Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Los Angeles Herald Examiner v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild

hn FOP AASY Y | |. See FIL ED’ US,

SUPREME Court. GE.

_ Supreme Court of th the jogs Stateg® 1368

JOHN F, Davis, CLERK

ee

“a Term, 1968

LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER, a Division of -The. Hearst

Corporation, and THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, a Division’ a...

of The Hearst Corporation, ,

Petitioners,

. ’ US. . 4 .

SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD; NEWS-

PAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS’ AND ‘HELPERS’ UNION

LOCAL 921; LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69;

_ LOS ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN’S UNION NO: 48; LOS AN:

“GELES STEREOTYPERS’ UNION NO. 58; LOS -ANGELES

TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL AS-

SOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, ;

DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN’S

UNION ‘LOCAL 598; BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTE- ; ‘

:

re

* NANCE EMPLOYEES UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAIL-

ERS’ UNION NO. 9; and LOS ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS’

UNION NO. 3, appellants in es before the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

_ Respondents,

RALPH toad Regional. Director of Region 21 cf the National

Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD, appellee in proceedings before the United States -

- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, :

, Respondent. ’

+ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

ae tet | 7 “CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR.,

. 433 South Spring Street, .

Los Angeles, Calif. 90013,

Attorney for Petitioners. ;

Of Counsel:

FLIN® & McKAY,

458 South Spring Street,

Los Angeles, Calif. 90013,

O'MELVENY & MYERS, —

RICHARD C;: WHITE, ,

CHARLES W. BENDER, | V-

PETER M. ANDERSON, .

433 South Spring Street, | . - &

Los Angeles; Calif. 90013. ak

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone MA. 6-9171. -

S| ii .

‘SUBJECT INDEX . | og

_% | - ae ae oy _Page

Opinions Below osalianesinnblebeaen a suit dine edad “i

Jurisdiction OR Nee ee ccna : Macao: i

Question Presented oe cae | wes veplanonnentamevedineeeniy i ou

| Statute Involved — isiiccisininsiihealiasaaiis :

Statement of the GTA ER a eae 4

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..................:-000-0+ 5

Conclusion dasibiaiidaistadion A Rn Aor esl cence 16

INDEX -TO APPENDICES’

Appendix A. Order EOE TOM, 2 , isa p. 1

Order on Motions a miei nn &

~ Appendix B/ Order - Granting. Temporary Tnjunc-

tion 4

_ Supplemental Order Granting Temporary, Injunc~ -

—tion : /

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ....:,.:-10 _

: 5 _ | ; ° . SN

f

y

' TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

pats Cages Page

— Local 283, UAW v. vo U.S: 805. ....2, 5,.6, 7:

siiineciebiiadss dake tueeeraadiipeenbiien moosesaeh By: 12, 13;

Trades Council, 383 | F.2d 562:..

Retail Clerks Union v. Food" Biployics Council,

ae | FS. een ene : = 5

Miscellaneous Bee a

_-National Labor Relations Board, Fighteenth Annual

~ Report (1954), OR BEE na iicresecinemnnerenins

National Labor Relations Bold, Thirtieth ‘Annual °

~_ Report (1966), ig eniodl Clescess tate Ra SOA

Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-

cedure, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,

2d Sess., Report on Regulatory Agencies the

" President-Elect 64. (1964) . buacisishpeacnciabniete

: Rules wie ae .

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule PP bihiidisaaeniances

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ruie — (2) .

- Statutes fae aa

National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 8(b) (4) OG)-

(B) eccccccccce eeccccccccccgecccccccccsccccccccesces on

National Labor. Relations Act,. Sec. 10. 2 6, 11, 12,

’ National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(e)..7, 11, 12,

16

aa

N L. R. B. v. Nashville Building & ‘Construction i:

14

5.

14.

1

4

16 .

14

- National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(£) dace 5,7, 11

National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10(h) ...-10, 11, 12°

National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 10( j) ....13, 14,

16.

‘_

out eu | Rage

National Labor Relations: Act, Sec. 10(1) . ey Se

26 vvenecenenti1O, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16°

‘United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1254(1) aeons 2

.. United States Code, Title 29, - Sec. 158(b) (4)(i)- :

Gi) (B) -----

United States Code, Title 29, Sec. 160(h) . cvsspecgencscone EL

United States Code, Title 29, Sec. aia aero a ae

*

2

IN THE

Supreme Court of th the United States

‘Gevher Term, 1968 |

BOD: wsnccieenn ssoeee

LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER, a Division of The Hearst

, .Corporation, and THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, a Division

As The Hearst. Corporation, ;

‘Petitioners,

‘SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD; NEWS-

PAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS’ AND HELPERS’ UNION

LOCAL 921; LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD,: LOCAL 69;

LOS ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN’S UNION NO. 18; LOS AN-

GELES STEREOTYPERS’ -UNION NO. 58; LOS ANGELE

TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL A . .

SOEIATION OF > gy AND AEROSPACE WORKER

DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN’S\

UNION LOCAL 598; BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTE-

._ NANCE EMPLOYEES UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAIL-

- ERS’. UNION NO, 9; and LOS. ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS’.

UNION NO. 3, appellants i in proceedings before the United -States Court

of Ss for the Ninth =

—

ee

RALPH. E. KENNEDY. Regional Director of mein 21 of the National

Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf. of the NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD, appellee in pecceoenget before the United States

_ Comt of ne for = Ninth decniecaan :

Respondent.

ii for a Writ of aes to the United States

one of. fie! for the _— Circuit. |

Petitioners; the Los Aingeles Herald cues Divi-

sion of The Hearst Corpor ation, and the ‘San Fran-

‘CISCO Examiner, Division f The Hearst Corporation,

-

pray, that a writ of certiorari issue to review: a final

order. of the United. States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, entered in the: above-entitled case en

- May 20, 1968, denying petitioners leave .to intervene

in appeal proceedings to. review a temporary in junction

issued by the United States District Court = the

°

. A

IM ccememnnarer

sone daa ny

=

LL LEPO PILE IIE LPI ON

.

Sper CRO

or

POO Ee Ae

Northern District of California under Section 10(1) of

_the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29

— U'S.C. $160(1).

sa OPINIONS BELOW. |

The Court of Appeals’ order of May 20, 1968 dus

_ ing petitioners leave to intervene, rescinded a previous

order of April 19, 1968. which had granted leave to

intervene. Neither of these orders was accompanied

by an opinion’of the court. The orders are printed in

Appendix A hereto.

