Appendix — Norman v. United States
Supreme Court brief1969
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
(Decided March 15, 1968)
No. 295-62
ROSCOE L. NORMAN v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 321-62
JOHN E. CROWLEY v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 336-62
SHERWOOD E. BUCKLAND v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 256-64
MAURICE J. FITZGERALD v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 351-64
LOREN E. BUCKEY v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 313-64
JOHN B. MARTIN v. THE UNITED STATES
Richard L. Merrick, attorney of record, for Plaintiffs
Roscoe L. Norman, John E. Crowley, Sherwood E. Buck-
land, Maurice J. Fitzgerald and Loren E. Buckey.
Clifford A. Dougherty, attorney of record, for Plaintiff
John B. Martin.
Charles M. Munnecke, with whom was Assistant Attor-
ney General Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., for defendant.
2a
Before COWEN, Chief Judge, LARAMORE, DURFEE, DAVIS,
SKELTON and NICHOLS, Judges.
OPINION
DURFEE, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
Each of the plaintiffs herein seeks to recover the differ-
ence between the active duty pay he would have received
as an officer in the Air Force if he had not been retired
early under the provisions of the so-called White Charger
Act and the retired pay he has received since the date of
his retirement under that Act. We conclude that none of
the plaintiffs is entitled to recover.
The “White Charger Act’! derived its name from an
observation that this legislation went through Congress
“like a White Charger.” The Act permitted eerly manda-
tory retirement of not to exceed 20 percent of officers in
the military service in the grade of permanent colonel and
an unlimited number of permanent colonels with 20 years
or more of service who had been considered for promotion
twice, but not recommended.
The Act took initial form in Senate Bill S. 1795 which
was the outgrowth of proposed legislation submitted by the
Secretary of Defease who explained its purpose to the Con-
gress on April 20, 1959:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to enable
the Armed Forces to meet more effectively the objec-
tive of a Regular officer corps of the highest quality
in all ranks by (1) more closely relating the retention
of officers after 20 years of service who are serving in
the permanent grades of lieutenant colonel and colo-
nel, commander and captain to the requirements of
the services, including the degree of contribution or
productivity of the officer and the needs of the serv-
| ices rather than solely to a “guaranteed” number of
years of service; (2) according increased recognition
and incentive for outstanding ability and competence;
* * * and (4) expediting the separation from the
service of officers who have been twice deferred from
permanent promotion. [Emphasis supplied]
* *
1Section 10 of Public Law 86-616, approved July 12, 1960, 74
Stat. 386, 395.
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3a
It is emphasized that the present legislation is not
intended to cause, and will not be used for, the invol-
untary removal of Regular officers from the active list
solely because of a reduction in the actual or author-
ized personnel strength of the service concerned.
Rather it is intended that the removal of Regular of-
ficers from the active list will continue to be author-
ized only for the reasons and under the procedures
and limitations now provided by law for such removal
and as further provided by the proposed legislation.
[Emphasis supplied]
The need “to meet more effectively the objective of a
Regular officer corps of the highest quality in all ranks”
arose from the sudden expansion of the Regular officer
corps in World War II, and again during the Korean War.
The law as finally enacted was limited to the Army and
the Air Force, but the principal problem of quality of serv-
ice by senior officers resulted mainly from the rapid expan-
sion in the number of Air Force officers during wartime.
For example, the Regular Air Force officer corps was in-
creased from 1,400 at the time of our entry into World
War II to 23,000 after World War II and to 69,000 in
1956 after the hostilities in Korea.
As a result of this expansion, many officers were pro-
moted rapidly for the purpose of staffing the increased
number of higher grade positions. Some officers were pro-
moted to the grade of colonel in the Air Force with 12 or
13 years of service, 10 years before they would have reached
that grade in the Army or Navy. As a consequence of
this rapid promotion, however, these Air Force senior offi-
cers faced many years of service in their attained rank
with severely limited prospects for further promotion.
Under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947? lieutenant
colonels- could expect to continue in active service until
they had completed 28 years of service (61 Stat. 905) ; this
same expectation of continued service for colonels was un-
til completion of 30 years of service (61 Stat. 904). During
the middle of the 1950’s responsible officials of the Air
Force became concerned as to the quality of service of some
of these senior officers in view of new and increasing re-
quirements, and the fact that the existing law provided a
sanctuary in long continued active service in grade for
them.
2 Approved August 7, 1947, 61 Stat. 795.
4a
Mandatory elimination by separation or retirement of
deferred officers of the Army in junior grades who failed
of selection for promotion, was provided by this Act of
1947. However, the only method for the elimination of
officers of the grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel was
for demonstrated deficiency in performance of such degree
was to warrant elimination through show cause proce-
dures, which had been largely ineffective. When used, this
method had the colorable effect of stigmatizing subject of-
ficers. In April, 1956, the Deputy Chief of Personnel of
the Air Force, in reviewing this problem, stated:
The 1946 and 1947 integration program increased
the Regular Officer corps to 17,500. * * *
As a result, the age and experience of 12,000 of our
Regular officers is concentrated in the five year brack-
et of officers commissioned from 1941 through 1945.
* * * *
With as many of our regular officers concentrated
in this five year group, and with only a limited num-
ber of spaces available for promotion to permanent
colonel, junior officers of this group would be manda-
torily retired as lieuteuant colonel without ever com-
peting for promotion to permanent colonel.
In light of this, a plan was developed in 1953 and
has been in use since 1955 which will assure every
Regular Air Force Officer at least two opportunities
for permanent promotion to colonel before he is man-
datorily retired.
Since the great majority of the eligible officers are
all well qualified for promotion, the board soon real-
izes that in reality, they are selecting the best of the
best qualified.
* * *
In this situation non-selection reflects in no way
upon the individual qualifications of the officers con-
cerned or the Air Force’s continued reliance on and
the need for their services. [Emphasis supplied]
All of the foregoing considerations were included in the
Report to the Secretary of Defense by an advisory group
known as the Cordiner Committee on Professional and
5a
Technical Compensation in 1957. This Committee noted
“the Military Manpower Problem” as follows:
The modern military manpower problem, reduced to
its simplest terms, is one of quality rather than quan-
tity. It is not merely a matter of the total number of
people on hand, but is much more a matter of the level
of competence, skill and experience of those people.
* * * *
(8) As retention of quality military personnel im-
proves, revitalize existing personnel controls and in-
stitute new controls to accomplish the following:
* « * *
A stiffening of the criteria of selection for promo-
tion and retention to insure the retention and ad-
vancement in all grades of only the highly qualified.
* * * *
As an example of the type of problem facing the
Services in this area, there exists within each of the
Services a small group of officers in grades 0-5 and
0-6 for whom this safeguard has served a purpose for
which it was not intended. Having failed of selection
for promotion and being in the sanctuary of this pro-
vision, these officers have not continued to produce
with customary effectiveness. * * *
The Committee, however, is co:.vinced that “quality
attracts quality.” Therefore, a positive requirement
exists for each Service to employ all administrative
and legislative measures now available to them to
separate from active duty the less productive officers
within its officer corps. The Committee recommends
that additional remedial Service legislation should be
sought if found necessary in the establishment of ef-
fective personnel quality controls.
As a result of careful and thorough consideration of
these considerations by Congress, Public Law 86-616, 74
Stat. 386, was enacted, and approved on July 12, 1960. In
relevant part, it provided [Jd. at 395]:
(ay Not more than once in each fiscal year, the
Secretary cf the Army and the Secretary of the Air
Force may convene one or more boards, each consisting
uf at least five officers * * * in a grade above colonel,
to review the records of, and recommend for continua-
tion on the active list, officers * * * in the regular
grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel who have at
6a
least 20 years of service * * * and who have been con-
sidered more than twice but not recommended for pro-
motion to the next regular grade.
(b) A board convened under this section shal! rec-
ommend officers for continuation on the active list in
the number specified by the Secretary. The Secretary
may specify separate numbers for particular cate-
gories of officers. However, except with respect to the
first board * * *, the number specified by him for of-
ficers in any category must be at least 80 percent of
the officers in that category being considered. An offi-
cer may be considered for continuation on the active
list * * * only once while serving in the regular grade
of colonel and only once while serving in the regular
grade of lieutenant colonel.
(c) * * * [I]f the Secretary approves the report of
a board, he shall, not later than the first day of the
seventh * * * month * * * retire each officer who is
considered but not recommended for continuation.
(d) A member * * * retired under this section is
entitled to retired pay * * *.
(e) * * &
(f) This section is not effective after June 30,
1965.
We shall first deal with the legality of the Act itself.
Plaintiffs assert that Section 10 of the Act of 1960 is
unconstitutional and void because it deprives them and
other officers similarly situated of valuable rights without
due process of law; is arbitrary and discriminatory, and
also constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative pow-
ers because no adequate standards are prescribed for the
exercise of administrative discretion in making the deter-
mination by which regular officers are to be continued on
the active list, or to be retired or discharzed.
First we take up plaintiffs’ claim the: they were de-
prived of a vested right without due process of law. The
alleged vested or property right is claimed by plai:.:tiffs on
the basis that they were appointed to permanent grades in
the Air Force, and therefore held by statute, office with
tenures fixed at 28 yeers for lieutenant colonels and 30
years for colonels, with vested rights to remain on duty
for these periods unless retired earlier for physical disabil-
ity or by other existing provision of law. Accordingly,
wen owns 2
Ta
plaintiffs urge that they could not legally be deprived of
these vested rights except by due process of law. Plaintiffs
charge that their removal without hearings, right of cross
examination, confrontation or challenges as authorized un-
der the Act, is a violation of due process and therefore un-
constitutional and void.
The principle is well established and there is no vested
right to Federal employment or to the privileges of retire-
ment thereby. The status of these officers was not a com-
mon law contractual relationship with the Government,
but was created entirely by statute and could be altered or
taken away by statute. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393
(1961). This rule in Bell, supra, although dictum, became
part of the basis for a clear holding by this court in
Charles L. Andrews, et al. v. Uniied States, 175 Ct. Cl.
561 (1966). Plaintiffs there were challenging the validity
of a statute (Uniform Services Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat.
210) which denied them their “right” to compute their re-
tirement pay at 75 percent of present active duty pay. The
statutory right to retirement pay had allegedly vested by
virtue of the fact that plaintiffs had given the Government
the bargained-for consideration, viz., performance in the
Armed Services for the required number of years. Our
court rejected this claim of a vested or contractual right to
any particular amount of retired pay under statute (175
Ct. Cl. at p. 563) :
* * * Under the plaintiffs’ theory, both the 1958 and
the 1963 Acts breach the contract and, therefore, are
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
he difficulty with this position, as defendant points
out, is that there is strong authority for the counter-
proposition that officers have no vested or contractual
right to any particular amount of retired pay. The
general rule has long been that “[a] soldier’s entitle-
ment to pay is dependent upon statutory right * * *
[and not upon] common-law rules governing private
contracts * * *.”
{Citations of authority—see footnote 3 below] And
since the pay of officers in the uniformed services is
’ Bell v. United Stutes, 366 U.S. 393, 401 (1961); Cf Leonard v.
United States, 279 U.S. 40 (1929) ; United States v. McDonald, 128
U.S. 471 (1888); Byrd v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 285 (1945);
Amchanitzky v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 409, cert. denied, 296 U.S.
