportunity to cross-examine was afforded at a

Huntley hearing (People v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d 935).

On somewhat different grounds, the court also has not

applied the Bruton rule where there are multiple confes-

sions of co-defendants and the complaining defendant has

himself confessed, apparently because this is a safety check

om the reliability of the confession or, in any event, mini-

mizes the prejudicial effect of receiving implicating con-

fesions of other defendants. “[I]n a case such as this,

the logic of Bruton is inapplicable” (People y. McNeil, 24

7”

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Appendiz A

N.Y.2d 550, 552 [Scileppi, J.]).. This was in part based

on the rationale in United States ex rel. Catanzaro \.

Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296).

This reasoning suggests somewhat the broader view of

Harrington which affords ground on which the record jy

this case should be distinguished from Bruton. If Stay.

bridge’s confession be taken into account the evidenc

against him is, indeed, as overwhelming as that considered

in Harrington.

The issue on the validity of that confession is poy

closed and as a matter of law it must be held a free ani

voluntary confession properly received against Stanbridge.

This, as to Stanbridge, was the main problem debated iy

this court, as the dissenting opinion demonstrates (”

N.Y.2d 706, 709-711).

The Supreme Court did not reopen this issue in remit.

ting to consider the effect of Bruton which is quite a

different question, and so the confession of Stanbridge

added to the circumstantial case against him gives strong

enough support to the judgment to come within Harrington.

Indeed the identity of an unusual car owned by Stanbridge

observed at the scene of the crime by a youthful and alent

witness led to the apprehension of all defendants.

Upon reconsideration the judgment should be aftirmed.

Upon reargument by defendant Stanbridge: Original de.

cision of this Court, dated December 29, 1967, affirming

the judgment, adhered to. Opinion by Bergan, J. All

concur, Fuld, Ch, J. and Burke, J., in the following memo-

randum: Although we still subscribe to the view set forth

in the dissenting opinion in People v. McNeil (24 N.Y.

550)—which would require a reversal here—we are con:

strained by the majority’s decision in that case to vote

for affirmance. (See, also, concurring opinion in Peoplr

v. Galloway, 24 N.Y.2d 935, 936).

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APPENDIX B

Dissenting Opinion by Burke, J.

i

” No. 97 67

THE PHOPLE Ke.,

Respondent-Appellant,

vs.

ROBERT MOLL,

Appellant,

and

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE and JOHN CLOSTER,

Appellants-Respondents.

nl

buRKE, J.: (Dissenting) :

We are unable to agree to aftirmance of these defen-

dants’ convictions. This is the sort of case where feelings

run high—any case involving the vicious killing of a police

ificer is bound to produce such feelings. But it is just

ihis sort of case that demands scrupulous care on the part

of the authorities to prevent the sort of claims that are now

made here by these defendants. In the instant case, un-

fortunately, no such care was taken. Here, rather, the

record reveals a lack of concern on the part of a number

of those charged with responsibility for the administration

of criminal justice who had any contact with this case with

preventing possible reversible error. As a result, we have

lefore us three convictions for most serious crimes that,

under all circumstances here presented, hint strongly of

unfairness. This, where it seems clear conviction of these

defendants would likely have been obtained even if the

utmost moderation had governed the conduct of the au-

thorities.

~~”

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6a

Appendix B

¢

To begin with, three assistant district attorneys sat

throughout the night at the Sixth Precinct Station houy

of the Nassau County Police in Roslyn while teams of

police officers incessantly questioned the defendant Stay.

bridge, an eighteen year old youth, in an effort to obtain

a confession. It was clear at the time that Stanbridg

could likely be connected with the killing, yet apparently

none of the assistant district attorneys made any cffort to

sit in on the interrogation of this defendant until the

police were satisfied that they had obtained all that they

could from him. This was not until 8 A.M., when one of

the assistant district attorneys took over and began (ues.

tioning the suspect further. (Stanbridge had been picked

up about midnight.) Defendant Closter was picked up

at 3 A.M. and the same procedure was followed with him.

Presumably, Moll also received this treatment, but he doe

not urge on this appeal that his confession was a product

of coercion (only that it was taken after his request for

counsel had been denied).

