Appendix — General Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission

Supreme Court brief1968

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APPENDIX A

_ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

_ FOR.THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 15910

GeneRAL Foops Corporation, Petitioner,

v.

FEpeRAL TRADE Commission, Respondent.

On Petition To Review anp Set Aspe an ORDER

or THE FeperaL Trane ComMIssION

Argued J une 6, 1967 s

Before Statey, Chief Judge, Hastie, Circuit Judge, and |

Suerpan, District Judge.

Opinion of the Court*

_ (Filed November 9, 1967)

By Statey, Chief Judge.

Appellant, General Foods Corporation (hereinafter

. **G.F.’’), seeks to have reviewed and set aside a final order.

of the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission’ .

order required G.F. to divest itself of all the S.0.S. assets

acquired in violation of §.7 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 |

(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).? —

* The opinion of the Court of Appeals has been reproduced as

it appears in the certified Record in this Court.. Where typo-

graphical and other errors have been corrected in the Federal

Reporter they have been marked by inserting ‘‘[sic].’’

1 The pertinerit portion of the statute provides:

‘‘No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly

or indirectly, the whole or any: part of the stock or other

share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction

of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or

any part of the assets of another. corporation engaged also in

commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the

country, the effect of such acquisition may be ‘substantially to

lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’’ 64 Stat.

1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731

(1914). :

2

Appendia A

The precise determination was that G.F.’s acquisition of -

S.0.S. ‘‘will in fact substantially lessen competition in the

steel wool pad market.’’ ,

Both before and after the acquisition, which octurred

on December 31, 1957, the major source of revenue for

-§.0.S. came from tlie sale of its household steel wool pads.

These pads are produced by a shaving process in which a

specifically manufactured steel wool wire is drawn through

‘a machine containing a series of cutting knives. As the wire

is drawn against the knives, strands of steel wool with tri-

angular cross sections are shaved off and collected in

ribbons. Thereafter, these ribbons are formed into balls

or pads, the majority of which are impregnated with soap,

dried, and packaged for sale.

Steel wool pads make a ivtineiaely effective abrasive.

The three exposed cutting edges or cross sections perform

in much the same manner.as a knife abrasing by cutting or

shaving the surface to which the steel wool is applied. With

the addition of soap to the pad to facilitate its abrasive

action, steel wool makes a highly effective scouring and

cleansing agent.

_. The steel wool cutting machines are comparatively large,

complicated machines, not generally available on the open.

market, but are custom made to the manufacturer’s specifi-

cations. A German manufactured machine is available

but is not as efficient. as its American counterpart. The

machines can be used for no other function than the produc-

tion of steel wool. Wool manufactured from materials

other than steel are impractical because of the high cost of

the raw materials.

G.F. is one of the largest producers and distributors of

packaged food in the United States? All-its products are

2G.F. is divided ate five operating divisions which manufacture

and distribute its products—the operations of the five divisions

are supported by a Distribution Sales Service Division, an Institf-

38

Appendix A |

- low-priced high-turnover household consumer commodities

sold to customers through the Same grocery and super-

‘market outlets as are S.0.S. steel wool soap pads. Between

1955 and 1964, its net sales rose from $825 million to $1.3 .

billion, and its net asséts from $279 million to $436 million, |

an increase of 57.6% and 56.2% respectively. int

Because the self-service outlet is. the primary source of

distribution’ for its products, G.F. endeavors to create a

desire for a particular product in the mind of the shopper,

. thereby enabling her to make a distinction among the differ-

ent brands of a similar commodity. . It is ‘an unrelenting

_ effort, to presell.the housewife.’

Mass advertising and market promotions are essential

factors in the effort to achieve this goal. In 1957 G.F.’s

advertising and sales promotions aggregated $69 million,

and in 1958 $87 million. By 1961, G.F. ranked third among

all national advertisers, with most of its advertising expen-

ditures going into television advertising. * |

tional Food Service Division, and a Technical Center for research.

Each ‘division is headed by a general manager who reports to a

corporate vice-president and who is responsible for. executing his

own ‘‘business plan’’ following review and approval by higher .

~ levels of authority. Each division consists of regional sales dis-

tricts with each division having its own sales force. The exception

to this is the ‘‘Kool Aid’’ division, which distributes its products

through independent brokers.

_ 3 Advertising, according to .G.F., émbraces all phases of commer-

cial communication with consumers, and all of the many consumer

_ “‘deals’’ and incentives. Between 1957 and 1964, G.F. more than

- doubled its expenditures on consumer promotions, from $9 million

to $18.9 million.

Similarly, G.F. also was of the opinion that a successful mar-

keting program should include not only persuasion of the housewife

to select G.F.’s products from the shelves but also the. retailer to

place them on the shelves. Commensurate with this idea, G.F.

spent $9.8 million on trade promotions in. 1957. Six years later,

its expenditures in this area had more than tripled, rising to $31.5

million.

4

: Appendia A |

Prior to the acquisition, the steel wool industry had

been an almost perfectly balanced duopoly.*’ But in terms

of regional, as distinguished from national sales, 8.0.8.

managed to achieve a monopoly position in many areas.®

G.F., however, was not satisfied with the market position of

the company it acquired. Soon after the acquisition, appel-

lant concluded that the entire marketing and advertising

approach of S.0.S. needed rejuvenation.. This task was

entrusted to an advertising ageney then handling other G.F.

products. The new agency succeeded in enhancing the

. §.0.8. image by skillfully emphasizing different aspects of

the product than had previously been featured and by per-

*In 1957, the total'sales for the stee] wool industry amounted to

$28.6 million, The sales of the largest competitor, S.0.S., amounted

to $14.6 million, or 51%, and those of Brillo, to $13.6 million, or

47.6%. Three small producers accounted for the remaining 1.4% of

the total sales. None of these smaller companies had sales of over a

half-million dollars.

In 1957, S.0.S. had net assets of almost $6 million, while Brillo’s

assets, in 1958, amounted to $8 million.. None of the other industry

competitors possessed assets of as much as a half-million dollars.

5In April-May of 1957; S.0.S.’. sales represented 77.5% of total

sales on the Pacific coast, 75% in Chicago, 68.5% in the west-central

region, 65.7% in the south-west region, 60% in New England,

58.4% in the east-central region. Brillo scored very heavily in the

metropolitan New York area, accounting for almost 77% ‘of total

sales there. *° | ;

Traditionally, the ‘tude, has sold ts products on a delivered-

price basis on all orders exceeding a‘minimum amount with the:

manufacturer absorbing the cost of transportation. Due to the

high cost of shipping, the manufacturer confined the distribution

of its product to the region of its plant’s location. Only: 8.0.8. and

Brillo, with higher prices than the smallest companies, were in a

position to absorb the high freight.

5

a Appendiz A

suading G.F.’s management that they. should place an:

almost total reliance on television advertising.® ,

A survey of sales’ statistics for the household steel

wool industry reveals the dramatic change that G.F. was

able to effect. . During the period from 1955 to 1957 total

sales in the industry rose ‘from $24.2 million to $28,6 million,

a market expansion of over 18%. The sales of S.0.8., how-.

ever, increased by. only 14.5% from $12.7 million in 1955

to $14.6 ‘million in 1957. S.O.S. thus failed to keep pace -

. with the expanding market, its share falling from 52.8% in |

1955 to 51% in 1957. Contrasted with this decline is the —

rise of Brillo’s market share during the same period, going

from 45.7% in 1955 to 47.6% in 1957. Brillo’s sales in-

: creased by 23.4%, a rate markedly more rapid than that for

the industry as 4 whole.

The downward trend in the market position of S.OS.

continued for a period of time after the acquisition due.to

G.F.’s preoccupation with the integration of 8.0.8. into its

own organization. Brillo, during this same period, con-

tinued to grew faster than the market ; its sales increased,

for example, from $14.4 million in 1958 to $14.9 million in

® Prior to the acquisition, in the period from 1954 through 1957,

S.0.S. spent approximately $1.25 million yearly for television

advertising. After the acquisition, in the period from 1960 to 1963,

expenditures rose to a yearly average of- $2.25 million, an increase”

One reason for the increased expenditures was a decision to

advertise on more expensive evening shows. . §.0.S. had formerly

recognized that advertising on nighttime shows was preferable

but had felt that the expense ‘was prohibitive. G.F., however, as

of other G.F. products, 8.0.8. not only gained . access to choice

shows at prime time but earned G.F.’s greater discounts computed

on the basis of G.F.’s huge combined advertising purchases for all

’ its products, 3

Q

6

——s A.

1959, a gain of 3:8% as compared to a total market expan-

‘sion of 2.8%.

Beginning in 1960, with the post-acquisition period coming

to a close, the advantages derived from G.F.’s great com- _

petitive strength began to make themselves evident, and

the fortunes of S.0.S. took an upward turn. Sales began

to accelerate sharply and at a much faster pace than those

. for the total industry.’ Between 1959 and 1962, the sales of

8.0.8. rose from $15.2 million to $19.2 million, a gain of

26.5%. ‘Total industry ‘sales, however, increased by’ only -

11.5%, from $30.7 million to $34.2 million. Sales of S. 08.,

therefore, expanded at' more than twice the rate of the

household steel wool market, and the market share of S.0.S.

grew from 49.4% in 1959 to 56% in 1962.

In: the face of this. remarkable comeback by S.O.S.,

‘ Brillo’s position deteriorated rapidly. Even though in-

dustry household steel wool sales increased by 11 5%,

Brillo’s sales actually “decreased. from $14.9 million in

1959 to $14.3 million in 1962, a decline. of 4.2% in an ex-

panding market.® Confronted with steadily falling nies, 0

7 Trade and consumer promotions ‘for the sale of S.0.S. ae were

also more energetically engaged in by G.F. And owing to its in-

tegration in, G.F.’s market-centered distribution system, 8.O.S.

would naturally benefit from the system’s attendant advantages.

The integration enabled S.0:S. to induce purchases of its products

by: (1) granting customers discounts based ‘on pooled purchases

' of the products of G.F.’s various divisions ; (2) giving customers

the convenience of including orders of S. 0.8.’ products in their

orders of other G.F.’s —— and ‘(3) improving national

availability. .

8 Nowhere is the contrast between G.F.’s power in the market

and Brillo’s inability to cope with this power painted more starkly.

- than in the most important local market in the United States, New

York: Twenty per cent-of all soap pad consumption takes place

there. With its manufacturing facilities located in the area, Brillo

dominated the market prior to the merger, outselling $.0.S. at

7

Appendiz A

dangerously declining market share, and mounting adver-

tising and promotional expenses, Brillo, in December 1963,

ceased operations as an independent company and merged

with Purex Corporation, Ltd.

I

Section. 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which

may substantially lessen competition or tend toward mo-

-nopoly ‘‘in any line of commerce.”’ Prohibition of a

merger depends, not upon the form it assumes, but upon

the realities of the market in which the merged companies

operate. Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble

Co. (hereinafter ““Clorox’’) 386 U.S.. 568 (1967) ; Reynolds

‘Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 —

(C.A.D.C., 1962). The fact that different products may in

some sense be competitive with each other is not sufficient

to place them in the same market if by themselves they

constitute: distinet product lines. Unitéd States v. Alu-

minum Co. of America (Alcoa-Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271

(1964). -Nor does the availability of substitute products

retail during August and September 1959, by almost 6 to 1 (84.9%

v. 15.1%) on a per pad basis. wo

For years 8.0.8. had attempted, without success, to penetrate -

the New York City market, - After the acquisition, however, G.F.

was able to effectively realize a substantial increase in $.0.S. ’s

share of this market. Resulting largely from advertising, by Sep- |

tember 1963, G.F. had gained control of 31.8% of the combined .

- $.0.S.-Brillo retail market, reducing Brillo’s share to 68.2%..

Faced with this vigorous competition not only in New York City ~

‘but throughout the coyntry, Brillo countered by introducing a new

® Purex is a multi-product manufacturer and distributor of house-

hold cleaning agents, having total sales of about $127 million

in 1963. '

8

Appendia A os

compel the conclusion that they belong in the same relevant |

‘ market. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

. 853 U.S. 586 (1957), Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade

Commission, supra.

In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.. 294, 325

(1962), the Supreme Court addressed itself to the task of

clarifying some of the uncertainty surrounding the concept

of relevant market. There, the Court said:

‘“‘The outer boundaries of a product market are

determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use

‘of [sic] the cross elasticity of demand between the prod-

uet itself and substitutes for it. However, within this

broad market, well defined submarkets may exist which,

in themselves,: constitute product markets for anti-

- trust: purposes: United’ States v. E. I.-duPont de

Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-595. The boundaries.

‘of such a submarket may be determined by examining

such practical indicia as industry or public recognition —

‘of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the

product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique pro-

duction facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,

" sensitivity to price changes and spectenioed vendors. =

(Emphasis supplied.) ° :

In the present case, the Commission followed, as far

as possible, the guidelines laid down in Brown, Shoe. It

-* found that the appropriate line of commerce or relevant —

| product market within which to test the impact of the

G.F.-S.0.8. merger was household steel wool. Appellant

challenges this finding, accusing the Commission of ‘‘un-

tenable gerrymandering”’ becanse of its failure to include

in the relevant market numerous nonsteel wool household

' aids that G.F. introduced into the record. Appellant fur-

ther argues that even if the’ market definition was tech-

nically tenable, the Commission nevertheless erred ‘in

assessing the impact of the merger by treating nonsteel

wool scouring devices as though they did not exist. |

9

%

Appendia A

_ At the outset, it is important to note that G.F. does

not quarrel with the legal principles that guided the Com-.

mission. Rather, appellant contends that the Commission |

not only did not find sufficient facts to satisfy the Brown

Shoe criteria, but that many of the facts that were found

had no basis in the reeord. On this latter point thé law is

clear: the Commission’s factual findings ‘‘if supported by

evidence,’’ are conclusive.: See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964);

Universal Camera Corp. v, NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487, 80 [sic]

(1951). We have long recognized that ‘‘our job is not to

retry [a] case. We have no right to substitute a different

view from that of the Commission so long as we have

determined that its findings have substantial support in the

whole record.’’ C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. Federal Trade

Commission, 197 F.2d 273, 278 (C.A.3, 1952). Suffice it

now to say that we find there is substantial evidence to

support those facts found by the Commission. We shall

: Shortly elaborate on this point, but first -we turn to appel- -

lant’s argument that there were insufficient facts for the

Commission to determine that the relevant market in this

case was household steel wool. '

It is urged that Brown Shoe enumerates seven factors

to be considered when evaluating the relevant product

market, and that the Commission erred by ignoring the

significance of the-inapplicability to this case of two of

the seven Brown criteria. It is true that the Commission.

did not make a special finding as to the existence of

specialized vendors and distinct customers, but we do not

think that this, in itself, indicates that the relevant market

was erroneously delineated. Our reading of Brown Shoe

discloses no requirement that each of the seven criteria

must be present in every merger case. In fact, there is at

least one case where a well-defined submarket-was held to

exist where only three of the Brown criteria were present.

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309

F.2d 223 (C.A.D.C., 1962). ae ,

Ldhaieaaaaaae

10

eiaietie A

We now return to G.F.’s contention that the Consmis-

sion erroneously found many of the crucial facts in this

case. As mentioned earlier, we think. this. argument is

without merit. The Commission found that there was: a

definite industry recognition of the household steel wool

submarket as a separate economic entity. This finding is °

supported by testimony of several household steel wool

producers stating that they only looked to other steel wool

producers in setting prices and in reaching marketing de-

cisions with respect to their products. As far as these . .

producers were concerned, their ‘only serious competition

was with those companies in the industry who manufac-

tured household steel wool. Little or ho attention was

paid to producers of materials other than steel wool. In- :

deed, G.F. itself recognized that, competition offered by

nonsteel wool. products is at best ‘‘indirect.’’

Prior to acquiring S. OS, G.F. made a detailed study

of the soap pad: business and its competition. In part this: |

study stated:

“* * * Brillo, the only significant direct competition,

has been in the field for years without retarding 8.0.S.

“We are unaware of any new inventions or products ~

‘which would jeopardize the §.0.S. market. 8.08.,

through Tuffy, is setting up its own indirect eompeti-

tion.”°. Other indirect competition includes abrasive

sponges and bronze or stainless steel scouring pads.

S.0.S. has an opportunity to introduce such items as

new products under its own label.’”’ (Emphasis sup-:

plied.) ! |

te: light of the Sevegelng report, it is difficult to under-

stand how appellant can seriously expect us to believe that

10“"uffy’? is appellant’s own plastic product, inh according to —

a study prepared for appellant in 1962 it is by far the largest

selling of all the nonsteel wool cleaning devices that appellant seeks

to include in the relevant market.

11

Appendia A

nonsteel wool devices, including Tuffy, are directly com-

‘petitive with household steel wool products. Our incredu-

lity is heightened by the fact that the majority of products

which appellant now contends to be close substitutes were ‘

in existence and on the market at the time of G:F.’s” pre-

- acquisition study. As stated by the Commission: —

tidied 1 8 [appellant] and the other steel wool soap -

pad manufacturers regard themselves as a separate

market, then it is this market in which the impact

of [appellant’s] acquisition must be judged. It can- -

not be said that the existence and conduct of other

manufacturers outside the market must be considered

where the soap pad manufacturers themselves do not |

_take these substitute product manufacfurers into ac-

count. in their own pricing and marketing ‘decisions.’ ©

.General Food Corp., — F.T.C. — (Dkt. 8600, 1966).

