Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — United States ex rel. Trane Co. v. Gelman
Supreme Court brief1969
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7'IPREME COURT. tk &
eee ween 1969
JOHN F. BAVIS, @LERK
Supreme Court of the United States :
OCTOBER TERM, 1968
No. J. 1.} 9
Unrtep States or America, for the Use and Benefit
of the Trans Company,
Petitioner,
against
as, Bex sain Germay, doing busi-
ness as Geico Buitpers, Bursay Construction Corpo-
RATION, NATIONAL SuRETY CORPORATION AND THE HANOVER
INSURANCE CoMPANY,
Respondents.
ee
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
Herman N. ScHwartTz,
Attorney for Petitioner,
120 Broadway,
New York, N. Y. 10005.
Irvine Ronatp Storc#,
Of Counsel.
MOTO TM
2 Aer rete vs gm
INDEX
PAGE
IN no a cas 6 iia yes ks aaa oa ea nea 1
er iat. cae hul ss Ca ceeds y al enn dna 2
| FT TOT TOCE TTT ET TREE T ETE 2
MN 5 cen ce kes vie choke Kaunas Tere 2
NE Wr OE I ak sc Wackae tv cede nanessseces 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ .............0. 0008 7
i. The Court of Appeals decided an important
state question in conflict with applicable state
Be eS EREGRAAE SEES CRORE SORE UN ER ATES 48 7
2. The decision rendered in the District Court,
although not reached in the Court of Appeals,
involves an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be settled by
NE 66K SADA WEEN SEWER ESAS ASR OOR SON 68 8
EL caw adecancaseke ed Cent uneeubeSeenensees 10
APPENDIX:
A—Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals ...... 12
B—Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals and Dis-
OIE TTI oo soc nee sesesassetesseseneces 14
C—Pertinent text of the Miller Act ................ 20
T° 9OOm SPOOL EPR ee OP Gi nerie ss
1 tee
ii INDEX
Cases Crrep
Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will, 304 F. 2d 548, 554
Oe as ED cha bn ne encss Cade s hear ebes eeeens
Dodge v. Lambert & Gardner, 15 N. Y. Super. (2
a ok 6:5 5 FUG oa ob 0 tin oa wo ae wR Ks
Fellows v. Commissioners For Loaning United States
BNI, Be SG IU Sc doe se Rbdicneer ek sancueve
seambeek ¥. Benes, GE H. T. Ge icvsescavesvevns rere
Hundurhun vy. Cook, 66 Barb. 21 ............... aus
Pickel v. Conn, 209 App. Div. 410, 204 N.Y.S. 448 ....
mee 8 Pere eet eT eee
United States of America for the use and benefit
of General Electric Co. v. Southern Construc-
tion Co. Ine. et al., 383 F. 2d 135 (5 Cir. 1967),
cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968) ..............
United States for the use and benefit of Shields, Inc.
v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of At-
lanta, 367 F.. 2d 473, 477 (4 Cire. 1966) ..........
Statutes Crrep
GD DBR, FID cca cccsinccsescccesnssenesseseseves
GD UK, FIGW vec cessicccccvecnsccvocscsceseceens
4B UBC, SIGIR) occcesscccccvvcvcccseseccsecsces
MiIscELLANEOUS
Restatement, Agency, 2nd, § 85 ......... ccc eeeeeees
Restatement, Agency, 2nd, $97 .........ccceecccees
2 U. S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News
(1959), pages 1905-1906 .....ccccsscccccccccves
PAGE
Me i
Supreme Cont of the United States
OCTOLER TERM, 1968
Re
ys
4
Unrrep States or AMERICA, FOR THE UsE AND BENEFIT
OF THE TRANE CoMPANY,
Petitioner,
against
Raymar Contractinc Corp., BENJAMIN GELMAN, DOING
BUSINESS AS GELCo Bumpers, Bursay Construction Cor-
poration, NationaL Surety Corporation AwD THE Han-
oveR INsuRANCE COMPANY,
. Respondents.
y%
. 2
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
The Trane Company prays that » Writ of Certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Cireuit entered in the above-
entitled case on December 6, 1968.
Opinions Below
The opinion of the District Court (45a-50a)* is reported
at —— F. Supp. ——. The opinion of the Cireuit Court
of Appeals and the dissenting opinion are reported at
_. F, 24 ——-, and are printed in Appendix annexed
hereto at pages 14 through 19.