The order,~supplemental order, ‘end findings of fact

and conclusions of ‘law issued by the District Court

in connection with the temporary injunction have not

been published and are printed irr Appendix B hereto.

‘ JURISDICTION.

The order of the Court of Appeals denying the peti-

‘ tioners leave to intervene was entered on May 20, 1968.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).* . -

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Where a district court, in proceedings instituted by .

the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to §10

of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, issues _

a temporary. injunction against a charged party, and

the charged party appeals therefrom, may the charging ©

party be denied the right to intervene in the appeal

proceedings wherein the propriety of protecting his

‘rights and interests by injunctive relief’ will be deter-

mined ?

ae "

*In Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1965),

‘the Court held that a charging denied intervention ‘ih court

of appeals proceedings to review a decision was a “party” -

to the ease within the meaning of §1254(1). ine :

3

“~

STATUTE INVOLVED.

Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,

as amended, 29 U.S.C. §160(1), provides in relevant

fe, , “Whenever it is charged that any person has_

engaged in: an unfair. labor practice within the

meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of .

section’ 158(b) of this title *: . the ‘preliminary: in- .

vestigation of such charge shall be made forthwith

and given priority over all other cases except cases"

of like character in the office where it is filed

or to which it is referred. If, after such investi-

gation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the,”

matter may be referred has reasonable cause to be-

lieve such charge’ is true and that a complaint

should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, pe- »

_ tition any United States district court within any

district where the unfair labor practice in question

has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein

such person resides or transacts business, for ap-

propriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudi-

cation of the Board with respect to such matter. .

Upon the filing of any such petition, the district

court shall have jurisdiction to grant such. injunc-

- tive relief or temporary restraining order as it

. deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other °

provision of law. . ... Upon filing of any such pe- ;

tition the courts shall cause notice thereof ‘to be

® served upon any person involved in ‘the charge

and such person, including the charging party, shall

be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and _

present any relevant testimony. . . .”

4

EE

—

STATEMENT OF THE CASE;

This case originated from charges filed with the

Board by petitioners herein, alleging that the respond-

ent unions had engaged in and were engaging in unfair

labor pract: ces within the meaning of §8(b) (4) (i) (ii) _

(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (i) (ii) (B),

which proscribes secondary boycotts by unions. After

‘ conducting a preMminary investigation, as required by

_

f

$10(1) of the Act, Respondent Ralph E. Kennedy, Re-

gional Director of the Board, concluded that there was

reasonable cause to believe that respondent unions were

engaging in unfair labor practices, as charged, and

that an unfair labor practice complaint should issue.

Thereupon, pursuant to §10(1), Kennedy filed a, petition

in the District Court, seeking a. temporary injunction

interlocutory to the final, adjudication of the matter by

the Board. A hearing on an order to show cause was

held, during which the charging parties, petitioners

herein, were allowed to participate as provided by §10

(1). After presentation of evidence, the District Court

issued an order and supplemental order, accompanied

by findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting the

temporary injunction. Respondent unions appealed to

the Court of Appeals and petitioners petitioned for

_ leave to intervene in the appeal proceedings before that

court. +. 4

By an order issued April 19, 1968, the Court of Ap-

peals granted petitioners leave to intervene. Respond-

ents thereafter filed with ‘the Court of Appeals a mo-

‘tion to reconsider the order allowing intervention, and

_ in resporise thereto the Court of Appeals issued a second

order on May 20, 1968, rescinding its prior order but

SY

as amici curiae.

No.

a

providing that petitionefs might appear and_file a brief :

Petitioners applied: to the Court of Appeals for an

order staying further proceedings in that court pending |

final determination by this Court of the within petition

for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals denied sajd ap-

, plication by an order dated July 16, 1968.

" REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

1. The order of the Court of Appeals denying peti- -

tioners leave to intervene in the review proceedings be-

fore that court is directly in conflict with the control-

ling decision of this Court in Local 283, UAW v. Sco-

field, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). - |

In Scofield, this Court reviewed -two cases in which

courts of appeals had issued orders denying petitions

for intervention and relegating the would-be inter- —

venors to the status of amici curiae. In the’ first

_ of these cases (Scofield), the petitioner, who had been

the successful charged party in proceedings before the

Board, sought to intervene in review proceedings in-

stituted by the unsuccessful charging party pursuant to

§10(f) of the Act. In the second case (Fafnir), the

petitioner, who had been the successful charging: party

in proceedings before the Board, sought to intervene in :

review and enforcement proceedings which were insti-

tuted at the petition of the unsuccessful charged party

and the cross-petition of the Board. In each case; the

Court upheld the right of the successful party to in-

tervene.

“We hold. that both the successful charged

party (in Scofield) and the successful charging

party (in Fafnir). have a right to intervene in the

—ty—

Court of Appeals proceeding which reviews or en-

forces Labor Board orders. We think that Con-

. gress intended*to confer intervention rights upon.

the successful party to. the’ Labor ‘Board proceed-

ings in the court in which the unsuccessful party

. challenges the Board’s decision.” (382 U.S. at

08). [Emphasis added].

In Scofield and Fafnir, the Board argued, as it does

in this case, that the relevant provisions of §10 were in-

tended to protect the ‘ ‘public interest” to the exclusion

of the “private intefésts” of the charging party, and that:

the charging party was intended to be only an incidental

beneficiary of any relief obtained by the Board.* Mr.

Chief Justice Warren, for a unanimous Court, ejected.

this argument:

“In prior decisions, this Court ha observed that

the Labor Act recognizes the existence of . private

rights within the statutory scheme. . . . To em-

phasize the rhetoric of. ‘public interest’. ..is-not-

_‘to-imply-that-the public right excludes recognition

of parochial thes interests. ” (382 U.S. at 218).

i. :

“In short, we think that the statutory pattern

of the Labor Act ‘does not dichotomize ‘public’ as

opposed to ‘private’ interests. Rather, the two inter-

blend in the intricate statutory scheme.” (382 U.S..

af220).