The Commission further found that steel wool pads have.

peculiar characteristics and uses. ‘Testimony and ex-

hibits relating -to.the physical composition, operational

characteristics, and stated uses for household steel wool

substantiate this finding. Nonsteel wool products assume

variant forms bearing little resemblance to steel wool and*

their compositions range from plastic, to copper, to abra-

sive-surface sponges. But appellant argues that these

products are functionally similar to the steel wool’soap pad.

An attempt is made to support this argument by pointing to.

‘advertising claims made by some of ‘the allegedly direct

competitors. The attempt is unsuccessful. Advertising

puffs will not be considered by this court as evidence of

that which could not be proved below. . We prefer to place

reliance on testimony given by both the former general

manager of appellant’s Kool-Aid Division and the. pre-

acquisition president of 8.0.S.: These gentlemen stated

that, to the best of their knowledge, there was no available’

device that would perform as well as the steel-wool soap pad

for the purposes advertised on the S.0.S. box,

12

Append. A

Appellant’ s argument respecting the alleged similarity

between household steel wool and. the synthetic devices is

further attenuated by G.F.’s aforementioned pre-acquisi-

‘tion report. This report noted :

““S.0.S. in the kitchen is used primarily for. scour-—

ing pots, pans, stoves, etc., while Tuffy is used much

as a dishrag is used.”’

‘Surely, appellant does not expect us to find that*‘Tuffy,”’

one of the largest selling synthetic products, has the

same characteristics and uses'as the steel wool soap pad

- when its own officials admitted that it was not manufac-

tured or used for scouring pots and pans, but primarily as

a dishwashing aid. These admijssions, together with related

facts found by the Commission, support the conclusion that

household steel wool has peculiar characteristics and uses.

~ Adhering to the Brown Shoe. guidelines, the -Commis-

. sion next compared the retail sales price of steel wool soap

pads with the prices of allegedly competing products. After

carefully computing and contrasting the prices of all the

products in ‘both categories, the Commission concluded that

household steel wool products are sold at distinct prices.

Appellant strongly objects to this conclusion on the ground

that many of the nonsteel wool devices (13 of which gener-

ally sell for 29 cents and one of which usually sells for 27

cents) are comparable to those of Brillo and S.0.S. soap

pads (approximately 28 cents per package). At first glance ©

this argument appears to have merit. But further analysis

persuades us that the Commission’s focus on the selling

price of individual steel wool soap pads was the only practi-

cable way in which to approach the problem. The Com-

mission found that prices of steel wool soap pads range

between 1.4 cents to 2.8 cents per pad, while nonsteel wool |

~ products are sold between 6 cents and 29 cents per item.

Appellant, however, urges that the proper test is one of

comparing the life expectancy of a 28 cent package of steel

wool soap pads with the longevity of a similarly priced

‘13

Appendia Yi

_ package of a nonsteel wool product. We agree with the

Commission’s view that the very necessity of resorting to

such estimates in order to compare prices tends, by itself, to

demonstrate the distinctiveness of the prices of the house-

hold steel wool products. aa

_Almost no evidence was introduced on behalf of the Com-

mission concerning consumer sensitivity to price changes.

There is, however, sufficient evidence to support the finding

that the prices of household steel wool products display no

sensitivity to prices of nonsteel products. Without excep-—

tion, the smaller steel wool manufacturers testified that

they disregarded the pricing structure of the nonsteel wool

devices. These manufacturers stated that they looked only

to prices established by S.0.8. and Brillo when making

pricing decisions. The former general manager of G.F.’s -

8.0.8. operation stated that he and other high level execu-

tives paid little attention to the sales volume and pricing

structure of the -nonsteel wool products. And, not sur-

prisingly, ‘the present general manager, when questioned

‘ Closely, evidenced a general lack of knowledge of the prices

of many of these allegedly competing products.

_ Finally, the Commission found that the equipment used

for the production of steel wool is distinct from, and lacks

any similarity to, the facilities required to manufacture the

other cleaning devices .that appellant contends should be

included in the relevant market. It seems to us that this

finding is self-evident: and unimpeachable. -Steel wool pro- .

ducing machinery is not available on the open market, but

must be custom made to specification. It cannot practically

be used to manufacture other products. To argue that —

8.0.8. did not utilize ‘wnique production facilities would be

to ignore the obvious. | 7

To summarize, we think that there is substantial evi-

dence in the record to support the Commission ’s finding that

the relevant product market is household steel wool. It has

been shown that household steel wool products constitute

14

Appendix A

an economically significant market and that this market is.

sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade

realities. See Crown Zellerback Corp. v. Federal Trade

Commission, 296 F.2d 800, 811 (C.A.9, 1961); cert. denied,

370 U.S. 937 (1962). Some. of the more significant trade

- realities in this case include the existence of unique steel

wool producing machinery, industry recognition of the

household steel wool submarket as a separate economic

entity, the peculiar characteristics and uses of household

steel wool, a distinct pricing structure, and the. lack of

sensitivity to prices of nonsfeel products.

The Commission’s delineation of the relevant market

rested upon a carefully reasoned review of the applicable

legal precedents and a thorough ‘analysis of the relevant

- facts. Much of the evidence supporting the Commission’s

determination consists of studies and: analysis made by

G.F.’s own management in evaluating the possibility of

profitably presiap: hd 8.0.8. ‘Testimony of G.F.’s officials

as to how they actually: operated the S.O.S. division and

whom they regarded as their real competition lends added

weight to the finding that household steel wool is the rele-

vant product market for purposes of this case.

We therefore reject . appellant’ - contention that non-

steel wool cleaning devices constitute part of the relevant

market and hold that there is substantial evidence in the.

record to support the Commission’s finding that household

steel wool constitutes a relevant market within the meaning

' of Section 7.

II.

-"The essential issue remains whether the Commission had

substantial evidence to support its finding that the acquisi-

‘tion of S.0.S. by G.F. would have. a substantial anti-

~ ‘eompetitive effect in the household steel wool market. In

‘evaluating the record before us, we are mindful that the

facts must show more than a ‘‘mere possibility’? of an

15

~~

Appendix A

anticompetitive effect. United States v. H. I. duPont de .

Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598: (1957). However, the

language of §.7 clearly indicates that the Commission need

not show that competition has been, or is being restrained,

but only that ‘‘* * * the effect of such acquisition may be

substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a

_ Monopoly.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) As summarized by the

_ Supreme Court in Clorox:’ :

‘‘Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest —

the anticompetitive effects of market power in their

incipiency.. The core question is whether a merger

may substantially lessen competition, and necessarily

requires a prediction of the merger’s impact on compe- .

tition present. and future. * * * The section can deal

only’with probabilities, not with certainties, * * * And

there is certainly no requirement that the anticompeti-

tive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action be-

fore §7 can be called into play. If the enforcement

of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive

practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such

practices in their -incipiency would be frustrated.’’

386 U.S. at 577. | _ .

On the basis of our review of the record, the Commission "s

opinion, and the recent holding in Cloroz, supra, we will

affirm the Commission’s order.

In general ‘business parlance, the instant acquisition

would be classified as a conglomerate merger. A merger is

considered conglomerate when the relationship of the merg-

ing companies before the merger was not one of buyer and

seller (a vertical merger) or direct competitor (horizontal

merger). The fact that a given merger is of a conglomerate

nature has no effect per se on the antitrust consequences of .

the union: ‘‘All mergers are within the reach of § 7, and all

must be tested by the same standard, whether ‘they are

classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other.’?

LO EP oe OO

~/

16

Appendia A

Clorox at 577. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the 1950

amendment of § 7 was to make clear that the section was not

applicable only to horizontal mergers, -but ‘‘to all types of

mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well

as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substan-

tially lessening competition * * * or tending to create a

monopoly.’’ H. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. II

(1949). .

However, while a merger is not free of antitrust con-

sequences because it is conglomerate, few such mergers have

been contested by the government. Challenges to the kind

of acquisition involved in this case lie in a ‘‘comparatively

new field of economic adjudication,’’ Clorox at 582 (Justice

’ Harlan concurring), a field troubling to both courts and the

Commission. -

The problem in analyzing conglomerate mergers is that

the effect of such a merger on the relevant market isnot so

readily apparent as is the case with vertical and horizontal

mergers. In part, this problem arises froth the fact that the

~ term ‘‘conglomerate merger”’ encompasses such a variety

of combinations. As suggested by then-professor bison .

the class of mergers included i in this term

60 © © ranges from the © pure conglomerate, in: which

there are no discernible economic relationships between |

the businesses of the acquiring and the acquired firm, ©

through a variety of what may be-called mixed con-

glomerates, involving horizontal or vertical economic

. Yelationships * * *. Mixed conglomerates include ac-

quisition of a firm producing the same product as the

acquirer but selling it in a different. geographic market,

. and acquisition of a company manufacturing a different

product which is nevertheless related to a product or

products of the acquiring firm because it can be pro-

duced withmuch the same facilities, sold ‘through the

same distribution channels, or made a part of the same

research and development efforts.’”’ Turner, Con-

17

Appendia A.

glomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton ‘Act,

78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1315 (1965). ,

While antitrust consequences might-attach to a ‘pure’?

conglomerate merger, it is more likely that “‘mixed’? con-

glomerates with their attendant horizontal or vertical rela-

tionships will. come under attack as involving proscribed

alterations in the structure of a given relevant market.

The instanf case is an example of a mixed conglomerate

merger in that the acquired product line, 8.0.8. soap pads,”

‘‘fits’? quite closely into -the overall marketing program

utilized by G.F. The Commission labeled this merger a

‘‘product extension merger”’ which is to say a ‘* * * *

merger that may enable significant integration in the pro-.

‘duction, distribution or marketing activities of the merging

firfas. ’’ We quite agree with this characterization of the

instant merger because, as found by the Commission, the

acquired product line was easily integrated into the market-

_ Ing program employed by G.F. for its packaged food prod-. .

ucts: common to the marketing of all these. products are

high-consumer-oriented advertising budgets? the same dis-

tributional outlets, primarily grocery stores and super-

markets; and the same ultimate consumer group, the

-housewife.

Agreeing as ‘we do with this characterization of the

merger, it is still necessary to determine whether the Com-

mission had substantial evidence to support its prediction

‘that the merger would probably substantially lessen@eom-

petition. This determination is necessary because ye do

not read Clorox as proscribing, per se, all mergers labeled

““product extension mergers.”’ |

As summarized by the Commission, the conclusion that

G.F.’s acquisition of S.0.S. would in fact: substantially

lessen competition in the steel wool soap pad market was

based on its

‘“«* * * finding that respondent’s acquisition of 8.0.8.

has raised to virtually insurmountable heights entry

np earn

18

Appéndia A.

eshien which were already high, that the presence of

General Foods in the market has changed the steel

wool pad market which prior to the merger consisted of

two substantially equal-sized companies and several

. smaller firms to one in which S.O.S. is now dominant,

_and finally that the substitution of General Foods for

S.0.S. will depress rather than enhance the competitive

vitality of the market and v@}l paralyze any incentive

to€ompete which might otherwise have existed. The

fact that these high entry barriers to potential entrants

* and the impairment of the competitive vitality of the

market arises in part because of the impact which

General Foods’ advertising, promotional and distribu- -

tional resources had on potential and actual compéti-

tors in this market did not make its aequisition any less

. anticompetitive.’’

Although G.F. asserts that its acquisition of 8.0.S. did

not raise entry barriers, the Commission could reasonably °

conclude the contrary on the basis of the record before it.

The Commission found that before the merger, the steel

soap pad market was highly concentrated, and although the

products of the competitors were functionally identical,

consumer preference for the 8.0.8. and Brillo products had

been generated through extensive advertising and a long

history of industry dominance. ‘Thus the smaller companies

producing less well-known brands and potential producers

of new brands could not make significant market penetra-

tions without engaging in heavy expenditures for adver-

tising and promotions. | , After the merger of S.O.S. and

G.F., the existing competitors and such potential competi-

7 as existed faced an even more- formidable opponent. —

. was able to advertise and promote S.O.S. less expen-

pon han the pre-merger S.0.S. Company, especially be-

cause of the television discounts available to G.F. More-

over, after the merger, S.0.S. could and did induce potential

customers to purchase its soap pads by’ offering them. dis-

19

Appendix A 4

counts based on pooled purchases from various divisions of

G.F. The Commission also reasonably concluded that G.F.

was in a.position vis-a-vis the retailers that made it highly

likely that G.F. would be able to obtain advantages“in the

display or marketing of S.0.S: which were not available to

the pre-merger company, nor then ‘available to S 0.8”

competitors. These factors are adequate to support the »

Commission’s finding that factual and psychological bar-

riers to entry were substantially heightened by this merger.

The Commission also found that. the merger had an

adverse impact on the structure of the soap pad industry.

_ Comparing the situation with that presented in Cloroz, the ~

Commission found—that the impact of G.F.’s acquisition

of 8.0.8. was. of greater competitive significance than

Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of Clorox since G.F.’s

entrance into the soap pad market had a more pronounced

effect on the competitive structure of the industry. In

Clorox, Procter & Gamble acquired the overwhelmingly

dominant company in the liquid bleach industry, the only

’ nationwide seller ‘that accounted for almost half of the

national sales and whose nearest competitor accounted for

only 15% of the market. Highly significant in Clorox was

- the fact that the Commission found that Procter & Gamble

was the most likely prospective entrant and exerted an

influence on the market as a potential gompetitor.

The Commission found that while the merger in Clorox

rendered the dominant company in an industry even more

powerful, G.F.’s acquisition of S.0.S. ‘‘eliminated the

competitive balance betweén S.O.S. and Brillo,’’ the two -

‘dominant members. of the industry, and left S.0.S. with

‘decisive competitive advantages over Brillo.’’ This dis-

proportionate strength. would contribute to and increase

_ concentration in the industry. Thougl»not well articulated,

there is merit to the Commission’s finding. - While itis not |

the aim of astitrust policy to merely preserve ‘‘competitive |

balance’’ per se, it assuredly is the aim of such policy to

20

?

Appendix A 4

+

preserve whatever competition exists in a given industry,

even if such. competition be of an oligopolistic nature.

G.F. also challenges~the Commission’s findings as in-

consistent with the woat actuation tistDry of the merger,

asserting that the effect of the merger-was really to re-

- witalize the then-stagnant competition between S.O.S. and

Brillo.. As pointed out by appellant, post-acquisition evi-

dence shows that S.O.S. lost ground to Brillo during the

initial period following the merger. Subsequently, through

an aggressive, imaginative campaign directed especially

against Brillo’s dominant position in the lucrative New

York market, S.0.S. regained its position and, at the time

the record closed below, had increased substantially its

shareof the market over its pre-merger proportion. The

problem .here’is that the post-acquisition evidence is in-,

conclusive and susceptible of diverse inferences,: including

inferences supporting the Commission’s position. Indeed,

the post-acquisition history indicates that Brillo has merged

with the Purex Corporation, Ltd. While the Commission

did not attempt to evaluate the effect that this merger

would have in the steel soap pad market, it did note that

the likelihood that a given merger will trigger other

mergers and give impetus to further concentration is a

relevant. factor in assessing the anticompetitive effect of

that merger. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S.

294, 343-44 (1962).

G.F. has also argued that one of the central aspects

of the Clorox case, the elimination of the acquiring firm as

a potentiat competitor, is entirely missing in this case, "and

that the record does not support the finding that the |

market structure of the steel wool soap pad industry was

\drastically altered through any loss of potential competi-

tion. It is true that G.F. was not a potential competitor

lurking on the fringe of the soap pad market and exerting

an effect-on the actions of the actual competitors. How-

lever, we do not read Clorcx as holding that ‘‘product ex-

‘of

wane

. - Appendix A

‘> tension’’ mergers must involve the elimination of this type

of potential competition to run afoul “ this type [sic] of

the Clayton Act.

Moreover, the Commission could reasonably conclude

that the potential competition was adversely affected by

G.F.’s entrance into the market through the acquisition of

8.0.8. because the entry of such a large, well-financed,

aggressive competitor would necessarily hamper whatever

effect potential competition had in tthe pre-merger market.

This result follows because the threat of entrance into a

given market by potential competitors is reduced to the

extent that entry barriers are raised. Thus.the Commis-

sion’s finding that’ potential competition was reduced by

the instant merger is based on its finding that the substitu-

tion of G.F. for the smaller 8.0.8. Company increased: the

difficulty of entering the market, and the reduction of

potential competition was a predictable consequence.

The Commission could reasonably conclude that the entry

of G.F. would have a depressing effect on the quality —

_ of competition in the market. Asin Clorox, the degree of

market power enjoyed by G.F.., including the power to take

retaliatory action against any aggressive competition by

smaller competitors, made it unlikely [sic]. that the market

would be come an even more rigid oligopoly. It is no answer

to/contend that the market was oligopolistic before the.

entrance of G.F. because the Commission could reasonably

. conclude that under G.F.’s eventual dominance, the market -

would become even. less competitive. Moreover, the im-

mediate post-acquisition flurry of competition between .

Brillo and S.0.S.—which apparently led to 8.0.8.’ even- _

tual emergence with a greater market share, and the merger

of Brillo. with Purex—certainly does not compel the con- we

. Clusion that the market will become competitive.

Thus, we conclude that the Commission was justified

in finding that G.F.’s acquisition of the S.OS. Company

would substantially ‘teeeen competition in the steel wool

+ ONENESS EY NONETING

22

Appendia A .-

soap pad market, and in adopting. the order entered by the

hearing examiner requiring G.F.. to- divest itself of the

- §.0.S. assets found to have been acquired in violation of

§ 7. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366

U.S. 316, 328-31 (1961). . s

The order of the Commission. will ™ stiiad and en-

forced. 15 U. 8. C. 8 21(c) (1964).

