Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Parker v. Cargill, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT, U. 8,
Ce-Supteate “Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 21 1970
ae
OCTOBER TERM, 1969
Oe
ange
.
By) LOR she Wa tageE RR Pe aes Go
No. 1098
LOUIS PARKER,
versus
Pe Te 7 Ay guia ie PERC hale te ee fa iM
CARGILL, INC.,
a
Respondent.
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Circuit Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit
NOE LIM HOC IN LE TIE LR NOTRE LS IE VV SLEPT HOLE
AN
RAYMOND H. KIERR,
ELDON E. FALLON, and
GERALD J. MARTINEZ ‘|
: 1718 Nat’l Bank of Commerce Bldg. t
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112. {
OF COUNSEL: ,
KIERR AND GAINSBURGH a | |
~ Fi
|
aT
- INDEX
Page
SONG BR oe ee 1
sesso anh ose RE RS Pee ITT as ta 2
Question Pevetites SAMAR D ade E Re CURES “oie EMG f 2
UG ee Ab anee eS ENE ey ek teri 2
| > Granting Writ ........... Pe eR beta 4
Conc Sion Breet oS ee ee Re wit eats 8
Appendix A— Opinion of Fifth Circuit Court ‘of
Me sigs li RE SPAR OE are WM RE 9
Appendix B — Petition for Re-hearing .<......:..... 13
Appendix C— Findings of Fact and €onclusions 7
of Law of District Court ............ 16
0
ce eae
ot od (eee ‘CITATIONS ©
CASES: | :
Alaska Steamship Co., Inc. Vv. Petterson, 347 US.
REE fee OG arta us us a ae ree ae ee oe 4,5
2 Albanese v. N.V. Neder. peers Stooniv. Moats,
392 F. 2d 763 (2d oo a gt RE Cree Se 7
Crumady v. ‘Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959): . ic [eacenuca tae Scene os a6 avs Wire esss 4,5
Petterson v. Aianks Steamship Co., Inc., 205 F.
2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953) ...... Pie pre CoS Pee 7
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ...... 4
Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954) ... 4,5
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1945) yates 4
West v. Uhited States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959) ........ es.
MISCELLANEOUS: |
Norris, Maritime Personal Injuries, 2d Ed. Sec.
eg te AE oes Sn rales SF ee bela ee dla ce ys 6
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ppbemet MOReRes. RARE,
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| IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
, OCTOBER TERM, 1969 3
No.
LOUIS PARKER,
Petitioner,
versus ,
CARGILL, INC.,
; _ Respondent.
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Circuit Court Of Appeals
' For The Fifth Circuit
Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in ‘the above
entitled case on October 2, 1969. —
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is unreported but it is printed
in Appendix A. 2.
Petition for rehearing was: timely filed and ‘denied
on October 31, 1969 and is printed in Appendix B,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ‘Law of the Dis-
trict Court are printed in Appendix C.
4
htt aS A A NLS Lat i SANS ce ae ee Oe ea ir ey
ot norman
ok as ele
2
JURISDICTION.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was entered on October 2, 1969. Rehearing»
was denied on October 31, 1969. Jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under the provisions of 28 U. S. C.
$1254(1).
» ‘QUESTION PRESENTED ne
Whether a vesse! owner must have control ver a
~ vessel at the time an unseaworthy condition occurs be-
fore it can be held liable for damages resulting frorn
injuries caused by the unseaworthy condition.
STATEMENT
«Petitioner, Louis Parker, sustained disabling inju-
ries while descending a ladder when he slipped on
a portable light which was hooked on a rung of the
ladder. The ladder led into one of the cargo spaces
of a barge known as Barge J-9 and owned by the
defendant, Cargill, Inc.
At the time of his injury the Barge J-9 was in a
floating, dry-dock undergoing minor repairs and being
cleaned so it could be returned to the same ‘service
it was performing before it was dry-decked.