*In the proceedings below, Respondent Kennedy invoked. this

argumeht as follows: “Section 10(1) of the Act was not in-

tended to establish a remedy for the benefit of a private party,

“and the incidental benefit which might inure to the charging

party from an injunction under the section is not a sufficient

‘basis for permitting charging parties to intervene in the special

statutory proceedings contemnlated by Section 10(1).” (An-°

swer of appellee Kennedy, before Court of Appeals to Motion by

Charging Parties for Leave to Intervene, p. 3).

ae

Here, as in Scofield and Fafnir, the attempt to deny:

petitioners’ rights of intervention by invoking the ‘“‘pub-

«lie right” dogma must fail. For, although §10(1) does

_not address itself directly to the question of whether in-

tervention is allowed in proceedings to review a tempo-

rary injunction, the intricate blending of: private and

public rights in the statutory scheme clearly. manifests a

congressional intention favoring intervention. The

- omission of Congress to provide expressly for inter-

véntion in an. appeal from a §10( 1) proceeding cannot

be read as an expression of intention to deny charging

parties in this case their due.process rights to participate

actively in litigation involving their statutory rights.

This issue was laid to rest in Scofield and Fafnir when .

the Court held that Congress’s omission to provide. ex-

pressly for intervention as of right in §10(e) atid. §10-

(f) review proceedings did not indicate an intent to bar

intervention. (382.U.S. at 209-10).

Congress recognized the irreparable injury which -

could be caused to an employer by secondary boycott

activity, and it was for this reason that §10€1) makes

it mandatory for-the Board to petition for injunctive re-

lief whenever such illegal activity is-alleged and the

regional director has “reasonable cause to believe such

charge is true.” Having thus recognized the essential

and immediate need for pretecting the interests of the

threatenéd employers in such circumstances, Congress

could not simultaneously have intended to prevent full

participation ‘in the: litigation by the employer. Indeed,

the contrary is shown by the language of eet) itself,

which provides, in relevant part:

“Upon filing of any such petition the courts

shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any

| com

person involved in the charge and sueh ‘person,

including the charging party, shall be given an op-

cosa by counsel and present any rele-

vant testimony... .” [Emphasis added].

Sined this . lahguage authorizes the charging eaiti to

appear and introduce contentious evidence (Retail Clerks.

Union v. Food Employers ‘Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525,

528 (9th Cir; 1965)), the legislative niente clearly

; makes the charging party-more than an amicus, for an .

_ amicus. would have no absolute right to -be-heard and

—to “introduce and dispute contentious evidence. ‘Were’

a charging -party relegated to the role of an amicus

. in the appeal proceedings, he would be, denied the op-

portunity for active participation in the litigation which

Congress intended should be secured to him as a matter

‘of right.

” Relegation of a charging party to the status of amicus

in appeal proceedings would. thus be wholly incon-

sistent with the recognition of private: rights which

pervades the scheme of the Act. “This is ‘made plainly

. evident by Fafnir’s rejection of the argument that the

would-be intervenor can’ adequately protect his interests

by participating in appeal proceedings as amicus curiae.

,As stated by the Court, in language equally applicable .

here: | ~ ; -

“The rights typically secured to an intervenor

‘in a reviewing court—to participate in designating

the record, to pafticipate/jh prehearing conferences

preparatory to simplification of the issues, to file a

brief, to engage in oral argument, to petition for

rehearing in the appellate court or to this Court

for certiorari—are” not productive of delay nor do

they cause es in the appellate cotirts.

y

ay

Participation in defining the issues before the

court guarantees that. all relevant material is ©

brought to its attention, and makes the briefs on |

the merits more meaningful... .. On the other hand,

an amicus—vwith the vaio ofthe right to file

a brief—imght be unable adequately to present all

16). |

As noted by the. Court, intervention secures for the

petitioner, not only the right to participate in the

appeal proceedings, but. also’ the right to seek review.

by writ of certiorari from an adverse decision on: the

merits in the court of appeals. The need to secure

_ by intervention this right to petition for review is vi- -

tally. important .to the- successful charging; party, for

the Board might decline to petition for review from an

adverse .decision for reasons wholly unrelated ‘to~ the

-merits of the ‘controversy.

* * «The Labor Board may . .¢. adversely affect the

rights of the private parties. .. . For example, the

Board may decide a case and later re-evaluate its

position at a time when that case is before an

appellate court. The Géneral Counsel, in such a sit-

uation, cannot be expected wholeheartedly to at-

_ tempt to convince an appellate court of ‘the correct-

ness of a doctrine which the Board itself has aban-

doned.” (382 U.S. at 214-15 n. 7).

“Intervention additionally ‘ ‘serves the ‘public interest’

by guaranteeing that the Board’s interpretation of the

relevant provisions accords with the intent of Con-.

gress.” (382 U.S. at 219).

Finally, as stressed by the Court in Rafer, the

right of intervention by a successful charging party is

-. the relevant data to the court.” (382 U.S. at 215-

10

. supported by: the policies vterying intervention gen-

erally: 7

“[H]elpful, analogies may be found’ in the

Judicial Review Act of 1950, governing interven-

_tion in the Courts of Appeals ‘by private. parties

directly affected by agency order's, and in the Fed-

eral Rules’ of. Civil Procedure. ‘ — U.S. at ai |

- AT).

x “The Federal Rules of Civil Proceduré, of Course gs

/ apply only in the federal district courts. « Still, the

policies underlying intervention may be applicable

in appellate courts. Under Rule 24(a)(2) or Rule .«

w, 24(b)(2), we think the charged party would be |

entitled to intervene.” oe U.S. at 217 n.10).

This was the comment of the Court prior ‘to the

-1966.amendment of Rule 24. As now amended to ex-

_pand the right of intervention, Rule 24(a)(2)* offers -

an even more compelling analogy. in support - of peti-

tioners’ right to intervene.

. Respondents: have attempted to. distinguish Scofield

and Fafnir by arguing that intervention in appeal pro- .

ceedings to review a §10(1) injunction is prohibited by

" the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limits the jurisdiction

of federal courts to grant injunctive selief in labor dis-

_ putes. This argument wholly fails to take account of §10

(h) of the Act, which excepts fron the Norris-La-’

*Rule 24(a)(2),-as amended, reads, in material part :

“Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone

shall\be permitted to intervene in an, action... . when the

applicant claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so

situated that the disposition of the action may as a prac-

tical:matter impair or -impede his ability:to protect that in-

terest, unless the applicant’s interest is’ adequately repre-

sented by existing parties.”

sahil iis

Guardia Act all federal ‘court proceedings authorjzed 7

under §10 of the National Labor: Relations Act, in-.

cluding not only §10(e) and §10(f) review and enforce-

ment proceedings of thé type involved in Scofield and ~

Fafnir, but also §10(1) injunction proceedings of the

t¥pe here itivolved. Section 10(h) provides :

“W hen granting appropriate temporary relief or

‘a restraining order, or making and entering a de&

‘cree enforcing, modifying, and ‘enforcing as so,

_ modified, or setting aside in whole or in part ‘an

order of the Board, as provided in this section

[10], the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity

shall not be limited by sections 101-115 of this

title.” (29 U.S.C. §160(h)). [Emphasis added].

