Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — California v. McGrew
Supreme Court brief1970
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
5
SUBJECT INDEX
_ OPINIONS BELOW
"JURISDICTION ..
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS AROSE .
1. The decision below misinterpreted the
protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment as construed by Katz v.
United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, in
that the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection in the decision below was
determined by the subjective intent or
purpose of the searcher rather than
the reasonable expectation to privacy
of the person's whose effects were
searched
A. Whatever the subjective motivation
or private purpose of a search by
an airlines' agent may be is irrel-
event to whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy
ii
SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)
Page
as to the contents of a trunk, etc.,
delivered into the hands of a pas-
senger airlines for shipment on an
—. ᷣ ᷣ Ä., Sah ecw bie tee 21
2. When a person who as condition to a
voluntary, bilateral contract with an
interstate air carrier must declare
the contents of a trunk so the carrier
may determine whether it will accept
it for shipment and, if so, what rate
will be charged under a contract which
incorporates the right of the carrier,
at its option, to inspect the contents of
said trunk, such a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as to the contents of said trunk . 23
. The decision below creates a conflict
with the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
as to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment under the facts of this
case; under the federal decisions
there would not have been a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, whereas
the majority of the court below found
such a violation; are interstate car-
riers to conduct their business under
the decisions of the several states, or
under federal law? In this case the
airlines would not be subject to a civil
~iii-
SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)
Page
action under the federal decisions; are
interstate airlines to be subjected to
possible civil actions in the state
courts for doing the same thing under
the same law, namely, the Fourth
6 ¹¹⁰⁰ P , 9 32
The decision below implicitly held that
one of the rules and regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board is violative of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States .......... 46
The decision below, as pointed up by
the dissent, may result in an airline's
agent (operating under the rules of the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the terms
and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral
contract between the airline and a con-
signor) who by his independent conduct
determines that the consigned freight
is contraband, being arrested for a
felony offense under the law of the State
of California in order to protect the
consignor's Fourth Amendment rights--
even though said consignor has no right
to possess the contraband and the con-
traband was given into the possession of
the airline's agent under the circum-
stances set forth under the first ques-
tion presented in this petition........
-iv-
SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)
6. The majority opinion in the court below
implicitly held that a person's effects
have more protection under the Fourth
Amendment in the circumstances of
this case than those same effects would
have had if they had been in respond-
ent's automobile; that such is the im-
plicit holding of the majority in the
court below is clear since the Court of
Appeal of the State of California ex-
pressly ruled that respondent's foot-
lockers in this case were not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection under the
decisions of this Honorable Court which
holds that a police officer may search a
vehicle without a warrant, without con-
sent and not as an incident to an arrest
if the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contra-
%%% ee TRS Bie 880) 0.8
7. The majority of the court below held
that under the circumstances of this
case respondent had not waived by his
contracts any protection which the
Fourth Amendment gave his effects in
his footlockers; this holding was based
on federal decisions, but it fails to ac-
knowledge this Honorable Court's deci-
sions in Katz v. United States, supra,
389 U.S. 347, and Zap v. United
States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, which are
Page
-V-
SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)
authority contrary to the holding of the .
majority of the court below ........ 58
8. The majority decision of the court be-
low holds while a seizure of respond-
ent's footlocker by the airlines for the
police would be reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a
search of said footlockers, i.e., look-
ing into them, by the police under the
total circumstances of this case was
unreasonable within the meaning of said
Fourth Amendment ............. 63
„„ 8 a 5 ai oe i 6 a
-vi-
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX "A"
Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State
of Californian AP eer Al
Dissenting Opinion by Mosk, J. Al4
APENDIX B“
Opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State
Kn CROs CF TO Ho Bl
APPENDIX "C"
United States Constitution, Fourth Amend-
ID C1
APPENDIX D*
Civil Aeronautics Board of Regulation
ge ES ee
-vii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
CASES
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,
(1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 20 Cal. Rptr.
321, 369 P. ad 9877. 45
Clayton v. United States (9th Cir. 1969)
eta baci AE A 44,46
Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58,
17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S.Ct. 788 .... 18, 19, 46,
| 53, 55
Corngold v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 18, 39, 43,
We ME Fo ĩᷣͤ KK 44, 59, 63
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co. (1968)
391 U.S. 216, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 88
* ˙· OTe 53
Gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1967)
S76 F.2d 66s CD PSE bos 18, 26, 39,
42, 43, 44, 46
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U. S.
347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 3, 5, 13,
18, 19, 21,
22, 23, 27, 28
Lewis v. United States (1966) 385 U. S. 206,
17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S. Ct. 424. 5
-viii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)
Page
CASES
People v. Anderson (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d
125, 71 Cal. Rptr. 823x777. 51
People v. Barcenas (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d
405, 59 Cal. Rptr. 419 ......... 51, 54
People v. Crovedi (1967) 253 Cal. App. 2d
739, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349 ......... 54
People v. Lawson (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 729,
81.Cal. Retr. 6 66
People v. Layne (1965) 235 Cal. App. 2d
188, 45 Cal. Rptr. 110 ......... 50
People v. Lindogan (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d
466, 27 Cal. Rptr. 905 ......... 50
People v. Lurie (1967) 257 Cal. App. 2d 98,
G6 Gal: pte. GSE . ov cs cece 54
People v. Madero (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d
., FO-Gal. Rete. 16D 2 ccc scce se 53
People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51,
69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P. 2d 665. 12, 17, 51,
52, 54, 63
People v. Morrison (1968) 258 Cal. App. 2d
75, 65 Cal. Rptr. 444335. 53
People v. Smith (1969) 268 Cal. App. 2d
764, 74 Cal. Rete. %
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)
CASES
People v. Sullivan (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d
767, 51 Cal.Rptr. 778 .........
People v. Walters (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d
834, 70 Cal.Rptr. 766 .........
People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal. App. 2d
292, 47 Cal. Rptr. 73424.
Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U. S. 483,
11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 84 S. Ct. 8889
United States v. Spencer (9th Cir. 1969)
F. 2d (No. 22,623-A,
decided June 22, 1969) ))
Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U.S.
62, 98 L. Ed. 503, 74 S. Ct. 354...
Wolf Low v. United States (9th Cir. 1968)
. ³¹ »] eee Cee
Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U. 8. 624,
90 L. Ed. 1477, 66 S. Ct. 1277
page
50
29
18, 43, 46
18, 58, 60,
61, 62, 63
-X-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. CITED (Continued)
Page
CALIFORNIA CODES
Health and Safety Code
Section 1153ͤ000⁸uʒuu r 50
Section 11530. 55553. 5
Section 11311121 5
Penal Code
Section 1238, subdi vision 5
See 1% „ „ „ „ „„ „„ 5
e beecevre 5
CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT
Rule 2 ę . 7
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REGULATIONS
Regulation No. 96, Rule No. 24 4, 25, 44,
UNITED STATES CODES
Title 28, Section 1257 (3) 3
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment l 3, 4, 5, 12,
19, 21, 2 6, 27, 29, 30,
2, 23, 2
32, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52
9, 60, 6
53, 55, 5 2, 63, 65, 66
, U
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1969
No.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
KENNETH T. McGREwW,
1
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
The State of California requests that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of California entered on the above-
entitled cause on December 17, 1969.
*
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of
California rendered on February 17, 1969, and reported
as People v. McGrew, 269 A.C.A. 851, 75 Cal. Rptr.
378, is set out as Appendix B to this petition. The grant-
ing of a hearing by the Supreme Court of the State of Cal-
ifornia vacated that opinion. The opinion of the Supreme
Court of the State of California affirming the trial court's
order dismissing the action after having ordered the sup-
pression of petitioner's evidence against respondent,
rendered on December 17, 1969, is reported as People
v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 462 P. 2d
1, and is set out as Appendix A to this petition.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the State of California
rendered its decision and judgment in this case on De-
cember 17, 1969. On January 19, 1970, the Supreme
Court of the State of California issued its remittitur,
thereby making final its judgment in this case.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
California in this case affirms the order of the Superior
Court for the State of California dismissing the criminal
action instituted by petitioner against respondent for
felony narcotics offense under the laws of the State of
California. The decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of California in this case also affirmed the order of
the Superior Court for the State of California suppressing
all of the incriminating evidence which was in the posses-
sion of respondent and which was the basis for having
instituted a criminal prosecution against respondent in
the Superior Court of the State of California. Therefore,
pat
the decision of the California Supreme Court of the State
of California in this case is final and bars petitioner
from taking any further action against respondent.
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Honor-
able Court under section 1257(3) of Title 28 of the
United States Code and Rule 22 of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, since a right has been
especially set up and claimed under the Constitution of
the United States.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States as construed by this Honorable
Court in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 19
L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507, would a person who must,
as conditions to a voluntary, bilateral contract with an
interstate carrier, declare the contents of a trunk 80
that the carrier may determine whether it will accept it
for shipment and, if so, what rate will be charged under
a contract which incorporates a right on the part of the
carrier, at its option, to inspect the contents of said
trunk, have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the
agents of the interstate carrier and the contents of such
a trunk, especially when, in addition, the interstate
carrier is a commercial passenger airline which the
general public would expect--if not demand--to inspect
the contents of any trunk or parcel that the agents of the
airline had any reason to believe contained a potentially
dangerous device?
2. Are interstate carriers operating under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board to conduct
their business according to the construction placed on
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
er
States by the Supreme Court of the State of California
and the several states or by the United States Court of
Appeals; if such a carrier were to do an act which did
not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights as con-
strued by the United States Court of Appeals, could the
carrier be subjected to a civil action in the courts of
California for having violated the same person's Fourth
Amendment rights based on the same act because the
Supreme Court of the State of California has declared
said act to be violative of the Fourth Amendment?
3. Is Rule and Regulation of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Number 96, rule 24 which states: "INSPECTION
OF SHIPMENTS All shipments are subject to inspection
by the carrier, but the carrier shall not be obligated to
perform such inspection." violative of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
4. Must an agent of an interstate airline, operating
under the rules and regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and terms and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral
contract between the airline and a consignor, who by his
independent conduct determines that the consigned
freight is contraband subject himself to a possible felony
arrest under the laws of the State of California in the
interest of the consignor's purported Fourth Amendment
rights when the consignor has no lawful right td possess
the contraband and has delivered it into the possession
of the airline's agent under the circumstances set forth
in the first question as presented in this petition?
