Respondent Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1970

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

LY

, Office-Supreme Court, US.

WIBKAN Y : FILED

SUPREME COURT, U. S.

JAN 24 1970

JOHN F | DAVIS, CLERK

gn the ~

Supreme Court

of the Wnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1969

No. 996

PSG Co., a corporation, and PHILIP S, GREENBERG,

Petitioners,

Vv.

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI be

KING, MILLER, ANDERSON, NASH & YERKE

NORMAN J. WIENER ‘

1200 American Bank Building

Portland, Oregon 97205

Telephone: 226-2431

Attorneys for Respondent.

DAILY JOURNAL OF COMMERCE

INDEX” 7

} Page

Table of Cases and Authorities er Fs eS

Statement of the Case ... «eee a

Ae 2m the Triai Court «ss «>» 1

B. In the Court of Appeals. . 4

ATSGUMONT «2 6 0 6 he ee te te 8s 5

: é f r

A. , Greenberg's fpetition seeks

‘ to ob¥ain further review of

aqwéstion of fact .... 5

B.” The decisions of the two

courts below are correct . 13

C. The trial court's order

striking Greenberg's claim

for exemplary damages does

not present a ground for

ROVOSORS 68 Fe eo ce ee ED

D. The trial court correctly

denied Greenberg's motion

to amend the pleadings to.

add a new and unrelated

Cause Of AGtiON .. «6 «-« » 29

SONTAG R 8S ae OS we eS ee

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baumer v. Franklin County Distilling

Co. (6th Cir 1943) 135 F2d 384 cert.

Mees See OE F803 6 see kk

Berenyi v. Immigration Service

(1967) 385 US 630,17 L ed 2d

eg ea Se eS So A

Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer

Kellogg and Sons (5th Cir 1958)

257 F2da 162 e e e * e e e e e@o @ © e

Classic Bowl, Inc., v. AMF

Pinspotters, Inc. (7th Cir 1968)

403 F2da 463 e o oe o a e e a > o e e

DeCicco v. Uniroyal, Inc.

(D. Or. 1968) 293 F Supp 1190 ...

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v.

Linde Air Prod. Co. (1949)

S20 We 27a; 9S bed 672

(adhered to on rehearin ’ ‘

wan Ue Oly Oe ts OO L007. ok ck kl

Houston Oil Co. v. Goodrich

(1918) 245 US 440, 62 L ea 385. ‘e *

James Wood General Trading

Establishment v. Coe (2nd Cir

eewal ae? See G51, 688 . . 3 cc.

Martin v. Cambas (1930)

oe Oe Sees eee COL. 6k swe oe x

ii

Page

Mercury Cleaning Systems v. °

Manitowoc Eng. Corp. (7th Cir

1958) 255 F2d 318 Bes ee ie kw ee a

Polar Steamship Corp. v.

Inland Overseas S. Corp.

(4th Cir/1943) 136 F2d 835

cert. denied, Sa IO FTE a6 Ses 9

Portsmouth Baseball Core. Vv.

Frick (SDNY EOO8) Sh RRO SLE So ea Oe

Putnam v. Lower (9th Cir 1956)

sie PEO OER ye el yh Sore etre a tn ee 9

Siaith v. Abel et al (1957)

ks US Ob) SAO Pa Oo sg se es 18

Suehle v. Markem Machine eee

Company (ED Pa. 1965) 38 FRD 69 .. 21

Terre Haute Brewing Co. v.

Dwyer (8th Cir 1940) 116 F2d 239... 9

Washington Sand & Gravel Co. v.

