Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Parker v. Cargill, Inc.

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SUPREME COURT, U. 8,

Ce-Supteate “Court, U.S.

FILED

JAN 21 1970

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OCTOBER TERM, 1969

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ange

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By) LOR she Wa tageE RR Pe aes Go

No. 1098

LOUIS PARKER,

versus

Pe Te 7 Ay guia ie PERC hale te ee fa iM

CARGILL, INC.,

a

Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Circuit Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit

NOE LIM HOC IN LE TIE LR NOTRE LS IE VV SLEPT HOLE

AN

RAYMOND H. KIERR,

ELDON E. FALLON, and

GERALD J. MARTINEZ ‘|

: 1718 Nat’l Bank of Commerce Bldg. t

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112. {

OF COUNSEL: ,

KIERR AND GAINSBURGH a | |

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|

aT

- INDEX

Page

SONG BR oe ee 1

sesso anh ose RE RS Pee ITT as ta 2

Question Pevetites SAMAR D ade E Re CURES “oie EMG f 2

UG ee Ab anee eS ENE ey ek teri 2

| > Granting Writ ........... Pe eR beta 4

Conc Sion Breet oS ee ee Re wit eats 8

Appendix A— Opinion of Fifth Circuit Court ‘of

Me sigs li RE SPAR OE are WM RE 9

Appendix B — Petition for Re-hearing .<......:..... 13

Appendix C— Findings of Fact and €onclusions 7

of Law of District Court ............ 16

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ce eae

ot od (eee ‘CITATIONS ©

CASES: | :

Alaska Steamship Co., Inc. Vv. Petterson, 347 US.

REE fee OG arta us us a ae ree ae ee oe 4,5

2 Albanese v. N.V. Neder. peers Stooniv. Moats,

392 F. 2d 763 (2d oo a gt RE Cree Se 7

Crumady v. ‘Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423

(1959): . ic [eacenuca tae Scene os a6 avs Wire esss 4,5

Petterson v. Aianks Steamship Co., Inc., 205 F.

2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953) ...... Pie pre CoS Pee 7

Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ...... 4

Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954) ... 4,5

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1945) yates 4

West v. Uhited States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959) ........ es.

MISCELLANEOUS: |

Norris, Maritime Personal Injuries, 2d Ed. Sec.

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| IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

, OCTOBER TERM, 1969 3

No.

LOUIS PARKER,

Petitioner,

versus ,

CARGILL, INC.,

; _ Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Circuit Court Of Appeals

' For The Fifth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in ‘the above

entitled case on October 2, 1969. —

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit is unreported but it is printed

in Appendix A. 2.

Petition for rehearing was: timely filed and ‘denied

on October 31, 1969 and is printed in Appendix B,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ‘Law of the Dis-

trict Court are printed in Appendix C.

4

htt aS A A NLS Lat i SANS ce ae ee Oe ea ir ey

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2

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit was entered on October 2, 1969. Rehearing»

was denied on October 31, 1969. Jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under the provisions of 28 U. S. C.

$1254(1).

» ‘QUESTION PRESENTED ne

Whether a vesse! owner must have control ver a

~ vessel at the time an unseaworthy condition occurs be-

fore it can be held liable for damages resulting frorn

injuries caused by the unseaworthy condition.

STATEMENT

«Petitioner, Louis Parker, sustained disabling inju-

ries while descending a ladder when he slipped on

a portable light which was hooked on a rung of the

ladder. The ladder led into one of the cargo spaces

of a barge known as Barge J-9 and owned by the

defendant, Cargill, Inc.

At the time of his injury the Barge J-9 was in a

floating, dry-dock undergoing minor repairs and being

cleaned so it could be returned to the same ‘service

it was performing before it was dry-decked.

