Appendix — Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Candiano

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Opinion, F indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

by Feinberg, J. - Rise

_ Fersere, D. J.

This is an admiralty action for personal injuries by

plaintiff, Carmelo Candiano against Moore-McCormack

Lines, Inc. (‘‘Shipowner’’), owner of the ship on which .

Candiano was working when injured. Shipowner impleaded

: John W. McGrath Corporation. (‘‘Stevedore’’), employer

of Candiano and stevedore for Shipowner.’ pe:

_ Plaintiff was hit by a fallingshatch beam weighing about

a ton while working in the lower hold of the “‘S.S. Mor- -

machawk”’ shortly after midnight, on the morning of Feb-_

_Tuary 18, 1961. The ship. was at its berth at the 23rd

_. Street Pier in Brooklyn. Shipowner denies liability and

contests the alleged damage; Stevedore, while also arguing

against plaintiff’s recovery, does not strenuously contest

its. obligation to indemnify Shipowner if the latter is liable

. to plaintiff. .Plaintiff’s viable theory of recovery at this

stage is unseaworthiness; a negligence count was dismissed

during trial without objection. :

Plaintiff, as part of a gang of carpenters, was checking '

cargo in the lower hold of No. 3 hatch on the night in

question. The accident occurred: while longshoremen, also

employed by Stevedore, were engaged in placing a steel

hatch beam on No. 3 tween deck hatch preparatory to

covering up the hatch prior to sailing. While the steel

hatch beam was béing placed athwart tween deck hatch

‘No, 3 and’ was suspended over the square of .the hatch, a

hook inserted into the opening at one of the ends of the

hatch beam became dislodged and the beam fell into the

lower hold. The heavy beam struck plaintiff’ and knocked

‘him down, Plaintifféwas rendered unconscious by the blow

and injured severely, as discussed more fully below, and

was taken out of the hold and off the ship by stretcher

and transferred to a hospital. ,

’ YHRATTR NC ee aR ie eT ee Stee ace ene my aannenr 5 ¥ aa

a se ,

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

by Feinberg, J.

The basis of plaintiff ’s claim is that the. ship was un-

seaworthy because the device used to lower the hatch beam

_ was not reasonably’fit for its intended use. “All parties

agree that the longshoremen used a pontoon bridle to

- secure the beam to the cargo falls (or hoist rope). The.

bridle consisted of four equal lengths of wire; each had |

at one end a pontoon hook and was inserted: into a hole

at one end a pontoon hook and was attached at the other

end to a common ring. One hook was inserted into a hole

at one end of the twenty-foot long hatch beam and another

hook ‘was attached .at the other end; the remaining two

hooks were looped up and placed into the common ring.

- Plaintiff claims that a different type of bridle—a toggle °

beam bridle—was the proper appliance for lowering a steel

.. hatch beam. The distinguishing feature-of a toggle bridle

js that at’onéyend a metal bar rather than a hook is at-

‘tached to a length of chain; by passing the chain and

metal.bar through the hole of a hatch beam and then-posi-

al

tioning, the bar properly, the hatch bearn i is prevented from

falling off “the bridle. . Plaintiff argues that if a toggle |

beam bridle had~been used instead of pontoon bridle, the -

-hatech beam could nothave been dislodged and it would

not have fallen. Accordingly, plaintiff argues ‘that an im-

proper and unsafe appliance was used, thereby rendering .

the ship unseaworthy, Shipowner claims that the pontoon -

- bridle was reasonably fit for its intended purpose and,

in'any event, toggle bridles were supplied by the ship and

made available to Stevedore.

There is little doubt that the lowering sccliondion util- .

-izing the pontoon bridle, as it was actually used by the

longshoremen, was unsafe and therefore unfit. The evi-

dence shows that the hook that became dislodged had: not

been fully brought through the hole in the hatch beam and

made-’secure to the standing. part ofthe bridle. Ship=

owner’s claim that the pontoon bridle was reasonably. fit

A

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Option, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Os. by Fewberg, J. ;

is based upon the proposition that: had this operation been.

performed, the hatch beam would have’ been secure. Ship-

owner thus argues that the longshoremen’s failure to prop- |

erly secure. the beam was ‘‘operational negligence,”’. so

_ that no. unseaworthiness had as: yet resulted. The cases

“in this circuit do make a distinction between operational

negligence and an unseaworthy condition - negligently

created,’ denying the ship’s liability in the former case.