Brann & Stuart Co. (3d Cir 1947)

Eee ee eR SO gr og kg ME ee boy 9

Weaver v. Austin (1948)

184 Or 586, 200 P2da-593 ee ae ee a eee eee SL

Western Rebuilders, Inc. my

Felmley (1964) 237 or pe Gai’ oc 2

ooo Pea Ol, 319. 920 363 5°. 3 Pie pian A

Other Authority

15 USC, Section 13 (c) ee ke eae Te Paha:

Rules of the Supreme Goure of

the United States, Rule 19 .... a6

133

‘is AGIA ARG): ANU eee a a Ria LIE

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent ("Merrill Lynch")

deems the statement of the case by peti-

tioners ("Greenberg") to be inaccurate

‘and incomplete and the brief of Greenberg

to improperly argue the merits, tater

than to present the legal questions as

required when seeking ‘a writ of certiorari

from this court. Merrill Lynch is com-

pelled, therefore, to make the following

statement:

A. -In the Trial Court

This is an action for breach of

an alleged contract to accept ‘Greenberg's

orders to purchase or sell commodity

futures contracts, on margin, up to a

maximum of 300 "open" contracts. (R. 61,

62)1 erecnbers cleian that by reason of

Merrill Lynch's refusal to accept orders

for new transactions, he was prevented

from making profits on the transactions,

and that Merrill Lynch's conduct in termin-

ating the agreement was such as to entitle

him to recover exemplary damages. (R. 62)

Nineteen months after the action

had been filed, and 1iteig wore than a

month before the date set for trial,

Greenberg moved to amend his complaint to

assert alleged violations of the Robinson-

. Patman Act, 15 USC, See. l3{e)}. - ths.450)

At the same time, Greenberg filed numerous

and complex interrogatories directed at

such issues.. (R. 437-449)

1. At this late stage, it should be

clear that this is an action for breach

of an express contract, and not for vague

"wrongs committed" on commodity futures

transactions, as Greenberg states in his

petition. (Greenberg's Petition, p. 3)

- 2-

The trial court denied Greenberg's

eres to. amend on the ground that the new :

claim Greenberg sought to include by amend-

ment would greatly complicate the issues,

that it constituted a separate claim not

related to the issues to be tried, that

Greenberg proposed to initiate extensive

discovery on the new claim at a late stage

in the course of the proceedings, and that

the late amendment and discovery proceed-

ings would require a postponement of trial,

which in turn would require postponement

ae enor major case already scheduled

| for trial in which Greenberg was a

defendant. (Pretrial Tr. 26-28, 46-48)

At trial, the court granted

Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss on the

ground that there had been no probative

evidences adduced of breach of any agree-

ment, and further that the evidence of

damages based on loss of future profits

was plitpiy apeculative. f.

- 3-

B. In the Court of Appeals

As Merrill Lynch reads the

decision, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial

court's ruling that Merrill Lynch had no

continuing obligation to act as broker for

Greenberg in the purchase of new commodity

contracts not already held in his margin

account, but ruled that Merrill Lynch had

an obligation to act as broker in the dis-

posal or "liquidation" of contracts pres-

ently held in Greenberg's account. However,

the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial.

court's ruling that the evidence that

Greenberg had suffered any, damage was

speculative and insufficient to require

submission of the case to the jury, in

that there was no evidence introduced to

show that Greenberg actually lost profits

or that liquidation of his contracts

resulted in a loss. The Court of Appeals

0 ie«

refused rehearing on a petition Sccan

solely to the question whether the damages

Greenberg had sought to recover were specu-

lative.

Il

ARGUMENT

CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE IN THIS

CASE BECAUSE THERE ARE NO A

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Greenberg's petition seeks to

obtain further review of a question of fact.

A review of a decision of a

court of appeals on writ of certiorari

will be granted only where the petitioner

shows that there are important questions —

of law presented, involving a conflict Te

between the decision of the court of

appeals and this court, or other circuit

courts of appeal.