On Arraignment the following day (16 hours after

Stanbridge’s arrest) the magistrate was advised of the

suspects’ complaints concerning police brutality, yet he

refused their request for a court ordered medical examina-

tion, commenting simply that this would be taken care of

by the jail authorities. He also refused their request that

they at least be allowed to exhibit in court their claimed

injuries. The same request were made some thirty minutes

later to another judge, with the added allegation that the

jail doctor on examining defendants purposely ignored

their injuries, and he also refused the requests. Subse

quently the police officers involved and the jail officials all

swore that no one had laid a hand on the suspects and

no injuries were observed, but independent verification of

the testimony of these witnesses, whose sympathy toward

and identification with the cause of the prosecution in a

case such as this must be obvious, was made forever in:

~

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ja

Appendiz B

wssible. (The arraigning magistrate and his court ste

nographer later testified that they noticed no injuries on

the parts of the suspects’ bodies that were visible to them,

wut it is ingenuous to suppose that the police Officers, if

in fact they did beat these defendants, would have beaten

them in such a way that the marks of such abuse would

le obvious On arraignment. At the Huntley hearing coun-

vl representing the defendants testified as to observing

signs of injuries.)

The trial court's later reading of People vy. Huntley

(15 N.Y. 2d 72) as mandating that he sit on the Huntley

was uncalled for. As we pointed out in People y. Horton

(7 N.Y. 2d 355, at 362), the trial court has discretion

is to whether or not to disqualify himself. This, we be-

lieve, is the only fair reading that can be given Huntley,

and, here discretion would seem to have called for dis-

qualification.

Finally, we do not believe the court on the Huntley

hearing was free to reject defendant Moll’s uncontradicted

testimony as to the denial of counsel before his confession

was obtained. The People had available numerous wit-

nesses Who would have been able to rebut this testimony,

if in fact Moll’s claim was false. The failure of Moll to

testify on his trial and raise this point cannot rea sonably

be held to impeach his later claim. If he had done so he

would have been open to unrestricted cross-examination as

to his part in the crime.

On these grounds we would reverse and order new trials

for all defendants.

* * * * *

ggoguae affirmed. No opinion. All concur except

Rurke, J., who dissents and votes to reverse and order

new eats in an opinion in which Fuld, Ch. J., coneurs.

~~”

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8a

Order of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

STATE oF NEW York,

In Court of Appeals

At a Court of Appeals for the State of

New York, held at Court of -\ppeals

Hall in the City of Albany on th

Fourteenth day of February \.))

1968.

Present, HON. STANLEY H. FULp,

Chief Judge, Presiding.

ee

Mo. No. 105

THE PEOPLE &c.,

Respondent,

vs.

ROBERT MOLL, WILLIAM STANBRIDGE

and JOHN CLOSTER,

A ppellants.

Sa

A motion for reargument and to amend the remittitu

in the above cause having heretofore been made upon the

part of the appellant Stanbridge herein, papers having

been submitted thereon and due deliberation having been

thereupon had, it is

ORDERED, insofar as reargument is sought, that the said

motion be and the same hereby is denied, and it is

ORDERED, insofar as amendment of the remittitur is

sought, that the said motion be and the same hereby is

granted, the return of the remittitur requested and, when

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9a

Order of Court of Appeals of the State of New York

returned, it will be amended by adding thereto the fol-

lowing :

Upon the appeal herein of appellant William

Stanbridge there were presented and necessarily

passed upon questions under the Constitution of the

United States, viz.: Whether appellant's right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment has been adversely atfected and whether ap-

pellant’s conviction was based in part on unlawful

search and seizure in violation of his rights under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The

Court of Appeals held that there was no violation

of appellant’s constitutional rights under either of

these amendments.

ANp the County Court of Nassau County hereby is re-

quested to direct its Clerk to return said remittitur to this

Court for amendment accordingly.

A copy

8/ GEARON KIMBALL

Deputy Clerk

10a

APPENDIX C

COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF N5W YORK

>

THD PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF New York

Respondent,

—against—

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,

Defendant-A ppellant.

>

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF UPON REMAND T0

THIS COURT FROM THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Statement

The defendant-appellant, William Stanbridge, was jointly

indicted and tried in the Supreme Court, Nassau County,

before Judge and jury, together with Robert Moll and John

Closter for Murder and Robbtry in the First Degree in con.

nection with a robbery at a supermarket on March 23, 1961.

EFreesPtdcteree ff & & Se ee eS eee

Appellant was convicted of Manslaughter and Robbery

in the First Degree. The judgments were affirmed by this

Court by virtue of a 5 to 2 majority (21 N. Y. 2d 706).

On June 16, 1969, the Supreme Court granted appel-

lant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and the judgment of

this Court was vacated and the case was remanded for

further consideration in light of Bruton y. United States,

391 U.S. 123 (Appendix A).

COPY BOUND CLOSE |!

lla

Appendiz C

Appellant thereafter motioned this Court to conform its

remittitur to the mandate of the Supreme Court to the

extent of either remanding appellant to the Supreme Court,

Nassau County, for a new trial or in the alternative, dis-

missal of the indictment.

The Court thereafter set this case down for reargument.

