Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — California v. McGrew

Supreme Court brief1970

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

5

SUBJECT INDEX

_ OPINIONS BELOW

"JURISDICTION ..

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

STATEMENT OF FACTS

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS AROSE .

1. The decision below misinterpreted the

protection afforded by the Fourth

Amendment as construed by Katz v.

United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, in

that the scope of Fourth Amendment

protection in the decision below was

determined by the subjective intent or

purpose of the searcher rather than

the reasonable expectation to privacy

of the person's whose effects were

searched

A. Whatever the subjective motivation

or private purpose of a search by

an airlines' agent may be is irrel-

event to whether a person has a

reasonable expectation of privacy

ii

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Page

as to the contents of a trunk, etc.,

delivered into the hands of a pas-

senger airlines for shipment on an

—. ᷣ ᷣ Ä., Sah ecw bie tee 21

2. When a person who as condition to a

voluntary, bilateral contract with an

interstate air carrier must declare

the contents of a trunk so the carrier

may determine whether it will accept

it for shipment and, if so, what rate

will be charged under a contract which

incorporates the right of the carrier,

at its option, to inspect the contents of

said trunk, such a person does not

have a reasonable expectation of pri-

vacy as to the contents of said trunk . 23

. The decision below creates a conflict

with the decisions of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

as to the applicability of the Fourth

Amendment under the facts of this

case; under the federal decisions

there would not have been a violation

of the Fourth Amendment, whereas

the majority of the court below found

such a violation; are interstate car-

riers to conduct their business under

the decisions of the several states, or

under federal law? In this case the

airlines would not be subject to a civil

~iii-

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Page

action under the federal decisions; are

interstate airlines to be subjected to

possible civil actions in the state

courts for doing the same thing under

the same law, namely, the Fourth

6 ¹¹⁰⁰ P , 9 32

The decision below implicitly held that

one of the rules and regulations of the

Civil Aeronautics Board is violative of

the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States .......... 46

The decision below, as pointed up by

the dissent, may result in an airline's

agent (operating under the rules of the

Civil Aeronautics Board and the terms

and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral

contract between the airline and a con-

signor) who by his independent conduct

determines that the consigned freight

is contraband, being arrested for a

felony offense under the law of the State

of California in order to protect the

consignor's Fourth Amendment rights--

even though said consignor has no right

to possess the contraband and the con-

traband was given into the possession of

the airline's agent under the circum-

stances set forth under the first ques-

tion presented in this petition........

-iv-

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

6. The majority opinion in the court below

implicitly held that a person's effects

have more protection under the Fourth

Amendment in the circumstances of

this case than those same effects would

have had if they had been in respond-

ent's automobile; that such is the im-

plicit holding of the majority in the

court below is clear since the Court of

Appeal of the State of California ex-

pressly ruled that respondent's foot-

lockers in this case were not entitled to

Fourth Amendment protection under the

decisions of this Honorable Court which

holds that a police officer may search a

vehicle without a warrant, without con-

sent and not as an incident to an arrest

if the officer has reasonable cause to

believe that the vehicle contains contra-

%%% ee TRS Bie 880) 0.8

7. The majority of the court below held

that under the circumstances of this

case respondent had not waived by his

contracts any protection which the

Fourth Amendment gave his effects in

his footlockers; this holding was based

on federal decisions, but it fails to ac-

knowledge this Honorable Court's deci-

sions in Katz v. United States, supra,

389 U.S. 347, and Zap v. United

States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, which are

Page

-V-

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

authority contrary to the holding of the .

majority of the court below ........ 58

8. The majority decision of the court be-

low holds while a seizure of respond-

ent's footlocker by the airlines for the

police would be reasonable within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a

search of said footlockers, i.e., look-

ing into them, by the police under the

total circumstances of this case was

unreasonable within the meaning of said

Fourth Amendment ............. 63

„„ 8 a 5 ai oe i 6 a

-vi-

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX "A"

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State

of Californian AP eer Al

Dissenting Opinion by Mosk, J. Al4

APENDIX B“

Opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State

Kn CROs CF TO Ho Bl

APPENDIX "C"

United States Constitution, Fourth Amend-

ID C1

APPENDIX D*

Civil Aeronautics Board of Regulation

ge ES ee

-vii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page

CASES

Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,

(1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 20 Cal. Rptr.

321, 369 P. ad 9877. 45

Clayton v. United States (9th Cir. 1969)

eta baci AE A 44,46

Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58,

17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S.Ct. 788 .... 18, 19, 46,

| 53, 55

Corngold v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 18, 39, 43,

We ME Fo ĩᷣͤ KK 44, 59, 63

Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co. (1968)

391 U.S. 216, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 88

* ˙· OTe 53

Gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1967)

S76 F.2d 66s CD PSE bos 18, 26, 39,

42, 43, 44, 46

Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U. S.

347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 3, 5, 13,

18, 19, 21,

22, 23, 27, 28

Lewis v. United States (1966) 385 U. S. 206,

17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S. Ct. 424. 5

-viii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)

Page

CASES

People v. Anderson (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d

125, 71 Cal. Rptr. 823x777. 51

People v. Barcenas (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d

405, 59 Cal. Rptr. 419 ......... 51, 54

People v. Crovedi (1967) 253 Cal. App. 2d

739, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349 ......... 54

People v. Lawson (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 729,

81.Cal. Retr. 6 66

People v. Layne (1965) 235 Cal. App. 2d

188, 45 Cal. Rptr. 110 ......... 50

People v. Lindogan (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d

466, 27 Cal. Rptr. 905 ......... 50

People v. Lurie (1967) 257 Cal. App. 2d 98,

G6 Gal: pte. GSE . ov cs cece 54

People v. Madero (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d

., FO-Gal. Rete. 16D 2 ccc scce se 53

People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51,

69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P. 2d 665. 12, 17, 51,

52, 54, 63

People v. Morrison (1968) 258 Cal. App. 2d

75, 65 Cal. Rptr. 444335. 53

People v. Smith (1969) 268 Cal. App. 2d

764, 74 Cal. Rete. %

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)

CASES

People v. Sullivan (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d

767, 51 Cal.Rptr. 778 .........

People v. Walters (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d

834, 70 Cal.Rptr. 766 .........

People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal. App. 2d

292, 47 Cal. Rptr. 73424.

Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U. S. 483,

11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 84 S. Ct. 8889

United States v. Spencer (9th Cir. 1969)

F. 2d (No. 22,623-A,

decided June 22, 1969) ))

Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U.S.

62, 98 L. Ed. 503, 74 S. Ct. 354...

Wolf Low v. United States (9th Cir. 1968)

. ³¹ »] eee Cee

Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U. 8. 624,

90 L. Ed. 1477, 66 S. Ct. 1277

page

50

29

18, 43, 46

18, 58, 60,

61, 62, 63

-X-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. CITED (Continued)

Page

CALIFORNIA CODES

Health and Safety Code

Section 1153ͤ000⁸uʒuu r 50

Section 11530. 55553. 5

Section 11311121 5

Penal Code

Section 1238, subdi vision 5

See 1% „ „ „ „ „„ „„ 5

e beecevre 5

CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT

Rule 2 ę . 7

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REGULATIONS

Regulation No. 96, Rule No. 24 4, 25, 44,

UNITED STATES CODES

Title 28, Section 1257 (3) 3

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Fourth Amendment l 3, 4, 5, 12,

19, 21, 2 6, 27, 29, 30,

2, 23, 2

32, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52

9, 60, 6

53, 55, 5 2, 63, 65, 66

, U

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1969

No.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

vs.

KENNETH T. McGREwW,

1

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

The State of California requests that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme

Court of the State of California entered on the above-

entitled cause on December 17, 1969.

*

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of

California rendered on February 17, 1969, and reported

as People v. McGrew, 269 A.C.A. 851, 75 Cal. Rptr.

378, is set out as Appendix B to this petition. The grant-

ing of a hearing by the Supreme Court of the State of Cal-

ifornia vacated that opinion. The opinion of the Supreme

Court of the State of California affirming the trial court's

order dismissing the action after having ordered the sup-

pression of petitioner's evidence against respondent,

rendered on December 17, 1969, is reported as People

v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 462 P. 2d

1, and is set out as Appendix A to this petition.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of the State of California

rendered its decision and judgment in this case on De-

cember 17, 1969. On January 19, 1970, the Supreme

Court of the State of California issued its remittitur,

thereby making final its judgment in this case.

The decision of the Supreme Court of the State of

California in this case affirms the order of the Superior

Court for the State of California dismissing the criminal

action instituted by petitioner against respondent for

felony narcotics offense under the laws of the State of

California. The decision of the Supreme Court of the

State of California in this case also affirmed the order of

the Superior Court for the State of California suppressing

all of the incriminating evidence which was in the posses-

sion of respondent and which was the basis for having

instituted a criminal prosecution against respondent in

the Superior Court of the State of California. Therefore,

pat

the decision of the California Supreme Court of the State

of California in this case is final and bars petitioner

from taking any further action against respondent.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Honor-

able Court under section 1257(3) of Title 28 of the

United States Code and Rule 22 of the Rules of the Su-

preme Court of the United States, since a right has been

especially set up and claimed under the Constitution of

the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States as construed by this Honorable

Court in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 19

L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507, would a person who must,

as conditions to a voluntary, bilateral contract with an

interstate carrier, declare the contents of a trunk 80

that the carrier may determine whether it will accept it

for shipment and, if so, what rate will be charged under

a contract which incorporates a right on the part of the

carrier, at its option, to inspect the contents of said

trunk, have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the

agents of the interstate carrier and the contents of such

a trunk, especially when, in addition, the interstate

carrier is a commercial passenger airline which the

general public would expect--if not demand--to inspect

the contents of any trunk or parcel that the agents of the

airline had any reason to believe contained a potentially

dangerous device?

2. Are interstate carriers operating under the

jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board to conduct

their business according to the construction placed on

the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

er

States by the Supreme Court of the State of California

and the several states or by the United States Court of

Appeals; if such a carrier were to do an act which did

not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights as con-

strued by the United States Court of Appeals, could the

carrier be subjected to a civil action in the courts of

California for having violated the same person's Fourth

Amendment rights based on the same act because the

Supreme Court of the State of California has declared

said act to be violative of the Fourth Amendment?

