Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Troutman v. Rumsfeld

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In The oui HN F. DS.

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

DECEMBER TERM ©

No. > A

“-

RUSSELL TROUTMAN, ET AL,

Petitioners,

versus ‘ f :

SARGENT SHRIVER, Director, Office

of Economic Opportunity, and UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

A .

ig BSaau

\ :

O.B. MCEWAN, —

P.O. Box 753

Orlando, Florida, 32800

| Counsel of Record for Petitioners

ree » BRIAN C. SANDERS

P.O. Box 753

Orlando, Florida, 32800

and

PHILIP G. NOURSE

‘133-A North 4th Street

Ft. Pierce, Florida, 33450

Of counsel for Petitioners

‘\

Gere

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Citations to Opinions below | 2

Jurisdiction : : 2

Questions Presented for Review 2-3

Statutes and Constitutional 2

Provisions Involved 3-5

Statement of the Case 6=7

Reasons for Granting the Writ 8-23

Appendix A-Opinions of the ;

Courts Below 25-42

B-Judgment of Court

‘ Of Appeals . | 43-44

C-Congressional Record -

May 24, 1946 45

D-Congressional Record

‘September 29, 1966 47-48

E-Congressional Record

October 4, 1967 49-50

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TABLE OF AUTHOBITIES |

CASES CITED. Pg.

Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, .381 U.S. 136, 87

S. Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed 2d 681 .13,14

Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes

302 U.S: 464, 58 S.Ct. 306, . |

82 L Ed 374 © ee amerciiees Pe

‘ Association of Data Processing

Service Organizations v.

Camp 406 F. 24.837: : 12,18

- 261 F. Supp 247 Sea 18

City of Chicago v. Atd¢hison

T.&S.F. Rwy, 357 U.S. 84, |

78S. Ct. 1063. ee 8,19,20

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,

88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed, .

(2a ser = 3,8,9,21,22,23

Frost v. Corporation Commis-

sion of the State of

Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 522, .

_73 L Ed. 483 Ce: 8,17/19

‘e

iii

*. Leedom v. Klyne, 358 U.S.

184, 79 S:Ct. 18Q,

3 .L. Ed. 2d 210°

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415°

Saxon Vv. Georgia Asagciation

Of Independent Insurance —

Agents, 399 F. 24 1010 PS eer

' Tennessee Electric Powér co.

Vv. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 59,

S..Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed. 543

Whitney National Bank v. Bank '

“of New Orleans, 323 F 2d 290°

CONSTITUTIONAL

fe i _ CIFATIONS

woe.

Article I, § 1

. Article I, § 9

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act

5 U.S.C. $702 and 8 706

Economic Opportunity Act,

42 U.S.C.A. 62792 (b) (3)

12,13

8,17,18

5,39

5,22

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SECONDARY

AUTHORITIES

Congressional Record, September

29, 1966 pg 23479 .

Congressional Record, October *-

4, 1967; $14161™

Pg.

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In The

Supreme Court of the Bnited. States

DECEMBER TERM

No.

RUSSELL TROUTMAN, ET AL,

Petitioners,

versus :

SARGENT SHRIVER, Director, Office

3 of Economic Opportunity, and UNITED

a STATES OF AMERICA, .

peeorenss

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, entered in the

above entitled case on September 30th,

1969.

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the’ District Court,

Southern District of Florida, is report-

ed in 273 F. Supp. 415. The opinion of

the Court of Appeals is presently unre-

ported and is printed as Appendix A ,

hereto.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

wis entered September 30, 1969, The

Jurisdiction of this Court. is invoked

under 28'U.S.c. § 1254. ‘The Jurisdic-

tion of the District Court was invoked

under 28 U.S.C. $ 2282 and 2284; and 5’

U.S.C.A. & 1009 (when read in conjunc—_

tion with the ICHORD amendment to the

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 asa

"relevant statute").

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Did Petitioners have standing as

local Bar Associations, and as an attor-

ney, to challenge the impending estab-

lishment of Office of Economic Opportu-

“nity Legal Service Programs, in their ~

a=, oe

respective counties without prior suh-

mission of such programs to said Associa-

tiongs by virtue of the ICHORD Amendment

(42 U.S.C.A. $ 2792 (b) (3), P.L.90-222)?.

B. Did petitioners have standing as

attorney and as Bar Associations to seek

an injunction against impending activi-

ties of Legal Service Programs constitu-

ting criminal (unlawful) competition?

C. Did petitioners have standing as

Taxpayers under the doctrine of FLAST v

COHEN 392 U.S. 83, 20 L. Ed 947, 88S.

Ct. 1942? ;

ne a

STATUTES INVOLVED |

A. .Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as_

amended, specifically 42 U.S.Cc.A. §&

'2792(b) (3): : :

"A Legal Services program’to

further the cause of justice among

persons living in poverty by mobil-

izing the assistance of ‘lawyers

.and legal institutions and by pro-

viding ‘legal advice,’ legal repre-

‘sentation, counseling, education

and other appropriate services.

Projects involving legal advice,

and representatiofr shall be carri-

ed on in a way that assures

)

maintenance of a lawyer-client

.relationship consistent with the

best standards of the legal pro-

fession. The Director shall make

arrangements under which the State

Bar association and the principal

local ‘bar associations in’the

community to be served by any

proposed project authorized by

this paragraph shall be consult ed

and afforded an adequate opportu-

nity to submit, to the Director,

comments and recommendations on

the proposed project before such

is approved or funded, and to sub-

mit, to the Director, comments

and recommendations on the opera-

tions of such project, if approved

and funded...." ,

The Administrative Procedure Act:

"S u.S.C. $°702 A person suffer-

_ing legal wrong because of agency ;

action, or adversely affected or

aggrieved by agency action within —

the meaning of a relevant statute,

is entitled to judicial review

thereof."

"5 u.S.c. § 706 - To the extent

necessary to decision and when

presented, the reviewing court shall

interpret statutory provisions, and

~e--(2) Hold unlawful and set

- aside agency action.....(d) with-

out observance of procedure

required by law.

c. Constitution of the United States of

‘America, Article I, 8 9, Clause 7:

"No money shall be drawn from the

Treasury, but in Consequence of

* appropriations made by Law; +..!

