Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Town of Hempstead v. American Airlines, Inc.

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OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 637

- ERR

TOWN OF HEM®?STEAD, PALMER D. FARRINGTON, as Presiding Supervisor of the

Town of Hempstead, RALPH G. CASO, as Supervisor of the Town of Hempstead, JOHN

H. BENOIT, EASA EASA, JAMES F. NIEHOFF, and GEORGE A. MURPHY, as

Councilmen of the Town of Hempstesd, and JOHN A. MORHOUS, as Town Attorney

of the Town of Hempstead,

: Petitioners,

—against—

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., BRANIFF AIRW.Ax%, INC., DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., NORTHWEST AIR-

LINES, INC., PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., TRANS WORLD AIR-

LINES, INC., and UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY,

CHARLES H. RUBY, as President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International and as

Representative of that class of persons hereinafter mentioned, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSO.

CIATION, INTERNATIONAL, an unincorporated association, on behalf of the Assccia-

tion and on behalf of that class of persons hereinafter mentioned, and HARRY F.

CLARK, THOMAS M. BARTLEY, JR., and RUSSELL G. DERICKSON, individually

and on behalf of the class of persons hereinafter mentioned, and

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY (Intervenor),

Respondents.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FOWLER HAMILTON SIDNEY GOLDSTFIN

Attorney for Respondents Attorney for siespondent

American Airlines, Inc., et al. The Port of New York Authority

52 Wall Street 111 Eighth Avenue

New York, New York 10005 New York, New York 10011

SAMUEL J. COHEN

Attorney for Respondents

Charles H. Ruby, et al.

605 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10016

———

RPE KYLIE

eget a

INDEX

PAGE

Opinions Below ....................-- 1

Jurisdiction 2

Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions ............ 2

Questions Presented 2

Statement ot the Case 3

ARGUMENT

(a) No novel legal issue is presented .

(b) No conflict exists between the decision of the

District Court in this case on the question of

preemption and the holding of any other court,

state or federal 11

(c) The unquesticned fact that aircraft noise is a

problem of national importance is not sufficient

basis for granting a writ in this case ................. 14

(d) There is no novel question of federal statutory

interpretation 15

ConcLusIon 16

APPENDIE .... la

TaspLE oF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d

2 BG | eeeaeeieeie enemas saree 9, 11, 12

American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, No.

5828, W.D.Ky., April 1, 1968 -

Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) 13

Chronister v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108

S.E.2d 731 (1959) .. 13

City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F.Supp.

750 (D.N.J. 1958) 11,13

Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) 8

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) -...... 8

Houston v. T.C.R.R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321 (1906) 8

International Union of U.A.W. v. O’Brien, 339 U.S.

454 (1950) 9

Local 24, Int’l1 Bh’d of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.

283 (1959) 9,13

Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39

Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964) 11, 12

Minnesotu Rate Cases, The, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) .......... 8

Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605

(1926) 13

Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944) .. 138

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U-S. 497 (1956) -...W000..... 9

Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S.

447 (1936)

PAGE

Redman v. Patterson, No. 14869/60, Sup.Ct., Nassau

Co., New York, January 4, 1961 ‘ 13

Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los

Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 363 P.2d 25 (1961), cert. den.,

368 U.S. 899 (1961) 13

Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) . 13

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 2

6 UG. 410OP ns 3

28 U.S.C. § 1337 3

28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) 2

28 U.S.C. § 2201 3

49 U.S.C. $1301 2

49 U.S.C. § 1308 .... 10

49 U.S.C. § 1304 16

49 U.S.C. § 1548 10, 16

49 U.S.C. § 1482 11

P.L. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968) 14

Public Utilities Code of California § 21240 13

iv

Miscellaneous

PAGE

United States Supreme Court Rule (19(b) 8,12

United States Supreme Court Rule 22(3) 2

S. Rep. No. 1851, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ................ 10

S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ................ 15

Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of

the President, Jet Aircraft Noise Panel, “Alleviation

of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports” (March, 1966) 15

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (3d ed.