POINT I

The Decision of the United States Supreme Court on

June 16, 1969, granting appellant’s Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari after that Court had directed specific argument as

to the applicability of Bruton y. United States, 391 U.S. 123,

the vacatur of the judgment of this Court and the remand

of appellant’s case to this Court for further consideration in

the light of Bruton v. United States, supra, notwithstanding

the earlier decision of that Court in Harrington vy. California,

395 U.S. 250 (1969), decided two weeks prior to the grant of

appellant’s petition for a Writ of Certiorari and nearly two

full months after the decision of this Court in People v.

MeNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (decided April 23, 1969), a decision

which the Supreme Court undoubtedly considered in deciding

appellant’s petition amounts to a definitive adjudication from

the highest Court in our land that appellant is indeed en-

itled to a new trial in light of Bruton v. United States, supra.

Appellant’s convictions of Manslaughter and Robbery

in the First Degree were affirmed by this Court by virtue

ofa 5 to 2 majority (21 N.Y. 24 706). He then petitioned

the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari

during the October Term, 1967. The petition was pending

for approximately one year when on October 15, 1968, the

respondent was directed by that Court for a “further re-

ponse in the light of Bruton vy. United States, 391 U. 8.

123” which had then been recently decided by that Court.

SE IN CENTER

12a

Appendiz C

The appellant filed an Answer to the respondent's Argy.

ment which must be well known to this Court at this point,

viz., that appellant could not hope to benefit from the

Bruton rule inasmuch as there were cross-implicating ¢on.

fessions in this case and, therefore, Stanbridge had not been

sufficiently prejudiced by co-defendant Moll’s incriminating

confession as to warrant the invocation of the Bruton rule.

Cf. United States ex rel. Catanzaro vy. Mancusi, 404 F24

296 (a case relied upon by the majority in People vy. Me-

Neil, supra).*

We submit that the respondent’s argument was care.

fully considered and rejected by the Supreme Court since

appellant’s conviction is hanging by the bare thread of a

confession already held invalid by Chief Judge Fuld and

Associate Judge Burke (21 N.Y. 2d 706).** A confession

which we submit patently cannot withstand the scutiny of

a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Cf. People vy. Cerrulo,

18 N.Y. 2d 839, where a federal writ of habeas corpus was

granted after a hearing ordered by the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit. United States ex rel

Cerullo vy. Follette, 393 F.2d 879 (1968). Such being the

case and applying the criteria outlined by the Supreme

Court in Harrington v. California, supra, as opposed to the

* Appellant reproduces his brief as to the applicability of

Bruton rule in the Supreme Court as “Appendix B” for the pur-

pose of demonstrating that the Supreme Court has indeed ruled

precisely as to the applicability of the Bruton rule.

** Appellant also contends infra under Point II of this brief

that inasmuch as there was a drastic variance between his state-

ments and that of his co-defendant Moll his case is more analo-

gous to that of United States ex rel. ohnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d

508-510-11 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 620, than to

the Catanzaro v. Mancusi case, supra. A case, unlike appellant's,

where the evidence was overwhelming.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN

13a

Appendir C

blanket holding of People vy. McNeil, supra, this would pre-

clude the invocation of the harmless error doctrine in this

case of Chapman v. California (386 U.S. 18).

The decision of Harrington y. California, supra, out-

lining the ertremely rare instances where the harmless

error doctrine would apply in case of cross-implicating con-

fessions is obviously a much tricter rule than the seeming

blanket holding a majority of this Court in People v.

McNeil, supra, to the effect that per se where there are

cross-implicating confessions the harmless error rule could

be invoked to save a conviction from reversal.

To this extent McNeil should be overruled since the

Harrington case constitutes a supervening and inconsistent

decision of the United States Supreme Court. Cf. People

v. Perez, 299 N.Y. 784, 300 N.Y. 208; Cohen and Karger,

Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, Sec. 786, et seq.

To demonstrate that the Supreme Court considered ap-

pellant’s case in relation to the Harrington rule and held

that the Bruton rule nevertheless applied to his case with

full force and effect we annex to this brief as “Appellant’s

Appendix C” a telegram which the writer had transmitted

to that Court following the Harrington decision.

The United States Supreme Court had before it appel-

lant’s case for more than two long years with a complete

trial record, extensive briefs and additional “Bruton” styled

briefs, To say now that the remand to this Court for fur-

ther consideration in the light of Bruton y. United States,

supra, is anything but for the purpose of according this

Court an opportunity to render a decision in conformity

with the true intent of the Supreme Court in this case, riz.,

that appellant be aecorded a new trial under the teachings

of the Bruton rule would be manifestly illogical.

lia

Appendiz C

POINT II

With respect to appellant’s conviction of manslaughter

his statements were totally exculpatory. His co-defendant,

Moll, however, not only incriminated himself but Stanbridge

as well in his statements. As to his manslaughter conviction

appellant is on all fours with the Bruton rule.