598 (1935) ; Fulmer v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 141% (1897) ; Magaw
v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 3 (1889) ; Lowry v. McCarl, 79 F. 2d 144
(D.C. Cir. 19385); Heidt v. United States 56 F. 2d 559 (5th Cir.
19382).
silt
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within the exclusive control of Congress, it was free
to limit the benefits of the 1958 active duty pay in-
crease to members on the active duty list.
We hold that this same general rule is applicable to the
present case.
As a further ground for challenge of the constituticnal-
ity of the Act, plaintiffs urge that the Act is unconstitu-
tional because no standards were therein provided for
exercise of the legislative discretion delegated by Congress
to the Secretary of the Air Force to retire the lieutenant
colonels and colonels here involved before completion of
their statutory terms of 28 and 30 years respectively.
The trial commissioner in his findings, which we adopt,
has set forth in detail the full and extensive information
and explanation of the background and purpose of this leg-
islation presented to the Congress by the Cordiner Com-
mittee and the Department of Defense. Extensive hear-
ings were conducted by the appropriate committees of the
Congress, and it is clear that Congress fully understood
the action that it was taking and the consequences thereof
to the officers who could be retired under this legislation.
Whatever the “White Charger” catch name may imply, it
is a misnomer if it implies hasty or ill-considered action
by Congress.
The objective of Bill S. 1795 as finally enacted was made
abundantly clear to the Congress through the reports of
hearings and the Committee reports. The Senate Commit-
tee on Armed Services in its Report No. 571, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., stated:
The basic purpose of this bill is to provide certain
“quality control” authority for the management of
regular officer personnel in the military departments.
2
(p * * ” *
* * * The Bill in effect provides discretionary author-
ity whereby officers in these two grades who failed at
least twice for promotion to permanent rank could be
selectively retired prior to completing the full 28 or
30 years respectively. [p. 2]
9a
BACKGROUND
The proposed legislation stems from the studies and
recommendations of the Cordiner Committee. That
Committee stressed the need for additional authority
for involuntary retirement of officers in the perma-
nent grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, and equiva-
lent ranks, whose performance of duty did not meas-
ure up to the high quality standards required. Fur-
ther, the Committee has urged that in light of the
substantial increases in pay for the higher grades
there should be a corresponding emphasis on measures
to insure that only officers of the highest quality and
potential were promoted to and retained in these high-
er grades. [p. 3] [Emphasis supplied]
~ * * *
It is the view of the Department of Defense that
this legislation does not constitute a breach of faith
with resnect to officers who might consider themselves
adversely affected by its provisions. The military
services over many years have sought and obtained
changes in the laws regarding their personnel policies
with a view toward improving the forces and of meet-
ing changing times and conditions. Changes have been
made over a number of years in both the retirement
systems and the promotion systems in order to meet
the needs of the services. * * * [p. 9]
The House Committee’s Report No. 1406, 86th Congress,
2d Sess., concludes:
Within the framework of existing law, the military
services have been and are now vigorously carrying
out sound, progressive, personnel programs and ad-
ministrative measures designed to make career serv-
ice more attractive and to improve further the qual-
ity of the career officer structure. Measurable prog-
ress has resulted from these programs and every ef-
fort will be continued to consoiidate and improve the
gains already made.
The [sic] remains, however, a need for added flexi-
bility in some of the statutory provisions presently
controlling the promotion, retention, and involuntary
retirement of Regular officers. [p. 16]
With these considerations clearly before the Congress, it
specifically gave the Secretary authority to convene boards
to review the records of and recommend for continuation
10a
on the active list in numbers specified by the Secretary,
colonels or lieutenant colonels who have at least 20 years
of service, and who have been considered more than twice,
but not recommended for promotion to the next higher
grade. However, with respect to the first board, the num-
ber specified by the Secretary for continuation in active
service must be at least 80 percent of the officers in the
category being considered. Such officers could be consid-
ered only once under this section of the Act.
The two leading cases advanced in support of plaintiffs’
contention are Panama Refining Co., et al. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et
al. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The rule in
these cases as to unconstitutional delegation of legislative
standards was not applied in Fahey, Federal Home Loan
Bank Commissioner, et al. v. Mallonee, et al., 332 U.S. 245
(1947), since the Supreme Court found that both cases
were distinguishable on their facts. This case involved a
provision of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1953 that au-
thorized a delegation of legislative discretion to the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board to prescribe by regulation the
terms and conditions under which a conservator may be
appointed for a Federal savings and loan association.
The Supreme Court said in Fahey v. Mallonee, supra, at
p. 249:
* * * This, the District Court held, was unconstitu-
tional delegation of the congressional function. It re-
lied on Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
and Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495.
Both cited cases dealt with delegation of a power to
make federal crimes of acts that never had been such
before and to devise novel rules of law in a field in
which there had been no settled law or custom. The
latter case also involved delegation to private groups
as well as to public authorities. * * *
And at p. 250:
The savings and loan associations with which
§5(d) deals, on the other hand, are created, insured
and aided by the Federal Government. It may be
that explicit standards in the Home Owners’ Loan Act
would have been a desirable assurance of responsible
EL NS SE 9
lla
administration. But the provisions of the statute un-
der attack are not penal provisions as in the case of
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, or United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81. The provi-
sions are regulatory. They do not deal with unprece-
dented economic problems of varied industries; They
deal with a single type of enterprise and with the
problems of insecurity and mismanagement which are
as old as banking enterprise. The remedies which are
authorized are not new ones unknown to existing law
to be invented by the Board in exercise of a lawless
range of power. Banking is one of the longest regu-
lated and most closely supervised of public callings.
It is one in which accumulated experience of super-
visors, acting for many states under various statutes,
has established well-defined practices for the appoint-
ment of conservators, receivers and liquidators. Cor-
porate management is a field, too, in which courts
have experience and many precedents have crystal-
lized into well-known and generally acceptable stand-
ards. A discretion to make regulations to guide su-
pervisory action in such matters may be constitution-
ally permissible while it might not be allowable to au-
thorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the recent case of United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967), the Supreme Court found that a section of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which provided
that when a communist action organization is under a
final order to register, it is unlawful for any member of
the organization “to engage in any employment in any de-
fense facility,” was unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, pointed out
that the area of permissible indefiniteness in Congressional
delegation of authority narrows when criminal sanctions
are invoked and fundamental rights are potentially affected.
However, by way of contrast, he added (Jd. at 274-75]:
Congress ordinarily may delegate power under
broad standards. E.g., Dakota Central Tel. Co. v.
South Dakota, 250 U.S. 168, 188; FPC v. Hope Nat-
ural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591; NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190. No other general rule would be feas-
ible or desirable. Delegation of power under general
directives is an inevitable consequence of our complex
society, with its myriad, ever changing, highly techni-
cal problems. ‘The Constitution has never been re-
garded as denying to the Congress the necessary re-
12a
sources of flexibility and practicality * * * to perform
its function * * *.” Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421; Currin v. Wallace, 806 U.S. 1, 15.
It is generally enough that, in conferring power upon
an appropriate authority, Congress indicate its gen-
eral policy, and act in terms or within a context which
limits the power conferred. See, e.g., Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 373 U.S. 546, 584-585; FCC v. RCA Commu-
nications, Inc. 346 U.S. 86; Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742; Yakus v. United States, supra, 321 US.
at 424; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284
US. 8; FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421; Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470. * * *
We conclude that Congress gave sufficiently specific di-
rectives “within a context which limits the power con-
ferred.” Certainly, the Congressional Committee reports
on the bill set out the basic guidelines and purposes for ad-
ministrative action as to deferred officers who came within
the quality contro] concept.
As a corollary to the assertion of unconstitutionality of
the Act, plaintiffs further assert that the Secretary had
no authority to delegate his own exercise of discretion to
convene selection hoards and specify the number of officers
to be continued on the active list,* whereas the Deputy
Chief of Staff Personnel allegedly performed these func-
tions under delegation and orders from the Secretary. In
this respect, the Act permits [74 Stat. 395]:
“(a) Not more than once in each fiscal year, the
* * * Secretary of the Air Force may convene one or
more boards * * * to review the records of, and rec-
ommend for continuation on the active list, officers of
that component * * *.
“(b) A beard convened under this section shall rec-
ommend officers for continuation on the active list in
the number specified by the Secretary. * * *” [Em-
phasis supplied ]
We conclude that the delegation of authority to the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, to convene the board and
to specify the number of officers to be retained on active
duty was a permissible and valid delegation.
*This is the only challenge to the Secretary’s power to sub-
delegate his authority raised by plaintiffs in their brief. See,
Plaintiffs’ Brief, pp. 28-40.
anil
13 a
The reason for this conclusion is obvious. Congress
could not possibly have intended that every single power
vested in the Secretary of the Air Force be actually ex-
ecuted by him. The multitudinous duties of that office
would necessarily receive scant and superficial attention if
the Secretary were to perform each function of his office
personally. The fact that Congress also authorized an Air
Staff (which includes the Deputy Chief of Staff of Person-
nel) to “furnish professional assistance to the Secretary” °
supports this conclusion. This proposition is applicable
where, as here, the decision to be made, viz., how many of-
ficers are to be continued on the active duty list, is in the
nature of an expert opinion based on the accumulation and
interpretation of many disparate facts peculiarly within
the knowledge of the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of
Personnel. It is this expertise and knowledge upon which
the Secretary relied when he authorized the Deputy Chief
of Staff to make this decision. The “law does not preclude
practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid
of assistants in the department.” NLRB v. Duval Jewelry
Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958). In addition, it should be noted
that the decision was not made by the Deputy in his own
name, but rather in the name of the Secretary. The Sec-
retary, in effect, “ratified” the Deputy’s decision and is-
sued the decision by his own authority. Cf. Wirtz v. At-
lantic States Construction Co., 357 F. 2d 442, 446 (5th
Cir. 1966). We conclude that the sub-delegation of au-
thority from the Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Personnel, was a valid delegation of power.
In further support of its assertion that the Act is un-
constitutional because it fails to prescribe adequate stand-
ards for selecting officers retained or retired, plaintiffs
assert: .
* * * Under the statute, the Secretary, in carrying
out its provisions, could retire mandatorily the young-
est, the oldest, the tallest, the thinnest, or the heaviest
officers, cr all graduates of a particular educational
institution, or those with blue eyes, who had at least
twenty years of service and had been passed over
more than twice for promotion to the next higher
grade. This, we contend, clearly renders the statute
5 Act of Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat. 490; Aug. 6, 1958, Pub.
L, 85-599, §4(h), 72 Stat. 517, 10 U.S.C. § 8082.
l4a
unconstitutional and void. [Plaintiffs’ Exceptions and
Objections to the Commissioner’s Report, p. 31]
The purpose of this Act, as clearly stated by the Cordi-
ner Committee, the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
and the House Committee was to emphasize measures to
insure that only officers of the highest quality and poten-
tial were to be promoted or retained in these higher
grades. To attain these objectives the Congress clearly
envisioned the need for added flexibility in some of the
statutory provisions controlling the promotion, retention
and involuntary retirement of Regular officers, as shown
by the legislative history of the Act.