1962) 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

No. 637

<i -

Town or Hempsteap, et al.,

Petitioners,

—against— ‘

American Arruines, Inc., et al., THe Port oF

New York Avutuority, Cuartes H. Rusy, eZ al.

and

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

FeperaL Aviation AGEency (Intervenor),

Respondents.

<->

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION*

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, printed in the petitioners’ Appendix

(P.Ap. la-15a),** is now reported at 398 F.2d 369. The

* The airline respondents, The Port of New York Authority and

Air Line Pilots Association, International join in this brief.

** “P Ap.” refers to the Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. “R.Ap.” will refer to the Appendix hereto. When one

of the lower court opinions reprinted in the petitioners’ Appendix

is cited herein, and the opinion cited is not otherwise apparent from

yey

2

opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Dooling, J.) (P.Ap. 16a-34a) is re-

ported at 272 F. Supp. 226.

Jurisdiction

The petitioners have invoked the authority of this Court

to review cases in the courts of appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1). Under 28 U.S.C. §2101(¢) and Rule 22(3) of

this Court their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was

timely. The respondents received copies of the Petition,

by mail, on October 14, 1968.

Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions

In addition to the provisions ,of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.), set

out in the Appendix to the Petition (P.Ap. 35a-41a), this

case also involves the constitutional provisions, and the

Town of Hempstead’s noise ordinance, which are repro-

duced, infra, in the Appendix hereto (R.Ap. la-6a).

Questions Presented

The Petition lists three questions for review (Pet. 2).

Stated summarily they are whether Article IT of the Town

of Hempstead’s Unnecessary Noise Ordinance (the “Ordi-

nance”) is invalid (1) because it operates in a field over

which the national government has preempted the power of

the context, the abbreviations “D.C.Op.” and “C.A.Op.” will be used.

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari itself will sometimes be abbre-

viated herein as “Pet.”

3

plenary regulation; or (2) as an undue burden on inter-

state and foreign commerce; or (3) because it is in direct

conflict with valid and applicable regulation by the national

government. The District Court concluded that the Ordi-

nance is invalid on all three of these grounds (C.A.Op.,

P.Ap. 6a). However, the Court of Appeals held only that

the Ordinance is invalid because of direct conflict with

federal regulation, expressly finding it unnecessary to de-

cide the first two questions listed above (P.Ap. 6a, 15a

(n. 4)), even though it did say that “Any one of the Dis-

trict Court’s three conclusions is enough, of course, to make

the ordinance invalid” (P.Ap. 6a).

Statement of the Case

As stated in the Petition the jurisdiction of the Dis-

trict Court in this case was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337

(giving jurisdiction in actions arising under acts of Con-

gress regulating commerce) and 28 U.S.C. $1331 (giving

jurisdiction in controversies #rising under the Constitution,

laws or treaties of the United States). In addition, it was

also based on 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (authorizing the granting

of declaratory judgments).

The Town of Hempstead (hereinafter individually called

“Hempstead”) enacted the Ordinance on November 19,

1963.* In brief, it provides, with respect to aircraft, that

it is unlawful to operate any aircraft that creates a “tran-

sient” noise within Hempstead, for a duration greater

* The Ordinance was amended on March 10, 1964, and, by stipu-

lation, it is the arnended version that is at issue in this action. Since

the record does not contain a composite rendition of the Ordinance

as amended, such a composite, based on the record, is included in

the Appendix hereto (R.Ap. la-6a).

4

than twelve seconds from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., or greater

than six seconds for the remainder of the day, which ex-

ceeds in any one octave band of sound frequency the listed

decibel limit for that octave band as set forth in a “limiting

noise spectrum” consisting of such limits for each of eight

such octave bands; and that it is unlawful for aircraft to

create “steady noise” (noise for a period of one minute at

any time) which exceeds in any one octave band the listed

limit set forth in a different limiting noise spectrum appli-

cable to the same eight octave bands.