Appellant’s statements (People’s Exhibits 23 and 97

in Evidence) were total disclaimers of any criminal par-

ticipation in the homicide of Patrolman Coote (see Appel-

lant’s Main Brief, Point V, page 37 et seq.).

On the other hand, co-defendant Moll’s statements not

only incriminated himself but he placed Stanbridge in such

close proximity to the area of the actual shooting that it

tended to connect Stanbridge to the actual homicide (R.

5260-62; People’s Exhibit 37 in Evidence). Indeed, it was

deemed sufficient to merit the affirmance of his conviction

of Manslaughter by this Court.

Appellant Stanbridge, therefore should be considered

to be “on all fours’’ by this Court with the Bruton rule

since Moll did not testify at trial and thereby foreclosed

any inquiry * in regard to the truth of his statements im-

plicating Stanbridge in the actual homicide by placing him

in his statements in close proximity to the area of the shoot-

ing while Stanbridge had denied any complicity in the

*The respondent has argued before the Supreme Court and

in his affidavit before this Court that whatever Bruton prejudice

Stanbridge suffered at trial was somehow cured by the “Post-

Trial” Huntley hearing. If the respondent somehow finds solace

in the seemingly “better than nothing” argument we cannot fore-

close him. However, we are sure this Court will understand if

we eschew answering this meritless argument.

pes

—_—

COPY BOUND CLOSE |

15a

Appendix C

homicide of Patrolman Coote. It therefore follows that

his conviction of Manslaughter should be reversed since he

had been denied the right of confrontation and cross-exami-

nation vouchsafed by the Bruton rule. Cf. People v.

Anthony, 24 N.Y. 2d 696 (reversing Anthony’s co-defendant,

Reginald Stephen Batten). Accord—United States ex rel.

Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508, 510-511 (3rd Cir. 1968),

cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 620.

POINT Ill

Appellant’s conviction of robbery in the First Degree

should be reversed in the light of Bruton v. United States,

supra, since the harmless error rule cannot be applied here

inssmuch as appellant’s conviction is not predicated upon

overwhelming evidence. Instead, the entire evidentiary con-

tent of the People’s case consists of appellant’s suspect con-

fessions.

In arguing before this Court in People vy. McQueen, 18

N.Y. 2d 337 for a prospective application of Escobedo vy.

Minois, 378 U.S. 478, the respondent had occasion to allude

to appellant’s case in his brief. He stated there, and quite

correctly so, that if Escobedo were applied to cases then

on appeal, appellant’s conviction, in which an appeal was

then pending in this Court would result in reversal of his

conviction and a dismissal of the indictment since apart

from his confessions there was no other probative evidence

which the People possessed with which to prosecute Stan-

bridge.

In successfully arguing last July for the reargument of

appellant’s appeal in this Court, notwithstanding the chron-

ological set-of-events illustrated herein culminating in the

grant of appellant’s petition for a writ of certiorari and

remand in the light of the Bruton case, he stated such re-

”~

SE IN CENTER

léa

Appendia C

argument would not be a “sham and is not frivolous” (Res,

Affd. p. 3). He also asserted that Stanbridge’s convictions

do not stand exclusively “upon his confessions alone but a

mountain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to remove

any doubt in the Court’s mind about the fairness of the

trial” (Res. Affd., p. 5). The respondent’s “mountain” jg

in reality a Chimera. At best, respondent’s “mountain”

can be characterized a “molehill”. Of course, there is no

other evidence apart from Stanbridge’s probably constitn.

tionally defective confessions which explains why arring.

ton’s conviction was affirmed and Stanbridge’s case was re.

manded following Harrington and citing a case where the

defendant’s conviction (Bruton) had bbenreversed by that

august tribual.

The victims of the robbery, Frank Gagliardi and Ray-

mond Tichelaar, respectively testified that they were cer.

tainly incapable of rendering any identification of the

robbers (R. 458).

The ultimate disposition of Stanbridge’s case, which

would be consistent with the intent of the Supreme Court's

remand, would be the same result as in the case cited by

that Court in remanding appellant’s case to this Court

(Bruton v. United States, supra).

In applying the criterion of Harrington it is apparent

that the harmless error rule has no standing in the case of

appellant Stanbridge.

~~

COPY BOUND CLOSE |

lia

Appendix C

POINT IV

The appellant’s right to confrontation was violated by

virtue of testimony adduced by the People. A joint trial

severely prejudiced appellant’s substantial rights.