The difficulty lies in defining when negligent conduct ends

and an unseaworthy condition begins. In Grillea v. United

States, 232 F. 2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1956), Judge Learned

Hand stated:

It would be futile to try to draw any line between

' situations in which the defect-is only an incident ina

_ Cantinuous operation, and those in which some inter-

mediate step is to be taken as making the ship unsea-

_ worthy. ‘Nevertheless, it is necessary to separate the

.. two situations, even though each case must, turn on its

particular circumstances, —

e<

_ In Puddu v. Royal Netherlands 8.8. Co., 303 F. 2d 752, 756

' (2d Cir.) (per curiam in banc), cert. denied, ‘371 U. S.:480

(1962), Judge Hays, in a concurring opinion: stated (303

F. 2d 757): | : :,

The difficulty with the concept of unseaworthiness

arises from the fact that while the authorities hold

- that there is liability without fault, there is no case

ad

which holds that there is absolute liability. The situa-.

tion demands, then, that without regard to fault, we fix

a point short of absolute liability. But logical coordi-

nates for fixing'a point, such as the time during which

a. particular condition continues to exist, are entirely

lacking. ‘Time is obviously irrelevant since notice to

the shipowner is of consequence only if his liability is

yee Se ee See re pee GIF NO A ENE OIL GEG E

4a

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

by Feinberg, J.

362.U. S. 539, 80 S. Ct. 926,.4 L. Ed. [2d] 941 (1960).

: Perhaps the best that ean be done is, like Judge ~

Hand in Grillea v.-United States, 232 F. 2d 919 (2d

Cir. 1956), to take as the starting point a condition

of reasonable fitness for intended use, to consider this

condition as impaired by the conduct or process which

is the subject .of: litigation, and to call the resulting

condition ‘‘unseaworthiness.’’. The conduct or process

by which the fitness is changed to unfitness is not then

to be claissified as itself constituting unseaworthiness.

_ A ship is not unseaworthy because it has glass ir in a

window whieh might be broken, The injiiries of a.’

seaman who negligently breaks such a. glass are not

the-result of unseaworthiness, nor are the injuries of

a seaman who is cnt by the falling glass. But. injury

incurred. in stepping on the broken glass does result

from unseaworthiness.

The .rule.is far from satisfactory,.but it has the

virtue of being possible, though not easy, of applica-

' fon, and of having behind it the authority of a great

* . judge. The situation itself does not permit the forma- |

tion. of ® really satisfying rule. | ~~

This distinction was recently re-affirmed in Norfleet v.

Isthmian Lines, Inc. —— F. 24 —— (2d Cir. 1966).

In Grillea, the wrong hatch cover was placed over a

pad-eye ‘‘only a short time’’ before hibelant, a longshore-

man, stepped on it and it gave way béneath him. This

was held (2-1) to constitute a condition of unseaworthiness.

- In Puddu, a boom buckled while a rain tent, was being.

raised and the falls of a. winch were being stretched to a

dangerously large angle. It was there held (7-2) that no

condition of unseaworthiness had as yet been created.

The distinction has been questioned-in this circuit? and

is not accepted in some other jurisdictions. However,

limited by fault. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., | |

i ae oe ’

. 5a

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lavo,

| by Femberg, J. i oe

accepting it as. the applicable law in this cireuit, I find

that an unseaworthy condition had already come into be-

ing. at the time the hatch beam: fell and this condition

caused the injury to plaintiff. There was. an appreciable __

period of time after the hatch beam was ‘secured to the

cargo falls and beforé the beam fell off as it was being

lowered. Once the beam was attached to the pontoon

bridle—albeit insecurely, as later became clear—the lower-

ing mechanism was clearly unsafe and, therefore, unsea-

worthy. The negligence of the stevedores in failing

properly to: secure the hook holding the beam had already

been completed. . Therefore, under the Grilled-Puddu dis-

tinction, the ship was unseaworthy. at that time. Con-

cededly, determination of - the dividing. line between

operational negligence and an unseaworthy condition is

difficult but crucial, and much depends on what is con-

sidered to be the negligent act that has or has not come to

and end.* However, my finding is supported by Strika v.

Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.' 2a 555 (2d Cir. _

_ 1950), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 904 ( 1951), where the manner

of hooking up two bridles to lift a heavy piece of metal was

unsafe and rendered the ship’s gear unseaworthy. See also

Skibinski v. Waterman SS. Corp., 242 F. § pp. 290

(S.D.N.Y. 1965), relying on Strika, where plaintiff was in-

jured because an: open-mouth cargo hook, without any

locking device, was used to lower a ladder which f¢ll upon

plaintiff. But ¢f..Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion,

332 F. 2d 779 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 379 U. S. 914 (1964).° .

Shipowner also contends that the ship canndt’ be held

unségworthy because proper équipment—a toggle bridle—

was on board and available. However, this contention was

squarely met and réjected in Strika, supra, where J udge

Learned Hand stated (185 F. 2d at 556):

[But other ‘‘bridles’?. were available which could

have been used, and which had a single ring with four

6a *

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ‘ie

by Feinberg, Z,

lengths of -wire. Thése concededly would have been ©

suitable, and the defendant asserts. that their presence

made the ship seaworthy, even if they. were not used.

In answer we need only cite Mahnich v. Southern S.