Petitioner, Louis Parker, was employed ‘by Dravo
Corporation which corporation was employed by the
barge owner to perform work on the barge. The pe-
titioner was assisting in the cleaning operation.
w
3
_ Petitioner filed suit in the Federal District Court for
' the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Di-
vision, alleging that the presence of the portable light
on the rung of the ladder caused him to fall and sus-
in injuries; that the preserfce of the light on the -
rung of the ladder rendered the barge in question un-
seaworthy and that the owner of the barge, Cargill,
Inc., is liable for all damages resulting from his ‘in-
juries. —
The District Court denied recovery holding, inter
alia, that: j
“|. the cause of the plaintiff’s- fall was the
- presence of the portable light on the rung of
the ladder, which was a transitory condition
resulting from the course of performing the
‘contract by Dravo which alone had custody
and control of the vessel ard therefore the
warranty of seaworthiness’ did not extend to
the plaintiff’.R.12- ©. ~ °
: \
In short, the District Court below held ‘that the
vessel owner was not liable for the unseaworthy con-
dition which caused ‘the plaintiff's injury because it
did not have control over the barge in question at the
time the unseaworthy condition ‘occurred. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s ruling in a per baie ices 3
.
ae 2
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g
4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT :
I, |
CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT
Beginning with Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U. S. 85 (1945), this Court has consistently held that
those in the service of the ship doing seaman’s work
are entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness. See also
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
The obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel “is
peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the owner.
It is one he cannot delegate. By the same token it is
one he cannot contract away as to any workman with-
in the scope of its policy”. id. at p. 100.
‘. The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is an ab-
solute duty and does not depend upon negligence.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 382 U. S. 85 (1945).
Control is an element of fault and fault is an ingre-
dient of negligence. Neither control nor fault isneces-
sary for a cause of action based on unseaworthiness
because such a cause of action is “a species of lia-
bility without fault.” Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
382 U. S. 85,.94 (1945). See also Crumady v. Joachim |
Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423, 427 (1959). Rogers v. U-
nited States Lines, ahd U. S. 984 (1954). :
-
In Alaska%sSteamship to, Inc..v. Petterson, 347
U. S. 396 (1954), the plaintiff.was employed as a long-
shore foreman by a stevedoring company. The steve-
doring company was engaged by Alaska Steamship
company, Inc. to load its vessel. The stevedoring
.
‘ -
‘ . ee ee ee
.
s
‘
5
company, the plaintiff's employer, was authorized to
use its own gear in the loading operation. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff and his fellow employees rigged
up a snatch block which was owned by the stevedor-
ing company and brought aboard the vessel by that
company’s employees. ; ss |
While being put to a proper use in a proper manner,
the block broke and injured the plaiitiff. The plain-
tiff sued the vessel owner under the General Mari-
time law alleging that the defective snatch block ren-
. dered the vessel unseaworthy.
Notwithstanding the fact that the block was owned
by the plaintiff’s employer and was under the control
of sorheone other than the vessel owner, the Court held
the vessel unseaworthy and allowed recovery against
the vessel owner-
In the present \case, however, the lower court ruled
that a vessel owner must have control over a vessel
when the unseaworthy condition occurs before the ves-
sel owner can be held liable for injuries resulting from
____the unseaworthy condition. Such a holding is in con-
- flict with this Court's Tuling in Alaska Steamship Co.,.
Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). See also’ Crumady
v. Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423 (1959). Rogers
v. United States Lines, 347 U. S. 984 (1954).
The court below based its decision on West v. United
States, 361 U. S. 118 (1959). This decision we submit
is not applicable to the present case. |
Seeiceeirte
a NE AS BA He
>
6
In West v. United States, the vessel had been in the
“moth ball fleet” for several years and at the time
of the injury the vessel was not in navigation. Since
it was out of navigation, thé warranty of seaworthiness
was not applicable. The only basis of recovery avail-
able to the plaintiff in the West case was negligence;
_-and control is an essential ingredient of a cause of
action based on negligence. Therefore, when the
Court in West discussed the importance of the vessel
’ owner having control over the vessel, it could only
have intended to formulate a rule for vessels out of
navigation. The rule of law set forth in West should
not be applied to vessels which are in navigation at the
time the cause of action arises. The warranty of sea-
worthiness is applicable to those vessels and the doc-
trine of seaworthiness is a “species of liability with-
out fault” and the lack of control is of no significance.