The airjline respondents began this action on December

4, 1963 to obtain (i) a declaratory judgment that the

Ordinance is unconstitutional and (ii) an order enjoining

its enforcement. They instituted it because, as the Dis-

trict Court found, compliance with the Ordinance’s noise

requirements would force changes, including unsafe

changes, in traffic patterns and altitudes prescribed by the

Federal Aviation Agency (findings of fact Nos. 282, et seq.,

P.Ap. 3a-4a; C.A.Op., P.Ap. 15a). Separate, but compan-

ion, actions of a similar nature were thereafter begun

against, the petitioners (hereinafter collectively called the

“Town”) by The Port of New York Authority (the “Port

Authority”) and the Air Line Pilots Association, Interna-

tional (“ALPA”). The Port Authority operates John F.

Kennedy International Airport (“JFK”), the airport af-

fected by the Ordinance, and ALPA is an unincorporated

association representing pilots employed by scheduled air-

lines. On January 24, 1964 motions for an order granting a

preliminary injunction were filed in each of the three ac-

tions, and subsequently the Administrator of the Federal

Aviation Agency (the “FAA”) intervened in support of

the motions. The three separate actions were consolidated

by consent on June 2, 1964.

5

Before ruling on the motions for a preliminary injunc-

tion, 4,088 pages of testimony, by 12 witnesses, were

taken intermittently from September 21, 1964 to Septem-

ber 24, 1965 by Judge Dooling; 187 exhibits were offered

and 53 affidavits, some very lengthy and technical, were

submitted. After Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed

Counter-Findings of Fact and plaintiffs’, defendants’ and

intervenor’s written comments thereon were received

by Judge Dooling, he made detailed and technical findings

of fact consisting of 294 paragraphs and, on August 7,

1967, entered an order granting a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals pointed out the reason for the

exhaustive record:

“The Town argued initially that aircraft could fly

over the Town in compliance with both the ordinance

and with FAA regulations governing landing and

take-off patterns and procedures. There was no ques-

tion, however, but that at the time the suit was brought,

take-offs and landings at JFK regularly produced

noise exceeding the relevant limiting noise spectrum

of the ordinance.

“The District Court made crucial findings of fact

which contradict the Town’s initial argument that com-

pliance with the ordinance is possible without altera-

tions in flight patterns and procedures, and the Town

has now shifted its ground, arguing in essence that the

ordinance is not an undue burden on interstate com-

merce, because ‘the Town has unveiled a plan pursuant

to which approximately 98% of all flights [to and from

JFK] will avoid the Town while, at the same time, the

present traffic capacity will be unaffected.’ (Town’s

brief, p.22).” (P.Ap. 3a).

The Town’s initial position that the Ordinance and the FAA

regulations were compatible necessitated detailed evidence

6

as to how and why air traffic at JFK is regulated and oper-

ated as it is, how it would be affected by enforcement of

the Ordinance, and the nature of aircraft noise, including

the technical possibility of its control (see D.C.Op., P.Ap.

20a-23a, 27a-28a, 31a-32a). The respondents completed this

complex presentation and rested on June 15, 1965.

The Town’s case, consisting only of the testimony of its

expert witness (the acoustician who authored the Ordi-

nance), was put in during the period September 21-24, 1965,

after the Town had had a full summer to prepare. It was

only during this testimony, under cross-examination, that

it was first admitted by the Town’s expert that despite a

considerable amount of testing he could not point to a

single jet landing over Hempstead which had complied with

the Ordinance. Moreover, no mention was made by this

witness of any different “plan” for regulating air traffic at

JFK. While the respondents do not concede that such a

“plan” would be relevant (let alone safe), since it is not

really within the power of the Town or the District Court

to pose a different “plan” on the FAA, it is clear that the

Town had ample opportunity to prepare and submit its

ideas to the District Court and to argue their relevance.

It was only thereafter, in its Proposed Counter-Findings

of Fact (and not through any evidence), that the Town

first presented the new “plan” for regulating air traffic at

JFK in a different fashion from that prescribed by the

FAA, but allegedly permitting compliance with the Ordi-

nance. The Town has since largely rested its argument on

this “plan” (Pet. 5-6), but the very fact of its presentation

is a demonstration that the long record has been conclusive

that the air traffic patterns and altitudes required to achieve

compliance with the Ordinance would be in conflict with

7

those prescribed by the FAA and now in force (D.C.Op.,

P.Ap. 34a). The fact of such conflict was further verified

by the Town’s failure to attack on appeal (C.A.Op., P.Ap.