5. Does a person's effects have more protection
under the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances
set forth in the first question presented in this petition,
than those same effects would have if they were in an
automobile ?
—
whe
6. Under this Honorable Court's decisions in
Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v.
United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 90 L. Ed. 1477, 66
8. Ct. 1277, and under the circumstances of this case,
did respondent waive his rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment?
7. If under the circumstances of this case it
would not have been violative of the Fourth Amendment
for the airlines to seize respondent's trunks at the re-
quest of state law enforcement agents, why was it vio-
lative of the Fourth Amendment for the airlines to permit
state law enforcement agents to search the same trunks?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The grand jury for the County of San Diego in-
dicted respondent, in count one, for transporting mari-
juana in violation of Section 11531 of the California
Health and Safety Code, ia count two, for possessing
marijuana for sale in violation of Section 11530. 5 of the
California Health and Safety Code, both felony offenses.
After pleading not guilty and waiving trial by jury, re-
spondent brought a pretrial motion to suppress all
evidence of the charged offenses under Section 1538.5 of
the California Penal Code and to dismiss the indictment
under Section 1385 of the California Penal Code. Both
motions were granted by the trial court.
Petitioner appealed the trial court's dismissal of
the indictment based upon its order suppressing the evi-
dence. (California Penal Code, Section 1238, subdivision
7.) The Court of Appeal for the State of California,
Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in a unanimous
decision reversed the orders of the trial court in an
-6-
opinion reported as People v. McGrew (1969) 269 A. C. A.
851, 75 Cal. Rpt. 378. (See, Appendix B to this petition. )
Respondent did not petition the Court of Appeal for a re-
hearing but did file a timely netition for a hearing of the
case in the Supreme Court of the State of California.
The Supreme Court of the State of California
granted respondent's petition for a hearing of the case,
thereby vacated the prior decision of the Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court of the State of California, by a vote
of 4 to 3, affirmed the trial court's order suppressing
the evidence and the dismissal of the indictment in an
opinion reported as People v. McGrew (1969) 1 Cal. 3d
404, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 462 P.2d1. (See, Appendix A
to this petition.) On January 19, 1970, the Supreme
Court of the State of California issued its remittitur
thereby rendering its decision final.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As its summary of the facts, petitioner sets forth
the facts as stated by the Supreme Court of the State of
California in its opinion in this case. 2
1, People v. McGrew, supra, 1 Cal.3d, pp. 406-408,
Appendix A, pp. Al - A5. This statement, however, is
inaccurate in one respect, namely, it seems to state that
a "federal" narcotics agent arrived on the scene and took
charge of the investigation. Though the reporter's
transcript shows that a federal narcotics agent did make
an appearance at the scene, the narcotics agent who per-
formed those acts, etc., attributed to the "federal" nar-
cotics agent in the California Supreme Court's majority
(Continued on next page. )
a
"McGrew brought a new, securely
locked footlocker to the United Airlines
freight service at the San Diego airport
in the afternoon of June 25, 1967, to be
shipped to San Francisco. The freight
agent, one Dowling, observed that Mc-
Grew was wearing walking shorts and a
T-shirt and had ‘quite long' hair. Dow-
ling's supervisor had told him to be on
the alert for footlockers and suspicious
people, and so on, that they had been
shipping marijuana, * * * ' to check out
any suspected contraband, to 'see what
is in there, and if it is marijuana * * *
call the police. ' Dowling was suspicious,
because of McGrew's ‘general appearance, '
and because the locker, which McGrew
declared contained books and clothes, had
an ‘exceptional weight' of 112 pounds,
(Continued from preceding page. )
opinion was an agent of the state, i.e., California Bur-
eau of Narcotics Enforcement. This is more clearly
shown in the facts as set forth by the California Court of
Appeal in this case. (See, Appendix B, pp. B-2 - B-4. )
In this regard, petitioner believes the statement of
facts set forth by the California Court of Appeal (Appen-
dix B, ibid.) to be a fair and accurate statement. Nor,
in petitioner's view, could respondent take issue with the
Court of Appeal's statement since he did not petition that
court for a rehearing. (See, Rule 29(b) of the California
Rules of Court. )
oGu
although Dowling admitted that the weight
was consistent with a shipment of two-
thirds clothes and one-third books.
"After McGrew paid for the shipment
and left, Dowling called his supervisor,
who told him to open up the footlocker
to see what it contained. Using a nail
and hammer to knock out the hinge pins,
Dowling opened up the locker a couple
of inches, just enough to see what was
in there.' He observed several bricks
or small packages, wrapped in brown
paper or newspaper. He could not see
the contents of the packages and he did
not open any of them. He closed the lid
of the footlocker and after calling his
supervisor again, called the police.
"San Diego Police Officer Burgess
came, and Dowling told him what had
happened, and he said he would like to
see IIthe locker]].' Dowling took him
back and opened it up and showed him
the footlocker. The officer removed and
inspected one of the packages. A federal
narcotics agent then arrived, removed
and examined the packages, and decided
that the packages contained marijuana.
2, The federal narcotics agent testified, Burgess did
not. Dowling's testimony concerning the actions of
Burgess is not challenged.
-9-
The officers inquired about fill, to weigh
down the emptied footlocker, and Dowling
furnished ballast. Using the ballast and
one brick of marijuana, the officers re-
packed the locker for shipment to San Fran-
cisco.
"Dowling notified other airlines about
McGrew and the shipment. About eight
p. m. McGrew brought a blue footlocker,
which he said contained books and dishes,
to the Western Airlines freight service,
where it was received by the freight clerk,
one Case, who wrote up the airbill, and
accepted the footlocker from McGrew. A
fellow employee named Sweeney called
United Airlines to tell them about the foot-
locker. The federal narcotics officer in-
volved in the United Airlines transaction
and two other officers went to the Western
Airlines freight office. The footlocker
was closed and locked. The federal nar-
cotics agent detected an odor of marijuana'
by compressing the top of the footlocker
and asked Sweeney and Case to open it,
although they 'were under no obligation
to do so.' Sweeney and Case opened the
footlocker, on the suggestion of one of
the officers, by knocking 'the hinge pins
out of the rear,' using a hammer and nail.
Sweeney opened up the lid, and the federal
agent removed and opened the packages,
which were wrapped in brown paper. The
footlocker was then repacked in the same
manner as the one checked with United
Airlines.
-10-
"About 11 p.m., McGrew returned to
the Western Airlines counter, purchased
a ticket for San Francisco, and checked
a suitcase. Case notified officers and
told them that he had last seen McGrew |
walking through the terminal in the direc-
tion of the restaurant. The officers, Case
and Dowling, went to the restaurant and
found McGrew sitting at the end of the
counter. Both Case and Dowling identified j
him, and the officers placed him under
arrest. An officer found a Western Air-
lines baggage claim ticket in searching
the person of McGrew. The officer re-
turned to the Western Airlines luggage
counter with the baggage claim ticket and
secured the suitcase. He opened it and
found marijuana.
"The United Airlines employee, Dowling,
testified that at the airlines training school
he had been instructed that 'we had the
right to inspect shipments;' that an agent
could open anything that arouses your
suspicions;' that the concern of the airlines
was for ‘aircraft safety, for improperly
declared goods going at a cheaper rate,
and for overvalued goods, such as a TV
set claimed to be good but in fact with the
picture tube * * * kicked in. He could
not recall being instructed to check to see
whether contraband was being shipped.
"He testified in connection with the
McGrew search that he was not concerned
about aircraft safety or rate structures:
ais
that when he opened up the locker he was
looking for one thing, to determine wheth-
er marijuana was contained in the locker.
He did not, however, smell marijuana
before opening the locker.
He further testified that in searching
the footlocker he was following his orders
| to assist the police; that he Suggested and
furnished ballast to the police in response
to their inquiry about fill, to weigh down
the emptied footlocker and that in so doing
he was following his orders to assist the
| police; that before the McGrew incident,
he had opened two other footlockers, in
the presence of the police, having obtained
the combination to the locks from the police;
that he found contraband in the two lockers,
and that he knew of two other footlockers
having been opened by fellow employees, in
which contraband was not found.
"The People stipulated that the officers
did not have a search warrant for either
search. ®
-12-
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS AROSE
In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of
California held that because the marijuana itself was
not in “plain view"3/ of the law enforcement officer
when he arrived at the airport, a search warrant was
needed for the officer to search, i.e., look into, and
to seize respondent's footlockers. The majority then
made it clear that its holding on this point was predi-
cated on the Fourth Amendment as construed by this
Honorable Court; thus the majority held:
3/ in People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 69
Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P. 2d 665, a majority of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that "plain view" meant what
was apparent to the sense of sight, i.e., an object was
not in plain view" if it could be smelled or heard but
not seen. The majority in Marshall held that marijuana
in an opaque bag which police officers unquestionably
knew to contain the marijuana because of prior inform-
ant received by a reliable information and because of
the odor emanating from the bag was not in "plain view"
to the officers and therefore the bag could not be
searched, i.e., looked into, and seized without a search
warrant. The bag in Marshall was found in an apart-
ment which the police had lawfully entered for the pur-
pose of finding and arresting the defendant; the police
found no one in the apartment, but while looking for the
defendant they found the bag. Citing decisions of this
Honorable Court, the majority in Marshall held that
there was no basis to conduct a search of the bag as
found in the apartment since:
(Continued on following page.)
-13-
"Our decision in Marshall is not
limited to dwelling houses. The Fourth
Amendment protection of 'effects' in-
cludes securely closed footlockers
shipped through common carriers. Neith-
er the language of the Fourth Amendment,
nor of any of the cases interpreting the
protection of that amendment, suggest that
warrants apply to houses“ but not to
‘effects. ' The exceptions to the require-
ment of a warrant are based on circum-
stances and not on categories of items.
The requirement of a warrant, unless
otherwise excused, applies to whatever
is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
(See Katz v. United States, (supra, 389 U.S.
347, 356-35 J.)“ (1 Cal. 3d 409-410; footnote
omitted. )
(Continued from the preceding page.)
"... "There was no question of violence,
no movable vehicle was involved, nor
was there an arrest or imminent destruc-
tion, removal, or concealment of the
property intended to be seized.' [Citation.]
They made no move to obtain a warrant
ol arrest or of search, although time per-
mitted it. [Citation.] IITImere was no
probability of material change in the situa-
tion during the time necessary to secure
such warrant. Moreover, a short period
of watching would have prevented any such
possibility. (Citation. ]“ dd., 69 Cal.