D. Constitution of the United States of

america, Article I, § aan

. "All legislative powers herein

granted shall be vested ina

Congress of the United States,

which shall consist of a Senate

and a House of Representatives."

| . aa’

: STATEMENT OF THE CASE

‘Russell Troutman, by amended complaint

of January 10, 1967, alleged that Office

of Economic Opportunity Legal Service

Programs had been instituted in Dade,

Volusia and St. Lucie Counties, Florida,

and that the Director of the Office of

Economic Opportunity had plans for

imminent ijettretage of an O.E.0O. Legal

Service Program in Orange County,

‘Florida, here Troutman is.a citizen,

taxpayer, and practicing attorriey. | The

- complaiht further. alleged that if an

. 0.E.0. Legal Service Program. were insti- _

tuted in Orange County, Troutman would

be forced to compete with 0.E.0. lawyers —

for.a clientele who could afford to

obtain representation by Troutman, i.e.

fee producing cases. He further alleged

that such a Legal Service Program would, —

as to such fee producing’ cases, engage in

solicitation and maintenance (which ~

tactics he is. precluded by - Cannon from_

adopting.) He further alleged that the

- proposed program contemplated the use:

of unlicensed persons in the unauthoriz-

ed pfactice of law, and that such

1k | programs were being instituted without

a °. .

the valid research required; that a

corporation had been chartered | in Orange

County to conduct a a Legal. Service pro- >

gram under the. Directo r' s control and

was funded, or would be funded by. the

Director.’ The expenditure of J

$30,000,000.00 of tax money from July

1965 to July. 1966 was attacked as an

unlawful expenditure of funds. (there

being no authorization for the Legal

Service viet at that time. ).

Four tseat Bar Associations, St’ Lucie.

Orange, Osceola, and Seminole, moved to

intervene as plaintiffs, “charging: that

the Director was operating (St. Lucie)

‘or was promotirig or would operate 0.E.O.

‘Legal Service Programs in their respec-

tive counties. 4

Sak teats ane injunctive relief was

prayed for.

| The District Court held that none of |

the appellants had standing to maintain .

the action, dismissing the Amended a"

Complaint with prejudice, and denying :

the motions to intervene. The Fifth i

' Circuit affirmed. s, eee

° — “Wye

"REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT |

’

Reyarding issue "A" above, the Court

is urged to take jurisdiction on the

grounds that the interpretation of the

ICHORD amendment below is a case of

first impression involving a Federal

statute. The interpretation placed

eres n_by the Fifth Circuit is contrary

to. “the intent of Congress, jeopardizes

the future of Legal Aid, and the indepen-

dence and ethics of the Bar.

Regarding issue "B" above, the Court

is urged to take jurisdiction on the

grounds that the decision \below conflicts

with the decision of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals in WHITNEY

NATIONAL BANK v. BANK OF NEW ORLEANS,

323 F. 2a 290, and with the decisions of

this: Court in CITY OF CHICAGO Ve

. ATCHISON T. & S. F. RY, 357 U.S. 84, 78

S. Ct. 1063,2 L. Ed.2d11%, and in FROST

‘v CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE. OF

OKLAHOMA, 278 U.S. 515, 73° L. Ed. 483,

49 S.Ct. 235.

Regarding issue "c" the issue is

raised as to whether FLAST v COHEN, 392

‘U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L Ed. 2nd

947, grants a taxpayer standing to con-"*"

test unappropriated expenditures under

the "specific" limitation of Article I,

Section 9 of the United States Constitu-

tion. | | Fath ee

; , :

A. The ICHORD Amendment. ,

The issue posed’ is whether Congress

intended to vest principal local Bar _

-Associations with a right to know and

to be heard prior to ‘the approval or

funding of Legal Service Programs, not

-~whether the Bars were to have a "veto".

The abuses the ICHORD amendment was

TE to protect against have seen

the-treation of a "veto". It-‘is vested

in the hands. of the Governors of the |

several states. |

e .

? fs - ¥

As first written, the Economic

Opportunity Act of 1964 did sot author-

ize a Legal Service Program. Nonethe-

. IeSs, one was instituted. State-.and

Bars objected, this action was ”

brought; the act was amended to

authorize such a program, and the amend-

ment was itself amended from the House

rf£loor by\Repregentative Ichord.

The debates are reflected in the

Congressional Record at pg. 23479,

chm

September 29, 1966. In offering his.

amendment Representative Ichord said:

i“ '

"Mr. Chairman,.this amendment is

prompted by a legal representation

program that was approved in the

state of Missouri embracing ~<five

counties in my district and four.

counties in the district of the

gentleman from Missouri. This

particular program was conceived

by a professor at the University

of Missouri. In the application

for approval of the program the

misrepresentation was made that

all the local bar associations

were in favor of the plan.

Subsequently thereto eight or

nine bar associations met and

disapproved the particular

application. Mr. Chairman I

think the amendment is very explicit.

It merely requires that before

these programs are approved or

funded they MUST be submitted to

the local bar associations in order

that the local bar associations can

make comments and recommendations.

(Emphasis supplied).

eoeee MEe Va, the intent of a)

ae,

-ll-

this amendment is to REQUIRE the

Office of Economic Opportunity to

submit this program to the local

bar associations for comment and

suggestions before the application

is funded.......Mr. Chairman, I

know that the Gentleman from

Florida (Mr..Gibbons) has a similar

situation and is in favor of the

amendment......++

Mr. Chairman (By Mr. Lennon) I

want to commend the Gentleman

from Missouri: very highly upon |

his purpose in offering this

amendment. Mr. Chairman, those of

us in North Carolina delegation

have heard from our state bar

‘associations, our district and

county bar associations, which

associations have been very much

concerned about the manner in which

this question has been handled.

Mr. Chairman (Mr. Ichord) I would

like to make it clear that this

does not give the local bar associa-

tion a veto over the proposed

programs, but merely GIVES the |

various bar associations the oppor-

tunity to present suggestions and —

TEP 5

=i3-

recommendations thereon."