3. Is Rule and Regulation of the Civil Aeronautics

Board, Number 96, rule 24 which states: "INSPECTION

OF SHIPMENTS All shipments are subject to inspection

by the carrier, but the carrier shall not be obligated to

perform such inspection." violative of the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

4. Must an agent of an interstate airline, operating

under the rules and regulations of the Civil Aeronautics

Board and terms and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral

contract between the airline and a consignor, who by his

independent conduct determines that the consigned

freight is contraband subject himself to a possible felony

arrest under the laws of the State of California in the

interest of the consignor's purported Fourth Amendment

rights when the consignor has no lawful right td possess

the contraband and has delivered it into the possession

of the airline's agent under the circumstances set forth

in the first question as presented in this petition?

5. Does a person's effects have more protection

under the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances

set forth in the first question presented in this petition,

than those same effects would have if they were in an

automobile ?

—

whe

6. Under this Honorable Court's decisions in

Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v.

United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 90 L. Ed. 1477, 66

8. Ct. 1277, and under the circumstances of this case,

did respondent waive his rights under the Fourth Amend-

ment?

7. If under the circumstances of this case it

would not have been violative of the Fourth Amendment

for the airlines to seize respondent's trunks at the re-

quest of state law enforcement agents, why was it vio-

lative of the Fourth Amendment for the airlines to permit

state law enforcement agents to search the same trunks?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The grand jury for the County of San Diego in-

dicted respondent, in count one, for transporting mari-

juana in violation of Section 11531 of the California

Health and Safety Code, ia count two, for possessing

marijuana for sale in violation of Section 11530. 5 of the

California Health and Safety Code, both felony offenses.

After pleading not guilty and waiving trial by jury, re-

spondent brought a pretrial motion to suppress all

evidence of the charged offenses under Section 1538.5 of

the California Penal Code and to dismiss the indictment

under Section 1385 of the California Penal Code. Both

motions were granted by the trial court.

Petitioner appealed the trial court's dismissal of

the indictment based upon its order suppressing the evi-

dence. (California Penal Code, Section 1238, subdivision

7.) The Court of Appeal for the State of California,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in a unanimous

decision reversed the orders of the trial court in an

-6-

opinion reported as People v. McGrew (1969) 269 A. C. A.

851, 75 Cal. Rpt. 378. (See, Appendix B to this petition. )

Respondent did not petition the Court of Appeal for a re-

hearing but did file a timely netition for a hearing of the

case in the Supreme Court of the State of California.

The Supreme Court of the State of California

granted respondent's petition for a hearing of the case,

thereby vacated the prior decision of the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of the State of California, by a vote

of 4 to 3, affirmed the trial court's order suppressing

the evidence and the dismissal of the indictment in an

opinion reported as People v. McGrew (1969) 1 Cal. 3d

404, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 462 P.2d1. (See, Appendix A

to this petition.) On January 19, 1970, the Supreme

Court of the State of California issued its remittitur

thereby rendering its decision final.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As its summary of the facts, petitioner sets forth

the facts as stated by the Supreme Court of the State of

California in its opinion in this case. 2

1, People v. McGrew, supra, 1 Cal.3d, pp. 406-408,

Appendix A, pp. Al - A5. This statement, however, is

inaccurate in one respect, namely, it seems to state that

a "federal" narcotics agent arrived on the scene and took

charge of the investigation. Though the reporter's

transcript shows that a federal narcotics agent did make

an appearance at the scene, the narcotics agent who per-

formed those acts, etc., attributed to the "federal" nar-

cotics agent in the California Supreme Court's majority

(Continued on next page. )

a

"McGrew brought a new, securely

locked footlocker to the United Airlines

freight service at the San Diego airport

in the afternoon of June 25, 1967, to be

shipped to San Francisco. The freight

agent, one Dowling, observed that Mc-

Grew was wearing walking shorts and a

T-shirt and had ‘quite long' hair. Dow-

ling's supervisor had told him to be on

the alert for footlockers and suspicious

people, and so on, that they had been

shipping marijuana, * * * ' to check out

any suspected contraband, to 'see what

is in there, and if it is marijuana * * *

call the police. ' Dowling was suspicious,

because of McGrew's ‘general appearance, '

and because the locker, which McGrew

declared contained books and clothes, had

an ‘exceptional weight' of 112 pounds,

(Continued from preceding page. )

opinion was an agent of the state, i.e., California Bur-

eau of Narcotics Enforcement. This is more clearly

shown in the facts as set forth by the California Court of

Appeal in this case. (See, Appendix B, pp. B-2 - B-4. )

In this regard, petitioner believes the statement of

facts set forth by the California Court of Appeal (Appen-

dix B, ibid.) to be a fair and accurate statement. Nor,

in petitioner's view, could respondent take issue with the

Court of Appeal's statement since he did not petition that

court for a rehearing. (See, Rule 29(b) of the California

Rules of Court. )

oGu

although Dowling admitted that the weight

was consistent with a shipment of two-

thirds clothes and one-third books.

"After McGrew paid for the shipment

and left, Dowling called his supervisor,

who told him to open up the footlocker

to see what it contained. Using a nail

and hammer to knock out the hinge pins,

Dowling opened up the locker a couple

of inches, just enough to see what was

in there.' He observed several bricks

or small packages, wrapped in brown

paper or newspaper. He could not see

the contents of the packages and he did

not open any of them. He closed the lid

of the footlocker and after calling his

supervisor again, called the police.

"San Diego Police Officer Burgess

came, and Dowling told him what had

happened, and he said he would like to

see IIthe locker]].' Dowling took him

back and opened it up and showed him

the footlocker. The officer removed and

inspected one of the packages. A federal

narcotics agent then arrived, removed

and examined the packages, and decided

that the packages contained marijuana.

2, The federal narcotics agent testified, Burgess did

not. Dowling's testimony concerning the actions of

Burgess is not challenged.

-9-

The officers inquired about fill, to weigh

down the emptied footlocker, and Dowling

furnished ballast. Using the ballast and

one brick of marijuana, the officers re-

packed the locker for shipment to San Fran-

cisco.

"Dowling notified other airlines about

McGrew and the shipment. About eight

p. m. McGrew brought a blue footlocker,

which he said contained books and dishes,

to the Western Airlines freight service,

where it was received by the freight clerk,

one Case, who wrote up the airbill, and

accepted the footlocker from McGrew. A

fellow employee named Sweeney called

United Airlines to tell them about the foot-

locker. The federal narcotics officer in-

volved in the United Airlines transaction

and two other officers went to the Western

Airlines freight office. The footlocker

was closed and locked. The federal nar-

cotics agent detected an odor of marijuana'

by compressing the top of the footlocker

and asked Sweeney and Case to open it,

although they 'were under no obligation

to do so.' Sweeney and Case opened the

footlocker, on the suggestion of one of

the officers, by knocking 'the hinge pins

out of the rear,' using a hammer and nail.

Sweeney opened up the lid, and the federal

agent removed and opened the packages,

which were wrapped in brown paper. The

footlocker was then repacked in the same

manner as the one checked with United

Airlines.

-10-

"About 11 p.m., McGrew returned to

the Western Airlines counter, purchased

a ticket for San Francisco, and checked

a suitcase. Case notified officers and

told them that he had last seen McGrew |

walking through the terminal in the direc-

tion of the restaurant. The officers, Case

and Dowling, went to the restaurant and

found McGrew sitting at the end of the

counter. Both Case and Dowling identified j

him, and the officers placed him under

arrest. An officer found a Western Air-

lines baggage claim ticket in searching

the person of McGrew. The officer re-

turned to the Western Airlines luggage

counter with the baggage claim ticket and

secured the suitcase. He opened it and

found marijuana.

"The United Airlines employee, Dowling,

testified that at the airlines training school

he had been instructed that 'we had the

right to inspect shipments;' that an agent

could open anything that arouses your

suspicions;' that the concern of the airlines

was for ‘aircraft safety, for improperly

declared goods going at a cheaper rate,

and for overvalued goods, such as a TV

set claimed to be good but in fact with the

picture tube * * * kicked in. He could

not recall being instructed to check to see

whether contraband was being shipped.

"He testified in connection with the

McGrew search that he was not concerned

about aircraft safety or rate structures:

ais

that when he opened up the locker he was

looking for one thing, to determine wheth-

er marijuana was contained in the locker.

He did not, however, smell marijuana

before opening the locker.

He further testified that in searching

the footlocker he was following his orders

| to assist the police; that he Suggested and

furnished ballast to the police in response

to their inquiry about fill, to weigh down

the emptied footlocker and that in so doing

he was following his orders to assist the

| police; that before the McGrew incident,

he had opened two other footlockers, in

the presence of the police, having obtained

the combination to the locks from the police;

that he found contraband in the two lockers,

and that he knew of two other footlockers

having been opened by fellow employees, in

which contraband was not found.

"The People stipulated that the officers

did not have a search warrant for either

search. ®

-12-

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS AROSE

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of

California held that because the marijuana itself was

not in “plain view"3/ of the law enforcement officer

when he arrived at the airport, a search warrant was

needed for the officer to search, i.e., look into, and

to seize respondent's footlockers. The majority then

made it clear that its holding on this point was predi-

cated on the Fourth Amendment as construed by this

Honorable Court; thus the majority held:

3/ in People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 69

Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P. 2d 665, a majority of the Califor-

nia Supreme Court held that "plain view" meant what

was apparent to the sense of sight, i.e., an object was

not in plain view" if it could be smelled or heard but

not seen. The majority in Marshall held that marijuana

in an opaque bag which police officers unquestionably

knew to contain the marijuana because of prior inform-

ant received by a reliable information and because of

the odor emanating from the bag was not in "plain view"

to the officers and therefore the bag could not be

searched, i.e., looked into, and seized without a search

warrant. The bag in Marshall was found in an apart-

ment which the police had lawfully entered for the pur-

pose of finding and arresting the defendant; the police

found no one in the apartment, but while looking for the

defendant they found the bag. Citing decisions of this

Honorable Court, the majority in Marshall held that

there was no basis to conduct a search of the bag as

found in the apartment since:

(Continued on following page.)

-13-

"Our decision in Marshall is not

limited to dwelling houses. The Fourth

Amendment protection of 'effects' in-

cludes securely closed footlockers

shipped through common carriers. Neith-

er the language of the Fourth Amendment,

nor of any of the cases interpreting the

protection of that amendment, suggest that

warrants apply to houses“ but not to

‘effects. ' The exceptions to the require-

ment of a warrant are based on circum-

stances and not on categories of items.

The requirement of a warrant, unless

otherwise excused, applies to whatever

is protected by the Fourth Amendment.

(See Katz v. United States, (supra, 389 U.S.

347, 356-35 J.)“ (1 Cal. 3d 409-410; footnote

omitted. )

(Continued from the preceding page.)

"... "There was no question of violence,

no movable vehicle was involved, nor

was there an arrest or imminent destruc-

tion, removal, or concealment of the

property intended to be seized.' [Citation.]