Rptr. p. 591.)
-14-
It is also clear that the majority opinion of the
California Supreme Court in this case relied upon the
decisions of this Honorable Court and the United States (
Court of Appeals as the controlling authority for the
proposition that respondent had not waived his rights
under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the majority in
this case stated:
"Corngold relied on Stoner v. Cali-
fornia (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 489, which
rejected the contention that implied con-
sent of access for any purpose results in
consent for all purposes: It is true
that when a person engages a hotel room
he undoubtedly gives "implied or express
permission" to "such persons as maids,
janitors or repairmen" to enter his room
"in the performance of their cuties."
[{Citation.]] But the conduct of the night
clerk and the police in the present case
was of an entirely different order.
"In Corngold v. United States, supra,
367 F.2d 1, the court ruled that 'Appel-
lant did not abandon his package; and
mere surrender of custody to a carrier
did not forfeit appellant's right to privacy.
llcitations. ]] * * * Appellant's package,
securely wrapped and tied, was delivered
to the airline solely for transportation
from Los Angeles to New York, and the
inspection clause in TWA's tariff author-
_ ized examination only by the carrier itself.
(367 F. 2d at pp. 7-8.)
"Stoner and Corngold recognize that
the scope of consent to an invasion of
-15
privacy depends upon the circumstances.
Other cases involving implied limited con-
sent to an invasion of privacy make clear
the significance of the circumstances.
Thus, in United States v. Blok (D.C. Cir.
1951) 188 F. 2d 1099, 1021, the police
searched the desk of an employee; the
court, in holding the search unlawful,
stated: No doubt a search of {[the desk]
without her consent would have been
reasonable if made by some people in
some circumstances. Her official su-
periors might reasonably have searched
the desk for official property needed for
official use.' (See also, Cunningham v.
Heinze (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F. 2d 1, 5,
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968, following
Stoner. Compare searches properly
within the implied consent to search in
People v. Plane, 274 A. C. A. 1, 4
Illandlord entered tenant's apartment
to shut off lights and oven]; In re
Donaldson, 269 A.C.A. 593, 594 [[search
of student's locker by school vice princi-
palll: People v. Rightnour, 243 Cal. App.
2d 663, 666 [[maid entered guest's room
to clean up}]; People v. Gonzales, 182
Cal. App. 2d 276, 277-278 [[search of
knife-wounded victim by hospital person-
nel to determine identity]].)" (1 Cal. 3d,
p. 411.)
That the majority opinion of the California Supreme
Court draws into issue important questions of federal law
is pointed up by the dissent in this case. Thus, the dis-
sent on this point states:
-16-
"The majority lean heavily on Corn-
gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1966)
367 F.2d 1. In Corngold the transporta-
tion agent was initially contacted by
government agents who directed him to
a specific package and asked him to open
it. Our case is factually closer akin to
a more recent Ninth Circuit decision
which carefully circumscribed the Corn-
. gold rule: Gold v. United States (1967)
378 F.2d 588, in which at pages 590-591,
the court held Corngold inapplicable to a
situation in which the transportation per-
sonnel, with 'suspicions aroused * * * had
no way to determine whether the contents
were fit for carriage and properly classi-
fied except by opening them. This the
carrier had the right to do under its
tariffs.' Indeed, the instant case is
stronger than Gold for here there was no
prior direct contact between law enforce-
ment officers and the airline employee.
Dowling opened the footlocker at the dir-
ection of his company supervisor, not
upon police suggestion.
"It was not a law enforcement agency
but Dowling who notified other airlines
about the defendant and his shipment.
Pursuant to that warning Western Airlines
employees Case and Sweeney observed
the defendant's footlocker and called
United to report. Fortuitously the police
had then arrived at United and they pro-
ceeded from there to the Western offices.
They noted the footlocker pointed out to
It is clear, therefore,
for the state courts to
-17-
them by the Western employees and
could readily detect from it ‘an odor of
marijuana.' This justified the subse-
quent search and seizure. (See my dis-
sent in People v. Marshal] (1968) 69 Cal.
2d 51, 62.)
"kee * &
"Since the airline employees had a
legal right to inspect the footlockers, I
can see no impediment to their advising
the police of the presence of contraband
and to the police taking possession of
and making evidentiary use of the contra-
band displayed to them. Indeed, that was
the precise situation in People v. Superior
Court (1969) supra, 70 A. C. 129, in which
à private detective gave a copy of a tape
recording to law enforcement officers.
We properly declined to suppress the evi-
dence prior to trial. To the same effect
is Wolf Low v. United States (9th Cir.
1968) 391 F. 2d 61, 63, in which the court
found proper the ‘conduct of the airline
in turning over to the Government the
fruits of its search of the defendant's
suitcases, and the conduct of the Gov-
ernment in making use of the informa-
tion and evidence obtained by the airline's
search * * t (1Cal. 3d, 415-417.)
that this case points up the need
understand the application of the
-18-
decisions of the United States Court of Appeal4/ and of
this Honorable Court®/ in cases such as this one. It is
also evident that the interstate carriers and other feder-
al agencies have a need for a decision of this Honorable
Court to guide them in the conduct of their affairs.
The majority of the California Supreme Court also
ruled that there was no merit to petitioner's contention
that under the facts and circumstances of this case the
law enforcement authorities had a good faith basis to
believe that the airlines agents had apparent authority
to consent to a search of the footlockers which respond-
ent had under his contract given to the airlines for ship-
ment. On this issue, the dissent states:
"As the majority concede, People v.
Hill (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 550, 554, holds
that a search is not unreasonable if made
with the consent of a third party whom the
police reasonably and in good faith believe
has authority to consent to their search
* * *. The police belief was entirely
reasonable and in good faith here, since
it was founded upon the right legally con-
ferred upon the airlines to inspect ship-
4/ Specifically, Corngold v. United States, supra,
367 F. 2d 1; Gold v. United States, supra, 378 F. 2d
588; Wolf Low v. United States, supra, 391 F. 2d 61,
cert. denied, 4 Cr. L. 4038.
5, Specifically, Stoner v. California, supra, 376
U.S. 483; Cooper v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 58;
Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624; and Katz
v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347.
-19-
ments in their Possession, the inspections
actually made pursuant to that right, the
discovery of contraband legally ineligible
for shipment, the reporting of these
events to the police and the disclosure to
the police of the actual contraband." (1
Cal.3d, 417.)
Thus, the majority opinion of the California Supreme
Court draws into issue the Constitutionality of a rule of
Amendment; in Cooper v. California, supra, 386 U.S.
58, 61, this Honorable Court Stated that a search au-
thorized by state law may or may not be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and in this case it is clear
that the majority of the California Supreme Court held
the authority of a rule of the Civil Aeronautics Board is
REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED
1. The decision below misinterpreted the pro-
tection afforded by the Fourth Amendment
as construed by Katz v. United States (1967)
389 U.S. 347, in that the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection in the decision below
was determined by the subjective intent or
purpose of the searcher rather than the
reasonable expectation to privacy of the per-
son's whose effects were searched.
-20-
In the decision below, a majority of the California
Supreme Court, under the facts, stated that Dowling, an
employee of United Airlines, testified that.. in
connection with the McGrew search that he was not con-
cerned about aircraft safety or rate structures; that
when he opened up the locker he was looking for one
thing, to determine whether marijuana was contained in
the locker..." (1 Cal. 3d, 408.) The majority then
held that... in the instant case, McGrew might
have expected that an airlines employee would inspect
where a danger or inconsistency was observed, but he
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate police
searches for contraband. He may not be held to have
consented to searches by police officers totally unre-
lated to the interests of the airlines in hope that contra-
band may be discovered. [Citation.]" (1 Cal.3d, 412.)
And, in this regard, later in its opinion the majority
stated that"... [a]s pointed out above, the consent to
inspection by the airlines was limited to consent for
inspection for the airlines“ own purposes." (1 Cal. 3d,
413.)
Thus, although respondent may well have con-
sented to an inspection of his footlocker by the airlines,
if the airlines were to make such an inspection for its
own purposes or because the airlines observed a
"danger or inconsistency, " in this case the airlines
agent searched respondent's footlocker solely because
the agent believed it contained contraband, viz. , mari-
juana. Therefore, the majority held that respondent
could reasonably expect that if the airlines inspected
the contents of his footlocker for its own purposes and
learned the truth, i.e., that it contained kilos of mari-
juana instead of the declared "books and clothes, " his
effects, i.e., his marijuana, would remain secure
from the police. This was so, according to the majority
21
because respondent ".. , may not be held to have con-
sented to searches by police officers totally unrelated
to the interests of the airlines in hope that contraband
may be discovered. [Citations. ]" (1 Cal. 3d, 412.)
Petitioner respectfully submits that this holding
of the majority misses the point made by this Honorable
Court in Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347.
It misses the point in this case because under
Katz the question is not whether respondent may have
consented to a search by the police after the airlines
had opened his footlocker and observed marijuana. The
question in this case, in petitioner's view, is whether
respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy
from the police as to the contents of his footlocker
after the airlines for its own reasons opened it and ob-
served marijuana.
A. Whatever the subjective motivation or pri-
vate purpose of a search by an airlines'
agent may be is irrelevant to whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as to the contents of a trunk, etc. ,
delivered into the hands of a passenger air-
lines for shipment on an airliner.
Petitioner respectfully submits that airlines
should be able to search closed trunks or parcels
which persons seek to have placed aboard an airliner.
And such searches, under today's circumstances,
should be deemed reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
If an airlines' agent--for any reason--has a sus-
picion that a parcel or trunk contains a bomb or a deadly
-22-
weapon, petitioner contends that the airlines should be
able to search such a container to remove any doubt as
to its contents. The average, i.e., reasonable, air-
lines customer would expect the airlines to do so; in-
deed, the average air traveler would probably demand
that the airlines do so before such a passenger boarded
an airliner for a flight.
Although counsel for petitioner would not, person-
ally, enjoy an airlines' agent opening counsel's suitcase
and searching through his dirty laundry, counsel would
be irate if he learned that the airlines had suspected
that his or another's luggage contained a bomb or a con-
cealed weapon and permitted the luggage to be placed
aboard the same airliner as counsel was to board and,
yet, did not search the suspected luggage. Similarly,
counsel would be irate if the airlines did not search an
item of airfreight which was suspected of containing a
destructive device and was placed aboard the same air-
liner that counsel was to board unless that item was
searched to be certain that there was no danger.
