Opposition Brief — Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

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SUPREME COURT, U. S.

ay Cir am

: Soupeeme Court of the Anited States Fis

October Term, 1969

No. 1031

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

DAVID G. RALL and RB. E. LEE,

) Petitioners,

vs.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

4

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

j

HENRY HALLADAY

2400 First National Bank Bldg.

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Attorney for Respondent

Dorsny, MARQUART, WINDHORST,; West & HALLADAY

JOHN M. MASON and

Davip A. RANHEIM :

2400 First National Bank Bldg.

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Of Counsel

eed

1970—Northwest Brief Printing Co., 322 S. Fourth St., Minneapolis 55415 338-5078

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QUESTION PRESENTED.....................0.00::006: Reseeianvarrepes SURREAL 2

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ARGUMENT: '

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I, The Court of Appeals’ Decision Concerning Recoverability

II.

III.

of Attorneys’ Fees Does Not Involve an Important Ques-

tion of Federal Law, and Even if It Does, That Question

Already Has Been Settled by Congress and by This Court

A. The Question Raised by Petitioners Is Not of Sufficient

Importance to Necessitate Review by This Court........

B. The Question Raised by Petitioners Already Has Been

Settled by Congress and by This Court..........................

1, Congress Did Not Make § 153 Aplicable to Air Car-

POEM, Roeder sbtcav add ie avhesacadrlveds (pox sibronnesthtsandpeenders opts igesesy

_ 2. This Court Has Settled the Question of Applicabil-

ity of § 153 to the Airlines in International Ass’n

<——o v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682

PUD 5 acu tas oso avi tonsignnarnegh eratexacUagsbassalicas Distt recssysddcnaeit yye>

The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not Conflict with the

Decisions of Other Courts of Appeal, Either as to the Ques-

tion of Attorneys’ Fees or That of the Basis for Federal

RE IN 55s nb cu san eb ieo rad hke las uakcacas eenvacies oolkaeck sedusbassesece

~The Court of Appeals’ Decision in No Way Conflicts with

the Decision of This Court in Central Airlines, But Rather

Is Required by That Decision.......................0....-.¢c.cccoeeeeeeeee

CONCLUSION

13

17

Bes le PER

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: * Page

Air Liné Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 415 F.

ee ee a FR ha ai ene ba pa eh Arua Fok SVN NS occ Paneees 19, 22

Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 203 F. >

I ROGUE Bas ee 0 aris ink caer A le * 15

Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961).... 18

Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F.Supp. 273 (D. Minn.

DF wacetias biess cad ues uel ov take hv vane cole a bw Teubado sb audeckanebeubs Caseka pekasetenieewins 18

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353

U.S. 30_ 41957) Ses adapt avas ea che Cosanecscvelin cient tivyab cevmeekablevuihi poonioca oes mobo 2

Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’ n, Int'l, 341 F.2d 288 |

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965)...........00000 18

Crusen v. United Air Lines, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 347 (D. Colo.), aff’d,

REO Ee SO CACC Katty ROWS bikes ess so¥eicis egousechsracesesdonstosroniesucssesirs 18

Dominguez v. National Airlines, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y.

SE ails eR aoeecd wre can nsnicbapeens ad's cedssyohesvanchacuoyitonsbasvtaourtenaes 19

Edwards v. Capitol Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

OS BBE as ee Baa aa hs sav pn fosnka pe eeneah ve acapnentntoe sesh tua 18

Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Wash.

fy 7 Raia ea SB iti lead 0 Than pe aera eae oe Ad te Pen pe CDSS Re kD ERE Sa 18

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714'

Rt 1S Rae Gee We Satis cesire re eae aCe es ie pte oe cir Iw hs aR ERC Oa 5

Flight Engineers Int’l] Ass’n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5

CUI INE RO ov seca weasaic he snosies sav ech tah Cene evtaa baad pe pdasean uence suauTauNiEas 18

Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 268 F.Supp. 210 (W.D. Va.

LT se Nip aaah G The DNase bchue hheg Eon praeco met hag SEL TY CBee RABE CATON ety Panen sn ae Nl 19

Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1966) 19

International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372

Base Oe AAO RD iciiccn seoxpisinccabatadsesn igehsksall snaskeneveisscahceesis events 2, 4, 11-23

International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.

Ee re Ce aks kD ys ooh sc oss Gs ceca Sed psn dda me oN nis panne va webabens 15

International Union, UAW v. Delta Air Lines, Tue., 83 F. Supp. 63

gfe SEE cB en |g Reerreeeeremenrreey Fe ASER TE, Pavel iS ERAS ele ina Sn NCHRP RE DE 18

Kelley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 389 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1967)... 18

Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Weston Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387

Raves sect vacace dos Daoeuy tase sevens en cib oben pimate rae susbse ype ete sieass ennaeies 6

Metcalf v. National Airlines, Inc., 271 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1959)

CE ERR LE AER EERO ae Ry SPR OR eT MELD LD MRS Pe ER TR 14,15, 16, 18,19, 21

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 373 F.2d

Se ee ey sos as ante ened cdoaceute deans ndtanap i dubentoreckeNtovss eeubeuher nl ios 9

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70

Oe Ne acai a ovathed pds covemetvade ov tevervasionk poses? be hecacus cs duLaeath oceedoaVer tesa 6

Rosen v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968).... 17

Rudolph_v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962)....... Pte detect ee aoe 6

<i

4

IV °

Page

Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 230 F.2d 13 (5th

CRP} CURE GOOG, SSL TB. GAS CEO BSD oickvccssccssiyccicsercssvisivaasitees 18

Thorgeirsson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 288 F, ‘Supp. 71 (S.D.