They made no move to obtain a warrant

ol arrest or of search, although time per-

mitted it. [Citation.] IITImere was no

probability of material change in the situa-

tion during the time necessary to secure

such warrant. Moreover, a short period

of watching would have prevented any such

possibility. (Citation. ]“ dd., 69 Cal.

Rptr. p. 591.)

-14-

It is also clear that the majority opinion of the

California Supreme Court in this case relied upon the

decisions of this Honorable Court and the United States (

Court of Appeals as the controlling authority for the

proposition that respondent had not waived his rights

under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the majority in

this case stated:

"Corngold relied on Stoner v. Cali-

fornia (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 489, which

rejected the contention that implied con-

sent of access for any purpose results in

consent for all purposes: It is true

that when a person engages a hotel room

he undoubtedly gives "implied or express

permission" to "such persons as maids,

janitors or repairmen" to enter his room

"in the performance of their cuties."

[{Citation.]] But the conduct of the night

clerk and the police in the present case

was of an entirely different order.

"In Corngold v. United States, supra,

367 F.2d 1, the court ruled that 'Appel-

lant did not abandon his package; and

mere surrender of custody to a carrier

did not forfeit appellant's right to privacy.

llcitations. ]] * * * Appellant's package,

securely wrapped and tied, was delivered

to the airline solely for transportation

from Los Angeles to New York, and the

inspection clause in TWA's tariff author-

_ ized examination only by the carrier itself.

(367 F. 2d at pp. 7-8.)

"Stoner and Corngold recognize that

the scope of consent to an invasion of

-15

privacy depends upon the circumstances.

Other cases involving implied limited con-

sent to an invasion of privacy make clear

the significance of the circumstances.

Thus, in United States v. Blok (D.C. Cir.

1951) 188 F. 2d 1099, 1021, the police

searched the desk of an employee; the

court, in holding the search unlawful,

stated: No doubt a search of {[the desk]

without her consent would have been

reasonable if made by some people in

some circumstances. Her official su-

periors might reasonably have searched

the desk for official property needed for

official use.' (See also, Cunningham v.

Heinze (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F. 2d 1, 5,

cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968, following

Stoner. Compare searches properly

within the implied consent to search in

People v. Plane, 274 A. C. A. 1, 4

Illandlord entered tenant's apartment

to shut off lights and oven]; In re

Donaldson, 269 A.C.A. 593, 594 [[search

of student's locker by school vice princi-

palll: People v. Rightnour, 243 Cal. App.

2d 663, 666 [[maid entered guest's room

to clean up}]; People v. Gonzales, 182

Cal. App. 2d 276, 277-278 [[search of

knife-wounded victim by hospital person-

nel to determine identity]].)" (1 Cal. 3d,

p. 411.)

That the majority opinion of the California Supreme

Court draws into issue important questions of federal law

is pointed up by the dissent in this case. Thus, the dis-

sent on this point states:

-16-

"The majority lean heavily on Corn-

gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1966)

367 F.2d 1. In Corngold the transporta-

tion agent was initially contacted by

government agents who directed him to

a specific package and asked him to open

it. Our case is factually closer akin to

a more recent Ninth Circuit decision

which carefully circumscribed the Corn-

. gold rule: Gold v. United States (1967)

378 F.2d 588, in which at pages 590-591,

the court held Corngold inapplicable to a

situation in which the transportation per-

sonnel, with 'suspicions aroused * * * had

no way to determine whether the contents

were fit for carriage and properly classi-

fied except by opening them. This the

carrier had the right to do under its

tariffs.' Indeed, the instant case is

stronger than Gold for here there was no

prior direct contact between law enforce-

ment officers and the airline employee.

Dowling opened the footlocker at the dir-

ection of his company supervisor, not

upon police suggestion.

"It was not a law enforcement agency

but Dowling who notified other airlines

about the defendant and his shipment.

Pursuant to that warning Western Airlines

employees Case and Sweeney observed

the defendant's footlocker and called

United to report. Fortuitously the police

had then arrived at United and they pro-

ceeded from there to the Western offices.

They noted the footlocker pointed out to

It is clear, therefore,

for the state courts to

-17-

them by the Western employees and

could readily detect from it ‘an odor of

marijuana.' This justified the subse-

quent search and seizure. (See my dis-

sent in People v. Marshal] (1968) 69 Cal.

2d 51, 62.)

"kee * &

"Since the airline employees had a

legal right to inspect the footlockers, I

can see no impediment to their advising

the police of the presence of contraband

and to the police taking possession of

and making evidentiary use of the contra-

band displayed to them. Indeed, that was

the precise situation in People v. Superior

Court (1969) supra, 70 A. C. 129, in which

à private detective gave a copy of a tape

recording to law enforcement officers.

We properly declined to suppress the evi-

dence prior to trial. To the same effect

is Wolf Low v. United States (9th Cir.

1968) 391 F. 2d 61, 63, in which the court

found proper the ‘conduct of the airline

in turning over to the Government the

fruits of its search of the defendant's

suitcases, and the conduct of the Gov-

ernment in making use of the informa-

tion and evidence obtained by the airline's

search * * t (1Cal. 3d, 415-417.)

that this case points up the need

understand the application of the

-18-

decisions of the United States Court of Appeal4/ and of

this Honorable Court®/ in cases such as this one. It is

also evident that the interstate carriers and other feder-

al agencies have a need for a decision of this Honorable

Court to guide them in the conduct of their affairs.

The majority of the California Supreme Court also

ruled that there was no merit to petitioner's contention

that under the facts and circumstances of this case the

law enforcement authorities had a good faith basis to

believe that the airlines agents had apparent authority

to consent to a search of the footlockers which respond-

ent had under his contract given to the airlines for ship-

ment. On this issue, the dissent states:

"As the majority concede, People v.

Hill (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 550, 554, holds

that a search is not unreasonable if made

with the consent of a third party whom the

police reasonably and in good faith believe

has authority to consent to their search

* * *. The police belief was entirely

reasonable and in good faith here, since

it was founded upon the right legally con-

ferred upon the airlines to inspect ship-

4/ Specifically, Corngold v. United States, supra,

367 F. 2d 1; Gold v. United States, supra, 378 F. 2d

588; Wolf Low v. United States, supra, 391 F. 2d 61,

cert. denied, 4 Cr. L. 4038.

5, Specifically, Stoner v. California, supra, 376

U.S. 483; Cooper v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 58;

Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624; and Katz

v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347.

-19-

ments in their Possession, the inspections

actually made pursuant to that right, the

discovery of contraband legally ineligible

for shipment, the reporting of these

events to the police and the disclosure to

the police of the actual contraband." (1

Cal.3d, 417.)

Thus, the majority opinion of the California Supreme

Court draws into issue the Constitutionality of a rule of

Amendment; in Cooper v. California, supra, 386 U.S.

58, 61, this Honorable Court Stated that a search au-

thorized by state law may or may not be reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment and in this case it is clear

that the majority of the California Supreme Court held

the authority of a rule of the Civil Aeronautics Board is

REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. The decision below misinterpreted the pro-

tection afforded by the Fourth Amendment

as construed by Katz v. United States (1967)

389 U.S. 347, in that the scope of Fourth

Amendment protection in the decision below

was determined by the subjective intent or

purpose of the searcher rather than the

reasonable expectation to privacy of the per-

son's whose effects were searched.

-20-

In the decision below, a majority of the California

Supreme Court, under the facts, stated that Dowling, an

employee of United Airlines, testified that.. in

connection with the McGrew search that he was not con-

cerned about aircraft safety or rate structures; that

when he opened up the locker he was looking for one

thing, to determine whether marijuana was contained in

the locker..." (1 Cal. 3d, 408.) The majority then

held that... in the instant case, McGrew might

have expected that an airlines employee would inspect

where a danger or inconsistency was observed, but he

could not reasonably be expected to anticipate police

searches for contraband. He may not be held to have

consented to searches by police officers totally unre-

lated to the interests of the airlines in hope that contra-

band may be discovered. [Citation.]" (1 Cal.3d, 412.)

And, in this regard, later in its opinion the majority

stated that"... [a]s pointed out above, the consent to

inspection by the airlines was limited to consent for

inspection for the airlines“ own purposes." (1 Cal. 3d,

413.)

Thus, although respondent may well have con-

sented to an inspection of his footlocker by the airlines,

if the airlines were to make such an inspection for its

own purposes or because the airlines observed a

"danger or inconsistency, " in this case the airlines

agent searched respondent's footlocker solely because

the agent believed it contained contraband, viz. , mari-

juana. Therefore, the majority held that respondent

could reasonably expect that if the airlines inspected

the contents of his footlocker for its own purposes and

learned the truth, i.e., that it contained kilos of mari-

juana instead of the declared "books and clothes, " his

effects, i.e., his marijuana, would remain secure

from the police. This was so, according to the majority

21

because respondent ".. , may not be held to have con-

sented to searches by police officers totally unrelated

to the interests of the airlines in hope that contraband

may be discovered. [Citations. ]" (1 Cal. 3d, 412.)

Petitioner respectfully submits that this holding

of the majority misses the point made by this Honorable

Court in Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347.

It misses the point in this case because under

Katz the question is not whether respondent may have

consented to a search by the police after the airlines

had opened his footlocker and observed marijuana. The

question in this case, in petitioner's view, is whether

respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy

from the police as to the contents of his footlocker

after the airlines for its own reasons opened it and ob-

served marijuana.

A. Whatever the subjective motivation or pri-

vate purpose of a search by an airlines'

agent may be is irrelevant to whether a

person has a reasonable expectation of pri-

vacy as to the contents of a trunk, etc. ,

delivered into the hands of a passenger air-

lines for shipment on an airliner.

Petitioner respectfully submits that airlines

should be able to search closed trunks or parcels

which persons seek to have placed aboard an airliner.

And such searches, under today's circumstances,

should be deemed reasonable within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment.

If an airlines' agent--for any reason--has a sus-

picion that a parcel or trunk contains a bomb or a deadly

-22-

weapon, petitioner contends that the airlines should be

able to search such a container to remove any doubt as

to its contents. The average, i.e., reasonable, air-

lines customer would expect the airlines to do so; in-

deed, the average air traveler would probably demand

that the airlines do so before such a passenger boarded

an airliner for a flight.

Although counsel for petitioner would not, person-

ally, enjoy an airlines' agent opening counsel's suitcase

and searching through his dirty laundry, counsel would

be irate if he learned that the airlines had suspected

that his or another's luggage contained a bomb or a con-

cealed weapon and permitted the luggage to be placed

aboard the same airliner as counsel was to board and,

yet, did not search the suspected luggage. Similarly,

counsel would be irate if the airlines did not search an

item of airfreight which was suspected of containing a

destructive device and was placed aboard the same air-

liner that counsel was to board unless that item was

searched to be certain that there was no danger.