True, in this case the airlines' agent did not sus-
pect that respondent's footlocker contained a bomb or
a weapon. But this fact, in petitioner's view, is irrele-
vant under the teachings of Katz.
It is irrelevant because it is not the subjective
motivation or private purpose of a search by an airlines'
agent but the reasonable expectation to privacy of the
person's whose effects are searched that, under Katz,
determines whether the effects are within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment.
And petitioner respectfully submits that any per-
son who delivers into the hands of a commercial
-23-
passenger airlines a trunk which is to be placed aboard
a passenger airliner does and should not reasonably be-
lieve that the contents of such a trunk are secure from
the scrutiny of airlines' agents.
Furthermore, a reasonable person would expect
the airlines which searched a trunk because it suspected
that it contained a bomb and which in fact found a bomb,
to report it and deliver it to the police. Thus, a reason-
able person would not only not expect that his trunk was
secure from the scrutiny of airlines' agents but, also,
would not in the event a bomb were found expect that it
would be secure from the scrutiny of the police. And,
on this premise, a reasonable person would not expect
that a trunk which was searched by airlines' agents and
which revealed narcotics instead of a bomb would be
secure from the scrutiny of the police.
Therefore, in petitioner's view, footlockers such
as were attempted to be shipped by respondent in this
case are not protected by the Fourth Amendment as that
amendment has been construed by this Honorable Court
in Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S. 347, and the
majority of the court below erred and misinterpreted
the Fourth Amendment and this Honorable Court's
decisions construing said amendment when it was held
that the marijuana in respondent's footlockers were
"effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment.
2. When a person who as a condition to a vol-
untary, bilateral contract with an interstate
air carrier must declare the contents of a
trunk so the carrier may determine whether
it will accept it for shipment and, if so, what
rate will be charged under a contract which
-24-
incorporates the right of the carrier, at its
option, to inspect the contents of said trunk,
such a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the contents of
said trunk.
It is clear that when respondent delivered his foot-
locker (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) to United Airlines for
shipment to San Francisco he voluntarily entered into a
bilateral contract with United Airlines. No finding was
made to the contrary. Nor has respondent contended to
the contrary. Therefore, from the airbill used by the
airlines (e. g., Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6), respondent
entered into a contract which was subject to certain
terms and conditions.
One of the terms or conditions of respondent's
contract with United Airlines was that it was "... mu-
tually agreed that the shipment described is accepted
. Subject to the governing classifications and tariffs.
«+. Said classifications and tariffs are available for
inspection by the parties hereto and are hereby incor-
porated into and made part of this contract. 6 The
same provisions apply in respondent's contract with
Western Airlines.
It is equally clear--no finding having been made
nor contention raised to the contrary--that the tariffs
incorporated into respondent's contract with United Air-
lines and Western Airlines provide that ſalll shipments
6/ See, "CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT," No. 2, as
set forth on the reverse side of the original of the air-
bills, Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 6.
-25-
are subject to inspection by the carrier, but the carrier
shall not be obligated to perform such inspection. 14
It is to be further noted that in filling out the con-
tract between the parties, respondent, among other
things, had to declare the value of the "clothing and
books" which he stated to be the contents of the foot-
locker he gave to United Airlines for shipment (R. T.,
pp. 10-14), and the value of the "books and dishes"
which he stated to be the contents of the footlocker he
gave to Western Airlines for shipment (R.T., p. 105).
Respondent did not have to ship his footlocker via
the airlines. Nor, apparently was he forced to ship the
footlockers with any common carrier--he had an auto-
mobile. Thus, respondent was not forced or otherwise
coerced into using a common carrier in order to trans-
port his footlockers and their contents to San Francisco.
Respondent elected to do so. He initiated the negotia-
tions. And he was free to withdraw his offer before it
was accepted.
If respondent wanted to keep the contents of his
footlockers secret, he could have taken them to San
Francisco by private automobile--or he could have
planned to smuggle them to San Francisco by some
means other than a common carrier which operates
under governmental regulations. His decision to enter
into a contract with United Airlines and with Western
Airlines was his own voluntary act. Therefore,
petitioner submits that respondent is bound by the terms
of his contracts.
see, Rule No. 24, C. A. B. No. 96.
If the airlines suspected that respondent's foot-
lockers did not contain what he had stated they con-
tained the airlines could have opened the footlockers to
determine their contents for the purpose of assessing
proper charges. (See Gold v. United States (9 Cir.
1967) 378 F.2d 588, 591.) And if by such an inspection
it was found that there had been an undercharge because
of respondent's fraudulent and deceitful misrepresenta-
tion of the footlocker's contents, petitioner assumes
that respondent would not contend that he would not be
liable for any additional charges which would be due.
By the same token, the evidence clearly shows
that the airlines do not ship contraband. (R.T., pp.
122-123,) Respondent's footlockers, i.e., Petitioner's
Exhibits 2 and t, did, in fact, contain contraband.
Respondent told Dowling that Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 5
contained clothing and books. (R.T., pp. 10-14.) Re-
spondent told Case that Petitioner's Exhibit 5 contained
books and dishes. (R.T., p. 105.) Respondent lied.
Respondent lied and he then urged that his foot-
lockers (which he voluntarily placed in the hands of
third persons under terms of a contract between him
and the third persons) were entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, respondent used the
Fourth Amendment as a sword, not asa shield. Re-
spondent used the Fourth Amendment to assist him in
requiring third parties unwittingly to assist him in a
nefarious, commercial enterprise. And he urged that
because of the Fourth Amendment when these third
parties discover the use which respondent had attempted
to make of them, said third parties must have their
eyes and lips forever sealed.
Petitioner respectfully submits that respondent
-27-
cannot use the Fourth Amendment in such a manner.
(Cf., Walder v. United States (1954) 347 U. 8. 62, 98
locker, United Airlines did only that which respondent
had agreed could be done and, by so doing, United Air-
lines not only discovered that respondent had lied but,
also, that he was committing a public offense.
Respondent waived his Fourth Amendment rights
as to his footlockers-if any he had--under the terms
and conditions of the contracts which he entered into
with United and Western Airlines.
And, contrary to the majority opinion below,
United Airlines had a legitimate business interest in
determining whether respondent's footlocker contained
marijuana. Dowling's suspicions (based on his exper -
ience, his knowledge, and the apparent circumstances)
were reasonably aroused. He Suspected that respond-
ent's footlocker contained marijuana, not clothing and
books. In petitioner's view, it is in the legitimate
interest of a common carrier--or any other reputable
business--not to want to assist in making contraband
narcotics available to peddlers and users.
persons. (Katz v. United States, Supra, 389 U.S 347.)
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
-28-
Amendment protection. [Citations.]...." d. 389
U.S., at 351.)
In this case, respondent knowingly delivered into
the possession of a common carrier a footlocker. Asa
condition of the contract with the common carrier, e.g.,
United Airlines, to ship said footlocker for him, re-
spondent, among other things, agreed that the carrier
could inspect the contents of the footlocker. As part of
the contract, respondent publicly declared what the con-
tents of the footlocker were, albeit he lied in this re-
gard. A reasonable, honest person would not expect to
have privacy as to the contents of a footlocker under
these circumstances.
And petitioner respectfully submits that the man
whose expectations of privacy are the test under Katz
is not only a reasonable man but, also, an honest man.
By entering into a voluntary, bilateral contract with
the airlines respondent had to tell the airlines what was
in the footlockers. He had to disclose their contents.
If a reasonable man is assumed to be an honest man,
i.e., that a reasonable man would not expect that he is
entitled to lie in his business dealings and expect the
Constitution to shield him from his lie, then, in petition-
er's view, respondent's footlockers in this case were
not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, a reasonable man would expect to be
held to the terms and conditions of a voluntary, bilateral
contract. It is true that the right of the airlines to in-
spect is incorporated by reference on the back of the
contract or airbill“ and that these terms and conditions
-29-
are printed in grey type. / But it is also true that this
grey type is clearly legible. And, furthermore, it is
tracted with the airlines to transport a large amount of
marijuana. 9/ And petitioner respectfully submits that
the average, i.e., reasonable, business man who de-
livers goods worth $50, 000. 00 to a carrier will read--
even the fine print--of any contract which he enters
into.
Thus, in this case the question is not solely wheth-
er respondent consented to a search of his footlockers
by either the airlines or the police. It is not whether
respondent waived the protection which the Fourth
Amendment afforded the contents of his footlockers.
Such questions assume that the contents of respondent's
footlockers were protected by the Fourth Amendment.
8/ See, People v. McGrew, supra, 1 Cal. 3d, n. 3,
p. 410.
A conservative value of the marijuana on the illi-
cit market would be $50,000.00. The gross weight of
Petitioner's Exhibit 2 was 112 pounds; the gross weight
of Petitioner's Exhibit 5 was 84 pounds; Petitioner's
Exhibit 8 contained 18 kilos of marijuana, i.e., approx-
the weight of the footlockers, wrapping paper, etc.
Assuming there was 225 pounds of marijuana and that
1,000 cigarettes can be made from a kilo of processed
marijuana (see People v. Walters (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d
834, 70 Cal. Rptr. 766, 770) respondent was transport-
ing enough marijuana to make over 100, 000 cigarettes.
At fifty cents a cigarette, this would be a retail price of
$50, 000. 00
-30-
The question in this case--and the first reason
why this Honorable Court should grant certiorari--is
whether respondent had any Fourth Amendment pro-
tection in the first place.
As the dissent in the court below states:
"In People v. Edwards (1969) 71 A.C.
1141, [80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P. 2d 713],
this court indicated that in determining
admissibility of evidence the significant
criterion is the defendant's 'reasonable
expectation of privacy' in maintaining
actual or constructive possession of the
objects at issue. While undoubtedly this
defendant hoped to avoid detection in ship-
ing contraband, I find it difficult to con-
clude that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy when he shipped a footlocker by
an interstate carrier which had a right of
inspection given to it by the administrative
agency regulating the airline and its opera-
tions. This defendant declared to one car-
rier he was shipping clothing and books“
and to the other he represented he was
shipping "books and dishes.' The rates
charged for shipment were based on those
representations, which were knowingly
false. If, for any reason, an airlines em-
ployee doubted the shipments contained the
objects indicated, he had an unquestioned
right to open the containers for inspection.