Louis Parker, the plaintiff and appellant in the pres-
ent case, was aboard the Barge J-9 for the purpose of
assisting in the operation of cleaning the tanks of the
barge. The Barge J-9 had never been removed from
navigation and was in navigation at the time of the
plaintiff's injury. The type work in which the plain-
tiff was engaged at the time of his injury was work
traditionally done by seamen. See Norris, Maritime
Personal Injuries, 2d Ed. Sec. 51, P. 116 (1966).
The owner of the Barge J-9, Cargill, Inc., owed the
warranty of seaworthiness to the plaintiff. The fact
that the owner of the Barge J-9 did not have control
of the vessel at the time the unseaworthy condition
occurred is of no significance. .
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7 — . = =
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7
+ al
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUITS
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in the present case
is in conflict with the decisions of other Circuit Courts.
SECOND CIRCUIT:
In Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stooniv. Moats,
, 392 Fs 2d 763 (2d Cir. 1968), reversed on other grounds
see 393 U.S. 74. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that “regardless of the shipowner’s con-
trol or lack of it, he still has a nondelegable duty
to use reasonable care to keep the area a safe one in
which to work.” Failure to do this, the Court ruled,
could be the basis for a cause of action for unsea-
worthiness. id. at p. 764.
NINTH CIRCUIT:
In Petterson v. Alaska Steamship Co., 205 F. 2d
478 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that in a cause of action based on unseaworthi--
ness “It is not necessary to show, as it is in negligence
cases, that the shipowner had cumplete control of the
instrumentality causing the injury, or that the result
would not have occurred unless someone were neg-
- ligent.” The Court stated “It is only necessary to show
that the condition upon which the absolute lia-
bility is determined—unseaworthiness—exists.” id. at
p. 479.
ITI.
IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION
The duty of a vessel owner to provide a seaworthy
vessel has long been a part of maritime law. It is an
absolute duty and is not dependent on negligence.
ws bgt kay we aU hema ee
The Court below by its holding in the present case
is either attempting to convert the obligation to pro-
vide a seaworthy vessel from an absolute duty to one
dependent. on fault or seeking to carve out an ex-
ception to the vessel owner’s responsibilities. Neither
of these objectives is in keeping with the prior de-
cisions of this Court or of the decisions in other Cir-
. Cuits.
Petitioner is convinced that the Court upon exam-
ination of the decision of the Fifth Circuit will be readily
persuaded that its discretionary jurisdiction should be
exercised and the case should be reviewed.
CONCLUSION
To protect the integrity of this Court’s decisions in
the cases referred to above, to resolve a conflict be-
tween the circuits and to preserve the warranty of
seaworthiness in its present posture, the petition for
a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND H. KIERR
ELDON E. FALLON
GERALD J. MARTINEZ
1718 Nat’l Bank of Commerce
Bldg.
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
osc LOSE CA RM LS ILENE TIGER: BS NTE NAG ARO NG Set ABADI AE 2D ASP aa it mieten en habs RENE LIA AORN tS Sr H
9 [Se
APPENDIX A
IN THE | NY,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 27533
Summary Calendar
LOUIS PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CARGILL, INC., ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
_ Eastern District of Louisiana .
(October 2, 1969)
‘Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Appellant Parker, a shipyard work-
er employed by Dravo Corporation at its repair fa-
cility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, filed an action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana seeking to recover damages for per-
* \ ,
STALE TES AIT
10
sonal injuries received aboard the coal and molasses
barge J-9, owned by appellee Cargill, Inc. He contends
that his injuries were caused by an unseaworthy con-
dition for which the vessel owner is liable. The dis-
trict court found for ai ac and this appeal was taken.
We affirm." °
Caxgill turned ovér the barge J-9, empty and unman-
ned, to. Dravo for repairs and cleaning. On February
14, 1964,\the barge was placed in a floating dry-dock
on navigakle waters in the Mississippi River. While
thus situated on February 17, 1964, Parker went on
board te-assist in the cleaning operation. He was in-
jured when he siipped and fell from a ladder while
descending into one of the cargo holds of the barge.
At the time of injury, Dravo had exclusive custody
and control of the barge and the repair and cleaning
operations were being conducted under its direction.