As a further ground for assertion that the Act is uncon-
stitutional, plaintiffs assert that they were not afforded
the usual constitutional rights of a hearing confrontation
and cross-examination.
The Act provides for alternative types of elimination or
release from duty:
1. The show-cause action; and
2. Project 20-3 proceedings.
The first type of proceeding is used for elimination on
the grounds of misconduct or gross inefficiency, while the
second provides for retirement of officers as a personnel
control measure. It is apparent, in reading the record of
the Congressional hearings, that two types of proceedings
were contemplated by Congress, and there is no question
in reading the provisions of PL 86-616 that two separate
and independent procedures and actions are provided for
in the legislation. The statute contemplates that show-
cause proceedings would involve hearings, counsel, con-
frontation and cross-examination—a full-fledged formal
proceeding. On the other hand, Section 10 of the Act pro-
vides for a summary proceeding. Congress was fully
aware of the distinction between the two procedures, as
the legislative hearings and particularly the Committee re-
ports demonstrate. In the case of Section 10 eliminations,
Congress advisedly made provision for summary proceed-
ings.
The stigma that could have resulted from specific
charges of inefficiency or undesirability was one of the
principal consequences of mandatory retirement by show-
cause procedure which Congress intended to avoid by au-
thorizing the alternative type of proceeding utilized in this
Spices penta baud Ve aa
15a
case. Indeed, as the Deputy Chief of Personnel of the Air
Force said, in reviewing this problem (supra) :
Since the great majority of the eligible officers are
all well qualified for promotion, the board soon real-
izes that in reality, they are selecting the best of the
best qualified. [Emphasis supplied]
In this connection, the recent case of Norbert Chwat v.
United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 392 (1966) is noteworthy.
While this case involved the separation of a Foreign Serv-
ice Officer, it would appear to have equal application to
the instant case. The court stated, at p. 397:
When the plaintiff was “retired” or selected-out
“because he did not measure up to the standards of
his class” and also because the action was being taken
under sections 633 and 634 of the Foreign Service
Act, he was not entitled to a hearing, since none is
provided under sections 633 and 634, * * *
* * * *
[Citing report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Report No. 229, at page 12]:
* * * It should be observed that this section is not
a substitute for the provisions governing separa-
tions for cause. * * * [Emphasis in original. ]
It follows then, that the two methods for separat-
ing officers of the Foreign Service, by selection-out
without a hearing under section 633, and by discharge
after a hearing under section 637, stand on an equal
footing and both methods have the approval of the
Congress * * *. [Emphasis added]
In anticipation of the adoption of the Act, the Secretary,
in April, 1960, convened a Screening Board of general of-
ficers of the Air Force to recommend a minimum-maxi-
mum quota of officers for, continuation on the active list.
After the Act became law, and pursuant to the recommen-
dations of this preliminary Screening Board, the Chief of
Staff, by order of the Secretary, on July 25, 1960, estab-
lished by order a program for controlled retirement of the
officers affected by the Act, known as Project 20-3. This
order contained specific instructions to the first selection
board therein appointed. The instructions provided, in
part:
* * * Using the “Best Qualified” method of selection,
the board shall select and recommend officers for con-
ee $18 2. Pe ee ON ee ee eee ee
16a
tinuation on the active list within the percentages pre-
scribed below:
a. Permanent Colonel: Not less than 55% nor more
than 75% of those considered.
b. Permanent Lieutenant Colonel: Not less than
45% nor more than 65% of those considered.
* * * Within the percentages specified above, the Dep-
uty Chief of Staff, Personnel, shall establish for the
Secretary of the Air Force during the course of the
board, the exact number of officers in each grade to be
selected for continuation * * *,
The Letter of Instructions further stated that “in mak-
ing its selections, the board will be guided by the following
pertinent considerations” :
a. As a result of the rapid expansion of the Regu-
lar Air Force after World War II, officers were pro-
moted to the permanent grade of Colonel with as little
as 14 years of service, to permanent Lieutenant Colo-
nel with as little as 8 years of service.
b. Until the exactment [sic] of the Public Law 86-
616, these officers could serve in the grade of Cclonel
for 16 years and in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel
for 20 years prior to mandatory retirement for serv-
ice.
c. Some of these officers have lost their initiative
and drive; others have been unable to keep pace with
technical and operational advances occurring subse-
quent to World War II.
d. Limitations placed upon the number of officers
who may serve on active duty in the grades of Colonei
and Lieutenant Colonel make it essential that only
highly qualified officers continue toe occupy these
grades if the Air Force is to maintain a quality officer
corps.
e. An officer once considered for continuation or in-
voluntary retirement under Public Law 86-616 may
not again be considered in that same grade.
These instructions were clearly in careful compliance with
the purposes and directives of the Congress in enacting the
statute.
Thereafter, the Selection (Continuation) Board report-
ed that, upon careful consideration of all the records, it
recommended 310 cf 430 Colonels, and 589 of 964 Lieuten-
ant Colonels for continuation, and that those not selected
for continuation should be retired. Plaintiffs were listed
17a
among this latter category. The Board certified that it
carefully reviewed the case of every officer submitted to it
for consideration, and that a majority of the total board
members concurred in the recommendations.
The trial commissioner has summarized the actions and
conduct of the Board as follows:
(a) The Selection (Continuation) Boards of 1961
(Colonels Norman, Crowley, Buckland, Fitzgerald,
and Buckey) and of 1963 (Colonel Martin) were com-
posed of mature senior general officers of varying and
extensive experience in many fields. They contributed
judgment to the task of evaluation.
(b) In addition to the OER’s (officers’ effectiveness
reports), they gave consideration in their evaluations
to commendations, historical records of service, age,
educational background, scope and level of responsi-
bility of assigned position, and demonstrated qualities
of leadership.
(c) * * * these boards did not rely upon IBM card
selections of numerical equivalents of OER’s. While
they did devise and apply a numerical rating system
of their own, they sometimes disregarded the results
shown by it in that some officers were selected for con-
tinuation whose numerical! values were less than those
of some officers who were not selected for continuation.
(d) The significance of the concentration upon
OER’s in findings 14 through 26, relating to individ-
ual plaintiffs in this litigation, stems from the results
of the statistical analysis of the White Charger Pro-
gram to which reference was made in finding 13(a).
In that study, the OER’s of the officers, as individ-
uals and as groups, were reduced to numerical equiva-
lents from which averages were derived. In each of
the individual cases herein considered, the affected oi-
ficer fell into a position below the mean or average
into a relative position vis-a-vis his fellow officers who
were also under consideration to such as extent as to
absolve the decision of the continuation board of seri-
ous question.
* * * =
(b) The Secretary of the Air Force has admin-
istered Project 20-3 in conformity with the authority
granted to him by the Congress. There is no evidence
of arbitrary, capricious, or illegal action by the Secre-
tary in such administration; nor is any action by the
Bh ea oe ik PE ace FON ON a li lca tes Ble hee ee
18a
Secretary or of the screening and selection boards
convened by him lacking in support by substantia!
evidence.
{Commissioner’s Report, pp. 29 and 30]
We concur in these findings as amply supported by the
record. The Board’s failure to select plaintiffs for contin-
uation was not arbitrary, or unsupporied by substantia!
evidence.
In Goldstein v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 228, 130 F.
Supp. 330, cert. denied 350 U.S. 888 (1955), this court
stated, at p. 232:
* * * Nor can this court undertake to grant plaintiff
promotions or assignments which the Army having
jurisdiction over him decided not to make. * * *
In Donnelly v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 120, 134 F.
Supp. 635 (1955), this court stated, at p. 122:
* * * Perhaps it was wrong for the Navy not to have
promoted plaintiff; * * *. Appointment is an execu-
tive function, involving the exercise of executive dis-
cretion. * * * This erurt cannot exercise this function
and in the absence of actual appointment, or facts
equivalent thereto, we cannot award Plaintiff Donnel-
ly compensation zs commissaryman, chief. * * *
See, Chase v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 610 (1962).
In the case of Garrard Johnson v. United States, 150
Ct. Cl. 747, 280 F. 2d 856 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
&82 (1961), this court stated, at p. 751:
We think that the proper exercise cf judicial re-
straint requires this court to decline to intervene in
this matter. Certainly it was no part of the original
act by which Congress created the jurisdiction of this
court to make us the overseer of the military. * * *
We conclude thet Secticn 10 of the Act of 1960, supra,
is a constitutional delegation of discretionary power to the
Secretary of the Air Force within the limitations and pur-
poses of the Act; that his delegation of review to the Selec-
tion or Continuaticn Board was within constitutional limi-
tations, and that the recommendations of the Board and
the action of th< Secretary thereupon were not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law, and are supporte. »y sub-
stantial evidence.
19a
For the above reasons, plaintiffs are not entitled to re-
cover, and their petitions are dismissed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court, having considered the evidence, the report of
Trial Commissioner W. Ney Evans, and the briefs and
argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as foi'ows:
1. (a) The 6 cases in caption are part of a s2ries of
cases, now numbering 15 altogether, wherein former offi-
cers (lieutenant colonels and colonels) of the Air Force
challenge the validity of their retirement under the so-
called White Charger Aci‘ in a program designated by the
Air Force as Project 20-3.?
(b) At the time of the trial of “Norman and Related
Cases,” there were 10 cases in the series. Evidence has
been completed as to the six cases in caption, and the par-
ties have filed their requested findings and briefs. Four
of the 10 cases were deferred because of the pencency in
each of a motion by defendant for summary judgment.
Five cases in the series have been filed since the trial.*
(c) Findings 2-13 and 27-30, below, are relevant to
each of the six cases now repcrted.
2. (a) The term “White Charger Act” is a popular ref-
erence to section 10 of Public “.aw 86-616, approved July
12, 1960 (74 Stat. 386, 395). Fublic Law 86-616 reflected
the enactment of S. 1795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced
in the Senate on April 25, 1959, as permanent legislation
to permit early retirement of not to exceed 20 percent of
officers in the military service in the grade of permanent
colonel and an unlimited number of permanent lieutenant
colonels with 20 years or more of service who had been con-
sidered at least twice but not recommended for promotion.
1The name was derived from an anonymous observation to th:
effect that the legislation went through Congress like a White
Charger. °
2 The “20” refers to years of service; the “3” to “pass-overs”; all
as hereinafter more fuily explained.
’ The four cases deferred are: Charles W. Bicking, No. 306-62;
Clifford A. Dougherty, No. 311-62; Lamont Saxton, No. 314-62; and
Owen F. Clarke, No. 178-64. Defendant’s motions for summary
judgment were subsecucntly denied and amended pleadings (peti-
tions and answers) have been filed.
In the five additional cases, answers to the petitions have been
filed in Walter Eckman, No. 445-65; Georze B. Marvel, Jr., No.
79-66; Harold W. Scruggs, No. 93-€6; and Phil B. Cage, No. 379-
66. Answer had not (at the time of this writing) ben filed in the
case of Samuel H. McKinnon, No. 399-66.
20a
(b) A hearing was held before a subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on June 17,
1959; the bill was reported to the Senate (S. Rep. No.
571) on July 23, 1959, and passed by the Senate on July
27, 1959. Reference to the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives followed on July 28, 1959.