Petitioner, Louis Parker, was employed ‘by Dravo

Corporation which corporation was employed by the

barge owner to perform work on the barge. The pe-

titioner was assisting in the cleaning operation.

w

3

_ Petitioner filed suit in the Federal District Court for

' the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Di-

vision, alleging that the presence of the portable light

on the rung of the ladder caused him to fall and sus-

in injuries; that the preserfce of the light on the -

rung of the ladder rendered the barge in question un-

seaworthy and that the owner of the barge, Cargill,

Inc., is liable for all damages resulting from his ‘in-

juries. —

The District Court denied recovery holding, inter

alia, that: j

“|. the cause of the plaintiff’s- fall was the

- presence of the portable light on the rung of

the ladder, which was a transitory condition

resulting from the course of performing the

‘contract by Dravo which alone had custody

and control of the vessel ard therefore the

warranty of seaworthiness’ did not extend to

the plaintiff’.R.12- ©. ~ °

: \

In short, the District Court below held ‘that the

vessel owner was not liable for the unseaworthy con-

dition which caused ‘the plaintiff's injury because it

did not have control over the barge in question at the

time the unseaworthy condition ‘occurred. The Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District

Court’s ruling in a per baie ices 3

.

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4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT :

I, |

CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT

Beginning with Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328

U. S. 85 (1945), this Court has consistently held that

those in the service of the ship doing seaman’s work

are entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness. See also

Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).

The obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel “is

peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the owner.

It is one he cannot delegate. By the same token it is

one he cannot contract away as to any workman with-

in the scope of its policy”. id. at p. 100.

‘. The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is an ab-

solute duty and does not depend upon negligence.

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 382 U. S. 85 (1945).

Control is an element of fault and fault is an ingre-

dient of negligence. Neither control nor fault isneces-

sary for a cause of action based on unseaworthiness

because such a cause of action is “a species of lia-

bility without fault.” Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,

382 U. S. 85,.94 (1945). See also Crumady v. Joachim |

Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423, 427 (1959). Rogers v. U-

nited States Lines, ahd U. S. 984 (1954). :

-

In Alaska%sSteamship to, Inc..v. Petterson, 347

U. S. 396 (1954), the plaintiff.was employed as a long-

shore foreman by a stevedoring company. The steve-

doring company was engaged by Alaska Steamship

company, Inc. to load its vessel. The stevedoring

.

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‘ . ee ee ee

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‘

5

company, the plaintiff's employer, was authorized to

use its own gear in the loading operation. Accord-

ingly, the plaintiff and his fellow employees rigged

up a snatch block which was owned by the stevedor-

ing company and brought aboard the vessel by that

company’s employees. ; ss |

While being put to a proper use in a proper manner,

the block broke and injured the plaiitiff. The plain-

tiff sued the vessel owner under the General Mari-

time law alleging that the defective snatch block ren-

. dered the vessel unseaworthy.

Notwithstanding the fact that the block was owned

by the plaintiff’s employer and was under the control

of sorheone other than the vessel owner, the Court held

the vessel unseaworthy and allowed recovery against

the vessel owner-

In the present \case, however, the lower court ruled

that a vessel owner must have control over a vessel

when the unseaworthy condition occurs before the ves-

sel owner can be held liable for injuries resulting from

____the unseaworthy condition. Such a holding is in con-

- flict with this Court's Tuling in Alaska Steamship Co.,.

Inc. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). See also’ Crumady

v. Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423 (1959). Rogers

v. United States Lines, 347 U. S. 984 (1954).

The court below based its decision on West v. United

States, 361 U. S. 118 (1959). This decision we submit

is not applicable to the present case. |

Seeiceeirte

a NE AS BA He

>

6

In West v. United States, the vessel had been in the

“moth ball fleet” for several years and at the time

of the injury the vessel was not in navigation. Since

it was out of navigation, thé warranty of seaworthiness

was not applicable. The only basis of recovery avail-

able to the plaintiff in the West case was negligence;

_-and control is an essential ingredient of a cause of

action based on negligence. Therefore, when the

Court in West discussed the importance of the vessel

’ owner having control over the vessel, it could only

have intended to formulate a rule for vessels out of

navigation. The rule of law set forth in West should

not be applied to vessels which are in navigation at the

time the cause of action arises. The warranty of sea-

worthiness is applicable to those vessels and the doc-

trine of seaworthiness is a “species of liability with-

out fault” and the lack of control is of no significance.