William Brittain, 2 life-time friend of co-defendant Moll

and a friend of appellant Stanbridge, testified for the

People that following the crime, he had spoken with Moll.

He noticed that Moll’s hand was injured. He testified that

Moll had told him that he injured his hand when he shot

acop with a defective shotgun and that Red, William Stan-

bridge, was with him (R. 926). Brittain had made a

statement to the District Atiorney shortly after Moll on

the date of Moll’s arrest. At one point the trial prosecutor

was permitted to refresh the witness’ recollection by read-

ing from this statement in which Brittain had stated that

Moll admitted shooting Patrolman Coote in cenjunction

with a robbery in which appellant Stanbridge participated

(R. 931).

Upon cross-examination by counsel for Moll this witness

testified that three weeks prior to the trial of this indict-

ment, counsel for Moll and an associate, Mr. Griffin, along

with Walter Moll, the brother of Robert Moll, had inter-

viewed him. Britain testified that he had agreed with a

statement made by Mr. Griffin at this interview to the effect

that “Red” (Stanbridge) had shot the police officer with

a pistol and Walter Moll’s statement that Stanbridge had

shot Patrolman Coote with a shotgun (R. 968). Counsel

for appellant immediately moved for the declaration of a

mistrial on the basis of this prejudicial testimony adduced

at this joint trial. The motion was denied and an excep-

tion duly noted (R. 969).

Ido Ruiz, who had preceded Brittain as a prosecution

Witness earlier testified that Moll had come to his home

PME S GOI OLD Oe

”~

SE IN CENTER

léa

Appendia C

argument would not be a “sham and is not frivolous” (Res,

Affd. p. 3). He also asserted that Stanbridge’s convictions

do not stand exclusively “upon his confessions alone but a

mountain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to remove

any doubt in the Court’s mind about the fairness of the

trial” (Res. Affd., p. 5). The respondent’s “mountain” jg

in reality a Chimera. At best, respondent’s “mountain”

can be characterized a “molehill”. Of course, there ig no

other evidence apart from Stanbridge’s probably constity.

tionally defective confessions which explains why Harring.

ton’s conviction was affirmed and Stanbridge’s case was re.

manded following Harrington and citing a case where the

defendant’s conviction (Bruton) had bbenreversed by that

august tribual.

The victims of the robbery, Frank Gagliardi and Ray-

mond Tichelaar, respectively testified that they were cer-

tainly incapable of rendering any identification of the

robbers (R. 458).

The ultimate disposition of Stanbridge’s case, which

would be consistent with the intent of the Supreme Court's

remand, would be the same result as in the case cited by

that Court in remanding appellant’s case to this Court

(Bruton v. United States, supra).

in applying the criterion of Harrington it is apparent

that the harmless error rule has no standing in the case of

appellant Stanbridge.

Fy oat=-.*an~-lea'hi" «aealin.° 1a

lia

Appendir C

POINT IV

‘

The appellant’s right to confrontation was violated by

virtue of testimony adduced by the People. A joint trial

severely prejudiced appellant’s substantial rights.

William Brittain, a life-time friend of co-defendant Moll

and a friend of appellant Stanbridge, testified for the

People that following the crime, he had spoken with Moll.

He noticed that Moll’s hand was injured. He testified that

Moll had told him that he injured his hand when he shot

acop with a defective shotgun and that Red, William Stan-

bridge, was with him (R. 926). Brittain had made a

statement to the District Atiorney shortly after Moll on

the date of Moll’s arrest. At one point the trial prosecutor

was permitted to refresh the witness’ recollection by read-

ing from this statement in which Brittain had stated that

Moll admitted shooting Patrolman Coote in conjunction

with a robbery in which appellant Stanbridge participated

(R. 931).

Upon cross-examination by counsel for Moll this witness

testified that three weeks prior to the trial of this indict-

ment, counsel for Moll and an associate, Mr. Griffin, along

with Walter Moll, the brother of Robert Moll, had inter-

| viewed him. Britain testified that he had agreed with a

statement made by Mr. Griffin at this interview to the effect

that “Red” (Stanbridge) had shot the police officer with

a pistol and Walter Moll’s statement that Stanbridge had

shot Patrolman Coote with a shotgun (R. 968). Counsel

for appellant immediately moved for the declaration of a

mistrial on the basis of this prejudicial testimony adduced

at this joint trial. The motion was denied and an excep-

tion duly noted (R. 969).

Ido Ruiz, who had preceded Brittain as a prosecution

witness earlier testified that Moll had come to his home

_— — ee

18a

Appendia C

with his brother Walter and William Brittain the night of

the shooting and robbery (R. 822-24).