This right of the airline is not diluted by
the fact that contraband was discovered--
which could not be shipped at any rate--
rather than some legal perishable commodity
-31-
which could be shipped at a rate dif-
ferent from that prescribed for cloth-
ing, books and dishes." (Emphasis in
original.) (1 Cal. 3d, 415.)
Yet the majority in the court below held that:
... The Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of effects“ includes securely closed
footlockers shipped through common car-
riers. Neither the language of the Fourth
Amendment, nor of any of the cases
interpreting the protection of that amend-
ment, suggest that warrants apply to
houses“ but not to effects. The excep-
tions to the requirements of a warrant
are based on circumstances and not on
categories of items. The requirement of
a warrant, unless otherwise excused,
applies to whatever is protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Gee Katz x. United
United States, [supra, 389 U.S. 347].)"
(Footnote omitted.) (1 Cal. 3d, 409-410. )
Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that
this Honorable Court should grant certiorari to answer
the question as to whether respondent in this case so
knowingly exposed to the public the contents of his foot-
lockers that their contents were not the subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. 12
10/ See Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347,
-32-
3. The decision below creates a conflict with
the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as to the ap-
plicability of the Fourth Amendment under
the facts of this case; under the federal
decisions there would not have been a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, whereas
the majority of the court below found such
a violation; are interstate carriers to con-
duct their business under the decisions of
the several states, or under federal law?
In this case the airlines would not be sub-
ject to a civil action under the federal de-
cisions; are interstate airlines to be
subjected to possible civil actions in the
state courts for doing the same thing under
the same law, namely, the Fourth Amend-
ment?
In its opinion, the majority of the court below
relied upon a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the proposition that in this case there was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The dissent below
takes issue with the majority on this point and points up
the conflict which the majority opinion creates with
other decisions of the United States Court of Appeals.
Thus, the majority of the court below states:
"The People argue in effect that any
waiver of Fourth Amendment protection,
for whatever limited purposes, results in
a waiver for all purposes. This contention
was rejected in Corngold v. United States,
367 F. 2d 1, 7, also involving a search of
-33-
baggage shipped through an airlines
freight service.
"Corngold relied on Stoner v. Califor-
nia (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 489 [11 L. Ed. 2d
856, 861, 84 8. Ct. 889], which rejected
the contention that implied consent of ac-
cess for any purpose results in consent
for all purposes: It is true * * that
when a person engages a hotel room he
undoubtedly gives "implied or express
permission" to "such persons as maids,
janitors or repairmen" to enter his room
"in the performance of their duties.
ll Citation. II But the conduct of the night
clerk and the police in the present case
was of an entirely different order. '
"In Corngold v. United States, supra,
367 F.2d 1, the court ruled that "Appel-
lant did not abandon his package; and mere
surrender of custody to a carrier did not
forfeit appellant's right to privacy.
Citations. II * * * Appellant's package,
securely wrapped and tied, was delivered
to the airline solely for transportation
from Los Angeles to New York, and the
inspection clause in TWA's tariff author-
ized examination only by the carrier itself.
(367 F.2d at pp. 7-8.)
"Stoner and Corngold recognize that the
scope of consent to an invasion of privacy
depends upon the circumstances. Other
cases involving implied limited consent to
an invasion of privacy make clear the
*
In
-34-
significance of the circumstances. Thus,
in United States v. Blok (D.C. Cir. 1951)
188 F.2d 1019, 1021, 88 App. D.C. 326,
the police searched the desk of an employ-
ee; the court, in holding the search un-
lawful, stated: 'No doubt a search of
{{the desk]] without her consent would
have been reasonable if made by some
people in some circumstances. Her of-
ficial superiors might reasonably have
searched the desk for official property
needed for official use.' (See also,
Cunningham v. Heinze (9th Cir. 1965) 352
F. 2d 1, 5, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968
[16 L. Ed. 2d 309, 86 S.Ct. 1274], following
Stoner. Compare searches properly within
the the implied consent to search in People v.
Plane, 274 A. C. A. 1, 4 [78 Cal. Rptr. 528]
[flandlord entered tenant's apartment to
shut off lights and oven]; In re Donaldson,
269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 510 [75 Cal. Rptr.
220] {[search of student's locker by school
vice principal]]; People v. Rightnour,
243 Cal. App. 2d 663, 666 [52 Cal. Rptr.
654] [[maid entered guest's room to clean
up]]; People v. Gonzales, 182 Cal. App. 2d
276, 277-278 [5 Cal. Rptr. 920] [[search
of knife-wounded victim by hospital person-
nel to determine identity]].)" (1 Cal. 3d,
411-412.)
response to this, the dissent below stated:
"The majority lean heavily on Corngold
v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 367 F. 2d
1. In Corngold the transportation agent
was initially contacted by government
-35-
package and asked him to open it. Our
case is factually closer akin to a more
recent Ninth Circuit decision which care-
fully circumscribes the Corngold rule:
Gold v. United States (9th Cir. 1967) 378
F. 2d 588, in which at pages 590-591, the
court held Corngold inapplicable to a
situation in which the transportation per-
sonnel, with 'suspicions aroused * * *
had no way to determine whether the con-
tents were fit for carriage and properly
classified except by opening them. This
the carrier had the right to do under its
tariffs.' Indeed, the instant case is strong-
er than Gold, for here there was no prior
direct contact between law enforcement
officers and the airline employee. Dowling
opened the footlocker at the direction of
his company supervisor, not upon police
suggestion.
"It was not a law enforcement agency
but Dowling who notified other airlines
about the defendant and his shipment. Pur-
suant to that warning Western Airlines'
employees Case and Sweeney observed the
defendant's footlocker and called United to
report. Fortuitously the police had then
arrived at United and they proceeded from
there to the Western offices. They noted
the footlocker pointed out to them by the
Western employees and could readily de-
tect from it 'an odor of marijuana.' This
justified the subsequent search and seizure.
(See my dissent in People v. Marshall
(1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 62 [69 Cal. Rptr. 585,
-36-
442 P. 2d 665]. )
As this court recently held in People
v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 123,
128 [74 Cal. Rptr. 294, 449 P. 2d 2301:
The conduct of a person not acting under
the authority of a state is not proscribed
by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments
of the federal Constitution. There are no
state standards for "search and seizure"
by a private citizen who is not acting as
an agent of the state or other governmental
unit. Therefore, acquisition of property
by a private citizen from another person
cannot be deemed reasonable or unreason-
able. (People v. Randazzo (1963) 220 Cal
App. 2d 768, 775-776 [34 Cal. Rptr. 65]
{{[citation]] cert. den., 377 U.S. 1000 [12
L. Ed. 2d 1050, 84 S. Ct. 1933] [[citations]],
and a motion to suppress evidence so ob-
tained cannot be made on the ground that
its acquisition constitutes an unreasonable
search and seizure under section 1538. 5.
Since the airline employees had a legal
right to inspect the footlockers, I can see
no impediment to their advising the police
of the presence of contraband and to the
police taking possession of and making
evidentiary use of the contraband displayed
to them. Indeed, that was the precise
situation in People v. Superior Court (1969)
supra, 70 Cal. 2d 123, in which a private
detective gave a copy of a tape recording
to law enforcement officers. We properly
declined to suppress the evidence prior to
-37-
trial. To the same effect is Wolf Low v.
United States (9th Cir. 1968) 391 F. 2d
61, 63, in which the court found proper
the ‘conduct of the airline in turning over
to the Government the fruits of its search
of the defendant's Suitcases, and the con-
duct of the Government in making use of
the information and evidence obtained by
the airline's search * * *!"' (1 Cal. 3d,
415-417.)
In petitioner's view, the majority below erroneous-
ly interpreted and erroneously applied Corngold to this
case. Corngold is inapposite to this case.
Nowhere in the record is there evidence that the
warning to be on the lookout for contraband came
directly from any police department. Mr. Dowling
(agent for United Airlines) stated, "I opened it up on
my own with no instructions from anyone except the
permission of the supervisor to do it." (R.T., p. 100.)
Mr. Dowling, in response to a question posed by re-
spondent stated: "I don't know where they [meaning his
supervisors] received the word from " (R.T., p.
100.) Further, Mr. Dowling stated: Il don't know for
sure who told our inspectors what. All I know is what
the scuttlebutt said, that it came through from Honolulu.
I don't know that for sure. It could have come from--
they could have dug it up on their own. I don't know. "
(R. T., p. 58.) .
The record shows that essentially we had this
Situation: We have a young air freight agent, Mr. Dowl-
ing, that has been so employed with United Airlines for
several years prior to the date in question. (R.T., p.
8.) Mr. Dowling was schooled (R.T., p. 67) and
-38-
obviously well-read in regard to the tariffs which govern
the day-to-day handling of air freight. (R.T., p. 23.)
The lead agent of the United Airlines air freight office
in San Diego told Mr. Dowling that he had received in-
formation from the United Airlines investigators in Los
Angeles (R.T., p. 46), that people were shipping nar-
cotics out of San Diego, and that they were coming out
in footlockers, brand new ones. Also Mr. Dowling was
given the approximate weights to look for, as footlockers
filled with narcotics generally were overweight (R.T.,
p. 33). With that background enters respondent.
Testimony shows that Mr. Dowling's suspicions were
aroused by respondent's appearance (R.T., p. 14), ner-
vous manner (R.T., p. 62), and the fact that the trunk
was heavy (R.T., p. 65) for the type of material stated
to be enclosed therein, i.e., clothes and books (R.T.,
p. 10). With Mr. Dowling's suspicions being reasonably
aroused, to the extent of suspecting that the trunk con-
tained marijuana (R.T., p. 39), he called his super-
visor. After relating the situation to his supervisor,
Mr. Dowling was given the "go ahead." (R.T., p. 36.)
The locker was opened, notwithstanding the supervisor's
authorization, because of Dowling's knowledge of tariff
regulations that authorize an inspection of any shipment,
and completely on his own without any thoughts as to
police rights to du this sort of thing. (R. T., p. 41.)
After Dowling opened the footlocker with a hammer
and nail, i. e., forcing the pins out of the hinges in the
back (R. T., p. 39), he called his supervisor back and
told him what he had found (R.T., p. 24) and at that time
was told to contact the police (R. T., p. 37). Mr. Dowl-
ing had at the depot no specific person (R. T., p. 75) or
number to call (R. T., pp. 37-38) so he was able only to
contact the City Police Department general information
number (R. T., p. 73) and they sent out an officer (R.