6a) any of the crucial findings (Nos. 281-294, quoted at

P.Ap. 3a-5a), “except that the Town still insists that its

alternate plan, submitted to the District Court, could steer

most flights away from the Town, thus assuring compliance

with the ordinance” (P.Ap. 6a). As to this argument, the

Town made no showing “that the District Court’s finding

[No. 286] to the contrary is clearly erroneous...” (C.A.

Op., P.Ap. 6a), and has never explained how air traffic thus

required to avoid flying over Hempstead could at the same

time avoid violation of FAA requirements thai dictate such

flights.* .

Thus, with such a plain basis for decision before it, the

Court of Appeals did not go beyond the conflict of the

Ordinance with applicable federal regulation (P.Ap. 6a) in

affirming the August 7, 1967 order of the District Court,

which granted the preliminary injunction restraining the

Town from enforcing the Ordinance against aircraft opera-

tions. The Town seeks review of that judgment of affirm-

ance.

*In essence, the Town’s “plan” is a contrived attempt to enable

aircraft to comply with the Ordinance either by causing flights over

Hempstead to be diverted over equally populous communities in the

Borough of Queens in the City of New York (to the west and south

of JFK), or by causing aircraft to avoid flying over Hempstead

by engaging in flight procedures which would substantially reduce

safety (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 33a; C.A.Op. n. 1, P.Ap. 3a-5a). In this

regard, the record flatly contradicts the statements at pages 5 and 6

of the Petition that the Town’s “plan” would permit compliance

with the Ordinance without affecting the capacity of JFK or the

safety factors now existing, and that the “evidence and exhibits”

show that operations at JFK can be conducted differently while

continuing to accommodate current traffic and allowing aircraft to

avoid the Town and equally populous areas. Jbid.

ARGUMENT

The respondents submit that none of the Town’s four

reasons for the granting of a writ of certiorari is sufficient.

None of them is of the character :equired by Rule 19(b).

Before briefly dealing with each of these four reasons, the

respondents wish to reemphasize that the District Court,

in a careful opinion, rested its decision on several separate,

alternate bases (see pages 2-3, swpra), each sufficient to sus-

tain the result (C.A.Op., P.Ap. 6a). All of these grounds

are discussed at length in the District Court’s opinion

(P.Ap. 23a-32a), and this brief will not dwell on them.

In discussing, below, the Town’s four points, we have

directed particular attention to the Court of Appeals’ af-

firmance on the ground of direct conflict between the Ordi-

nance and federal regulation of air commerce.

(a) No novel legal issue is presenied.

The legal question presented for review is not new. Ever

since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824)

it has been settled that when Congress has acted consti-

tutionally all local police power regulations that directly

conflict in any way with federal action must, under the

Supremacy Clause, give way. This rule has been con-

sistently and continuously reaffirmed. E.g., Houston & T.C.

R.R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321, 328 (1906) ; The Minnesota

Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913) (“There is no room

in our scheme of government for the assertion of state

power in hostility to the authorized exercise of Federal

power.”) ; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297

U.S. 447, 459 (1936); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,

9

315 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1942) ; International Union of U.A.W.

v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1950) (“A state statute

so at war with federal law cannot survive.”); Pennsyl-

vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505-509 (1956) ; and Local 24,

Int’l Bh’d of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959).

Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812

(2d Cir. 1956) (no petition for a writ) struck down a

minimum altitude ordinance that Judge Dooling, in this

case, hela to be the “legal equivalent” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 23a)

of the Town’s Ordinance, and, in doing so, specifically ap-

plied the above rule in a case involving Kennedy Airport.

Indeed, in this case the Court of Appeals said that the

Hempstead Ordinance “is in effect a more comprehensive

regulation of air traffic patterns than was the Cedarhurst

ordinance”, and that Cedarhurst is a “square precedert for

holding the Hempstead ordinance invalid” because of its

conflict with federal regulation (P.Ap. 13a-14a).