True, in this case the airlines' agent did not sus-

pect that respondent's footlocker contained a bomb or

a weapon. But this fact, in petitioner's view, is irrele-

vant under the teachings of Katz.

It is irrelevant because it is not the subjective

motivation or private purpose of a search by an airlines'

agent but the reasonable expectation to privacy of the

person's whose effects are searched that, under Katz,

determines whether the effects are within the protection

of the Fourth Amendment.

And petitioner respectfully submits that any per-

son who delivers into the hands of a commercial

-23-

passenger airlines a trunk which is to be placed aboard

a passenger airliner does and should not reasonably be-

lieve that the contents of such a trunk are secure from

the scrutiny of airlines' agents.

Furthermore, a reasonable person would expect

the airlines which searched a trunk because it suspected

that it contained a bomb and which in fact found a bomb,

to report it and deliver it to the police. Thus, a reason-

able person would not only not expect that his trunk was

secure from the scrutiny of airlines' agents but, also,

would not in the event a bomb were found expect that it

would be secure from the scrutiny of the police. And,

on this premise, a reasonable person would not expect

that a trunk which was searched by airlines' agents and

which revealed narcotics instead of a bomb would be

secure from the scrutiny of the police.

Therefore, in petitioner's view, footlockers such

as were attempted to be shipped by respondent in this

case are not protected by the Fourth Amendment as that

amendment has been construed by this Honorable Court

in Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S. 347, and the

majority of the court below erred and misinterpreted

the Fourth Amendment and this Honorable Court's

decisions construing said amendment when it was held

that the marijuana in respondent's footlockers were

"effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment.

2. When a person who as a condition to a vol-

untary, bilateral contract with an interstate

air carrier must declare the contents of a

trunk so the carrier may determine whether

it will accept it for shipment and, if so, what

rate will be charged under a contract which

-24-

incorporates the right of the carrier, at its

option, to inspect the contents of said trunk,

such a person does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy as to the contents of

said trunk.

It is clear that when respondent delivered his foot-

locker (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) to United Airlines for

shipment to San Francisco he voluntarily entered into a

bilateral contract with United Airlines. No finding was

made to the contrary. Nor has respondent contended to

the contrary. Therefore, from the airbill used by the

airlines (e. g., Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6), respondent

entered into a contract which was subject to certain

terms and conditions.

One of the terms or conditions of respondent's

contract with United Airlines was that it was "... mu-

tually agreed that the shipment described is accepted

. Subject to the governing classifications and tariffs.

«+. Said classifications and tariffs are available for

inspection by the parties hereto and are hereby incor-

porated into and made part of this contract. 6 The

same provisions apply in respondent's contract with

Western Airlines.

It is equally clear--no finding having been made

nor contention raised to the contrary--that the tariffs

incorporated into respondent's contract with United Air-

lines and Western Airlines provide that ſalll shipments

6/ See, "CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT," No. 2, as

set forth on the reverse side of the original of the air-

bills, Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 6.

-25-

are subject to inspection by the carrier, but the carrier

shall not be obligated to perform such inspection. 14

It is to be further noted that in filling out the con-

tract between the parties, respondent, among other

things, had to declare the value of the "clothing and

books" which he stated to be the contents of the foot-

locker he gave to United Airlines for shipment (R. T.,

pp. 10-14), and the value of the "books and dishes"

which he stated to be the contents of the footlocker he

gave to Western Airlines for shipment (R.T., p. 105).

Respondent did not have to ship his footlocker via

the airlines. Nor, apparently was he forced to ship the

footlockers with any common carrier--he had an auto-

mobile. Thus, respondent was not forced or otherwise

coerced into using a common carrier in order to trans-

port his footlockers and their contents to San Francisco.

Respondent elected to do so. He initiated the negotia-

tions. And he was free to withdraw his offer before it

was accepted.

If respondent wanted to keep the contents of his

footlockers secret, he could have taken them to San

Francisco by private automobile--or he could have

planned to smuggle them to San Francisco by some

means other than a common carrier which operates

under governmental regulations. His decision to enter

into a contract with United Airlines and with Western

Airlines was his own voluntary act. Therefore,

petitioner submits that respondent is bound by the terms

of his contracts.

see, Rule No. 24, C. A. B. No. 96.

If the airlines suspected that respondent's foot-

lockers did not contain what he had stated they con-

tained the airlines could have opened the footlockers to

determine their contents for the purpose of assessing

proper charges. (See Gold v. United States (9 Cir.

1967) 378 F.2d 588, 591.) And if by such an inspection

it was found that there had been an undercharge because

of respondent's fraudulent and deceitful misrepresenta-

tion of the footlocker's contents, petitioner assumes

that respondent would not contend that he would not be

liable for any additional charges which would be due.

By the same token, the evidence clearly shows

that the airlines do not ship contraband. (R.T., pp.

122-123,) Respondent's footlockers, i.e., Petitioner's

Exhibits 2 and t, did, in fact, contain contraband.

Respondent told Dowling that Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 5

contained clothing and books. (R.T., pp. 10-14.) Re-

spondent told Case that Petitioner's Exhibit 5 contained

books and dishes. (R.T., p. 105.) Respondent lied.

Respondent lied and he then urged that his foot-

lockers (which he voluntarily placed in the hands of

third persons under terms of a contract between him

and the third persons) were entitled to the protection of

the Fourth Amendment. Thus, respondent used the

Fourth Amendment as a sword, not asa shield. Re-

spondent used the Fourth Amendment to assist him in

requiring third parties unwittingly to assist him in a

nefarious, commercial enterprise. And he urged that

because of the Fourth Amendment when these third

parties discover the use which respondent had attempted

to make of them, said third parties must have their

eyes and lips forever sealed.

Petitioner respectfully submits that respondent

-27-

cannot use the Fourth Amendment in such a manner.

(Cf., Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U. 8. 62, 98

locker, United Airlines did only that which respondent

had agreed could be done and, by so doing, United Air-

lines not only discovered that respondent had lied but,

also, that he was committing a public offense.

Respondent waived his Fourth Amendment rights

as to his footlockers-if any he had--under the terms

and conditions of the contracts which he entered into

with United and Western Airlines.

And, contrary to the majority opinion below,

United Airlines had a legitimate business interest in

determining whether respondent's footlocker contained

marijuana. Dowling's suspicions (based on his exper -

ience, his knowledge, and the apparent circumstances)

were reasonably aroused. He Suspected that respond-

ent's footlocker contained marijuana, not clothing and

books. In petitioner's view, it is in the legitimate

interest of a common carrier--or any other reputable

business--not to want to assist in making contraband

narcotics available to peddlers and users.

persons. (Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S 347.)

"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even

in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth

-28-

Amendment protection. [Citations.]...." d. 389

U.S., at 351.)

In this case, respondent knowingly delivered into

the possession of a common carrier a footlocker. Asa

condition of the contract with the common carrier, e.g.,

United Airlines, to ship said footlocker for him, re-

spondent, among other things, agreed that the carrier

could inspect the contents of the footlocker. As part of

the contract, respondent publicly declared what the con-

tents of the footlocker were, albeit he lied in this re-

gard. A reasonable, honest person would not expect to

have privacy as to the contents of a footlocker under

these circumstances.

And petitioner respectfully submits that the man

whose expectations of privacy are the test under Katz

is not only a reasonable man but, also, an honest man.

By entering into a voluntary, bilateral contract with

the airlines respondent had to tell the airlines what was

in the footlockers. He had to disclose their contents.

If a reasonable man is assumed to be an honest man,

i.e., that a reasonable man would not expect that he is

entitled to lie in his business dealings and expect the

Constitution to shield him from his lie, then, in petition-

er's view, respondent's footlockers in this case were

not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

Similarly, a reasonable man would expect to be

held to the terms and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral

contract. It is true that the right of the airlines to in-

spect is incorporated by reference on the back of the

contract or airbill“ and that these terms and conditions

-29-

are printed in grey type. / But it is also true that this

grey type is clearly legible. And, furthermore, it is

tracted with the airlines to transport a large amount of

marijuana. 9/ And petitioner respectfully submits that

the average, i.e., reasonable, business man who de-

livers goods worth $50, 000. 00 to a carrier will read--

even the fine print--of any contract which he enters

into.

Thus, in this case the question is not solely wheth-

er respondent consented to a search of his footlockers

by either the airlines or the police. It is not whether

respondent waived the protection which the Fourth

Amendment afforded the contents of his footlockers.

Such questions assume that the contents of respondent's

footlockers were protected by the Fourth Amendment.

8/ See, People v. McGrew, supra, 1 Cal. 3d, n. 3,

p. 410.

A conservative value of the marijuana on the illi-

cit market would be $50,000.00. The gross weight of

Petitioner's Exhibit 2 was 112 pounds; the gross weight

of Petitioner's Exhibit 5 was 84 pounds; Petitioner's

Exhibit 8 contained 18 kilos of marijuana, i.e., approx-

the weight of the footlockers, wrapping paper, etc.

Assuming there was 225 pounds of marijuana and that

1,000 cigarettes can be made from a kilo of processed

marijuana (see People v. Walters (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d

834, 70 Cal. Rptr. 766, 770) respondent was transport-

ing enough marijuana to make over 100, 000 cigarettes.

At fifty cents a cigarette, this would be a retail price of

$50, 000. 00

-30-

The question in this case--and the first reason

why this Honorable Court should grant certiorari--is

whether respondent had any Fourth Amendment pro-

tection in the first place.

As the dissent in the court below states:

"In People v. Edwards (1969) 71 A.C.

1141, [80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P. 2d 713],

this court indicated that in determining

admissibility of evidence the significant

criterion is the defendant's 'reasonable

expectation of privacy' in maintaining

actual or constructive possession of the

objects at issue. While undoubtedly this

defendant hoped to avoid detection in ship-

ing contraband, I find it difficult to con-

clude that he had a reasonable expectation

of privacy when he shipped a footlocker by

an interstate carrier which had a right of

inspection given to it by the administrative

agency regulating the airline and its opera-

tions. This defendant declared to one car-

rier he was shipping clothing and books“

and to the other he represented he was

shipping "books and dishes.' The rates

charged for shipment were based on those

representations, which were knowingly

false. If, for any reason, an airlines em-

ployee doubted the shipments contained the

objects indicated, he had an unquestioned

right to open the containers for inspection.