gO ARR REE Ol naw Nara CNC ark sy oer a Ry wT TP CHa nen MWe ETRE FEST 19

Transport Workers Union of America v. American Airlines, Inc.,

Fe a ek BOD sancti sciences avn tebawtszatciaaneicorvuagsenyvas 18,19

Woolley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1957),

Cnrt Gonsee,. SEE. Fi. Bes. CIR S ioe Kas cence 18

STATUTES: ;

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ee Ree ee”) ee orenrnn rere ioaneericntseu ys aaibavaads woe 2,12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21

ies My RO peices pee cb pags ceveaeniena vo edavtaneshy ech denbananbervangs a RE 19

28 U.S.C. § 1337 ..... Ale etndae actus inesavecBusteusersenscess 2,12, 15, 16,:19, 20, 21

ae Rag 5 a ainsi senvnccoitvnroersoonta esos bey eos vaadbevenee=tauaincbans 2,5

BO BOS | citi tio lene octal anernsendis oh irideattos 2,5, 7-19, 21, 22,

i ae ag aoa har cirhesimepevio tne eavicesexiepissilintentionereneats 5,10, 14,17

ee Fe Sy} aa eee cd Sia eee Vea asada co WOR cs beaten teode Teteceesaskdekaes 5,10, 14, 17

OG FEA, BOE pritivencsteresstoecesetts 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18, 17, 18, 19, 23, 22

<6 GAG. B06 ooo. AS ae ee ia eer RO 7, 10, 11, 12, 17, 20

RULES:

- Supreme Court of the United States Revised Rule&s.

a SO eka eee cer eee een hae 4

pS NAT S EAC Repack het gL RS eA MERE NDS ALAM THN rot Pre 4

SECONARY AUTHORITIES:

Hearings on S. 2496 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on

Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).......0.0..... 10

H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1° (1936)...................... 10

In The

- Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

No. 1031

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

DAVID G. RALL and R. E. LEE,

_ Petitioners,

VS.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

” CERTIORARI.TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF: APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT |

The respondent, } vorthwest Airlines, ane: submits this

Brief in opposition to the petition of Air Line Pilots Asso-

ciation, International, David .G. Rall and R. E. Lee for a

writ of certiorari to review, the judgment of the ‘United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered on

September 9, 1969. In accordance with Rule 40, subd. 3, of

this Court, we accept the petitioners’ recital of the lower

court opinions, invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), and citation of relevant statu-

tory provisions. However, we believe that petitioners’ formu-

lation of the question presented requires revision, and that

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their statement of the case is deficient in certain respects.

bo

a QUESTION PRESENTED

’ Whether a federal court may grant attorneys’sfees to the

prevailing party in an action to enforce awards of an Air-

line System Board of Adjustment established by contract

between Northwest Airlines, Inc. and Air Line Pilots Asso-

ciation, International, where there is no provision in that

contract: for attorneys’ fees.

’

STATEMENT OF CASE

We object to petitioners’ invocation of federal district

court jurisdittion under 45 U.S.C. § 153, and contend, in ac-

cordance with the holding of this Court in Jnternational

Ass’n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682.

(1963), that such jurisdiction is based solely upon 28 U.S.C.

$$ 13381 and 1357.'

This is a suit to enforce two awards by Northwest Air-

lines Pilots’ Systém Boards of Adjustment. Air Line Pilots

Association, International (hereinafter “ALPA”) and

Northwest Airlines, Ine. ( hereinafter “NWA”) have en-

tered into agreements concerning the disposition of certain

99 2

“minor disputes. The procedure is spelled out in Section

31 of their Agreement dated Jilly 28, 1960. TA. 18.3 From an

10f course, petitioners’ reference to 45 U.S.C. § 184 as a jurisdictional basis ‘s

appropriate to the extent that that section requires Northwest Airlines, Inc.

and Air Line Pilots Association, International to create a system board of

adjustment by contract, which contract controls the rights and obligations of

these parties.

2The Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., pre-

scribes different procedures for the settlement of disputes between carriers

and their employees, depending on the nature of the dispute. Courts have

devised the terms “minor dispute” for disagreements concerning the inter-

pretation of an existing contract, and “major disputes” which arise when a

‘new contract is sought. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River

& Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957).

3As petitioners have done, we shall refer to Volume I of the two-volume Ap-

pendix submitted to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as “IA.”

be s ©

3

adverse decision at the highest company level, the pilot may

appeal to the Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Board of

Adjustment. LA. 20-21. This System Board was created by

an agreement between NWA and ALPA. IA, 11-17.

In ‘October and November, 1964, two separate but. iden-

tical Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Boards held hearings

to consider the action of NWA in discharging Captain David

G. Rall and Robert E. Lee from their positions as pilots for

NWA on February 28, 1964, effective February 9, 1964. Evi-

dence adduced at those hearings indicated that David G.

Rall was captain on a charter Flight N027 on January 4;

1964, which flew from Ilickam Air Force Base, Honolulu,

IIawaii, carrying. military personnel to Eniwetok. IA.’ 22.

In connection with that flight, Rall violated the NWA rule

(and the ALPA rule) prohibiting the use of alcoholic bever-.

ages by any pilot within twenty-four hours of departure of,

a flight on which he is a crew member. IA. 22-23. In fact,

_Rall reported for the flight in an intoxicated condition and

congealed himself in the aircraft to avoid being seen prior

o takeoff. IA. 33. He failed to attend the weather briefing

and otherwise carry out his pre-flight dujfies. IA. 33.