The last passage was cited by the

Fifth Circuit as showing that the Bar

Associations were not given a protected

“competitive” interest. But the thrust

of petitioners’. argument on the ICHORD

amendment is threefold:

(1) That "a public interest" was invol-

_ ved in which Congress has recognized the -

need for review of administrative action

and the petitioners are significantly

involved to such an extent as to have

| ‘standing.

| _ "ASSOCIATION OF DATA ‘PROCESSING SERVICE

Bie. 4 ORGANIZATIONS: v. CAMP 406 F. 2d 837.

(2). That: the ICHORD amendment was en-.

acted amid a storm of protest from local

Bar Associations. It was intended to

REQUIRE that the. programs be submitted

and the Bars afforded

be heard. We urge that thi

a “competitive right" is a “valuable

“though not

» right" falling squarely within the intent

-of this Court's decision in LEEDOM., v

KLYNE, 358 U.S. 184, 190, 79 S. Ct. 180,

3 L. Ed 2d 210, wherein this Court said:

"Here, differently from the Switch-

men's case, absence of jurisdiction

Pe Nia esis ts NER NI A ED i te toh atl

~13-

of the Federal courts ‘would mean a

a sacrifice or maar of a

right which Congress has given

professional employees, for there

is no other means, within their

‘control.....to protect and enforce

_that right. And the inference is |

strong that Congress intended the |

the statutory provisions governing

the general jurisdiction of those

courts to control. This.Court does

not lightly: infer that Congress |

does not intend judicial protection

of rights it confers against agency

‘action taken in excess of delegated

powers"

(3) Petitioners would further urge hat

the Administrative Proceedure Act, 5. U.

s. c. § 702 is applicable, and, in light

of the “right to be heard" given by the ©

ICHORD amendment, confers standing.

Such a "statutory condition precedent”

is a "procedure" required by a provision

of a "relevant statute". Agency action

which doesnot comply with that procedure

and which denys that "right to be heard" —

is action which renders the Bars, and

their members, aggrieved. In ABBOTT:

~14-

PABORATORIES v GARDNER, 381 U.S. 136, 87

S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed 2d 681, this Court

said, at page 1510: ack

“The Administrative Procedure Act

provides specifically not only for

review of "Agency action made

reviewable by statute, but also

for review of 'final’ agency action

for which there’ is no other adequate

remedy in a court'. The legislative

material elucidating that seminal

act manifests a congressional intent

that it cover a broad spectrum of ©

administrative actions, and this

Court has echoed that themé- by

noting that the Administrative

Procedure Act's ‘generous review

provisions’ must be given a |

"hospitable interpretation'......

Again in Rusk v. Cort, supra...

the Court held that only upon a shia

showing of 'clearn and convincing __

evidence' of contrary legislative

intent should the courts restrict

access to judicial review."

The “regulatory agency only" applica-

tion of the Administrative Procedure Act Q

urged by the Fifth Circuit is less than poe

"hospitable". In essence the Fifth

VEX ioe

question onfers protection of a “compe-.

titive® interest, persons expressly

given a right to be heard may be depriv-

ed of that right, and the court must

infer that congress did not ‘intend

agency action, "contrary to procedure

‘established by law" to be rere to

judicial review. Pa

The Suncene Court has never ruled on

the’ question of whether the Administra-

tive Procedure Act extended the concept

of standing to include the procedural

rights which many statutes provide in

non-competitive context. The issue of

whether 5 U.S.C. § 702 must be read in

conjunction with 5 u.s. c. § 706, when

determining questions of standing is

’

now directly presented. We urge that

the history of the Administrative Proce-

dure Act, as explained | by its’ author

when dis cussing “legal wrong" as affec- ~-

ted by the act, clearly shows that it

was the intention of Congress to extend

the doctrine of standing to include

procedural rights. That history is set

forth in Appendix C.'

That Congress intended submission to

nian

‘the local bars to be a required procedure.

is further manifested by the original

text of the ICHORD amendment, and the

version reported by the committee of

conference, as is set forth in Appendix

D hereafter. It is also urged that the

"judicial reform" activity of the O.E.O.

argues strongly for the Congressional

intent, manifested above, to set a

"watchdog". See the comments of ‘Senator

Murphy, Appendix E, Congressional Record,

$14161, October 4, 1967. The actively |

’ solicited O.E.0. test case threatens to )

soon set Federal courts sitting as a :

council, of revision of state and federal

laws, contrary to the intention of the

Constitution's framers,” in a flood of ©

litigation. Yet the rights of the indi-

vidual poor to assert constitutional

rights should not be abridged. Only

local Bar Associations, when adequately

informed, may detect the local Legal

Service Program which has ‘abandoned its_

duty to help individuals in need in

favor of the politically motivated test

case which diverts funds from the needy

while building a wave of: public revulsion

to legal aid. It is in hope of preserv-

ing the middle way between the grave

pa Yay

abuses to which "legal aid" has been ~

perverted and sacrifice of federal legal

aid through the MURPHY Amendment (by

Governor's veto) that we are come. Thus

the nature of the issue, as well as its

-gtatus as a question of first impression

under a Federal statute, argues for re=-.

view. :

B. Standing from illegal competition. ’

In WHITNEY v NATIONAL BANK OF NEW

ORLEANS & TRUST CO. 323.F 2d 290, the.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

recognized that “unlawful" competition

can confer standing. While no'man has a

right to be free of "lawful" competition,

_every man has a right to be free of a

competition that is "unlawful" in the

sense that it is independently illegal,

rather than "unauthorized by law". The

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

noted this Court's language in ALABAMA

POWER CO. v ICKES, 302 U.S. 464, at 484,

58 S. Ct. at page 306, 82 L Ed. 374,

where the Court distinguished FROST v

CORPORATION COMMISSION, 278 U.S. 515, 49

S. Ct. 235, 73 L. Ed. 483, saying: -

"The difference between the Frost

case and this is fundamental;| for

‘

«18s

the competition contemplated there

was unlawful while that of the

municipalities contemplated here

is entirely lawful."