“Ignoring the fact that the exemption. provided i in §10-

(h) is applicable to all §10 proceedings, respondents

argue that the asserted potential. conflict between the

Norris-LaGuardia Act and intérvention-was not in-

volved in Scofield and Fafnir, where the Court sanc-

tioned intervention’ in a §10(e) enforcement proceeding.’

But, in “a. §$10¢ e) proceeding, a court of appeals de-

cree enforcing a Board cease-and-desist order is an in-

junctive decree.. A. cease-and-désist order is not self

enforcing.- When the Board, as in the Fafnir case,

issues an order and petitions the court of appeals for

enforcement, it seeks injupctive relief—just as it seeks

injunctive relief. when it petitions a district court pur-

suant to §10(1). Indeed, the only : difference is that

‘ the scope of injunctive relief in ‘a §10(e) proceeding is

permanent, while being temporary in‘a §10(1): proceed-

ing. Intervention in an appeal from a §10(1) proceed- —

ing involves far less potential conflict with the Norris-.

_ LaGuardia Act than the intervention in a §10( e) pro-

r

4

2

4

NOE Glee wR eras

LEER OED,

OO EE TO AES aan Se ay oi

TL ee

‘

>

ceeding. which this Court unequivocally sanctioned in

Scofield and Fafuir.

Thus, Scofield and Fafmir ae be dicteeondint on

the grounds that intervention in the §10(e) proceeding

there involved did not entail te potential conflict with

the Norris-LaGuardia Act which is asserted to bar in-

~ tervention in this* case. Intervention . in; Scofield and

Fafnir did ‘not’ conflict with the Norris- LaGuardia Act

for the same reasohs ‘that intervention in this case does

-not. Section 10(h), which . expressly exempts all §10

_ proceedings «from the ‘liritations of the Norris- La--

Guardia Act, uniformly applies to a §10(1) eee:

as well as toa §10(e) review proceeding.

Respondents have also argued that. the legislative

history of §10(1) demonstrates a congressional intent ©

not to allow intervention. This view represents an, il-

logical: extension of what was a stated congressional

objective—to allow only the Board to initiate injunction

proceediags. “While it is true that Congress did not .

intend that a charging party have the right to initiate

§10(1) ‘proceedings, ° it is clearly a. non sequitur to as-

sume from this premise that once a proceedings is in-

stituted by the Board the charging party should be

denied intervention. To “deny a private’ party ‘the

power to institute a proceeding is manifestly not tanta-

mount to. denying him the right to intervene. once the |

Board in its discretion has’ begun proceedings. Under -

- §10(e), only the Board had statutory authority to’ file. :

the enforcement petition involved: in Fafnir: Had the —

Board not sought enforcement of .its order, the suc-

| cessful charging party could not have instituted en-,

forcement proceedings in the court ‘of appeals. But: once

the Board exercised its discretion to -seek enforce-

a“ . | ; —

". ment in Fafnir, the successful charging pay a had

a right to.intervene—as do petitioners in this case. ”

In‘a word, there is “nothing inconsistent in denying “ -

the right of a private party to institute” an injiinction

proceeding “and, on the other hand,/in permitting’ in-

‘tervention in a- proceeding already ‘in the court for

. decision.” (Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S.

at 221.) Such. participation after proceedings’ have

._ begun in no way impairs the congressional policy of

according to the Board exclusive authority to initiate

an injunction proceeding. =~

oe 2. The order of the court below is in con-

flict with the order of the Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit in McLeod v. General. Elec. *Co.,

: 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir., 1966). In McLeod, the Board

obtained a-§10(j) injunction in the district court. The

union had been the. charging party and ‘participated in

the district court, proceeding through examination and

cross-examination of witnesses, as well as in the making

- of .legal’ submissions. Although the union was not. con-

sidered a “party” in the district. court proceedings, it

was allowed.to intervene formally in the: appeal pro-'

ceedings before’ the Second Circuit. The contrary

. *Respondents have attempted to discount the significance. of

. McLeod v. General Electric Co., arguing that the matter was not

_ litigated and that, in any event leave to intervene was allowed only —

as a “nominal party.” But the court’s. order did not refer to the

intervenor as a “nominal’~party. And while it is not clear whether

the matter was litigated, the holding of the Second Circuit

_ clearly gave the charging party “party” status with the right to -

seek review in this Court. This right was exercised when the un-

“= joined with the Board to petition for certiorari, (385 U.S.

. 533). y . | )

_ Furthermore, it is interesting that. the Board through respond-

ent Kennedy attempts to avoid the conflict with McLeod v. Gen-

eral Electric Co., by ‘arguing that there the Board through its

regional director McLeod ¢hoose not to object to- the charging

- party intervening and appearing as a party. and filing a petition

_yfor certiorari.. One wonders. why the Board did not object in

that case (if that is the fact) and objects so strenuousfy in the

4 ORs

a of

- result was reached in the present case after the charging

parties had participated in the district cgurt proceedings.

Both the order allowing intervention by the Second

Circuit and the order denying intervention in the pres-

ent case were issued without opinion.*

3. The question presented ‘involves. an important —

issue in the administration of the. Act. The ‘number

of §10(1) injunction proceedings filed in district courts -

has risen from 44 in fiscal year 1953 to 227 in fiscal year

1965.** In addition, the resolution of the question of the

right of a charging party to intervene in the appeal of the;

~ issuance of a §10(1) injunction will undoubtedly dispose :

of the question of the right of a charging party to in- _

tervene in the appeal of the issuance of a §10(j) in- ~

junction. Ghe number of §10(j) injunction proceedings .

filed in district courts is also on the rise. There was

one such proceeding in fiseal year 1953 and 18 in

fiscal year 1965.*** The question presented is there-

fore not episodic, but is likely to arise with increasing

frequency in the courts of appeals and therefore it, is

in the public interest to resolve it now.

