Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — United States ex rel. Trane Co. v. Gelman

Supreme Court brief1969

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

} & 8 88 Gs 29

7'IPREME COURT. tk &

eee ween 1969

JOHN F. BAVIS, @LERK

Supreme Court of the United States :

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. J. 1.} 9

Unrtep States or America, for the Use and Benefit

of the Trans Company,

Petitioner,

against

as, Bex sain Germay, doing busi-

ness as Geico Buitpers, Bursay Construction Corpo-

RATION, NATIONAL SuRETY CORPORATION AND THE HANOVER

INSURANCE CoMPANY,

Respondents.

ee

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Herman N. ScHwartTz,

Attorney for Petitioner,

120 Broadway,

New York, N. Y. 10005.

Irvine Ronatp Storc#,

Of Counsel.

MOTO TM

2 Aer rete vs gm

INDEX

PAGE

IN no a cas 6 iia yes ks aaa oa ea nea 1

er iat. cae hul ss Ca ceeds y al enn dna 2

| FT TOT TOCE TTT ET TREE T ETE 2

MN 5 cen ce kes vie choke Kaunas Tere 2

NE Wr OE I ak sc Wackae tv cede nanessseces 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ .............0. 0008 7

i. The Court of Appeals decided an important

state question in conflict with applicable state

Be eS EREGRAAE SEES CRORE SORE UN ER ATES 48 7

2. The decision rendered in the District Court,

although not reached in the Court of Appeals,

involves an important question of federal law

which has not been, but should be settled by

NE 66K SADA WEEN SEWER ESAS ASR OOR SON 68 8

EL caw adecancaseke ed Cent uneeubeSeenensees 10

APPENDIX:

A—Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals ...... 12

B—Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals and Dis-

OIE TTI oo soc nee sesesassetesseseneces 14

C—Pertinent text of the Miller Act ................ 20

T° 9OOm SPOOL EPR ee OP Gi nerie ss

1 tee

ii INDEX

Cases Crrep

Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will, 304 F. 2d 548, 554

Oe as ED cha bn ne encss Cade s hear ebes eeeens

Dodge v. Lambert & Gardner, 15 N. Y. Super. (2

a ok 6:5 5 FUG oa ob 0 tin oa wo ae wR Ks

Fellows v. Commissioners For Loaning United States

BNI, Be SG IU Sc doe se Rbdicneer ek sancueve

seambeek ¥. Benes, GE H. T. Ge icvsescavesvevns rere

Hundurhun vy. Cook, 66 Barb. 21 ............... aus

Pickel v. Conn, 209 App. Div. 410, 204 N.Y.S. 448 ....

mee 8 Pere eet eT eee

United States of America for the use and benefit

of General Electric Co. v. Southern Construc-

tion Co. Ine. et al., 383 F. 2d 135 (5 Cir. 1967),

cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968) ..............

United States for the use and benefit of Shields, Inc.

v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of At-

lanta, 367 F.. 2d 473, 477 (4 Cire. 1966) ..........

Statutes Crrep

GD DBR, FID cca cccsinccsescccesnssenesseseseves

GD UK, FIGW vec cessicccccvecnsccvocscsceseceens

4B UBC, SIGIR) occcesscccccvvcvcccseseccsecsces

MiIscELLANEOUS

Restatement, Agency, 2nd, § 85 ......... ccc eeeeeees

Restatement, Agency, 2nd, $97 .........ccceecccees

2 U. S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News

(1959), pages 1905-1906 .....ccccsscccccccccves

PAGE

Me i

Supreme Cont of the United States

OCTOLER TERM, 1968

Re

ys

4

Unrrep States or AMERICA, FOR THE UsE AND BENEFIT

OF THE TRANE CoMPANY,

Petitioner,

against

Raymar Contractinc Corp., BENJAMIN GELMAN, DOING

BUSINESS AS GELCo Bumpers, Bursay Construction Cor-

poration, NationaL Surety Corporation AwD THE Han-

oveR INsuRANCE COMPANY,

. Respondents.

y%

. 2

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

The Trane Company prays that » Writ of Certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Cireuit entered in the above-

entitled case on December 6, 1968.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the District Court (45a-50a)* is reported

at —— F. Supp. ——. The opinion of the Cireuit Court

of Appeals and the dissenting opinion are reported at

_. F, 24 ——-, and are printed in Appendix annexed

hereto at pages 14 through 19.