1 References are to printed Appendix in the Court of Appeals.
IRIE ORR NS Wh aan
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Cireuit Court of Appeals was en-
tered on December 6, 1968. Jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).
Questions Presented
1. Whether a supplier of materials to a federal construc-
tion project can ratify a transaction by an agent and rely
on the date thereof, so as to render its action timely under
the one-year limitation provision of the Miller Act, where
the supplier holds the agent out as one empowered to act
for it, the agent pretends or purports to act for the sup-
plier and the third party treats the transaction as one with
the supplier, notwithstanding that the agent in fact was
acting for his own account,
2. Whether the one-year limitation period under the
Miller Act runs only once for each supplier commencing
on the last day he supplied any material for work under
the prime contract, instead of running from the last day he
supplied material on each separate contract or order.
Statute Involved
The pertinent statutory provisions involved are 40
U.S.C, 27Ca-270b, printed in full in the appendix, infra, pp.
20-22. The limitation period set forth in Section 270b (b)
thereof, provides as follows:
‘*(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall
be brought in the name of the United States for the
use of the person suing, in the United States District
Court for any district in which the contract was to be
performed and executed and not elsewhere, irrespective
of the amount in controversy in such suit, but no such
suit shall be commenced after the expiration of one
year after the day on which the last of the labor was
3
performed or material was supplied by him. The
United States shall not be liable for this payment of
any costs or expenses of any such suit. As amended
Aug. 4, 1959, Pub. L, 86-135, § 1, 73 Stat. 279.”’
Statement of the Case
Petitioner, The Trane Company, instituted suit to re-
cover a sum of money on a Miller Act (40 U.S.C. 270a)
payment bond against the prime contractor, respondents
Benjamin Gelman, doing business as Gelco Builders and
Burjay Consiruction Corp., a joint venture (referred to as
‘‘Geleo-Burjay) and its sureties, respondents National
Surety Corporation and The Hanover Insurance Company.
Jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked under Sec-
tion 270b of said Act. After trial without a jury, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed Trane’s complaint and the Circuit
Court of Appeals aftirmed,? with one Judge dissenting.*
In March 1960, Geleo-Burjay contracted with the United
States to install an air-conditioning system at two federal
post office buildings. Geleo-Burjay subcontracted a por-
ticu of its contract to respondent Raymar Contracting
Corp.,‘ including the furnishing and installation of certain
air-conditioning. equipment and electric motors needed to
make said equipment operative. Raymar gave Jack Kleis-
rath, one of Trane’s New York salesmen, a purchase order
dated April 19, 1960 for the air-conditioning equipment
which Trane thereupon supplied to the project through
November 1, 1960. After billing Raymar for the agreed
price of $39,703.05, Trane, on January 25, 1961, gave due
notice of non-payment of said sum to Gelco-Burjay, and
said sum remains unpaid.
? Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Hays.
8 Judge Kaufman.
* Raymar Contracting Corp. defaulted by not appearing or plead-
ing and is not involved herein.
ALE TN LAE REE id
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4
On or about April 25, 1961, Raymar defaulted and Gelco-
Burjay took over completion of Raymar’s subcontract.
About that time, Gelco-Burjay contacted Trane’s New
York office to inquire about the purchase of the electric
motors and was referred by Trane’s New York credit man-
ager to Trane’s employee, the same Jack Kleisrath who
acted for Trane in the sale of the air-conditioning equip-
ment to Raymar (32a-34a, 39a-41a).
Although Kleisrath’s written agreement (Exhibit ‘‘D’’)
with Trane limited his authority to Trane-manufactured
products, Trane’s employee testified that it was common
practice for its salesmen and, in this case, Kleisrath, to
purchase motors, freons and other items not manufactured
by Trane from other manufacturers for shipment directly
to the job site and to resell same to Trane’s customers, in
order to avoid large freight bills from Wisconsin to New
York (19a, 21a, 29a), but the salesmen were required to
notify Trane in Wisconsin of the transaction for billing
and warranty purposes (22a). In this instance, Kleisrath
did not so notify Trane in Wisconsin (22a), nor is there
any evidence that he notified anyone in tlie New York office.