Moreover, the right of a charging employer to iriter-

-vene i in appeal proceedings to review a §10(1) injunc-

tion presents a particularly important federal question

*In N.L.R.B. v.. Nashville Building & Construction Trades

Council, 383 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1967), the court had before it

both a §10(1) note I proceeding and an enforcement pro-

ceeding under §10(e): Intervention by the successful charging

party in the enforcement proceeding was allowed, but the. court

did not speak to the issue af whet ‘infervention in a §10(1)

proceeding was proper. 383 F.2d at 563 n- 1.

**Eighteenth Anntal Report of the National Labor Relations

Board at 114-17 (1954) ; Thirtieth Annual Report of the National

Labor Relations Board at 214 —

***Tbid.

a tra ; «a

a

which should be seltled. by this Court. Section’ 10(1) .

provides that when a complaint alleges an illegal sec-

ondary boycott, the Board must petition for injunctive

relief if the regional director has “reasonable cause to

believe such charge is true.” This mandatory nature of

§10(1) reflects congressional recognition of the need to

accord employers immediate injunctive relief from the

irreparable injury that results from secondary boycotts:

’ - “Section 10(1)- «reflects a congressional de-

termination. that ‘the unfair labor practices enu-

‘merated therein are so disruptive of labor manage-

ment relations and threaten such danger of harm

to the .public that they should be enjoined when-

ever a, district court has been shown reasonable

cause to believe in their existence and finds that

the threatened harm or disruption can best be ©

avoided through an injunction. [citations omitted].

It is not*for the Regional Director to substitute his

own ideas of how best to-deal with alleged unfair

labor practices for those of the Congress.” (Retail

Clerks- Union v. Food Employers Council,.Inc., 351

F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1965)). ss

‘Congress’s firm purpose in enacting §10(1) was to

protect employers from the necessity of waiting for a

final Board adjudication in .cases involving such

business-crippling practices as secondary boycotts. In

the average case where ‘enforcement of the Board’s

action is resisted, nearly seventeen months, elapse from

the date of the violation to the date of the enforcement

order.* To deny the initially successful charging em-

on Administrative Practice and Procedure:

Sen nm. om the Judi , 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on

Regulatory Agencies to’the sident-Elect 64 (1964).

ai,

ployer the right to intervene in appeal proceedings in

order to protect his interest in continuing such injunctive _

relief would be egregiously contrary to this congression-

al purpose. - rs

Petitioners believe that thé reasoning and the holding

of Scofield and Fafnir are controlling in this case. How-

ever, whatever view is taken on this substantive issue,

the question of the application of Scofield and Fafnir

to §10 injunction proceedings should’ be resolved by

this Court. A court of appeals will have to face’ the is-.

sue of intervention by the su¢cessful charging party each

‘time review is’ sought by the unsuccessful charged party

_in a §10(1) or §10(j)- injunctive proceeding. We* re-

spectfully submit that a resolution of the charging

party’s rights is in the public interest and essential to

the ‘proper and smooth functioning’ of feder bor

relations law.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this pe-

tition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Cuar.es G. BAKALY, Jr.,

Attorney for Petitioners.

Of Counsel:

Fitnt & McKay,

O’Metveny & Myers,

~ Ricwarp C. WHITE,

Cuarves W. BENDER,

Peter M. ANDERSON,

Avucust, 1968

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- APPENDIX A.

United States Court of Appeals, for the Ninth Cir-

cuit. . >

San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper. Guilds» -News- co

paper and Periodical Drivers’ and. Helpers’ Union se

Local 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69;

Los Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los An- .

_ geles Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typo-

» graphical Union No. 174; International Association |

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge .

No. 94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; |

Building Service and Maintenance Employees Se ;

No. 399; Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los. :

Angeles Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Appellants, vs.

Ralph. E. Kennedy, Regional Diréctor of Region 21 of E

the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be- ,

half of the National Labor Relations Board, Appellee.

Nos. 22767-8-9. ee ; ; ; |

__ Filed: May 20, 1968. - .

Before: KOELSCH, BROWNING and DUNIWAY, -

Circuit Judges

The Regional Director and charged parties, having.

moved for reconsideration of our order allowing the

_ charging parties to intervene in:this proceeding, the lat- , |

ter. were permitted to and did file a brief in opposition &§

and the matter was then submitted. eeaoks

If IS ORDERED that the order of April 19, 1968,

so far as ‘it permitted such intervention, is rescinded

but is deemed ‘an authorization for charging parties ‘to -

appear and file a brief as amici curiae.

/s/ M. OLIVER KOELSCH _

/s/ JAMES R. BROWNING

/s/ BEN C. DUNIWAY *

United States Circuit Judges

SrapeNree Soe ry

Order. on Motions.

United States Court of Appeals, for the Ninth Cir-

cuit.

San F rancisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild; News-

- paper and Periodical Drivers’ and. Helpers’ Union Lo-

cal. 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los

Angeles Web .Pressmen’s Uriion No. 18; Los Angeles

Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographi-

cal Union No. 174; International A$sociation-of Ma-

chinists and Aerospace Workers, District, Lodge No.

94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Build-

ing Service and Maintenance Employees” Union No.

399; Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los An-

geles Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Appellants, vs.

Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of Region 2 1 of

the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf

of the National Labor Relations Board, Appellee. Nos.

~~ 22767-89. | '

Filed: April 19, 1968.

Before: KOELSCH, BROWNING and DUNIWAY,

' Circuit Judges.

Appellants, above named, have siited from an

order of the United States District Court, granting a

temporary injunction on February 7, 1968, in an ac-

tion brought by the Regional Director of Region 21 of

the National Labor Relations Board under Section 10-

(L) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended

(29 U.S.C. §160(L)). ES Grae /

Presently they have moved for an nts suspending

the injunction pending this appeal. By stipulation: the

‘ parties agreed that the Regional Director should file a

written response to said motion by April 17 and that

v

nis

the matter would then be submitted for the court’s de-

termination withotit argument; additidnally, the par-

ties agreed upon a briefing schedule. and requested an

_early hearing of the appeal on the merits.