The evidence further revealed that Robert E. Lee served

as a co-pilot on that same flight with a pilot having an ap-

parent physical deficiency. IA. 26. Lee regarded Rall as —

drunk and unable to carry out his duties as pilot of the air~

craft and yet proceeded to fly the airplane out. IA. 35.

In both cases the System Board upheld disciplinary ac-

tion and refused to exonerate the individuals involved, but

nevertheless ordered re-employment after periods of discipli-

nary layoff without pay. When NWA declined to rein-'

state them, ALPA, Rall and Lee (collectively “ALPA’)

4Rall was ordered re-employed as of, November 1, 1964, and Lee was ordered

re-employed as of May 1, 1964. IA. 24, 27.

®

commenced this action on February 11, 1965. The remainder

of the procedural history involved in this litigation has been

set forth .in petitioners’ statement of the case and need not

he repeated here.

ae ams

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

Under. Rule 19 of this Court, review on a writ of certiorari

will be granted only where there are “special and important

reasons” therefor. The strict standard which a_ petitioner,

for a writ of certiorari must meet has been articulated many

times by this Court. It is clear that petitioners here have

“not met their burden-of demonstrating the presence of such

reasons. The qnestion presented here does not involve an

important question of federal law, since it may be resolved

by the parties simply by negotiating an amendment to their

contract; and it already has been settled by Congress and

hy this Court. Furthermore, the decision of the Eighth Cir-

crit Court of Appeals in this case does not conflict with de-

cisious of other courts of appeal; that decision in no way

conflicts with that of this Court in Juternational Ass'n of

- Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inec., 372 U.S. 682 (1563),

but rather is required by that decision. For these reasons,

respondent requests that the petition for a writ of certiorari

he denied.

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ee nensueseneusmennant anemenememanens tei ei

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ES, THAT QUESTION ALREADY HAS BEEN SETTLED BY

NGRESS AND BY THIS COURT

Petitioners concede that attorneys’ fees cannot be allowed

by a federal court absent contractual or statutory authority

for such_an award.” Indeed, petitioners have no other choice

in view of this Court’s recognition and application of that

rule, most recently in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier

Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Apparently petitioners

also concede that there is no contractual authority for such

an award herein, as they fail to point to any provision in the

contract between the parties authorizing such an award.®

inally, petitioners concede that there is no direct statutory

authority for an award of attorneys’ fees herein since 45

U.S.C, §$ 181-182 do not make § 153 applicable to airlines.’

Thus, petitioners are left with the sole contention that the

general provisions of the “Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.,

$151 et seq.,” looked at “as a whole,’ do more than the

language says they do, namely, authorize an award of attor-

neys’ fees herein. We submit that this question is not of

sufficient importance to necessitate review by this Court,

and, in any event, it already has been resolved by Congress

and by this Court.

%

‘Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 11,

"Petitioners do call attention to that provision in the contract which continues

the operation of any provisions of the Railway Labor Act which might other-

wise be applicable. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 12, n. 3. The only

provision of the Railway Labor Act authorizing attorneys’ fees, 45 U.S.C.

§ 153, is not applicable to airlines, as will be shown in this Brief. Thus, the

aforementioned contractual provision in no way authorizes an award of at-

torneys’ fees in this case.

af

7Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 11.

A. The Question Raised by Petitioners Is Not of Sufficient

Importance to Necessitate Review by This Court.

Review on writ of certiorari generally is not granted

where only the interest of the litigants themselves, as op-

posed to that of the public or a larger segment of the com- .

munity, is involved, Rice v. Siowr City Memorial Park

Cemetery, Inc, 349 USS. 70 (1955); accord, Rudolph r.

United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Layne & Bowler Corp.

r. Weston Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387 (1923). We sub-

mit that there is no overriding public interest in the question

presented. The reason, simply stated, is that air carriers and

their unions have full contractual capacity to provide for

the award of attorneys’ fees in proceedings like this one.

This proceeding involves an action to enforce awards of

a contractually created board of adjustment possessing juwr-

isdiction over minor disputes in the NWA System. The con-

tract does not contain a provision for reimbursement of at-

torneys’ fees. If provisions governing attorneys’ fees are de-

sirable, it is a negotiable matter for bargaining by the par-

ties, and by other air carriers and their unions, as yet an-

other set of rules or working conditions in a collective bar-

gaifiing context. Neither legislation nor reversal of court

decisions is necessary to effect the policy which petitioners

contend ought to be*fixed and implemented. Such a policy

can properly be tested and established only in collective bar-

gaining where it can be weighed by the parties to the negotia-

tions, sophisticated in the techniques and ramifications of

such bargaining.

Under 45 U.S.C. $184, air carriers and their unions are

required to create, by contract, system, group or regional

hoards of adjustment as follows:

It shall be the duty of every [air] carrier and of its

employees, acting through their representatives, select-

ed in accordance with the provisions of sections 181-188

7

of this title, to establish a board of adjustment of juris-

diction not exceeding the jurisdiction which may be

lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional boards

of adjustment, under the authority of section 153 of ‘this

title. (Emphasis supplied).

NWA and ALPA complied with § 184 by a contract which

established the Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Board of

Adjustment in complete detail. They provided, with clarity,

for the manner in which the Board was to be created and op-

erated and the disputes within its jurisdiction.® They. also

‘provided for the degree of administrative finality which de-

cisions of that Board were to have,® and they provided for

the event of a deadlock in the Board.’® Yet, though the par-

ties set forth all of these provisions in detail, and clearly

could have included a provision concerning attorneys’ fees

incurred in proceedings to enforce the Board’s awards, they

did not do so. Furthermore, not only could the parties to

this proceeding have contracted for payment of attorneys’

fees, but they still can through future negotiations, The

same is true of other air carriers and their unions."*

In these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals very properly ruled that it was neither its prerogative

nor its responsibility to write a provision into the agree-

“STA, 11-17.