The trial court, however, found that Kleisrath had no au-
thority to order and resell the motors, but predicated
Trane’s claim only on its purported ratification of Kleis-
rath’s actions (46a, 49a).
On April 28, 1961, Geleo-Burjay gave Kleisrath an oral
order for electric motors without specifying the amount or
type, assuming that Kleisrath knew the details because the
motors had previously been ordered or negotiated by Ray-
mar (33a). The motors, ordered by Kleisrath from Gen-
eral Dynamics Corporation, were delivered to the construc-
tion site and were billed to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service
Co.’’, Syosset, N. Y., consigned to Raymar, with the last
delivery occurring on July 10, 1961 (Exhibit ‘‘7’’, 33a).
Kleisrath, with permission, not only worked for Trane out
of Trane’s New York City office but also out of his home
in Syosset, Long Island. ‘‘Long Island Trane Service
5)
Co.”? was a trade name filed by Kleisrath in the County
Clerk’s Office, Nassau County on April 26, 1961, just two
days before the motor transaction, but Kleisrath was not
authorized by Trane to form such a company, nor to con-
duct business for his own account. Trane, however, had a
division called ‘The New York Trane Service Co.’’ which
was used to service its customers (28a).
On July 18, 1961, Kleisrath delivered invoices totalling
$3,235.00 to Geleo-Burjay for the motors on a printed bili-
head captioned ‘‘The Trane Company’’, beneath which was
typed ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co., 88 Cold Spring
Road, Syosset, Long Island, New York’? (Exhibits "a
and ‘‘5’’). The invoices directed payment to be made to —
the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.”’ Geleo-Burjay, know-
ing Kleisrath to be a sales representative of Trane, first
made out the checks to ‘‘The Trane Company’’, but these
were voided before delivery, and other checks were then
issued to the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.’’ (48a). A
receipt signed by Kleisrath stated that the motors were
‘‘billed to the account of Raymar . . .”’ (Exhibit ‘‘6’’).
Kleisrath endorsed the checks and converted the proceeds
to his own use (30a). Trane did not learn about the sale
of the motors until several months later. On December 5,
1961, Gelco-Burjay sent a letter to Trane complaining
about the motors sold to them through Kleisrath, thus
treating the motors transaction by Kleisrath as a Trane
transaction (Exhibit ‘‘9’’, 11a, 43a).°
Petitioner instituted suit on June 26, 1962 to recover
the purchase price for the air-conditioning equipment
($39,703.05) and the motors ($3,235.00).
The District Court seemingly accepted Trane’s conten-
tion that it ratified the Kleisrath-negotiated motors coi-
tract, but held that Trane’s claim for materials supplied
to Raymar was time-barred because the judge interpreted
5 The letter said: “Remove and correct motors as per Trane
Co. (Jack Kleisrath).”
EGE AES PETE HE IY EE SR OROE YT TAO ACF POOR,
2”
6
the Miller Act as providing that the limitation period
runs from the day the last material was supplied ‘‘on
each separate contract.’’ The judge found that the con-
tract of April 1960 between Trane and Raymar where the
lest date of delivery was November 1, 1960, was separate
from the contract of April 1961 between Trane and Gelco-
Burjay where the last date of delivery was July 10, 1961,
and as separate contracts, Trane’s action for the recovery
of $39,703.05 was untimely for the reason that it was not
commenced within one year of the day the last material was
supplied on that contract (47a). The court further held
that the claim of $3,235.00 for the motors was extin-
guished by payment inasmuch as Trane’s ratification of
the contract of sale by Kleisrath must be affirmed in its
entirety and Trane was therefore bound by the payment
received and appropriated by its agent (49a).
The Cireuit Court of Appeals, as represented by the
view of the majority, held that Trane could not ratify
the motors contract because 'Trane was ‘‘an utter stran-
ger’’ to that transaction and therefore did not reach the
question of the interpretation of the Miller Act limitation
clause. The majority further agreed with the District
Court that in any event Trane could not recover for the
motors because even if Trane ratified, the ratification must
include the receipt of payment.