(c) Hearings before the House committee were held on
February 1-4 and March 14-15, 1960. The bill was re-
ported to the House of Representatives (H.R. Rep. No.
1406) on March 17, 1960. The House report presented an
amendment consisting of striking all after the enacting
clause and inserting a new text. As amended, the bill was
considered and passed by the House on March 30, 1960.
The House amendment was accepted by the Senate on June
27, 1960. Approval by the President followed on July 12,
1960,
3. (a) S. 1795, as initially introduced and as ultimately
passed, was the outgrowth of a draft of proposed legisla-
tion submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of De-
fense, as “* * * part of the Department of Defense legis-
lative program for 1959 * * *.”
(b) Following are excerpts from identical covering let-
ters addressed to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on April 20, 1959:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to enable
the Armed Forces to meet more effectively the objec-
tive of a Regular officer corps of the highest quality
in all ranks by (1) more closely relating the retention
of officers after 20 years of service who are serving in
the permanent grades of lieutenant colonel and colo-
nel, commander and captain to the requirements of
the services, including the degree of contribution or
productivity of the officer and the needs of the serv-
ices rather than solely to a “guaranteed” number of
years of service; (2) according increased recognition
and incentive for outstanding ability and competence;
* * * and (4) expediting the separation from the
service of officers who have been twice deferred from
permanent promotion. [Emphasis supplied. ]
* * * ad
It is emphasized that the propo-ed legislation is not
intended to cause, and will not be used for, the invol-
untary removal of Regular officers from the active list
’
2la
solely because of a reduction in the actual or author-
ized personnel strength of the service concerned.
Rather it is intended that the removal of Regular offi-
cers from the active list will continue to be authorized
only for the reasons and under the procedures and
limitations now provided by law for such removal and
as further provided by the proposed legislation. (Em-
phasis supplied. )
4, (a) S. 1795, as initially introduced in the Senate, was
“A Bill To amend title 10, United States Code, to revise
certain provisions relating to the promotion and involun-
tary retirement of officers of the regular components of the
armed forces.” The opening section contained the counter-
part of what became section 10 of Public Law 86-616.
(b) Following is a condensation of pertinent portions
of section 1 of original S. 1795:
(a) Not more than once in each fiscal year, the
Secretary of a military department may convene one
or more boards * * * to review the records of, and
recommend for continuation on the active list, officers
*** in the * * * permanent grades who have at least
20 years of service * * * and who, in the case of offi-
cers of the Army or the Air Force * * * have been
considered at least twice but not recommended for
promotion * * *:
(1) Colonel * * *.
(2) Lieutenant colonel * * *.
~ * a +e
(b) A board convened under this section shall rec-
ommend officers for continuation on the active list in
the number specified by the Secretary. The Secretary
may specify separate numbers for their particular
categories of officers. However, the number specified
by him for officers in any category in the grade of
colonel * * * must he at least 80 percent of the offi-
cers in that category being considered.
(c) * * * if the Secretary approves the report of a
board, he shall * * * retire each officer who is consid-
ered but not recommended for continuation.
cl * a »
(c) At the hearing before the subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Committee on Armed Services, the chairman (Senator
Stennis) observed:
* * * the provisions of * * * two pending items
* * * are similar in that a board procedure is estab-
22a
lished whereby regular lieutenant colonels * * * and
colonels * * * who have twice failed of selection to the
next higher grade may be involuntarily retired prior
to completing the normal years of service for officers
in those twice-failed categories. In the Army and Air
Force a twice-failed lieutenant colonel remains on ac-
tive duty until he has completed 28 years. * * * For
colonels * * * it is 30 years * * *. All officers affected
under both bills would have completed 20 years of
service for retirement purposes.
bad * * a
It should also be pointed out that the authority in
S. 1795 would be used only to retire involuntarily
those officers whose standard of performance would
not justify their continuance on active duty. * * *
(d) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mr. Finu-
cane), in his testimony before the subcommittee, said:
S. 1795 is essentially an officer personnel quality con-
trol measure which when compared to existing law will:
1. Provide for the Army and Air Force a more flex-
ible, less restrictive procedure for involuntary retire-
ment of the least effective officers in the permanent
grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel * * *.
2. Accord increased recognition and incentive for
officers of outstanding ability.
* * * *
The most important provisions of S. 1796 are those
dealing with the selective, involuntary retirement of
certain officers with more than 20 years’ service, who
are in the permanent grades of colonel * * * [and]
lieutenant colonel * * *.
These provisions are limited in application to offi-
cers in the grades I have mentioned because in the low-
er grades in all services the elimination or retirement
of an officer from the active list is already required
by law if the officer is twice “passed over” for perma-
nent promotion * * *, In effect S. 1795 extends that
system on a discretionary basis to the higher grades.
Existing law permits officers in the permanent
grade of colonel * * * to be retained until they have
completed 30 years of service regardless of the num-
ber of times they have been considered but not select-
ed for the next higher grade. Similarly, officers in
the permanent grade of lieutenant colonel * * * are
retained until they have completed 28 years * * * of
onvas ° * °° * ”.
23 a
The intent behind these provisions was to protect
and retain competent officers in those grades who
could not be promoted to the next higher grade be-
cause of lack of vacancies for promotion. The De-
‘partment of Defense believes, however, that these
provisions for retention also operate in some cases
to keep on the active list some officers whose per-
formance in the grades concerned does not equal the
potential expected of them when they were promoted.
* * * *
(e) The Assistant Secretary described the procedure
under S. 1795 as follows:
S. 1795 would augment existing law pertaining to
inivoluntary retirement of officers with more than 20
years’ service by authorizing the service Secretaries
to convene not more than one each fiscal vear, a
board of five general * * * officers, to consider for
continuation on the active Jist. officers in the perma-
nent grade of colonel] or * * * lieutenant colonel * * *
who have failed twice of selection for permanent pro-
motion to the next higher grade. From among the
colonels * * * considered, the board must select for
continuation at least 80 percent. No limitation would
be imposed on the number of officers in the lover
grades who could be involuntarily retired. Any offi-
cer not selected for continuation on active duty would
be retired. (Emphasis supplied.)
ck * * *
(f) The Assistant Secretary also commented on “other
considerations” which are pertinent to these cases:
te * +
Two other imvortant considerations arise in con-
nection with S. 1795 which I believe require expres-
sion of the view of the Department * * *. These are:
1. _Whether its enactment could reasonably be re-
garded as a “breach of faith” to the detriment of
officers now in service, particularly those with more
than 20 vears’ service: and
(2) Whether it would materially lessen the secur-
ity incentive aspect of militarv service so as to dis-
courage voung persons of the desired quality and
potential from undertaking a military career.
We have earnestly considered both these asnects.
It has been concluded that neither of these considera-
tions is sufficient to override the more important
issue at stake; that is, the public interest in an officer
ee Tg we 4“ ited . > ne or
24a
corps composed throughout of persons whose profes-
sional ability and contribution fully meet the high
standards which must apply to the career officer, and
who would make a constant try toward bettering
their professional capabilities and thus further the
working efficiency of the Armed Forces.
Standards can and must be high without being ex-
trete. It is recognized that abilities vary from man
to man and are partly what heredity and environ-
ment have made them. If nature had not imposed a
ceiling, mere striving would make every man a gen-
ius. In battle or comparable emergency, however,
mediocrity in any form cannot be tolerated. It fol-
lows that, if we are to achieve and maintain maxi-
mum defense preparedness in this age of world
tensions, we cannot afford or tolerate any lower
standards of competence than must prevail in war.
* * ok *
(g) The Assistant Secretary concluded:
* * *S. 1795 is a long-range, permanent measure to
— more flexibility in the career management of
egular officers. We believe the changing times and
needs of the military services make this legislation
essential.
At the same time, however, the Department of De-
fense is deeply aware of the need for administering
this bill, if it is enacted into law, in such a way as to
insure continued fair and equitable treatment of any
officer who might be affected by its provisions.
eo * * k
(h) Among the questions put to the Assistant Secretary
and the answers given by him after the completion of his
formal statement before the Senate subcommittee, the fol-
lowing are pertinent:
(1) Senator Stennis. * * * [T]he authority of this
legislation would, of course, permit the involuntary
retirement of officers prior to the completion of the
normal periods of service. Would you mind confirming
for the record the fact that this authority is not meant
to alter the pattern for a normal 30-year career but is
aimed solely at retiring those officers whose perform-
— does not justify their continuation on the active
ist.
I suppose your answer to that is an emphatic “Yes.”
Mr. Finucane. Yes, sir.
Senator Stennis. Now, the charge also be
made that this legislation constitutes a breach of
25a
faith for officers who would be adversely affected and
could normally be expected to serve on active duty for
a longer period. Since this bill only supplements exist-
ing authority, would this charge in any way be true?
Mr. Finucane. No, sir.
(2) Senator Stennis. The involuntary retirement
authority is permissive, and it is my understanding
that only the Air Force intends to make immediate
use of this bill if enacted. * * *
Mr. Finucane. * * * [T]he Air Force has a re-
quirement for this at the moment. * * *
(3) Senator Thurmond. If a Reserve officer fails
of promotion twice when he comes before a board,
then he goes out of the Reserves. There is no such
provision for the Regular services, is there?
Mr. Finucane. Yes, sir. When an officer fails
twice of promotion, up to the grade of lieutenant
colonel, he is eliminated. Under this provision, lieu-
tenant colonels and up to 20 percent of the colonels
* * * or whatever percentage the Secretary agreed
below that could be involuntarily retired * * *.
Senator Thurmond. In other words, under the
present law he is eliminated up to the grade of lieu-
tenant colonel and under the proposed law he would
be eliminated up to the grade * * * of * * * colonel.
Mr. Finucane. Yes, sir; he would not be given
this * * * 28- and 30-year guarantee tour. Colonels
= to 20 percent * * * could be retired before those
ultimate requirements of years of service, but they
would have all had over 20 years of service, so they
would get their pensions and they would have been
passed over twice. * * *
(4) Senator Cannon. * * * [I]f this bill has as
its purpose the elimination of substandard officers,
why can’t they be eliminated under the present law
under show-cause procedure?
Mr. Finucane. This is not * * * necessarily an_
elimination of officers that would be subject to a
show-cause procedure. This is a carrying on of a
program of last year’s pay increase that we were
going to have an officer proficiency arrangement
where you could, if you wanted to, eliminate some
of your weak officers without “showing cause.”
In other words, between all humans there is a de-
gree of effectiveness and when you get into a show-
cause, you are inferring, at least, that the man has
done something wrong. This is not aimed at that at
all. The mere fact that he has been passed over twice
26a
indicates that he probably is not quite as good as
somebody else who was not passed over.
(5) Senator Thurmond, * * * [Is the main pur-
pose of this bill to eliminate officers of the grade now
of lieutenant colonel and colonel] * * * in order to
make way for other officers to give an incentive be-
cause you have a larger proportion within those grades
than any others and it is stymieing promotions?
Mr. Finucane. No. * * * The essential reason for
this bill is to give the services a vehicle to remove
the officer who has slowed up because he knows he
cannot be touched until he completes 30 years.
In other words, this gives 2 quality contro] of the
people that are now in what is known in the services
as the “sanctuary.”