A True Copy:

7

2 Teste:

oo _ |

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

_for the Third Circuit.

"f 23

Appendix A .

UNITED STATES COURT OF. APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

oS.

~ No. 15,910 P

‘GENERAL Foops Corporation, Petitioner,

v. |

FEDERAL TRADE Commission, Respondent.

Present: Statey, Chief Judge, Hastir, Circuit Judge, and

SHERIDAN, District Judge.

Final Decree Affirming and Enforcing Order of the

*“; ° . Federal Trade Commission a

Petitioner, General Foods Corporation, having filed in

. this Court on May 12, 1966, a petition to review and set

aside an order issued against it on March 11, 1966, by

the Federal Trade Commission, respondent herein ; and

respondent having thereafter certified and filed in this

Court a list of all documents, transcripts of testimony,

exhibits and other material comprising the record in the

proceeding upon which the order was based; and the matter

having been heard by this Court on briefs and oral argu-

ment on June 6, 1967; and this Court having rendered _

its decision and issued its opinion on November 9, 1967,

affirming and enforcing-the Commission’s order in its ‘en-

tirety: ;

Now, THererorg, Ir Is Heresy ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

Decreep that the prayer of the aforesaid petition to set

aside the order of the Federal Trade Commission be, and

it hereby is, denied; |

Ir Is FurrHer Orperzp, ApsupcEp ANnp Decreep that the

order of the Federal Trade Commission be, and it hereby

is, affirmed, and that petitioner be, and it hereby is, com-

24 |

” Appendia A

manded forthwith to obey said order and * comply there- ;

with.

By the Ceurt.

Wim H. Haste

‘United States Circuit Judge

Entered: December 21, 1967

189a

| Opinion and Order

UNITED STATES oF AMERICA .-

BEFORE

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION |

CoMMISSIONERS:

Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman —

. Philip Elman

Everette MacIntyre.

John R. Reilly .

Mary Gardiner Jones

In the Matter of

GENERAL Foops CorporaTION, - Docket No. 8600.

a corporation. ;

Final Order

_- This matter having been heard by the Commission on -

an appeal by respondent from the initial decision of the

hearing examiner, and upon briefs and argument in support -

thereof and in opposition thereto; and

The Commission having .rendered its decision determin-

ing that the appeal should be denied, that the initial deci-

sion, as supplemented and modified-to conform to the views .

— expressed in the accompanying opinion, should be adopted

as the decision of the Commission, and that the order issued

. by the hearing examiner should be adopted as the order. of

the Commission: |

IT Is ORDERED that the initial decision, as modified and

supplemented by the accompanying opinion be, and it hereby

is, adopted as the decision of the Commission. .

CD

190a

Opinion and Order

IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the order issued by the

hearing examiner be, and it hereby is, adopted. as the

order of the Commission. |

IT Is vunrnie ORDERED that the respondent herein shall,

within sixty (60) days after service upon it of this order,

_ file with the Commission a report in writing setting forth —

in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with

this order.

_ By the Commission, without the concurrence of Com-.

missioner MacIntyre. Commissioner Elman. dissented and

has filed a dissenting aauen

SEAL |

. /s/ .JosEPpH W. SHEA

Joseph W.:Shea -

Secretary

IssuED: March 11, 1966

ATTACHED ARE:

( 1) Opinion of the ‘Commission by

Commissioner Jones .

(2) Dissenting’ opinion be Commissioner Elman

_ CoMMISSIONERS:

-19la

‘Opinion and Order

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE

_ FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

. f3) >

Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman

- Philip Elman |

Everette MacIntyre

John R. Reilly |

Mary Gardiner Jones

‘In the Matter of .

GENERAL Foops CorPoraTION, Docket No. 8600

' acorporation. - |

i

Opinion of the Commission

- By Jones, Commissioner :

.On September 30, -1963, complaint wa against .

respondent General Foods Corporation (General Foods)

_ charging it with-violation of Section’7 of the Clayton Act.

_. by reason of its acquisition on December 31, 1957, of the -

assets of The S.O.S. Company, Inc. (S.0.S.). The com-

plaint alleged that the effect of the acquisition “has been,

or may be, substantially to lessen competition or tend to

create a monopoly in the manufacture, distribution and sale

of household steel wool * * * throughout the United

States * * *.” |

On December 18, 1964, the hearing examiner filed his

initial decision. The hearing examiner concluded that Gen-

PANTIE LA

an a ee

*%

Opinion and Order

eral Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. had the tendency substan-

tially to lessen competition and¢consequently violated Sec-

tion 7 of the Clayton Act. Respondent has appealed and

urges, first, that the examiner erred in defining the relevant

product market as-consisting solely of household steel wool

products and excluding from this definition some 40 other

© cleaning’ devices; second, respondent contends that this

product extension merger was totally dissimilar in type and

effect on’ competition to Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of

The Clorox Company, held illegal by this Commission in

1963 (The Procter & Gamble Co., Docket 6901), and in-

deéd that respondent’s acquisition of S.O.S., rather than .

diminishing competition, has brought much-needed ‘com-

petition in an industry which has been characterized by

peaceful competitive co-existence. Accordingly, respondent |

contends that the complaint against it should be dismissed.

_ We will consider these arguments seriatim.

a |

The Relevant Product Market!

The examiner found that the appropriate line of com-

merce or product market for measuring the effect of the

acquisition is household steel wool. This product market -

consists primarily of soap-impregnated steel wool pads, but

also includes plain household steel wool pads with or without

separate pieces of soap. Respondent, condemning this mar- .

ket as “artificial,” contends that, in addition to steel wool

pads, approximately 40 other kitchen cleaning devices, com-

posed of such materials as plastic, cellulose and metals other

than steel, should be included in the market: “Pwo of ‘these _

"The hearing examiner found, and both parties agree, that the

relevant geographic market is the entire United Stehes.

- * 308a\

i

Opinion and, Order

devices are inipregnated with soap and the remainder are

not.” oe Ces wee

A. The Criteria for Determining the Appropriate

Product Market ae : |

The standards to be applied in delineating a line of com-

. merce do not depend upon the form of the merger but on |

the realities of the market in which the merged companies

operate.* | : £

2The examiner classified the devices which are. claimed by the

respondent to be part ‘of the relevant market as follows:,‘‘(a) 14 are

steel wool pads which counsel in support of the complaint agree.are

properly includable in the ‘line of commerce,’ whether soap-impreg-

nated or not. (b) 13 items are plastic mesh balls or pads, ‘some of ~-

which have a sponge inside the ball or mesh, but none of which are

- soap-impregnated. Respondent’s product ‘Tuffy’ is in this group.

(c) 14 items are basically plasti¢ or cellulose sponges with an abrasive

_ surface‘joined to one side of the sponge. Minnesota Mining and Man-

ufacturing Company’s ‘Rescue’ is in this’ group and is sodp-impreg-

nated. (d) 7 items are pads of metal mesh made of metal other than

steel wool, but none of which are soap-impregnated. (e) 2 items.are

fiber dish cloths. coated with an abrasive substance, neither of which

is soap-impregnated” (I.D., par. 15).

° to date involving “‘conglomerate”-mergers have used the _

same tests for defining the relevant-market and measuring the effects

" of such mergers as those applied to teststhe effects of horizontal and

veritical mergers; see Consolidated Foods Corp. (Dkt. 7000, 1962) ;

rev. 329 FE. 2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964); rev. 380 U. S. 592 (1965); -

Reynolds Metals Co. v. F.:T. C.,; 309.F. 2d 223 (D. C. Cir. 1962)*; ..

Union Carbide Corp., 59 F. T. C. 614, 642-3, 658 (Dkt. 6826,

_- 1961); and the Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox) (Dkt. 6901, 1963).

Legal commentators and economists who have discussed “conglom- —

erate” mergers have similarly not. suggested the application of any

different tests to define the relevant product market in such mergers.

See for example, Turner, “Conglomerate Mergers and, Section 7 of

the Clayton Act,” 78 Harvard Law Review 1313 (1965) ; Clark,

“Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,” 36 Notre

Dame Lawyer.255 (1961); Edwards, “Conglomerate Bigness as a

Source of: Power”, Business Concentration and Price Policy 331

(1955) ; Stocking, “Conglomerate Bigness—Comment,” Business Con-

centration and Price Policy 352 (1955) ; Blair, “The Conglomerate’

_ Merger in Economics and Law,” 46 Georgetéwn Law Journal 672

(1958):; Adelman, “Antitrust Problems: The Anti-Merger Act .1950-

60,” Atherican Economic Association at 236; Day, “Conglomerate

Mergers and ‘The Curse of Bigness,’” 42 N. Carolina Law Review

511 (1964) ; Comment, “Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of

the Clayton Act,” 72 Yale Law Journal 1265, 1270 (1963). "

ee ee ee eC ee ee ee oe om

. FY

7 | | 1942 om ds

- Opinion and Order

The relevant market is the “area of effective competi-

tion” within which the respondent operates, Standard Oil

Company of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293,

300, n. 5 (1949). “[T]he problem of defining a. market

turns on discovering patterns of trade which are followed

in practice.” United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,

110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.-Mass., 1953) ; aff'd por curiam,

347 U. S. 521 (1954). The boundaries of the market

“must be drawn with sufficient breadth to.* * * recognize

competition: where, in fact, competition exists.” Brown

Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 326 (1962).

The product line must be “sufficiently inclusive to be-mean-

-ingful in terms of trade realities”. Crown Zellerbuch v.

F. T. C., 296 F. 2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961). United States

v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 357 (1963). °

The fact that different products may in some sense be

competitive with each other is not sufficient to place them in

the same market if by themselves they constitute distinct

product lines. In United States v. Aluminum‘Co. of Amer-

ica (Alcoa-Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 275 (1964), insu-

lated aluminum conductor was consideréd a separate market

although the Court conceded that there was sufficient com-

petition between this product and its copper counterpart to

justify grouping these two products in a single product

market.. In Union Carbide Corp., 59 F. T. C. 614, 655

(Dkt. 6826, 1961), the Commission noted that ‘there is

and will continue to be competition between polyethylene

film and other flexible packaging materials” but nonethe-

’ less place them in separate lines of commerce. Competing

products have also been placed in separate product markets

in a number of other cases, including United States v. Lever

Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S. D. N. Y. 1963) (where

low sudsing detergents and high sudsing detergents were —

placed in separate markets despite the “direct competition”

between them), and United States v. Aluminum Co..of —

America, et al., 233 F. Supp. 718 (E. D. Mo. 1964) (where

Fo ; ‘ aney Ty nl

a ~ 195° -

Opinion and_Order

a market was found for aluminum curtain wall despite the

competition between it and other types ‘of building mate-

rials). See also United States v. Philadelphia. National

Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 356 (1963) ; United States v. Bethle-

hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593 (1958); Crown-

Zellerbach Corp. v. F. T.'C., 296 F. 2d 800, 814, 815

(1961) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v.. F.T. C., 309 F. 2d 223,

229 (D. C. Cir. 1962) and United States v. Pennzoil Co.,

1966 Trade Cases Par: 71,659 (W. D. Pa. 1966).

Similarly, the fact that “substitute” products are avail- .

able does not compel the conclusion that they be placed in

the relevant market. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957) the market was re-

stricted to “automotive fabrics and finishes” even though.

the same or similar products were utilized. in other indus-

tries. In Union Carbide Corporation, supra, the Commis-

sion acknowledged that there were “adequate substitutes”

for polyethylene film as a flexible packaging material but

nevertheless excluded such substitutes from the relevant

market. See also Consolidated Foods Corp., supra (where

dehydrated onion and garlic were held to comprise.a sepa-

rate market, even though a broader market could presum-

ably have been considered including fresh onion and garlic,

as respondent therein contended) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v.

F. T. C., 309 F. 2d 223 (D. C. Cir. 1962) (where the

market was narrowly defined to be decorative aluminum foil

sold to the florist trade, as distinct from aluminum decora-

tive foil, aluminum household foil and perhaps even wrap-

ping paper); and Clorox, supra, (where household dried

bleach was shown to be available-as a substitute product for

-certain purposes’ but -was nevertheless excluded from the

- market, which was confined to household liquid bleach).

The applicable legal test for. defining a product market

for the purposes of determining the effect upon competition

of a merger or acquisition was most recently reaffirmed in

the Brown Shoe opinion, supra at pagé 325:

SG AE aD OM

— :196a

Opinion and Order

“The outer boundaries of a product market are .

determined by the reasonable interchangeability of

use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the

- product itself and substitutes for it. However, with-

in this broad market, well-defined submarkets may

exist, which, in themselves, constitute product mar- _

kets for antitrust purposes.. United States v. E. I.

du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 593-595.

The boundaries of such a submarket may be deter-

‘ mined by examining such practical indicia as indus-

try or public recognition of the submarket.as a

separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar

characteristics and uses, unique production facili-

ties, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity

to price changes, and specialized -vendors. . Because

'§ 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which

may substantially lessen competition ‘in any line of

commerce’ (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to

examine the effects of a merger in each such eco-

nomically significant submarket to determine if there

_- is a reasonable probability that the merger will sub-

. ‘stantially lessen competition. If such a probability

‘is found to exist; the merger is proscribed.’”*

*The criteria enumerated in Brown Shoe did not spring full-

blown from the Supreme Court but had been developed in the pre-

ceding cases decided under Section 7 subsequent to its amendment

in 1950. For example, (1) industry and public recognition of the

market was regarded as a significant factor in defining the market

in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S. D.

N. Y. 1958) and A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., 56 F. T. C. 1125,

1160 (Dkt. 6478, 1960), aff'd. 301 F. 2d 585 (3rd Cir. 1962); (2)

the. “peculiar characteristics and uses” of automotive fabrics and

finishes was the sole basis, for the finding of the market in United

States v. E. I.-du Pont de Nemours & Co. (General Motors), 353

U. S. 586, 593-95 (1957); (3) the distinct prices of two product

. lines was one of the factors cited by the Commission in the Spalding

and Union Carbide cases in placing such products in separate mar-

kets; (4) price sensitivity was one of.the tests applied in American

Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co:, 259 F. 2d 524,

530 (2nd Cir. 1958) and; Union Carbide, 59 F. T. C. 614 (Dkt.

6825, 1961). : ;

reer ayer meaer neem: vr me

197a |

Opinion and Order

While conceding the validity of the tests enumerated in _.

the Brown Shoe case, respondent nevertheless argues that

.the relevant market must be defined to include all products

which could in any sense be regarded as -competitive. In

support of this view respondent relies heavily on the, Su-

preme Court decision in United States v. C ontinental Can,

378 U. S. 441 (1964), decided three weeks’ after Alcoa-

Rome Cable, supra. In Alcoa, the merger challenged was

between two aluminum conductor producers-and defendant

argued that its acquisition did not have the prohibited im-

pact on competition because of the existence of substitute

products (i.e., insulated copper conductors ) which therefore

required a broader market definition comprising all competi-

tive products. The Court rejected this argument, finding

. that whatever the broader market might be, a meaningful

product also existed consisting of aluminum conductors

alone. re

In Continental Can, the Court was confronted with just

_ the reverse of the situation in Alcoa. In. Continental Can,

the acquiring company, Continental, produced metal con-

tainers and the acquired company produced glass containers. _

Thus, the issue before the Court was whether a broader

market encompassing both products was meaningful ; the

Court was not concerned with the question as to whether a

more limited product market also existed. The Court held |

that metal and glass containers were in the same product

market for the purposes of considering the effects of the

_acquisition, even though the Court ‘considered the products

of the two companies to be in “separate industries” and to

comprise. distinct “product markets”. The market defined

by the Court in Continental Can was that delimited by the

“outer boundaries” referred to in the Brown Shoe opinion ;

but the Court took pains to ‘point out that its finding with

respect to this broader market did not preclude: the finding

198a

Opinion and Order ,

of narrower submarkets within. the more comprehensive

market: |

‘ %* * That there may be a broader product market

made up of metal, glass and other competing con-

tainers does not necessarily negative the existence of

submarkets of cans, glass, plastic or cans and glass

together, for ‘within this broad market, well-defined

submarkets may exist which, in themselves, consti-

tute product markets for antitrust purposes.’ Brown

Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., at 325” (378

‘U.S. 457-58).

In short, the test of the relevant market.is whether a

given line of products constitutes an economically signifi- —

- cant market and whether that market is “sufficiently inclu-

I39-

sive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities”: Crown

Zellerbach Co. v. F. T. C., 296 F. 2d supra at 811. In de-

fining the market it is immaterial that there may be other

broader or narrower markets in which the companies are

alsooperating® Uae -

5Respondent argues that “whatever the technical definition of the

product market no rational evaluation of present or future competitive

conditions can be made without taking non-steel scouring devices into

account” (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, ‘page 26). It is clear, how-

ever, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, that once the appropriate

product market for determining the effect. of the merger has been

defined, the only consideration which is relevant is whether or not

there is a reasonable probability that competition in that market may

be substantially lessened. “If such a probability is found to exist the

merger is proscribed.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S.

294, 325 (1962). Consequently, we reject respondent’s contention

that whatever the definition of the market may be we must neverthe-

less still consider the broader cleaning device market in our assess-

ment of the competitive impact of respondent’s merger.