9 “Decisions of the Board in all cases properly referable to it shall be final

and bindirig upon the parties hereto.” IA. 15. Note that by the terms of

this provision alone, without reference to 45 U.S.C. § 153, awards of the

Northwest Airlines Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment can be held final

and _ binding.

10TA, 15.

11]t is for this reason that petitioners are incorrect when they argue that no

airline employees would retain the system boards in lieu of the National Air

Transport Adjustment Board, authorized by 45 U.S.C. § 185, if attorneys’ ~

fees are not allowed in cases such as the present one. Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari, p. 15. There is a plain avenue to such a provision which re-

quires neither legislative nor judicial intervention.

‘

8

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ment which the parties did not. Neither is it the burden of

this Court to review a question which bears significance only

for these particular petitioners in this particular proceed-

ing,’? and not for the general public, the airlines, or the em-

ployees in the airline industry and’ their unions.

B. The Question Raised by Petitioners Already Has Been

: Settled by Congress and by This Court.

|. Congress Did Not Make § 153 Applicable to

Air Carriers.

In their attempt to create the atmosphere of an “unset-

tled” question concerning the recoverability of attorneys’

fees, petitioners’ argument seems to proceed as follows: (1)

the parties entered into a contract under § 184 which gave

their System Board jurisdiction over grievances, which jur-

isdiction did not exceed that of Railroad Boards authorized

under $153; (2) the contract complied with the provisions

of $184; (3) Railroad System Board awards are subject,

by virtue of the provisions of § 153 Second, to the same en-

forcement provisions as those applicable to the National

Railroad Adjustment Board; (4) attorneys’ fees are award-

ed to successful petitioners in federal court proceedings to

enforce National Railroad Adjustment Board awards under

§ 153 First (p); and (5) therefore, reading these proyisions

“in the context of the Railway Labor Act as a whole and in

the context of the Railway Labor Act’s history,” recovery of

attorneys’ fees is authorized herein. fi

The difficulty with this argument is that it is founded on

statutory provisions which are not applicable to Airline

12Since ALPA presumably is able to pay attorneys’ fees incurred in protecting

its members, it is unlikely that even the individual petitioners here would

have been discouraged from the commencement of litigation, or will be

prejudiced in any way, by a refusal to award attorneys’ fees.

9

System Boards, and it then sweeps to its final conclusion by

invoking the Railway Labor Act “as a whole,”.as well as its

general “history.” Of course, even after completing these

mental gymnastics, petitioners still are unable to direct the

Court to a single statutory provision authorizing an award

of attorneys’ fees, nor have we found any such provision.”

In adopting the so-called Air Carrier Amendments to the”

Railway Labor Act in 1936, Congress extended all of the

provisions of the Railway Labor Act ercept § 153 to airlines.

Congress said: :

$181. Application of sections 151, 152, and 154-163 to

carriers by air.

All of the provisions of sections 15 152, and 154-163

of this title are extended tgand shal cover every com:

mon carrier hy aif... -. jy }

$182, Same; -dutiés, positities, benefits and privileges.

The duties, requirements, penalties, benefits and priv-

ileges prescribed” and established bythe provisions of

sections 151,152 and 154-163 of this title shall apply to

said carriers by air and their employees.

—_——_-

131t is unclear exactly what legal importance petitioncrs attach to our com-

ments in a previous Brief regarding the workings of § 153 First (p). Peti-

tion for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 10, n. 2. First of all, petitioners choose io

quote out of context. In that same Brief we said as follows: “Appellant

[NWA] has assumed arguendo that Awards of the Northwest Airlines Pilots’

System Board of Adjustment are accorded the same degree of finality as

Awards of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. This assumption should

not be made. The statute, the contract and the facts require different treat-

ment of the awards of Railroad vis-a-vis Airline System Boards.” Appellant's

Brief, p. 38, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 373 F.2d

136 (8th Cir. 1967). We then pointed out, as we have here, that § 153

does not apply to Airline System Boards. In any event, it hardly matters

what position we may have taken in the past on the degree of finality of

Airline Board awards, since this is irrelevant to the question of federal court

authority to award attorneys’ fees.

10 ©

45 U.S.C. $$ 181, 182."

For the railroad industry, Congress adopted § 158, which

deals with (1) the establishment, composition, powers and

duties, division, hearings and awards of the National Rail-

road Adjustment Board, and (2) the establishment of rail-

road system, group or regional boards by voluntary agree-

ment. For the airline industry, in place of § 153, Congress

provided in 45 U.S.C. $185 for the creation of an equivalent

National Air Transport Adjustment Board, but postponed

this until “in the judgment of the National Mediation Board,

it shall be necessary to have a permanent national board of

adjustment. . . .” By the express language of § 185, only

in the event such a permanent Airline Board is established

will its awards be enforced in accordance with § 153."°

In the meantime, and until the National Mediation Board

determines the necessity of establishing a permanent. Na-

tional Air Transport Board, § 184 simply requires that air

~

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14In addition to the obvious absence of “section 153” from these statutory

provisions, the legislative history the Air Carrier Amendments explicitly

recognizes the inapplicabitity of § 153 to airlines. In hearings on the Amend--

ments, ALPA’s ovwzt representative testified:

“As we interpret the bill, it would apply to air transportation all of the

provisions of the Railway Labor Act with the exception of section 3.