He was permitted to testify over vigorous objection and

motions for a mistrial that Robert Moll had told himthat

he had “pulled” a robbery with appellant Stanbridge and

John Closter in a supermarket and had shot a cop in effect.

ing an escape (R. 822).

The following then ensued:

“A. He told me that they were running and the off.

cer said ‘Stop’, and as they made a turn or some.

thing like that, the officer couldn’t see the shotgun

because he was holding it in front of him and the

officer was in back.

Mr. Direnzo: Move that that be stricken, if your

Honor pleases.

The Court: That is all part of the conversation.

The Witness: Yes.

Q. Go ahead. A. And he said that he turned

around and he asked one of the other tico guys if he

should, and somebody said ‘yeah’, one of the other

two guys.

Mr. Direnzo: Object to it, if your Honor pleases.

The Court: Just tell us what the conversation

was. Go ahead.

Mr. Dienzo: Move that this be stricken, if your

Honor pleases.

Mr. Direnzo: Respectfully except” (R. 823-24).

The tria! prosecutor, seemingly unsatisfied in “merely”

adducing thix patently prejudicial testimony as against

Stanbridge, questioned Ruiz further as follows and again

over the i peated objections of counsel for appellant:

CAnDY aRMeInMmn Crnert

19a

Appendia C

“Q. Mr. Ruiz, did the defendant Robert Moll say

anything to you, what weapons they had with them?

Mr. Direnzo: Objected to, if your Honor pleases—

The Court: Overruled—excuse me” (R. 828).

Thus, through the testimony of these two prosecution

witnesses the People succeeded in adducing hearsay—highly

prejudicial testimony against Stanbridge which he could

not combat by cross-examining Moll because Moll did not

testify at trial* and which could not have been adduced

had Stanbridge been separately tried.

This testimony is independent of and indeed in dractic

contradiction of much of Stanbridge’s exculpatory state-

ments. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that Stanbridge’s

substantial rights were irretrievably prejudiced by the mis-

we of such constitutionally inadmissible evidence. Apart

from the fact that the Bruton rule requires reversal of his

convictions occasioned by the elicitation of such patently

hearsay, highly inflammatory testimony in addition this

Court is in the unique position of retrospectively recogniz-

ing the prejudice suffered by Stanbridge because he was

jointly tried with Moll unseen at the beginning. People vy.

Boone, 22 N.Y. 2d 476; People vy. Jackson, 22 N.Y. 2d

H6; People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y. 2d 283; People v. Baker,

%3.N.Y. 2d 307; People v. Anthony, 24 N.Y. 2d 696. The

elicitation of this highly prejudicial testimony could have

easily been excluded. Indeed, counsel for appellant had

tried to head it off by requesting a side bar conference

just prior to the elicitation of this testimony. When it was

adduced he immediately moved for a mistrial.

*Perhaps it is this illegal evidence which is the “mountain”

of evidence the respondent was alluding to in his affidavit referred

to above.

22a

APPENDIX C-I

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968.

STANBRIDGE v. NEW YORK.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT oF

APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

No. 208, Mise. Decided June 16, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and

the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The

judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further

consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.s.

123.

COPY BOUND CLOSE

Ba

APPENDIX C-II

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 208 Mise.

oo

WILLIAM STANBRIDGE,

Petitioner,

—against—

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW York

rr

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF TO THE RESPONDENT’S

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETI-

TIONER’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To: The Honorable, Tie Chief Justice and the Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

This is the petitioner's reply to the respondent’s supple-

mental brief submitted in response to a letter dated October

15, 1968, from the Office of the Clerk calling upon the re-

spondent for a further response in the light of Bruton v.

United States, 391 U.S. 128.

POINT I

The petitioner’s case squarely falls within the definitive

specifics of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123.

At page 2 of his supplemental brief the respondent

endeavors to distinguish the Bruton holding from the case

at bar upon the premise that: (1) Unlike Stanbridge,

NPI ES OME RT PRT EIGER COLE TEST TEE Ie RE:

@

SE INCENTER

2ia

Appendiz C-II

Bruton did not confess; and (1) Evans (the confessing eo

defendant) did not take the stand at trial to give Bruto

aun opportunity to cross-examine.

The respondent admits, as indeed he must, that none 9

the defendants testified at the trial which resulted in Stay.

bridge’s conviction.

It was only after the rights of Stanbridge had been

irretrievably endamagaed and his conviction obtained did

the defendant testify at a post trial proceeding (Jacksony.