Louis Parker, the plaintiff and appellant in the pres-

ent case, was aboard the Barge J-9 for the purpose of

assisting in the operation of cleaning the tanks of the

barge. The Barge J-9 had never been removed from

navigation and was in navigation at the time of the

plaintiff's injury. The type work in which the plain-

tiff was engaged at the time of his injury was work

traditionally done by seamen. See Norris, Maritime

Personal Injuries, 2d Ed. Sec. 51, P. 116 (1966).

The owner of the Barge J-9, Cargill, Inc., owed the

warranty of seaworthiness to the plaintiff. The fact

that the owner of the Barge J-9 did not have control

of the vessel at the time the unseaworthy condition

occurred is of no significance. .

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7

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CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUITS

The decision of the Fifth Circuit in the present case

is in conflict with the decisions of other Circuit Courts.

SECOND CIRCUIT:

In Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stooniv. Moats,

, 392 Fs 2d 763 (2d Cir. 1968), reversed on other grounds

see 393 U.S. 74. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals

stated that “regardless of the shipowner’s con-

trol or lack of it, he still has a nondelegable duty

to use reasonable care to keep the area a safe one in

which to work.” Failure to do this, the Court ruled,

could be the basis for a cause of action for unsea-

worthiness. id. at p. 764.

NINTH CIRCUIT:

In Petterson v. Alaska Steamship Co., 205 F. 2d

478 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

held that in a cause of action based on unseaworthi--

ness “It is not necessary to show, as it is in negligence

cases, that the shipowner had cumplete control of the

instrumentality causing the injury, or that the result

would not have occurred unless someone were neg-

- ligent.” The Court stated “It is only necessary to show

that the condition upon which the absolute lia-

bility is determined—unseaworthiness—exists.” id. at

p. 479.

ITI.

IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION

The duty of a vessel owner to provide a seaworthy

vessel has long been a part of maritime law. It is an

absolute duty and is not dependent on negligence.

ws bgt kay we aU hema ee

The Court below by its holding in the present case

is either attempting to convert the obligation to pro-

vide a seaworthy vessel from an absolute duty to one

dependent. on fault or seeking to carve out an ex-

ception to the vessel owner’s responsibilities. Neither

of these objectives is in keeping with the prior de-

cisions of this Court or of the decisions in other Cir-

. Cuits.

Petitioner is convinced that the Court upon exam-

ination of the decision of the Fifth Circuit will be readily

persuaded that its discretionary jurisdiction should be

exercised and the case should be reviewed.

CONCLUSION

To protect the integrity of this Court’s decisions in

the cases referred to above, to resolve a conflict be-

tween the circuits and to preserve the warranty of

seaworthiness in its present posture, the petition for

a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RAYMOND H. KIERR

ELDON E. FALLON

GERALD J. MARTINEZ

1718 Nat’l Bank of Commerce

Bldg.

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

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APPENDIX A

IN THE | NY,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 27533

Summary Calendar

LOUIS PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CARGILL, INC., ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

_ Eastern District of Louisiana .

(October 2, 1969)

‘Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Parker, a shipyard work-

er employed by Dravo Corporation at its repair fa-

cility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, filed an action in

the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of Louisiana seeking to recover damages for per-

* \ ,

STALE TES AIT

10

sonal injuries received aboard the coal and molasses

barge J-9, owned by appellee Cargill, Inc. He contends

that his injuries were caused by an unseaworthy con-

dition for which the vessel owner is liable. The dis-

trict court found for ai ac and this appeal was taken.

We affirm." °

Caxgill turned ovér the barge J-9, empty and unman-

ned, to. Dravo for repairs and cleaning. On February

14, 1964,\the barge was placed in a floating dry-dock

on navigakle waters in the Mississippi River. While

thus situated on February 17, 1964, Parker went on

board te-assist in the cleaning operation. He was in-

jured when he siipped and fell from a ladder while

descending into one of the cargo holds of the barge.

At the time of injury, Dravo had exclusive custody

and control of the barge and the repair and cleaning

operations were being conducted under its direction.