1 References are to printed Appendix in the Court of Appeals.

IRIE ORR NS Wh aan

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Cireuit Court of Appeals was en-

tered on December 6, 1968. Jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Whether a supplier of materials to a federal construc-

tion project can ratify a transaction by an agent and rely

on the date thereof, so as to render its action timely under

the one-year limitation provision of the Miller Act, where

the supplier holds the agent out as one empowered to act

for it, the agent pretends or purports to act for the sup-

plier and the third party treats the transaction as one with

the supplier, notwithstanding that the agent in fact was

acting for his own account,

2. Whether the one-year limitation period under the

Miller Act runs only once for each supplier commencing

on the last day he supplied any material for work under

the prime contract, instead of running from the last day he

supplied material on each separate contract or order.

Statute Involved

The pertinent statutory provisions involved are 40

U.S.C, 27Ca-270b, printed in full in the appendix, infra, pp.

20-22. The limitation period set forth in Section 270b (b)

thereof, provides as follows:

‘*(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall

be brought in the name of the United States for the

use of the person suing, in the United States District

Court for any district in which the contract was to be

performed and executed and not elsewhere, irrespective

of the amount in controversy in such suit, but no such

suit shall be commenced after the expiration of one

year after the day on which the last of the labor was

3

performed or material was supplied by him. The

United States shall not be liable for this payment of

any costs or expenses of any such suit. As amended

Aug. 4, 1959, Pub. L, 86-135, § 1, 73 Stat. 279.”’

Statement of the Case

Petitioner, The Trane Company, instituted suit to re-

cover a sum of money on a Miller Act (40 U.S.C. 270a)

payment bond against the prime contractor, respondents

Benjamin Gelman, doing business as Gelco Builders and

Burjay Consiruction Corp., a joint venture (referred to as

‘‘Geleo-Burjay) and its sureties, respondents National

Surety Corporation and The Hanover Insurance Company.

Jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked under Sec-

tion 270b of said Act. After trial without a jury, the Dis-

trict Court dismissed Trane’s complaint and the Circuit

Court of Appeals aftirmed,? with one Judge dissenting.*

In March 1960, Geleo-Burjay contracted with the United

States to install an air-conditioning system at two federal

post office buildings. Geleo-Burjay subcontracted a por-

ticu of its contract to respondent Raymar Contracting

Corp.,‘ including the furnishing and installation of certain

air-conditioning. equipment and electric motors needed to

make said equipment operative. Raymar gave Jack Kleis-

rath, one of Trane’s New York salesmen, a purchase order

dated April 19, 1960 for the air-conditioning equipment

which Trane thereupon supplied to the project through

November 1, 1960. After billing Raymar for the agreed

price of $39,703.05, Trane, on January 25, 1961, gave due

notice of non-payment of said sum to Gelco-Burjay, and

said sum remains unpaid.

? Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Hays.

8 Judge Kaufman.

* Raymar Contracting Corp. defaulted by not appearing or plead-

ing and is not involved herein.

ALE TN LAE REE id

Phe TEAMED

COS he ROY en eigen tab yr et oe

e Be hel Oe a ae a ee

4

On or about April 25, 1961, Raymar defaulted and Gelco-

Burjay took over completion of Raymar’s subcontract.

About that time, Gelco-Burjay contacted Trane’s New

York office to inquire about the purchase of the electric

motors and was referred by Trane’s New York credit man-

ager to Trane’s employee, the same Jack Kleisrath who

acted for Trane in the sale of the air-conditioning equip-

ment to Raymar (32a-34a, 39a-41a).

Although Kleisrath’s written agreement (Exhibit ‘‘D’’)

with Trane limited his authority to Trane-manufactured

products, Trane’s employee testified that it was common

practice for its salesmen and, in this case, Kleisrath, to

purchase motors, freons and other items not manufactured

by Trane from other manufacturers for shipment directly

to the job site and to resell same to Trane’s customers, in

order to avoid large freight bills from Wisconsin to New

York (19a, 21a, 29a), but the salesmen were required to

notify Trane in Wisconsin of the transaction for billing

and warranty purposes (22a). In this instance, Kleisrath

did not so notify Trane in Wisconsin (22a), nor is there

any evidence that he notified anyone in tlie New York office.