[45 U.S.C. § 153]. Section 3 is that provision of the act which estab-

lishes a National Railroad Adjustment Board. It is the only provision

in the act which is peculiarly adapted to the railroads. All of the other

provisions are such that they may be applied to any industry without

modification.”

Hearings on S. 2496 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comni. on Interstate

Commerce, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1935).

The House Report states, “This bill [S. 2496] applies all of the provisions

of the Railway Labor Act except Section 3 to common carriers -by air and

their employees.” H.R. Rep. No. 2243, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936).

15The legislative history set forth in the Petition. for a Writ of Certiorari, pp.

16-17, nn. 12-13, refers to this yet non-existent National Air Transport Ad-

justment Board. Nowhere in this history does it suggest that Airline System

Board contracts must incorporate all,of the provisions of § 153, nor does it

suggest that if the ‘parties fail to do so, then those provisions automatically

will be incorporated for them. -

11

.

carriers and their unions create-Airline System Boards of

Adjustment with jurisdiction not exceeding that which may

be exercised by Railroad System Boards. Clearly, the par-

ties to a $184 airline contract may not confer upon an

Airline System Board jurisdiction which exceeds that of the

£153 Railroad System Board jurisdiction, and they must,

by judicial view, give awards of an Airline Board “some de-

eree of finality.” International Ass’n of Machinsts v. Cen-

tral Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 694 (1963). Beyond this,

¢ 184 contains absolutely no language which imports or even

-

suggests incorporation of any other part of § 153 into the

operation of, or enforcement ‘of awards by, an Airline Sys-

tem Board created pursuant to § 184.

And even if the parties herein exercised their § 184 pre-

rogative and provided in their contract that the System

Board should have jurisdiction equal to that of a § 153 Rail-

road Adjustment Board, this still would not.empower a fed-

eral court, in an action for enforcement of the Airline Board’s

award, to grant attorneys’ fees, unless the parties also spe-

cifically contracted for such fees.. To paraphrase, there is no

statutory grant of authority to a federal court to do more

than enforce an Airline System Board contract. Whether

such contracts provide for “some degree of finality” or “ulti-

mate finality” of an Airline System Board award, there

‘must be an independent contractual basis for payment of at-

torneys’ fees. Otherwise, there is nothing for a federal court

to enforce in this regard, beyond ruling-on the appropriate

degree of finality and requiring compliance. )

Although Congress did not impose the provisions of § 153

on Airline System Boards, it knows how to do so. In § 185,

Congress found no difficulty in repeatedly and specifically

referring to and incorporating the provisions of § 153 into

the operation of the yet non-existent National Air Transport

Adjustment Board. One portion of § 185 provides:

[M]embers of the National Air Transport Adjustment

Board shall be compensated, hearings shall be held, find-

ings and awards made, stated, served and enforced, and

the number and compensation ‘of :any necessary assis-

tants shall: be determined.and the compensation of such

employees shall be paid, all in the same manner and to

thé same extent as provided with reference to the Na-

tional Railroad Adjustment Board by section 153 of this

title.

-45 U.S.C. $185. (Emphasis supplied). .

Furthermore, in recent amendments to § 153 Second, Con-

gress specifically provided that ‘compliance with awards of

the Railroad System Boards permitted by that section:

. shall be enforcible by proceedings in. the United

States district courts in the same manner and subject to

the same provisions that apply to proceedings for en-

forcement of compliance with awards of the [National

Railroad] Adjustment Board. :

45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1964), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1965-

66). No such amendment was enacted with respect to Air-

line System Boards which have cont ‘actual status creating

“arising under” on “commerce” jurisdiction only by reason

of 28 U.S.C. $$ 13381 and 1337. International Ass'n of Ma-

chinists rv. Central Airlines, Ine., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).

In the original 1936 Air Carricr Amendments to the Rail-

“way Labor Act, Congress provided that $153 would apply

to the National Air Transport Adjustment Board only if it

were to be created. In 1966, Congress made §$ 158 applicable

to Railroad System Boards created by contract. Tt did not

choose to make $153 applicable to contractual Airline Nys-

tem Boards in spite of the fact that Gongress is manifestly

aware of its power to make specific provision for such ap-

plication.

These circumstances alone are sufficient to describe as de-

_ liberate, rather than inadvertent, the failure of the 1966 Con-

gress to apply $153 to Airline Svstem Boards. This coneln-

af: ye Na She albe DELAP SNRs ttc Ra Gad te Rabe Sao

ce | 13

‘ sion is further supported by sound reason and common sense.

Air carriers and their employees are required by § 184 to

establish Airline System Boards of Adjustment by contract.

The manner’ and method by which such boards operate, as

well as the obligations or rights attendant upon such opera-

tion, is left, with the exception that they must provide some

‘degree of finality for awards, to the negotiating capabilities

of the parties. If the parties to Airline System Board con-

tracts wish to agree to-pay attorneys’ fees or other costs of

Airline System Board proceedings or award enforcement,

they may, of course, do so. They. have not done so in the con-

tract now under consideration, except by agreeing. on ex-

‘ penses incurred at the System Board level.. Congress has

neither required nor authorized more.

Thus, petitioners are patently in error when they claim

that airlines and their employees are to have “precisely the

same remedies as were provided railroads and their em-

ployees.” They are also in error when they. contend that air-

lines and their employees are to be treated “identically to

railroads and their employees.” They are finally in error

when they state that the only difference between a contrac:

tual Airline System Board and the NATAB is one of perma-

.

nency or lack thereof.’®

"2. This Court Has Settled the Question of Applicability of § 153

to the Airlines in Internafional Ass'n of Machinists v. Central

- Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).