The charging parties in the Labor Board proceed-

ings (Case Nos. 21-CC-1043 and 21-CC-1043-2) on

April 17, filed their motion seeking leave to intervene

in this appeal and time to file their — to ap-

‘{pellants’ motion. ._ ey apes

The court, after pam, consideration, eee the fol-

lowing order: :

1. The charging’parties are granted leave to inter-

vene in this appeal as or: their motion for time,

etc. is’ denied ; :

2. Appellants’ motion for stay of the temporary in--

_ junction is denied;

3. The briefing schedule i is as follows:

Appellants shall file and serve their briefs by April an

23; appellees may have seven days after receipt of such

briefs to file their briefs, and appellants’ reply briefs

to follow within five days.thereafter. —

/s/ M. OLIVER KOELSCH

/s/ JAMES R. BROWNING

/s/ BEN C. DUNIWAY

_ * United States Circuit Judges

APPENDIX B.

Order Granting Temporary Injunction.

United. States District Court, Northern District of . >

; California:

— Ralph E. Kosieeity. Regional Director of Region 21

of the National Labor Relations Boatd, for and on be- »

. half of the N ational Labor Rélations Board, Petitioner,

vy. San’ Francisco-Oakland™ Newspaper Guild; News-

paper and Periodical Drivers’ ‘and Helpers’ Union Lo-

cal 921; 1; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los

Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los: Angeles

Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los: Angeles Typograph-

ical Union No. 174; International Association of Ma-

chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94;

General Warehqusemen’s Union Local 598; Building

Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399;

Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles

Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, Respondents. Civil No.

48511.

. This cause came on to his ee upon the verified nl

' tition of Ralph F. Kennedy, Regional Director of Re-

gion 21. of the National Labor Relations Board, for and |

on behalf of’ the Board, for a temporary injunction

pursuant to Section 10(1) of the National -Labor Re-

lations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(1)), pend- .

ing the final disposition of the matters involved pend-

ing. before said Board, and upon the issuance of an

order to show cause why injunctive relief. should not be ~

~ ‘granted as ‘prayed in ‘said petition. The Court, upon

consideration of the pleadings, affidavits ‘and other

evidence, briefs, arguments of counsel, and the entire:

record in the case, has made and filed its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding and. concluding

that there is reasonable cause to believe that respondents

have engaged in, and are engaging in, acts and conduct

in violation of 29 U.S.C.+Sec. 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B),

affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

Sec. 152(6) and (7), and that such acts and conduct

" will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined.

~ Now, therefore, upon the entire- record, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that,

pending the final disposition .of the matters involved

pending before the National Labor Relations’ Board, re-

spondents Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los. |

Angeles Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los Angeles |

Stereotypers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographi-

cal Union No. 174; International Association of Ma-

4 “chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge. No. 94;

a : General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building

Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399;

Los Angeles Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles

. Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3, and each of them, their |

officers, representativ es, agents, - servants, employees,

attorneys, and. all members, persons and labor organi-

zations acting in concert. or participation. with them, or

any of them, be, and they hereby are, enjoined and,

restrained from:

aia iat ais rrr "

Engaging in, sanctioning, supporting, promoting, or

by picketing, handbilling,. orders, instructions, ‘requests’

or appeals, or by union disciplinary measures, or re-

fusal to refer employees, or by any like or related acts

or conduct, or by permitting any such to remain in ex-

’ istence or effect, inducing or encouraging any individ-

ual employed ‘bythe San Francisco Examiner (heréin

called Examiner), the Chronicle. Publishing Company

-

(herein called Chronicle), the San Francisco News-

, paper Printing . Company, Iné. .(herein - called Print-

ing Company), the ‘Hearst. Baltimore News American

Division, the Hearst Boston Record American-Adver- —

_tiser Division, the Hearst Capital ‘Newspapers Divi- -

sion, the Hearst San Antonio Light. Division, the:

Hearst Seattle Post-Intelligencer Division, or employed :

by any other, person engaged in commerce or an indus-

try affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a re-

fusal. in the course of his employment ‘to use, manu-

- facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work

on goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to per-

form any services, or in any such or similar manner ©

threatening, coercing or restraining the Printing Com-

pany, or the said newspapers, or any of them, or any

other person, where in either case an object thereof

is: (1) to force-or require the Printing Company, or

the said newspapers, or any of them, to cease doing

business with their customers or suppliers; or (2) to

'. force or require the customers or ‘suppliers of the Print-

ing. Compariy, or the said newspapers, or any of them,

to cease doing business with the Printing Company, or

the said newspapers, or any of them. |

-- Done at San Francisco, California, this 7th day of

February, 1968, at 4:50 p.m. |

/s/ Alfonso:J. Zirpoli .

United States District Judge

ee

. Supplemental Order Granting ~~

Temporary Injunction.

United States District natn Northern District. of

California

Ralph E. ‘Kennedy, em —— of Region 21

of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be-

half of the’ National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner,

v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild; News- -

_paper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’. Union

Local 921; Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69;

Los Ailes Web Pressmen’ s Union No. 18;:Los An-

geles Stereotypers’ Union Now 58; Los Angeles Typo-

graphical Union No. 174 -vinternational Association of

Machinists and Aerospacé Workers, ‘District’ Lodge No.

94; General Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building _

Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399 ;

' Los. Angeles Mailers’ Union No..9; and Los’ Angeles

Paper Handlers’ Union No. 3 Respondents. Civil No.

48511.

__- This cause came on.to be heard upon the verified

petition of Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of

Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board, for

and on behalf of the Board, for a temporary injunction

pursuant to Section 10(1) of the National Labor Re-,

lations Act, as amerided (29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(1)), pend-—

ing the final disposition of the matters involved pend-

ing before said Board, and upon. the issuance of an.

‘order to show cause why ‘injunctive relief should not: be

granted as prayed in said petition. ‘The Court, upon

‘consideration of -the pleadings, affidavits and other. evi-

dence, briefs, arguments of’ counsel, and the entire rec-

ord in the ease, has made and filed its Findings of Fact

and. Conclusions of Law, finding and concluding that |

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there is reasonable cause to believe that respondents

have engaged in, and are engaging in, acts and conduct

e violation -of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4)¢i)(ii)(B),

affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

Sec. 152(6) and (7), and that such acts and conduct.

will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined.

Now, therefore, upon the entire record, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that,

pending the final disposition of the matters involved

pending before the National Labor Relations Board, re-

spondents San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild and

Newspaper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’.Union —

Local 921, and each of them, their officers, representa-

tives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all

members, persons and labor organizations acting in

concert or participation with them, or any of them, be,

and they hereby are, enjoined and restrained, in fur-

therance and support.of a labor dispute between two

‘respondents parties hereto and the Herald-Examiner,

from: one .