Insofar as air commerce is concerned, Congress has

long since “recognized the national responsibility”, as it

was called by Mr. Justice Jackson in 1944 (see D.C.Op.,

P.Ap. 32a), and assumed for the federal government full

control of its regulation. It has placed the regulatory

powers in the FAA (see pages 10-11, 16, infra). Since

there is no suggestion that the Acts of Congress under which

air commerce is regulated are invalid, and in view of the

established principle of the supremacy of valid federal

regulation over conflicting local law, there is not only no

new issue presented here—there is no issue at all of “the

entire relationship of federal-local” governmental interests

(Pet. 4, 6) as urged by the Town as its first reason for

further review.

The Town also argues that, since differing local situa-

tions of wind, terrain, obstructions, etc. require the FAA

10

to cirect air traffic differently (“ad hoc”) from airport to

airport (which only makes it more important that there

be unified control), it should be permitted te reopen the

record on the issue of whether the Town’s late-blooming

“plan” for operating air traffic at JFK would sustain the

validity of the Ordinance. The Town asserts that the plan

“would not affect the traffic capacity at the Airport, but

would retain the safety factors now existing” (Pet. 5); it

claims: “In essence . . . that the airport is improperly

operated ...” (Pet. 5); and it apparently concludes that

the courts below were both in error in calling the plan

“irrelevant”. It is worth noting, in passing, that the Dis-

trict Court did devote attention in its opinion to the in-

adequacies of the “plan” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 33a-34a) and,

in finding Ne. 286 .°.A.Op., P.Ap. 4a), expressly found,

without any subsequent showing of error before the Court

of Appeals (C.A.Op., P.Ap. 6a), that:

“There is no reliable evidence that a set of proce-

dures could be devised for Kennedy Airport in the

present state of aviation development which could

without substantial sacrifice of the interest in flight

safety assure either practical or complete compliance

with the Hempstead Ordinance.”

Regardless of the plan’s deficiencies, what the Town over-

looks is that Congress specificaily directed the FAA <Ad-

ministrator to develop the air traffic regulations to which

the Town now objects (see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. $1303, 1348;

P.Ap. 35a-38a) and that Congress did so, with the over-

riding interest of safety in mind, to assure unified control

over the navigable airspace and over air navigation.

Plenary authority in the matter of air traffic rules was

vested in the FAA (S. Rev. No. 1851, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

11

13-15 (1958)). If a iocality like Hempstead believes an

airport is improperly operated, it may file a complaint with

the FAA. 49 U.S.C § 1482.

It is not for the courts to decide how air traffic at an

airport should be routed, or whether the Town’s “plan”

would impair safety or reduce traffic capacity. Those and

all other aspects of any plan to regulate air traffic or deal

with the use of the navigable airspace are extremely cor: -

plex subjects reserved for the expertise of the FAA.*

That is basically why judicial consideration of the “plan”

belatedly proposed by the Town is irrelevant (D.C.Op.,

P.Ap. 25a, 3la-34a). See also, City of Newark v. Eastern

Airlines, Inc., 159 F.Supp. 750, 757-58 (D.N.J. 1958), and

Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal.

Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548, 554 (1964).

(b) No conflict exists between the decision of the

District Court in this case on the question of

preemption and the holding of any other court,

state or federal.

This second argument for review need be discussed only

briefly because, as the Town recognizes (Pet. 4), the Court

of Appeals did not base its decision on preemption. The

only conflict between decisions that is argued by the Town

as a basis for review is that alleged to exist on the issue

of preemption between the District Court in the present

case, and the Cedarhurst case, supra, on the one hand, and

Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal.

Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964), on the other. This issue

* As to the complexity of air traffic regulation, see C.A.Op. n. 2,

P.Ap. 8a-13a; D.C.Op., P.Ap. 26a-28a, 31a.

12

is obviously not one of state law, as described by this

Court’s Rule 19(b). In any event Loma Portal did not in-

volve an ordinance at all, but rather an action by prop-

erty owners to enjoin airline operations at San Diego’s

Lindbergh Field. The California Supreme Court affirmed

a summary judgment denying such an injunction. In dicta

the court did decline to say that federal aviation legislation

was clearly intended to be exclusive in all areas relating tc

aviation, pointing out that it did not wish to preclude the

enforcement of state-created rights to damages, the imposi-

tion of state property taxes, and the entertainment of

wrongfui death actions against airlines. However, the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court also said that “we could not erjoin

a pilot from flying in the landing pattern that he was or-

dered to follow by the [federal] control tower ...” (394

P.2d at 554), and specifically distinguished Cedarhurst on

the ground that it involved a local ordinance (394 P.2d at

555).