199a

Opinion and Order | a

B. Application of the Brown Shoe Criteria To. Define

the Relevant Product Market . .*,

Although seven separate criteria are suggested i in Brown

“Shoe for use in defining the market, the opinion did not

indicate that all of them must necessarily be considered in

each case. We find the following factors are particularly

significant in this case:

1. Industry or public recognition of the submarket as a

separate economic entity®

The producers of household steel iad recognized that —

the product, which they frequently referred to as a “soap

pad”’, constituted a distinct market and looked -only to the

steel wool products manufactured by each other in setting

prices and making marketing decisions. Thus respondent,

in its pre-acquisition report, considered only the steel wool

products of S.O.S. and Brillo'in making its determination

that S.O.S. had “60 per cent of the national dollar volume” *

(CX 5(b)). :

Furthermore, in separate studies prepared for respond-

ent by Market Facts, Inc., in 1959 (RX 12), by National

Family Opinion, Inc. in 1962 (RX 14) and by Foote, Cone .

and Belding in 1963 (RX 15), the market was again re-

ferred to as the “soap pad market,’ which included steel

wool products and excluded other cleaning devices. Other .

non-steel wool cleaning devices were considered in the 1963

Foote, Cone and Belding report, but they were consistently -

referred to as constituting a different market separate and

distinct from steel wool pads. Even for the purpose of this

litigation counsel for respondent was unable to produce

any study of a market including both steel wool and non-

steel woo] devices.

*Respondent misstates this test’ as “ ‘industry and ‘public recog-

nition’ of the presence or absence of competition between the products

under consideration” (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, page 17).

200a

@

Opinion and Order

_ It is clear that the only competition which respondent

seriously considered in the advertising, packaging and pro-

_ duction of its product was that offered by Brillo household

soap-impregnated steel wool pads. Thus,.in its pre-acquisi-

tion study of S.O.S., respondent made a distinction between |

the “direct competition” between S.O.S. and Brillo and the

“indirect competition” between S.O.S. and such articles as _ |

“abrasive sponges and bronze or stainless steel scouring

pads” (CX 7, p. 10). After its acquisition of S.O.S., re-

spondent continued its preoccupation with the sales of 3. O. S.

as compared with those of Brillo and did not concern itself

* with the market roles.of the cleaning devices which it now

claims are part of the market. Thus after the acquisition

respondent revamped the advertising and packaging of

S.O.S. pads in an attempt to demonstrate or convey the im- -

pression that the S.O.S. pad rusted less and “actually car-

ried more soap than the average Brillo pad” (Tr. 1079).

_ A change in the color of the soap pad from red to blue was

prompted by studies which “had indicated that the reddish

soap used by both Brillo and S.O.S. reminded the housewife

-of rust (Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, page 11). More-

over, when respondent launched an onslaught on the New

York market in 1959, the only other product which it took

-into consideration was the Brillo soap pad (RX’s 12, 17,

42; Tr. 1089).

~ One of the products now claimed by respondent’s. coun-

sel to be directly “competitive” and to have been artificially

excluded from the relevant product market is respondent’s

‘ own plastic device, “Tuffy.” This must come as a surprise

to respondent’s own officials, who, as shown by the record,

had apparently never considered “Tuffy” to be directly com-

petitive with the S.O.S. soap pads. Ina report prepared for .

the board of directors prior to the acquisition it was stated |

that “Tuffy and S.O.S. are complementary rather than com-

petitive.” (CX 5(b)). In General Foods’ acquisition study

of S.O.S., Tuffy was stated to be of the “indirect com-

20la

Opinion and Order

petition” with S.O.S. At the hearing, a former general man-

ager and the present general manager of the’ Kool-Aid Di- .

vision of General Foods which now includes S.O.S. pads,

testified that Tuffy did not comnpete. with “S.O. s (Tr.

626, 761-762). ;

Respondent’s own.general manager up to the time of this

. litigation had been totally unaware of even the existence of ct

many of the cleaning devices now alleged by “Fespondent

to be part of the relevant product market. and directly com-

petitive with steel. wool pads (Tr. 791-795, 816-817).

Finally, it should be noted that the other. steel wool pad

manufacturers regard themselves as constituting a separate .

‘ and distinct industry. Thus, the president of Durawool

’ Company testifying at the hearing drew a careful distinc-

g “

tion between what he characterized as’ “the new products”

(meaning non-steel wool products ) and those “in the in-

dustry” (consisting of steel wool producers) (Tr. 875).

The president of Demcorp testified that the non-steel wool

devices did not offer his product any. “direct competition”

and that he did not “take the prices of the other products

into consideration when he set his price” (Tr. 974). The

‘president of Alloy Metal Wool Products declared that his

only competitors were Brillo, S.O.S., Durawool and Amer-

ican Steel Wool Company, and that he had not considered

the non-steel wool devices to be ae items” (Tr.

897- 898).

* It is, obvious that if respondent and the pn steel .

' wool soap pad manufacturers regard themselves as a sepa-

rate market, then it is this market in which the impact of

respondent’s acquisition must be judged. It cannot be said

that the existence and conduct of other manufacturers

outside this market must be considered where the soap pad

manufacturers themselves do not take these substitute prod-

uct manufacturers into account in their own pricing and’

" marketing decisions.

—

202a

| Opinion and Order

2. The product’s peculiar characteristics and uses

The steel wool pad is composed of triangular-shaped

steel strands with three cutting edges. When-used, a

number of the edges are pressed down, and the pad cleans

the surface in a manner similar to a knife or a razor blade.

The soap with which a soap pad is impregnated lubricates,

inhibits scratching, facilitates polishing, and removes grease

and grime (Tr. 432, 629, 893, 939, 978-979). The steel _

wool pad is a soft and pliable product which is able to reach

crevices and corners (Tr. 844).

The primary use of steel wool pads is the scouring of

pots and pans; the general manager of respondent’s Kool-

Aid Division estimated on the pad usage basis that this use

constitutes “at least 80 percent of the total volume” (Tr.

759). Other uses, described as peripheral, are. cleaning

white-wall tires, floors, walls, stoves, aluminum doors and _

windows and barbecue grills.

Physically, the non-steel wool cleaning devices which

respondent’s counsel argues should ‘be included in the rele-

vant market are unquestionably distinct. They are composed

of a variety of substances such as plastic, copper and abra-

sive surface sporiges, none of which closely resembles steel

wool. Furthermore, only two of the non-steel wool devices,

unlike the overwhelming number of “steel wool pads’ pro-

duced, contain soap. -

The examiner found that steel “es wade ‘made a par-

ticularly effective abrasive” (I. D. par. 18) and that none of

the other. devices “are able to perform the wide range of

household cleaning jobs as well as household steel wool”

(I. D. par. 20). Respondent’s counsel accuse the examiner

of “substituting his own personal judgment for that of the

market place with respect to the quality of the different

scouring devices involved” and further disparages:the ex-

203a.

Opinion and Order

‘aminer’s finding by declaring that his " personal quality

judgment is without evidentiary support” (Racponfeat's

Brief on Appeal, page 19):

We find, however, ‘that the examiner’s finding, which

coincides with the conclusions of S.O.S.’ and respondent’s

' own’officials who testified at the hearing, is amply supported

. by, the record, and we note that the only evidence which re-

spondent offered to contradict this evidence consisted of ad-.

vertising claims made for some of the purportedly com-

petitive products. A former general manager of the re-

spondent’s Kool-Aid Division testified flatly that “For the

uses that.S.0.S. was advertised for and pictured on the box,

it was better than other products” (Tr. 624). He further

testifid that respondent had tested- a number of other

cleaning devices and: found that none of them could “per

form as well as the S.O.S. steel wool sap pad * * * for the

purposes that we advertise on the box” (Tr. 626). . The

president of S:0.S. prior to the acquisition testified that

his company had-“found there was nothing in [its] opinion

that was as good as steel wool abrasive” (Tr. 429-30) and

that in his opinion “soap pads are the best cleanser I know .

of” (Tr. 431). Moreover,.respondent’s own plastic de-

vice, “Tuffy”, which, according to a study2prepared for

respondent in 1962 (RX 14( m)), is by far the largest of

- all of the non-steel wool cleaning devices which respondent

seeks to include in the relevant market, was not devised .

or used for scouring pots and pans, according to respond-

ent’s own officials who testified at the hearing (Tr. 626,

761) as well as respondent’s pre-acquisition report, in which —

it had stated: :

“S.O.S. in the kitchen is used primarily for scouring _

pots, pans, stoves, etc., while Tuffy is used much as

a dish rag is used” (CX 5(b)). |

204a e

_ Opinion and Order

Also, at least four eile ‘blastic devices, “Dobie,”

“Handy Mandy,”-“Polly Puff,” and “Reddy”, which re-

spondent’s counsel claim should be included in the market,

e do.not even claim in their advertiséments that their - prod- ..

ucts can be used for scouring pots and pans. (See re-

spondent’ s proposed findings, pp. 148, 152, 155 and 156.)

Accordingly, we find that household steel wool has

unique physical characteristics; that many of the allegedly

competitive devices are riot even claimed to perform all of

the household chores performed by steel wool, including

its principal task, scouring pots and pans; and that those as.

to which such claims are made are substantially inferior in

. the performance of such tasks.

3. Distinct prices -

The unit sales prices of steel wool soap pads and the

other cleaning devices claimed by respondents to be part of

the same market differ markedly from each. other. (See

_ Appendix B, Table IV.) Steel wool soap pads sell at a .

range of 1.4 cents to 2.8 cents (the latter representing the -

price at which S.O.S. and Brillo pads normally: sell’), while

the prices per item of the non-steel wool devices range from

6 cents to 29 cents. Respondent emphasizes the fact that

the prices ‘per package of certain of the non-steel wool

‘devices (13 of which sell for 29 cents and one of which sells

for 27.cents) are comparable to those of Brillo and S.O.S.

_ pads (28 cents per package). However, the number of units

per package varies so widely as to rénder the package price

meaningless in any comparison of prices between steel wool

and non-steel wool devices. For example, one “Scotch Brite”

pad separately packaged sells for 29 cents, while the al-

legedly comparable “package” of Brillo or S.0.S. soap pads

TBrillo also has a special purpose Brillo Whitewall Tire oad

which sells for 7.3 cents.

° 205a_

- Opinion and ‘Order

' which sells for 28 cents per-package contains ten pads.

Similar: examples could be multiplied. Moreover, in con-

sidering respondent’s argument it should be noted that in

the case of many of the scouring devices which respondent

claims should be included in the relevant market (8 of which

sell for less than 20 cents) even the package prices bear no-

relationship of any kind to the prices of the dominant steel

wool brands. .

It is clear that while the- prices of steel wool. iil are

substantially identical, they bear little or no relationship to

the prices of non-steel wool cleaning devices. The only way

_in which prices could be compared would be to make esti-

mates of the useful life of the 29-cent single pad, for ex-_

ample, as compared with the 10 S.O.S. pads selling for 28:

cents. Surely, the need to make such a computation in order: |

to compare prices almost by itself demonstrates - the ‘dis-

tinctiveness of the steel wool products as compared with the °

other cleaning devices which respondent urges be included j in

the relevant market.

4. Sensitivity to pone a

Although ines is no direct evidence as to consumer

sensitivity to price changes, the record does make it clear

that respondent and the other steel wool manufacturers paid

little or no attention to the prices of the non-steel wool de-

vices. The former manager of respondent’s Kool-Aid Divi-

sion testified that respondent “didn’t pay much attention to

the pricing structure of these small products” in setting its

prices (Tr. 626). The present general manager of this

division was almost totally ignorant of the‘ prices of the

non-steel wool devices (Tr.. 790-795), thus clearly. indicat-

ing that the prices of such goods were of slight concern to

. respondent. The smaller steel wool manufacturers who ap-

peared at the hearing also testified unanimously that the

only prices: which -they took into consideration were the

3%

206a

Opinion and Order a

prices @f other steel wool products and that they did not

consider the prices of the non-steel wool devices in setting

their prices (Tr. 841, 973-938 [sic] and 897-898).

5. Unique production facilities.

The facilities required for the production of steel wool

are distinct from those required for the other cleaning, de-

vices cited by respondent. The production of steel wool

feguires large, complicated cutting machines and other ac-

cessory equipment is required such as “take-offs” and “ball-

ing machines” (Tr. 828), for the automatic shaping, soap-

impregnation and drying of the product. The machines are ~

not generally available on the open market, but are custom-

made to the manufacturer’s specification (I. D..17). The

machines used in the production of steel wool can be used

for no other function than the production of steel wool

(I. D. 17). :

&

Cc. Conclusion

In conclusion we find of particulars significance the

facts-that: (1) household steel wool is recognized by the

industry as a separate and distinct market and that in mak-

ing marketing decisions and in setting their: prices the

manufacturers of this product do not take into account the

plastic and other types of cleaning devices referred to by

~ respondent; (2): the substitute products advanced by re-

spondent are significantly inferior in performance of the

_ household cleaning chores performed by household steel wool

. and therefore they can at best offer. only indirect competition

~ to the household steel wool manufacturers; (3) there is a

’ substantial difference between the price of steel wool and

that of the plastic and other. type cleaning devices; (4) and

. the machines used for the production of steel wool are dis-

tinct from those used -for the production of the ategedly

207a

Cpa and Order

competitive cleaning devices. Accordingly, we are of the

opinion that it would be economically unrealistic to include

said other products in the relevant market. Since the house-

hold steel wool industry-is economically significant and suffi-

ciently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities

it seems clear that the hearing examiner was correct in —

determining that this is the appropriate market for adjudg-

ing the effects of the merger.

We note that the same conclusion was reached by the

Commission in Brillo Mfg. Co., Inc» (Dkt. 6557, 1963) in

which we considered the precise issue now before us. As we

stated in that case: '

“# * * Steel wool is generally recognized as an essen-

tially unique product, i.e., possessing peculiar charac- -

- teristics and uses. It can be used either wet or dry —

on either a wet or dry surface. It will both clean

-- and polish soiled and oxidized surfaces. It is fine and

flexible so that it can be used on rough and irregular

surfaces * * *

“* * * [N]o competing product is capable of the ©

variety of applications possible with steel wool. Any

householder who has ever utilized steel wool to clean

cooking utensils, white-wall tires, golf clubs, rusty -

tools, lineoleum or tile floors, and to remove peeling |

paint or rust recognizes that this is a ey ver-

satile product * * *

‘“ * * Moreover, both the industry members and the

public recognize steel, wool as-an essentially unique”

product -sold and’ distributed in its own separate

markets. There is little or no cross-elasticity of de-

. mand between steel wool and other products. The-.

+ machinery upon which it is produced cannot be uti-.

lized to produce products other than metal wool. * * *..

es | “ge Sag : 208a |

Opinion and Order.

“* * * The single most peculiar ‘characteristic and —

use’ of steel wool and steel wool products is that no

other product will perform all of the multiple func-

tions of steel wool in either the household or in the

industrial market. The housewife can buy steel wool

for dozens of household uses rather than buying:

separate products for each use. The same fact applies

equally in the industrial field. Although other prod-

ucts may compete with steel wool for some uses,

‘such demand exists at the outer boundaries of the

steel wool market .and need not be considered in

evaluating the competitive impact of this merger be-

tween two steel wool. producers.”

i

The Competitive Effects of the Merger

The acquisition of S.O.S. by General Foods demon-

strates the same.anticompetitive effects-as the acquisition

by Procter & Gamble of The Clorox Chemical Conipany,

which the Commission recently held to be violative of Sec-

tion 7 of the Clayton Act. The Practer & Gamble Company

(Dkt. 6901, 1963) ‘(herein called the Clorox case). There

is a substantial identity both in the structure of the house-

hold steel wool market involved in this case and the struc-

ture of the liquid bleach market involved in the Clorox casé

and in the significant operative facts respecting the impact

of those mergers in their respective markets. A detailed

comparative analysis of the relevant facts in the two cases

is attached hereto as Appendix A.® While we will not detail

_ 8The facts recited in Appendix A, together with those referred to

‘in this opinion and those found by the hearing examiner to the extent

-latter are not inconsistent constitute our Findings of Fact in

this case.

209a

Opinion and Order

in our opinion all of the factual similarities which are set

forth in Appendix A, a few of the major conclusions re-.

specting the competitive significance of these facts will

serve to illustrate the basic identity of the two acquisitions

and the reasons why our. factual and legal analysis and

conclusions in the Clorox case are applicable with even

greater force to demonstrate the anticompetitive and illegal

nature of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S:

A brief-summary of the operative facts respecting re-

spondent’s acquisition of S.O.S. is necessary before analyz-

ing the competitive impact of this acquisition in the relevant

household steel wool market. ‘a

A. The Household Steel Wool Market

S.O.S. at the time of its acquisition by General Foods:

in December 1957 was basically a single-product company

_ engaged principally in the production of household steel

wool pads (App. A, pars. 1, 3). Its sales of this product

amounted to $14.6 million in 1957, representing: 51% of :

the household steel wool market (App. A, par. 6). It also

manufactured industrial steel wool which both parties agree

is not included in this market definition as well as one plastic

scouring device (App. A, par. 3). Its principal competitor,

Brillo Manufacturing Company, Inc., also. primarily a

single-product company, accounted for 47.6% of the house-

hold steel wool market and the remaining 1.4% of the mar-

ket was accounted for by three small companies with net

assets valued at less than $500,000 each (App. A, pars.

5-7). Household steel wool products on the market are vir-

tually indistinguishable from each other (App. A, par. 16).

. They are low-price, high-turnover household constimer com-

modities sold to consumers through grocery and supermar-

ket outlets (App. A; par. 17). | , .

So ak tr ae pm

210a

Opinion and Order

Advertising is an essential factor in the marketing of

steel wool pads, both as a means of building brand loyalty

and of securing adequate shelf space (App. A, pars. 18-20).