The trial court, however, found that Kleisrath had no au-

thority to order and resell the motors, but predicated

Trane’s claim only on its purported ratification of Kleis-

rath’s actions (46a, 49a).

On April 28, 1961, Geleo-Burjay gave Kleisrath an oral

order for electric motors without specifying the amount or

type, assuming that Kleisrath knew the details because the

motors had previously been ordered or negotiated by Ray-

mar (33a). The motors, ordered by Kleisrath from Gen-

eral Dynamics Corporation, were delivered to the construc-

tion site and were billed to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service

Co.’’, Syosset, N. Y., consigned to Raymar, with the last

delivery occurring on July 10, 1961 (Exhibit ‘‘7’’, 33a).

Kleisrath, with permission, not only worked for Trane out

of Trane’s New York City office but also out of his home

in Syosset, Long Island. ‘‘Long Island Trane Service

5)

Co.”? was a trade name filed by Kleisrath in the County

Clerk’s Office, Nassau County on April 26, 1961, just two

days before the motor transaction, but Kleisrath was not

authorized by Trane to form such a company, nor to con-

duct business for his own account. Trane, however, had a

division called ‘The New York Trane Service Co.’’ which

was used to service its customers (28a).

On July 18, 1961, Kleisrath delivered invoices totalling

$3,235.00 to Geleo-Burjay for the motors on a printed bili-

head captioned ‘‘The Trane Company’’, beneath which was

typed ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co., 88 Cold Spring

Road, Syosset, Long Island, New York’? (Exhibits "a

and ‘‘5’’). The invoices directed payment to be made to —

the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.”’ Geleo-Burjay, know-

ing Kleisrath to be a sales representative of Trane, first

made out the checks to ‘‘The Trane Company’’, but these

were voided before delivery, and other checks were then

issued to the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.’’ (48a). A

receipt signed by Kleisrath stated that the motors were

‘‘billed to the account of Raymar . . .”’ (Exhibit ‘‘6’’).

Kleisrath endorsed the checks and converted the proceeds

to his own use (30a). Trane did not learn about the sale

of the motors until several months later. On December 5,

1961, Gelco-Burjay sent a letter to Trane complaining

about the motors sold to them through Kleisrath, thus

treating the motors transaction by Kleisrath as a Trane

transaction (Exhibit ‘‘9’’, 11a, 43a).°

Petitioner instituted suit on June 26, 1962 to recover

the purchase price for the air-conditioning equipment

($39,703.05) and the motors ($3,235.00).

The District Court seemingly accepted Trane’s conten-

tion that it ratified the Kleisrath-negotiated motors coi-

tract, but held that Trane’s claim for materials supplied

to Raymar was time-barred because the judge interpreted

5 The letter said: “Remove and correct motors as per Trane

Co. (Jack Kleisrath).”

EGE AES PETE HE IY EE SR OROE YT TAO ACF POOR,

2”

6

the Miller Act as providing that the limitation period

runs from the day the last material was supplied ‘‘on

each separate contract.’’ The judge found that the con-

tract of April 1960 between Trane and Raymar where the

lest date of delivery was November 1, 1960, was separate

from the contract of April 1961 between Trane and Gelco-

Burjay where the last date of delivery was July 10, 1961,

and as separate contracts, Trane’s action for the recovery

of $39,703.05 was untimely for the reason that it was not

commenced within one year of the day the last material was

supplied on that contract (47a). The court further held

that the claim of $3,235.00 for the motors was extin-

guished by payment inasmuch as Trane’s ratification of

the contract of sale by Kleisrath must be affirmed in its

entirety and Trane was therefore bound by the payment

received and appropriated by its agent (49a).

The Cireuit Court of Appeals, as represented by the

view of the majority, held that Trane could not ratify

the motors contract because 'Trane was ‘‘an utter stran-

ger’’ to that transaction and therefore did not reach the

question of the interpretation of the Miller Act limitation

clause. The majority further agreed with the District

Court that in any event Trane could not recover for the

motors because even if Trane ratified, the ratification must

include the receipt of payment.