In a dissenting opinion, one judge disagreed with the
majority’s treatment of the ratification issue and found,
on the facts of the case, that since Kleisrath purported
to act for Trane, Trane did in law and fact ratify the
motors sale and therefore became the supplier of the mo-
tors. The dissenting judge disagreed entirely with the
District Court’s view of the Miller Act, and concluded
that he would reverse on the claim for the air-conditioning
equipment on the ground that there should be only one
limitation period for each supplier on a job, commencing
on the last day he supplied materials under the prime
contract, which would be the July 10, 1961 date. He too
was of the opinion that Trane could noi collect for the
7
motors for the same reasons as both courts below. Peti-
tioner concedes that it cannot collect for the motors.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
1. The Court of Appeals decided an important state ques-
tion in conflict with applicable state law.
In actions brought under the Miller Act, state law has
been uniformly applied by the Circuits to determine the
substantive rights of the parties under their contract.
United States for the use and benefit of Shields, Inc. v.
Citizens and Southern National Bank of Atlanta, 367 F. 2d
473, 477 (4 Cir. 1966) ; Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will,
304 F. 2d 548, 554 (9 Cir. 1952). The law of New York,
applicable herein, is settled that a principal may ratify
the acts of his agent where the agent pretends or as-
sumes to be acting for the principal. Ramsey v. Miller,
202 N. Y. 72; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327; Pickel v.
Conn, 209 App. Div. 410, 204 N.Y.S. 448; Fellows v. Com-
missioners For Loaning United States Moneys, 36 Barb.
655; Restatement, Agency, 2nd, §85. The decision of the
majority of the Court of Appeals herein turned mainly
on a determination that the principal did not know of
the transaction until months later* and that the agent in
fact acted for his own account, but disregarded all the
evidence leading to the conclusion that the agent pur-
ported or pretended to act for his principal.
The dissenting judge stated that he was ‘‘at a loss to
understand the basis for the majority’s conclusion that
Trane was an ‘utter stranger’ to the contract between
Gelco-Burjay and Kleisrath’’,’ in view of the undisputed
facts that Trane’s New York office referred Kleisrath to
Gelco-Burjay when they inquired about the motors and
that Kleisrath used the name ‘‘Long Island Trane Service
Virtually every case of ratification involves after-acquired
knowledge by the principal.
FS ee
ICL oP
FOE SP OLA YL OAIEN
8
Company”’ to give the obvious impression that he was act-
ing for Trane. Neither the majority nor the dissenting
judge commented on the most telling evidentiary facts that
Kleisrath, on July 18, 1961, used Trane’s billhead for his
invoice to Gelco-Burjay, and that Gelco-Burjay by its letter
dated December 5, 1961, treated the motors transaction as
one having been entered into with Trane, both of which
fortify the dissenting judge’s conclusion that Kleisrath had
purported to act for Trane.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals’
decision on the important question of ratification was not
in accordance with New York Law.’ Further, the error was
so obvious and exceptional that it would be shockingly
wrong to permit it to stand, and the impact on the peti-
tioner, in having its entire claim wiped out, notwithstand-
ing that it furnished materials of substantial benefit to the
United States, would be unduly harsh and unjust.
2. The decision rendered in the District Court, al-
though not reached in the Court of Appeals, involves
an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be settled by this Court.
The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the limita-
tion provision of tle Miller Act which was amended in 1959
to its present form, and since many millions of dollars are
involved annually in federal construction projects, it is of
vital interest to suppliers, laborers and subcontractors of
the government and to the government itself, to have the
question settled as to when suit must be commenced when
* The majority incorrectly referred to the contract for motors as
one between Gelco-Burjay and General Dynamics, although elsewhere
they also referred to the same contract as one between Gelco-Burjay
and Kleisrath.,
®Neither of the courts below questioned the right of Trane to
ratify by the commencement of suit. See Hunderhun v. Cook, 66
Barb. 21; Dodge v. Lambert & Gardner, 15 N. Y. Super. (2 Bosw.)
570; Restatement, Agency, 2nd § 97.
9
a supplier has more ¢1an one order or cortract on a single
project.
The question involved is novel and witi remaim in a state
of confusion unless settled by the Supreme Court. In the
only similar case, this Court recently denied certiorari
where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
Miller Act limitation provision as being plain and clear,
reversing the District Court’s decision which read into the
limitation provision the words ‘‘for which claim is made’’.
The Fifth Circuit held that the date of de:ivery of mate-
rials, although paid for, should be used as the measuring
date to allow recovery for materials delivered prior thereto.