5. (a) The Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
ate reported S. 1795 favorably, with minor amendments,
one of which required that at least 80 percent of the twice-
failed lieutenant colonels (as well as colonels) considered
by a particular board should be continued on the active
list. The Senate passed the bill as reported.
(b) Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives began hearings
on S. 1795 on February 1, 1960. Following are excerpts
from the opening statement of the chairman of the sub-
committee:
The purpose of S. 1795, as amended by the Senate,
is to establish an additional method by which regular
officers in the armed services in the grade of colonel
and lieutenant colonel * * * may be involuntarily
retired.
* * * [Whhile this bill applies to all four services,
it is realy an Air Force measure since none of the
other three services intend to use the authority con-
tained in the proposal for the present.
* * * *
At present, permanent lieutenant colonels in the
Air Force are being twice failed to the next higher’
permanent grade of colonel at an average of 20 years
of service. The second failure for permanent promo-
tion to brigadier ogee by colonels in the Air Force
occurs in about the 25th year of service.
Under the proposed legislation, as amended, the
Secretary of each service would be given the author-
ity to convene boards to involuntarily retire twice
failed lieutenant colonels and colonels * * *. How-
ever, the board may only select for involuntary re-
v
roe HRS
27 a
tirement a maximum of 20 percent of the twice
failed officers in each grade.
* * * [Tthe basic purpose of the iegislation is to
eliminate, through a board selection process, certain
Reeular officers in the grade of colonel and lieutenant
colonel who cannot perform their duties in a manner
commensurate with the responsibilities of the grades
in which they are now serving, under today’s stand-
ards.
= 2 * *
* * * [There is a present method by which officers
can be involuntarily retired under a “show cause”
procedure.
# 2 # a
This “show cause” procedure will not be eliminated
by this proposal.
# 2 = *
The Department of Defense, however, takes the
position that the show cause procedure is not effec-
tive in reaching the marginal officer that this bill is
intended to reach.
- No officer will be retired under this bill who is not
qualified for retirement pay.
* * = &
(c) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mr. Finu-
cane) appeared before the House subcommittee and pre-
sented a prepared statement quite similar to his state-
ment before the Senate subcommittee. Following are
excerpts from the questioning of the Assistant Secretary
by members of the subcommittee:
(1) Mr. Kilday. * * * [Y]ou call this a continu-
ation board. You select the board to determine those
lieutenant colonels and colonels who shall be contin-
ued in the service. Of course, that results in the
selection of those who are to be eliminated.
Secretary Finucane, That is correct.
(2) Mr. Hardy. * * * [T]he officers currently on
duty who would be affected by this wouldn’t be so
happy about it; is that right?
Secretary Finucane. * * * [T]he person who is
going to be involuntarily eliminated through this
process is going to be disappointed to a certain de-
gree.
x * & €
28 a
Mr. Hardy. * * * [{I)f you impose this, aren’t you
taking away something that he already has?
Secretary Finucane. * * * |Wije are taking away
something that he has if he feels that he was going to
just hang on until the bitter end. * * *
Mr. Hardy. You are taking away a period of ac-
tive service to any of those who are plucked out.
Secretary Finucane. That is right, and the ones
that are plucked out are the least desirable officers
and we think in the interest of the service that we
should do that.
Mr. Hardy. So aren't you in effect stigmatizing
them? * * *
Secretary Finucane. * * * [T jhe word “stigmatiz-
ing” desires some analysis.
Anybody that gets to be a colonel or a captain has
performed a very significant career pattern. He has
been. through some very, very difficult and strict se-
lection boards up to that time, and, indeed, he has
equipped and qualified himself very well. I personal-
ly have always felt and feel that any man who makes
that grade and retires has very honorably discharged
his duties, unless he is relieved for cause.
And this is the very heart of this bill. There is
nobody here relieved—nobody is accused of anything.
Now, in the present system of eliminating lesser
officers by board action, they are in fact removed for
cause. So we think that this is an excellent quality
control, something that is going to do the services a
great deal of good, without the radical semoval of of-
ficers that we were forced to take in the Navy hump
bill. There are fairly few officers involved here, Mr.
Hardy.
(3) Mr. Osmers. * * * |WJould you say that the
main purpose of this legislation was to create spaces
for younger officers or to improve the quality of this
top group?
Secretary Finucane. It is our hope to use this per-
missive legislation, if passed, very sparingly to elimi-
nate only the very bottom in these grades. It is a posi-
tive action. It is not done to make vacancies, It is not
done to reduce the size of the services. It is not done
even to have fewer officers. It is done to help us, to
give us a vehicle for eliminating some of our weakest
officers in these grades, where they are now protected
against comnetition by the so-called sanctuary.
(d) Upon the completion of the testimony of the As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, civilian officials and ranking
officers of the Air Force testified at length before the
29a
House subcommittee, explaining in detail] the situation of
the Air Force and justifying the need for the proposed
legislation.
(e) Similarly, civilian officials and ranking officers of
the Army and the Navy appeared before the subcommit-
tee to explain facets of S. 1795 other than the mandatory
retirement provisions.
(f) As a consequence of the extensive testimony prc-
sented to the House subcommittee, the bill was rewritten
and regrouped, resulting in the mandatory retirement
provisions here pertinent being pla ed in section 10 in-
stead of s ction 1 as originally dratted.
6. (a) The Committee on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives reported favorably the amended bill
which, as heretofore noted, was passed by the House on
March 30, 1960, accepted by the Senate on June 27, 1960,
and approved by the President on July 12, 1960.
(b) Following is an abstract of section 10 of Public
Law 86-616 (74 Stat. 395):
* * * (a) Not more than once in each fiscal year,
the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the
Air Force may convene one or more boards, each
consisting of at least five officers * * * in a grade
above colonel, to review the records of, and recom-
mend for continuation on the active list, officers * * *
in the regular grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel
who have at least 20 years of service * * * and who
have been considered more than twice but not recom-
mended for promotion to the next higher regular grade.
(b) A board convened under this section sliall rec-
ommend officers for continuation on the active list
in the number specified by the Secretary. The Secre-
tary may specify separate numbers for particular
categories of officers. However, except with respect
to the first board * * *, the number specified by him
for officers in any category must be at least 80 per-
cent of the officers in that category being considered.
An officer may be considered for continuation on the
active list * * * only once while serving in the regu-
lar grade of colonel and only once while serving in
the regular grade of lieutenant colonel.
(c) * * * [I)f the Secretary approves the report
of a board, he shall, not later than the first day of
the seventh * * * month * * * retire each officer who
is considered but not recommended for continuation.
(2) A member * * * retired under this section is
entitled to retired pay * * *.
S0a
= *,
“ak This section is not effective after June 30,
(¢) By comparison of the foregoing text with the text
of section 1 of the original bill as summarized in finding
4(b), the following changes are noteworthy:
(1) The law as enacted was limited to the Army and
the Air Force, whereas the original bill gave similar au-
thority to the Secretary of a military department.
(2) The law as enacted authorized the retirement of
officers “who have been considered more than twice but
not récommended,” whereas the original bill applied to
officers “who have been considered at least twice but not
recommended.”
(3) The law as enacted required that “except with re-
spect to the first board, * * * the number specified * * *
[for continuation] must be at least 80 percent * * *”
whereas the original bill required continuation of 80 per-
cent of the colonels but placed no limitation on the num-
ber of lieutenant colonels.
(4) The law as enacted was limited te June 30, 1965,
wherexs the original bill was proposed as permanent leg-
islation,
7. (a) During World War IT, the number of officers
on active duty with the Army Air Corps (predecessor of
the Air Force) was expanded some 125 times, from a
nucleus of 3,000 (1,400 Regular; 1,600 Reserve) to 375,-
000. Of course, the great majority of these were Reserve
officers. After the war, the Regular officer strength was
fixed at 23,000; and shortly after the creation of the Air
Force in 1947,‘ the officer strength was raised (in 1948)
to 48,000.
(b) The expansion of the Regular officer corps from
1,400 officers (upon United States entry into the war)
to some 28,000 Regular officers (after the war) was ac-
complished by means of selections" from officers who had
served in the war. The officers so selected were promoted
quite rapidly from the lower grades to the higher grades
for the purpose of staffing the higher grades. This proc-
ess was reneated in 1948, by what has been described as
* By the National Security Act of 1947, approved July 26, 1947,
61 Stat. 495, 502-03.
5 The selections were made by selection boards from applicants for
Regular commissions,
3la
a “one-shot adjustment” of the officers then in the Regu-
lar force to higher permanent grades, in order to align
and distribute the officers in the higher graces.
(c) Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, i:
1950, the overall officer strength of the Air Force was
again increased to 130,000, the approximate level at which
it has since remained. The Regular officer authorized
strength was fixed in 1956 at approximately 69,090,
(d) As a result of these programs, officers were pro-
moted to the grade of colone! with 12 or 13 years of serv-
ice, 10 years before thev would have reached that grade
in the Army or Navy. The Air Force thus made senior
officers of men who were junior in age to the senior offi-
cers of the other services. With promotions thereafter
limited, these Air Force senior officers were ‘n line for
many years of service in their attained rank with limited |
prospects of promotion to the next higher permanent grade.
(e) In April 1956, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel
of the Air Force, commented on this situation in o state-
ment published in the Air Force Personnel News Letter.
The 1946 and 1947 intecration program increased
the Regular Officer corps to 17,500, * * *
As a result, the age and experience of 12,000 of
our Regular officers is concentrated in the five vear
bracket of officers commissioned from 1941 through
1945.
* * * *
With as many of our regular officers concentrated
in this five year groun, and with onlv a limited num-
ber of spaces available for promotion to permanent
colonel, junior officers of this group would be manda-
torily retired as lieutenant colonel without ever com-
peting for promotion to permanent colonel.
In light of this, a plan was developed in 1953 and
has been in use since 1955 which will assure every
Regular Air Force Officer at least two opportunities
for permanent promotion to colonel before he is man-
datorily retired.
bd * * *
Since the great majority of the eligible officers are
all well qualified for promotion, the board soon real-
izes that in reality, they are selecting the best of
the best qualified.
*
* x *
} SMR pa aR Peet i pain Am ot ato
32a
In this situation non-selection reflects in no way
upon the individual qualifications of the officers con-
cerned or the Air Force’s continued reliance on and
the need for their services.
(f) At about this same time (during the middle
1950's), there were expressions of concern by responsible
officials of the Air Force, relative to the quality of some
of the officers then serving in the Regular Air Force in
the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel. These ex-
pressions were founded on the impression that some such
officers, having been integrated into the Regular Air
Force, were not performing in the manner desired and
expected of senior officers.
(g) Under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947,° lieuten-
ant colonels could expect to continue to serve until they
had completed 28 years of service; and colonels could
expect to continue to serve until (hey had completed 30
years of service. Critics of the sitvation considered ex-
isting law to provide a sanctuary for officers whose per-
formance was not what the critics thought it should be.
(h) The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 provided’ man-
datory elimination (by separation or retirement) of ‘“de-
ferred officers” of the Army of the grade of first lieuten-
ant, captain, or major who failed of selection for promo-
tion under stated standards.