39
T., p. 25). The officer, Mr. Burgess, came alone
(R. T., p. 77) and after identifying himself (R. T., p.
77), was briefed by Dowling for about five to ten min-
utes (R. T., p. 78a) out in front by the counter area (R.
T., p. 78a) on what had taken place. (R. T., p. 78a.)
The majority of the court below, under these facts,
relied on the decision in Cor old v. United States (9
Cir. 1966) 367 F. 2d 1. But it is to be noted that the
majority opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in
Corngold held that under the facts of that case the initial
opening of the packages by the airlines was done at the
direct request of a law enforcement agent and, therefore
the airline agent was a state agent.
The facts of Corngold are to be distinguished from
the facts of this case. Indeed, in Gold v. United States,
Supra, 378 F.2d 588, the United States Court of Appeals
itself distinguished away the Corngold holding. In Gold
the court stated:
"In Corngold government agents ob-
served the defendant deliver packages to
a Trans-World Airlines agent at the Los
Angeles International Airport. When the
defendant departed, the government agents
informed the transportation agent that they
>
-40-
suspected that the packages contained
smuggled watches and that they would
like to inspect the shipment. They also
pointed out that the shipper had incor-
rectly filled out the airway bill. The
transportation agent testified that the
government agents asked him to open
the package. The employee initially
opened one package while the government
agents looked on, and then the agents
completed opening the package. They
found a number of small boxes inside the
large package and removed and opened
them. They found contraband watches
and marked the small boxes for future
identification.
"On this evidence the court sitting en
banc concluded that the search was in sub-
stance a search by the federal agents. It
found that the airline employee had par-
ticipated in the search solely to serve the
purposes of the government and that the
carrier had taken no action on its own be-
half when the mislabeling was revealed.
The search was without a warrant and the
covrt, finding no circumstances justifying
a search without a warrant, reversed the
defendant's conviction.
"The instant case differs from Corngold
in several significant respects. After in-
forming the manager of their suspicions
regarding the shipment, the government
agents left the premises. The manager,
after attending to some other business,
-41-
made the decision to investigate further.
The shipment was taken from the freight
area to the air freight room at the man-
ager's direction. No one else was
present while the manager and one other
employee opened one of the packages.
After finding the film and observing its
nature, the manager determined that the
matter 'should be someone else's business.
It was another 45 minutes to an hour after
discovering the films before he got around
to calling the government agents.
"We conclude that the initial search of
—ñꝛñ — — — nene
the 8 by the airline's em was
not a federal search but was an nd-
be o and they were not present when
it was opened. The agents had the same
right as any citizen to point out what they
suspected to be a mislabeled shipping
document, and they exercised no control
over what followed. What did follow was
the discretionary action of the airline's
manager and was not so connected with
government participation or influence as
to be fairly characterized, as was the
search in Corngold, as 'a federal search
cast in the form of a carrie; inspection. '
"While it might be expected that the
carrier would not ignore the packages
after being advised of the mislabeling by
government agents who obviously had more
-42-
than a citizen's interest in the shipment,
the carrier had sufficient reasons of its
own for pursuing the investigation. The
manager testified that packages sus-
pected of containing something other
than what was described on the air way-
bill were sometimes opened so that the
airline would know what was being carried
on its airplanes, and so that it could as-
sess proper charges. Despite the mana-
ger's inquiry, the government agents did
not reveal what they suspected the true
contents of the packages to be. His sus-
picions aroused, the manager had no way
to determine whether the contents of the
packages were fit for carriage and prop-
erly classified except by opening them.
This the carrier had the right to do under
its tariffs.
"These same independent interests of
the airline were relied upon by the gov-
ernment in Corngold to support the posi-
tion that the search was nothing more than
a carrier inspection carried out pursuant
to the inspection clause of the airline's
tariff. Here the facts support that theory.
In Corngold they did not. The court below
was correct in denying appellant's motion
to suppress the films. (Emphasis added.)
(378 F.2d, 590-591. )
Thus, in this case, all law enforcement did was
to alert United Airlines to salient facts. Indeed, there
was not even the direct communication between law en-
forcement and the airlines in this case as there was in
Gold.
43
That the majority below erred by holding Corn-
gold applicable in this case is also made clear by three
other decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit--all of which were before the
court below. 11/
The first case, Wolf Low v. United States (9 Cir.
1968) 391 F. 2d 61, cert. denied, 4 Cr. L. 4038, is dis-
cussed in the above quoted portion of the dissent in the
court below.
/ Corngold v. United States, supra, 367 F. 2d 1,
was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc. Gold v. United States,
Supra, 378 F.2d 588, was decided after Corngold. If
it assumed that the two decisions were irreconcilable
it could be urged that Gold overruled Corngold. Thus,
Corngold was decided by a majority of the court in an
opinion written by Circuit Judge Browning in which
Circuit Judges Hamley, Jertberg, Merrill, Koelsch and
Ely concurred (i.e., a total of six circuit judges); two
dissenting opinion were filed, one by Circuit Judge
Barnes, in which Chief Circuit Judge Chambers con-
curred and the second in which Circuit Judge Duniway
dissented separately and concurred in part in the dis-
sent of Circuit Judge Barnes (i.e., a total of three cir-
cuit judges dissented). Gold was decided by a unani-
mous panel of three circuit judges, two of whom were
among the majority in Corngold; thus, the decision in
Gold was written by Circuit Judge Madden and con-
curred in by Circuit Judges Jertberg and Browning (who
wrote for the majority in Corngold). Therefore if one
subtracts the two circuit judges who decided Gold from
the majority in Corngold (i. e., 6 minus 2 equals 4) and
(Continued on next page.)
-44-
The second case is United States v. Spencer (9
Cir. 1969) F. 2d (No. 22,623-A, decided
June 22, 1969). In Spencer the court held in circum-
stances more persuasive than present in this case that
the opening of a footlocker by an airline employee pur-
suant to the Civil Aeronautics Board inspection rule,
supra, was not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.
Corngold was held by the court to be inapposite.
Similarly, in the third case, Clayton v. United
States (9 Cir. 1969) 413 F. 2d 297, the court upheld an
airline search of an air express shipment on the ground
that the initial discovery of the heroin was the result of
a private search and that the subsequent acts of the
police were justified because of the exigencies of the
case. Corngold was inapposite.
Thus, it is clear that if this case had been re-
viewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit a violation of the Fourth Amendment would
not have been found. Yet the majority of the court be-
low, relying on a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that there was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The two results would be different despite the fact
(Continued from preceding page. )
adds these two circuit judges to the dissenters in Corn-
gold (i. e., 3 plus 2 equals 5) the vote in Corngold be-
comes 5 to 4. Then adding Circuit Judge Madden's
position in Gold, Gold on this basis overrules Corngold.
45
that the airlines“ agents performed the same acts and
were purportedly controlled by the very same law,
namely, the Fourth Amendment.
This, in petitioner's view, is an intolerable
situation. Interstate airlines operate in the several
states. Is their conduct to be lawful in one jurisdiction
and unlawful in another when the same law is supposed
to govern? Are interstate carriers to be left to defend
themselves against civil actions in the several states
for alleged violations of privacy or constitutional rights,
when under federal decisions there were no such viola-
tions ?
In California, lower courts are bound to follow
the decisions of courts of superior jurisdiction, wheth-
er these decisions are right or wrong. (See Auto Equity
es, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455,
20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P. 2d 937.) But California
courts are not bound by the decisions of lower federal
courts. (See People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal. App. 2d
292, 305, 47 Cal. Rptr. 734.) Thus, as the law of Cali-
fornia now stands under the majority opinion of the
California Supreme Court in this case, a lower court in
California would on the facts of this case be bound to
find that respondent's Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated, even though the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the same facts would
not find such a violation.
In petitioner's view, this Honorable Court should
grant certiorari to resolve the conflict and to provide a
uniform answer to all federal and State courts as well
as all interstate airlines. Similarly, whether this
Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v. California
(1964) 376 U.S. 483, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889, is
~46-
controlling in cases such as this should be resolved;
if it is, then the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gold, Wolf Low,
Spencer and Clayton should be reviewed since, implicit-
ly, these decisions are authority for the proposition
that Stoner is not controlling.
4. The decision below implicitly held that one
of the rules and regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board is violative of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
Whether Rule and Regulation Number 96, Rule 24
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (which reads "INSPEC-
TION OF SHIPMENTS All shipments are subject to
inspection by the carrier, but the carrier shall not be
obligated to perform such inspection. ") be viewed as
private law, e.g., contractual rights created by parties
to a contract, or public law, e. E. governmental regu-
lations or statutes. Cooper v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788, teaches that
searches of air freight by airlines is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
In Cooper this Honorable Court stated that searches
authorized by law can be, though they are not per se,
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In this case,
inspection of respondent's footlockers was authorized by
law--public or private. And whether respondent under
the circumstances of this case had actual knowledge of
this law is, in petitioner's view, just as irrelevant as
was whether the defendant in Cooper had actual knowl-
edge of the law which under the circumstances of his
case permitted the search of his automobile. The rele-
vant point in Cooper and in this case is that the laws which
-47-
authorized the respective searches were reasonable.
Without reiterating all of the reasons given in
this petition by petitioner under the first reason why
certiorari should be granted, the rule of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board above cited is reasonable. An interstate
airline should have the right to inspect containers which
it is asked to ship on airliners. This is especially so
when the carrier rightfully requires a declaration or
description of what it is that is being offered for ship-
ment and when what is being shipped has a direct bear-
ing on the rates which will be charged if the goods are
accepted for shipment by the carrier.
Any business enterprise should be able to protect
itself against fraud.
Any business enterprise should be able to protect
itself from taking into its possession that which is ille-
gal for any person to possess. Ifa person has no right
to possess something, €-£-, narcotics, surely that
person has no right to make a business enterprise ship
it.
And for the reasons given earlier in this petition
à commercial, interstate passeager airlines should have
the right to protect itself and its customers from dangers
which are common to all airlines.
The Civil Aeronautics Board rule at issue in this
case gives airlines under the jurisdiction of the Board
That the majority of the court below implicitly
48
rules that the Civil Aeronautics Board rule here under
review is violative of the Fourth Amendment is pointed
up in the dissent below, which states:
To deny the airline through its em-
ployees a right of inspection when they
doubt, for any reason, that a package
contains the objects represented by the
shipper to be therein, results in com-
pelling the airline, an innocent third
party, to blind itself to reality and thus
to assist the [respondent] in his illicit
commercial enterprise of transporting
marijuana. This is the unfortunate re-
sult of the majority opinion. (1 Cal. 3d,
415.)