S.O:S. and Brillo had advertising budgets in 1957 of $2.2

and $1.8 million respectively, expended primarily for day-

time TV and magazines (App. A,-par. 19). Their three

_ small competitors lacked the financial resources for adver-

tising to any appreciable extent and accordingly were forced

to market their products principally under private labels and

through discount houses (App. A, pars. 20, 24).

Respondent General Foods Corporation is the largest

producer of packaged food in the United States, with net

sales of $1 billion (App. A, pars. 25, 27). General Foods

also produces some nonfood items such as bluing (App. A,

par. 26). All of its products are low-price, high-turnover

household consumer commodities sold to consumers through

the same grocery and supermarket outlets as are S.O.S. steel.

wool soap pads (App. A, par. 25). Mass advertising and

promotions are essential factors in the marketing of General

Foods’ product lines (App. A, par.’28). General Foods had

an advertising budget of $105 million and expended a sub- —

stantial portion of this on nighttime TV. Its budget for.

consumer and trade promotions, which neither S.O.S. nor

Brillo engaged in, amounted in 1957 to $19 million, exceed-

ing S.O.S.’ total sales in that year (App. A, par. 28).

_ After its acquisition by General Foods, S.O.S. was

organized first as a separate division of General Foods and

later, in 1960, was merged with General Foods Kool-Aid

Division, the products of which were, like S.O.S. pads,

also sold through food brokers (App. A, par. 33(g)). In

1962, General Foods incorporated the distribution of its -

Kool-Aid Division’ products into its overall distribution-

sales service warehousing: and distributive system, thus

effecting estimated economies in transportation, ware-

21la

Opinion and Order

housing and sales costs of $647,000, of which $388,000

. was attributed to savings effected respecting ‘the products

of the Kool-Aid Division (App. A, par. 33(f)). This

incorporation of S.O.S. directly into General Foods’ over-

all distributional organization . provided an incentive for

General Foods’ customers to include S.O.S. products in their

orders of other General Foods products. Furthermore,

S.O.S. could and did induce purthases by offering discounts

based on combined purchases of the products of various.

divisions of General Foods. Presumably, General Foods

warehousing and distributive system also improved S.O.S.’

national availability (App. A, par. 33(f)). General Foods

improved the appearance of the S.O.S. pad as well as its

advertising. The costs of advertising S.O.S. products were

substantially reduced by reason of the discounts which were

available as a result of the overall General Foods advertis-

ing budget, estimated to amount to a net saving of 23%

or a net increase in TV time of 28% in the case of network

TV advertising, a 15% decrease in the cost of spot-TV ad-

vertising, a 5.5% decrease in radio advertising and a range .

of 5-15% discount in magazine advertising. General Foods

also engaged in substantial consumer and trade promotions

respecting’ S.O.S. pads which S.O.S. dad not itself engaged

in prior to the acquisition (App. A, pars 33(a)-(d), (i)).

. After the acquisition, S.O.S.’ share of the market in-

creased from 51% in 1957 to 56% in 1962. The market

share of Brillo, its nearest competitor, declined during this

_ same period from 47.6% to 41.8%. The combined share of |

_ the three remaining companies increased slightly by 0.8%.

On an absolute basis, S:0.S.’ sales of soap pads grew from

$14.6 million in 1957 to $19.1 million in 1962, an increase of

31% while Brillo’s sales rose from $13.6 ‘million to $14.3 .

- million for the same period, or an increase of only 5% (App. -

A, par. 34). In December 1963 Brillo merged with Purex

bs]

212a

Opinion and Order

. ”

° .

.

a

Corporation Limited, a manufacturer of household cleansing .

products, with total sales for its fiscal -year ended. June 30,

1963 of $127 million (App. A, par. 37). a!

B. Competitive Impact of Respondent’s Acquisition

General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. and consequent

entry into the household steel wool market is a product ex-

tension merger identical in all respects to the extension of

Procter & Gamble’s product line to liquid bleach, a product

which it liad. not theretofore produced or sold. As we-noted

in our Clorox decision, product extension mergers | involve

functionally closely related products by which we stated we

“meant to * * * suggest the kind of merger that may enable

significant integration in the production, distribution or

marketing activities of the merging firms” (Clorox, p. 15).

Integration at the marketing level.we defined as encom-

passing integration of advertisirig and sales promotion ac-

tivities and as resulting where the products of the merging

firms were “sold to the same customers or are actually com-

plementary” (Clorox, p. 15). In Clorox we pointed out that

Procter was engaged in the sale of a broad range of low-

cost, high-turnover household consumer goods sold to the

consumer in grocery and department store outlets primarily

- through mass advertising and sales promotions. The liquid es

bleach market was held by us to be “virtually indistinguish-

able” from the markets previously utilized by Procter for its

*The record contains no market data after 1963. Accordingly, the

discussion in this opinion of the competitive impact of General Foods’

acquisition of S.O.S. concerns the steel wool soap pad market as it

existed prior to this merger between Brillo and Purex. While the

record does not permit a definitive appraisal as to the impact of this

merger on the household steel wool market, it should be observed that

one of the anticompetitive factors considered by the Courts in deter- _

mining the validity of-mergers is their likelihood of triggering other

‘mergers in the same market thus pyramiding their own impact on the

11965). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, en

)

213a

Opinion and Order

product lines insofar as “the problems and techniques of

__.._marketing the product to the ultimate consumer are con-

_ cerned” (Clorox, p. 17). We pointed out that liquid bleach

was functionally identical to Procter’s product line “even

if we look beyond household cleansing agents to the food,

paper and toilet products which round out the Procter line”

(Clorox, p. 17).

The functional relationship between S.O.S.’ steel wool

soap pads and General Foods’ product line is identical as

respects the problems arid techniques of marketing involved

‘in both groups of products. Household steel wool, like

liquid bleach, is marketed by the same techniques (prin-

cipally advertising and promotions) and through the same

distributional outlets (principally supermarkets) as General

Foods’ other products and is purchased by the housewife at ‘

the same time and along with the other products sold by

General Foods. Thus we hold that General Foods’ acquisi-

tion of S.O.S. involves functionally related products and

constitutes a product extension merger cognizable under

Section 7 of the Clayton Act (See App. A, pars. 17, 18, 25,

28, 33).

The next question to be determined is whether this mer-

ger had the requisite. anticompetitive effects to render it

illegal under Section 7. |

We find that General Foéds’ acquisition of S.O.S. had’

_ the same anticompetitive effects as those which we found to

exist in Procter’s acquisition of Clorox and on which we

- based our conclusion that that acquisition had the effect of

substantially lessening competition in the household liquid

bleach industry. Here, as there, the market of the acquired

company was highly concentrated and oligopolistic (App. A,

par. 6). Indeed, the steel wool soap pad industry appears

éven more. concentrated, since it does not have the large

_ number of small fringe companies which characterized the

liquid bleach industry.

Oe eee ee

.

214a

Opinion and Order

In Clorox, the acquired company was the dominant

factor in the industry, the only national seller in an industry

consisting primarily of ‘regional sellers and able to com-

mand a premium price for its product. Its nearest competi-

tor of significance was Purex with 15% of the market,

which confronted Clorox directly in only:50% of the na-

tional market, In the steel wool soap pad industry, the ac-

quired company, S.O.S., prior to its acquisition was also.

a dominant industry factor able to command a premium

price, but, unlike Clorox, S.O.S. shared its dominant market

position with Brillo (App. A, par. 6). Thus, the impact

of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. was of greater

anticompetitive significance. than Procter’s acquisition of

Clorox, since whatever competition existed between Brillo

and S.O.S. was far more distorted by the entry of General

Foods into that market than was the competitive structure

of the liquid bleach market by Procter’s entry into that mar-

ket. General Foods’ entry into the household steel wool

market eliminated the competitive balance between S.O.S.

and Brillo and weighted it irrevocably in favor of S.O.S.

‘Thus, whereas in Clorox the acquisition of Clorox oper-

- ated primarily quantitatively to render even more dominant

the single dominant industry member, in the instant case

the acquisition of S.O.S. by General Foods operated quali-

tatively as well to eliminate the market balance which had

prevailed between the two dominant members of the indus-

try and created a situation in which S.O.S. as a result of

its acquisition by General Foods acquired decisive competi-.

tive advantages over Brillo.-As we noted in our Clorox

decision, it is the disproportionate strength of the companies,

in a market which is of major significance in judging its

competitive viability or lack thereof (Clorox, pp. 23-27).

Not only did General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. con-

tribute to and increase concentration in the steel wool indus-

try, but it also operated to render almost insurmountable

Ee

215a

O pinion and Order

the barriers to entry surrounding this. market. In this case,’

as in Clorox, the barriers to entry were high prior to the

acquisition.” In each case, the product of the.acquired com-

.pany was functionally identical to that produced by smaller

companies but was differentiated through extensive adver-

tising and a long history of dominance in the field to-such -

an extent that the smallegscompanies in the industry pro-

ducing less well-known brands and potential producers of —

_ new brands could not penetrate the market to any significant

degree, absent huge investments in advertising and promo-

tions (App. A, pars. 16-23). The entry of General Foods

into the household steel wool market substantially height-

-enéd the factual and psychological barriers to entry to that .

markét, just as the entry of Procter in the liquid bleach

market raised the barriers surrounding that market (App.

A, par. 33). As we held in Clorox, such substantial height-

ening of the barriers to entry constitutes an important

element in the finding that a merger is in violation of Sec- -

tion 7 (Clorox, p. 50). |

General Foods, like Procter; is a powerful company,

_ Strongly entrenched in the marketing of low-cost consumer

products to grocery stores with huge financial resources

and advertising budget (App. A, pars. 25-28). Its presence

in the soap pad market where the existing competitors were

relatively small, like Procter’s presence in. the liquid bleach

market, operated as a formidable barrier to new market

entrants who, in order to gain a significant foothold in the

market, would have to withstand the powerful competitive -

weapons available to General Foods which would imme-

*°The high barriers to entry into the household steel wool market

prior to the acquisition were attested to by General Foods ‘in its pre-

acquisition study, in which it concluded that “the fact that S.O.S. and

Brillo have well-established product franchises is undoubtedly a re-

straining: factor which does not invite widespread competition even™

(CX 7, p. 23).

’ though profit margins are very attractive”

216a

Opinion and Order

diately confront them upon their first entry (App. A, -par.

33). ‘Furthermore, General Foods’ merger had exactly the

saine consequence which wé noted in our Clorox decision

is an.important anticompetitive result of mergers of this

type, namely, that of motivating the remaining firms in the

markét to seek protection by affiliating by merger with com-

panies larger than themselves (Clorox, p. 55). This was

what we predicted would happen in f lorox and what actually

did occur after General Foods’ acquisition when Brillo

merged with Purex (App. A, par. 38). - |

General Foods’ entry into the household steel wool mar-

ket conferred on S.O.S. a series of advantages which its

competitors could not match (App. A, par. 33). As we

noted in our Clorox decision, “the merger of a relatively

small, single-product firm with a very large multi-product

firm enables substantial costgsavings and other advantages

in advertising and sales promotion, especially in television

advertising.” All of the discount rate and other cost-saving

advantages ‘in television," radio and magazine advertising

' 411Respondent seeks to belittle the impact of the television discounts

available to S.O.S. after the acquisition by contending that as a matter

of fact Brillo was more efficient in its television, advertising and that

its television advertising costs were lower than those of S.0.S. (Re-

spondent’s Brief on Appeal, pp. 49-51). We reject this argument on

its facts.and on its logic. Respondent’s calculations of relative costs

and efficiency are based on Neilsen’s estimates of actual viewers after .

the program has been contracted, paid for and shown. Thus, if the

program attracted more viewers than originally estimated respondent

would equate the resulting lower per viewer poor ion greater

efficiency.: What respondent is in fact equating with efficiency is the

popularity of a program not originally anticipated and ‘therefore not

paid for. We do not believe that this is a proper basis for determining

costs and efficiency of advertising. If the figures relied upon by

respondent show anything, they demonstrate that for the programs

selected by respondent for its cost/efficiency calculation, S.0.S. spent

far more on advertising after the merger than Brillo and its com-

mercials reached many more viewers than Brillo’s. S.O.S. was able

to reach 700,120 viewers by spending $1,999,300 on the programs

enumerated, whereas Brillo was. able to reach only 336,459 persons

_as the result of its expenditure of $934,385 on the programs listed

on which its commercials appeared (CX 170).

217a

Opinion and Order

and in promotions as well as in marketing and distribution ©

which accrued to Clorox as a result of its acquisition by .

Procter were demonstrated in this case to have accrued in

large part to S.O.S. after its acquisition by General Foods

(App. A, pars, 33(a)-(d)).

| Due to the functional identity of the various household

steel wool products (like the identity of the various liquid

bleaches in their market), and the high degree of product

differentiation, or preference by the consumers ‘for the

established, well-known brands, extensive advertising is

crucial (App. A, pars, 16-22). Without widespread ad-

vertising a potential competitor cannot enter the market

and an existing competitor will disappear (App. A, par. -

18). Thus, just'as Procter’s ability to advertise and pro-

mote less expensively gave it a substantial competitive ad-

vantage over Clorox’s competitors and inhibited the entry

of new competitors so the ability of General F oods to secure

lower advertising and promotion costs gave’ it a substantial

‘advantage over S.O.S.’ competitors and raised the barriers

to entry into the market (App. A, par. 33).

After its acquisition by General Foods, S.O.S. could —

and.did induce potential customers to purchase its steel

wool pads by offering them discounts based on pooled pur-

chases from various divisions of General Foods and by ©

enabling customers to coordinate their steel wool soap pad

orders with their orders of other General Foods’ products.

~These were marketing advantages which accrued to 5.0.5.

solely as a result of the merger and which were not en joyed

by its single-product competitors (App. A, par. 33(f)).”

12Respondent in its brief denied that its incorporation of S.O.S.

into its Kool-Aid Division, with the resulting consolidation of the

warehousing and distribution facilities of the two companies, achieved

any cost savings or increased efficiency (Respondent’s Reply Brief,

pp. 8-10). Complaint counsel, on the other hand; argued the reverse

(Complaint Counsel’s Brief, pp. 44-45).‘ To the extent the point

FST RNR? AACE

-* 2184 |

5

Opinion and Order

oa.

Again,-as was also true with Procter, General Foods’ posi- .

tign as a well-established producer of “must” items made it

- likely that it would be able to ) obtain from retailers various

advantages in the display or marketing of its products which

were not available to S.O.S. prior to the merger or to any

of its competitors, all of whom were small ‘Singlerproduct

firms (App. A, par, 33(h)).

To the extent that unlawful exercise of its marketing

power by Procter was taken into account in assessing the

competitive impact of its acquisition of.Clorox, so must

' this same fac r also be considered in appraising the com-

petitive signiffcance of General Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S.. '

(Clorox,,pp. 48-49). In this connection we find the same

potential anticompetitive possibilities to be present in the

General Foods’ acquisition. The significance of this factor -

- did not depend in the Clorox case on the few instances in *

the record where Procter had in fact exercised its power un- ~ .

fairly in the past, but rather-on the fact that it possessed’ ji

such market power to compete urifairly (Clorox, pp. 48-49).

. There is no doubt that the degree of market power enjoyed

by General Foods is substantially identical, to Procter’ sand -

that its possession of this.power must be regarded as en-

genidering the same poteritially anticompetitive effects. i in the

steel wool pad market as we found Procter’s power poten-

tially engendered in the liquid bleach market.

The.so-called acceleration of competition which respond-

ent alleges followed upon General Foods’ acquisition of

S.O.S. appears to’us to have been somewhat ephemeral

and in any event is not of such a quality as in our opinion

‘changes or mitigates the deep underlying structural changes

is relevant we find that cost savings did result’ (App. A, pars. 33(f).

and (g))., We note, however, in this connection that whatever cost

savings were achieved were not reflected in any reduction in the list

price of S.O.S. pads and in fact after the merger one price increase

was announced ( App. A, par.: 36). .

219a

Opinion and Order

.

which General Foods’ acquisition accomplished in this mar--

ket and which, in our judgment, constitute the same type

of competitive destruction which we foresaw in the liquid

bleach market after Procter’s entry.and which led us to

» conclude that that merger was illegal. In our appraisal of

respondent’s claims respecting the competitive. “awakening”

which allegedly “followed its acquisition of S.O.S., we find

particularly significant the facts that during the six-year

period which followed the acquisition the only price change

made by.S.O.S. and Brillo was a price increase, that by .

1962 General Foods (S.O.S.) had increased. its market

differential over that of Brillo to 14.2%, in contrast with

the modest lead of only 3% which it had had in 1957, and:

that there were no new entries into the market during the

period in question (App. A, par. 34)...

The record indicates that another. .major multiproduct

company—Colgate-Palmolive Company—was engaged in

the sale of household steel wool in Canada (Tr. 947-948), .

and thus ‘could be regarded as a potential competitor of

S.0.S. Presumably there were other companies engaged

in the sale of low-cost, high-turnover commodities in super-

markets, which could also be considered to have been poten-

tial entrants.. Therefore, the entry of General Feods into

the market did not’ eliminate all potential competition.

Nevertheless, its entry did have the effect of substantially

lessening potential competition, since it raised to virtually

insurmountable heights the barriers ‘to entry which had al-

ready existed to some extent; thus, the acquisition severely

limited the role which potential competition could otherwise

have played as a critical check on the ability of S.O.S. to

stifle competition in the steel wool industry. ( See Clorox,

pp. 61-62. )

‘In sum, wé conclude that the same discrepancies i in ‘size ©

between the acquired and acquiring company, the same

220a

Opinion and Order

threat posed by the acquisition to transform a basically

single-product small firm industry into an industry in which, —

the incentive will be to merge and ape the oe: com-

pany, the same probability that the. acquisitisn would

dampen or even eliminate whatever modest competition ac-

tually or potentially may have existed in the pre-acquisition

market—all of these factors relied on in our Clorox decision

apply with even greater force, and ‘on the same legal and

factual reasoning, to the steel wool soap pad industry.