Denno, 378 U.S. 363; People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y. 24 72),

The issu at such hearing was exclusively devoted to that

of the voluntariness of the respective confessions. In all

candor, it is quite difficult for the writer to follow the

reasoning of the respondent therein. It seems that he is

endeavoring to argue that this Post-Trial proceeding, held

after conviction, whereat the defendants testified concern

ing the voluntariness of their respective confessions eso

terically cured the prejudice of having Moll’s and Closter's

respective statements, incriminating Stanbridge received as

evidence at trial for jury consideration. If we are correct

in our interpretation of respondent’s argument, then it ix

apparent that the respondent has miscontrued the basic

precept of the Bruton rule. Prejudice results to the accused

in a joint trial when before the jury a non-testifying co

defendant's statement is read to the jury incriminating

the accused. This results from the fact that the accused

is bereft of any effective means of challenging the truth

of such hearsay accusations indelibly imprinted upon the

minds of the jurors. The jury in the case at bar having

rendered their verdict based on such tainted evidence, the

error cannot be cured. A new trial is therefore required.

If an error of such Constitutional magnitude could ever be

cured in the convenient manner suggested by the respondent

herein there would have been no necessity whatsoever for

COPY BOUND CLOSE |

25a

Appendiz C-II

ihe reversal in the Bruton case. The post-trial proceeding

in this case could not cure the damage which Stanbridge

affered before the jury as it could not in the Bruton case.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of Certiorari should be

ganted in accordance with the due process of law.

POINT LA

The co-defendant, Moll’s confession in this case was

inriminatory of Stanbridge while Stanbridge’s statement

vas exculpatory with respect to the actual homicide of

Oficer Coote. Therefore, to all intents and purposes Stan-

bridge is in the position of a non-confessor convicted upon

the hearsay incriminatory confession of a co-defendant.

The respondent ventures forth with the anticipated

argument that inasmuch ax both Moll and Stanbridge both

made confessions the petitioner herein suffered no prejudice

(Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18).* This argument

must alxo fall when confronted by a juxtaposition of the

respective statements.

The petitioner's statement (fols. 5155-5214; Peo’s. Ex.

3 in Ev.) is an unequivocal denial of any intent to murder

m Stanbridge’s part. On the other hand, Moll’s statement

clearly demonstrates his intent to “kill.” Furthermore,

Moll and only Moll, incriminates Stanbridge in the actual

homicide (fols. 5248, 5260, 5280; Peo's. Ex. 37 in Eyv.).

*It is quite germane to the issue at bar that the harmless error

doctrine (Chapman V. California, 386 U.S. 18), has been held by

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in

Johnson Vv. Yeager, (decided August 23, 1968 and reported Sep-

tember 11, 1968, 3 Crim. L. 2481), to be unable to save convic-

tiong based upon cross-implicating confessions.

PRIN LL RGAE I OER LT OC a OO CO omengeR: 50

«

SE IN CENTER

26a

Appendia C-II

This argument of the respondent herein could not fing

juridicial solace even in New York State. See, People y.

Cassidy, 30 A.D. 2d 795 (A.D. 1st Dept. 1968) ; People y.

Shelly Jean Jackson and Wayne Bruton, 22 N.Y. 24 .......

dec’d, New York Court of Appeals, July 2, 1968, New

York Law Journal, 11-6-68, p. 1.

The respondent further alludes in his brief to the Sey.

erance concept (Res. Br., p. 4) (Federal Rules of Crim.

Pro. Rule 14). It is noteworthy that Moll’s incriminating

statements could not have been redacted by the People, tw

exclude all prejudicial references to Stanbridge. People y.

Boone, 23 N.Y. 2d 476; People vy. Shelly Jean Jackson and

Wayne Bruton, supra.

It is also our submission that this Court is in the

unique position of retrospectively determining the impair.

ment of petitioner Stanbridge’s Constitutional Rights “un-

seen at the beginning” by virtue of the unredactability

of Moll’s statements incriminating Stanbridge and the

joint trial of the defendants. Cf. People v. Krugman,

44 Cisce. 2d 48 to 49; People vy. Cole, 27 A.D. 2d 7H

People v. La Belle, 18 N.Y. 2d 405; People vy. Burrell,

21 N.Y. 2d 265; People v. Cassidy, 30 A.D. 2d 795; Bruton

v. United States, 391 U.S. 123. 130; People v. Shelly Jean

Jackson and Wayne Bruton, supra.

In the Cassidy case supra, the defendant had been

jointly tried with four others in New York. In reversing

the ensuing convictions of all of the defendants, the Ap

pellate Division for the First Judicial Department unan-

imously held there, consonant with the concept of Bruton:

“The admission into evidence, at the joint trial,

or oral and in some cases written extrajudicial state

ments of each of several defendants tending to in

COPY BOUND CLOSE

27a

Appendix C-IT

criminate co-defendants violated the rights of said

co-lefendants and requires a new trial. In the cir-

cumstances of this case, the instructions limiting the

: consideration by the jury of the incriminating state-

ments could not reasonably operate to dispel the

prejudice to co-defendants resulting from the receipt

of such evidence which was hearsay to them. (See,

Bruton vy. United States, 391 U.S. 123; Roberts v.