The district court found that Parker’s injury was
caused by either or both of the following conditions:
- the presence of molasses on the deck and ladder of
the barge; the presence of a portable lantern left hang-
ing on a rung of the ladder by another employee of
Dravo. The court reasoned that neither of these causal
agents could give rise to unseaworthiness liability. The
molasses residue on the barge was a condition which
Parker as a Dravo employee was called on board to
acount to new Rule 18 of the Rules of this court, we have con-
cluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not
to justify oral argument and have directed the clerk to place
the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties
in writing. See Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 409 F.2d 804,
Part I (5th Cir. 1969).
11
correct. Relying principally on Moye v. Sioux City
& New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc.,3 the negligently
placed lantern was found to be a transitory condition
which occurred during the course of performing the
repair contract by Dravo and as a result of such per-
formance. It is only this latter conclusion that parker
contests here. ee
The parties agree that it is not possible to distinguish
the present case from Moye. Parker, however, urges
that Moye was erroneously decided. and should not
be followed. He contends that in reaching its decision,
the Moye court misconstrued West v. United States.4
In West the Supreme Court faced the claim of a
shipyard worker against a shipowner, grounded in neg-
ligence as well as the warranty of seaworthiness. In
denying recovery, the Court was influenced by the fact
that an independent contractor rather than the owner
had custody and control of the vessel at the time of
injury. It is Parker’s contention, contrary to Moye,
that West treats the element of control as modifying
only the potential liability of a shipowner for negli-
2See, Pinion v. Mississippi Shipping Company, 156 F. Supp. 652
(E.D. La. 1957): Brusbewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1947); Byars v. Moore-McCormack ‘Lines, 155 F.2d
587 (2d Cir. 1946); McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 282 F.2d 816
(2d Cir. 1960).
$402 F.2d 238 ( (5th Cir. 1968).
4361 U.S. 118 (1959). In West the injured workman was a member
of the crew of an independent contractor employed by the gov-
ernment to completely overhaul an inactive merchant ship. The
vessel, after several years in “moth balls”, had been towed to
the contractor’s repair dock for the express purpose of render-
\ ing her seaworthy.
SNES RRC RIRATALI FY ye
12
gence, and that the absence of control over the circum-
stances of an injury has no effect on the warranty
of seaworthiness. We cannot agree with this conten-
tion, and conclude that Moye properly interpreted West
as a sensible but very restrictive limitation on unsea-
worthiness liability.®
As noted in the opinion of Chief Judge Brown con-
curring in Moye,® there. may be instances in which
a shipowner will be liable for injuries to a repairman
caused by an unseaworthy condition even though he
does not have physical possession of the vessel. How-
ever, this will not be the case where the injury is
caused by a transitory condition resulting from the
course of performing a repair contract by one who
alone has present custody and control of the vessel.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
5Parker’s criticism focuses on a passage quoted by the Moye opin-
ion from West v. United States:
“Petitioner overlooks that here the respondent had no —
control over the vessel, or power either to supervise
or to control the repair work in which petitioner was
engaged. We believe this to be decisive against both
aspects of plaintiff’s dual theory [of warranty of sea-
worthiness and negligence].”’
402 F.2d at 240.
Parker contends that the insertion [of the phrase] “of war-
ranty of seaworthiness and negligence’’, which did not appear
in West, does not accurately identify the antecedent of the
* phrase “plaintiff’s dual theory.’”’ He discounts identical treat-
ment by the Second Circuit in Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1960), as identical error. 6
Assuming arguendo that the quotation has been used inap-
propriately, neither the vitality of Moye, nor the aptness of
its interpretation of West is thereby impaired.
6402 F.2d at 241.
a
Juieeouaee ie ;
;
°-*
13
APPENDIX B
IN THE }
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 27,533
LOUIS PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus .
CARGILL, INC., ET AL, 3
Defendants-Appellees.
a
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant
a rehearing.
The single issue for review in the present case is
whether a vessel owner must have custody or control
of a vessel in navigation at the time an unseaworthy
_ condition occurs before the vessel owner can be held
liable for damages resulting from the unseaworthy con-
dition. | iF
14
In its opinion dated October 2, 1969, this Court an-
swered affirmatively and cited West v. United States,
361 U. S. 118 (1959) as the basis for its decision. We
submit that the West case should not be depositive
of the present case.