Rule 19, Rules of the Supreme Court

of the United States

"1. A review on writ of

certiorari is not a matter of

right, but of sound judicial

- 5 -

discretion, and will be granted

only where there are special and

important reasons therefor. The

following, while neither control-

ling nor fully measuring the

court's discretion, indicate the

Character of reasons which will

be considered:

Veee

"(b) Where a court of

appeals has rendered a decision

in conflict with the decision of

another court of appeals on the

same matter; or has decided an

important state cr territorial

question in a way in conflict

with applicable state or terri-

torial law; or has decided an

important question of federal

law which has\not been; but should

be, settled by this court; or

has decided a federal question

in a way in conflict with appli-

cable decisions of this court;

or has so far departed from the

accepted and usual course of judi-

cial proceedings, or so far sanc-

tioned such a departure by a lower

court, as to call for an exercise -

of this court's power of supervi-

sion."

Greenberg's petition presents

no issue within the guidelines of Rule 19

for consideration by this court. The trial

court ruled that the evidence Greenberg

- 6 -

presented in support of his claim for

damages for lost profits was speculative

and insufficient to raise a question for

the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed

on that ground, and denied a petition for

rehearing on that issue.

This court, as a court of law

rather than a court for the correction of

errors in fact finding, will not undertake

to review concurrent findings of fact by

two courts. below in the absence of a very

obvious and exceptional showing of error.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.*v.

Linde Air Prod. Co. (1949)

336 US 271, 93 L ed 672

(adhered to on rehearing,

339 US 605, 94 L ed salelily

Berenyi v. Immigration- .

Service (1967) 385 US 630,

17 L ed 2nd 656, 661

For the same reason, this court

will not undertake to review concurrent.

rulings by the two courts below that ea

evidence was insufficient to present a He

jury question. ) |

+ ere, | - 7 -

Houston Oil Co. v.

ae Goodrich (1918)

245 US 440, 62°'L ed 385

Greenberg argues in his petition

that the Court of Appeals decided a ques-

tion of law in conflict with decisions of

other federal courts. In furtherance of

the argument, he cites one case from this

court and one case from each of the eleven

courts of appeal wherein it was held, under

the fact situation presented in the par-

' ticular case, that the evidence of damages

was not too speculative to prevent sub-

mission of the case to the jury. None of

the cases cited involve a claim for damages

for breach of a contract to plirchase or

sell stocks or commodities contracts.

Instead, they involve such diverse subject

matter as antitrust proceedings, claims:

for wrongful death, fraud and other tort

' claims. Further, none of the Shien Gitea

enunciate a rule of law different from that

' (—- Qo

relied upon by the two courts below in this

case, but simply hold that, under the parti-

cular facts presented, the evidence was not

too speculative.

The fallacy in the argument that

the eesiei oe in this case is in conflict

with the decisions of other federal courts

on a point of law is pointed up by the

fact that cases can be found from each

dircuit holding that, under phe evidence

presented in the particular case, there |

was insufficient evidence to require sub-

mission of. the case to the jury.” Thus,

2. See, e.g., James Wood General

Trading Establishment v. Coe (2d Cir 1961)

297 F2d 651; Washington Sand & Gravel Co.

v. Brann & Stuart Co. (3d Cir 1947) 162

F2d 826; Polar Steamship Corp. v. Inland

Overseas S. Corp. (4th Cir 1943) 136 F2d

835, cert. denied, 320 US 774; Camilla

Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg and

“Sons (5th Cir 1958) 257 F2d 162; Baumer v.

Franklin County Distilling Co. (6th Cir

1943) 135 F2d 384, cert. denied, 320 US

. 750; Classic Bowl, Inc. v. A M F Pinspot-

ters, Inc. (7th Cir 1968) 403 F2d 463;

_ Terre Haute -Brewing Co. v. Dwyer (8th Cir

1940) 116 F2d 239; Putnam v. Lower (9th

' Cir 1956) 236 F2d 561. For another recent

Oregon decision, see DeCicco v. Uniroyal,

Inc. (D.Or.1968) 293 F Supp 1190.

oa

it is clear that waethes the Suidencs of

damages is too speculative to require sub-

mission of the case to the jury is a ques-

tion of sufficiency of the evidence to be

determined in each individual case.