Russell, ........ if So ; People v. Burrelle, 21 N.Y.

: 2d 265).” 30 A.D. 2d 795.

Accord—See, People y. Boone, 23 N.Y. 2d 476 (N.Y.

| & Court of Appeals, July, 1968). The instant case is man-

ifestly “on all fours’’ with the Bruton rule. Accordingly,

the petitioner’s application fur a writ of Certiorari should

' It be granted.

. POINT Il

: There is ample justification under traditional standards

. ¥ for this Court to render constitutionally invalid Stanbridge’s

| § confession.

Under the undisputed facts of Stanbridge’s case there

, § is a legion of authority to support a finding that Stan-

bridge’s confessions were nothing more than a product of

testimonial compulsion (See, Vet.’s Pet. for Certiorari).

: Indeed two Judges of the Court below which included

. § the Chief Judge, were constrained to find that Stanbridge’s

. § confession to be Constitutionally infirm (See, Petitioner’s

Ex.-A to his Petition for Certiorari).

The State may be mislead to believe that this Con-

stitutionally defective instrument could be utilized at a

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Appendix C-II

new trial if this Court were to remand this case solely

in the light of Bruton v. United States, supra.

It is respectfully submitted that the State should Ie

promptly disabused of any such concept. The confession

obtained from Stanbridge was undoubtedly procured in q

manner inimical to every basic concept and tenet of fair

play and decency. It is ripe, indeed overripe, for judicial

burial.

CREO AAR AY EY RE A ITER RIE RE ETE 8 a mn mapas aa earmark, a

COPY BOUND CLOSE II

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APPENDIX C-III

TELEGRAM

To: THE HONORABLE CHIEF Justice EARL WARREN AND

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME CoURT oF THD

UNITED STATES:

Re: Stanbridge v. New York

No. 208 Misc., Ooctober Term,

1968.

HONORABLE SIRS:

The Court, last week, by virtue of a 5 to 3 majority and

applying the harmless error doctrine of Chapman vy. Cali-

fornia, 386 U.S. 18, affirmed the conviction of the petitioner

in Harrington v. California.

In response to aletter received from the Clerk of the

Court, dated October 15, 1968, an additional brief in the

light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 was filed

with this Court by the respondent and petitioner, William

Stanbridge in this case.

After perusing the Harrington opinion I would, in my

estimation, be remiss in my duty to my client if I did not

point out certain calient facts which we submit favorably

distinguishes Stanbridge’s case from that of Harrington.

‘In the first instance, Stanbridge’s conviction is predi-

cated entirely upon a confession which two Judges of the

New York Court of Appeals have held to be constitutionally

defective. This evidence constitutes the entire evidentiary

content of the State’s case as against Stanbridge (see,

Court’s Charge to the Jury; Appellant’s Brief in the Court

helow, Points 1, 5 and the Conclusion).

In People y. McQueen, 18 N.Y. 2d 337, the respondent,

the same respondent as in the instant case, in arguing be-

fore the New York Court of Appeals in that case for a total

ERE LENG IOS, LY SIE INE OE IES LN OPI I LR TE LR BR Be

@

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30a

Appendia C-III

prospective application of the rule enunciated by this Court

in Escobedo vy. Illinois and alluding to Stanbridge’s appeal

then pending before that Court stated in his brief that if

that Court were to hold otherwise in the McQueen case the

conviction in Stanbridge’s case would have been reversed

and the indictment dismissed because this evidence was the

only evidence the State had with which to try Stanbridge.

Thus, unlike Harrington, Stanbridge’s conviction js

patently predicated on the most meager of evidence.

Also, unlike Harrington, neither of petitioner's ¢o.

defendants—Moll or Closter—testified at trial thereby pre.

cluding any cross-examination whatsoever. Moreover, Moll's

and Closter’s statements incriminating Stanbridge were not

redacted. Furthermore, even a cursory reading of Stan-

bridge’s statement is a full denial of any guilt in the actual

homicide while on the other hand, Moll fully incriminates -

himself and also directly incriminates Stanbridge.

We submit that inasmuch as Stanbridge’s statement is BR

totally exculpatory in character and Moll’s statement is in-

criminating of himself and Stanbridge as well coupled

with the fact that Moll did not testify at trial brings our

case more on all fours with Bruton v United States than

—

Most respectfully,

THEODORE ROSENBERG

(The foregoing text was

sent as a telegram to the

Supreme Court of the

United States. )

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