The district court found that Parker’s injury was

caused by either or both of the following conditions:

- the presence of molasses on the deck and ladder of

the barge; the presence of a portable lantern left hang-

ing on a rung of the ladder by another employee of

Dravo. The court reasoned that neither of these causal

agents could give rise to unseaworthiness liability. The

molasses residue on the barge was a condition which

Parker as a Dravo employee was called on board to

acount to new Rule 18 of the Rules of this court, we have con-

cluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not

to justify oral argument and have directed the clerk to place

the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties

in writing. See Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 409 F.2d 804,

Part I (5th Cir. 1969).

11

correct. Relying principally on Moye v. Sioux City

& New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc.,3 the negligently

placed lantern was found to be a transitory condition

which occurred during the course of performing the

repair contract by Dravo and as a result of such per-

formance. It is only this latter conclusion that parker

contests here. ee

The parties agree that it is not possible to distinguish

the present case from Moye. Parker, however, urges

that Moye was erroneously decided. and should not

be followed. He contends that in reaching its decision,

the Moye court misconstrued West v. United States.4

In West the Supreme Court faced the claim of a

shipyard worker against a shipowner, grounded in neg-

ligence as well as the warranty of seaworthiness. In

denying recovery, the Court was influenced by the fact

that an independent contractor rather than the owner

had custody and control of the vessel at the time of

injury. It is Parker’s contention, contrary to Moye,

that West treats the element of control as modifying

only the potential liability of a shipowner for negli-

2See, Pinion v. Mississippi Shipping Company, 156 F. Supp. 652

(E.D. La. 1957): Brusbewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.2d

720 (3d Cir. 1947); Byars v. Moore-McCormack ‘Lines, 155 F.2d

587 (2d Cir. 1946); McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 282 F.2d 816

(2d Cir. 1960).

$402 F.2d 238 ( (5th Cir. 1968).

4361 U.S. 118 (1959). In West the injured workman was a member

of the crew of an independent contractor employed by the gov-

ernment to completely overhaul an inactive merchant ship. The

vessel, after several years in “moth balls”, had been towed to

the contractor’s repair dock for the express purpose of render-

\ ing her seaworthy.

SNES RRC RIRATALI FY ye

12

gence, and that the absence of control over the circum-

stances of an injury has no effect on the warranty

of seaworthiness. We cannot agree with this conten-

tion, and conclude that Moye properly interpreted West

as a sensible but very restrictive limitation on unsea-

worthiness liability.®

As noted in the opinion of Chief Judge Brown con-

curring in Moye,® there. may be instances in which

a shipowner will be liable for injuries to a repairman

caused by an unseaworthy condition even though he

does not have physical possession of the vessel. How-

ever, this will not be the case where the injury is

caused by a transitory condition resulting from the

course of performing a repair contract by one who

alone has present custody and control of the vessel.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

5Parker’s criticism focuses on a passage quoted by the Moye opin-

ion from West v. United States:

“Petitioner overlooks that here the respondent had no —

control over the vessel, or power either to supervise

or to control the repair work in which petitioner was

engaged. We believe this to be decisive against both

aspects of plaintiff’s dual theory [of warranty of sea-

worthiness and negligence].”’

402 F.2d at 240.

Parker contends that the insertion [of the phrase] “of war-

ranty of seaworthiness and negligence’’, which did not appear

in West, does not accurately identify the antecedent of the

* phrase “plaintiff’s dual theory.’”’ He discounts identical treat-

ment by the Second Circuit in Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil

Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1960), as identical error. 6

Assuming arguendo that the quotation has been used inap-

propriately, neither the vitality of Moye, nor the aptness of

its interpretation of West is thereby impaired.

6402 F.2d at 241.

a

Juieeouaee ie ;

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APPENDIX B

IN THE }

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 27,533

LOUIS PARKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus .

CARGILL, INC., ET AL, 3

Defendants-Appellees.

a

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant

a rehearing.

The single issue for review in the present case is

whether a vessel owner must have custody or control

of a vessel in navigation at the time an unseaworthy

_ condition occurs before the vessel owner can be held

liable for damages resulting from the unseaworthy con-

dition. | iF

14

In its opinion dated October 2, 1969, this Court an-

swered affirmatively and cited West v. United States,

361 U. S. 118 (1959) as the basis for its decision. We

submit that the West case should not be depositive

of the present case.