Thus, this Honorable Court should grant cer
to determine whether airlines operating under a federal
regulatory agency can exercise the rights given to them
by that agency or whether, as is implicit in the majority
opinion of the court below, the particular rule or regula-
tions at issue in this case is violative of the Fourth
Amendment. This question needs to be answered by this
Honorable Court, otherwise interstate airlines must
operate under a rule of regulatory agencies which rule
can be interpreted differently by the federal courts as
well as the courts of the several states.
5. The decision below, as pointed up by the
dissent, may result in an airline's agent
(operating under the rules of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and the terms and conditions
of a voluntary, bilateral contract between
the airline and a consignor) who by his inde-
pendent conduct determines that the con-
~49-
signed freight is contraband, being arrested
for a felony offense under the law of the
State of California in order to protect the
consignor's Fourth Amendment rights--even
though said Consignor has no right to possess
the contraband and the Contraband was given
into the possession of the airline's agent
under the circumstances set forth under the
first question presented in this petition.
The effect of the majority opinion in the court
below is that when an airline's agent opens a freight con-
tainer under circumstances such as those in this case
and obtains cause to believe the container contains kilos
of marijuana; closes the Container, calls and informs
the police of the facts, when the police arrive again re-
lates the facts to the police and takes the police to and
identifies the container in question, the airline's agent
must demand that the police produce a search warrant
As the dissenting opinion in the court below states:
"Section 11531 of the Health and Safety
Code makes it a felony for any person to
transport marijuana. The section applies
not only to one who arranges shipment, as
the defendant here, but it would also apply
to any airline employee who knowingly
transports marijuana. Thus if an airline
employee reasonably believes a shipment
contains a substance the transportation of
which is illegal, he has the right and per-
haps a duty to inspect the package or con-
tainer. The purpose of such inspection is
-50-
not to act as an agent of the police, but
to insulate himself from any criminal
culpability." (1 Cal. 3d, 414.)
And the dissent in the court below points up a very
real problem when it states that an airline's agent under
the circumstances of this case has an interest in insulat-
ing himself from criminal culpability.
Under the procedure which the majority of the
court below requires, an airline's agent in a case such
as this one, must place himself in a position where the
police could lawfully arrest the airline's agent, e.g. ,
for possession of marijuana in violation of Section 11530
of the California Health and Safety Code, a felony.
The elements of unlawful possession of marijuana
under California law are (1) dominion and control (2)
knowledge of its presence and (3) knowledge of its nar-
cotic nature. (People v. Layne (1965) 235 Cal. App. 2d
188, 193, 45 Cal. Rptr 110.)
The police must have reasonable cause to make
an arrest without a warrant. But reasonable cause
means such a state of facts as would lead a man of
ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientious-
ly entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the per-
son to be arrested is guilty of a crime. (People v.
Lindogan (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d 466, 27 Cal. Rptr. 905.)
And the experience of an officer may be considered in
determining whether he has reasonable cause to arrest.
(People v. Sullivan (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d 767, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 778.)
Therefore, under facts such as those in this case,
since the airline's employee was a reliable person
=§3-
present in the apartment at the time the police entered,
a search of the opaque bag under the law which was then
applicable would have been lawful as an incident to a
valid arrest. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 69 Cal.
2d, at 61.)
In petitioner's view, it is unreasonable and con-
trary to logic--especially to the logic of a lay business-
man who is conducting a legitimate enterprise-- to
place a person such as an airline's agent in a position
where he could be arrested because the Fourth Amend-
ment protects a shipper's privacy as to the contents of
a container of putative freight which has been given into
the possession of the airline's agent under the circum-
stances set forth under the first question presented in
this petition.
As mentioned earlier in this petition, under the
majority opinion in the court below, respondent was and
is permitted to use the Fourth Amendment as a sword.
Under the procedure which is required by the majority
opinion in the court below respondent is allowed to
wield his Fourth Amendment sword in such a manner as
to strike and injure third persons who want no part in
respondent's criminal acts and who want to assist in
suppressing criminal acts of persons such as respond-
ent.
In petitioner's view, this Honorable Court should
grant certiorari in this case to determine whether
citizens who in the course of exercising legal rights--
given by a federal agency and a voluntary, bilateral con-
tract--must place themselves in a position where they
could be criminally culpable as the price for "getting
involved" and in assisting in the suppression of crime.
-53-
6. The majority opinion in the court below im-
plicitly held that a person's effects have
more protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment in the circumstances of this case than
those same effects would have had if they
had been in respondent's automobile; that
such is the implicit holding of the majority
in the court below is clear since the Court
of Appeal of the State of California express-
ly ruled that respondent's footlockers in
this case were not entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection under the decisions of this
Honorable Court which hold that a police
officer may search a vehicle without a
warrant, without consent and not as an in-
cident to an arrest if the officer has reason-
able cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband.
The starting point in any search and seizure case
is whether, under the facts and circumstances presented,
the search or seizure was reasonable. Cooper v. Cali-
fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788.
And the object or Subject of the search must be
considered. That is, automobiles, for instance, are
not entitled to the same protection as homes because an
automobile is mobile. Therefore, the police may search
an automobile without Consent, without a warrant and
without the search being incident to an arrest if there is
probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband, the instrumentality of a crime, or evidence
relating to a specific crime. ke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 216, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 88 S. Ct.
1472; People v. Madero (1968) 264 Cal. App. 2d 107, 11i,
70 Cal. Rptr. 159; People v. Morrison (1968) 258 Cal.
-54-
App. 2d 75, 65 Cal. Rptr. 445, 449.)
Also the exigencies of the circumstances must be
considered. Thus, when a person or object is about to
leave the jurisdiction by air, it is a factor to be con-
sidered. (See, People v. Crovedi (1967) 253 Cal. App.
2d 739, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349; * (1967) 257
Cal. App. 2d 98, 64 Cal. Rptr. 637.
In the case at bar, either Officer Burgess or
Agent McLaughlin, or both, had probable cause to be-
lieve that Petitioner's Exhibit 2 contained marijuana
after Dowling explained what had gone to pass prior to
Burgess' arrival--which includes Dowling's observations |
of the inside of Petitioner's Exhibit 2 as well as the cir-
cumstances surrounding its acceptance by him and the
exhibit's outward appearance. (Cf., People v. Barcenas,
supra, (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 405.)
And since the police may search an automobile
without a warrant, without consent, and not as an inci-
dent to an arrest if the police have probable cause to
believe the automobile contains contraband, a fortiori,
the police should have authority to do the same with
luggage, etc., under the circumstances of this case.
That is, since respondent's footlockers were placed in
the hands of a common carrier, since he was required
to disclose the contents of the footlockers as part of the
contract for shipment of same, since a condition of the
contract granted the airlines the right to inspect the
12/ That the exigencies are to be considered was
acknowledged by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 51, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442
P. 2d 665.
-55-
footlockers, since respondent elected to place his foot-
lockers and their contents into the stream of transpor-
tation via a common carrier, since without prompt
action the footlockers would soon be shipped and there-
by easily lost to any surveillance, certainly such foot-
lockers should not be entitled to more protection than
is afforded by the Fourth Amendment to an automobile.
Since respondent was using footlockers to further
his nefarious commercial activity, petitioner submits
commercial activities loses the character of a private
residence. (Cf., Lewis v. United States (1966) 385 U. 8.
206, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S.Ct. 424, DU
Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that
assuming the Fourth Amendment gave the footlockers in
question some degree of protection, the searches of
said footlockers by the law enforcement agents under
the circumstances of this case was nonetheless reason-
Honorabie Court as followed by the courts of California,
respondent's footlockers were not entitled to Fourth
13/ Whether the officers involved had sufficient time
to obtain a search warrant is irrelevant. That is not
the test. Cooper v. California Supra, 386 U.S. 58.
Assuming the police had three hours within which to
obtain a search warrant, petitioner disagrees that on
a Sunday evening in June such was sufficient time to
obtain a search warrant.
-56-
Amendment protection after the police lawfully obtained
probable cause to believe they contained contraband.
Thus, the Court of Appeal stated:
"When Dowling, based upon his pre-
vious experience, recognized marijuana
in the footlocker, his report to the police
gave them probable cause to believe the
footlocker contained contraband. Where
the police have probable cause to believe
an automobile contains marijuana they
may make a warrantless search of it not
incident to arrest. [Emphasis in the
original.] (Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mig. Co., 391 U.S. 216 [88 S.Ct. 1472];
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149 [45 S.Ct. 280, 283-284]; People x.
Madero, 264 A. C. A. 126, 129.) The rule
has its basis in the mobility of motor
vehicles. In Carroll v. United States
supra, the rule was formulated, in part,
upon an analogy to goods in the course of
transportation, which Congress has
historically treated differently with regard
to search authorization than it has goods
in a fixed dwelling or other building.
(Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S.
132 at pp. 150-153 [45 8. Ct. at pp. 284-
285]. )
"Here McGrew had placed the two foot-
lockers and the suitcase in the course of
transportation. One of two things was
bound to happen unless the police seized
them. Either they would be shipped out
of the jurisdiction to San Francisco or the
-57-
owner might return and remove the ship-
ments from transit.
"It is our opinion the rule allowing a
warrantless search of motor vehicles,
not incident to an arrest, where the
police have probable cause to believe
contraband is present, applies with equal
reason to goods in the course of trans-
portation. Support for this view is found
in Hernandez v. United States, 353 F. 2d
Se
624.
"Having probable cause to search the
footlocker at United Air Lines the police
had equal cause to search the footlocker
at Western Airlines. It was shipped by a
person matching the description of the
United shipper, who gave the same name
and told the same travel plans." (75 Cal.