| Among the decisions from other

courts of appeal holding that evidence of

damages was too speculative is

James Wood General Trading Establishment

v. Coe (2d Cir. 1961) 297 F2d 651

which is relied on, among other authorities,

by the Court of Appeals in the instant

case.3 In the James Wood case, a customer

brought an action against stockbrokers for

alleged breach of contract to sell a

particular stock when the price went above

$58 per share. On the question of damages,

the court remarked (p. 658):

3. Greenberg had relied on the trial

court's decision in the James Wood case in

his briefs. in the Court of Appeals, but had

neglected to inform the Court of Appeals

that the case had been reversed on appeal.

The Court of Appeals pointed this matter.

out in footnote 9 of its Opinion.

- 10 -

\ ey

"However, even assuming Moretti

had forgotten the instructions as

given, and that he exercised no.-

discretion ‘whatever, it #s difficult

to find in this record any evidence

of damage. What proof can there be ~

that, if Moretti had not forgotten

the instructions, he would have sdld

the stock on July 25 or 26, 1957, at

598 1/8 or any other price? How can

such a conclusion be arrived at

other than by the merest guesswork

and speculation? The plain fact is

that, in the circumstances of this

case there is and can be no evidence

of any probative value to support

a finding that he would have sold.

-On the contrary, there is substan-

tial evidence to support an infer-

ence that he would not have sold the

B &-O at the prices prevailing in

the market on July 25 and 26, 1957.

"Damages cannot be based on

Speculation. The difficulty of

measuring and appraising the amount,

once it is clear that actual damage

has been sustained, is another

matter. Where, as here, the exis-

tence of any damage whatever would

have to be a matter of guesswork,

no recovery is allowed (citations

omitted).

"Where actual damage depends on

an exercise of discretion, and there

is no evidence from which it can

reasonably be determined how such

discretion would be exercised, no

damages are recoverable: (citations

omitted) ."

- ll -

The law of Oregon also is to the

effect that damages cannot be based on™

‘speculation.

Weaver v. Austin (1948)

464 Or 586, GOL, 200 P2d 5393

Western Rebuilders, Inc. v.

Felmley (1964) 237 Or 191,

203, 386 P2d 8143, 391 P2d' 363

In summary, a writ of certiorari

should not issue in this case, because the

question presented for consideration is

the correctness of the trial court's ruling

on a question of sufficiency of evidence,

and not a question of law. That ruling

was sr) eed on appeal and on petition for

rehearing. Chie soees has had his day: in

Baga and the Court of nopenie: which is

the court designed to review allegations

of error:as to determinations of fact, has

upheld the trial court. This court's time

should not be taken up with further argu-

ments as to the sufficiency of the Sawer «

o

he is

B. The decisions of the two.

courts below are correct.

The question presented by

Greenberg's Serielon for writ of certiorari ’

is whether there was sufficient evidence

to require submission of this case to the

Sey Apart from the question whether

the case involves \legal issues of a kind

this court should teview, it is clear that

the two lower courts\ were correct.

Greenberg asserts that in com-

\

- \

% - ?

modity futures transactions, where because

a.)

of market action the value of the conttacte

held by the broker for a Suseonce increases

over Margin requirements, the. excess may

be withdrawn by the customer; thee. had

Merrill Lynch accepted Greenberg's orders,

the value of the contracts at a given date

selacted by Greenberg would have exceeded

the required margin; and that the excess

toaek* Greenberg was "entitled to withdraw"

from his accounts edasti tuted prerits

- 13-

Greenberg lost when Merril] Lynch refused

to accept his orders.