(i) The only method then available for the elimination
of officers of the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel
was by means of a demonstrated deficiency in perform-
ance of such degree as to warrant elimination through
show cause procedures. Critics of the Air Force situation
in the middle and late 1950’s believed that the show cause
procedures had not been effective in eliminating officers
solely upon the basis of inadequate performance; that the
show cause procedures were being utilized only in gross
cases of very serious inefficiency, or in cases involving
misconduct which, while unrelated to charges of ineffi-
ciency, had the colerable effect of stigmatizing any officer
subjected to the show cause procedure,
* Approved August 7, 1947, 61 Stat. 795.
"In section 509, 61 Stat. 894, 896.
33 a
(j) In May 1957, the Cordiner Committee, in its Re-
port for the Secretary on Professional and Technical
Compensation, noted the “Military Manpower Problem”:
The modern military manpower problem, reduced
te its simplest terms, is one of quality rather than
quantity. It is not merely a matter uf the total num-
ber of people on hand, but is much more a matter |
of the level of competezice, skill and experience of :
those people. |
* * * *
(8) As retention of quality military personnel] im-
proves, revitalize existing personnel controls and in-
stitute new controls to accomplish the following:
*
* * *
A stiffening of the criteria of seliction for promo-
tion and retention to insure the retention and ad- |
vancement in all grades of only the highly qualified. |
* * * *
As an example of the type of problem facing the
Services in this area, there exists within each of the
Services a small group of officers in grades 0-5 and
0-6 for whom this safeguard has served a purpose
for which it was not intended. Having failed of se-
lection for promotion and being in the sanctuary of
this provision, these officers have not continued to
produce with customary effectiveness. * * *
The Committee, however, is convinced that “qual-
ity attracts quality.” Therefore, a positive require-
ment exists for cach Service to employ ali adminis-
trative and legislative measures now available to them
to separate from active duty the less productive offi-
cers within its officer corps. The Committee recom-
mends that additional remedial Service legislation
should be sought if found necessary in the establish-
ment of effective personnel quality controls.
(k) The legislative proposal which culminated in sec-
tion 10 of Public Law 86-616 was founded on the fore-
going considerations.
8. (a) On April 19, 1960, in anticipation of the enact-
ment of the White Charger legislation, a Screening Board
of six general officers of the Air Force was convened to
recommend a minimum-maximum quota of officers for
continuation on the active list. The board was given and
duly reviewed a sample set of records, selected at random,
34a
representing approximately one-third (71) of some 215
permanent colonels and one-third (173) of 552 permanent
lieutenant colonels who would become eligible for consid-
eration under the legislation.
(b) The Screening Board was informed that:
The law, if enacted in its present form, will allow
100°% of the officers considered by the first [Central
or Selection] board to be retired involuntarily. For
subsequent boards the law specifies that at least 80°
of those considered must be continued on active duty.
In each case, however, the law requires that the Sec-
retary of the Air Force specify the exact number to
be continued on active duty.
The purpose for which the initial Screening Board was
convened was to recommend quotas for the first selection
board.
(ec) The Screening Board recommended that “the Air
Force should establish the following selection quotas * * *:”
a. Permanent colonels—select for continuation on
active duty not more than 75°-, but at least 55°% of
those considered.
b. Permanent lieutenant colonels—select for con-
tinuation on active duty not more than 65%, but at
least 45% of those considered.
(d) The Screening Board reported that “in making
the foregoing recommendations the board was guided by
the foilowing pertinent considerations :”
a. Although 100° of the eligibles may be selected
for involuntary retirement by the first board con-
vened under this Law, the Secretary of the Air Force
must specify the exact number to be retained by the
board.
b. The Letter of Instructions to the Central Board
will, within any minimum-maximum limits estab-
lished, delegate to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Per-
sonnel, authority to specify for the Secretary of the
Air Force the exact number in each group to be con-
tinued on active duty, based upon the findings and
recommendations of the Central Board.
e. * & &
d. The “Best Qualified” method of selection will
be used by the Central Selection Board. * * *
9. On July 25, 1960 (13 days after the approval of
Public Law 86-616), the Department of the Air Force in
tN RS DSR
35 a
a letter to all commands advised that the program for
the controlled retirement of officers affected by the legis-
lation would be known as Project 20-3; that the initial
Project 20-3 board would be convened in headquarters on
or about November 14, 1960; that officers to be considered
by the board wouid include permanent colonels with per-
manent date of rank of 1953 or earlier, ard permanent
lieutenant colonels with permanent date of rank of 1950
or earlier; and that the letter should be disseminated to
all subordinate commands and brought immediately to the
attention of all interested officers.
10. (a) On November 8, 1960, the Letter of Instruc-
tions was issued by the Office of the Chief of Staff “by
order of the Secretary of the Air Force” appointing “a
selection board designated Regular Colonel and Lieuten-
ant Colonel Continuation Board FY-1961” consisting of
10 general officers, to convene at headquarters on or about
November 14, 1960.
_ (b) Following are pertinent excerpts from the Letter
of Instructions:
# en See ee 7
* * * The purpose of the board is to select Regu-
lar Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels of the Line for
continuation on active dutv from among those officers
who have failed of selection for promotion to the next
higher permanent grade five or more times «and three
or more times, respectively.
* * * The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, shall
furnish the board with the names and records of the
* * * officers for consideration [giving specific limits
on the promotion lists].
* * * Using the “Best Qualified” method of selec-
tion, the board shall select and recommend officers
for continuation on the active list within the per-
centages prescribed below:
a. Permanent Colonel: Not less than 55% nor ‘
more than 75% of those considered.
b. Permanent Lieutenant Colonel: Not less than
45% nor more than 65% of those considered.
* * * Within the percentages specified above, the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, shall establish for
the Secretary of the Air Force during the course of
the board, the exact number of officers in each grade
to be selected for continuation * * *.
TEMPTS BEIGE. TR ALON POLE LLY NE PLE Bi Pe eT BE PTR II AY HN BIRT I DAE NANNERL PBT IETS LOE ED NILE IT S
i OI PAOD RN ee!
a AD Sella Bt ats Met Pack acuta
36a
(c) The Letter of Instructions further stated that “in
making its selections, the board will be guided by the
following pertinent considerations :”
a. Asa result of the rapid expansior. of the Regu-
lar Air Force after World War II, officers were pro-
moted to the permanent grade of Colonel with as
little as 14 years of service, to permanent Lieutenant
Colonei with as little as 8 years of service.
b. Until the exactment [sic] of Public Law 86-
616, these officers could serve in the grade of Colonel
for 16 years and in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel
for 20 years prior to mandatory retirement for service.
c. Some of these officers have lost their initiative
and drive; others have been unable te keep pace with
technical and operational advances occurring subse-
quent to World War II.
d. Limitations placed upon the number of officers
who may serve on active duty in the grades of Colonel
and Lieutenant Colonel make it essential that only
highly qualified officers continue to occupy these grades
if the Air Force is to maintain a quality officer corps.
e. An officer oncz considered for continuation or
involuntary retirement under Public Law 86-616 may
not again be considered in that same grade.
(d) With respect to the report to be made by the se-
lection board, the Letter of Instructions specified:
* * * The Report of the Board shall be addressed
to the Secretary of the Air Force. It shall contain
the names of the officers selected and recommended
for continuation on active duty by the board, listed
in order of permanent grade seniority separately for
Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, and those selected
for involuntary retirement listed in a similar manner.
* * * The Report ef the Board shall be signed by
all members and shall certify that:
a. The board has carefully reviewed the record of
every officer submitted to it for consideration.
b. Voting was conducted by secret ballot.
ce. A majority of the total voting membership of
the board concurs in the recommendations thereof.
11. (a) The Selection (Continuation) Board reported
to the Secretary of the Air Force on December 14, 1960
(1) that it had convened on November 14, 1960, and was
in session during November 14-18 and on December 14,
1960; (2) that the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, had
37 4
furnished the board with the names and records of eligi-
ble officers to be considered for continuation, being 430
permanent colonels and 964 permenent lieutenant cclo-
nels; (3) that the Deputy Chief oi Staff, Personnel, had
instructed the board, “in accordance with paragraph 6
of the Letter Order, to select for continuation not less
than the number of officers specified in Exhibit ‘B’”
(wherein the board was advised that it might select for
continuation 310 colonels and 589 lieutenant colonels) ;
(4) that the board had “carefully considered all records
made available to it * * *”’; and (5) that of the 430
permanent colonels, the board selected 310 for continua-
tion; and that of the 964 permanent lieutenant colonels,
the board selected 589 for continuation.
(b) The board recommended that:
a. The 310 permanent Colonels selected for con-
tinuation *:* * be continued on the active list * * *.
b. The 589 permanent Lieutenant Colonels selected
for continuation * * * be continued on the active
de aN
ec. The 120 permanent Colonels, not selected for
continuation * * * be retired.
d. The 375 permanent Lieutenant Colonels, not
selected for continuation * * * be retired.
In each instance, the officers were listed by name in
separate attachments which are not in evidence.
(c) The board further certified that:
a. It has carefully reviewed the case of every offi-
cer submitted to it fox consideration.
b. Voting was conducted by secret ballot.
e. A majority of the total board membership con-
curs in the recommendations.
12. (a) The identity of the members of the Selection
(Continuation) Board was not made known to the officers
who were considered by it.
(b) Such officers were not given opportunity (1) to
challenge the membership of the board, (2) to appear
personally before the board, or (3) to present evidence
in their own behalf.
13. (a) While no member of the Selection (Continua-
tion) Board testified at the trial as to the board’s delib-
erations, the Chief of the Personne; Branch of the Direc-
38 a
torate of (Air Force) Personne] Planning made a statis-
tical study of the White Charger Program for Fiscal
Years 1961 and 19¢3 (covering the period here pertinent)
and testified concerning it.
(b) This witness explained the use of Officer Effective-
ness Reports (hereinafter OER’s) and the use of Overall
Numerical Equivalents assigned thereto. Three separate
OER forms were cited: one in use from November 1953
through May 1958; one in use from June 1958 through
September 1960; and one adopted in October 1960. Each
form had designations of five or more categories with
numerical equivalents from 0 through 9 assigned to the
various categori“s.
(c) Following is a breakdown of AF Form 77, of No-
vember 1953: Mamertoal
Category Equivalents
Unsatisfactory _.__. TE ETE RE. 0
An acceptable officer ...§. .. ............... me a _ 2
A dependable and typically effective officer a
A very fine officer of great value to the service nn. 6-7-8
One of the very few outstanding officers I know .. __....... 9
(d) Following is a breakdown of AF Form 177, of
June 1958:
Numerical
Category Equivalents
Se in SoM PES 5 Se RS Eee COREE EIEN 0
Marginal ______.. "Siete than 97 ED, Prada OT Dee 1
An acceptable officer aida baikcaticoniiocedies 2
A dependable and typically effective officer. .... 8-4-5
A very fine officer of great value to the service aa . 6-7-8
One of the very few outstanding officers I know 9
(e) Following is a breakdown of AF Form 707, of
October 1960:
Numerical
Category Equivalents
NE AE ES A eS OE COPE Ae 0
Sl RR A Na ee OO SeenON ec AEN OI 1
Below average . pO ae Re Rn OLS RE IN OR De 2
Slightly below average. NT OC De COE RPT 3
EE SSS ES OL
Effectiveness well above most - BER F A RBar MOTOS SON 6
Excellent, seldom equaled __. its INTENT Aes Oa SC 7
Outstanding, almost never equaled ane scaloaieacietihasak oceania 8
Absolutely superior _. so 9
(f) Comparison of ‘the ‘foregoin; “breakdowns ‘reverls
that an officer rated in 1953 as dependable and typically
effective might have been rated in 1960 as either slightly
39 a
below average or as effective and competent, while a very
fine officer of great value to the service in 1953 might
have emerged in 1960 with either effectiveness well above
most or as outstanding, almost never equaled, depending
in each instance upon the numerical equivalent.