In West v. United States, the vessel had been in

the “moth ball fleet” for several years and at the

time of the injury the vessel was not in navigation.

Since it was out of navigation, the warranty of sea-

worthiness was not applicablé. The only basis of re-

covery available to the plaintiff in the West case was

negligence and control is an essential ingredient of

a cause of action based on negligence. Therefore, when

the Court in West discussed the importance of the ves-

sel owner having control over the vessel, it could only

have intended to formulate a rule for vessels out of

navigation. The gule of law set forth in West should

not be applied to vessels which are in navigation at

the time the cause of action arises because the war-

ranty of seaworthiness is applicable to these vessels

and control is not an essential ingredient of a cause

of action based on a theory of unseaworthiness. Seas

Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).

In the present case the barge, J-9, was only being

cleaned and undergoing minor repairs in a floating

_ drydock and was in navigation at the time appellant

was injured. Hunt v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 578

(S.D.N.Y. 1936); 9 F. 2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1937). By taking

advantage of specialized labor, such as Louis Parker,

the petitioner, the owner of the barge, J-9, cannot dis-

card or delegate its responsibility to provide a sea-

\e

~ 15 :

worthy vessel. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US.

. 85-(1946).

For the foregoing reasons petitjbrer prays that the

Court grant a rehearing in this matter and reverse

the decision of the lower court and order the case

remanded to the lower court so t judgment can

be entered in favor of petitioner, Louis Farker.

Respectfully submitted,

KIERR AND GAINSBURGH

Va ) ELDON E. FALLON

1718 Nat'l] Bank of Commerce

Bldg. ;

New Orleans, Louisiana

522-2304

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

I, Eldon E. Fallon, attorney for appellant, certify

that this petition is presented in good faith, that it

is not interposed for delay and that in my. judgment

it is well-founded. ;

October 16, 1969, New Orleans, Louisiana.

ELDON E. FALLON

———————EeEeEeEeEeEeeeee

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and fore-

going Petition for Rehearing has been forwarded to

all counsel of record by depositing same in the US.

Mail, postage pre-paid, this pa of October, 1969.

ELDON E. FALLON

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION .

, No. 7119

Admiralty Section G

LOUIS PARKER

versus

CARGILL, INC. and THE AETNA CASUALTY AND

SURETY COMPANY

ee a SR oly Ew Si ea oe

*

17

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This is a suit for damages for personal injuries sus-

tained by plaintiff, Louis Parker, as a result of the

alleged unseaworthiness of the defendant Cargill, Inc.’s

barge J-9. Plaintiff, at the time of his accident on

February 17, 1964, was employed by Dravo Corpora-

tion, a ship repair facility, hired by the operator of

the barge to perform certain work aboard the J-9.

The plaintiff in his suit alleged that his injuries proxi-

mately resulted from the negligence, carelessness and

inattention of the agents, servants and employees of

Dravo Corporation, which caused the barge J-9 to be-

come unseaworthy, in the following respects:

“1. Failure of plaintiff's co-employees to pay

sufficient attention to and mairitain proper

regard for plaintiff's safety aboard the

barge, J-9, in the performance of his du-

ties.

2. Failure to follow prescribed safety regula-

. tions and procedures pertaining to ladders

and walkways aboard vessels.

3. The absence of reasonably su:table appli-

ances, lights and appurtenances for the

_ Safe conduct of plaintiff's work aboard the

J-9.

4. Presence of a portable light and extension

cord on the steps of the ladder in the No. 3

hatch of the J-9.”

.

CIN I AOA, a TI Rat 8

——

The plaintiff filed a second cause of action against

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company as the compen-

rae S60 ne Pat GA etme 5 lay Oe TROIS ita CPL Te! wa

sation insuror of Dravo Corporation, seeking Louisiana

Workmen’s Compensation Act benefits in the event

that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under

the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act as against Dravo Corporation.

Defendant, Cargill, Inc., filed a third party action

against Dravo Corporation, seeking indemnity from

Dravo on the basis that if Cargill, Inc. was held liable

to the plaintiff, suit liability arose from Dravo Corpora-

tion breaching its contract to perform its work in a

workmanlike manner. Attorney’s fees and costs were

also sought.