T’nited States of America for the use and benefit of General
Electric Co. v. Southern Construction Co. Inc. et al., 383 F.
2d 135 (5 Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968).
The language in that decision appears to be in conflict
with the interpretation of the statute by the District Court
in the instant case in that the Court also read words into
the statute, ‘‘under each separate contract’’ which do not
appear therein. If this Court does not grant certiorari, the
decision of the District Court will stand as a precedent
which will affect all federal construction projects and will
result in needless multiplicity of suits. As the dissenting
judge in the Court of Appeals pointed out, ‘‘Piecemeal
litigation is a plight to be avoided wherever feasible’’. The
legislative history of the 1959 amendment to the Miller Act
shows that Congress was trying to overcome complexities
under the prior statute which the majority’s view will only
tend to perpetuate.®
®In the pre-1959 Miller Act, a supplier had one year from the
final settlement of the prime contract to commence suit and it did
not matter how many different subcontracts or orders or contracts
for materials there were. The 1959 amendment sought to relieve
the Comptroller General of the responsibility for fixing the date on
which the statute commences to run and also created uniformity of
treatment as to each supplier, but there was no indication that
Congress intended that a supplier should have multiple limitation
periods under one prime contract. See 2 U. S. Code, Congressional
and Administrative News (1959), pages 1995-1996.
Fe YS aan |
ee Pe LAET Ee, ee Ln ae
10
The dissenting Court of Appeals judge in the instant
case cited the General Electric case approvingly in con-
cluding that the one-year limitation period should run onty
once for each supplier on a job, ‘‘commencing on the last
day he supplied any material for work under the prime
contract’’.
The question in this case prevails in several different
combinations of contractual relationships between one sup-
plier and (1) one or more subcontractors; (2) one subcon-
tractor and the prime contractor; (3) one or more subcon-
tractors and the prime contractor; (4) one subcontractor
from whom the supplier receives two or more orders or
contracts. In each case, the question will arise as to when
the statute commences to run. Review by this Court of
the instant case would settle the question of when the sup-
plier must commence suit in all these other situations.
Conclusion
Petitioner submits that the important federal question
posed herein as to the interpretation of the limitation pe-
riod under the Miller Act should be resolved with finality
by the Court at this time. It is of vital interest for all con-
cerned with public construction contracts to know with
certainty when suit must be instituted where one supplies
materials to a single project under two or more contracts
spread over several years. Since the error on the ratifi-
cation issue conflicted with New York State law and was
so obvious and exceptional, this Court should consider thai
question in order to reach the statutory one. To be thwarted
in its effort to seek review of an important question of
federal law by so palpable an error as is manifest in the
court’s treatment of the preliminary question of ‘‘ratifica-
tion’’, the petitioner falls victim to a gross injustice in
being denied the right to seek redress under the Miller Act.
11
Wherefore, petitioner respectfully prays that this Court
issue a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to review its judgment
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
Herman N, Scuwartz,
Attorney for the Petitioner,
120 Broadway,
New York, N. Y. 10005.
732-2570
Irvine Ronaiv StorcH,
Of Counsel.
ET ea gor.
12
APPENDIX A
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHE Sreconp Crrcuir
Ata Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals,
in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States
Courthouse in the City of New York, on the sixth day of
December, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
Present: Hon. J. Epwarp LuMmrarp,
Chief Judge,
Hon. Irnvinc R. KavurMan,
Hon. Pavut R. Hays,
Circuw Judges.
a
ww
Unrrep States or America, for the use and benefit of
THe Trane Company,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,
v.
RaymMar Contractinc Corp., BENJAMIN GELMAN, doing
business as GeLco Bur~pers, Bursay Construction Corp.,
Nationa Surety Corporation and THe Hanover In-
SURANCE COMPANY,
Defendarts-Appellees.
%
_
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
13
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District
Court be and it hereby is affirmed with costs to be taxed
against appellant.
A. Dantex Fusaro,
Clerk.
A true copy,
A. Dariet Fusaro,
Clerk.
(Seax)
PEL ILLLOVELN LE LSS ONE EG BA ee ep
vr ail Sil
14
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
and Dissenting Opinion.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHE Seconp Circurr
No. 146—September Term, 1968.
(Argued October 30, 1968 Decided December 6, 1968.)