As we emphasized in Clorox, advantages of scale can

be an important factor heightening the barriers to’-entry

and impairing competitive conditions in an industry. (See

Clorox opinion at pp. 28-29; 31, 33; 46-47, 54, and 64-65).

Whether, a merger has or has not conferred benefits on

either the customers of the acquired company or on. the

acquired company itself is not the primary inquiry which

Congress and the Courts have commanded us to.make in

determining whether a merger violates the law or not. That —

_a merger. may “on some 4ultimate reckoning of social or

economic debits and credits * * * be deemed beneficial” is

a “value choice” from which we have been foreclosed from’

considering. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,

374 U,.S. 321, 371 (1963). The central inquiry is whether

the merger will probably substantially lessen competition.”

_ As we pointed « out in our Clorox opinion :

FE g., 95 Cong. Rec. 11486. For discussion of the Congressional -

objectives i in.enacting the Clayton Act and of the case law see Com- .

ment, “ ‘Substantially to Lessen.Competition . . .’: Current Problems

of Horizontal Mergers,” 68 Yale L. J. 1627, 1660 (1959); Blake

and Jones, “In Defense of Antitrust,” 65 Col. ) BY) 377, 382 (1965)

and Bok, “Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law

and Economics,” 74 Harv. L. R. 226, 235-37, 318-21 (1911) ; some

of the leading cases in which mergers were invalidated. despite claimed

efficiencies, e.g., United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co.,

376 U. S. 665 ( 1964) ; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376

_U. S. 651 (1964) ; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374

U.,S. 321, 370- 1 (1963) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

168 F. Supp. 576, 615-18 (S. D. N. Y. 1958). ;

”

22la ot

Opinion and Order

“In stressing as we have, the importance of advan- :

tages of scale as a factor heightening the barriers

_ to new entry into the liquid bleach industry, and so oe

- impairing competitive conditions in that industry, |

we reject, as specious in law and unfounded in fact,

the argument that the Commission ought not, for

the sake of ‘protecting the ‘inefficient’ small firms in

the industry, proscribe a merger so productive of

% ‘efficiencies.’ The- short answer to this argument is

that, in a proceeding under Section 7, economic ef.

ficiency or any other ‘social benefit resulting from a

merger is pertinent in-only so far as it may tend to

promote or retard the vigor of competition. * * *

- Congress did not mean the adjudicators of Section

7 cases to attempt to weigh the ultimate social and

economic merits and demerits of a merger, but only *

to determine its effect on competition and monopoly”

(Op., p. 64). ie

In the instant case we have concluded. that General ..

Foods’ acquisition of S.O.S. will in fact substantially lessen

competition in the steel wool pad market. We have based

this conclusion on our finding that respondent’s acqttisition

of S.0.S. has raised to virtually insurmountable heights

entry barriers which were already high, that the presence

of General Foods in the market has changed the steel wool

pad market -which prior to the merger consisted of two

substantially , equal-sized companies and several smaller

firms to one/in which S.O.S. is now dominant, and finally |

that the substitution of General Foods for S.O.S. will de-

press rather than enhance the compétitive vitality of the

market and will paralyze any incentive to compete -which

might otherwise have existed. The fact that these- high

entry barriers to potential entrants and the impairment of

the competitive vitality of the market arises in part because

222a

Opinion and Order

of the impact which General Foods’ advertising, promo-

tional and distributional resources had on potential and

‘actual competitors in this market did not make its acquisi-

.tion any less anticompetitive. Evaluation of competitive im- -

pact must take account of business reality and of the re-

- action of businessmen to a state of facts. The state of facts

in the instant case is the effect on competition which General

Foods’ presence in this market will have. We have con-

cluded that its presence in the market will be to lessen

competition substantially. Because it chose to achieve this

market position by merger it runs afoul of Section 7.

ll

Relief

_ The.order entered by the heafing examiner requires

respondent to divest itself of the-S.O.S. assets which were

found to have been acquired in violation of Section 7. As

we held in Clorox, this is the appropriate relief in a case

involving a product extension merger of the type herein.

considered.. We pointed out in Clorox that:

“It is settled * * * that divestiture is normally

the appropriate remedy in a Section 7 proceeding.

~ United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, 366

U. S. 316. This case would be a particularly inap-

propriate one in which to make an exception. The —

anti-competitive effects of this acquisition are non

enjoinable. They inhere in the very presence of

Procter, standing in the, place of Clorox in the liquid

bleach industry [here the very presence of General

Foods standing in the place of S.O.S. in the house+

hold steel wool industry], and can be corrected only

by restoration of the market structure, so far as

possible, as it existed at the time of acquisition”

(Clorox Opinion, p. 70).

4

: 223a

Opinion and Order

In conclusion, therefore, the initial decision, as supple-.

mented and modified to conform to this opinion and to

Appendix A attached hereto, and the order entered by the

examiner, are adopted as the decision and order of the Com-

mission. . :

The Commission’s decision of this case is without the

concurrence of Commissioner MacIntyre. a

‘Commissioner Elman dissented and has filed a dis-

seriting opinion.

| March 11, 1966

o

224a

Opinion and Order

Appendix A

. Comparison of Operative Facts

in the General Foods and

Procter & Gamble Cases |

«

Facts in the General Foods Corpora-

tion Case, Docket No. 8600

- A, Tue S.O.S. Company, Inc.

AND THE HOUSEHOLD STEEL

Woot Inpustry Prior To-

THE ACQUISITION

1. On December 31, 1957 General

Foods Corporation (herein called

GF) acquired The S.O.S. Company,

_ Inc. (herein called S.O.S.) which .

was the nation’s leading manufac-

turer of household steel wool’ (App.

B., Table I). As of July 31, 1957

S.O.S. had net assets of almost $6

million and a net worth of $4,400,-

000, which was almost three times

its total liabilities (CX 5(h)). Its

net sales in 1956 amounted to $14,- ©

468,000, and its profits before taxes

* in that year ($3,214,000) amounted

to a 22.2% return on net sales and

over 72% of net worth as of July

31, 1957 (CX 5(h) ; CX 5(i)).

2. In GF’s pre-acquisition report of

S.O.S. it was stated that its sales of

household steel wool would grow as

the number of uses multiplied, the

items within each were category ex-

panded and the population increased,

with an improving standard of living

(CX 7, pp. 21, 22). The real growth

of S.O.S. had been accomplished

within the 10 years preceding the _

Facts in the Procter & Gamble Com-

pany (Clorox) case, Docket No. 6901

(November 26, 1963)

A. THE Ciorox CHEMICAL Com-

PANY AND THE HousEHOLD

Liguip BLeAcH ° INDUSTRY

PrioR TO THE ACQUISITION

1. On September 30, 1957 Procter

& Gamble Company (herein called

P&G) acquired the Clorox Chem-

ical Company (herein called Clor-

ox) which was the nation’s leading .

manufacturer of household liquid

bleach. Clorox had annual sales of

slightly under. $40,000,000 (Clorox .

Opinion, pp. 1, 5).?

”

2. P&G prepared a report prior to

its acquisition of Clorox in which it

predicted the ascendency of liquid

bleach over powdered bleach (Clor-

ox Opinion, p. 13).

1The citations are to +hé pages of the

Commission Opinion on which the

operative facts relied on where recited.

225a

Opinion and Order

acquisition (CX 7, p. 21). Sales

of S.O.S. soap pads increased from

$3.9 million in 1948 to $14.6 million

in 1957 (CX 5(g), CX 118(b)).

According to the pre-acquisition

study prepared by General Foods, ©

this growth was due to the fact that

the soap-pad products were “very

_efficient as a cleaner -of aluminum .

‘and, as the use of aluminum has

multiplied, sales of pads have in-

creased. This growth has been

abetted by the increased distribution

of modern kitchen ranges and the

need to clean burner plates, ovens

and broiling pans” (CX 7, p. 21).

3. In addition to household steel

wool, S.O.S. also produced small

quantities of plastic scouring de-

vices and industrial steel wool. In

1956 S.O.S.’ sales of. the former

totaled $1.4 piition (CX. 5(g)),

and its sales df industrial steel wool

amounted to $229,000 (Brillo Mfg.:

Co., D. 6557, 1963).

4, Price to the entry of GF into the

~household steel wool industry, the

industry had been basically a small-

firm industry. Its.total sales were

less than $29 million annually (App.

B, Table I).

5. S.O.S.’ principal. eomeulints in

the household steel wool soap pad

- business was Brillo Manufacturing

Company, Inc. (herein called Brillo)

with total sales in 1958 of 21.7

million dollars (CX 161). Like

S.0.S. Brillo engaged almost ex-

clusively in the manufacture of steel

wo@ products, but also produced a

relatively small amount of industrial

steel wool and a plastic Ne,

device (Brillo Mfg. Co., D. 6557,

1963 ; RX 4(b) (2)).

3. Clorox was engaged almost ex-

clusively in the manufacture of

household liquid bleach (Clorox

» Opinion, p. 6).

4. Prior to the advent of P&G,

household liquid bleach was basically

a small-firm saeco = lorox. Opin-

ion, p. 55).

5. Clorox’s principal competitor in —

the liquid bleach field was the Purex

. Corporation, with total sales in 1957

of approximately $50 million. Un-

like Clorox, Purex manufactures, in

addition, to liquid bleach, a number

of other products, including deter-

gents, an abrasive cleanser and a

toilet soap (Clorox Opinion, p. 6).

26a

Opinion and Order

6. ring the year 1957, S.O.S.,

nh ole of household steel wool

in the amount of $14,600,000, was

the leader in the industry, with 51%

of the national sales of household

steel wool products. Brillo was a

close second with sales of $13,-—

629,000, or 47.6% of the market.

Thus, the two together accounted

for 98.6% of the market. Three .

smaller producers, Durawool In-

corporated, American Steel Wool

Manufacturing Company, Inc. and

Alloy Metal Products oH

shared the remaining portion of the

market, amounting to 1.4% (App.

B, Table I): So insignificant were

the market positions of the smaller

.companies' that S.O.S. and Brillo

could, and did, ignore them in their

competitive activities (CX 7, pp.

21-25; CX 124). Durawool began

producing household steel wool in

or about 1952 or 1953 (Tr. 825-

826). Ameérican first entered the

business in 1898 (Tr. 921). Alloy

began producing steel wool soap

_ pads in late 1956 (Tr. 889-891).

Alloy was dissolved in 1963 and its

plant and equipment sold to Dem-.

corp which subsequently entered the .

steel wool industry (Tr. 890, 901).

Two other small producers of

household steel wool had been elim-

inated from the market. ac-

quisition by S.O.S, and Brillo re-

spectively in 1954 and 1955. (CX 7,

Bey CX 53; CX 118(b); Tr.

7. S.O.S. and Brillo had net assets

of $6,000,000 and $8,000,000 re-

spectively, while the -net assets of

each of the smaller manufacturers

were valued at less than $500,000

Answer Par. 2(d); CX 158(a);

CX 156(b); CX ‘144; Tr. 871,

966).

rporation, -

6. In 1957, Clorox (with sales

slightly under $40 million and

48.8% of the market) and Purex

(with 15.7%) between them ac-.

counted for almost 65% of the na-

tion’s household bleach sales; four

other manufacturers accounted for

15%; and the remaining 20% of

the market was divided among ap-

proximately 223 small producers

plus a “large number of extremely

small” producers (Clorox Opinion,

pp. 5, 6). :

.

7. Only eight of the liquid bleach

manufacturers had assets in excess

of $1 million. Very few had assets

of more than $75,000 (Clorox

Opinion, p. 6).

227a

Opinion and Order 4

8. ° Both Brillo and S.O.S. had na-

‘ tional” distribution and sold their’

state in the coun- |

products in eve

try (CX 7, p. 24; CX 124). S.O.S.

. had two plants in Chicago (CX 7, p:

26) and Brillo had two plants, one

located in Ohio and the other in.

Brooklyn, New York (RX 27, p. 6).

Each of the three smaller soap pad

companies had only regional distri-

bution. Durawool and American

were limited to the northeastern area

of the United States (Tr. 834-835,

923, 957), and Alloy, which indeed

made no sales at all until 1958 (App.

B, Table I) was limited vy to

Detroit, Michigan (Tr. 910). —

. 9. While S.0.S. had 51% of the

national market in terms of total

dollar sales of household steel wool

in 1957 (App. B; Table I), it had

almost 55% of the combined S.O.S.-

Brillo sales in the nation of soap-

impregnated steel wool pads in terms

of retail sales (App. B, Table II).

Its share of combined S.O.S.-Brillo .

sales in terms of packages sold was .

proportionately higher in certain re-

gions of the country, namely: 60%

of New England, 75% in Chicago,

68% in the West Central Region,

66% in the Southwest Region and

“4 - the Pacific Region (CX 7,

P- .

10. Except for metropolitan New

York, S.O.S.’ share of the combined

sales of Brillo and S.O.S. soap-im-

pregnated steel wool soap pads in

terms of packages sold was at least -

47.8% in each region. The only area

in which Brillo had a greater dom-

inance than S.O.S. was in metropoli-

_tan New York, where Brillo had

76.7% and S.O.S. had 23.3% of

sales in terms of es sold in

April-May 1957 (CX 7, p. 84).

8. Clorox, which had 13 plants dis-

tributed throughout the country, was

the only producer selling on a na-

tional ‘scale. Purex had as many

plants as Clorox, but did not dis-

tribute its bleach in the northeast

or middle-Atlantic states and sold

in less than 50% of the national

market. Most of the other liquid

bleach manufacturers had only a

single plant and were limited to a

ee market (Clorox Opinion,

p. 7).

9. While Clorox had 48.8% of the

national market, it had 56% of the

market in New England, 64% of the

market in the metropolitan New

York area, and 72% of the market

in the middle-Atlantic states (Clorox

Opinion, p. 7). -

. one

10. Even in areas where the prin-

cipal competitors of Clorox were

active, Clorox’s total share of the

liquid bleach market was high. Ex-

cept in metropolitan Chicago and

the west-Central states, Clorox ac-

counted for at least 39% of the 73

sales (Clorox Opinion, p. 7).

228a

Opinion and Order

11. Between the founding of S.O.S. 11. Neither the liquid bleach prod-

-in 1919 and the mid-1930’s its soap —_uct nor its process is the subject of

pads were protected by patent. At a patent or trade secret (Clorox

‘ter the expiration of ‘this patent, no Opinion, p. 6).

patent on the steel wool soap pad .

product or process has been in effect

(CX 7, p. 21). While S.O.S. claims

to have a “rust arrester” (CX 68)

and Brillo advertises that its prod-

uct contains a “rust resistor” (CX

167(k)), there is’ no indication in’

the record that either is the result

of a secret process.

‘12. The American-made machines 12. The manufacturing process is

used for the manufacture of house-. relatively simple (Clorox Opinion,

hold steel wool are custom-made to. p.8). . \

the manufacturer’s eS \ \

(Tr. 847, 888-890, 908-909). \

German-manufactured machine is» \

‘available but cannot produce steel 4

wool as efficiently as. American-

made machines (Tr. 847-848).

Technical know-how is vital and

constitiites a barrier to entry by po-

tential competitors (CX 7, pp. 11,- .

- 23,75). oo ers

13. S.O.S.’ costs of producing its 13. The-equipment, raw materials

products and. of the equipment re- and labor required in the manufac-

_ quired to manufacture these prod- ture of liquid bleach are relatively

ucts were low, compared with its - inexpensive (Clorox Opinion, p. 6).

sales and profits: In 1956 gross

. sales (less allowances and cash dis-

counts) amounted to $15,728,000

-and profits before taxes were $3,-

214,000 (CX 5(i)). The cost of

goods sold was $7,144,000, or 45%

of gross sales. (less allowances ani

discounts) (CX 5(i)).. Although

there are no precise figures as to.

the costs of the raw materials’ (pri-

marily steel.and soap),.it does ap-

r that labor costs are low (CK

, pp. 31 ff.). The cost of the equip-

ment on the corporate books was

$2,293,000 (CX 5(h)), which was

$900,000 less than the profits for —

a

229a

Opinion and Order

the year 1956. No accurate figures

are —e as to the —

- costs e€ equipment ui to

enter the Seale tas yay

indicates that the approximate cost

is between $200,000 and $300,000

(CX 156(b); Tr. 871, 966).

14, Steel wool soap pads are sold

on a delivered price basis, with the.

- Manufacturer paying the freight.

Shipping costs amounted. to 11%

of S.O.S.” production and distribu--

tion costs in 1956 (CX 5(i)). The

President of American Steel Wool

Manufacturing Company _ testified

that freight “is a very large part

of our costs” (Tr. 942). The Presi-

dent of \Alloy testified - that freight

was “very definitely” a factor. which

prevented his company from selling

in other parts of the country (Tr.

913). Demrack, of Demcorp, testi-

fied that “[f]reight- rates are

- high on steel wool. It carries a

. good class of freight. It carries a

top class of freight. Percentage-wise

it is very high” (Tr. 979). Trans-

portation and warehousing together’

comprised 15%-of S.O.S.’ costs of

production and distribution in 1956

(CX S(i)). .

15. — oes contains no —

steel wool soap pad eapacity

but indicates that the household

steel wool soap pad industry has

adequate capacity with an ability

to expand, at least for short-range

intervals (Tr. 428; RX 28(a)).