Both Cargill; Inc. and Dravo Corporation answered

the plaintiff's complaint denying that plaintiff was en-

titled to the warranty of unseaworthiness and denying

that the vessel was in fact unseaworthy.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company intervened in

said proceedings for subrogation, seeking reimburse-

ment fot the compensation and medical expenses paid

to and in behalf of the plaintiff.

The parties to this litigation have submitted the fol-

lowing stipulations to the Court:

“The Barge J-9 was involved in both molasses

and coal trade. The cargo pump on the Barge

J-9 began to malfunction. Trash, scale residue

and other foreign matter was getting into the

]

19

pump and causing it to malfunction and had

caused damage to the pump. This malfunction

of the pump did not render the barge wholly in-

operative, but the pump had to be repaired in

order for the barge to carry molasses.’

‘Cargill, Inc..decided to have the pump re-

paired and in order to prevent the malfunction

from recurring, contracted to have the tanks or

compartments on the barge cleaned.’

‘Dravo Corporation undertook this work and

the Barge J-9 was dry-docked for this pur-

pose.’

‘The cleaning operation required to cut holes in

the bottom of the barge for drainage and gen-

erally when plates are put over the holes at the

completion of the cleaning operation an air test

is performed to make sure that there are no

leaks in the area of these plates, and ordinarily

when the compartments are cleaned, the barge

is tested for other leaks and fractures and this

was done on the J-9 on this occasion.’

‘This type of work is periodically performed

and is customarily done on an average of once

every two years when the barge is carrying the

same type of cargo as was the case with the

J-9.” ;

“That the empty unmanned barge J-9 was

turned over to Dravo Corporation for cleaning

20

and repairs. Thereafter said vessel was dry-

' docked in a floating dry dock situated on navi-

gable waters of the Mississippi River and re-

pairs and cleaning of the barge were perform-

ed by Dravo Corporation as set forth in the in-

voice marked as Dravo #1. During the period

that the repairs were being performed Dravo

had the exclusive care, custody and control of

the barge and the repairs to the barge were

done solely. under the supervision and control

of Dravo.’

‘The barge J-9 was dry-docked at. 10:00 o’clock

A.M. February 14, 1964, undocked at 9:00

o’clock A.M. February 20, 1964, and all work

was completed on February 28, 1964, and there-

after the Barge J-9 returned to the same type

work that it was doing prior to dry docking.’

The main work done to the barge, as reflected by

the invoice, was dry-docking the barge, cutting two

approximately 24” diameter holes in each of eight car-

go compartments, cleaning the cargo holds, installing

patch plates over the cut holes, gouging and welding

fractures in side shell and bottom plating, repairing

cargo pump, testing by means of air all compartments

for leaks and cropping and renewing starboard stern

corner of the barge. The total amount of the invoice

was $5,452.00. |

The plaintiff testified that he was injured when de-

scending a ladder into one of the cargo tanks on Feb-

ruary 17, 1964, to retrieve out of the hold a portable

21

light and extension cord and other equipment left there F

by another Dravo crew. The hold was dark. He said [

that he slipped on the ladder when he stepped on the

hook of the portable light which was left hanging on

one of the rungs of the ladder. He said that there

«was no defect in the ladder, although the evidence

reflects that there may have been molasses on the

ladder, although the evidence reflects that there may

have been molasses on the ladder as well as on the

outside top deck of the barge. The plaintiff also testi-

fied that he had molasses on his boots. |

fewest

The evidence discloses that the portable light and

cord were owned by Dravo and that the plaintiff could

have turned on lights in the hold by simply turning

on a switch about twenty feet away.

Conceding the ladder had molasses on it, or the upper

deck had molasses on it, or the plaintiff was injured

as claimed, this Court cannot find for the plaintiff.

When a repairman, such as the plaintiff, is aboard

a vessel remedying an unseaworthy condition then ex-

isting, no warranty of seaworthiness runs in his favor

with respect to the unseaworthy condition which he

is called on to repair; and if he is wae as a result

of the. very unseaworthy condition he is attempting

to remedy, he may not recover from the barge owner

on the grounds of unseaworthiness. Pinion v. Missis-

sippi Shipping Company, 156 F.Supp. 652 (E.D. La.