This rule was followed by the District

of Columbia District Court in BAKER,

WATTS & CO. v SAXON, 261 F. Supp. 247

(which the Fifth United States Circuit

Court cites with approval in SAXON v

GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT

INSURANCE AGENTS, 399 F 2a 1010, at

1017). To avoid the "illegal competi-

tion argument the Fifth Circuit cites

with approval in this case, ASSOCIATION

OF DATA PROCESSING SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

INC. v ‘CAMP, 406 F 2d 837, Cert. Granted,

395 U.S. 976, 23 L. Ed. 2a 764, thus

making manifest the very conflict be-

tween its decision in the Troutman case,

at bar, and WHITNEY NATIONAL BANK (C.

Appl D.C.) supra, (not to mention the

conflict between the Troutman ruling,

and the. alternative basis of its deci-

sion in SAXON, supra, set forth clearly

in 399 F 2d 1010, from 1016 through

1017.) In all events the majority in

_ SAXON, supra, note at pg 1017:

aig-

““The decision, of the Supreme Court

in, FROST v CORPORATION COMMISSION,

'278\U.S. 235, 73 L. Ed. 483....

held that one engaged ina licensed

| business has standing to sue to

enjoin unlawful competition."

_In the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit

held that an allegation of illegal com-

petition is not the “balancing deter-

minant of Plaintiff's.standing". This

puts the case at bar squarely in con-

flict with oe Court | s ruling in FROST

supra, pe the Pifth Circuit correctly

perceived its. effect in SAXON \{as we

urge it did). We also urge that the

decision of the Fifth Circuit in the.

instant case was in conflict with CITY

OF CHICAGO v. ATICHISON T. & S. F. RY.

78 S. Ct. 1063, 357 U.S., where at head-

note 2, On. pg 84, the Court said:

"Parmelee has standing to secure

review of the judgment below by

appeal. It is enough, for purposes

of standing, that we have an actual

controversy before us in which

Parmelee has a direct and substan-

tial personal interest in the out-

come.....Parmelee contends tHat

eine BEI

=20=

this operation (Transfer 's) is

prohibited by a valid city ordin-

ance and asserts the right to be

free from unlawful competition.

Transfer on the other hand suggests

that~.Parmelee has no standing

because the’ city ordinance is

invalid and Transfer's operation

is lawful. It argues that a party

has no right to complain about

lawful competition, citing Alabama

Power Co. v. Ickes 302 U.S. 464,

58 S. Ct. 300, 82 L. Ed. 374, and

Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.

T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 59 S. Ct.

366, 83 L. Ed 543. We do not

regard either of these cases as

~~, controling here. It seems to us

_ that Transfer's argument confuses

the merits of the controversy. with

the standing of Parmelee to litigate

CHEMcesces”

We urge that petitioners are members

»9£ a licensed profession under the dis-

ripline of the cannons. We complain of

~ she Director's creation of a criminal

sompetition, unlawful under state law

ind the cannons, just as the Intervenor,

=Zi=

“paxentes complained of the "illegal" s

nompetition of Transfer. The issue of

whether Respondents are in fact “runhing"

fee producing cases under a disguided

"kickback" arrangement to stretch ‘appro-

priations is a question of jurisdiction- .»

al fact to be litigated, and should not

have been confused with Petitioners"

right to litigate the issue. (It should

be noted that N.A.A.C.P. v BUTTON, ce se

U.S. 415 does not apply to fee producing

cases). The use of Legal Aid for the

"polifical Organization of the poor" is

questionable under the Economic Oppor-

tunity Act. The funding of stich ..

activities from the pockets of private

practitioners As cause for complaint.

It confered standing under the decisions

of this Court.

C. Taxpayer Standing under FLAST\v.

COHEN.

when this action was begun, the Economic

opportunity Act of 1964 did not Suthor-

ize a Legal Service Programé Nonethe-

less, the Director spent millions of the

Taxpayers funds for. that purpose. This

expenditure was, and is challenged. 4

Those specific funds have never to this »: \

sash (e wae 3 : ae ee N

ns . ce

_=22-

day’ been appropriated to that purpose

. by act of Congress. If it be urged :

that Congress gave the Director a

“blank check" by way of general author-

ity to spend to “fight poverty", then

the allegations of improper delegation

‘of: authority (contrary to Article I,

section 1) were properly. raised.

Petitioners had standing as taxpayers

to ‘Challenge the delegation of the one

power that congress: clearly can not |

delegate, in light of the mandate of

Article.I, Section 9 that no money shall

be withdrawn from the treasury save on

"Approptiation made by law". Adminis-

trative actions are not "law". Alterna-

tively, if the expenditure was unauthor-

ized, then it clearly violated Article I,

Section 9 which is most explicit about

unauthorized spending. ‘There being a

violation of an express .constitutional

limitation on the spending power, a tax-

payer had standing under FLAST v COHEN,

392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20.L.>.Ed 24 -

947, and the decision of the Fifth

Circuit below is in conflict with the

decision of this Court in FLAST, supra.

-2 3- j

This problem (the use of funds appropri-

ated for one purpose by administrative

officials’ for another purpose) is one

of the most. serious in government today.

Thus the question of whether PLAST appli-

es to this problém by virtue of Article

I, Section 9 is of great public moment,

as well as ‘a question of first impression

under FIAST... °.: | or

Respectfully Submitted

RUSSELL TROUTMAN

5 Zine, |

the

wa 7h, as

O. B. MczWAN

P.O. Box 753

Orlando, Florida

Counsel of Record For:

St. Lucie County Bar Assn

Orange County Bar Assn

Osceola County Bar Assn

Russell Troutman

Seminole County Bar Assn

BRIAN C, SANDERS

P.O. Box 753

Orlando, Florida

Counsel for Russell

Troutman

-Phillip G. Nourse

133=A,N, 4th Street

Ft. Pierce, Florida

Of Counsel For

St. Lucie County Bar Assn

a 5 A NSC Tia De ela we

spe

APPENDIX ‘'A’

OPINION

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 25539

RUSSELL TROUTMAN, ET-AL,

_ Appellants,

versus

SARGENT SHRIVER, Director, Office

of Economic Opportunity, and UNITED

' STATES OF AMERICA, .

Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida

(September 30, 1969)

Before THORNBERRY and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges,

and SUTTLE, District Judge.

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge: .The determinative issue

in this appeal is whether the appellants, as four county

bar associations and a taxpayer-citizen-attorney, have

standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Eco-

nomic Opportunity Act of 1964,.as amended, 78 Stat.

508, 42 U.S.C.A. §2701 et seq., or alleged acts or omis-

-26-

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

sions of the Director of the Office of Economic Oppor-.

tunity regarding the establishment of legal aid service

programs in their counties pursuant to the Act.

Appellant Russell Troutman by an amended com-

plaint of January 10, 1967, alleged that Office of Eco-

nomic Opportunity Leg&l Services Programs had been

instituted in Dade, Volusia and St. Lucie Counties,

Florida, and that the Director of the Office of Economic

Opportunity had plans for imminent institution of an

OEO Legal Services Program in Orange County, Flori-

da, where Troutman is a citizen, taxpayer and prac-

. + tioing attorney. The complaint ‘further alleged that if

an OEO Legal-Services Program were instituted in

Orange County, Troutman would be deprived of the

privilege and obligation of providing legal services to

those who could not otherwise obtain representation

//and that he would be forced to compete with OEO

lawyers for a clientele who could afford to obtain rep-

resentation by Troutman. The complaint prayed for

‘ declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting the invali-

dity and impropriety of the Economic Opportunity Act

and the impropriety and lack of authority of the Di-

rector’s involvement with the profession of law.

The four local bar associations' moved to intervene

as plaintiffs in Troutman’s suit, charging that the de-

fendants were operating,? promoting or prospectively

would operate* OEO Legal Services Programs in their

‘%The Orange County Bar, Osceola County Bar Association, Semi-

nole County Bar Association, and -St. Lucie County Bar As-

sociation.

2St. Lucie Cotnty |

2The other three counties

ad Ste Re SE ah stake ee we sx aes ORS

ay Ps

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

- respective counties. Generally the movants sought re-

lief similar to that demanded by Troutman. A aat

The Court below held that none of the appellants

had standing to maintain _the ‘action. Without ruling

upon the merits or other jurisdictional defenses inter-

posed by the defendants, the district judge dismissed

Troutman’s amended complaint with prejudice and de-

nied the motions to intervene. This appeal ensued. We

affirm. mt

In order to resolve the question whether appellants

have ‘standing fo contest the validity and constitution-

: ality is Acf or.the actions of the Director, it must

: “be determined whether they are proper persons to re-

f quest an adjudication of issues raised by: such action. .

“ “The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses

on the party seeking to get his complaint before a

federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have

adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, 1968, 392 U.S. 83, 99,

88 S.Ct. 1942, , 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 961. The status as-

serted by the person whose standing is challenged must

be examined to ascertain whether there is a logical

nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought

to be adjudicated. Id. at 102. It is the existence of

a logical nexus which ensures that “the party seeking

relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome

of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-

ness which sharpens the ‘presentation of issues upon

which the court so largely depends for illumination

of difzicult constitutional questions.’” Id. at 99, quoting

Rak « v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691,

_.., ? L.Ed.2d 663, 678.

~28=

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.SA.

The first status asserted by the appellants is that

of federal taxpayer.

“The nexus demanded of federa! taxpayers

has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must

_establish a logical link between that status and

the type of legislative enactment attacked. Sec-

ondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus be-

tween that status and the precise nature of the

constitutional infringement alleged.” Id. at 102.

“"I]n Flast ». Cohen, supra, * * * the [Su-

preme] Court set out the requirements which *

must be met by the taxpayer before he has

standing. Essentially they are:

1. that he is in fact a taxpayer;

2. that the tax dollars are being expended in

the furtherance of specific government

business;

3. that there is a substantial expenditure;

and

4. that these expenditures exceed the limits

imposed. by the establishment clause of the

first amendment on the taxing and spend-

ing powers in Article I.”.

Protestants and Other Americans, etc. v. Watson, D.C.

Cir, 1968, 407 F.2d 1264, 1265 (emphasis omitted).

It is important for our purposes that in Flast v. Cohen

the majority pointed out that the Flast test of taxpayer |

ioe

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and USA.

standing is consistent with the result of the Court’s pri-

or decision in Frothingham v. Mellon, 1963, 262 U.S.

447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078, which ruled that a

federal taxpayer is without standing to challenge the

constitutionality of a federal statute. See Flast v. Co- |

hen, supra at 104-105. The difference between Flast

and-Frothingham was that in the former the taxpayer

attacked the statute on the ground of its inconsistency

with a specific limitation upon the congressional taxing

and spending power: the Establishment Clause of the

First Amendment, whereas in the latter the taxpayer’s

challenge was bottomed upon the general provisions

of the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. “In essence, Mrs. Frothing-

ham was attempting to assert the States’ interest in

their legislative prerogatives and not a federal tax-

payeér’s interest in being free of taxing and spending

in contravention of specific constitutional limitations

imposed upon Congress’ taxing and spending power.”

Flast'v. Cohen, supra at 105.

‘

The appellants have not coupled their attack, as tax-

payers, upon the Economic Opportunity Act with any.

specific limitation upon Congress’ taxing and spending

power and thus have failed to “establish a nexus be-

tween that status and the precise nature of the con-

stitutional infringement alleged.” Id. at 102.: Therefore

they were without standing to challenge the Act. Froth-

ingham v. Mellon, supra.*. |

4We have not overlooked our decision in Saxon, Comptroller of the

Currency, etc. v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Insurance A-.

gents, Inc. et’ al., 5 Cir. 1968, 399 F.2d 1010. Since that case

involved the Comptroller’s approval by regulation of competi-

id A ES

= 30

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

. The appellants’ further claims of standing as citizens

and attorneys must also fail. Exactly as with the status

of taxpayer qua taxpayer, these claims of status have

not been coupled with any assertion of direct injury

in violation of specific constitutional limitations. “It

is an established. principle that to entitle a private

individual to invoke the judicial power to determine ,

the validity of executive or legislative action he must |

show.that he has sustained or is immediately in danger

of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action

and it is not sufficient that: he has merely a general

interest common to all members of the public.” Ex

parte Levitt, 1937, 302 U.S. 633, 634, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed.