In a dissenting opinion, one judge disagreed with the

majority’s treatment of the ratification issue and found,

on the facts of the case, that since Kleisrath purported

to act for Trane, Trane did in law and fact ratify the

motors sale and therefore became the supplier of the mo-

tors. The dissenting judge disagreed entirely with the

District Court’s view of the Miller Act, and concluded

that he would reverse on the claim for the air-conditioning

equipment on the ground that there should be only one

limitation period for each supplier on a job, commencing

on the last day he supplied materials under the prime

contract, which would be the July 10, 1961 date. He too

was of the opinion that Trane could noi collect for the

7

motors for the same reasons as both courts below. Peti-

tioner concedes that it cannot collect for the motors.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. The Court of Appeals decided an important state ques-

tion in conflict with applicable state law.

In actions brought under the Miller Act, state law has

been uniformly applied by the Circuits to determine the

substantive rights of the parties under their contract.

United States for the use and benefit of Shields, Inc. v.

Citizens and Southern National Bank of Atlanta, 367 F. 2d

473, 477 (4 Cir. 1966) ; Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will,

304 F. 2d 548, 554 (9 Cir. 1952). The law of New York,

applicable herein, is settled that a principal may ratify

the acts of his agent where the agent pretends or as-

sumes to be acting for the principal. Ramsey v. Miller,

202 N. Y. 72; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327; Pickel v.

Conn, 209 App. Div. 410, 204 N.Y.S. 448; Fellows v. Com-

missioners For Loaning United States Moneys, 36 Barb.

655; Restatement, Agency, 2nd, §85. The decision of the

majority of the Court of Appeals herein turned mainly

on a determination that the principal did not know of

the transaction until months later* and that the agent in

fact acted for his own account, but disregarded all the

evidence leading to the conclusion that the agent pur-

ported or pretended to act for his principal.

The dissenting judge stated that he was ‘‘at a loss to

understand the basis for the majority’s conclusion that

Trane was an ‘utter stranger’ to the contract between

Gelco-Burjay and Kleisrath’’,’ in view of the undisputed

facts that Trane’s New York office referred Kleisrath to

Gelco-Burjay when they inquired about the motors and

that Kleisrath used the name ‘‘Long Island Trane Service

Virtually every case of ratification involves after-acquired

knowledge by the principal.

FS ee

ICL oP

FOE SP OLA YL OAIEN

8

Company”’ to give the obvious impression that he was act-

ing for Trane. Neither the majority nor the dissenting

judge commented on the most telling evidentiary facts that

Kleisrath, on July 18, 1961, used Trane’s billhead for his

invoice to Gelco-Burjay, and that Gelco-Burjay by its letter

dated December 5, 1961, treated the motors transaction as

one having been entered into with Trane, both of which

fortify the dissenting judge’s conclusion that Kleisrath had

purported to act for Trane.

Accordingly, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals’

decision on the important question of ratification was not

in accordance with New York Law.’ Further, the error was

so obvious and exceptional that it would be shockingly

wrong to permit it to stand, and the impact on the peti-

tioner, in having its entire claim wiped out, notwithstand-

ing that it furnished materials of substantial benefit to the

United States, would be unduly harsh and unjust.

2. The decision rendered in the District Court, al-

though not reached in the Court of Appeals, involves

an important question of federal law which has not

been, but should be settled by this Court.

The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the limita-

tion provision of tle Miller Act which was amended in 1959

to its present form, and since many millions of dollars are

involved annually in federal construction projects, it is of

vital interest to suppliers, laborers and subcontractors of

the government and to the government itself, to have the

question settled as to when suit must be commenced when

* The majority incorrectly referred to the contract for motors as

one between Gelco-Burjay and General Dynamics, although elsewhere

they also referred to the same contract as one between Gelco-Burjay

and Kleisrath.,

®Neither of the courts below questioned the right of Trane to

ratify by the commencement of suit. See Hunderhun v. Cook, 66

Barb. 21; Dodge v. Lambert & Gardner, 15 N. Y. Super. (2 Bosw.)

570; Restatement, Agency, 2nd § 97.

9

a supplier has more ¢1an one order or cortract on a single

project.

The question involved is novel and witi remaim in a state

of confusion unless settled by the Supreme Court. In the

only similar case, this Court recently denied certiorari

where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the

Miller Act limitation provision as being plain and clear,

reversing the District Court’s decision which read into the

limitation provision the words ‘‘for which claim is made’’.