1957); Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.(2) 720

(C.A.3rd— 1947); Patterson v. Esso Jamestown, 274

F.Supp. 854 (E.D. La. 1967). sin ag

-

SES Lt re SA Et A, SFE COINS GOAT RIES BEE EP bw ots

22

&

Nor can the plaintiff under the facts of this case

be permitted to recover here in view of the most recent

decision emanating from the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge

Lines, Inc., (Nov. 1968). The majority opinion of the

Court said:

“In this case there were no major repairs -or

structural changes made‘in the barge although

the collision damage required the renewal of

side’plating in two places, the renewal of some

deck plating and the reworking of Nos. 4 and 5

roller hatch covers. This work required the

barge to be dry-docked by Saucer who, from

the time it received the barge until the work

was completed, had exclusive control of the

’ barge and the lighting under which the repairs

were effected. The barge was designed to

carry no motive power, lights or crew. Sioux

City had no motive power, lights or crew. Sioux

City had no representative or crew aboard at

any time while the barge was in Saucer’s yard.

Under these circumstances we hold that there

was no warranty of seaworthiness by the ship

owner running in favor of shore-based workers

on the vessel.” 402 F.2d 238

And in the concurring opinion of Judge John

R. Brown it is said:

“If the circumstances bringing about the in-

jury is a transitory condition resulting from

the course of performing the contract by one

aay

SEEDS RGR Sie 0. E506 FN ie EEL. EDIE ey or mnt gp

23

who alone has the present custody and control

of the vessel, then the warranty of seaworthi-

ness *** does not extend to-such person for

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Plaintiff, Louis Parker, at the time of his injury

was an employee of Dravo Carporation, an independ-

ent contractor: He was a shipyard worker working

in Dravo Corporation’s repair facility in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, on February 17, 1964.

2;

At the time of plaintiff's accident en February 17,

1964, the Barge J-9 was owned by Cargill, Inc.

3.

The Barge J-9, an empty unmanned barge, was

turned over to Dravo Corporation for cleaning and

repairs.

4,

The said barge was dry-docked in a floating dry

dock on navigable waters in the Mississippi River on

February 14, 1964, undocked on February 20, 1964, and

all work was completed by Dravo Corporation by Feb- |

ruary 28, 1964.

such condition.” sid Lesa ee

ae

‘

PME Ap AO RELE OPENS SEAT) ae

Ps : . at ee

eit amen SE SI OD aa REED ee PL at FM dg lS A Det fa oe tae PN aaa a ME Sails ano Eel

The repairs and cleaning of the barge were per-

formed by Dravo Corporation and at all times during

the period of repairs and cleaning Dravo Corporation

-had the exclusive care, custody and control of the barge

and said repairs and cleaning were done solely under

the supervision and control:of Dravo Corporation.

6.

Plaintiff, Louis Parker, was injured while descending

a ladder into one of the cargo holds when he slipped,

either because of a portable light hook hanging on

one of the rungs of the ladder which portable light

hook had been placed there by a previous Dravo. crew

cleaning the cargo hold, or because of molasses on

the ladder, or both conditions acting concurrently.

7.

The cleaning of the Barge J-9 was to remove residual

molasses and loose scale and corrosion from the said

_ barge. , ,

8.

The portable light was owned by Dravo Corporation

and there was nothing defective about the ladder that.

plaintiff was descending at the time of his injury.

25

9.

The procedure used in cleaning the residual molasses

and in repairing the vessel was entirely within the

discretion of and under the control of Dravo Corpora-

- tion.

10.

Plaintiff was injured while in the course of correcting

and cleaning the molasses, which condition he was

called aboard to correct, or he was injured as a result

of the hanging portable light, which was a transitory

condition resulting from the course of performing the

contract of repairs by Dravo Corporation which alone

had the custody and control of said barge, and, there-

fore, the warranty of seaworthiness did not extend

from the barge ‘or its owner, Cargill, Inc., to Louis

Parker.

at:

The proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. was

his own negligence and the negligence of his co-work- |

ers. c

- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. °

a

t

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter and venue

is properly laid in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

26

2.