To the best of our knowledge there is only one other

case (besides Cedarhurst and the present one) which has

considered whether federal preemption of the fields of air

traffic safety and control and airspace management in-

validates local aircraft noise ordinances, and that one held

in the affirmative, agreeing with Cedarhurst and Judge

Dooling. American Airlines, Inc. et al. v. City of Audubon

Park, No. 5828, W.D.Ky., April 1, 1968 (unreported, but

appeal pending). In that case a summary judgment per-

manently enjoining the enforcement of a 750-foot minimum

altitude ordinance passed by a suburb of Louisville was

granted on the grounds, among others, of preemption and

conflict with federal regulation. Moreover, the only expres-

sions of dicta on the point of which we are aware were in

13

agreement. City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Irc., 159

F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.N.J. 1958) ; Redman v. Patterson, No.

14869/60, Sup.Ct., Nassau Co., New York, January 4, 1961

(unreported). See also, Northwest Airlines v. Mimnesota,

322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) {concurring opinion) ; Chronister

v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731, 734

(1959); Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of

Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 37, 363 P.2d 25 (1961), cert.

den., 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Public Utilities Code of Cali-

fornia § 21240.

The Town’s contention that there is no preemption be-

cause federal aviation iegislation does not contain “noise

criteria” (Pet. 6), which the Ordinance does, is not only

irrelevant to the issue of whether there are conflicting de-

cisions but is unsound. The argument is unsound because

local regulation of noise would require conduct inconsistent

with federal directives, as the trial court found (findings

Nos. 282, et seq., P.Ap. 3a-4a), and because the fact that

noise control, rather than airspace or air traffic regula-

tion, is the nominal objective of the Ordinance, does not

save it from invasion of the preempted fields (D.C.Op.,

P.Ap. 24a). See also, Local 24, Int’l Bh’d cf Teamsters

v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-

Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479-81 (1955) ; Napier v. Atlantic

Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926). Not even

complementary local regulation is permissible where the

federal interest is dominant. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S.

297, 302 (1961). The argument is alco unsound because the

FAA “is not free to ignore, and it has not ignored, noise

abatement considerations” * (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 30a).

* Since the decision by the Court of Appeals, Title VI of the

Federal Aviation Act has been amended to require the Administra-

14

(c) The unquestioned fact that aircreft noise is a

problem of national importance is not sufficient

basis for granting a writ in this case.

The respondents do not know of any other “litigation

involving aircraft noise ordinances or minimum altitude

ordinances ...” that has “been stayed pending ultimate

decision on the Town’s Ordinance” (Pet. 7), even though

they believe they would be informed if there were any.

Respondents do agree that if the Ordinance were ulti-

mately sustained “one could almost certainly expect similar

type ordinances being enacted by communities” (Pet. 7)

across the country, and even around the same airports. It

could be expected that these would impair safety by impos-

ing a variety of requirements on aircraft, not necessarily

consistent with FAA controls. Furthermore, ordinances

or plans of neighboring towns would be likely to be mutu-

ally contradictory; like Hempstead, each would endeavor

to require aircraft to fly over the others (see D.C.Op., P.Ap.

33a). This is an additional practical argument in support

of the decisions below, even when looked at from the point

of view of airport communities themselves (see D.C.Op.,

P.Ap. 20a, 25a, 33a). However, the fact that the subject

matter generally is of importance is not sufficient reason

for reviewing a ruling which is unquestionably correct as

to the precise issue presented by the case. Srexn & Gress-

MAN, SUPREME Court Practice 255 (3d ed. 1962).

For a realistic appreciation of the background of this

case it should be understood that “the aircraft are operated

tor of the FAA to prescribe standards tor the measurement of

aircraft noise and sonic boom and, subject to certain stated con-

siderations, to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may find

necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise

and sonic boom. P.L. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968).