The Fifth Circuit held that the date of de:ivery of mate-

rials, although paid for, should be used as the measuring

date to allow recovery for materials delivered prior thereto.

T’nited States of America for the use and benefit of General

Electric Co. v. Southern Construction Co. Inc. et al., 383 F.

2d 135 (5 Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968).

The language in that decision appears to be in conflict

with the interpretation of the statute by the District Court

in the instant case in that the Court also read words into

the statute, ‘‘under each separate contract’’ which do not

appear therein. If this Court does not grant certiorari, the

decision of the District Court will stand as a precedent

which will affect all federal construction projects and will

result in needless multiplicity of suits. As the dissenting

judge in the Court of Appeals pointed out, ‘‘Piecemeal

litigation is a plight to be avoided wherever feasible’’. The

legislative history of the 1959 amendment to the Miller Act

shows that Congress was trying to overcome complexities

under the prior statute which the majority’s view will only

tend to perpetuate.®

®In the pre-1959 Miller Act, a supplier had one year from the

final settlement of the prime contract to commence suit and it did

not matter how many different subcontracts or orders or contracts

for materials there were. The 1959 amendment sought to relieve

the Comptroller General of the responsibility for fixing the date on

which the statute commences to run and also created uniformity of

treatment as to each supplier, but there was no indication that

Congress intended that a supplier should have multiple limitation

periods under one prime contract. See 2 U. S. Code, Congressional

and Administrative News (1959), pages 1995-1996.

Fe YS aan |

ee Pe LAET Ee, ee Ln ae

10

The dissenting Court of Appeals judge in the instant

case cited the General Electric case approvingly in con-

cluding that the one-year limitation period should run onty

once for each supplier on a job, ‘‘commencing on the last

day he supplied any material for work under the prime

contract’’.

The question in this case prevails in several different

combinations of contractual relationships between one sup-

plier and (1) one or more subcontractors; (2) one subcon-

tractor and the prime contractor; (3) one or more subcon-

tractors and the prime contractor; (4) one subcontractor

from whom the supplier receives two or more orders or

contracts. In each case, the question will arise as to when

the statute commences to run. Review by this Court of

the instant case would settle the question of when the sup-

plier must commence suit in all these other situations.

Conclusion

Petitioner submits that the important federal question

posed herein as to the interpretation of the limitation pe-

riod under the Miller Act should be resolved with finality

by the Court at this time. It is of vital interest for all con-

cerned with public construction contracts to know with

certainty when suit must be instituted where one supplies

materials to a single project under two or more contracts

spread over several years. Since the error on the ratifi-

cation issue conflicted with New York State law and was

so obvious and exceptional, this Court should consider thai

question in order to reach the statutory one. To be thwarted

in its effort to seek review of an important question of

federal law by so palpable an error as is manifest in the

court’s treatment of the preliminary question of ‘‘ratifica-

tion’’, the petitioner falls victim to a gross injustice in

being denied the right to seek redress under the Miller Act.

11

Wherefore, petitioner respectfully prays that this Court

issue a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit to review its judgment

herein.

Respectfully submitted,

Herman N, Scuwartz,

Attorney for the Petitioner,

120 Broadway,

New York, N. Y. 10005.

732-2570

Irvine Ronaiv StorcH,

Of Counsel.

ET ea gor.

12

APPENDIX A

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHE Sreconp Crrcuir

Ata Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals,

in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Courthouse in the City of New York, on the sixth day of

December, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Present: Hon. J. Epwarp LuMmrarp,

Chief Judge,

Hon. Irnvinc R. KavurMan,

Hon. Pavut R. Hays,

Circuw Judges.

a

ww

Unrrep States or America, for the use and benefit of

THe Trane Company,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

v.

RaymMar Contractinc Corp., BENJAMIN GELMAN, doing

business as GeLco Bur~pers, Bursay Construction Corp.,

Nationa Surety Corporation and THe Hanover In-

SURANCE COMPANY,

Defendarts-Appellees.

%

_

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

13

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District

Court be and it hereby is affirmed with costs to be taxed

against appellant.

A. Dantex Fusaro,

Clerk.

A true copy,

A. Dariet Fusaro,

Clerk.

(Seax)

PEL ILLLOVELN LE LSS ONE EG BA ee ep

vr ail Sil

14

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

and Dissenting Opinion.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHE Seconp Circurr

No. 146—September Term, 1968.