_ Though petitioners claim to have considered the provisions

of the Railway Labor Act “as a whole,” as well as their “his-

tory,” it is clear that ultimately the statutory provision upon

~which they must rely for an award of attorneys’ fees herein

is 45 U.S.C. § 153. No amount of discussion or rhetoric can

16See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 15-16.

~

14

obfuscate this central fact. * Thus, we still are left with the

question of whether that section is applicable to the airlines.

On the basis of the above statutory analysis, it is clear that

it is not. This conclusion also is ‘supported directly by this

Court's decision in International Ass'n of Machinists vr. Cen-

tral Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963). %s

Prior to Central. Airlines, the question of applicability of

§$ 158 to the airlines was first brought sharply into focus in

Metcalf v. National Airlines, Ine 271 F.2d 817 (Sth Cir.

1959). In Wetcalf, airline employees sought to enforce, in

federal court, awards of an Airline System Board which had

been established by their contract. The airline contended

that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce that award, and

moved to dismiss. The motion was granted, the court ruling

against jurisdiction because $$ 181-182 of the Air Carrier

Amendments specifically excluded application of $153. to

airlines and restricted its impact to railroads. In holding

that $158 did not confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to

enforce an award of an Airline Svstem Board, the court con-

sidered the exact nature of the relationship between § 153

and air carriers:

Thus, the legislative scheme is complete. All the provi-

sions of the Railway Labor Act are adopted for the air

industry except section 153; instead of giving similar

relief to 153, special provision is made for adjustment of

labor disputes by svstem or regional boards with no

legislative determination as to their finality or as to

their being the basis of federal suit jurisdiction; but

all of the provisions of Section 153 are brought into

play, including the right granted in subsection (p) to

sue on an award in the federal district court, when and

if the National Mediation Board exercised the judgment

qxanted it in Section 185,

* * *%

We conclude that the legislative design of Congress is

clearly expressed. Such design is to grant to those win-

15

ning arbitration awards the right to sue on them in fed-

eral courts only when and if the Mediation Board creates

a National Air Transport Adjustment Board whose

award is ignored er not complied with by the carrier.

Then only does Section 1538 (p) become operative in the

air industry. ;

271 F.2d at 819, 820. (Emphasis supplied).

Two years after the Metcalf case, the Fifth Cireuit was

again faced with the issue of whether a federal court has

jurisdiction to enforce an award of an Airline System Board

extabfished pursuant to contract. International Ass’n of Ma-

chihists ve Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.

196T

ployees in the Central Airlines case sought a jurisdictional

In view of the holding in Metcalf, the petitioning em-

hase other than § 153, and argued that federal court juris-

diction could be predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. -

These sections provide for federal court jurisdiction over

matters “arising under” a federal law or “a civil action or

proceeding arising under act of Congress regulating com-

merece” (commonly referred to as “arising under” and “com-

merce” jurisdiction). Nevertheless, the Fifth Cirenit reject-

ed the petitioners’ contentions and held that there was no

federal court inrisdiction’ under any statute over suits to

enforce the award of an Airline Svstem Board.!7

When petitioners requested review of the decision of the

Fifth Cirenit in Central Airlines, this Court was presented

with and took the opportunity: to dispel the confusion sur-

rounding the applicability of § 153 to the airline industry.

International Ass'n of Machinists vr. Central Airlines, Ine.,

372 TS. 682 (1963). In reviewing the decision of the court

>

™Both this decision and the Metcalf case were later cited by a federal district

court in Missouri in holding that federal court jurisdiction to enforce the

award of an Airline System Board could not be predicated either upon § 153

or upon §§ 1331 and 1337. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 203 F.Supp. 458 (W.D. Mo. 1962).

er

16

below, this Court clearly held that air carriers are not cov-

ered by $153. This Court reasoned that the aim of the 19%6

Air Carrier Amendments:

_ was to extend to air carriers and their employees

the same benefits and Obligations avilable and applic:

able in the railroad industry. But there was to be a sig-

nificant variation. The 1936 amendments made applic-

able to the airlines all of the provisions of the Railway

Labor Act, ercepting $3, 45 U.S.C. $158, dealing with

the National Railroad Adjustment Board. .

232 US. at 685. (Emphasis supplied). This Court concluded,

therefore, that federal court jurisdiction over such actions

could not be predicated upon the provisions of 45 U.S.C.

$153 First (p). But it also rejected the conclusion of the

Fifth Cirenit that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction on

any other statutory basis to enforce the awards of contrac-

tnally created Airline System Roards. This Court held in

Central Airlines that although the provisions of $153 are

inapplicable to matters arising out of contracts establishing

‘Airline System Boards, the federal courts do have jurisdic-

‘tion, nonetheless, to enforce the awards, based on “arising

under”. jurisdiction (28 U.S.C, £1331) or on “commerce”

jurisdiction (28 U.S.C, £1337). 372 ULS. at 696.

The force of the Vetealf ease is in no way diminished by

this Court’s decision in Central Airlines, since this Court did

adopt the position of Metcalf that federal jurisdiction is not

conferred by $153. It went on to find jurisdiction existed

pursnant to 28 U.S.C, €£$ 1331 and 1337. ence, $155 pro-

vides no subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts in

Airline cases, while providing the only statutory authority

for the award of attorneys’ fees in Railroad cases.