Engaging in, sanctioning, supporting, promoting, Or

by picketing, handbilling, orders, instructions, requests

or appeals, or by union disciplinary measures, or refusal

to refer, employees, or by any like or related acts or con-

duct, or by- permitting any such to remain in existence

or effect, inducing or encouraging any individual em-

ployed by the San Francisco Examiner (herein called

Examiner), the Chronicle Publishing Company (herein

called Chronicle), the San Francisco Newspaper Print-

ing Company, Inc. (herein called Printing Company),

the Hearst Baltimore’ News American Division, the

Hearst Boston Record American-Advertiser Division,

the Hearst Capital Newspaper Division, the Hearst San

Antonio Light Division, the Hearst Seattle Post-Intel- _

_digencer Division, or employed by any other person en-

gaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, °

to-engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his

employment to use,.manufacture, process, transport, or

otherwise handle or work on goods, articles, materials,

-or commodities, or to perform any services, or in any’

such or similar manner threatening, coercing or restrain-

ing the Printing Company, or the said newspapers, or

_any of them, or any other person, where in either case

an object thereof is: (1) to force or require the Printing

Company, or the said newspapers, or any of them, to.

cease doing business with their customers or Suppliers; ~

or (2) to force or require the custoniers or suppliers

of the Printing Company, or the said newspapers, or any

of them, to cease doing business with the Printing Com-

pany, or the said newspapers, or afty. of them; provided

‘that nothing in this order shall prevent San Fran-

- cisco-Oakland Newspaper’ Guild of Newspaper and

Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union Local 921 from

engaging in or lawfuly supporting any primary labor

dispute between the Examiner, Chronicle or the Print:

ing Company afd any union representing any —

of said persons.

Done at San Francisco, California, this 8th day of

February, 1968, at 9:45.a.m.

/s/ Alfonso J. Zirpoli,

United States District Judge

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law..

United States District Court, Northern District .of

California. ‘ | 7

Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of Region 21

of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on be-

half of the National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner,

v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper. Guild; Newspaper

and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union Local 921;

-. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los Angeles

Web Pressmen’s Union No. 18; Los Angeles Stereo- |

typers’ Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographical Union

No. 174; International Association of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94; General

Warehousemen’s Union Local 598; Building Service and.

Maintenance Employees Union No. 399; Los Angeles

Mailers’ Union No. 9; and Los Angeles Paper Handlers’

Union No. 3, Respondents. Civil No. 48511.

This cause came“on to be heard upon the verified

petition of Ralph E. Kennedy, Regional Director of .

Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (here-

in called the Board), for a temporary injunction pur-_

suant to Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations

Act, as amended (herein called the Act), pending the —

final disposition of the matters involved herein pending

before the Board, and upon the issuance of an order to

show cause why injunctive relief should not be granted.

. as prayed in the petition. Respondents filed answérs

to the said petition. A hearing on the issues raised by

the petition and answers was duly held on February 7,

1968. : 3

=} J.

The Court, upon consideration of the pleadings, evi-

dence, briefs, arguments of counsel; and the entire

record in the case, makes the following:

-Findings of Fact

&R Petitioner i is the Regional Director of Region 21

of the Board, an agency of the United States, and filed

this petition for and on behalf of the Board. |

_ 2, (a) On or about January 6, 1968, the San Fran-

cisco Examiner, Division of The Hearst Corporation

(herein called Examiner), and the Los Angeles Herald-.

_ Examiner, Division of The Hearst Corporation (herein

called Herald-Examiner ), - inter alias, filed with the.

Board’ a first amended charge to a charge originally

filed with the Board on or about January 5, 1968, the

- said first amended charge alleging: that respondents,

other than the San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, .

have engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor

practices within the meaning of 29 U. S.C. Sec. 158(b)-

(4) (i) (ii) (B). *

(b) On or about January 10, 1962, the. Herald-Ex-

aminer and the Examiner filed with the Board a

similar charge alleging that the San Francisco-Oakland

Newspaper Guild has engaged in, and is engaging in, —

unfair labor practices within the meaning of 29 U.S.C,

- Sec. 158(b) (4) (i) (ii) (B).

3. The aforesaid charges and first amended charge

were referred to_petitioner as the Regional Director of ©

Region 21 of the Board.

4. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable chuse to

believe that: PY oil

(a) Respondents, each an unincorporated ‘association,

are organizations in which -employees participate and

* dani

which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of deal-

ing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-

putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment. or

conditions of work. Respondents maintain their prin- _

cipal offices either in Los Angeles County, California,

or in San Francisco, California. At all times material

herein, respondents, and each of them, have been en-

gaged within this judicial district in transacting busi-

‘ness and in promoting and protecting the -interests of

their employee members or employee members of con-

stituent or affiliated labor organizations.

(b) The Hearst Corporation (herein called Hearst),

a Delaware corporation with its principal office in

New York, New York, is engaged in, among other

things, the publishing of newspapers and magazines.

‘Hearst maintains seven newspaper divisions: The Balti-

more News American Division; The Boston Record

_ American-Advertiser Division; Capital Newspapers , Di-

vision; The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division;

The San ‘Antonio Light Division; The San Francisco

Examiner Division; and The Seattle Post- ia catad

Division.

(c) The Herald-Examiner publishes in Los hiitiihins

California, a daily and a Sunday newspaper in connec-’.

tion with which it subscribes to several interstate news

sérvices, has an annual gross volume of business in

~ excess of $1,000,000 and annually purchases goods and

materials valued in excess of $100,000 which are

shipped to it from points and _— located outside

the State of California.

(d) The Examiner publishes in San Francisco, Cali-

fornia, a daily newspaper, subscribes to several inter-

state news. services, has an annual gross volume of

f

business in excess of $1,000,000 and annually purchases

goods, services and materials valued in excess of $100,-

000 originating at points and places outside the State

of California. The’ Examiner also, jointly with The

Chronicle Publishing Company, publishes a Sunday

. newspaper.

(e) The Chronicle Publishing ‘Os (herein -

called Chronicle), a Nevada corporation with offices in

San Francisco,, California, publishes, in San Francisco,

California, a daily newspaper known as The San Fran-

cisco Chronicle. In connection with its publication of

the said newspaper, and jointly with the Examiner in_

the publication of a Sunday newspaper, Chronicle: pur-

chases and receives goods, services, materials and sup-

plies originating outside the State of California valued

at a substantial amount and subscribes to interstate |

news services.