(g) The evidence is unclear as to the extent (if any)
to which numerical equivalents, as above cited, were be-
fore the selection board. The testimony is emphatic that
the selection board did not content itself with IBM card
selections of numerical equivalents of OER’s. The sig-
nificance of the items and figures recited in this finding
is therefore limited to a single fact: viz, that during the
period 1954 to 1960 there was a continuing vise in OER
averages “which [rise] amounted during that period to
approximately one full block in the overall rating scale.” *
(h) This inflation of the rating average lies at the
heart of the complaint of every officer involved in this
litigation.
RoscoE L. NORMAN
14. Roscoe L. Norman, plaintiff in Case No. 295-62,
seeks by his action to recover the difference between the
active duty pay he would have received if he had not been
retired under the White Charger Act and the retired pay
he has received since July 31, 1961, the date of his re-
tirement under that Act. As to him the parties have
stipulated the facts set forth below in findings 15 and 16.
15. (a) Colonel Norman enlisted in the Enlisted Re-
serve Corps of the United States on 16 July 1937,° and
was honorably discharged 31 August 1937, to accept a
commission as second lieutenant. He accepted an appoint-
ment as second lieutenant, Infantry Reserve, on 1 Septem-
ber 1937, and served on active duty for the periods 1
June 1938, to 30 November 1939, and from 16 June 1949,
to 29 June 1940.
(b) He was ordered to extended active duty on 28
® For example, the average OER rating of all lieutenant colonels
in 1954 was a fraction below 7; in 1960 that average was 8. The
average OER rating for colonels in 1954 was approximately 7.25; by
1960 it was better than 8.25. Numericai ratings of 8 or better
signified very high quality overall, and few officers could have
fallen far belew since there was only one more block (vr portion
thereof—fror: 8 to 9) to pull up the overall average.
® He was then 21 years of age. He was born 1 October 1915, at
Rochester, Indiana. He is a citizen of the United States, a resident
of Indiana, residing temporarily in Puerto Rico.
Romie Bt ened A ae b+ OR Blok
40a
August 1940, and continued on active duty in the Armed
Forces until 31 July 1961, when he was retired in the grade
of lieutenant colonel under the provisions of section 10,
Public Law 86-616, and advanced to the grade of colonel
pursuant to section 8968, title 10, United States Code.
(c) Because of satisfactory service, he was promoted
from time to time until he reached the rank of permanent
lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force on 21
April 1951, and temporary colonel on 1 January 1958, in
which grade he was serving when retired. His total pro-
motion list service at retirement was 24 years and 17 days.
(d) During hic service as an Air Force officer, Colonel
Norman was described in the efficiency and effectiveness
reports submitted by the officers under whom he served
as a “Very Fine Officer of Great Value to the Service.”
Some of such reports contained commendatory remarks
describing him as a highly qualified officer technically,
whose duty was performed with a high degree of effec-
tiveness, one of the better and more effective comptrollers
in the Air Force, an officer capable of handling positions
of greater responsibility, a “top-notch” officer, and one
who should be promoted in advance of his contemporaries.
He received an Air Force Commendation Medal and a
citation for meritorious service for the period 1 April
1956, to 23 January 1960. Fifteen letters of appreciation ~
and commendation are or should be [sic] ir his 201 file.
16. (a) Prior to and through the year 1958 and there-
after the Department of the Air Force sought authority
from the Congress for the elimination by mandatory re-
tirement or discharge of deficient, unsatisfactory, margi-
nally effective, and substandard Air Force officers. By
representations and statements to the Congress that the
purpose of such proposed legislation was not the creation
of vacancies fur the promotion of junior officers, but the
elimination of ineffective, inefficient, unsatisfactory, and
substandard officers for the betterment and improvement
uf the service, the Air Force procured enactment of the
Act of 12 July 1960.
(b) The names and grades of the members of the
board of officers convened by Air Force letter dated 8
November 1960, under section 10 of said Act were with-
4la
held from Colonel Norman, although demand for that
information was duly made. He also made a due and
timely application in writing on 14 February 1961, to
the Secretary of the Air Force for a statement of the
reasons for identifying him as an officer to be retired,
but that information was not furnished, for the stated
reason that such cause for not selecting him for reten-
tion on active duty is “known only to the composite mem-
bership” of the selection board.
(c) When the Act of 12 July 1960, was enacted there
were about 1,000 Regular Air Force lieutenant colonels
who had been passed over for promotion more than twice
witnout being promoted and who had 20 or more years
of promotion list service to their credit.
(d) Colone! Norman was not permitted to challenge
or cross-examine members of the boards convened pur-
suant to the Act of 12 July 1960, and was not granted
any hearing or opportunity to show cause for retention
on the active list of the Air Force.
(e) Colone: Norman was first considered for promotion
to the grade of colonel Regular Air Force by the selection
board in 1956 and was not so selected. He was again so
considered by each succeeding annual selection board, in-
cluding the board of June 12, 1961, and was not selected
for promotion to the grade of permanent colonel.
(f) On 30 January 1961, the Director of Military
Personnel, Headquarters, Air Defense Command, United
States Air Force, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, notified Colonel Norman in writing that he had
been considered but not recommended for continuation
on the active list and that he would be retired not later
than 31 July 1961.
(g) Similar letters were written by the respective
Major Command headquarters to each officer who had
been considered but not recommended for continuation on
the active list, notifying him of this fact and that he
would be retired not later than 31 July 1961.
JOHN E, CROWLEY
17. John E. Crowley, plaintiff in Case No. 321-62,
seeks by his action to recover the difference between the
active duty pay he would have received if he had not been
a.
SR hint icra 8S OP a ime Ae etceee ae .
42a
retired under the White Charger Act and the retired pay
he has received since July 31, 1961, the date of his re-
tirement under that Act.
18. (a) Colonel Crowley was appointed a second lieu-
tenant in the Quartermaster Reserve Corps, United States
Army, on December 27, 1939,'° accepted the appointment
on January 13, 1940, was ordered to extended active
duty on March 27, 1941, and served continuously on ac-
tive duty until July 31, 1961. He was promoted from
time to time until he reached the rank of permanent
lieutenant colonel in the Regular Air Force on October 20,
1950, and temporary colonel on August 16, 1951, in which
grade he was serving when he was retired.
(b) For the period of service from December 27, 1951,
to July 31, 1960, 10 effectiveness reports, all on Air
Force Form 77, were made by officers under whom he
served. In nine of such reports his overall rating was
“A Very Fine Officer of Great Value to the Service,” and
the remaining report, March 1 to July 30, 1960, gave him
the highest rating, viz, “One of the Very Few Outstand-
ing Officers I Know.” He was granted the following
awards: Pre-Peari Harbor Medal; two Commendation
Medals; World War II Victory Medal.
(c) Colonel Crowley was first considered for promo-
tion to the grade of colonel in the Regular Air Force in
1955 and was not selected. He was again so considered
by each succeeding annual promotion board, including
the board of June 12, 1961, and was not selected for
promotion to the grade of permanent colonel.
(d) By stipulation of the parties, the facts recited in
findings 16(a), 16(c), and 16(d), above, in relation to
Colonel Norman, have been adopted an.. made applicable
to the case of Colonel Crowley.
SHERWOOD IE. BUCKLAND
19. Sherwood E. Buckland, plaintiff in Case No. 356-
62, seeks by his action to recover the difference between
the active duty pay he would have received if he had not
10 A native of Massachusetts, born in Boston on June 1, 1911, he
was then 28 years old.
43a
been retired under the White Charger Act and the retired
pay he has received since July 31, 1961, the date of his
retirement under that Act.
20. (a) Colonel Buckland received bachelor of science
degrees from New York University in 1934 and from the
United States Military Academy in 1938." He was ap-
pointed second lieutenant in the Coast Artillery Corps of
the Army on 14 June 1938, and first lieutenant on 14
June 1941. He continued on active duty from 14 June
1938, until 31 July 1961, when he was retired under the
White Charger Act.
(b) He reached the rank of temporary colonel in the
Air Force on 18 June 1945, and permanent colonel on
23 June 1952, the grade in which he was serving when
he was retired.
(c) Since his promotion to colonel, his effectiveness re-
ports characterized him most often as “A Very Fine
Officer of Great Value to the Service,” once as “One of the
Very Few Outstanding Officers I Know,” and once as
“A Dependable and Typically Effective Officer.” He was
awarded the National Defense Service Medal] and the Air
Force Longevity Award with 4 bronze leaf oak clusters.
(d) Colonel Buckland was first considered for promo-
tion to the grade of brigadier general in 1955 and was |
again considered by each annual board, but was never
selected for promotion.
(e) By stipulation of the parties, the facts recited
in findings 16(a), 16(c), and 16(d), above, in relation
to Colonel Norman, have been adopted and made applica-
ble to the case of Colonel Buckland.
MAURICE J. FITZGERALD
21. Maurice J. Fitzgerald, plaintiff in Case No. 256-
64, seeks by his action to recover the difference between
the active duty pay he would have received if he had not
been retired under the White Charger Act and the retired
pay he has received since July 31, 1961, the date of his
retirement under that Act.
22. (a) Colonel Fitzgerald enlisted in the Regular
Army on October 13, 1937, and was commissioned a
second lieutenant in the Air Reserve in 1938. He reached
11 A native of New York, he was then 25 years of age.
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44a
the grade of permanent lieutenant colonel in the Regular
Air Force on April 12, 1951, and was serving in that
grade at the time of his retirement.
(b) Fifteen effectiveness reports made during the peri-
od from January 1, 1952, to July 31, 1961, gave him 12
overall evaluations as “A Very Fine Officer of Great
Value to the Service,” 2 evaluations of “Effectiveness
Well Above Most Officers,” and 1 rating as “A Dependa-
ble and Typieslly Effective Officer.” He was awarded
citations and decorations as follows: American Defense
Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; European-
African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal; World War II
Victory Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Air
Medal with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster; and a letter of commen-
dation.
(c) Colonel Fitzgerald was first considered for pro-
motion tc ihe grade of permanent colonel in 1956 and was
not so selected. He was again so considered by each suc-
ceeding annual selection board, including the board of
June 12, 1961, and was not selected.
(d) The facts recited in findings 16(a), 1€(c), and
16(d), above, in relation to Colonel Norman, have been
adopted by stipulation of the parties and made applicable
to the case of Colonel Fitzgerald.
JOHN B. MARTIN
23. John B. Martin, plaintiff in Case No. 313-64, seeks
by his action to recover the difference between the active
duty pay he would have received if he had not been re-
tired under the White Charger Act and the retired pay he
has received since June 30, 1963, the date of his retire-
ment under that Act.