493. (citations omitted). Seé also Dade-Commonwealth

Title Ins. Ca. v. North Dade Bar Ass’n, Fla. 1963, 153

So.2d 723, 726-27. |

Neither do appellants have standing to challenge the

Act or the actions of the Director because of their .

position as competitors, because they do not have the

type of interest required to confer standing to challenge

the Act in the status of competitors. 2,

In Florida, attorneys enjoy no protections from com- .

petition by those qualified to engage in legal services.

tion made expressly unlawful by statute, it is inapposite. As

we held there, the insurance agents ,had a “statutory aid to

standing’’. op. cit. at 1018, in addition to their legal right to

protect themselves from unlawful competition. There was thus

presented in that case a dispute in the necessary concrete ad-

versary context. Flast, supra. See the further explication in

Judge Thornberry’s specially concurring opinion in Saxon, Op.

cit. at 1019-1021.

“~ _— 2G aii x aR es CREO PATEL

ee oe

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

’ Restricting the practice of law to those who have been

examined and found qualified “is not done to aid or

protect the members of the legal profession either in .

creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop. It

4s done to protect the public from being ‘advised and

represented in legal matters by unqualified persons

. . & State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, Fla.

1962, 140 So.2d 587, 595, rev'd on other grounds, 1963, 373

U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322 10 L.Ed.2d 428.

‘The decisions of the courts appear to be uniform

in denying standing to competitors who otherwise pos-

sess no legal right to be free from competition. See

Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137, 59

S.Ct. 423, ___., 83 L.Ed. 543, 549. (1939)? Rural Electri-

fication Admin. v. Central La. Elec. Co., 5 Cir. 1966,

354 F.2d 859, cert. denied 358 U.S: 815,. 87 S.Ct. 34,

17 L.Ed2da 54 (1966). These appellants lack such a

legal. right and hence lack. standing.

The recent 8th Circuit case of Association of Data

Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 8 Cir.

1969, 406 F.2d 837, cert. granted 395 U.S. 976, _—- S.Ct.

___, 23 L.Ed.2d 764 (June 23, 1969), sets forth a clear

summation of the holdings of prior cases as to the

legal interest required for standing to sue as a competi-

tor:

“In summary, a plaintiff may challenge al-

leged illegal competition when as complainant

it pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of pub-

lic charter or contract, Frost v. Corporation

Comm’n, supra, (2) a legal interest by reason

-32=-. \

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

of statutory protection, Baker, Watts & Co. v.

Saxon, supra, or (3) a ‘public interest’ in which

Congress has recognized the need for review of

administrative action and plaintiff is signifi-

cantly involv to have standing to represent. —

the public, FCC vSanders Bros. Radio Sta-

tion, supra. From this ysis, it seems clear

that an allegation of ‘illegal c mpetition’ is not

the balancing determinant of a_ plaintiff’s

standing. The primary search must rest on.

whether the plaintiff's status is one which en-

joys a private interest entitled to protection or

is one which the law recognizes to be of such

legal significance to allow a party to act as a

public ‘representative for a public interest.” ~

Appellants earnestly argue that the Act itself con-

fers standing upon them by virtue of the “Ichord A-

mendment”, section 222(a) (3) of the Act, 42°U.S.C.A.

2809 (a) (3).5 It is urged that, while the amendment

does not expressly confer standing upon attorneys or

bar associations as “aggrieved persons”, see, e.g.,

Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 1942, 316 US.

4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86. L.Ed. 1229; F.C.C.-v. Sanders Bros.

SThe Ichord Amendment reads as follows: shes

“The Director shall make arrangements under which

the State bar association and the principal local bar

associations in the community to be served by any

proposed project authorized: by ébls paragraph shall be

consulted and afforded an adequate opportunity to sub- = /

mit, to the Director, comments and recommendations ~

on the proposed project before such project is approved

or funded, and to submit, to the Director, comments

and recommendations on the operations of such project,

if approved and funded.” 42 U.S.C.A. §2809(a) (3).

2 leiden

33~=.

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and USA.

__ Radio Station, 1940, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84...Ed.

869; it created a right of local bar associations to be

consulted prior to approval or funding of legal” sertices ae

programs and by implication confers standing to con-

test the Director’s actions. We disagree.® :

The Ichord Amendment as originally passed in 1966

provided that the Director was to consult with the local

bar associations, ‘but it was made clear at the time

by the sponsor of the amendment that it was not in-

tended to give the local bar associations any form

of veto over proposed programs but rather was for

the purfose of giving them an opportunity to present

suggestions and recommendations as to the proposed

programis. See 112 Cong. Rec. 24437 (Sept. 29, 1966).7_

/ oe a by :

The provision as originally enacted was amended in

1967/0 provide the State bar associations an opportuni- -

ty to. make comments and recommendations regarding

proposed: projects, but the amendment was explained

as being for the purpose of providing more helpful

assistance to the Director due to ‘the broader base

and typically better staff assistance .which State bar

SAppellants contend that the amendment was violated as to Orange

Lucie Counties. The pleadings assert that there was an

__—*"0.E.O. Legal Service chartered “and about to start operations

in Orange County, while in St. Lucie County the O.E.O. Legal ~

Services Program was already in operation. The O.E.O.

then promoting programs in Osceola and Seminole, the oth

two counties whose associations sought leave to intervene.

7Mr. Ichord: “. ... this does not give the loca] bar associations a veto

over the proposed programs but merely gives the various bar

associations the opportunity to present suggestions and recom-

mendations thereon.” 112 Cong. Rec. 24437 (Sept. 29, 1966).

\. ~34-

TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER and U.S.A.

associations can“provide. See 113 Cong. Rec. No. 14, |

S13856 (Sept. 28, 1967).®

We are unpersuaded that the Ichord Amendment con- .

fers standing upon appellants because we perceive no

legislative purpose in that amendment to protect a ~

competitive interest of appellants. There are times

when competitors are given standing by Congress to

challenge competition which allegedly is in violation '

of a'statute where the statute itself is said to be enacted ~

for the express protection of the class:of competitor

complaining. In order to fall within this: classification,

however, the particular statutory provision invoked

must reflect a legislative purpose to protect a compe-

titive interest, Hardin v. Kentueky-Util. Co., 380 US.