In view of the express holding of this Court in Central

Airlines, the conclusion is inescapable that the provisions of

€ 153 are not applicable to the air carriers, that that seetion

17

does not authorize enforcement of awards of contract ally

created Airline System Boards, and that-federal jurisdiction

to enforce awards of Airline Boards is on a parity with other

federally cognizable contract, actions in which there is also

io statutory basis for awarding attorneys’. fees.” Thus, re-

spondent submits that the question raised in the petition for

certiorari herein already has been settled.

,

il. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL,

EITHER AS TO THE QUESTION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES OR

THAT OF THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

‘Petitioners cite authorities which they claim support the

proposition that § 153 applies fo’ dwards of Airline System

Toards, and, therefore, that the Fighth Circuit decision re-

fusing to apply the provision. of $153 First (p) concerning

attorneys’ fees is in conflict with those decisions.’ No such

“conflict” exists, upon proper scrutiny of those authorities.

In pre-Central Airlines decisions, cited by petitioners, in-

volving Airline System Boards, the courts failed to analyze

the language of §§ 184 and 185 closely, and this resulted in

considerable confusion as to the applicability of § 153. to air

\18In a recent Fifth Circuit case, osen v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d

462 (5th Cir. 1968), two flight attendants had sought review of the Air-

line System Board decision denying them relief. The court noted that they

were not entitled to judicial, review, and with respect to the airline’s argu-

ment that the employees failed to state a cause of action under 45 U.S.C.

§ 153 the court commented that, “[I]t is novel since this section is not ap- .

plicable to airlines.” In doing so, the court cited the Central Airlines case

as well as 45 U.S.C. §§ 18D, 182 and 154.

19Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 18-19.

~

18

carriers.’ In none of those cases did the parties raise, nor

did the court expressly rule upon, the specific question of

whether § 153 was. applicable to Airline System Boards

established pursuant to £184. When this exact question tras

‘aised before the Fifth Cirenit in Metcalf and this Court in

Central Airlines, the confusion Was eliminated by clear rl-

ings that § 153 was not applicable to airlines. Thus, the ma-

jority of the cases cited by petitioners are of no precedential

value.

Aside from the above pre-Central Airlines authority, peti-

tioners cite three courts of appeal decisions which they claim

custain their position.”" Again, however, close examination

of these decisions reveals no such support. None of the three

cases contains any holding regarding the applicability of

¢ 153 to the airlines.” Furthermore, none of the three cases,

even “by implication,” deals with anything more than the

20Flight Engineers Int'l Ass’n v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.

1962); Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961):

Woolley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. de-

nied, 356 U.S. 931 (1958); Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

230 F.2d 13% (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); Edwards v-

Capitol Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 885

(1949); Bates v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 171 F.Supp. 973 (D. Minn.

1959); Crusen v. United Air Lines, Inc., 141 F.Supp. 347 (D. Colo. ), aff'd.

939 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1956); Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 115 F.Supp. ,

907 (W.D. Wash. 1953); International Union, UAW v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc. 83 F.Supp. 63 (N.D. Ga. 1919). ;

2! Transport Workers Union of America v. American Airlines, Inc., 415 F.2d :

746 (10th Cir. 1969); Kelley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 389 F.2d 478

(5th Cir. 1967); Capitol - Airways, Inc. “v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l,

341 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965).

°

22In the Transport Workers case, the only issue facing the court was one of

election and exhaustion of administrative remedies by the union. In the

Kelley case, the issue was whether the federal district court had properly

dismissed an employee's action for damages for unlawful discharge where

the system board had found that the employee had submitted a proper

letter of resignation. In the Capitol Airways case, a minor procedural ques-

tion was involved, and the court stated that such questions are to be deter-

mined by the system heard, not by a federal district court on review.

19

finality requirement; none of them mentions attorneys’

fees. ; 7

Finally, petitioner's cite certain district court authorities

in alleged support of the proposition that there is a conflict

in the decisions regarding applicability of § 153 to airlines.”*

Two circuit courts of appeal, the Fifth Cireuit in Metcalf

and the Eighth Cireuit in the instant case, as well as this

Court in Central Airlines, have directly ruled that § 153

Goes not apply. We know of no courts of appeal which have

ruled otherwise. This ample authority disposes of the dis-

trict court decisions relied upon by petitioners. Moreover,

the district court decisions, again, involve primarily the

finality requirement (and in the Gordon case, the statute of

limitations question ), not an award of attorneys’ fees. To

the extent that those cases seem to find § 153 to be applicable

to airlines, they are simply wrong. |

Petitioners claim further “conflict” between the Eighth

Cireuit’s decision in the instant case and. the Tenth Circuit's

decision in the Transport Workers case on the matter of the »

bases for federal court jurisdiction.’ In its recent decision

in the instant case, the Eighth Circuit properly cérrected its”

initial decision, and noted that federal court jurifdiction is

based upon 28 U.S.C. $§ 1331 and 1337, not on 45 USC.

§ 153. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l vr. Northwest Airlines,

Ine, 415 F.2d 493, 498 (Sth Cir, 1969). In the Transport

Workers case, the Tenth Circuit noted that the jurisdiction

in the complaint was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337

snd 45 U.S.C. § 184, no mention being made of 45 U.S.C.

¢ 153 in this context. Thus, we fail to see any conflict what-

23Thorgeirssoh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 288. F.Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.

1968 ); Dominguez yv. National Airlines, ‘Inc., 279 F.Supp. 392 (S.D:N.Y.

1968); Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 268 F.Supp. 210 (W.D. Va.