This right of the airline is not diluted by

the fact that contraband was discovered--

which could not be shipped at any rate--

rather than some legal perishable commodity

-31-

which could be shipped at a rate dif-

ferent from that prescribed for cloth-

ing, books and dishes." (Emphasis in

original.) (1 Cal. 3d, 415.)

Yet the majority in the court below held that:

... The Fourth Amendment protec-

tion of effects“ includes securely closed

footlockers shipped through common car-

riers. Neither the language of the Fourth

Amendment, nor of any of the cases

interpreting the protection of that amend-

ment, suggest that warrants apply to

houses“ but not to effects. The excep-

tions to the requirements of a warrant

are based on circumstances and not on

categories of items. The requirement of

a warrant, unless otherwise excused,

applies to whatever is protected by the

Fourth Amendment. Gee Katz x. United

United States, [supra, 389 U.S. 347].)"

(Footnote omitted.) (1 Cal. 3d, 409-410. )

Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that

this Honorable Court should grant certiorari to answer

the question as to whether respondent in this case so

knowingly exposed to the public the contents of his foot-

lockers that their contents were not the subject of

Fourth Amendment protection. 12

10/ See Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347,

-32-

3. The decision below creates a conflict with

the decisions of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as to the ap-

plicability of the Fourth Amendment under

the facts of this case; under the federal

decisions there would not have been a vio-

lation of the Fourth Amendment, whereas

the majority of the court below found such

a violation; are interstate carriers to con-

duct their business under the decisions of

the several states, or under federal law?

In this case the airlines would not be sub-

ject to a civil action under the federal de-

cisions; are interstate airlines to be

subjected to possible civil actions in the

state courts for doing the same thing under

the same law, namely, the Fourth Amend-

ment?

In its opinion, the majority of the court below

relied upon a decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the proposition that in this case there was a

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The dissent below

takes issue with the majority on this point and points up

the conflict which the majority opinion creates with

other decisions of the United States Court of Appeals.

Thus, the majority of the court below states:

"The People argue in effect that any

waiver of Fourth Amendment protection,

for whatever limited purposes, results in

a waiver for all purposes. This contention

was rejected in Corngold v. United States,

367 F. 2d 1, 7, also involving a search of

-33-

baggage shipped through an airlines

freight service.

"Corngold relied on Stoner v. Califor-

nia (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 489 [11 L. Ed. 2d

856, 861, 84 8. Ct. 889], which rejected

the contention that implied consent of ac-

cess for any purpose results in consent

for all purposes: It is true * * that

when a person engages a hotel room he

undoubtedly gives "implied or express

permission" to "such persons as maids,

janitors or repairmen" to enter his room

"in the performance of their duties.

ll Citation. II But the conduct of the night

clerk and the police in the present case

was of an entirely different order. '

"In Corngold v. United States, supra,

367 F.2d 1, the court ruled that "Appel-

lant did not abandon his package; and mere

surrender of custody to a carrier did not

forfeit appellant's right to privacy.

Citations. II * * * Appellant's package,

securely wrapped and tied, was delivered

to the airline solely for transportation

from Los Angeles to New York, and the

inspection clause in TWA's tariff author-

ized examination only by the carrier itself.

(367 F.2d at pp. 7-8.)

"Stoner and Corngold recognize that the

scope of consent to an invasion of privacy

depends upon the circumstances. Other

cases involving implied limited consent to

an invasion of privacy make clear the

*

In

-34-

significance of the circumstances. Thus,

in United States v. Blok (D.C. Cir. 1951)

188 F.2d 1019, 1021, 88 App. D.C. 326,

the police searched the desk of an employ-

ee; the court, in holding the search un-

lawful, stated: 'No doubt a search of

{{the desk]] without her consent would

have been reasonable if made by some

people in some circumstances. Her of-

ficial superiors might reasonably have

searched the desk for official property

needed for official use.' (See also,

Cunningham v. Heinze (9th Cir. 1965) 352

F. 2d 1, 5, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968

[16 L. Ed. 2d 309, 86 S.Ct. 1274], following

Stoner. Compare searches properly within

the the implied consent to search in People v.

Plane, 274 A. C. A. 1, 4 [78 Cal. Rptr. 528]

[flandlord entered tenant's apartment to

shut off lights and oven]; In re Donaldson,

269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 510 [75 Cal. Rptr.

220] {[search of student's locker by school

vice principal]]; People v. Rightnour,

243 Cal. App. 2d 663, 666 [52 Cal. Rptr.

654] [[maid entered guest's room to clean

up]]; People v. Gonzales, 182 Cal. App. 2d

276, 277-278 [5 Cal. Rptr. 920] [[search

of knife-wounded victim by hospital person-

nel to determine identity]].)" (1 Cal. 3d,

411-412.)

response to this, the dissent below stated:

"The majority lean heavily on Corngold

v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 367 F. 2d

1. In Corngold the transportation agent

was initially contacted by government

-35-

package and asked him to open it. Our

case is factually closer akin to a more

recent Ninth Circuit decision which care-

fully circumscribes the Corngold rule:

Gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1967) 378

F. 2d 588, in which at pages 590-591, the

court held Corngold inapplicable to a

situation in which the transportation per-

sonnel, with 'suspicions aroused * * *

had no way to determine whether the con-

tents were fit for carriage and properly

classified except by opening them. This

the carrier had the right to do under its

tariffs.' Indeed, the instant case is strong-

er than Gold, for here there was no prior

direct contact between law enforcement

officers and the airline employee. Dowling

opened the footlocker at the direction of

his company supervisor, not upon police

suggestion.

"It was not a law enforcement agency

but Dowling who notified other airlines

about the defendant and his shipment. Pur-

suant to that warning Western Airlines'

employees Case and Sweeney observed the

defendant's footlocker and called United to

report. Fortuitously the police had then

arrived at United and they proceeded from

there to the Western offices. They noted

the footlocker pointed out to them by the

Western employees and could readily de-

tect from it 'an odor of marijuana.' This

justified the subsequent search and seizure.

(See my dissent in People v. Marshall

(1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 62 [69 Cal. Rptr. 585,

-36-

442 P. 2d 665]. )

As this court recently held in People

v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 123,

128 [74 Cal. Rptr. 294, 449 P. 2d 2301:

The conduct of a person not acting under

the authority of a state is not proscribed

by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments

of the federal Constitution. There are no

state standards for "search and seizure"

by a private citizen who is not acting as

an agent of the state or other governmental

unit. Therefore, acquisition of property

by a private citizen from another person

cannot be deemed reasonable or unreason-

able. (People v. Randazzo (1963) 220 Cal

App. 2d 768, 775-776 [34 Cal. Rptr. 65]

{{[citation]] cert. den., 377 U.S. 1000 [12

L. Ed. 2d 1050, 84 S. Ct. 1933] [[citations]],

and a motion to suppress evidence so ob-

tained cannot be made on the ground that

its acquisition constitutes an unreasonable

search and seizure under section 1538. 5.

Since the airline employees had a legal

right to inspect the footlockers, I can see

no impediment to their advising the police

of the presence of contraband and to the

police taking possession of and making

evidentiary use of the contraband displayed

to them. Indeed, that was the precise

situation in People v. Superior Court (1969)

supra, 70 Cal. 2d 123, in which a private

detective gave a copy of a tape recording

to law enforcement officers. We properly

declined to suppress the evidence prior to

-37-

trial. To the same effect is Wolf Low v.

United States (9th Cir. 1968) 391 F. 2d

61, 63, in which the court found proper

the ‘conduct of the airline in turning over

to the Government the fruits of its search

of the defendant's Suitcases, and the con-

duct of the Government in making use of

the information and evidence obtained by

the airline's search * * *!"' (1 Cal. 3d,

415-417.)

In petitioner's view, the majority below erroneous-

ly interpreted and erroneously applied Corngold to this

case. Corngold is inapposite to this case.

Nowhere in the record is there evidence that the

warning to be on the lookout for contraband came

directly from any police department. Mr. Dowling

(agent for United Airlines) stated, "I opened it up on

my own with no instructions from anyone except the

permission of the supervisor to do it." (R.T., p. 100.)

Mr. Dowling, in response to a question posed by re-

spondent stated: "I don't know where they [meaning his

supervisors] received the word from " (R.T., p.

100.) Further, Mr. Dowling stated: Il don't know for

sure who told our inspectors what. All I know is what

the scuttlebutt said, that it came through from Honolulu.

I don't know that for sure. It could have come from--

they could have dug it up on their own. I don't know. "

(R. T., p. 58.) .

The record shows that essentially we had this

Situation: We have a young air freight agent, Mr. Dowl-

ing, that has been so employed with United Airlines for

several years prior to the date in question. (R.T., p.

8.) Mr. Dowling was schooled (R.T., p. 67) and

-38-

obviously well-read in regard to the tariffs which govern

the day-to-day handling of air freight. (R.T., p. 23.)

The lead agent of the United Airlines air freight office

in San Diego told Mr. Dowling that he had received in-

formation from the United Airlines investigators in Los

Angeles (R.T., p. 46), that people were shipping nar-

cotics out of San Diego, and that they were coming out

in footlockers, brand new ones. Also Mr. Dowling was

given the approximate weights to look for, as footlockers

filled with narcotics generally were overweight (R.T.,

p. 33). With that background enters respondent.

Testimony shows that Mr. Dowling's suspicions were

aroused by respondent's appearance (R.T., p. 14), ner-

vous manner (R.T., p. 62), and the fact that the trunk

was heavy (R.T., p. 65) for the type of material stated

to be enclosed therein, i.e., clothes and books (R.T.,

p. 10). With Mr. Dowling's suspicions being reasonably

aroused, to the extent of suspecting that the trunk con-

tained marijuana (R.T., p. 39), he called his super-

visor. After relating the situation to his supervisor,

Mr. Dowling was given the "go ahead." (R.T., p. 36.)

The locker was opened, notwithstanding the supervisor's

authorization, because of Dowling's knowledge of tariff

regulations that authorize an inspection of any shipment,

and completely on his own without any thoughts as to

police rights to du this sort of thing. (R. T., p. 41.)

After Dowling opened the footlocker with a hammer

and nail, i. e., forcing the pins out of the hinges in the

back (R. T., p. 39), he called his supervisor back and

told him what he had found (R.T., p. 24) and at that time

was told to contact the police (R. T., p. 37). Mr. Dowl-

ing had at the depot no specific person (R. T., p. 75) or

number to call (R. T., pp. 37-38) so he was able only to

contact the City Police Department general information

number (R. T., p. 73) and they sent out an officer (R.