Rptr. 381; see Appendix B to this petition. )
Petitioner, therefore, believes this Honorable
Court should grant certiorari in this case to determine
whether under the circumstances of this case (I e., as
set forth under the first question presented in this
-58-
petition ) respondent's footlockers could or could not be
searched by the police after the police had lawfully ob-
tained probable cause to believe the footlockers con-
tained contraband--just as a person's automobile which
does not travel at nearly the speed of goods placed in
the course of air transportation may be searched with-
out a warrant, without consent and not as an incident to
an arrest if the police have probable cause to believe
the automobile contains contraband. Under the decisions
of this Honorable Court, as followed by the California
courts, if respondent in this case had returned to the
airport and took his footlockers back from the airlines
before the police had arrived and had put them in his
car, then left his car for one reason or another, peti-
tioner submits that knowing what they did the police
could have searched respondent's car and, upon finding
the footlockers, could have looked into them and could
have seized the contraband therein. If there is a dis-
tinction between what could have been done by the police
had the footlockers been removed to respondent's car
and what was actually done in this case, petitioner re-
spectfully submits that this Honorable Court should
make the distinction.
under the circumstances of this case re-
spondent had not waived by his contracts
any protection which the Fourth Amendment |
gave his effects in his footlockers; this
holding was based on federal decisions, but
it fails to acknowledge this Honorable
Court's decisions in Katz v. United States,
supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v. United
States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, which are
authority contrary to the holding of the
majority of the court below.
7. The majority of the court below held that |
-59-
The majority of the court below stated that "(t]he
People argue in effect that any waiver of the Fourth
Amendment protection, for any limited purpose, results
in a waiver for all purposes..." (1 Cal. 3d, 411.)
The majority then cite Cor Id v. United States supra,
367 F. 2d 1, as authority that such a contention has been
rejected by the federal courts. Further, the majority
in the court below stated that the United States Court of
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in Corngold relied upon this
Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v. California,
Supra, 376 U.S. 483.
Petitioner's contention was not and is not that any
waiver of Fourth Amendment protection is a waiver for
all purposes. Petitioner's precise position was and is
that under the circumstances of this case (as set forth
under the first question presented in this petition) re-
spondent had not Fourth Amendment protection as to the
effects contained in his footlockers; secondly, that the
search was authorized by law, which law was and is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; thirdly, if
respondent had Fourth Amendment protection as to the
contents of his footlockers, by analogy to vehicles, once
the police had probable cause to believe the footlockers
Contained contraband such footlockers could be searched
by the police; and, finally, whatever--if any--protection
respondent had as to the contents of his footlockers
under the Fourth Amendment, he waived such protection
under the terms and conditions of the contract into
which he entered with the airlines.
That Corngold v. United States, Supra, 367 F.2d 1,
and Stoner v. California, Supra, 376 U.S. 483, are in-
apposite to this case has been made clear under the
second question presented in this petition.
-60-
Furthermore, the majority of the court below does
not explain why the decisions of this Honorable Court in
Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347, and Zap v.
United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, are not controlling.
The majority in the court below would, however,
be exactly right if it had stated that petitioner has and
does contend that respondent in this case did by his con-
tracts with the airlines waive any Fourth Amendment
protection as to the contents of his footlockers. This
position is predicated upon this case in the sense that
all facts and circumstances, i.e., the cumulative cir-
cumstances, lead to such a conclusion. And, on this
point, petitioner, in the court below as well as in this
Honorable Court, relies upon the decisions of this Hon-
orable Court in Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S.
347, and Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624.
In the opinion of this Honorable Court in Katz,
the twenty-second footnote reads, in part, as follows:
"A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth
Amendment requirements. (389 U.S. 358.) As
authority for this statement, the decision of this Honor-
able Court in Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624,
is cited.
The opinion of this Honorable Court in Zap reads,
in part, as follows:
J... [T]he law of searches and sei-
zures as related in the decisions of this
Court is the product of the interplay of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But
these rights may be waived. And when
petitioner, in order to obtain the Govern-
-61-
ment's business, specifically agreed to
permit inspection of his accounts and
records, he voluntarily waived such
claim to privacy which he otherwise
might have had as respects business
documents related to those contracts
[328 U.S. 628. ]
Wk K * * *
„... Though consent to the inspection
did not include consent to the taking of
the check, there was no wrongdoing in
the method by which the incriminating
evidence was obtained. The waiver of
such rights to privacy and to immunity
as petitioner had respecting this business
undertaking for the Government made
admissible in evidence all the incriminatin
facts ..." (Emphasis added. ) (328 U.S.
630.)
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. qustice
Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred, dissented
from the opinion of this Honorable Court in Zap. How-
ever, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented only from the
lawfulness of the actual seizure of the incriminating
evidence in this case, since the search warrant under
which it was taken was defective. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter agreed"... that the Government had authority,
as a result of its contract with the petitioner and the
relevant statutes, to inspect the petitioner's books and
records. Accordingly, the search was legal and
the inspectors could testify to what they gleaned from
the inspection..." (Emphasis added.) (328 U.S. 632.
62-
It is to be noted that in Zap, federal statutes
required as a condition of a defense contract that the
contractor give consent to an inspection of its books, .
etc. Zap held such a condition to be valid. And the
condition was held to be a valid waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Thus, Zap invoked a voluntary, bi-
lateral contract; if the petitioner in Zap did not like the
conditions offered by the government (just as if respond-
ent in this case did not like the conditions offered by the
airlines), he was free to take his business elsewhere.
But having entered into the contract, he was held to its
terms--even in a criminal action.
It is, of course, true that in Zap the waiver of
Fourth Amendment protection was set forth as an ex-
press condition in the contract; in this case the inspec-
tion clause was incorporated into respondent's contracts
by reference. But petitioner respectfuliy submits that
this difference is not a controlling distinction in this
case.
It is not a controlling distinction in this case be-
cause respondent was not merely bringing personal
baggage to an airport to check with the airlines as an
incident to respondent's travels, as would the average
traveler, student or serviceman. To the contrary, re-
spondent entered into contracts with a common, inter-
state carrier to ship freight. And the freight respond-
ent sought to have shipped was of substantial value, i.e.,
as stated earlier, $50,000.00. A person who ships
property worth $50, 000. 00 is, in petitioner's view, one
who should reasonably be held to a standard of care in
his business affairs that would require him to investi-
gate all aspects of his contracts for the shipment of
such property. The capital investment, in common busi-
ness logic, dictates that a reasonable man would take
~63-
care to understand all of the Conditions and details of
his contracts.to ship valuable property.
Therefore, petitioner believes this Honorable
Court should grant certiorari to resolve the conflict
created by the majority of the court below between the
States and this Honorable Court's decision in Stoner v.
California on the one hand, and this Honorable Court's
States on the other hand, when such decisions are to be
applied in cases such as this one.
8. The majority decision of the court below
holds while a seizure of respondent's foot-
locker by the airlines for the police would
be reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, a search of said foot-
lockers, i.e., looking into them, by the
police under the tota] circumstances of this
case was unreasonable within the meaning
of said Fourth Amendment.
The majority opinion of the court below, in part,
states:
None of the exceptions apply to the
United or western Airlines searches of
the footlockers. When the footlocker
checked with United Airlines was searched
by the police, McGrew 'was neither pres-
ent nor arrested until several hours after
the search.' (People v. Marshall, supra,
69 Cal. 2d 51, 61.) His whereabouts
were similarly unknown when the foot-
locker checked with Western Airlines was
searched. Nor was there any likelihood
64
that the lockers would be removed or the
contraband destroyed; both footlockers
were safely in the custody of the airlines.
Both footlockers had been shipped on a
‘space available' basis, so that the air-
lines were not even under a contractual
obligation to ship the footlockers before
a warrant could be obtained." (1 Cal. 3d
410.)
Thus, the majority of the court below direct that
in a case such as this the airlines, after its agents
have opened freight containers, which reveal contra-
band and have so informed the police, should, in effect,
seize such freight containers and hold them until such
time as the police arrive with a warrant, authorizing
their search and seizure.
The majority below states that since respondent's
footlockers were being shipped on a space available
basis, the airlines were under no contractual obligation
or duty to put the footlockers on the first space avail-
able. Petitioner submits that such would not have been
and is not the understanding of parties to a contract such
as is present in this case. That is, the parties would
have understood that the airlines would ship air freight
on the first space available, not on whatever space was
available which the airlines decided to use at some
future date. 14/
14/ The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of
California points up the actual exigencies in this case:
"Here McGrew had placed two footlockers and the suit-
case in the course of transportation. One of two things
(Continued on following page)
65-
Further the majority of the court below expressly
states that the footlockers were "safely in the custody"
of the airlines. If the airlines were the custodians of
respondent's footlockers with the right to inspect the
contents thereof, 15/ and if the airlines could, as the
majority of the court below apparently holds, seize the
footlockers and hold them for the police:
(1) Why could the airlines not give a valid con-
sent to the police authorizing the police to search, Ee: .
look into, the footlocker,
(2) Why did the police not have a good faith
basis to believe that the airlines had apparent authority
to give such a consent,
(3) And what makes a search of the footlockers
by the police without a warrant unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment while a seizure of the footlockers
for the police by the airlines is not unreasonable under
said Fourth Amendment?
(Continued from preceding page. )
was bound to happen unless the police seized them.
Either they would be shipped out of the jurisdiction to
San Francisco or the owner might return and remove
the shipments from transit. . (75 Cal. Rptr. 381; see
Appendix B to this petition. )
15/ Which right, however, the majority of the court
below held was limited to an inspection .. for the
airlines' own purposes." (1 Cal. 3d 413.)
— —
-66-
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against
unreasonable searches or seizures.
Petitioner respectfully submits that under the
procedure which the majority of the court below re-
quires in this case, a reasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is converted into an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment for no reasonable
reason.
Therefore, petitioner believes that this Honorable
Court should grant certiorari in this case to answer the
important question of what is a reasonable seizure, as
distinguished from what is a reasonable search, under
the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Since the Constitution does not guarantee to a
_ possessor of contraband that his acts will not be dis-
covered so long as he is in his residence but only that
his residence will not be subjected to an unreasonable
search or seizure (People v. Lawson (1969) 1 Cal. App.
3d 729, 81 Cal. Rptr. 883), petitioner respectfully sub-
mits that the same Constitution does not guarantee to a
shipper of contraband in a case such as this that his
acts will not be discovered but only that his effects will
not be subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure.
In this case, petitioner, for each separate reason
and more importantly because of their combined and
cumulative effect, respectfully submits to this Honor-
able Court that the searches in this case were not vio-
lative of the Fourth Amendment, that the suppression of
the evidence on the ground that the evidence had been
67
obtained in violation of
is erroneous and that r
grant certiorari to
below.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS C. LYNCH,
Attorney General
WILLIAM E. JAMES,
Assistant Attorney General
JAMES DON KELLER
District Attorney
RICHARD H. BEIN
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Petitioner.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.