The error in Greenberg's argument

is apparent when all the facts concerning

obligations between broker and customer are

considered. A broker's customer is entitled

to withdraw money from his account when it

becomes “overmargined" by appreciation of

the value of the contracts. He is also

required, however, to put up or pay to the

broker additional money when his account

is "undermargined." Because the market

fluctuates constantly, it is impossible to

determine wether a profit or loss Kas

ultimately been-made on the purchase of a

commodity contract until the. contract has

been disposed of and it has been determined

Wate cues Withdrawals exceeded

amounts required to maintain margin. Thus,

until the transaction has been completely

closed out by sale of the commodity con-

ea tog

tract, the question whether its purchase

~would have been profitable is necessarily

based on speculation. There cai be no

"profit" on a transaction until a final

Sale is made, and Greenberg did not claim

he would have sold the contracts in ques-

tion on the date chosen for valuation. If

Greenberg had not made a,sale or disposal

of the contract, of course, the temporary

paper profit never would have been. realized,

and if not realized by a sale woult have

disappeared immediately as the market |

began to swing against Greenbeke. The

fact is, as the court below noted. Green-

berg arbitrarily selected the one day on’

which the Geevaeie showed a paper appre-

ciation as the date to "value" the con-

tracts. (Tr. 270) Valuation on other

dates would have shown a loss.

| ‘In this connection it is important

to note that there was no evidence that

/

See &- aa

joo

ee

. Greenberg would have suffered any loss if

he had later actually replaced his orders

for the same contracts with his new broker,

sisusignentad there was no’ evidence that the con-

tracts were not available at the same orices

at a later date. _In fant. Greenberg could

have purchased the same contracts through

his new broker ne a more favorable price,

because, as mentioned above, the market

immediately turned and dropped below the

prices at which he claimed he should have

been able to purchase the contracts through

Merrill Lynch. (Ex. 180)

Damages for lost profits are

ordinarily shown by evidence of profitable

past operations.

Mercury, Cleaning Systems v.

Manitowo¢ Eng. Corp.

(7th Cir 1958) 255 F2d 318

In the instant case, Greenberg had steadily

lost money, and could not provide such evi-

dence. The new theory of damages he sought

- -16.°

to aesext in pldce of evidence of profitable

operation was without rational or factual

justification, nie the two courts below

properly held that the case should not be

submitted to a jury.

C. The trial court's order

striking Greenberg's claim for exemplary —

damages does not present a ground for

reversal. .

a

During the course of trial, the

court withdrew Greenberg's claim for exem-

plary damages from the case.

| The trial court believed that

there was no’ evidence presented or to be

presented in this case of malicious con-

duct attending the alleged breach of con-

tract which could provide a basis for an

award of exemplary damages. (Tr. 107-

113)

The court's ruling was based on

Oregon law that exemplary damages may not

be awarded for breach of contract. See,

- 17 -

-~@ “4 . t

>

AT Hs 8

Weaver, v. Austin

(1948) 184 Or 586,

200 P2d 593

Smith v. Abel et al

(2957) 211 Or: 571,

316: P2d 793

The Court of Appeals affirmed

the trial court's ruling on the ground

that Oregon law requires that there be an

award of actual damages before exemplary

damages can be recovered, and exemplary

damages cannot constitute the basis for a

cause of action. See,

Martin v. Cambas =.

(1930) 130 Or 257,

293 P 601

Weaver v. Austin

(1948) 184 Or 586,

200 P2d 593

As Greenberg failed to prove any

actual damages, the issue as to exemplary

damages is moot.

In his argument in this court,

Greenberg concedes that it is the law in

Oregon that exemplary damages may not be

awarded whare there are no actual damages.

we: PO

As Greenberg'S claim for exemplary damages

presents no/ground for reversal, it need

not be co sidered by this court as ground

for review on petition for writ of cer-

tiorari.

D. The trial court correctly

denied oreenberg's motion to amend the

pieadings to add a new and unrelated

cause of action.

In August, 1967, 19 months after

the case had been filed and a little more

- than a month before the date set for trial,

Greenberg moved to amend his complaint to

assert alleged violations of the Robinson-

Patman Act, 15 USC, Sec. 13{c).. (Record

450) At the same time, Greenberg filed

numerous interrogatories. (Record 437-449)

The trial court denied the motion to amend,

for, the reasons stated at pages 2-3 of this

brief. .