16. Although the: household steel

wool soap pads produced by the

various manufacturers can be dis-

tinguished from each other by such

14. Household liquid bleach is ex-

pensive to ship. Freight, which the

manufacturer pays for, ‘commonly

averages more than 10% of unit

cost. Liquid bleach was not pro-

fitably distributed outside of a 300-

mile radius from the manufacturing

plant (Clorox-Opinion, p. 7)

*

oa

15. The liquid bleach industry is

not plagued. by inadequate produc-

tive capacity or shortages and in-

dustry members are not producing -

at full capacity (Clorox Opinion,

p. 8).

“16. All household liquid bleaches

_are chemically identical, and none

is superior to any other (Clorox

Opinion, p. 8). '

~

” 230a

Opinion and Order

differences in their essential ingre-

’ * dients, and they are substantially

equivalent in quality and onthe

| ance (Tr. 481, 566, 954).

17. Household steel wool is a low-

price, high turnover consumer prod-

uct sold to housewives mainl

through grocery stores and

service supermarkets (Tr. 492

Approximately 97% of S.O.S.’s

soap pads were sold through

cery channels (CX 7, p. 22). .

18.-The allocation of sufficient

shelf space and the housewife’s: pre-

conditioning to select a given brand

are indispensable elements in the

successful sale of the product. Ad-

vertising is vital im the sale of steel

wool soap pads—so important, in ;

| fact, that, as. respondent’s Chairman

« | testified, the cessation of. advertis-

"ing ‘by s. O.S. would result in: the

loss of consumer brand loyalty, in

the discontinuance of. sales of thé

NS product by supermarkets and in the

~“ultimate disappearance of the prod-

‘uct from the market (Tr: 493; 494-

5, 511, 524-25, 565-66, 557; CX 36,

"S73 cx 39, p. 9).

19. S.O.S. expended a total of

$2,265,000 or is, 7%. of net sales,

for advertising in 1956 (CX 5(i)).

+ In 1957; S.0.5. spent $ 11,000 for .

aper advertis-

magazine ‘and new,

io advertising,

-ing, $22,000 for r:

and $1,390,000 for TV advertising, .

or a total of $2,124,000 (CX.

10). .Brillo’s advertising expenses

junted to $1, 837, 762 in 1957

159).

20. ‘The smaller competitors lacked

~. the financial resources to engage in

‘any substantial advertising (Tr.

836, 894, 972). Moreover, 7 re-

gro-

17. Household liquid. bleach is a

‘low-price, high turnover consumer

roduct sold mainly to housewives -

_, Im grocery stores (Clorox Opinion,

). p. 8)

18. Successful sales of liquid bleach

depend on the extent to which a

manufacturer can Me gros it, and

thus advertisi promotion are

vital to create niliazity and brand

loyalty for the product, and insure

that adequate shelf-space will be

allocated to the product by the -

grocer (Clorox Opinion, pp. 8-10).

-19.° Prior to the acquisition, Clorox

had advertised extensively. In 1957,

it had spent $1, grap al. for news-

paper advertising, $560,000 for mag-

azine advertising, $258,000 for radio

and billboard advertising, and

$1,150,000 for TV advertising. (a

total of $3,718,000), Advertising

expenditures were thus equal to

almost 10% of total sales (Clorox

Opinion, pp. 8-9)

20. Most manufacturers of liquid

bleach lacked the financial resources

to advertise extensively (p: 9). Pur-

ex was a large advertiser but very .

Zila

Opinion and Order 7

gional distributors, they could not

derive the same benefits from adver-

tising which were available to the

National distributors, S.O.S. ‘and

Brillo. Due to the almost complete

lack of advertising the smaller pro-

ducers were virtually unable to ob-

tain. shelf-space in

and su kets (Tr. 836, 894,

942-054, 972-992).

21. Neither S.0.S. nor Brillo en-

gaged in trade or consumer profno-

tions to any significant extent prior

to the acquisition. S.O.S. had a pol-

icy of not ing in consumer or

trade promotion ‘ 5(b) ; CX 7,

p- 36) and in 1957 Brillo spent

thi ) of

its soap pads and only $26,858 on

trade promotions (CX 160).

22. Before a new brand of house-

hold steel wool may be successfully

‘ bleach can be safely launched, it’

launched, extensive test marketing,

accompanied by substantial outlays

for advertising and/or promotions

are necessary (Tr. 833, 967, 977).

23. Due to the nearly universal ac-

ceptance of their brands, S.O.S. and

Brillo’ were able to command higher

‘a for their products than eir

esser-known itors. For ex-

ample, as of December 1958, $.0.S.

_ was able to charge $4.80 for twenty-

tors charged the following prices for

peed

eeeveeee

ee ee ee

ee eee eeoeene

(CX 15, 130, 139, 151 (a), 166(a)).

. ited

ocery stores .

ibly less. effective than Clorox

use of Purex’s territorially lim-

distribution (Clorox Opinion, |

p. 9

21. Prior to its acquisition by

P&G, Clorox had not been active in

“4 promotions (Clorox Opinion,

upon

22. There is evidence in this case .

that before a new brand of a

must _ be. test-marketed locally .

(Clorox Opinion, p. 43). ‘

23. Clorox is a premium brand

that commonly s for several

cents per quart higher than regional:

or > a brands (Clorox Opinion,

p. 8).. . >

A

”

232a

Opinion and Order *

24. As another result of the ina-

. ° bility of the smaller companies to

compete with the two dominant

brands, the smaller manufacturers

were relegated to. the- marketing of

much of their steel wool soap pads

under private labels and through dis-

count houses and other outlets

specializing in low-price merchandise

(Tr. 832-834; 891, 922-923, 970-

972). By way of contrast the two

majors did little or no private label

soap pad business. S.O.S. prior to

the acquisition did a very small

amount of private-label business

through its Cleanser Prodicts Divi-

sion (CX 7, p. 19),, but the over-

whelming bulk of the production of

these two: companies was marketed

under their two brandnames,

“S.0.S.” and “Brillo” respectively

(Tr. 720-722; CX 124). .

B. Position oF*GENERAL

Foops CorPORATION

25.. Respondent. General’ Foods |

Corporation is engaged in the sale

of a wide variety of low-price, high-

turnover household consumer items

sold to the consumer through gro-

cery stores and supermarkets (CX

149). GF has 50% of the food sales

markets in certain food products and

_is the largest packaged food manu-

facturer in the United States with .

net sales in the fiscal year ended

March 31, 1957 of almost one billion

dollars (CX .36). A’ substantial

tfumber of General Foods’ present

‘products were acquired through the

acquisition by General Foods of the

assets or stock of existing producers -

of such products. As of March 31,

1962 respondent had made about 69

of such acquisitions, including that

of S.O.S. (Answet, par. 6). —

o

24. Most manufacturers of house-

hold liquid bleacly sell at least part

_ of their production to grocery stores

and supermarkets for resale, to the

consumer under the stores’ own

brand names. . These private. or

house brands, however, appear to

account for only a small proportion

of the total sales of liquid bleach.

Clorox sells no private-brand liquid

bleach—all of Clorox’s bleach is sold

under* “Clorox” brand name—and

Purex very little (Clorox Opinion, .

p. 6).

B. Position or THE Procter & —

GAMBLE COMPANY

25. At the time of the acquisition.

Procter & Gamble was engaged in

the sale of a wide range of low-

price, high-turnover household con-

sumer items. which it markets

through grocery, drug and depart-

ment stores. P&G was one of the

nation’s 50 largest manufacturers,

with total net sales in 1957 of $1.156 |

billion (Clorox Opinion, p. 10).

a

233a

Opinion and Order

26. GF’s product range consists

principally of’ packaged food prod-°

ucts and includes other non-food

items such as bluing (CX 149),

27. In the fiscal year ended March

31, 1957 GF’s~net. sales were BR

proximately one billion dollars (

36) or more than 68 times the total

sales of S.O.S. in 1956 (CX 5(i))

and more than 36 times the industry- -

wide sales of household steel wool in

ie ($29,000,000) (App. B, Table

28. In 1961 General Foods ranked

third among all manufacturing cor-

porations and first among food proc-

€ssors in total advertising expendi-

tures (CX 117(b)).° Its advertising

expenditures in that year amounted

- to $105,000,000 (CX 117(b)), or 50

’ times S.O.S,’ advertising expendi-

tures in 1957, the year preceding the

acquisition (App. B, Table TI).

Respondent’s consumer and trade

promotions alone in 1957 amounted

to $19,000,000 (CX 63), which was

in excess of S.O.S.’ estimated total

_ sales in that year (CX 5(g)).

C. Tue Acouisition py GEN-

ERAL Foops or S.O.S. anp

THE ADVANTAGES TO S.O.S.

_Waicn Accruep

29. According to General Foods’.

pre-acquisition report, the acquisi-

tion could give og 2 —

position in a tight little specialty

market, similar to Postum in the

“e- beverage field” (CX 7,

p. 73), ; ,

_tergents and cleansers,

household liquid

26. P&G's‘ main locus of activity

was in the general area of soaps, de-"

and it also

manufactures a wide variety of var-

ious food items such as baking mixes

and shortenings and other household

products such as shampoos and den-

oe (Clorox Opinion, pp. 10-

11). ae

27. In 1957 P&G’s sales of pack-

aged detergents alone were 10 times

the total sales of Clorox and 8 times

the total sales of all of Purex’s prod-

ucts combined. P&G’s total sales

were more than 20 times the total

sales of Purex and more than 25.

7

times -the total sales of Clorox.

P&G’s total sales were more than

ten times the industry-wide sales of

bleach (Clorox

Opinion, pp. 53, 55).

28. P&G is one of the nation’s

leading advertisers ‘S lorox Opin-

ion, p. 12). In 1957, P&G spent

“upwards of $80 million on advertis-

ing and $47 million for domestic .

sales promotion.’ Domestic * sales

were approximately $900 million in

that year. (Clorox Opinion, p. 12).

.

GC. Tue Acguisition spy P&G oF

Clorox. AND THE ADVAN-

TAGES To CLorox WuicH Ac-

CRUED > ;

29. According to P&G’s pre-acqui-

' sition report, “Taking over the Clor-

ox business . . . could be a way of

achieving a dominant position in the

liquid bleach market quickly which

would pay out reasonably well”

(€lorox Opinion, p. 13).

satrremmars

30. General Foods’ pre-acquisition

t predicted that the acquistion

would give GF “an opportunity to

effect ecbnomies in physical distri-

bution” of S.O.S. products (CX 7,

p. 75). The president. of S.O.S.

Stated that “Large savings on adver-

tising, warehousing and transpo

tion [of soap pads] could be made

= S.O°S. in nal on of one of

the great nati organizations”

(CX 7,p. 70). | we

31. There is no indication in thé

record that General Foods had ever

considered entering the household

steel wool business by developing its

own capacity or by acquiring one of

the smaller competitors.

32. The assets of S.O.S. which

were acquired by General Foods had

a value of approximately $6 million

and the stock of General Foods for

which the assets were exchanged

had a.market value of $17,500,000

pone Par. 2(d)).

33. The following substantial cost

savings and other competitive ad-

vantages accrued to S.O.S. as a re-

sult of its acquisition by GF:

a.- Discounts for Network TV

Advertising

S.O.S. was.able to obtain gross-time

discounts (by earning the hourly

rate rather than the half-hourly

‘ rate) and an increase in its weekly

discounts (CX 86F). The discount

on gross-time amounted to 163%4%

(CX 81C, 81D, 82B, 82C, 83C,

83D, 84B, 84C, 85C, 85D, 86B,

86C, 86D, 87C, 87D, 87E, 88B,

88C, 88D). The weekly discount .

Opinion and Order

rta-"

234a

HW. P&G’s pre-atquisition report

predicted that P&G’s sales, distrib-

uting and manufacturing setup could

increase Clorox’s share of the mar-

‘ket in certain areas where it was low

and effect a number of savings that

would increase the profits of the bus-

iness eared (Clorox Opinion,

p. a

possibility of entry into the liquid

bleach market on its own. Prior to

the merger Procter was not only a

likely prospect for new entry into

the bleach market, it was virtually

the only such prospect (Clorox

_ Opinion, p. 61).

32. The assets of Clorox, which

were acquired by P&G had a value

of approximately $12.6 million and

the stock of P&G for which the as-

sets were exchanged had a niarket’

value of approximately $30.3 million

(Clorox Opinion, pp. 13, 14).

31. P&G had actually pondered the

.

33.- The following cost savings and :

other competitive advantages ac- .

crued to Clorox as a result of its

acquisition by P&G:

‘a. Discounts for Network TV

Advertising

The maximum annual volume dis- °

counts available to the largest ad-

vertisers amount to 25%-30% for

network TV advertising. In. 1957,

Clorox spent $1,150,000 on TV ad-

vertising. While complete discount

rates are not included in the record,

it is virtually certain that an ex-

penditure of this size would not en-

title Clorox to discounts of any

¢

235a

: Opinion and Order

was inrceased from 6% (CX 81B,

. 83B, 85-O, 87F) to 15% (CX 82G,

84G, 86F,'88L). The result of the

two discounts was to give S.O.S. a

net saving of approximately 23%

- On. its» pre-acquisition advertising

costs. By reason of the discount,

S.O.S. was thus able to obtain at

least 28% more television time for

‘the same expenditure. The exist-

ence of TV discounts for large ad-

vertisers was referred to by the

Chairman of the Board of General

Foods (Tr. 529, 531).

b. Discounts for Spot TV.

Advertising . '

-In December of 1957, S.O.S. con-

tracted for 13 20-second announce-

ments to be televised over WCIA-

TV, Champaign, Illinois, between

January 2nd and April Ist, 1958.

The rate to be charged S.O.S. for

these announcements, was $180.50

each (CX 77A). After its acquisi-

tion by GF, the rate ‘for each an-

‘nouncement was lowered to $152.00,

a reduction of approximately 15%

(CX 78B): Moreover, S.0.S.’ ad-

vertising costs were subject . to

further reduction through the abil-

ity of General Foods to package a

certain number of spots in one local-

ity desired by one division with a

. cértain number of spots in another

locality desired by another division

ae: , ee

c. Discounts for Radio .

" Advertising

As a result of the acquisition, S.O.S.

_- was able to have the rates for parti- .

cipation in a program on the Yan-

,kee Radio Network reduced by

5.5% (CX 79A, 80D).

substance. With Clorox. now part _

of the Procter line, for the same

amount of money Clorox spent on

TV network advertising prior to the

merger, at least 331%4% more TV’

network advertising can now be ob-’

tained (Clorox Opinion, pp. 44-45).

b. Discounts for Spot TV

_ Advertising

Discount rates available for local

“spot” television ‘advertising favor

the. large advertiser (Clorox Opin-

ion, pp. 44-46). Moreover, the

large nationa] advertiser can furnish

its divisions with coverage in a par-

‘ticular local area which it desires

while spotting another commercial

in another section of the country

(Clorox Opinion, pp. 45-46)

{

c. Discounts for Radio

Advertising

Substantial discounts are available |

to the largest advertisers for radio

advertising (Clorox Opinion, p.

44). . _

236a

Opinion and Order

d. Discounts for Magazine ,

Advertising — :

The maximum discount appears to

have been approximately 15% for

Better Homes and Gardens (CX :

75B, 76B, 76F). Other discounts

were - for Good Housekeeping

(CX 75B, 76B, 76D), 4: for La-

dies’ Home Journal (CX 75B, 76G)

and 7.5% for Everywoman’s (CX

» 76B and 76K). | ik

e. Ability to Purchase

Television Programs

Prior ‘to ‘the - acquisition, S:0.S._

could not afford nighttime network

television advertising, which is the

most desirable time to. reach con-

sumers (Tr. 439-440). Of five net-

work shows produced by General

Foods subsequent to the uisi-

tion, the cost of each of three (the

Danny Thomas Show, the Andy

Griffith Show, and Gunsmoke) was.

greater than the entire S.O.S. bud-

get for advertising, and the cost of

two.shows (Zane Grey Theater and

Lucy-Desi Hour) was approxi-

_ mately equal to the entire advertis-

ing budget of S.O.S. (CX 46).

After the acquisition, S.0.S. was

able to participate in.these night-

timé pr s because the amount

_ of the cost allocated to S.0.S. was

a fraction of the total -cost of the

shows.: GF increased the amount

spent on television advertising from

$1,390,000 in 1957 to.$2,520,000 in

1962 (App. B, Table III).

é

d. Discounts for Magazine |

Advertising

The record discloses that maximum

volume discounts of between 12%

and 17% are available to adver-

tisers in the leading women’s or

family magazines.. An annual ex-

penditure of $1 million or more may

be necessary to earn the maximum

in a particular magazine. Prior, to

the acquisition, Clorox received no

discounts for magazine advertising

(Clorox Opinion, p. 45).

e. Ability to Purchase

. Television Programs |

A commercial announcement dur- _

ing a television program is substan- .

tially more effective in promoting

a product than on€pduring the be-

tween program station break. Un- |

less Clorox had been willing to put

‘a disproportionate share of its ad-

vertising budget into a single ven--

ture, it could not, prior to the ac-

. quisition, have afforded to buy an —

entire network television program:

Procter, however, can and does buy

the sponsorship of such programs in ~

behalf of several of its products,

enabling Clorox to purchase _net-

work program advertising at. a

fraction of the previous cost. More-

over, even if Clorox could have

purchased: one show, it has the ad-

vantage now of being able to, spread

its’ sponsorship over more’ show

(Clorox Opinion, p. 45).

ee .