Docket No. 32279
a
¥
Unrrep States or America, for the use and benefit of
THe Trane Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
—_—vV.—
Raymar Contractina Corp., BenyJaMIN GELMAN, doing
business as Getco Bumpers, Bursay Construction Cor-
PORATION, NATIONAL Screty CoRPORATION AND THE Han-
OvER InsuraNcE CoMPANY.
Defendants-Appellees.
Before:
Lumsarp, Chief Judge,
Kaurman and Hays, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Lloyd F.
MacMahon, Judge, after a trial without a jury dismissing
use plaintiff’s complaint in a suit under the Miller Act,
40 U.S. C. §§ 270a-270d (1964), against a prime contractor
and its sureties.
Affirmed.
15
Irvine Ronatp Storce (Schwartz, Weissberger,
Leichter & Storch, New York, New York,
Herman N. Schwartz, of counsel), for Ap-
pellant Trane.
Jack Harr (Hart & Hume, New York, New
York), for Appellees.
Hays, Circuit Judge:
Use-plaintiff The Trane Company appeals from a judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Lloyd F. MacMahon, Judge, dis-
missing its complaint against defendants Benjamin Gel-
man, doing business as Gelco Builders, Burjay Construc-
tion Corporation, National Surety Corporation and The
Hanover Insurance Cumpany after trial without a jury
in a suit under the Miller Act, 40 U. S. C. §§ 270a-270d
(1964), against a prime contractor and its sureties. De-
fendant Rayiar Contracting Co:.., defaulted by failing
to appear and plead.
In March, 1960, defendant Gelco-Burjay entered into a
contract with the federal government for the installation
of an air-conditioning system at the General Post Office
and Morgan Annex in New York City. Defendant Na-
tional Surety. Corporation and the Massachusetts Bond-
ing and Insurance Company (succeeded by defendant The
Hanover Insurance Company), as co-sureties, furnished a
Miller Act payment bond ou behalf of Gelco-Burjay, as
principal, pursuant to 40 U. S. C. §270a (1964). Geleo-
Burjay made a subcontract with defendant Raymar to do
a part of the work.
On April 19, 1960, Raymar, following negotiations with
Jack Kliesrath, a salesman from Trane’s New York City
office, ordered certain air-conditioning equipment from
Trane. Trane’s principal place of business is in La Crosse,
Wisconsin.
Trane delivered the equipment to the construction site
by November 1, 1960 and thereafter billed Raymar for
Pr Cree © IT CaP
Se ee ae ks gee
16
the agreed price of $39,703.05. In January, 1961 Trane
gave Gelco-Burjay a timely Miller Act ninety-day notice,
pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 270b(a) (1964), stating that this
amount was due and owing from Raymar and that the
last date of furnishing material was November 1, 1960.
In April 1961, Raymar defaulted on its subcontract
and Gelco-Burjay undertook completion of Raymar’s work.
Gelman, as agent for Gelco-Burjay, telephoned Trane’s
New York office to inquire about purchasing electric motors
to be used with the air-conditioning equipment. Trane
does not manufacture electric motors. Gelman was referred
to Kliesrath, met with him and gave him an order for
electric motors on April 28, 1961. The contract provided
that the notes were to be paid for upon receipt and that
payment was to be made to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service
Co.,’? under which name Kliesrath had filed a certificate
of doing business. Without notifying Trane, Kliesrath
ordered the motors from General Dynamics Corporation.
The last delivery of the motors was made on July 10,
1961. Kliesrath sent invoices to Gelco-Burjay totalling
$3,235.00 for the motors on July 18, 1961. The invoices
were on a billhead which read: ‘‘The Trane Company,
Long Island Trane Service Co., 88 Cold Spring Road,
Syosset, L. I, N. Y.’’; they specifically directed that all
checks should be made payable to the ‘‘Long Island Trane
Service Co.’’ Geleco-Burjay immediately made payment by
checks payable to ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.’’ Klies-
rath endorsed the checks and converted the proceeds to
his own use.
Trane commenced this Miller Act suit on June 26, 1962.
It seeks to recover both the purchase price of the air-
conditioning equipment and the purchase price of the mo-
tors.