The Court of Appeals affirmed the

action of the trial court on the ground

that it is not an abuse of discretion to

Ae.

Y

oe

3

S \ Pe

refuse a late motion to amend, where such

motion would introduce an entirely new

and different cause of action, involving

complicated legal and factual issues, and

require extensive discovery and prepara-

tion for trial.

The allowance of a motion to amend

is Ai eoretiGuary and the trial sere clearly

did not ee its discretion in this case.

In the cases. where the trial court's denial

of a motion ks amend ak been held to be

an abuse of discretion, the proposed amend-

ment merely stated an alternative theory,

based on the same operative facts, or added

some fact necessary to state a complete

cause of action. In most of the cases, the

_ complaint had been dismissed for failure

to state a claim 6n which relief could be

granted and the plaintifé would have been

out of court if the ieee had not been

allowed. Thus, the trial court's refusal

to allow an amendment to cure an imperfectly

- 20 - | |

— - Ee ne eT

stated claim where -a genuine claim exists

may legitimately be considered an abuse of

discretion and require reversal because the

plaintiff is left without remedy. None of

ean Cite ee oe

those circumstances are present in the

instant case, as the new amendment did not

seek to cure or add to the old claim, but’

IONE SR NRT BASE ~

,constituted a new and independent claim.

See,

*Suehle v. Markem Machine ; J

Company (ED Pa. 1965) :

38 FRD 69 ‘

i See CARR

Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v.

Frick (SDNY 1958) 21 FRD 318,

Even assuming, arguendo, that the

trial court erred in refusing to allow

Greenberg to amend, the error would not

‘have been prejudicial and would not consti-

tute a ground for reversal. In the instant

SINT TS MELE TI AL OTIS ER me ho

case, Greenberg's new.claim involved an

Ventirely new set of Operative facts: and a

ee PSR Gregorio sy Sea

new theory of law. The new Claim conse-

quently could be asserted in an independent

- 21-

OS FS RR Ars RT SOAR BIEN

action, and could not. be. barred by the trial

court's refusal to allow amendment, as the

“ teial court's decision on the original

claim would have no res judicata effect.

As the new Robinson-Patman “Act claim did

not affect the merits of the original

Soneedee claim, the trial csuvets decision

on the merits of the contract claim cannot

be reversed and remanded to the trial court. .

Further, it is not necessary to reverse and

remand this case to the trial court for

determination of the Robinson-Patman claim

alone, because Greenberg has always been =

able to assert that claim by commencing

oa new action. Thus, Greenberg has not been

injured in any way by the trial court's

denial of the motion to amend. a

As a side issue, Greenberg con- z

‘tends that Merrill Lynch resisted dtsenvary

proceedings so extraordinarily that

Greenberg could have raised the new issues

Dy ee

_ of certiorari should be denied, in that:

cat

sooner. (Greenberg's petition: pages a

ee a This argument was urged at both the

trial court. level and on appeal, and'was

not found to have any. basis in fact.

| | "y III:

CONCLUSION.

ua Merrill Lynch respect fully sub-

mits that Greenberg's petition’ for writ

SER PERRIER RARER tye oem

POE aye

bi , Greenberg’ Ss. petition eo

a review of. the decisions of the two

courts below on an issue of fact, not law,

and this court, as a court of law, will not

undertake to review concurrent findings of

fact by the two courts below’.

26 Greenberg's argument with

CEL ER pa ROR EAE poy a ad oe aS ~

respect to exemplary ‘damages and denial of

oe x ee

motion to amend does not present any

ground for reversal.

Respectfully submitted,

KING, MILLER, ANDERSON, NASH & YERKE

Norman J. Wiener

: 1200 American Bank Building

Portland, Oregon 97205

Attorneys for Respondent

‘

=

TUOMALA” So Re sla DIB SARL?

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.