(f).The San Francisco Newspaper Printing. —

pany, Inc. (herein called Printing Company), a Ne- ;

vada corporation with principal office and place of ©

business in San Francisco, California, is engaged in the

business ‘of. newspaper .printing in connection with

‘which it performs the mechanical, circulation, advertis-

ing, accounting, credit, and collection functions for both

the Examiner and the Chronicle. In the course and

conduct of its printing business, the ‘Printing Company

purchases and receives goods, materials ‘and supplies _

originating outside the State of California valued at a

substantial amourtt.

(g) The Herald-Examiner is, and at all times mate-

rial herein has been, operated independently of the

Examiner the Chronicle and the Printing Company; is

‘and has been operated as a separate autonomous enter-

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prise and has and has had separate independent labor re- |

lations policies and practices. Neither the day-to-day

operations nor the labor relations policies of the Herald-

Examiner, the Examiner, the Chronicle or the Print-

ing Company are controlled by Hearst.

(h) At all times material herein, respondents, other

than the-San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild and

Newspaper and Periodical Drivers’ and Helpers’ Union

Local 921, have been engaged. in a labor dispute with

the Herald- Examiner, and in furtherance and support

-of such dispute some of such respondents have, since

about, December 15, 1967, picketed the plant and prem-

— ises of the Herald-Examiner.

(i) At no time material herein have respondents, or

any of them, had a labor dispute with’the Examiner, the

Chronicle, or the Printing Company, or any other Hearst

newspaper other than the dispute of some of. the re-

spondents with the Herald-Examiner.

(j) On or about January 5, 1968, in initial and

support of the aforesaid labor dispute with the Herald-

Examiner, respondents, acting jointly and in concert

and participation with each other, embarked upon a

plan, program and campaign to create a boycott and a

work stoppage at the plants and premises of the Exam-

iner, the Chronicle and the Printing Company. Pursu-

ant to the said plan, program and campaign, on or

about January 5, 1968, respondents commenced picket-’

ing the plants and .premises of the Examiner, the

Chronicle and the Printing Company, and distributing

‘handbills to employees and the public at - said plants

arid premises.

(k) In addition’ to ‘the picketing and handbilling, as

set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), above, and also pur-

o poe Te

suant to the aforesaid plan, program and campaign, re- |

spondent San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild oral-

ly instructed, directed and appealed to its members em-

ployed by the Printing Company to engage in work

stoppages and refusals to perform services for their

employer. . m

(1) In addition to. the paeneney set forth in Findings

of Fact 4(j)-and 4(k), above, and also pursuant to the

aforesaid plan, program and campaign, respondent

Newspaper and Periodical Drivers? and Helpers’

Union Local 921 instructed its members employed by

- the Printing Company to engage in a work stoppage,

failed and refused to permit them to perform services

for their employer, and threatened the Printing Com- .

pany with continued failure or refusal to permit its .

members to resume work for the Printing Company. |

(my Asa consequence gf respondents’ acts and con-

duct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), and 4(1),

above, individuals employed by the Examiner, by the

Chronicle, and by the Printing Company engaged in

work stoppages and failures to perform services for

their’ employers, and the newspaper publication’ and

printing facilities of the Examiner, the Chronicle, and

the Printing Company were completely shut down.

(n) By the acts and conduct set forth in Findings

of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), and 4(m), above, respondents

have engaged in, and have induced and encouraged it-

dividuals employed by the Examiner, the Chronicle, the

Printing Company,-and employed by other persons, to |

engage in, strikes or refusals in the ‘course of their

‘ employment to use, manufacture process. transport, or

otherwise handle or work on goods, articles, materials —

or commodities, or to perform services, and have

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-

threatened, coerced or restrained the Examiner, the

Chronicle, the Printing Company, -and other "persons

engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-

~ merce.

(0) Objects of the acts and coniheet of respondents;

set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), 4(m),

- and 4(n), above, have been, and are: (1) to force or re-

quire the .Examiner;, the Chronicle, or the Printing

Company to cease doing business with their “customers

and suppliers; or (2) to force or require the customers

and suppliers of the Examiner, of the Chronicle, or. of

the Printing Company to cease doing business with

the said persons.

5. - It may fairly be anticipated that, unless enjoined,

respondents will. continue to repeat the acts and con-

duct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1),

4(m), 4(n), and 4(0), above, or similar or like acts -

and conduct in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. a (4)-

GB).

: Contin of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of

the subject matter of these proceedings, and under 29 _

U.S.C. Sec. 160(1) is Sree to grant injunctive

relief.

2. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable cause

- to believe that#

(a) Each respondent is a labor organization within

‘the meaning of 29. U.S.C. Secs. shai 158(b), and

160(1).

(b) The ey eee the Examiner, the

,Chronicle, and the Printing Company each is -engaged

a ee

. \ in commerce within the meaning: of 29 U.S.C. Secs.

: 152(6) and 152(7). -

(c) The- Herald-Examiner, the Examiner, the

Chronicle, and the Printing Company each is engaged .

-in commerce or in an: industry affecting commerce.

(d) ‘Respondents have engaged in tinfair labor prac-:

tices within the meaning ‘of 29 U:S.C. Sec. 158(b) (4)-

(i) (ii) ( B), affecting commerce within the meaning of

29 U.S.C. Secs. 152(6) and 152(7), and a continua-

tion of these practices will impair the policies of the .

Act as set forth in 29 U.S. C. Sec. 151(b).’

3. To preserve the issues for the orderly determina-

tion as provided in the Act, it is appropriate, just and

proper that, pending the final disposition of the mat-

ters herein involved pending before the Board, re-

spondents, their officers, representatives, agents, ser-

--vants, employees, attorneys, and. all members;: persons

and labor organizations acting in concert or partici- .

pation with them, or any of them, be enjoined and re-

strained from the commission, continuation, or repeti-

tion of the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of

Fact 4(j), 4(k), 4(1), 4(m), 4(n), and 4(0), above,

acts.and conduct in furtherance and support thereof, a

like or related acts or conduct the commission of which

_in the future. is likely or may fairly be anticipated from

respondents’ acts and conduct in the past.

Done at San Francisco, California, this 7th day of

February, 1968.

/s/ Alfonso J. Zirpoli