39

T., p. 25). The officer, Mr. Burgess, came alone

(R. T., p. 77) and after identifying himself (R. T., p.

77), was briefed by Dowling for about five to ten min-

utes (R. T., p. 78a) out in front by the counter area (R.

T., p. 78a) on what had taken place. (R. T., p. 78a.)

The majority of the court below, under these facts,

relied on the decision in Cor old v. United States (9

Cir. 1966) 367 F. 2d 1. But it is to be noted that the

majority opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in

Corngold held that under the facts of that case the initial

opening of the packages by the airlines was done at the

direct request of a law enforcement agent and, therefore

the airline agent was a state agent.

The facts of Corngold are to be distinguished from

the facts of this case. Indeed, in Gold v. United States,

Supra, 378 F.2d 588, the United States Court of Appeals

itself distinguished away the Corngold holding. In Gold

the court stated:

"In Corngold government agents ob-

served the defendant deliver packages to

a Trans-World Airlines agent at the Los

Angeles International Airport. When the

defendant departed, the government agents

informed the transportation agent that they

>

-40-

suspected that the packages contained

smuggled watches and that they would

like to inspect the shipment. They also

pointed out that the shipper had incor-

rectly filled out the airway bill. The

transportation agent testified that the

government agents asked him to open

the package. The employee initially

opened one package while the government

agents looked on, and then the agents

completed opening the package. They

found a number of small boxes inside the

large package and removed and opened

them. They found contraband watches

and marked the small boxes for future

identification.

"On this evidence the court sitting en

banc concluded that the search was in sub-

stance a search by the federal agents. It

found that the airline employee had par-

ticipated in the search solely to serve the

purposes of the government and that the

carrier had taken no action on its own be-

half when the mislabeling was revealed.

The search was without a warrant and the

covrt, finding no circumstances justifying

a search without a warrant, reversed the

defendant's conviction.

"The instant case differs from Corngold

in several significant respects. After in-

forming the manager of their suspicions

regarding the shipment, the government

agents left the premises. The manager,

after attending to some other business,

-41-

made the decision to investigate further.

The shipment was taken from the freight

area to the air freight room at the man-

ager's direction. No one else was

present while the manager and one other

employee opened one of the packages.

After finding the film and observing its

nature, the manager determined that the

matter 'should be someone else's business.

It was another 45 minutes to an hour after

discovering the films before he got around

to calling the government agents.

"We conclude that the initial search of

—ñꝛñ — — — nene

the 8 by the airline's em was

not a federal search but was an nd-

be o and they were not present when

it was opened. The agents had the same

right as any citizen to point out what they

suspected to be a mislabeled shipping

document, and they exercised no control

over what followed. What did follow was

the discretionary action of the airline's

manager and was not so connected with

government participation or influence as

to be fairly characterized, as was the

search in Corngold, as 'a federal search

cast in the form of a carrie; inspection. '

"While it might be expected that the

carrier would not ignore the packages

after being advised of the mislabeling by

government agents who obviously had more

-42-

than a citizen's interest in the shipment,

the carrier had sufficient reasons of its

own for pursuing the investigation. The

manager testified that packages sus-

pected of containing something other

than what was described on the air way-

bill were sometimes opened so that the

airline would know what was being carried

on its airplanes, and so that it could as-

sess proper charges. Despite the mana-

ger's inquiry, the government agents did

not reveal what they suspected the true

contents of the packages to be. His sus-

picions aroused, the manager had no way

to determine whether the contents of the

packages were fit for carriage and prop-

erly classified except by opening them.

This the carrier had the right to do under

its tariffs.

"These same independent interests of

the airline were relied upon by the gov-

ernment in Corngold to support the posi-

tion that the search was nothing more than

a carrier inspection carried out pursuant

to the inspection clause of the airline's

tariff. Here the facts support that theory.

In Corngold they did not. The court below

was correct in denying appellant's motion

to suppress the films. (Emphasis added.)

(378 F.2d, 590-591. )

Thus, in this case, all law enforcement did was

to alert United Airlines to salient facts. Indeed, there

was not even the direct communication between law en-

forcement and the airlines in this case as there was in

Gold.

43

That the majority below erred by holding Corn-

gold applicable in this case is also made clear by three

other decisions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit--all of which were before the

court below. 11/

The first case, Wolf Low v. United States (9 Cir.

1968) 391 F. 2d 61, cert. denied, 4 Cr. L. 4038, is dis-

cussed in the above quoted portion of the dissent in the

court below.

/ Corngold v. United States, supra, 367 F. 2d 1,

was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc. Gold v. United States,

Supra, 378 F.2d 588, was decided after Corngold. If

it assumed that the two decisions were irreconcilable

it could be urged that Gold overruled Corngold. Thus,

Corngold was decided by a majority of the court in an

opinion written by Circuit Judge Browning in which

Circuit Judges Hamley, Jertberg, Merrill, Koelsch and

Ely concurred (i.e., a total of six circuit judges); two

dissenting opinion were filed, one by Circuit Judge

Barnes, in which Chief Circuit Judge Chambers con-

curred and the second in which Circuit Judge Duniway

dissented separately and concurred in part in the dis-

sent of Circuit Judge Barnes (i.e., a total of three cir-

cuit judges dissented). Gold was decided by a unani-

mous panel of three circuit judges, two of whom were

among the majority in Corngold; thus, the decision in

Gold was written by Circuit Judge Madden and con-

curred in by Circuit Judges Jertberg and Browning (who

wrote for the majority in Corngold). Therefore if one

subtracts the two circuit judges who decided Gold from

the majority in Corngold (i. e., 6 minus 2 equals 4) and

(Continued on next page.)

-44-

The second case is United States v. Spencer (9

Cir. 1969) F. 2d (No. 22,623-A, decided

June 22, 1969). In Spencer the court held in circum-

stances more persuasive than present in this case that

the opening of a footlocker by an airline employee pur-

suant to the Civil Aeronautics Board inspection rule,

supra, was not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.

Corngold was held by the court to be inapposite.

Similarly, in the third case, Clayton v. United

States (9 Cir. 1969) 413 F. 2d 297, the court upheld an

airline search of an air express shipment on the ground

that the initial discovery of the heroin was the result of

a private search and that the subsequent acts of the

police were justified because of the exigencies of the

case. Corngold was inapposite.

Thus, it is clear that if this case had been re-

viewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit a violation of the Fourth Amendment would

not have been found. Yet the majority of the court be-

low, relying on a decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that there was a

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The two results would be different despite the fact

(Continued from preceding page. )

adds these two circuit judges to the dissenters in Corn-

gold (i. e., 3 plus 2 equals 5) the vote in Corngold be-

comes 5 to 4. Then adding Circuit Judge Madden's

position in Gold, Gold on this basis overrules Corngold.

45

that the airlines“ agents performed the same acts and

were purportedly controlled by the very same law,

namely, the Fourth Amendment.

This, in petitioner's view, is an intolerable

situation. Interstate airlines operate in the several

states. Is their conduct to be lawful in one jurisdiction

and unlawful in another when the same law is supposed

to govern? Are interstate carriers to be left to defend

themselves against civil actions in the several states

for alleged violations of privacy or constitutional rights,

when under federal decisions there were no such viola-

tions ?

In California, lower courts are bound to follow

the decisions of courts of superior jurisdiction, wheth-

er these decisions are right or wrong. (See Auto Equity

es, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455,

20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P. 2d 937.) But California

courts are not bound by the decisions of lower federal

courts. (See People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal. App. 2d

292, 305, 47 Cal. Rptr. 734.) Thus, as the law of Cali-

fornia now stands under the majority opinion of the

California Supreme Court in this case, a lower court in

California would on the facts of this case be bound to

find that respondent's Fourth Amendment rights had

been violated, even though the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the same facts would

not find such a violation.

In petitioner's view, this Honorable Court should

grant certiorari to resolve the conflict and to provide a

uniform answer to all federal and State courts as well

as all interstate airlines. Similarly, whether this

Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v. California

(1964) 376 U.S. 483, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889, is

~46-

controlling in cases such as this should be resolved;

if it is, then the decisions of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gold, Wolf Low,

Spencer and Clayton should be reviewed since, implicit-

ly, these decisions are authority for the proposition

that Stoner is not controlling.

4. The decision below implicitly held that one

of the rules and regulations of the Civil

Aeronautics Board is violative of the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States.

Whether Rule and Regulation Number 96, Rule 24

of the Civil Aeronautics Board (which reads "INSPEC-

TION OF SHIPMENTS All shipments are subject to

inspection by the carrier, but the carrier shall not be

obligated to perform such inspection. ") be viewed as

private law, e.g., contractual rights created by parties

to a contract, or public law, e. E. governmental regu-

lations or statutes. Cooper v. California (1967) 386

U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788, teaches that

searches of air freight by airlines is reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment.

In Cooper this Honorable Court stated that searches

authorized by law can be, though they are not per se,

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In this case,

inspection of respondent's footlockers was authorized by

law--public or private. And whether respondent under

the circumstances of this case had actual knowledge of

this law is, in petitioner's view, just as irrelevant as

was whether the defendant in Cooper had actual knowl-

edge of the law which under the circumstances of his

case permitted the search of his automobile. The rele-

vant point in Cooper and in this case is that the laws which

-47-

authorized the respective searches were reasonable.

Without reiterating all of the reasons given in

this petition by petitioner under the first reason why

certiorari should be granted, the rule of the Civil Aero-

nautics Board above cited is reasonable. An interstate

airline should have the right to inspect containers which

it is asked to ship on airliners. This is especially so

when the carrier rightfully requires a declaration or

description of what it is that is being offered for ship-

ment and when what is being shipped has a direct bear-

ing on the rates which will be charged if the goods are

accepted for shipment by the carrier.

Any business enterprise should be able to protect

itself against fraud.

Any business enterprise should be able to protect

itself from taking into its possession that which is ille-

gal for any person to possess. Ifa person has no right

to possess something, €-£-, narcotics, surely that

person has no right to make a business enterprise ship

it.

And for the reasons given earlier in this petition

à commercial, interstate passeager airlines should have

the right to protect itself and its customers from dangers

which are common to all airlines.

The Civil Aeronautics Board rule at issue in this

case gives airlines under the jurisdiction of the Board

That the majority of the court below implicitly

48

rules that the Civil Aeronautics Board rule here under

review is violative of the Fourth Amendment is pointed

up in the dissent below, which states:

To deny the airline through its em-

ployees a right of inspection when they

doubt, for any reason, that a package

contains the objects represented by the

shipper to be therein, results in com-

pelling the airline, an innocent third

party, to blind itself to reality and thus

to assist the [respondent] in his illicit

commercial enterprise of transporting

marijuana. This is the unfortunate re-

sult of the majority opinion. (1 Cal. 3d,

415.)