1, 5-6, 88 S.Ct. 651, ___, 19 L.Ed.2d 787, 792 (1968).

But where, as here, the purpose of the statutory pro-

vision is simply to benefit the public at large by easing

the task of administration of the statute, 'no right, nor

legal standing, is —

Appellants reliance upon Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, call 387 US. i. 87 S.Ct:» 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d

eSenator Cooper explained the 1967 amendment which he introdue-

ed, as follows:

: “The present language of the bill provides that in as-

rf sisting in the provision of legal services to the poor,

the director shall make arrangements with the princi-

pal bar associations in the area. My amendment pro-

vides that, in addition, they shal seek the advice and

' compnents of the State bar association. I believe that

* State bar associations are more broadly based, and they

-- usually have a staff which is better able to provide

helpful assistance.: 113 Cong. Rec. #154, 513856 Sept.

_ 28, 1967).

Poe me eee a se

"TROUTMAN, ET AL v. SHRIVER ‘ond USA:

, 681; is soliaiaona. Abbott involved an.essentially regu-

latory stdtute requiring the petitioners, to make ‘signif-

icant changes. in their. everyday business practices,

id. at 154, including the possible destruction of existing

property rights, id. at_152, or possible criminal sanc-

tions for noncompliance, id. at 154. Thus the Govern-.

ment there acted not as a Gompetitor. ‘but asa regulator

interfering with legally recognized, rights. Where legal-

‘ly recognized rights such as the use or enjoyment of

property are sought to be protected: by’ ‘imposition of

a consultation requirement as a ‘condition precedent

_ to agency action, the indi iduals affected by ' agency

noncompliance with the.condi , or organizations rep-

resenting their-interests, may have standing to contest ._

the action by virtue-of the conditjon. See Citizens “Ass” Te,

v, Simonson, D.C, Cir. 1968, 403° F.2d :175.- Appellants,

however, have demonstrated no legal rights sought ~ .

to be protected by Congress, there /ordinarily being 5

no right to be free from competition and ‘the statute .

having been passed. for the benefit of the public at

large.

AF FIRMED.

Adm. Office, U.S. Courts—Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc. N. O., La.

aioe

IN THE UNITEO STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT

OF FLORIDA ORLANDO

DIVISION

RUSSELL TROUTMAN

Plaintiff,

iy 66-188 ORL-CIV

SARGENT SHRIVER, Difector, |

Office of Economic Opportunity

‘and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA —

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The first question to be decided by

this Court is whether plaintiff has any

standing to maintain this action. Also,

whether the proposed intervenors have

any standing to intervene as parties

plaintiff. The defendants by their

mot\ion to dismiss the amended complaint

say) this Court is without Jurisdiction

over the subject ratter of this action

because plaintiff tacks standing to sue.

In Tennessee Elec. Power Co. ve TVA,

306 U.S. 118 (1937), 15 power companies

sued to enjoin operation of the TVA,

asserting unconstitutfonality. The

Court held the plaintiffs to be without

standing to raise the constitutional

" {ggues, because “the damage consequent

on competition otherwise lawful, is in

such circumstances damnum absque injuria

and‘will not. support @ cause of action

or right to sue", Id. at 140. See

Perkins v. Lukens Stee! Co., 310 U.S.

113 (1940). Accordingly, we do not here

reach the constitutional questions

presented by the plaintiff and proposed

intervenors, including the question of

delegation of legislative niet s. 3

In a recent deciston the Second

Circuit held that the owners of a New

l at

Vork hotel lacked standing to sue

~38e:

‘federal and foca!l agencies and officials

to enjoin operation of an urban redevel-

opment program which included a transi-

ent hotel. Berry v. Housing & Home :

Finance Agency 340 F.2d 939(2nd Cir. 1965)

"Economic loss stemming from in-

creased competition, even though

made possible by federal aid, is

damnum _absque injuria™.

The Court. went on to state thats:

"If local officials do not comply. .

the housing agence ben vindicate the

public Interest by withholding

federal tunie but private hotel

prams are given no remedy. The

public good ..... could well be frus-

trated by the delay and expense of

litigation ff allowed on the suit

of évery person objecting to pos-

sible co-petition." Id. at 329.

In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.

Mckay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

a 3Q—

‘dented, 350 U.S. 884 (1955), utility

compantes attacked the validity of cer-

tain federally supported power programs.

The Court, was asked to hold that petit-

joners were within Section 10 of the

Administrative procedure Act which gives

a “right of reviéw to any person suffer-

ing legal wrong « « e OF adversely

affected or aggrieved within the meaning

of any statute". The Court stated that.

Section JO was no more than declaratory

of existing law and held that the

utility compantes had not suffered a

legal injury under present law and thus

had no standing to sue. Accord, United

(D.C. Cir. 1955) (Milk producers have no

standing to complain of a price order

enabling their competitors to undercut |

them). Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v.

Urban Redevelopment Authority, 202 F.

-40-

3 ©

Supp. ABG6 (W.D.Pa. 1962). See also Jaffe

Admin{strative Law 528 (1965).

In Rural Electrification Admin. Ve

Central rouleiana Elec, Co.-, a F. ed

- 859 (1966), the Court sald

“Under Section 10(a) of the Admini-.

strative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Ae

$1009, it seems to be settled ina

case of this kind that if Congress

has failed to give an appellant

standing io eae by express or im-

“pited provistone of gtatute ‘. os

mere econoric competition made

possible by governmental action /

(even if allegedly ittegal) does

not give standing to sue to rést-

rain such action. Pennsylvania

Railroad Company ve Dilton, 1964,

118.UsSe App. 0-C.. 257, /335 Fad

292, citing Tennessee Electric

Power Compary v. Tennessee Valley

Authority, 206 U.S. 118, 59/8. Cte

ore

366, 83 L. Ed. 543 (1939)3 Alabama

Power Company v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,

58 9. Ct. 300, S2°L. Ed. 374 (1938);

Kansas City Power and Light Company

ve McKay, 96 U.S. App D. C. 273, 225 F.