In West v. United States, the vessel had been in
the “moth ball fleet” for several years and at the
time of the injury the vessel was not in navigation.
Since it was out of navigation, the warranty of sea-
worthiness was not applicablé. The only basis of re-
covery available to the plaintiff in the West case was
negligence and control is an essential ingredient of
a cause of action based on negligence. Therefore, when
the Court in West discussed the importance of the ves-
sel owner having control over the vessel, it could only
have intended to formulate a rule for vessels out of
navigation. The gule of law set forth in West should
not be applied to vessels which are in navigation at
the time the cause of action arises because the war-
ranty of seaworthiness is applicable to these vessels
and control is not an essential ingredient of a cause
of action based on a theory of unseaworthiness. Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
In the present case the barge, J-9, was only being
cleaned and undergoing minor repairs in a floating
_ drydock and was in navigation at the time appellant
was injured. Hunt v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1936); 9 F. 2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1937). By taking
advantage of specialized labor, such as Louis Parker,
the petitioner, the owner of the barge, J-9, cannot dis-
card or delegate its responsibility to provide a sea-
\e
~ 15 :
worthy vessel. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US.
. 85-(1946).
For the foregoing reasons petitjbrer prays that the
Court grant a rehearing in this matter and reverse
the decision of the lower court and order the case
remanded to the lower court so t judgment can
be entered in favor of petitioner, Louis Farker.
Respectfully submitted,
KIERR AND GAINSBURGH
Va ) ELDON E. FALLON
1718 Nat'l] Bank of Commerce
Bldg. ;
New Orleans, Louisiana
522-2304
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I, Eldon E. Fallon, attorney for appellant, certify
that this petition is presented in good faith, that it
is not interposed for delay and that in my. judgment
it is well-founded. ;
October 16, 1969, New Orleans, Louisiana.
ELDON E. FALLON
———————EeEeEeEeEeEeeeee
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and fore-
going Petition for Rehearing has been forwarded to
all counsel of record by depositing same in the US.
Mail, postage pre-paid, this pa of October, 1969.
ELDON E. FALLON
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION .
, No. 7119
Admiralty Section G
LOUIS PARKER
versus
CARGILL, INC. and THE AETNA CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY
ee a SR oly Ew Si ea oe
*
17
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This is a suit for damages for personal injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff, Louis Parker, as a result of the
alleged unseaworthiness of the defendant Cargill, Inc.’s
barge J-9. Plaintiff, at the time of his accident on
February 17, 1964, was employed by Dravo Corpora-
tion, a ship repair facility, hired by the operator of
the barge to perform certain work aboard the J-9.
The plaintiff in his suit alleged that his injuries proxi-
mately resulted from the negligence, carelessness and
inattention of the agents, servants and employees of
Dravo Corporation, which caused the barge J-9 to be-
come unseaworthy, in the following respects:
“1. Failure of plaintiff's co-employees to pay
sufficient attention to and mairitain proper
regard for plaintiff's safety aboard the
barge, J-9, in the performance of his du-
ties.
2. Failure to follow prescribed safety regula-
. tions and procedures pertaining to ladders
and walkways aboard vessels.
3. The absence of reasonably su:table appli-
ances, lights and appurtenances for the
_ Safe conduct of plaintiff's work aboard the
J-9.
4. Presence of a portable light and extension
cord on the steps of the ladder in the No. 3
hatch of the J-9.”
.
CIN I AOA, a TI Rat 8
——
The plaintiff filed a second cause of action against
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company as the compen-
rae S60 ne Pat GA etme 5 lay Oe TROIS ita CPL Te! wa
sation insuror of Dravo Corporation, seeking Louisiana
Workmen’s Compensation Act benefits in the event
that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act as against Dravo Corporation.
Defendant, Cargill, Inc., filed a third party action
against Dravo Corporation, seeking indemnity from
Dravo on the basis that if Cargill, Inc. was held liable
to the plaintiff, suit liability arose from Dravo Corpora-
tion breaching its contract to perform its work in a
workmanlike manner. Attorney’s fees and costs were
also sought.