(Argued October 30, 1968 Decided December 6, 1968.)

Docket No. 32279

a

¥

Unrrep States or America, for the use and benefit of

THe Trane Company,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—_—vV.—

Raymar Contractina Corp., BenyJaMIN GELMAN, doing

business as Getco Bumpers, Bursay Construction Cor-

PORATION, NATIONAL Screty CoRPORATION AND THE Han-

OvER InsuraNcE CoMPANY.

Defendants-Appellees.

Before:

Lumsarp, Chief Judge,

Kaurman and Hays, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, Lloyd F.

MacMahon, Judge, after a trial without a jury dismissing

use plaintiff’s complaint in a suit under the Miller Act,

40 U.S. C. §§ 270a-270d (1964), against a prime contractor

and its sureties.

Affirmed.

15

Irvine Ronatp Storce (Schwartz, Weissberger,

Leichter & Storch, New York, New York,

Herman N. Schwartz, of counsel), for Ap-

pellant Trane.

Jack Harr (Hart & Hume, New York, New

York), for Appellees.

Hays, Circuit Judge:

Use-plaintiff The Trane Company appeals from a judg-

ment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York, Lloyd F. MacMahon, Judge, dis-

missing its complaint against defendants Benjamin Gel-

man, doing business as Gelco Builders, Burjay Construc-

tion Corporation, National Surety Corporation and The

Hanover Insurance Cumpany after trial without a jury

in a suit under the Miller Act, 40 U. S. C. §§ 270a-270d

(1964), against a prime contractor and its sureties. De-

fendant Rayiar Contracting Co:.., defaulted by failing

to appear and plead.

In March, 1960, defendant Gelco-Burjay entered into a

contract with the federal government for the installation

of an air-conditioning system at the General Post Office

and Morgan Annex in New York City. Defendant Na-

tional Surety. Corporation and the Massachusetts Bond-

ing and Insurance Company (succeeded by defendant The

Hanover Insurance Company), as co-sureties, furnished a

Miller Act payment bond ou behalf of Gelco-Burjay, as

principal, pursuant to 40 U. S. C. §270a (1964). Geleo-

Burjay made a subcontract with defendant Raymar to do

a part of the work.

On April 19, 1960, Raymar, following negotiations with

Jack Kliesrath, a salesman from Trane’s New York City

office, ordered certain air-conditioning equipment from

Trane. Trane’s principal place of business is in La Crosse,

Wisconsin.

Trane delivered the equipment to the construction site

by November 1, 1960 and thereafter billed Raymar for

Pr Cree © IT CaP

Se ee ae ks gee

16

the agreed price of $39,703.05. In January, 1961 Trane

gave Gelco-Burjay a timely Miller Act ninety-day notice,

pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 270b(a) (1964), stating that this

amount was due and owing from Raymar and that the

last date of furnishing material was November 1, 1960.

In April 1961, Raymar defaulted on its subcontract

and Gelco-Burjay undertook completion of Raymar’s work.

Gelman, as agent for Gelco-Burjay, telephoned Trane’s

New York office to inquire about purchasing electric motors

to be used with the air-conditioning equipment. Trane

does not manufacture electric motors. Gelman was referred

to Kliesrath, met with him and gave him an order for

electric motors on April 28, 1961. The contract provided

that the notes were to be paid for upon receipt and that

payment was to be made to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service

Co.,’? under which name Kliesrath had filed a certificate

of doing business. Without notifying Trane, Kliesrath

ordered the motors from General Dynamics Corporation.

The last delivery of the motors was made on July 10,

1961. Kliesrath sent invoices to Gelco-Burjay totalling

$3,235.00 for the motors on July 18, 1961. The invoices

were on a billhead which read: ‘‘The Trane Company,

Long Island Trane Service Co., 88 Cold Spring Road,

Syosset, L. I, N. Y.’’; they specifically directed that all

checks should be made payable to the ‘‘Long Island Trane

Service Co.’’ Geleco-Burjay immediately made payment by

checks payable to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.’’ Klies-

rath endorsed the checks and converted the proceeds to

his own use.

Trane commenced this Miller Act suit on June 26, 1962.

It seeks to recover both the purchase price of the air-

conditioning equipment and the purchase price of the mo-

tors.