Thus, this Honorable Court should grant cer

to determine whether airlines operating under a federal

regulatory agency can exercise the rights given to them

by that agency or whether, as is implicit in the majority

opinion of the court below, the particular rule or regula-

tions at issue in this case is violative of the Fourth

Amendment. This question needs to be answered by this

Honorable Court, otherwise interstate airlines must

operate under a rule of regulatory agencies which rule

can be interpreted differently by the federal courts as

well as the courts of the several states.

5. The decision below, as pointed up by the

dissent, may result in an airline's agent

(operating under the rules of the Civil Aero-

nautics Board and the terms and conditions

of a voluntary, bilateral contract between

the airline and a consignor) who by his inde-

pendent conduct determines that the con-

~49-

signed freight is contraband, being arrested

for a felony offense under the law of the

State of California in order to protect the

consignor's Fourth Amendment rights--even

though said Consignor has no right to possess

the contraband and the Contraband was given

into the possession of the airline's agent

under the circumstances set forth under the

first question presented in this petition.

The effect of the majority opinion in the court

below is that when an airline's agent opens a freight con-

tainer under circumstances such as those in this case

and obtains cause to believe the container contains kilos

of marijuana; closes the Container, calls and informs

the police of the facts, when the police arrive again re-

lates the facts to the police and takes the police to and

identifies the container in question, the airline's agent

must demand that the police produce a search warrant

As the dissenting opinion in the court below states:

"Section 11531 of the Health and Safety

Code makes it a felony for any person to

transport marijuana. The section applies

not only to one who arranges shipment, as

the defendant here, but it would also apply

to any airline employee who knowingly

transports marijuana. Thus if an airline

employee reasonably believes a shipment

contains a substance the transportation of

which is illegal, he has the right and per-

haps a duty to inspect the package or con-

tainer. The purpose of such inspection is

-50-

not to act as an agent of the police, but

to insulate himself from any criminal

culpability." (1 Cal. 3d, 414.)

And the dissent in the court below points up a very

real problem when it states that an airline's agent under

the circumstances of this case has an interest in insulat-

ing himself from criminal culpability.

Under the procedure which the majority of the

court below requires, an airline's agent in a case such

as this one, must place himself in a position where the

police could lawfully arrest the airline's agent, e.g. ,

for possession of marijuana in violation of Section 11530

of the California Health and Safety Code, a felony.

The elements of unlawful possession of marijuana

under California law are (1) dominion and control (2)

knowledge of its presence and (3) knowledge of its nar-

cotic nature. (People v. Layne (1965) 235 Cal. App. 2d

188, 193, 45 Cal. Rptr 110.)

The police must have reasonable cause to make

an arrest without a warrant. But reasonable cause

means such a state of facts as would lead a man of

ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientious-

ly entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the per-

son to be arrested is guilty of a crime. (People v.

Lindogan (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d 466, 27 Cal. Rptr. 905.)

And the experience of an officer may be considered in

determining whether he has reasonable cause to arrest.

(People v. Sullivan (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d 767, 51 Cal.

Rptr. 778.)

Therefore, under facts such as those in this case,

since the airline's employee was a reliable person

=§3-

present in the apartment at the time the police entered,

a search of the opaque bag under the law which was then

applicable would have been lawful as an incident to a

valid arrest. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 69 Cal.

2d, at 61.)

In petitioner's view, it is unreasonable and con-

trary to logic--especially to the logic of a lay business-

man who is conducting a legitimate enterprise-- to

place a person such as an airline's agent in a position

where he could be arrested because the Fourth Amend-

ment protects a shipper's privacy as to the contents of

a container of putative freight which has been given into

the possession of the airline's agent under the circum-

stances set forth under the first question presented in

this petition.

As mentioned earlier in this petition, under the

majority opinion in the court below, respondent was and

is permitted to use the Fourth Amendment as a sword.

Under the procedure which is required by the majority

opinion in the court below respondent is allowed to

wield his Fourth Amendment sword in such a manner as

to strike and injure third persons who want no part in

respondent's criminal acts and who want to assist in

suppressing criminal acts of persons such as respond-

ent.

In petitioner's view, this Honorable Court should

grant certiorari in this case to determine whether

citizens who in the course of exercising legal rights--

given by a federal agency and a voluntary, bilateral con-

tract--must place themselves in a position where they

could be criminally culpable as the price for "getting

involved" and in assisting in the suppression of crime.

-53-

6. The majority opinion in the court below im-

plicitly held that a person's effects have

more protection under the Fourth Amend-

ment in the circumstances of this case than

those same effects would have had if they

had been in respondent's automobile; that

such is the implicit holding of the majority

in the court below is clear since the Court

of Appeal of the State of California express-

ly ruled that respondent's footlockers in

this case were not entitled to Fourth Amend-

ment protection under the decisions of this

Honorable Court which hold that a police

officer may search a vehicle without a

warrant, without consent and not as an in-

cident to an arrest if the officer has reason-

able cause to believe that the vehicle contains

contraband.

The starting point in any search and seizure case

is whether, under the facts and circumstances presented,

the search or seizure was reasonable. Cooper v. Cali-

fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788.

And the object or Subject of the search must be

considered. That is, automobiles, for instance, are

not entitled to the same protection as homes because an

automobile is mobile. Therefore, the police may search

an automobile without Consent, without a warrant and

without the search being incident to an arrest if there is

probable cause to believe that the automobile contains

contraband, the instrumentality of a crime, or evidence

relating to a specific crime. ke v. Taylor Implement

Mfg. Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 216, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 88 S. Ct.

1472; People v. Madero (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d 107, 11i,

70 Cal. Rptr. 159; People v. Morrison (1968) 258 Cal.

-54-

App. 2d 75, 65 Cal. Rptr. 445, 449.)

Also the exigencies of the circumstances must be

considered. Thus, when a person or object is about to

leave the jurisdiction by air, it is a factor to be con-

sidered. (See, People v. Crovedi (1967) 253 Cal. App.

2d 739, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349; * (1967) 257

Cal. App. 2d 98, 64 Cal. Rptr. 637.

In the case at bar, either Officer Burgess or

Agent McLaughlin, or both, had probable cause to be-

lieve that Petitioner's Exhibit 2 contained marijuana

after Dowling explained what had gone to pass prior to

Burgess' arrival--which includes Dowling's observations |

of the inside of Petitioner's Exhibit 2 as well as the cir-

cumstances surrounding its acceptance by him and the

exhibit's outward appearance. (Cf., People v. Barcenas,

supra, (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 405.)

And since the police may search an automobile

without a warrant, without consent, and not as an inci-

dent to an arrest if the police have probable cause to

believe the automobile contains contraband, a fortiori,

the police should have authority to do the same with

luggage, etc., under the circumstances of this case.

That is, since respondent's footlockers were placed in

the hands of a common carrier, since he was required

to disclose the contents of the footlockers as part of the

contract for shipment of same, since a condition of the

contract granted the airlines the right to inspect the

12/ That the exigencies are to be considered was

acknowledged by the California Supreme Court in People

v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442

P. 2d 665.

-55-

footlockers, since respondent elected to place his foot-

lockers and their contents into the stream of transpor-

tation via a common carrier, since without prompt

action the footlockers would soon be shipped and there-

by easily lost to any surveillance, certainly such foot-

lockers should not be entitled to more protection than

is afforded by the Fourth Amendment to an automobile.

Since respondent was using footlockers to further

his nefarious commercial activity, petitioner submits

commercial activities loses the character of a private

residence. (Cf., Lewis v. United States (1966) 385 U. 8.

206, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S.Ct. 424, DU

Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that

assuming the Fourth Amendment gave the footlockers in

question some degree of protection, the searches of

said footlockers by the law enforcement agents under

the circumstances of this case was nonetheless reason-

Honorabie Court as followed by the courts of California,

respondent's footlockers were not entitled to Fourth

13/ Whether the officers involved had sufficient time

to obtain a search warrant is irrelevant. That is not

the test. Cooper v. California Supra, 386 U.S. 58.

Assuming the police had three hours within which to

obtain a search warrant, petitioner disagrees that on

a Sunday evening in June such was sufficient time to

obtain a search warrant.

-56-

Amendment protection after the police lawfully obtained

probable cause to believe they contained contraband.

Thus, the Court of Appeal stated:

"When Dowling, based upon his pre-

vious experience, recognized marijuana

in the footlocker, his report to the police

gave them probable cause to believe the

footlocker contained contraband. Where

the police have probable cause to believe

an automobile contains marijuana they

may make a warrantless search of it not

incident to arrest. [Emphasis in the

original.] (Dyke v. Taylor Implement

Mig. Co., 391 U.S. 216 [88 S.Ct. 1472];

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,

149 [45 S.Ct. 280, 283-284]; People x.

Madero, 264 A. C. A. 126, 129.) The rule

has its basis in the mobility of motor

vehicles. In Carroll v. United States

supra, the rule was formulated, in part,

upon an analogy to goods in the course of

transportation, which Congress has

historically treated differently with regard

to search authorization than it has goods

in a fixed dwelling or other building.

(Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S.

132 at pp. 150-153 [45 8. Ct. at pp. 284-

285]. )

"Here McGrew had placed the two foot-

lockers and the suitcase in the course of

transportation. One of two things was

bound to happen unless the police seized

them. Either they would be shipped out

of the jurisdiction to San Francisco or the

-57-

owner might return and remove the ship-

ments from transit.

"It is our opinion the rule allowing a

warrantless search of motor vehicles,

not incident to an arrest, where the

police have probable cause to believe

contraband is present, applies with equal

reason to goods in the course of trans-

portation. Support for this view is found

in Hernandez v. United States, 353 F. 2d

Se

624.

"Having probable cause to search the

footlocker at United Air Lines the police

had equal cause to search the footlocker

at Western Airlines. It was shipped by a

person matching the description of the

United shipper, who gave the same name

and told the same travel plans." (75 Cal.