1967); Hyland v. United Air Lines, Inc., 254 F.Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1966).

24Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 26-28.

S,

.

20 | i

soever. And we certainly do not agree that the language .

quoted by petitioners “directly conflicts” with the Eighth

Cireuit’s comments concerning federal court jurisdiction.””

We submit that there is no conflict in the decisions of the

circuit courts, nor any, others, which necessitates resolution

by this Court. It is equally clear that the Kighth Circuit's

decision herein and this Court’s decision in Central Airlines

are in complete accord,

lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IN NO WAY CON-

FLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN CENTRAL

AIRLINES, BUT RATHER IS REQUIRED BY THAT DECISION

As a last resort, petitioners seem to contend that this

Court should grant review because the decision of the Eighth

Circuit is in conflict with that of this Court in Central Air-

lines.2® We agree that, in order to accommodate the “statu-

tory scheme,” Congress provided, for the mandatory” estab-

lishment of Airline System Boards of Adjustment, pending

determination of the necessity for a National Air Transport

Adjustment Board which would be governed by the terms of

45 U.S.C. £185. Indeed, Congress intended no hiatus in the

field of airline industry labor relations, and that was the

basis for this Court’s holding in International Ass'n of Ma-

chinists r. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963), that

federal courts do have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $$ 1331

and\ 1337 to enforce the awards of the mandatory Airline

System Boards.

Petitioners somehow conclude from this Court’s Central.

Airlines’ comment that Airline System Board awards prob-

25See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 26-27. The language quoted. there

appears in the prefatory remarks in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion. There was

no issue or holding as to jurisdictional bases, since the action was brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

26Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, pp. 22-26.

21

fim”

ably are to be given “some degree” of finality, that all of the

provisions of § 153, including that authorizing a federal

court to award attorneys’ fees, are applicable to this proceed-

ing. We find nothing in the Lae Airlines decision which

supports such a conclusion.**

Nor do we find anything in Central Airlines which con-

flicts with the Eighth Circuit’s comments concerning federal

jurisdiction, a still more remarkable contention made by

petitioners.?®> .As pointed out in detail earlier in our Brief,”°

it was expressly held in Metcalf that 45 U.S.C. § 153 does

not provide jurisdiction for a federal court to enforce an

award of an Airline System Board. International Ass’n of

WVachinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963),

expressly recognized that § 153 does not apply to airlines,

but -held that the general jurisdictional provisions of 28

U.S.C. §$ 1331 and 1337 do confer jurisdiction upon federal

courts to enforce awards of Airline System Boards. —

The language of this Court quoted from Central Airlines

at p. 16 of our Brief is a clear and unambiguous statement

that $153 does not apply to Airline System Boards. And

certainly this Court would not have reasoned, as it did, to

find a jurisdictional base in other statutory provisions if it

had considered that Metcalf was wrong and that § 153 did

in fact provide jurisdiction. In view of these circumstances,

we submit that petitioners misread this Court’s decision in

Central Airlines in contending that. §$ 1331 and 1337 are

not. the exclusive bases of federal court jurisdiction to en-

27Petitioners imagine a myriad of drastic problems if attorneys’ fees are not

allowed in this froceeding. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 25. Here

we remind the Court that the parties can avoid all of these alleged prob-

lems simply by including a provision for payment of attorneys’ fees in their

§ 184 contract. See Part 1.A., supra, pp. 6 to 8.

28Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 24.0. 20.

29See Part I.B.2, supra, pp. 13 to 17. ;

9°

aad

force Airline System Board icaians Only if the Righth

Circuit ruled otherwise herein would there be a conflict be-

tween its decision and Central Airlines. As it is, the Eighth

Circuit has brought itself into perfect accord with this Court

on the issue of the proper bases for federal court jurisdic-

tion. We submit that nothing in the decision of the Fighth

Circuit violates the teachings of Central Airlines, and that

review by this Court is unnecessary to establish this oh-

vious point.

-

30Even assuming, arguendo, that § 153 also does ‘provide jurisdiction, it does

not “logically follow,” as claimed at p. 29 of the Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari, that the portion of § 153 concerning attorneys’ fees also applies.

The Eighth Circuit met this contention head on with the following language,

quoted by petitioners themselves in their statement of the case:

In any event, a finding of jurisdiction under § 153 would not solve

petitioners’ problem on the attorney fee issue. Forty-five U.S.C.A.,

§ 184, creates authority on the part of contracting parties to confer on

the System Board of Adjustment jurisdiction not exceeding that of a

§ 153 board, but it does not demand that jurisdiction be equal to that

of a §153 board. The parties by their contract creating the board

made no provision for attorneys’ fees, and we find nothing in the stat-

utes which required them to do so. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., 415 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1969).

a cS (Cun gas Ene Sy WOR eae JOR

: 23

CONCLUSION

The question presented here does not involve an important

question of gederal law, since it may be resolved by the par-

ties simply by negotiating an amendment to their contract ;

and it already has been settled by Congress and by this

Court. Furthermore, the decision of the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals in this case does not conflict with decisions

of other courts of appeal; and that decision in no way con-

flicts with that of this Court in International Ass’n of Ma-

chinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1968), but

rather is required by that decision. Therefore,.we submit

that this Court should deny the petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari. ;

Respectfully submitted,

- Henry HALLADAY

2400 Figst National Bank Bldg.

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Attorney for Respondent

Dorsey, MARQUART, WINDHORST, WEST & HALLADAY

JOHN M. MASON and

DaAvip A. RANHEIM

2400 First National Bank Bldg.

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Of Counsel

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