~~

237a .

Opinion and Order

f. Advantages Achieved Through f. (Né comparable advantages

Changes in Warehousing referred to.)

and Distribution ’ °

Prior to the acquisition §S.O.S.’

products were shipped to some 32

independent warehouses scattered

throughout the country from which

they were then shipped to customers

_ pursuant to specific order (CX 7,

p. 35). In 1962 General Foods in-

corporated the distribution of the

products of its Kool-Aid Division. -

into its over-all distribution-sales

service warehousing and distributing ns

system, utilized by it for products of /

& the Post, Jell-O, and Institutional /

Products Divisions, for the purpose

-of achieving savings.to respondent

in transportation, .warehousing and

sales costs, through. economies re- .

sulting from the integration of the © a

operations of their divisions (CX

120, 121). At the time the plan was

adopted it was estimated that it

would save the corporation $647,000,

of which $388,000 was attributed to

savings to the Kool-Aid Division.

This latter figure qncluded a saving

of $317,000, resulting from the re-

duction in: transportation costs from

$2,044,000 to- $1,727,000, and a

saving of $102,000, resulting from

reduction of warehousing costs from

$632,000 to $530,000 (CX 121, -

‘Schedule A). As a result of the in-

tegration of -S.0.S. into General

‘Foods, S.0.S. was able to induce |

purchases of its products by (1) a

granting customers discounts based ot

on pooled purchases of the products \ ° (=

° of General Foods’ various divisions ;

(2) giving customers the conven-

ience of including orders of $.0.S.’ -

products in their orders of other

General Foods’ products; and (3)

improving national availability (Tr.

512-515; CX 16(c)).

Ok NS Reena

238a -

Opinion and Order

. Savings in Dealing

. With Brokers .

‘Prior to the acquisition $.0S.’

‘products were sold nationally

through a network of independent

brokers located in the major mar-

(CX 128(4), (e), and (1). S

e), an uper-

brokers

vision of these was main-

tained by S.O.S. four re-

sales CX 7, p.

5). At the. time of ——

' division of General Foods. In 1960

this division was into the

Kool-Aid (Perkins). Division for

= reason that the latter also sold

roducts through national net-

' of brokers. Dual bro

which existed in’ many areas with

to the products of the two

. divisions, was _—_ eliminated

and by 1964 all of the products of

the divisions were sold in

marketing areas or territories by the

-same brokers (Tr. 786-789). Sub-

sequent to the acquisition the com-

poy ae to brokers on S.O.S.

declined from 734% of

ss sales to 5%, (CX 7, oe

6; Tr. 1278, 1317). On 15

7 'S.0S. soap of $19,170.

396. as ype Ry to a sav-

_ ings to respondent.

The record does not indicate the

reason for.this decline. Neverthe-

less, oe without considering this

» saga E c a it would appear that

t gained through the

avoidance 0 dual brokerage result-

=* 44 substantial savings to General

areas of the United States’

g. Savings in Dealing

With Brokers

Sey comparable coving» referred

to

239a °

‘ Opinion and Order

h. Bargaining Position

With Retailers

‘That General Foods is the leading

producer of a number of products

marketed through grocery stores

may enable it-to induce retailers to

give favored treatment to S.O.S. It

seems likely that General Foods can

obtain from retailers as a matter of

convenience or expediency certain

advantages in the display or mar-

keting of its products which are not

available to a single-product pro-

rr! such as the pre-acquisition

i. Ability to Engage

In Sales Promotions

Prior to the acquisition, neither

S.O.S. nor Brillo engaged in promo-

tions to any substantial extent. Gen-

eral Foods, a firm that in 1957 in-

curred sales-promotional expenses in

an amount greater than S.O.S.’ total

sales was in an obvious position to

utilize the sales-promotion technique

on a.wide scale on behalf of S.O.S.

more efficiently and effectively than

S.0.S. would have been able to do

had it attempted to engage in pro-

motions on the same scale. Respon-

dent’s chairman testified that it was

able to save money in. coupon pro-

motions:by having one center for the

redemption of coupons (Tr. 534).

Respondent may have also saved

money through its ability to obtain

lower prices by combining the vari-

$us divisions’ purckases of “bonus

items” such as frying pans, kitchen.

tool sets, skillets, etc. eral Foods

has since the acquisition engaged in

extensive promotions of the S.O.S.

products. Trade promotions have in-

.Cluded case allowances and free

goods and have been utilized in se-

lected areas as well as nationally

~

/

‘time of the merger,

h. Bargaining Position

With Retailers

That P&G is the leading producer

of a number of products pce

through grocery stores may

it to induce retailers to give favored

treatment to Clorox. It seems likely

that P&G can obtain from retailers

as a matter of convenience or ex-

product producer such as the

merger Clorox (Cloros Opinion, p.

i. Ability to Engage

In Sales Promotions

There:is testimony in the record that

sales promotions are considered in

the main too expensive for a single-

product firin in the relatively small

liquid bleach industry; thus, at the

‘Clonmm was en-

gaged in virtually no sales promotion

activities. P&G, a firm that in 1957

incurred sales-promotion ex

in an amount greater than Clorox’s

total sales, is in an obvious position

to utilize the sales-promotion tech-

nique on a wide scale. in behalf of

Clorox (Clorox Opinion, p. 47).

Pay

a ne LOOP BNR ARE NG LOL IIT OTE

240a

Opinion and Order

(CX 7, p. . 36; CX’s 13, 51, 59, 66,

160). Consumer promotions, includ-

.ing price reducing coupons, free

goods, contests, cents-off labels and

- reduced price premiums have also

been used locally and nationally and

cost $211,000 in 1963 (CX’s 13, 51,

60, 66). Brillo also sharply increased

its (ek 163 omotions after the acquisition

163). Due to the lower prices

hich they could command and to

the relatively higher costs

of

ducing the product and of conduct” .¢

ing a promotional campaign the

smaller companies could not and did

not engage in Promotions (Tr. 836- -

837).

. Ability to Offer Merchants

Special Prices

Although respondent did not en-

gagé"in local price-cutting: as such,

it did demonstrate its ability and

willingness to concentrate its con-

sumer and trade promotions in cer-

tain locations In 1963, of: the

$137,736 spent on trade promotions,

_ $35,409 were spent in Metropolitan

New York, and of the $211,083

which it spent for consumer pro-

* motions in that year, $109,352 were

for the Metropolitan New York

market. Smaller firms, which can-

not afford promotions, are driven

from the supermarket shelves in the

face of such intensive localized pro-

motions (Tr. 837 ; CX’s 59, 60).

k. Ability to Engage in

‘Systematic Underpricing

This danger is present in this case

to the, same extent as it was in the

Clorox case. However, the indica-

tion here is that the under-pricing

may take the form of disproportion-

ately high expenditures on promo-

tions. .

”

j. Ability to Offer Merchants

Special Prices '

To be able. to offer lower prices to

retailers requires the kind of pricing

flexibility available only to a firm’ ~

with ample reserves. Local price-

cutting is prevalent but cannot long —

be maintained by a firm short on

reserves. In a fight to the finish,

. P&G, whose scale of operations and

fiscal resources dwarf the entire

industry, can hardly be bested

(Clorox Opinion, p. 48).

‘

. Ability to Engage in

aon Underpricing ©

There is a danger that P&G may :

engage in systematic underpricing

’ below cost’ (Clorox Opinion, pp.

48-49). m

7 *

24la

Opinion and Order

‘Psychological Advantages

Although there: is no evidence that:

GF is a more feared competitor

than was S.O.S., it seems reason

able to infer this from GF’s history

- Of success, its size, and its prowess.

However unwilling a potential en-

trant would be to challenge the es-

tablished position of two brands as

well entrenched as are S.O.S, and

Brillo when backed up by com-

paratively small companies, ‘he

would be undoubtedly far more re-

luctant to challenge these brands

:.when one of them is backed up by

a colossus of American industry, .

namely, GF. Thus the same psycho-

logical barriers which were found in

Clorox to prevent entry’ of new

_. competitors and limit expansion. of

existing competitors are present in

this case, and in approximately the

- same degree.

%

D. MARKET SUBSEQUENT TO °

‘ ACQUISITION

34. S.O.S.’s share of the market in-

creased from 51% in 1957, the year

preceding the acquisition, to 56% in

1962, while Brillo’s market share de-

lined from 47.6% in 1957 to 41.8%

in 1962 (App. B, Table I). Hence

the differences -in the percentages of

market shares between the two com-

Panies rose from only 3.4% in 1957

‘to 14.2% in 1962. The share of the

independents ‘had only increased to

2.2% by 1962. Moreover, S.O.S.’

1. Psychological Advantages '

The record discloses that Procter is

regarded .by the firms in the. in-

dustry as a ‘well managed and ag-

gressive competitor, more to

feared than Clorox. Market be-

_havior is determined by the state

of mind of the firms in the market.

-P&G’s history of success, size agd

prowess must be idered sig-

nificant competitive factors. Because.

a large multiproduct enjoys

competitive advantages, the pros-

pects become’ remote that small or

medium-sized firms will be minded

to enter the industry. Only very

large firms can reasonably be ex-

pected to be able’ to compete on

roughly equal terms. A small or

medium-sized firm contemplating

entry cannot ignore the fact that

P&G is a billion dollar corporation

whose marketing experience stems

far beyond the limited horizons of

the industry. Even a é firm

would be loath to challenge a brand

as well established as Clorox when

that brand is backed up by power-

.ful marketing capacities of a firm

such as P&G (Clorox Opinion, pp.

49-51). oF -

D. MARKET SUBSEQUENT TO

ACQUISITION

34. Clorox’s share of the market in-

creased from. 48.8% in 1957, the- .

year, of the acquisition, to 51.5% -in

1961 (Ciofox Opinion, p. 68).

242a

pee

Opinion and Order

share of the combined S.O.5 -Brillo

sales of steel wool soap pads‘in gro-

cery stores and supermarkets_on a

consumer dollar basis advanced from—

54.9% in 1958 to°60.9% in 1963

(App. B, Table II). During the

years 1958-1959, the disparity be-

tween S.O.S. and. Brillo narrowed

to .7% (App. B, Table 1), but this

appears to have been due principally

to the fact that in those years S.O.S.

failed to get on the General Foods. .

night television programs: and ex-

pended a relatively. small proportion

of its advertising funds on television

advertising (App. B, Table III).

On an absolute basis S.O.S.’ sales

of soap pads grew from $14,600,000

in 1957 to $19,170,000 in 1962, an

increase of 31%, while Brillo’s sales

only rose from $13,629,000 in 1957,

to $14,305,000 in 1962, an increase

of only 5% in five years (App. B,

Table I). -

35. There were no new entries in

the industry in the 6% years which

elapsed between the acquisition and

the hearing except that Demcorp:

took over the defunct Alloy Metal

Wool Products Corporation in 1963

(Tr. 890-901),

36. The single price change which

took place was: an ‘increase ip the’

35. (No discussion of new entries

subsequent to the acquisition.) _

3G. (No price changes indicated.)

price of S.O.S. soap pads in July, .

1958 (CX 2(c)), which was ap-

. parently followed by Brillo.

37. In December, 1963, Brillo

merged with Purex Corporation

Limited, a manufacturer of -house-

hold cleaning products, which in the

fiscal year ended June 30, 1963 had

total sales of $127,000,000 (RX 27).

37. The remaining firms in the in-

dustry may now be motivatesl to seek

affiliation by merger with giant com-

panies (Clorox Opinion, p. 55).

A

243a

Opinion and Order

*’ GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION

_ APPENDIX B

re

244a

* Opinion and Order

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. 246a

Opinion and Order - |

wince 3 ae De 8600

o| IAB III

ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES OF THE S.O. S. COMPANY.

(1954-1957) AND OF GENERAL FOODS - S.0.S.

(195 8-1963)

(an thousafids of dollars).

fear Meee Magasines oad

195, = $ 5

1955_ &. 570 ~=—S-: 11,310

et | 650 "2,150

Rea 710. ~—«:1,390

Acquisition

‘on 12/31/57 | |

| a: —

1959700." gO (3690.

1960 Mees "1,950

"1961 ul | 2,360

1962 °° 9 13 2,520.

1963 55 og ga@o

(CX 9, 10, 58)

247a

_ Opinion and Order

_ TABLE IV .

Retail Price of Household Steel Wool

ucts vs. Non- tee 00 : ucts

As Shown on Respondent's Exhibits 1-6 1/

Steel Wool Products | re

‘Retail Price Items Per Price Per

Product Per Package Package Item

Brillo Soa Pads. a ce t 28 2 ¢ 10 2.8¢

0. e Sear Pads. S-s-¢ @-¢ . 38.y/ . 10 2.8¢

American Soap Pads. ... , 223 12 1.9¢

Dura — Pads. 2.4.2. ss 045 30 1.5¢

Brillo Whitewall Tire Pads. 29 = r 7.3¢

Grand Soap Pads ...... 35 i ;

Staff Soap Pads...) : : .27 12 2.5¢

SE * Sepa ae: .29 15 1.9¢

Paddy Soap Pads oe 42° 6" @ &. 8 229 20 - : 1.5¢

os t. 2s e 50 ; 1.&¢

Spring Soap Pads.

Non-Steel Wool Products

ee

Retail Price Items Per Price Per

Product Per Package Package | Item

Golden Fleece (king size) . $ 229 2 14. 5¢

Hand-eez Cleaning Pads. . . 019 2 9.5¢

Rubber SOWUEUET. « 6 2 6 0! 087 2 13.5¢

Glit Scour'n Wipe Pads. . . » 0th 4 :6.0¢

Kurly Kate Pot Cleaners. . 229 ti 9.7¢

Tuf. a © © .s—e 6 o . a 23 2/ 1 23 -O¢

Glit Whopper Scrubbers. . , 229 2 14. 5¢

‘ Scrubbee Scouring Sponge. . 229 1 29.0¢

Scotch Brite Scouring Pad . -29 3/ 1 29.0¢

_ Handy Mandy Pot Cleaner . ° -10 1 10.0¢

Rescue Soap Pads. .... . -29 b/ 3 9.7¢

Terry Tex Scouring Pads . . 23 3 7.7¢

Sudsy Scrubber. .. 5... +29 1. 29.0¢

Glit Scouring Sponge. .... 19 2 9.5¢

Magla Plastic Wool. .... «29 2 14.5¢

Kitchen Pal... . 2s 5, 0145 go | 14.5¢

Gottschalk Stainless Stee]

ie © 6 2° 6t¥e’e ¢ « 19 2 9.5¢

. Nylonet Scouring Pad... , 229 | 29 .0¢

Redd = + 2.3.4 8 8.2 & @ «@ -10 1 10.0¢

Nif- CC... « F 8 @ 8 es Be 10 1 , 10.0¢

a‘

S-sorypee nmr atom serenNanRONeER REIN Peat ae

BG IE EI EGE LEN ELINA ILOILO NG

: 248a

. Opinion and Order

D. 8600

3

TABLE IV (cont.)

- Non-Steel Hoo} Products —~

Retail Price “Teens Per Price Per-

-Product Per Package Package Item

Gottschalk Cleaning Pads. .- $ .23 3 7.7¢

“COR we coos e et Cees , 229 1 29.0¢

Dobis eo. © 6 @ @ @6¢ © 6 225 2 | 25.0¢

Kopper Kate Pot Cleaners. . 29 : 9.7¢

Scour Puss. e282 2 &€ & 6 8 10 1 10.0¢

Squeeze Ease Scrubber... +29 1 29 .0¢

Tally Scouring Pad. .... 225 1 25.0¢

pee bases Te a i oe 229 1 29 .0¢

A Many of the items included by respondent on RXs 1-6.

© not have retail prices printed or stamped thereon, and ~-*

the record does not contain any other evidence of their.

‘price. These products have not been included here. They

are: Brillo C ser, Fyne-Tex.Soap Pads, Shop-Rite Soap

Pads, Shop-Well Soap Pads, PolyPuff, Chore Girl Pot Cleaner,

Merry Maid, Kitchen Queen Pot Cleaners, Scoteh Brite Scrubbing

Sponge, Ken-Mar , Scrubbee Pot Cleaner, Scrub-Stik Pot Cleaner.

2/ _ Price not ‘shown on RXs 1, 3 but obtainable from Record

at Tr. 780; CX 7, p. 24; RX 17; pp. 2-3.

+ Price not shown on RX i but obtainable. from Record at

~ 1518-1519.

Haus. not shown on RX 1 but obtainable from Record at

sei

a

AC RIES SBR. WI as Nai dcetek a aba Aes

.

249a

Dissenting. Opinion -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

| See | . BEFORE eg ec

~~» FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION .

Commissioners :

Paut Rayp Dixon, Chairman

‘Puivip Etman - ,

EVERETTE MacINTYRE

Joun R. REILLy

. Mary GarpIner JonEs

7%

[SAME. TITLE]

y%

v

a :

~“ COMMISSIONER ELMAN, dissenting:

’ Unlike the majority, I do not regard this case as a mere

replica of Procter & Gamble (Clorox). I do not agree that.

all of the factors relied on in Clorox “apply with even

greater force, and on the same legal and factual reasoning”,

. to this case. A conclusion that the merger in this case is il- _

‘legal ‘requires one, in my view, to move beyond the-existing

boundaries of the merger law. This does ‘not: mean, of |

‘course, that the Commission’s decision is wrong. But it

does mean that the process of decision should consist of

more than treating this case as if it were simply an echo of

Clorox, and as if illegality here were an a fortiori conclu-—

sion. | |

Without a doubt, this case and Clorox bear striking

similarities. In both cases the acquired firm

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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