Rptr. 381; see Appendix B to this petition. )

Petitioner, therefore, believes this Honorable

Court should grant certiorari in this case to determine

whether under the circumstances of this case (I e., as

set forth under the first question presented in this

-58-

petition ) respondent's footlockers could or could not be

searched by the police after the police had lawfully ob-

tained probable cause to believe the footlockers con-

tained contraband--just as a person's automobile which

does not travel at nearly the speed of goods placed in

the course of air transportation may be searched with-

out a warrant, without consent and not as an incident to

an arrest if the police have probable cause to believe

the automobile contains contraband. Under the decisions

of this Honorable Court, as followed by the California

courts, if respondent in this case had returned to the

airport and took his footlockers back from the airlines

before the police had arrived and had put them in his

car, then left his car for one reason or another, peti-

tioner submits that knowing what they did the police

could have searched respondent's car and, upon finding

the footlockers, could have looked into them and could

have seized the contraband therein. If there is a dis-

tinction between what could have been done by the police

had the footlockers been removed to respondent's car

and what was actually done in this case, petitioner re-

spectfully submits that this Honorable Court should

make the distinction.

under the circumstances of this case re-

spondent had not waived by his contracts

any protection which the Fourth Amendment |

gave his effects in his footlockers; this

holding was based on federal decisions, but

it fails to acknowledge this Honorable

Court's decisions in Katz v. United States,

supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v. United

States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, which are

authority contrary to the holding of the

majority of the court below.

7. The majority of the court below held that |

-59-

The majority of the court below stated that "(t]he

People argue in effect that any waiver of the Fourth

Amendment protection, for any limited purpose, results

in a waiver for all purposes..." (1 Cal. 3d, 411.)

The majority then cite Cor Id v. United States supra,

367 F. 2d 1, as authority that such a contention has been

rejected by the federal courts. Further, the majority

in the court below stated that the United States Court of

Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in Corngold relied upon this

Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v. California,

Supra, 376 U.S. 483.

Petitioner's contention was not and is not that any

waiver of Fourth Amendment protection is a waiver for

all purposes. Petitioner's precise position was and is

that under the circumstances of this case (as set forth

under the first question presented in this petition) re-

spondent had not Fourth Amendment protection as to the

effects contained in his footlockers; secondly, that the

search was authorized by law, which law was and is

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; thirdly, if

respondent had Fourth Amendment protection as to the

contents of his footlockers, by analogy to vehicles, once

the police had probable cause to believe the footlockers

Contained contraband such footlockers could be searched

by the police; and, finally, whatever--if any--protection

respondent had as to the contents of his footlockers

under the Fourth Amendment, he waived such protection

under the terms and conditions of the contract into

which he entered with the airlines.

That Corngold v. United States, Supra, 367 F.2d 1,

and Stoner v. California, Supra, 376 U.S. 483, are in-

apposite to this case has been made clear under the

second question presented in this petition.

-60-

Furthermore, the majority of the court below does

not explain why the decisions of this Honorable Court in

Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v.

United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, are not controlling.

The majority in the court below would, however,

be exactly right if it had stated that petitioner has and

does contend that respondent in this case did by his con-

tracts with the airlines waive any Fourth Amendment

protection as to the contents of his footlockers. This

position is predicated upon this case in the sense that

all facts and circumstances, i.e., the cumulative cir-

cumstances, lead to such a conclusion. And, on this

point, petitioner, in the court below as well as in this

Honorable Court, relies upon the decisions of this Hon-

orable Court in Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S.

347, and Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624.

In the opinion of this Honorable Court in Katz,

the twenty-second footnote reads, in part, as follows:

"A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth

Amendment requirements. (389 U.S. 358.) As

authority for this statement, the decision of this Honor-

able Court in Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624,

is cited.

The opinion of this Honorable Court in Zap reads,

in part, as follows:

J... [T]he law of searches and sei-

zures as related in the decisions of this

Court is the product of the interplay of

the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But

these rights may be waived. And when

petitioner, in order to obtain the Govern-

-61-

ment's business, specifically agreed to

permit inspection of his accounts and

records, he voluntarily waived such

claim to privacy which he otherwise

might have had as respects business

documents related to those contracts

[328 U.S. 628. ]

Wk K * * *

„... Though consent to the inspection

did not include consent to the taking of

the check, there was no wrongdoing in

the method by which the incriminating

evidence was obtained. The waiver of

such rights to privacy and to immunity

as petitioner had respecting this business

undertaking for the Government made

admissible in evidence all the incriminatin

facts ..." (Emphasis added. ) (328 U.S.

630.)

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. qustice

Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred, dissented

from the opinion of this Honorable Court in Zap. How-

ever, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented only from the

lawfulness of the actual seizure of the incriminating

evidence in this case, since the search warrant under

which it was taken was defective. Mr. Justice Frank-

furter agreed"... that the Government had authority,

as a result of its contract with the petitioner and the

relevant statutes, to inspect the petitioner's books and

records. Accordingly, the search was legal and

the inspectors could testify to what they gleaned from

the inspection..." (Emphasis added.) (328 U.S. 632.

62-

It is to be noted that in Zap, federal statutes

required as a condition of a defense contract that the

contractor give consent to an inspection of its books, .

etc. Zap held such a condition to be valid. And the

condition was held to be a valid waiver of Fourth Amend-

ment protection. Thus, Zap invoked a voluntary, bi-

lateral contract; if the petitioner in Zap did not like the

conditions offered by the government (just as if respond-

ent in this case did not like the conditions offered by the

airlines), he was free to take his business elsewhere.

But having entered into the contract, he was held to its

terms--even in a criminal action.

It is, of course, true that in Zap the waiver of

Fourth Amendment protection was set forth as an ex-

press condition in the contract; in this case the inspec-

tion clause was incorporated into respondent's contracts

by reference. But petitioner respectfuliy submits that

this difference is not a controlling distinction in this

case.

It is not a controlling distinction in this case be-

cause respondent was not merely bringing personal

baggage to an airport to check with the airlines as an

incident to respondent's travels, as would the average

traveler, student or serviceman. To the contrary, re-

spondent entered into contracts with a common, inter-

state carrier to ship freight. And the freight respond-

ent sought to have shipped was of substantial value, i.e.,

as stated earlier, $50,000.00. A person who ships

property worth $50, 000. 00 is, in petitioner's view, one

who should reasonably be held to a standard of care in

his business affairs that would require him to investi-

gate all aspects of his contracts for the shipment of

such property. The capital investment, in common busi-

ness logic, dictates that a reasonable man would take

~63-

care to understand all of the Conditions and details of

his contracts.to ship valuable property.

Therefore, petitioner believes this Honorable

Court should grant certiorari to resolve the conflict

created by the majority of the court below between the

States and this Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v.

California on the one hand, and this Honorable Court's

States on the other hand, when such decisions are to be

applied in cases such as this one.

8. The majority decision of the court below

holds while a seizure of respondent's foot-

locker by the airlines for the police would

be reasonable within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, a search of said foot-

lockers, i.e., looking into them, by the

police under the tota] circumstances of this

case was unreasonable within the meaning

of said Fourth Amendment.

The majority opinion of the court below, in part,

states:

None of the exceptions apply to the

United or western Airlines searches of

the footlockers. When the footlocker

checked with United Airlines was searched

by the police, McGrew 'was neither pres-

ent nor arrested until several hours after

the search.' (People v. Marshall, supra,

69 Cal. 2d 51, 61.) His whereabouts

were similarly unknown when the foot-

locker checked with Western Airlines was

searched. Nor was there any likelihood

64

that the lockers would be removed or the

contraband destroyed; both footlockers

were safely in the custody of the airlines.

Both footlockers had been shipped on a

‘space available' basis, so that the air-

lines were not even under a contractual

obligation to ship the footlockers before

a warrant could be obtained." (1 Cal. 3d

410.)

Thus, the majority of the court below direct that

in a case such as this the airlines, after its agents

have opened freight containers, which reveal contra-

band and have so informed the police, should, in effect,

seize such freight containers and hold them until such

time as the police arrive with a warrant, authorizing

their search and seizure.

The majority below states that since respondent's

footlockers were being shipped on a space available

basis, the airlines were under no contractual obligation

or duty to put the footlockers on the first space avail-

able. Petitioner submits that such would not have been

and is not the understanding of parties to a contract such

as is present in this case. That is, the parties would

have understood that the airlines would ship air freight

on the first space available, not on whatever space was

available which the airlines decided to use at some

future date. 14/

14/ The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of

California points up the actual exigencies in this case:

"Here McGrew had placed two footlockers and the suit-

case in the course of transportation. One of two things

(Continued on following page)

65-

Further the majority of the court below expressly

states that the footlockers were "safely in the custody"

of the airlines. If the airlines were the custodians of

respondent's footlockers with the right to inspect the

contents thereof, 15/ and if the airlines could, as the

majority of the court below apparently holds, seize the

footlockers and hold them for the police:

(1) Why could the airlines not give a valid con-

sent to the police authorizing the police to search, Ee: .

look into, the footlocker,

(2) Why did the police not have a good faith

basis to believe that the airlines had apparent authority

to give such a consent,

(3) And what makes a search of the footlockers

by the police without a warrant unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment while a seizure of the footlockers

for the police by the airlines is not unreasonable under

said Fourth Amendment?

(Continued from preceding page. )

was bound to happen unless the police seized them.

Either they would be shipped out of the jurisdiction to

San Francisco or the owner might return and remove

the shipments from transit. . (75 Cal. Rptr. 381; see

Appendix B to this petition. )

15/ Which right, however, the majority of the court

below held was limited to an inspection .. for the

airlines' own purposes." (1 Cal. 3d 413.)

— —

-66-

The Fourth Amendment protects persons against

unreasonable searches or seizures.

Petitioner respectfully submits that under the

procedure which the majority of the court below re-

quires in this case, a reasonable seizure under the

Fourth Amendment is converted into an unreasonable

search under the Fourth Amendment for no reasonable

reason.

Therefore, petitioner believes that this Honorable

Court should grant certiorari in this case to answer the

important question of what is a reasonable seizure, as

distinguished from what is a reasonable search, under

the Fourth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

Since the Constitution does not guarantee to a

_ possessor of contraband that his acts will not be dis-

covered so long as he is in his residence but only that

his residence will not be subjected to an unreasonable

search or seizure (People v. Lawson (1969) 1 Cal. App.

3d 729, 81 Cal. Rptr. 883), petitioner respectfully sub-

mits that the same Constitution does not guarantee to a

shipper of contraband in a case such as this that his

acts will not be discovered but only that his effects will

not be subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure.

In this case, petitioner, for each separate reason

and more importantly because of their combined and

cumulative effect, respectfully submits to this Honor-

able Court that the searches in this case were not vio-

lative of the Fourth Amendment, that the suppression of

the evidence on the ground that the evidence had been

67

obtained in violation of

is erroneous and that r

grant certiorari to

below.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS C. LYNCH,

Attorney General

WILLIAM E. JAMES,

Assistant Attorney General

JAMES DON KELLER

District Attorney

RICHARD H. BEIN

Deputy District Attorney

Attorneys for Petitioner.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — California v. McGrew · 398 U.S. 909 | Frix