The Court finds as a matter of law that Cargill,

Inc. nor anyone by whose action. defendant is liable

was guilty of any negligence which in any way caused

or contributed to the cause of the accident and resulting

injuries herein involved.

3.

The Court finds as a matter of law that the sole

proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was the concur-

rent negligence of plaintiff himself and his co-workers

or employees of Dravo Corporation.

4,

The Court finds that the conditions giving rise -to

the plaintiff's injury was either or. both, concurrently,

of the following: First an unseaworthy condition of

molasses present on the ladder and on the deck of

the barge, which condition plaintiff, his co-employees

and Dravo Corporation were called upon to repair and

remedy, and that if ‘he was injured from said unsea-

worthy condition, he is not-entitled to recover for his

injuries from the shipowner on the grounds of unsea-

_worthiness, and, second, the cause of the plaintiff’s j

fall was the presence of the portable light on the rung

of the ladder, which was a transitory condition result-

ing from the course of performing the contract by

Dravo which alone had custody and control of the ves-

-sel and therefore \the warranty of seaworthiness did

not extend to the plaintiff. Patterson v. Esso James-

J

A a at ASRS «oe Al 2 et ERR tn Tie 5 SCONE RES Ra Tata ates “

27

town, 274 F.Supp. 854 '(E.D. La. 1967); Moye v. Sioux

City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 402 F.2d 238

(5th Cir. 1968). Counsel for plaintiff relies heavily, if

not exclusively, upon Allen v. Union Barge Line Cor-

poration, 239 F.Supp. 1004 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd 361

F.2d 217, cert. den. 385 U.S. 1006. In Moye, supra, the

5th Circuit Court of Appeals set out the rule to be

applied in these cases even citing with approval the

reasoning in the Allen case.' In the instant case, con-

sidering the character of the work to’ be done by the

shipyard, the absence of a crew, and the complete

control by-the shipyard over the vessel, we are con-

{inced that the plaintiff is not entitled to the warranty

of seaworthiness. The plaintiff's case lacks some of

the determinative facts found in the Allen case.

; D.

Since the Court concludes that the plaintiff’s injuries

were caused by the negligence of Dravo’s employees,

_ which constituted a breach of Dravo to perform its

work in a workmanlike manner, Cargill, Inc. is entitled

to recover from Dravo, pursuant to its third party

demand, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred

in defense of this suit. Patterson v. Esso Jamestown,

1In Lawlor the Second Circuit took the position that it is no longer

sufficient merely to require proof that the vessel is in naviga-

tion and that the shipyard worker is engaged in seaman’s work,

since 'West had made it clear that at least in some cases control

of the vessel is the decisive factor. The Court concluded that

“the character of the work to be done by the shipyard, the

presence or absence of a crew performing the customary work

of seamen on shipboard, and the consequent measure of control

or lack of control by the shipyard over the vessel\as a whole, .

are the determining factors that rule the decison of this case,”

275 F.2d at 604. We adopted this reasoning in Union Barge Line

Corporation v. Allen, 5 Cir. 1966, 361 F.2d 217.

Q;

28

supra; Strachan Shipping Company v. Koninklyke

Nederlandsche S.M.N.V., 324 F.2d 746.

6. ;

|

In the event Cargill, Inc. and Dravo Corporation are

unable to agree on what is reasonable for attorney’s

fees and costs, the Court will, upon application of either

party, hear evidence pertaining thereto.

-

7.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that since

plaintiff's injuries occurred upon a dry dock over navi-

gable waters, his exclusive recovery as against Aetna

Casualty and Surety Company as the insuror of Dravo

Corporation is under the Longshoremen and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C.A. 903.

Since the Court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled

to recover in this suit, the intervention filed by Aetna

Casualty and Surety Company for recovery of com-

pensation benefits previously paid to the plaintiff must

as a matter of law be dismissed.

Judgement will be entered accordingly.

New Orleans, Louisiana

January 28th, 1969,

=

29

(Signed) JAMES A. COMISKEY

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and fore-

going petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been for-

warded to all counsel of record by depositing same

in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, this ____ day of

January, 1970.

ELDON E. FALLON

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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