Section 270(b) of the Miller Act provides that a sup-
plier may not commence a suit ‘‘after the expiration of
one year after the day on which the last of the labor was
performed or material was supplied by him.’’ The com-
17
mencement of this action was within one year after the
last delivery by General Dynamics under the agreement
for the purchase of the electric motors but more than one
year after the last delivery by Trane of air conditioning
equipment.
Trane argues that its suit is timely because the two
agreements constituted a single contract. The evidence
does not support Trane’s theory.
The first agreement was made between Kaymar and
Trane, the parties to the second agreemen* were Gelco-
Burjay and Kliesrath, or Kliesrath’s alter ego, Long Js-
land Trane Service Co. Trane was not even aware of
Gelco-Burjay’s purchase of the motors until long after
the transaction took place. Kliesrath purchased the motors
from General Dynamics Corporation without notifying
Trane. Trane cannot now, for the purpose of reviving its
contract with Raymar, claim to have been a narty to Gelco-
Burjay’s contract to purchase motors from General Dy-
namics.
Trane argues that it becume a party to the purchase
of the motors by ratifying Kliesrath’s activity.
The motors were purchased from Kliesrath who ordered
them from General Dynamics Corporation and gave no
notice to Trane. Payment was made to Kliesrath through
his ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co. ,»’? as provided in his
contract with Gelco-Burjay. Trane did not learn of the
contract until months after both the last delivery of the
motors and the making of payment for them. Trane thus
had no connection with the motors contract and it cannot
now ‘‘ratify’’ a transaction to which it was an utter
stranger.
In any event ‘‘ratification’? wonld not aid Trane in its
suit under the motors contract vecause Trane could not
ratify Kliesrath’s other activity without also ratifying his
receipt of payment.
Affirmed.
ree
~ 4
Ph ol angle hae
18
KavurMan, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :
Since I cannot agree with the majority’s treatment of
the ratification issue, which I believe determinative of the
timeliness of Trane’s claim for materials it supplied to
Raymar, I must dissent. On the facts of this case, I am ata
loss to understand the basis for the majority’s conclusion
that Trane was ‘‘an utter stranger’’ to the contract be-
tween Geleco-Burjay and Kliesrath. I believe it is quite
clear that Trane involved itself because Kliesrath was
permitted by Trane to hold himself out as one empowered
to act for it in dealing with Gelco-Burjay. Not only was
Kliesrath Trane’s salesman, but as my brother Hays states,
Trane’s New York office referred Gelco-Burjay’s agent to
Kliesrath when he inquired about the purchase of motors
from Trane. In addition, it seems obvious that Kliesrath’s
purpose in creating the ‘‘Long Island Trane Service Co.”’
and directing that payment for the motors be made to it
was to create the impression that he was indeed effecting
the transaction on behalf of a subsidiary or division of the
Trane Company—a nction reinforced by the circumstance
that Trane did actually have a division similarly named
‘‘The New York Trane Service Company.’’ And since
Kliesrath hed thus purported to act for Trane in selling
the motors to Geleco-Burjay, and inasmuch as Trane clearly
could have authorized the sale, as in the past it had au-
thorized many similar transactions by its salesmen, I be-
lieve that Trane had the power to and did in fact and law
ratify the sale by bringing this action for the purchase
price of the motors.
I hasten to add that I agree that such ratification did
not entitle Trane to recover the amount of its claim, since
it would follow that in affirming the sale, it could not dis-
avow the payments made by Gelco-Burjay to Kliesrath
extinguishing the claim. A principal cannot selectively
ratify only those portions of a transaction which would
inure to its benefit. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 96
(1957). In short, it cannot have its cake and eat it too.
19
But, by its ratification in bringing the suit on its claim,
Trane, as a consequence, became the suppiier of the motors.
Under the Miller Act statute of limitations, 40 U.S. C.
§ 270(b), it seems clear to me that Trane’s act of ratifica-
tion fixed the date on which it supplied the last material
for the government project as July 10, 1961, less than a
year before it instituted this action. It should be noted
also that the lower court determined that even if the ratifi-
cation doctrine was applicable, Trane’s claim for the ma-
terials it had supplied to Raymar was time barred because
the judge interpreted the one year statute of limitations
in §270(b) as running from ‘‘ ‘the day on which the last
of the material was supplied’ on each separate contract.’’