Section 270(b) of the Miller Act provides that a sup-

plier may not commence a suit ‘‘after the expiration of

one year after the day on which the last of the labor was

performed or material was supplied by him.’’ The com-

17

mencement of this action was within one year after the

last delivery by General Dynamics under the agreement

for the purchase of the electric motors but more than one

year after the last delivery by Trane of air conditioning

equipment.

Trane argues that its suit is timely because the two

agreements constituted a single contract. The evidence

does not support Trane’s theory.

The first agreement was made between Kaymar and

Trane, the parties to the second agreemen* were Gelco-

Burjay and Kliesrath, or Kliesrath’s alter ego, Long Js-

land Trane Service Co. Trane was not even aware of

Gelco-Burjay’s purchase of the motors until long after

the transaction took place. Kliesrath purchased the motors

from General Dynamics Corporation without notifying

Trane. Trane cannot now, for the purpose of reviving its

contract with Raymar, claim to have been a narty to Gelco-

Burjay’s contract to purchase motors from General Dy-

namics.

Trane argues that it becume a party to the purchase

of the motors by ratifying Kliesrath’s activity.

The motors were purchased from Kliesrath who ordered

them from General Dynamics Corporation and gave no

notice to Trane. Payment was made to Kliesrath through

his ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co. ,»’? as provided in his

contract with Gelco-Burjay. Trane did not learn of the

contract until months after both the last delivery of the

motors and the making of payment for them. Trane thus

had no connection with the motors contract and it cannot

now ‘‘ratify’’ a transaction to which it was an utter

stranger.

In any event ‘‘ratification’? wonld not aid Trane in its

suit under the motors contract vecause Trane could not

ratify Kliesrath’s other activity without also ratifying his

receipt of payment.

Affirmed.

ree

~ 4

Ph ol angle hae

18

KavurMan, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

Since I cannot agree with the majority’s treatment of

the ratification issue, which I believe determinative of the

timeliness of Trane’s claim for materials it supplied to

Raymar, I must dissent. On the facts of this case, I am ata

loss to understand the basis for the majority’s conclusion

that Trane was ‘‘an utter stranger’’ to the contract be-

tween Geleco-Burjay and Kliesrath. I believe it is quite

clear that Trane involved itself because Kliesrath was

permitted by Trane to hold himself out as one empowered

to act for it in dealing with Gelco-Burjay. Not only was

Kliesrath Trane’s salesman, but as my brother Hays states,

Trane’s New York office referred Gelco-Burjay’s agent to

Kliesrath when he inquired about the purchase of motors

from Trane. In addition, it seems obvious that Kliesrath’s

purpose in creating the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.”’

and directing that payment for the motors be made to it

was to create the impression that he was indeed effecting

the transaction on behalf of a subsidiary or division of the

Trane Company—a nction reinforced by the circumstance

that Trane did actually have a division similarly named

‘‘The New York Trane Service Company.’’ And since

Kliesrath hed thus purported to act for Trane in selling

the motors to Geleco-Burjay, and inasmuch as Trane clearly

could have authorized the sale, as in the past it had au-

thorized many similar transactions by its salesmen, I be-

lieve that Trane had the power to and did in fact and law

ratify the sale by bringing this action for the purchase

price of the motors.

I hasten to add that I agree that such ratification did

not entitle Trane to recover the amount of its claim, since

it would follow that in affirming the sale, it could not dis-

avow the payments made by Gelco-Burjay to Kliesrath

extinguishing the claim. A principal cannot selectively

ratify only those portions of a transaction which would

inure to its benefit. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 96

(1957). In short, it cannot have its cake and eat it too.

19

But, by its ratification in bringing the suit on its claim,

Trane, as a consequence, became the suppiier of the motors.

Under the Miller Act statute of limitations, 40 U.S. C.

§ 270(b), it seems clear to me that Trane’s act of ratifica-

tion fixed the date on which it supplied the last material

for the government project as July 10, 1961, less than a

year before it instituted this action. It should be noted

also that the lower court determined that even if the ratifi-

cation doctrine was applicable, Trane’s claim for the ma-

terials it had supplied to Raymar was time barred because

the judge interpreted the one year statute of limitations

in §270(b) as running from ‘‘ ‘the day on which the last

of the material was supplied’ on each separate contract.’’