Both Cargill; Inc. and Dravo Corporation answered
the plaintiff's complaint denying that plaintiff was en-
titled to the warranty of unseaworthiness and denying
that the vessel was in fact unseaworthy.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company intervened in
said proceedings for subrogation, seeking reimburse-
ment fot the compensation and medical expenses paid
to and in behalf of the plaintiff.
The parties to this litigation have submitted the fol-
lowing stipulations to the Court:
“The Barge J-9 was involved in both molasses
and coal trade. The cargo pump on the Barge
J-9 began to malfunction. Trash, scale residue
and other foreign matter was getting into the
]
19
pump and causing it to malfunction and had
caused damage to the pump. This malfunction
of the pump did not render the barge wholly in-
operative, but the pump had to be repaired in
order for the barge to carry molasses.’
‘Cargill, Inc..decided to have the pump re-
paired and in order to prevent the malfunction
from recurring, contracted to have the tanks or
compartments on the barge cleaned.’
‘Dravo Corporation undertook this work and
the Barge J-9 was dry-docked for this pur-
pose.’
‘The cleaning operation required to cut holes in
the bottom of the barge for drainage and gen-
erally when plates are put over the holes at the
completion of the cleaning operation an air test
is performed to make sure that there are no
leaks in the area of these plates, and ordinarily
when the compartments are cleaned, the barge
is tested for other leaks and fractures and this
was done on the J-9 on this occasion.’
‘This type of work is periodically performed
and is customarily done on an average of once
every two years when the barge is carrying the
same type of cargo as was the case with the
J-9.” ;
“That the empty unmanned barge J-9 was
turned over to Dravo Corporation for cleaning
20
and repairs. Thereafter said vessel was dry-
' docked in a floating dry dock situated on navi-
gable waters of the Mississippi River and re-
pairs and cleaning of the barge were perform-
ed by Dravo Corporation as set forth in the in-
voice marked as Dravo #1. During the period
that the repairs were being performed Dravo
had the exclusive care, custody and control of
the barge and the repairs to the barge were
done solely. under the supervision and control
of Dravo.’
‘The barge J-9 was dry-docked at. 10:00 o’clock
A.M. February 14, 1964, undocked at 9:00
o’clock A.M. February 20, 1964, and all work
was completed on February 28, 1964, and there-
after the Barge J-9 returned to the same type
work that it was doing prior to dry docking.’
The main work done to the barge, as reflected by
the invoice, was dry-docking the barge, cutting two
approximately 24” diameter holes in each of eight car-
go compartments, cleaning the cargo holds, installing
patch plates over the cut holes, gouging and welding
fractures in side shell and bottom plating, repairing
cargo pump, testing by means of air all compartments
for leaks and cropping and renewing starboard stern
corner of the barge. The total amount of the invoice
was $5,452.00. |
The plaintiff testified that he was injured when de-
scending a ladder into one of the cargo tanks on Feb-
ruary 17, 1964, to retrieve out of the hold a portable
21
light and extension cord and other equipment left there F
by another Dravo crew. The hold was dark. He said [
that he slipped on the ladder when he stepped on the
hook of the portable light which was left hanging on
one of the rungs of the ladder. He said that there
«was no defect in the ladder, although the evidence
reflects that there may have been molasses on the
ladder, although the evidence reflects that there may
have been molasses on the ladder as well as on the
outside top deck of the barge. The plaintiff also testi-
fied that he had molasses on his boots. |
fewest
The evidence discloses that the portable light and
cord were owned by Dravo and that the plaintiff could
have turned on lights in the hold by simply turning
on a switch about twenty feet away.
Conceding the ladder had molasses on it, or the upper
deck had molasses on it, or the plaintiff was injured
as claimed, this Court cannot find for the plaintiff.
When a repairman, such as the plaintiff, is aboard
a vessel remedying an unseaworthy condition then ex-
isting, no warranty of seaworthiness runs in his favor
with respect to the unseaworthy condition which he
is called on to repair; and if he is wae as a result
of the. very unseaworthy condition he is attempting
to remedy, he may not recover from the barge owner
on the grounds of unseaworthiness. Pinion v. Missis-
sippi Shipping Company, 156 F.Supp. 652 (E.D. La.