15

in a thoroughly responsible manner ...” (D.C.Op., P.Ap.

22a) and that “the aircraft noise problem” is “not a con-

seqrence of the failure to take feasible precautions or to

p. ovide practical remedies” (D.C.Op., P.Ap. 20a). The

respondents and the FAA have all becn working for years,

with numerous others, to try to alleviate the noise from

aircraft. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1968). They cooperated, for example, in the 167-page

report of the Office of Science and Technology’s Jet

Aircraft Noise Panel, entitled Alleviation of Jet Aircraft

Noise Near Airports (March, 1966), which charted the

work which has since been carried on by the respondents

and others under federal leadership. This work has in-

cluded research on jet aircraft noise reduction at the source,

operational improvements to reduce noise by means ap-

proved by the FAA as consistent with safety, and suggested

limitations on land use near airports to encourage uses com-

patible with the noise (which are the three possible means to

alleviate aircraft noise).

(d) There is no novel question of federal

statutory interpretation.

The Town raises the supposed interpretative question

of “whether this federal legislation is dependent upon

local laws for measurement of its terms or is intended to

operate uniformly throughout the nation” (Pet. 8). “Meas-

urement”, in this context, can only mean the imposi-

tion by local laws of limitations on the flight of aircraft

and on their right to use the navigable airspace (whether

directly, or indirectly by noise limits). However Congress

has, among other things, declared “a public right of free-

dom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United

16

States” (49 U.S.C. § 1304), has delegated control of its use

to the FAA (49 U.S.C. 4 1348(a)), and has also delegated

control over air traffic rules and regulations to the FAA

(49 U.S.C. §1348(c)). This case does not involve any

question of statutory interpretation but rather, as found

in the District Court, the head-on conflict of a local enact-

ment with federal regulation.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should

be denied.

November 12, 1968

Respectfully submitted,

Fowier Hamitton

Attorney for Respondents

American Airlines, Inc., et al.

52 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Lyman M. Tonvet, JR.

Georce WEISZ

JaMeEs D. WIESE

Of Counsel

17

Smyey GoLpstern

Attorney for Respondent

The Port of New York Authority

111 Eighth Avenue

New York, New York 10011

Dantet B. GoipBere

JOSEPH LESSER

IsopeL E. MutrHeap

Of Counsel

Samvuet J. CoHEN

Attorney for Respondents

Charles H. Ruby, et al.

605 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10016

la

APPENDIX

Constitutional, Statutory and Other Provisions

United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and

all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

- Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall

be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8:

“The Congress shall have Power...

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several States, and with the Indian

Tribes....”

Unnecessary Noise Ordinance (No. 25) of the Town of

Hempstead: Article II, as amended (see Record, pp. 4112-

15, 4470-72):

ArtTicLe IT

REGULATION OF AND LimiTaTION Upon TRANSIENT

Sounp From Arrcrart In FLIcHTs aND ANY AND

ALL OtTseEeR Devices or a MECHANICAL NATURE.

1. Definitions of words and phrases used in this ordi-

nance.

(a) “Person”:—Includes any individual, firm, as-

sociation or corporation, whether such person be

ET APN eT TOS . ee eR SRS ee ee eed va:

2a

the owner, lessee or charterer, his or its pilots or

co-pilots as to aircraft, and any individual firm,

association and corporation, its servants, agents or

employees as to any other sound producing device

or mechanism.

(b) “Noise” :—Noise is any incr2ase in the ambient

noise, measured as provided in this Article, caused

by any mechanical device including aircraft.

(c) “Ambient Noise”:—Ambient noise is the all-

encompassing noise associated with a given environ-

ment.

(d) “Bel”:—The bel is a unit of level when the

base of a logarithm is 10 and is restricted to levels

of quantities proportional to power.

(e) “Decibel” :—The decibel is one-tenth of a bel

and is a unit of level when the base of the logarithm

is the tenth root of ten, and the quantities con-

cerned are proportional to power.

(f) “Spectrum”:—A spectrum is a function of

time and is a description of its resolution into

components, each of different frequency and is

also used to signify continuous range of com-

ponents usually wide in extent within which waves

have some specified characteristics such as “audio-

frequency spectrum” and is also applied to func-

tions of variables other than time.