24. (a) Colonel Martin was appointed second lieu-
tenant, United States Army Reserve, on November 29,
1939, and served on active duty continuously thereafter
until his mandatory retirement on June 30, 1963. He
reached the grade of temporary colonel in the Air Force on
April 15, 1943, and permanent colonel on April 11, 1957.
(b) Fifteen effectiveness reports made from 1952
through 1963 rated him as “One of the Very Few Out-
standing Officers I Know” (in 1952 and 1953); “A
Very Fine Officer of Great Value to the Service” (in
1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1960) ; “A Dependable
and Typically Effective Officer” (in 1954 and 1959) ; and
45a
“Effective and Competent” (in 1963). "or the period of
service from February 7, 1962, to April 8, 1963, he re-
ceived the Air Force Commendation Ribbon.
(c) Colonel Martin was first considered for promotion
to the grade of brigadier general in 1959, and was again
considered by each annual board thereafter and was not
selected.
(d) The Selection (Continuation) Board under Yroj-
ect 20-3, as a result of whose deliberations Colonel Martin
failed of selection for continuation, convened on October
22, 1962, under instructions to apply the “Best Qualified”
method in selecting for retention not less than 80 percent
of the officers to be considered and to be guided by the
following considerations:
* * * Some of these officers have lost their initia-
tive and drive. Others have been unable to keep
pace with technical and operational advances.
* * * Limitations placed on the number of oificers |
who may serve on active duty * * * make it essential
that only highly qualified officers continue to occupy
these grades,
(e) The board recommended 385 colonels for continu-
ation and 60 for retirement.
LOREN E. BUCKEY
25. Loren E. Buckey, plaintiff in Case No. 351-64,
seeks by his action to recover the difference between the
active duty pay he would have received if he had not been
retired under the White Charger Act and the retired pay
he has received since July 31, 1961, the date of his re-
tirement under that Act.
26. (a) Colonel Buckey entered the armed services as
an aviation cadet on April 28, 1941, and was commis-
sioned second lieutenant, Air Reserve, on December 12,
1941. He continued on active duty until his retirement in
1961, reaching the grade of lieutenant colonel, temporary,
on February 5, 1951, and permanent on April 12, 1951,
the grade in which he was serving at the time of his re-
tirement.
(b) Fourteen effectiveness reports, covering the period
from November 3, 1951, to March 5, 1960, characterized
Colonel Buckey as “A Very Fine Officer of Great Value to
MN RO RY eRe or Sl a.
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46a
the Service” or as “A Dependable and Typically Effective
Officer.” During the same period he received the following
awards: B-29 Combat Crew Training School; Medium
Bombardment—Jet B-47 Transition School: Atomic Bio-
logical and Chemical Warfare School (Nuclear Weapons).
(c) Colonel Buckey was first considered for promotion to
the grade of colonel in 1956, and was again considered by
each succeeding annual selection board, including the board
of June 12, 1961, but was not selected fc» promotion.
(d) The facts recited in findings 16(a), 16(c), and
16(d), above, pertaining to Colonel Norman, have been
adopted by stipulation of the parties and made applicable
to the case of Colonel Buckey.
SUMMARY
27. (a) The Selection (Continuation) Boards of 1961
(Colonels Norman, Crowley, Buckland, Fitzgerald, and
Buckey) and of 1963 (Colonel Martin) were composed
of mature senior general officers of varying and extensive
experience in many fields.. They contributed judgment to
the task of evaluation.
(b) In addition to the OER’s (officers’ effectiveness re-
ports), they gave consideration in their evaluations to
commendations, historical records of service, age, educa-
tional background, scope and level of responsibility of as-
signed position, and demonstrated qualities of leadership.
(c) As indicated in finding 13(g), these boards did not
rely upon IBM card selections of numerical equivalents of
OER’s. While they did devise and apply a numerical
rating system of their own, they sometimes disregarded
the results shown by it in that some officers were selected
for continuation whose numerical values were less than
those of some officers who were not selected for continuation.
(d) The significance of the concentration upon OER’s
in findings 14 through 26, relating to individual plain-
tiffs in this litigation, stems from the results of the sta-
tistical analysis of the White Charger Program to which
reference was made in finding 13(a). In that study, the
OER’s of the officers, as individuals and as groups, were
reduced to numerical equivalents from which averages
were derived. In each of the individual cases herein con-
sidered, the affected officer fell into a position below the
47a
mean or average into a relative position vis-a-vis his fel-
low officers who were also under consideration to such an
extent as to absolve the decision of the continuation board
of serious question.
28. (a) In the presentation and development of S. 1795
into enactment as Public Law 86-616, the Department of
Defense (and the Air Force in particular) fully informed
the responsible committees of Congress of the problems
involved and the solutions proposed. The Congress was
fully aware of the action it was taking in enacting S.
1795 into law.
(b) The Secretary of the Air Force has administered
Project 20-3 in conformity with the authority granted to
him by the Congress. There is no evidence of arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal action by the Secretary in such
administration; nor is any action by the Secretary or of
the screening and selection boards convened by him lack-
ing in support by substantial evidence.
29. (a) The governing law of the cases is deeply em-
bedded in the power and the duty of the legislative and
executive branches of the Government to regulate the
Armed Forces.
(b) No valid warrant has been cited for challenging
(1) the authority of the Congress to provide for manda-
tory retirement of officers of the Armed Forces (i) at an
earlier date than prescribed by previous authority * or
(ii) without the panoply of show cause proceedings; **
(2) the constitutionality of the statute for lack of stand-
ards governing administrative discretion; or (3) the au-
thority of the Sceretary of the Air Force to delegate the
powers conferred upon him by the statute.
30. (a) The alleged stigmatism of officers mandatorily
retired under the White Charger Act is colorable only. It
stems from the juxtaposition of such words as “deficient,”
“unsatisfactory,” “marginally effective,” “ineffective,”
“inefficient,” and “substandard” as used in finding 16(a)
with the categories of the OER’s (delineated in finding
13) classifying officers as “acceptable,” “dependable and
12 The principle is well established that there is no vested ‘right to
Federal employment or to the privileges of retirement from time to
time thereunto appertaining.
13The elimination of hearings (with concomitant challenges,
appearances, and presentations) was specifically requested by the
Air Force and expressly granted by the Congress.
Dita IMPOR NESTE AS EI EOS COTE
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48a
typically effective,” “very fine officer of great value to
the service.” Neither set of words can be properly under-
stood unless read in context.
(b) The context in which the Air Force used such
seemingly derogatory terms as “deficient,” “ineffective,”
“marginal,” and “substandard” was related to its problem
with the show cause procedure for the removal of officers
for “failure to achieve the standards of performance * * *
prescribed by the Secretary * * *,”'* which the Air
Force had found ineffectual except for “cause,” and
“cause” in such cases was related to gross inattention to
duty. An officer could be considered marginally effective
without being charged with gross inattention to duty.
(c) The context in which the Air Force grouped officers
in its OER’s,.as “acceptable,” “dependable,” “typically ef-
fective,” and even “very fine officer of great value to the
service” was related to the very human necessity for a
rating officer to work with 1..s subordinate in amity.
(d) Aside from semantics, the net effect of the White
Charger legislation was to place officers of the rank of
colonel and lieutenant colonel] in competition with others
of equal rank for continuation. Failure of selection for
continuation placed no greater stigma on officers of these
ranks than had been applied for years past to officers of
lower rank (major, captain, and lieutenant) who found
themselves in the category of “deferred” officers subject
to automatic separation.
(e) In any event, if failure of selection for continua-
tion be deemed to carry with it the stigma of being less
than the best of the better, in relation to the whole com-
petitive group, no legal significance flows therefrom.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
On the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a
part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a
matter of law that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
Therefore, theii petitions are dismissed.
1410 U.S.C. § 8781 (1958 ed.).
49a
Public Law 86-616, 86th Congress, S 1795, 74 Stat. 395
Approved July 12, 1960
* * * *
Sec. 10. (a) Not more than once in each fiscal year, the
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air
Force may convene one or more boards, each consisting
of at least five officers of the Regular Army or the Regu-
lar Air Force, as the case may be, in a grade above
colonel, to review the records of, and recommend for
continuation on the active list, officers of that component
on the active list in the regular grade of colonel or lieu-
tenant colonel who have at least 20 years of service com-
puted under section 3927(a) or 8927(a) of titie 19,
United States Code, whichever applies, and who have
been considered more than twice but not recommended
for promotion to the next higher regular grade.
(b) A board convened undeyx this section shall recom-
mend officers for continuation on the active list in the
number specified by the Secretary. The Secretary may
specify separate numbers for particular categories of
officers. However, except with respect to the first board
convened under his section in the Army and in the Air
Force, the number specified by him for officers in any
category must be at least 80 percent of the officers in that
category being considered. An officer may be considered
for continuation on the active list under this section only
once while serving in the regular grade of colonel and
only once while serving in the regular grade of lieutenant
colonel.
(c) Except as provided by section 1 of the Act of April
23, 1930, ch. 200, as amended (5 U.S.C. 47a), if the
Secretary approves the report of a board, he shall, not
later than the first day of the seventh calendar month
beginning after he approves that report, retire each officer
who is considered but not recommended for continuation.
(d) A member of the Army or the Air Force who is
retired under this section is entitled to retired pay com-
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50a
puted under formula A of section 3991 or 8991, respec-
tively, of title 10.
(e) This section does not apply to—
(1) members of the Army Nurse Corps, Army
Medical Specialist Corps, or Women’s Army Corps;
(2) Air Force nurses or medical specialists; or
(3) female members of the Air Force who are not
designated under section 8067(a)-(d) or (g)-(i) of
title 10.
(f) This section is not effective after June 30, 1965.
Title 10, United States Code
Sec. 8916. Twenty-eight years; promotion-list lieuten-
ant colonels.
(a) Unless retired or separated at an earlier date, each
promotion-list officer in the regular grade of lieutenant
colonel shall be retired, except as provided by section 47a
of title 5, on the thirtieth day after he completes 28 years
of service computed under section 8927(a) of this title.
However, if his name is carried on the list of officers
recommended for appointment to the regular grade of
colonel, he shall be retained on the active list while his
name is so carried.
sce * * #99
Sec. 8921. Thirty years or five years in grade; pro-
motion-list colonels.
(a) Unless retired or separated at an earlier date, each
promotion-list officer in the regular grade of colonel shall
be retired, except as provided by section 47a of title 5,
on the fifth anniversary of the date of his appointment
in that regular grade or on the thirtieth day after he
completes 30 years of service computed under section 8927
(a) of this tile, whichever is later. However, if his name
is carried on the list of officers recommended for appoint-
ment to the regular grade of brigadier general, he shall be
retained on the active list while his name is so carried.
ce * * #99
5la
Sec. 8963. Higher grade or service during certain
periods: regular and reserve commissioned
Officers.
(a) A regular commissioned officer who is retired, or a
reserve commissioned officer who is retired or to whom
retired pay is granted, is entitled to a retired grade equal
to the highest temporary grade in which he served on
active duty satisfactorily, as determined by the Secretary
of the Air Force, for not less than six months.
ce * 2 #99
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