1957); Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.(2) 720
(C.A.3rd— 1947); Patterson v. Esso Jamestown, 274
F.Supp. 854 (E.D. La. 1967). sin ag
-
SES Lt re SA Et A, SFE COINS GOAT RIES BEE EP bw ots
22
&
Nor can the plaintiff under the facts of this case
be permitted to recover here in view of the most recent
decision emanating from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge
Lines, Inc., (Nov. 1968). The majority opinion of the
Court said:
“In this case there were no major repairs -or
structural changes made‘in the barge although
the collision damage required the renewal of
side’plating in two places, the renewal of some
deck plating and the reworking of Nos. 4 and 5
roller hatch covers. This work required the
barge to be dry-docked by Saucer who, from
the time it received the barge until the work
was completed, had exclusive control of the
’ barge and the lighting under which the repairs
were effected. The barge was designed to
carry no motive power, lights or crew. Sioux
City had no motive power, lights or crew. Sioux
City had no representative or crew aboard at
any time while the barge was in Saucer’s yard.
Under these circumstances we hold that there
was no warranty of seaworthiness by the ship
owner running in favor of shore-based workers
on the vessel.” 402 F.2d 238
And in the concurring opinion of Judge John
R. Brown it is said:
“If the circumstances bringing about the in-
jury is a transitory condition resulting from
the course of performing the contract by one
aay
SEEDS RGR Sie 0. E506 FN ie EEL. EDIE ey or mnt gp
23
who alone has the present custody and control
of the vessel, then the warranty of seaworthi-
ness *** does not extend to-such person for
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiff, Louis Parker, at the time of his injury
was an employee of Dravo Carporation, an independ-
ent contractor: He was a shipyard worker working
in Dravo Corporation’s repair facility in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, on February 17, 1964.
2;
At the time of plaintiff's accident en February 17,
1964, the Barge J-9 was owned by Cargill, Inc.
3.
The Barge J-9, an empty unmanned barge, was
turned over to Dravo Corporation for cleaning and
repairs.
4,
The said barge was dry-docked in a floating dry
dock on navigable waters in the Mississippi River on
February 14, 1964, undocked on February 20, 1964, and
all work was completed by Dravo Corporation by Feb- |
ruary 28, 1964.
such condition.” sid Lesa ee
ae
‘
PME Ap AO RELE OPENS SEAT) ae
Ps : . at ee
eit amen SE SI OD aa REED ee PL at FM dg lS A Det fa oe tae PN aaa a ME Sails ano Eel
The repairs and cleaning of the barge were per-
formed by Dravo Corporation and at all times during
the period of repairs and cleaning Dravo Corporation
-had the exclusive care, custody and control of the barge
and said repairs and cleaning were done solely under
the supervision and control:of Dravo Corporation.
6.
Plaintiff, Louis Parker, was injured while descending
a ladder into one of the cargo holds when he slipped,
either because of a portable light hook hanging on
one of the rungs of the ladder which portable light
hook had been placed there by a previous Dravo. crew
cleaning the cargo hold, or because of molasses on
the ladder, or both conditions acting concurrently.
7.
The cleaning of the Barge J-9 was to remove residual
molasses and loose scale and corrosion from the said
_ barge. , ,
8.
The portable light was owned by Dravo Corporation
and there was nothing defective about the ladder that.
plaintiff was descending at the time of his injury.
25
9.
The procedure used in cleaning the residual molasses
and in repairing the vessel was entirely within the
discretion of and under the control of Dravo Corpora-
- tion.
10.
Plaintiff was injured while in the course of correcting
and cleaning the molasses, which condition he was
called aboard to correct, or he was injured as a result
of the hanging portable light, which was a transitory
condition resulting from the course of performing the
contract of repairs by Dravo Corporation which alone
had the custody and control of said barge, and, there-
fore, the warranty of seaworthiness did not extend
from the barge ‘or its owner, Cargill, Inc., to Louis
Parker.
at:
The proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. was
his own negligence and the negligence of his co-work- |
ers. c
- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. °
a
t
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter and venue
is properly laid in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
26
2.