2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884, 76

8. Ct. 137, 100 L. Ed. 780 (1955)3 and

Texas State AFL-CIO v. Kennedy, 117 U.S.

App. D.C. 343, 330 F. 2d 217 (1964)".

Under the Economic Opportunity Act

of 1964, .there ig no provision allow-

ing for a right of review for any party

aggrieved and thus under the decision

in Kansas City Power & Liqht Co. ve

McKay, supra, and Rural Electrifice

ation Admin. ve Central Louisiana

Elec. Co., Supra, no such right arises

under the Administrative Procedure Acte/

Thus, an individual’ legal practitioner

in the State of Florida does ‘not have

standing to maintain this action and

“

ert ee

‘the proposed intervenors do not have

standing to intervene as parties plaint-

iff either because of the potential l..

adverse competition of the Office of |

Economic Opportunity legal program be

because of ‘status as a citizen or tax-|°

payee

It {s, therefore, upon conalderat{on,

| 8 axes)

ORDERED’

1. Defendants motion to dismiss the

amended Gomplaint ‘is granted and this

suit ie dismisseac, with prejudice, at

the cost of the plaintiff. | . |

2. The several motions to. intervene

as parties plaintiff are dented.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jackgonvijle,

Florida, this 6th day of September,

1967.

s/Charies R. Scott

Judge

-a3=

APPENDIX B

‘United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH cincurr

October Tern, 1967,

No. 25539

D. C.:Docket No. Civ 66-188-0rl,

|. 4RUSSELL TROUTMAN, ET AL,

- |

; wy Appellants,

| \ versus

| SARGENT SHRIVER, Director, Office

| _ @f Economic Opportunity, and UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida

Betdre THORNBERRY and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges,

and SUTTLE, District Judge.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the

transcript of the record from the United

States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida, and was argued by

counsel;

a |

z 4

wikia

. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now

here ordered and adjudged by this Court

that the judgment of the said Nistrict

Court in this cause be, and the same is.

hereby, affirmed.

it is further ordered that appellants

pay to appellees, the costs on appeal to

be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

September 30, 1969

Issued as Mandate: Oct. 22, 1969

-45- 3

APPENDIX C -

Congressional Record, House, May 24,

1946, pg 5654 (Report of Mr. Walter,

Author of the bill which became the

the Administrative Procedure Act):

"Right of Review, Section 10(a) The

first subsection of section 10 provides ,

that any person suffering legal wrong

because of any agency ‘action, or adverse-

ly affected within the meaning of any

statute, is entitled to judicial review. ~

LEGAL WRONG MEANS ACTION OR IN-ACTION -

IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OR THE FACTS.

THE CATEGORIES OF QUESTIONS OF LEGAL

WRONG ARE SET FORTH AS SUBSECTION (e)

OF SECTION 10." (Emphasis supplied) |

On page 5654, Congressional. Record,

‘Section 10(e) appears thus:

"s....They (the courts) must hold.

unlawful any action, findings, or

conclusions which they ee be,

first arbitrary or in abuse of

- discretion; second, contrary to any

3 provision of the Constitution; third>,

in violation of statutes or statutory —

rights.....fourth without observance

of procedure required by law." =

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APPENDIX D

Congressional Record, House, September

29, 1966, pg 23479:

Amendment offered by Mr. Ichord: On

page 16, line ll, "before the period, in-

‘sert the following: “Provided that all

proposals for programs of legal advice

and legal representation shall not less

than 60 days prior to their approval, or

in the case of existing programs, prior

to any additional funding under the

title, be submitted by the applicant to

the bar associations in the areas intend-

ed to be served by the programs for such

associations's review, comments, ‘and _

recommendations." c

Report, 2298 (committee of conference) ;

Congressional Record, Oct 17, 1966, pg

26058 reported the conforming oe

The ICHORD amendment, as so reported,

read: "..cccee provided that the

Director SHALL establish. procedures to

ASSURE that, the principal local bar

associations in the area to be served

by any peeionat program of legal advice

and representation are afforded an”.

‘ ee

—e: “= ee _ : r

wa a ON IR ROE PONG AEST SNR DER ODE i iB:

' °

~.<

~48-

adequate opportunity to review the

the proposed program and to submit

comments and recommendations thereon

before such program is approved or

funded."

“sons unable to afford it. in order to

money when the party is represented by

another agency or program which is

iol Gan

° ae APPENDIX &~

October 4, 1967, Congressional Record,

Senate, $1416l = Feonomid Opportunity

Amendments of SOOT cc iia oe

seeeeeeeMY. MURPHY. ‘I yield myself

another 3 minutes.

‘I cannot for l’minute believe that

this was the original intent of the

legal service Program. I cannot. believe

that affording legal advice....to per- ; )

promote justice should include the right

to bring suit against a Federal, State or

local’‘agency supported by taxpayers’

financed by the same funds. | cs ag

Although I will hot dwell on this

subject, I cannot believe that in either

case the welfare recipient or the farm=

workers went to the CRLA for assistance.

It is far more likely that the CRIA

drummed up clients to come and do battle.

This is thé problem of Mr. Shriver and

Mr. Earl Johnson, the Director of the

legal services program, to determine

whether the attorneys employed by this |

ERT AIEEE IME SF LIME BGP IE BTN AR OSE A NES Nts

m -50—

program are working and conducting them-

selves in a proper manner.

ecee ThE program was designed to aid the

poor in achieving the legal rights and

privileges which the rich can afford.

It was designed to make them equal to

the average citizen in the courts of our

Nation. And Ij cannot believe that the

average citi en goes to court with a

test case which is of a spurious nature.

The disadvantaged should be helped, but

we must. remember the burden which is.

being placed on the taxpayer in provid-

"ing benefits under this.program. There

are too many cases for legal service

attorneys to handle without involving

themselves in thes€é test cases."

Mr. Murphy's amendment was lost by a

‘Narrow margin in 1967. But these debates

are useful background for the 1969 _

amendment, which was of a more extreme

nature, and which was not lost.

\ °

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.