(g) “Sound Pressure Level” :—The sound pressure

level, in decibels, of a sound is 20 times the loga-

rithm to the base 10 of the r&tio of the pressure

of this sound to the reference pressure, which

reference pressure must be explicitly stated.

3a

(h) “Band Pressure Level”:—The band pressure

level of a sound for a specified frequency band is

the sound pressure level for the sound contained

within the restricted band. The reference pressure

must be specified.

(i) “Cycle”:—A cycle is the compiete sequence of

values of a periodic quantity that occur during a

period.

(j) “Frequency”:—The frequency of a function

periodic in time is the reciprocal of the primitive

period. The unit is the cycle per unit time and

must be specified.

(k) “Microbars”:—-A microbar is a unit of pres-

sure commonly used in acoustics and is equal to 1

dyne per square centimeter.

(1) “Sound-Level Meter”:—A sound-level meter is

an instrument including a microphone, an ampli-

fier, an output meter, and frequency weighting

networks for the measurement of noise and sound

levels in the manner provided by this Article.

(m) “Sound Analyzer”:—A sound analyzer is a

device for measuring the band-pressure level or

pressure spectrum level of a sound as a function of

frequency.

(n) “Duration”:—The duration of a_ transient

noise from a machine during the entire period

when the transient noise is first distinguished from

the ambient noise until the noise from the same

machine finally recedes into the ambient noise,

shall be the period of the beginning when the tran-

sient noise first exceeds a certain band pressure

4a

level until it no longer exceeds the same band

pressure level and providing it remains above the

same band pressure level for at least one-third of

the total duration.

(o) “Transient Noise” :—Any noise having a dura-

tion of one minute or less shall be considered a

transient noise and the limits of Table I of this

ordinance shall apply.

(p) “Steady Noise”—Any noise having a duration

in excess of one minute shall be considered a steady

noise and the limits of Table II of this ordinance

shall apply.

2. No person shall operate or cause to be operated

any mechanism or device (including but not limited

to airplanes) which shall create a noise within the

Town of Hempstead exceeding the limiting noise

spectra set forth in Tables I and II as follows:

TABLE I

Liuitine Notsr SPectruM

ror Steapy NOISE

Band Pressure Level Octave Band Center

Decibels Re 0.0002 Frequency Cycles

Microbars per Second

92 63

87 125

79 250

72 500

66 1000

60 2000

54 4000

52 8000

ha

During the daytime from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M.

the limits of Tasie I hereinbefore set forth shall ap-

ply to transient noise having a duration in excess of

twelve (12) seconds. During the night from 7:00 P.M.

to 7:00 A.M. the same limits shall apply to transient

noises having a duration in excess of six (6) seconds.

TABLE II

Limitine Noise SPECTRUM

For Steapy No!lse

Band Pressure Level Octave Band Center

Decibels Re 0.0002 Frequency Cycles

Microbars per Second

72 63

67 125

59 250

52 50u

46 | 1000

40 2000

34 4000

32 8000

3. Noise measurements end limits shall conform to

the following practices:

(a) Noise shall be measured at an altitude not

exceeding 100 feet above sea level.

(b) Measurements of noise emanating from any

mechanism or device including, but not limited

to, motor vehicies, shall be made at a distance

of at least 100 feet from the longitudinal cen-

ter line of the vehicle.

6a

(c) Machinery noise originating on private prop-

erty shall be measured at the property line of

the property on which the noise source is lo-

cated.

. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part

of this article shall be adjudged by any Court of

competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment

shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder

of this article but shall be confined in its operation

to the clause, sentence, paragraph, section or part

thereof directly involved in the litigation in which

such judgment shall have been rendered.

. Penalties:—Any person violating any provision of |

this article shall be liable to a penalty not exceed-

One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars for each offense

and a violation of this ordinance or any part

thereof shall constitute disorderly conduct and any

person violating the same shall be a disorderly per-

son.

. This article shall become effective in accordance

with the provisions of Section 133 of the Town

Law of the State of New York.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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