The Court finds as a matter of law that Cargill,
Inc. nor anyone by whose action. defendant is liable
was guilty of any negligence which in any way caused
or contributed to the cause of the accident and resulting
injuries herein involved.
3.
The Court finds as a matter of law that the sole
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was the concur-
rent negligence of plaintiff himself and his co-workers
or employees of Dravo Corporation.
4,
The Court finds that the conditions giving rise -to
the plaintiff's injury was either or. both, concurrently,
of the following: First an unseaworthy condition of
molasses present on the ladder and on the deck of
the barge, which condition plaintiff, his co-employees
and Dravo Corporation were called upon to repair and
remedy, and that if ‘he was injured from said unsea-
worthy condition, he is not-entitled to recover for his
injuries from the shipowner on the grounds of unsea-
_worthiness, and, second, the cause of the plaintiff’s j
fall was the presence of the portable light on the rung
of the ladder, which was a transitory condition result-
ing from the course of performing the contract by
Dravo which alone had custody and control of the ves-
-sel and therefore \the warranty of seaworthiness did
not extend to the plaintiff. Patterson v. Esso James-
J
A a at ASRS «oe Al 2 et ERR tn Tie 5 SCONE RES Ra Tata ates “
27
town, 274 F.Supp. 854 '(E.D. La. 1967); Moye v. Sioux
City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 402 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1968). Counsel for plaintiff relies heavily, if
not exclusively, upon Allen v. Union Barge Line Cor-
poration, 239 F.Supp. 1004 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd 361
F.2d 217, cert. den. 385 U.S. 1006. In Moye, supra, the
5th Circuit Court of Appeals set out the rule to be
applied in these cases even citing with approval the
reasoning in the Allen case.' In the instant case, con-
sidering the character of the work to’ be done by the
shipyard, the absence of a crew, and the complete
control by-the shipyard over the vessel, we are con-
{inced that the plaintiff is not entitled to the warranty
of seaworthiness. The plaintiff's case lacks some of
the determinative facts found in the Allen case.
; D.
Since the Court concludes that the plaintiff’s injuries
were caused by the negligence of Dravo’s employees,
_ which constituted a breach of Dravo to perform its
work in a workmanlike manner, Cargill, Inc. is entitled
to recover from Dravo, pursuant to its third party
demand, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred
in defense of this suit. Patterson v. Esso Jamestown,
1In Lawlor the Second Circuit took the position that it is no longer
sufficient merely to require proof that the vessel is in naviga-
tion and that the shipyard worker is engaged in seaman’s work,
since 'West had made it clear that at least in some cases control
of the vessel is the decisive factor. The Court concluded that
“the character of the work to be done by the shipyard, the
presence or absence of a crew performing the customary work
of seamen on shipboard, and the consequent measure of control
or lack of control by the shipyard over the vessel\as a whole, .
are the determining factors that rule the decison of this case,”
275 F.2d at 604. We adopted this reasoning in Union Barge Line
Corporation v. Allen, 5 Cir. 1966, 361 F.2d 217.
Q;
28
supra; Strachan Shipping Company v. Koninklyke
Nederlandsche S.M.N.V., 324 F.2d 746.
6. ;
|
In the event Cargill, Inc. and Dravo Corporation are
unable to agree on what is reasonable for attorney’s
fees and costs, the Court will, upon application of either
party, hear evidence pertaining thereto.
-
7.
The Court concludes as a matter of law that since
plaintiff's injuries occurred upon a dry dock over navi-
gable waters, his exclusive recovery as against Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company as the insuror of Dravo
Corporation is under the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C.A. 903.
Since the Court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover in this suit, the intervention filed by Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company for recovery of com-
pensation benefits previously paid to the plaintiff must
as a matter of law be dismissed.
Judgement will be entered accordingly.
New Orleans, Louisiana
January 28th, 1969,
=
29
(Signed) JAMES A. COMISKEY
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and fore-
going petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been for-
warded to all counsel of record by depositing same
in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, this ____ day of
January, 1970.
ELDON E. FALLON
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.