I believe that this interpretation was erroneous and would

lead to complexities which the history of the statute indi-

cates Congress was trying to overcome. It is more in

keeping with Congressional intent for us to construe the

one-year limitation as running only once for each supplier

on a job, commencing on the last day he supplied any ma-

terial for work under the prime contract. See United

States of America for the use cf General Electric Co. v.

Southern Construction Co., Inc., 383 F. 2d 135 (5th Cir.

1967), cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968). Not only does

this result better comport with the literal language of

§ 270b(b), which contains no requirement that the time

limit should run separately for each separate claim, as does

§ 270b(a) (dealing with the 90 day notice provision), but I

believe it wiser doctrine. Otherwise, a materialman would

be required to bring multipie suits to recover for materials

which he supplied to a single project under separate con-

tracts spread over several years. Piecemeal litigation is a

plight to be avoided wherever feasible.

Accordingly, I believe that since Trane ratified the mo-

tors sale, it supplied materials for the project within a

year of bringing suit. The action for equipment furnished

to Raymar is timely, and I would reverse on this claim.

ee Lu” Oe it tak cal

Ss tr ad bs 7

« seonahace: Al

SERA yk SOMES. Ci tees

20

APPENDIX C

Pertinent Text of the Miller Act.

(40 U.S.C. § 270a-270b)

‘*270a. Bonds of contractors for public buildings or

works; waiver of bonds covering contract performed in

foreign country.

‘*(a) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount,

for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public

building or public work of the United States is awarded

to any person, such person shall furnish to the United

States the following bonds, which shall become binding

upon the award of the contract to such person, who is

hereinafter designated as ‘‘contractor’’:

‘*(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties

satisfactory to the officer awarding such contract, and

in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the pro--~

tection of the United States.

‘*(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satis-

factory to such officer for the protection of all persons

supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the

work provided for in said contract for the use of each such

person. Whenever the totel amount payable by the terms

of the contract shall be not more than $1,000,000 the said

payment bond shall be in a sum of one-half the total

amount payable by the terms of the contract. Whenever

the total amount payable by the terms of the contract

shall be more than $1,000,000 and not more than $5,600,000,

the said payment bond shall be in a sum of 40 per centum

of the total amount payable by the terms of the contract.

Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the

contract shall be more than $5,000,000 the said payment

bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000.

21

‘*(b) The contracting officer in respect of any contract

is authorized to waive the requirement of a performance

bond and payment bond for so much of the work under such

contract as is to be performed in a foreign country if he

finds that it is impracticable for the contractor to furnish

such bonds.

‘*(¢) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit

the authority of any contracting officer to require a per-

formance bond or other security in addition to those, or in

cases other than the cases specified in subsection (a) of

this section. Aug. 24, 1935, c. 642, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 793.

**270b. Same; rights of persons furnishing labor or

material.

**(a) Every person who has furnished labor or ma-

terial in the prosecution of the work provided for in such

contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished

under section 270a of this title and who has not been paid

in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety

days after the day on which the last of the labor was done

or performed by him or material was furnished or supplied

by him for which such claim is made, shall have the right

to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or the bal-

ance thereof, unpaid at the time of institution of such suit

and to prosecute said action to fina] execution and

judgment for the sum or sums justly due him: Provided,

however, That any person having direct contractual re-

lationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relation-

ship express or implied with the contractor furnishing said

payment bond shall have a right of action upon the said

payment bond upon giving written notice to said contractor

within ninety days from the date on which such person did

or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied

the last of the material for which such claim is made,

stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed

i arid

ibs DC deh

and the name of the party to whom the material was

furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done

or performed. Such notice shall be served by mailing

the same by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an

envelope address to the contractor at any place he main-

tains an office or conducts his business, or his residence,

or in any manner in which the United States marshal of

the district in which the public improvement is situated is

authorized by law to serve summons.

‘*(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall be

brought in the name of the United States for the use of

the person suing, in the United States District Court for

any district in which the contract was to be performed and

executed and not elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in

controversy in such suit, but no such suit shall be com-

menced after the expiration of one year after the day on

which the last of the labor was performed or material

was supplied by him. The United States shall not be liable

for the payment of any costs or expenses of any such suit.

As amended Aug. 4, 1959, Pub. L. 86-135, § 1, 73 Stat. 279.”

e e

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.