I believe that this interpretation was erroneous and would
lead to complexities which the history of the statute indi-
cates Congress was trying to overcome. It is more in
keeping with Congressional intent for us to construe the
one-year limitation as running only once for each supplier
on a job, commencing on the last day he supplied any ma-
terial for work under the prime contract. See United
States of America for the use cf General Electric Co. v.
Southern Construction Co., Inc., 383 F. 2d 135 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied 390 U. S. 955 (1968). Not only does
this result better comport with the literal language of
§ 270b(b), which contains no requirement that the time
limit should run separately for each separate claim, as does
§ 270b(a) (dealing with the 90 day notice provision), but I
believe it wiser doctrine. Otherwise, a materialman would
be required to bring multipie suits to recover for materials
which he supplied to a single project under separate con-
tracts spread over several years. Piecemeal litigation is a
plight to be avoided wherever feasible.
Accordingly, I believe that since Trane ratified the mo-
tors sale, it supplied materials for the project within a
year of bringing suit. The action for equipment furnished
to Raymar is timely, and I would reverse on this claim.
ee Lu” Oe it tak cal
Ss tr ad bs 7
« seonahace: Al
SERA yk SOMES. Ci tees
20
APPENDIX C
Pertinent Text of the Miller Act.
(40 U.S.C. § 270a-270b)
‘*270a. Bonds of contractors for public buildings or
works; waiver of bonds covering contract performed in
foreign country.
‘*(a) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount,
for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building or public work of the United States is awarded
to any person, such person shall furnish to the United
States the following bonds, which shall become binding
upon the award of the contract to such person, who is
hereinafter designated as ‘‘contractor’’:
‘*(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties
satisfactory to the officer awarding such contract, and
in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the pro--~
tection of the United States.
‘*(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satis-
factory to such officer for the protection of all persons
supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the
work provided for in said contract for the use of each such
person. Whenever the totel amount payable by the terms
of the contract shall be not more than $1,000,000 the said
payment bond shall be in a sum of one-half the total
amount payable by the terms of the contract. Whenever
the total amount payable by the terms of the contract
shall be more than $1,000,000 and not more than $5,600,000,
the said payment bond shall be in a sum of 40 per centum
of the total amount payable by the terms of the contract.
Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the
contract shall be more than $5,000,000 the said payment
bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000.
21
‘*(b) The contracting officer in respect of any contract
is authorized to waive the requirement of a performance
bond and payment bond for so much of the work under such
contract as is to be performed in a foreign country if he
finds that it is impracticable for the contractor to furnish
such bonds.
‘*(¢) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
the authority of any contracting officer to require a per-
formance bond or other security in addition to those, or in
cases other than the cases specified in subsection (a) of
this section. Aug. 24, 1935, c. 642, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 793.
**270b. Same; rights of persons furnishing labor or
material.
**(a) Every person who has furnished labor or ma-
terial in the prosecution of the work provided for in such
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished
under section 270a of this title and who has not been paid
in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety
days after the day on which the last of the labor was done
or performed by him or material was furnished or supplied
by him for which such claim is made, shall have the right
to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or the bal-
ance thereof, unpaid at the time of institution of such suit
and to prosecute said action to fina] execution and
judgment for the sum or sums justly due him: Provided,
however, That any person having direct contractual re-
lationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relation-
ship express or implied with the contractor furnishing said
payment bond shall have a right of action upon the said
payment bond upon giving written notice to said contractor
within ninety days from the date on which such person did
or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied
the last of the material for which such claim is made,
stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed
i arid
ibs DC deh
and the name of the party to whom the material was
furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done
or performed. Such notice shall be served by mailing
the same by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an
envelope address to the contractor at any place he main-
tains an office or conducts his business, or his residence,
or in any manner in which the United States marshal of
the district in which the public improvement is situated is
authorized by law to serve summons.
‘*(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall be
brought in the name of the United States for the use of
the person suing, in the United States District Court for
any district in which the contract was to be performed and
executed and not elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in
controversy in such suit, but no such suit shall be com-
menced after the expiration of one year after the day on
which the last of the labor was performed or material
was supplied by him. The United States shall not be liable
for the payment of any costs or expenses of any such suit.
As amended Aug. 4, 1959, Pub. L. 86-135, § 1, 73 Stat. 279.”
e e
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.