‘S.. Co. [321 U.S. 96 (1944:] »9

o

In Mahnich, cited by the court, a seaman was injured.when

a: staging collapsed because a piece of defective rope

parted. Sound rope was available on board, which could —

. have been but was not used. The Court held that the ship -

was unseaworthy and that any negligence of the ship’s

officers in selecting and using defective, rather than proper,

‘rope did not relieve the ship of the duty of furnishing ‘‘a

‘seaworthy staging.’’ Clearly, this reasoning applies to —

many cases where an unseaworthy condition has been neg-

ligently created, but proper equipment is on board. Thus,“

if a seaman should negligently remove a hatch cover

leaving a dangerous hole, that portion of the deck would

thereafter -be unseaworthy unless the hole was covered

up. The proper equipment to cover the hole would. be

available, yet it would not seem that this would insulate

the ship against a claim of unseaworthiness. This reason-

ing is implicit in Grillea; supra, where a wrong hatch cover

was used to cover a padeye. Although a proper hatch

cover was available, the ship.'was nevertheless unsea-

worthy. Since a fongshoreman doing seamen’s work on

_ board a ship is extended the protection of: the doctrine of

unseaworthiness to the same extent as.a seaman is, the

“other equipment”’ argument would fail,in his case as

’ -well. Indeed; in Grillea, the successful libelant was a long-

shoreman

In Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra, S. A., 314 F. 2d 223 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U. S: 829; 835 (1963), two members - _

of the court of appeals of this circuit agreed that _a ship

‘eould be unseaworthy because of i suproper lighting i in the

\

Ta: y

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

by Femberg, J. 7

hold, where plaintiff longshoreman was loading cargo, even

though adequate portable lights were available on board.’

This view was reinforced recently by Waldron v. Moore-

_ McCormack Lines, Inc., —— F. 2d y ——— (28 Cir. |

1966), where the court said in dictum: © .

It is with respect: to the ship’s gear, equipment

and appliances that thé most significant developments

along ‘liberal lines have taken place. It now’ makes

no difference that other safe gear was available but

not used, See, e.g., Mahnick v. Southern §.S. Co.,

- 1944; 321 U. S. 96. Shore workers, including long-’

shoremen and others performing tasks .traditionally

the work of seamen, became entitled to the benefits of .

the warranty of seaworthiness. Seas Shipping Co. v.

Sierackt, 1946, 328 U. S. 85. And ‘the doctrine has

been applied to them even if the defective gear was

supplied by the stevedore who brought it board ship.

See, e.g., Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 1954, 347 U. §8.

396, affirming 205 F. 2d 478 (9 Cir., 1953). Even if

' the gear or appliances were not defective, a maladjust-..

ment might make them dangerous and the vessel could

be: found wnseaworthy. Crumady v. The Joachim

Hendrick Fisser, 1959, 358 U. S. 423. So also’with a

stuck valve that could only be ‘‘broken’’ by the use

of tools or several men working together. American

President Lines, Ltd. v. Redfern, 9 Cir., 1965, 345 F.

2d 629. So also with a portable aluminum ladder

leading to the hold. which slipped out of place and

fell due to the moyement of the'ship, despite the fact

that an officer had. placed a man to hold it and had

‘told him to keep watch over it. Reid v. Quebec Paper —

_ Sales & Transp. Co., 2 Cir., 1965, 340 F, 2d 34. Other

. instances of dangérous conditions caused by defects

in, or analogous improper use of, various,types of

gear and equipment could be multiplied** ~

Opinion, Findings of Fact aia Conclusions of Law,

~~ by Feinberg, J.

‘Under the circumstances, then, the fact that a hae

bridle was available to the longshoreman does: not require

a finding that the ship was seaworthy. .

II

*

te = & .

” After the one-ton beam hit him on the morning of

February 19, 1961, plaintiff was knocked unconscious and

was taken off the ship ov a stretcher. One witness, testi-

fied that plaintiff appeared to be dead. Thereafter, with

the exception of a few days, ; plaintiff was hospitalized until

the end of March. %

The preponderance of evidence poe that plaintiff suf-

fered severe injuries as a result of the accident. A cerebral

concussion. was incurred, leading to recurrent headaches,

severedizziness and asthenopia (eye fatigue). It further

appears that plaintiff suffers from hypersensitivity on his

forehead. An examining neurologist, Dr. Ralph A. Olson, ”

felt that all of these conditions were a permanent residual

of the coneussion, Shipowner attempted to explain away

some of plaintiff’s complaints generally as the result, not

of an underlying organic neurological involvement, but

of conversion hysteria, defined as an emotional disorder

in which anxiety is unconsciously converted.into physical

symptoms. Since'the conversion hysteria, if any, followed

the accident and there is no evidence that the hysteria was

caused by something other than the accident, this ‘‘ex-

planation” is meaningless insofar as assessment of dam-

ages is involved. No argument is made by. defendant that

‘‘imagined’’ pain is less uncomfortable than ‘‘valid’’ pain.

Turning to injuries not relating to the nervous system

as such, Dr. Harry Sherman, an orthopedic surgeon, testi-®

fied that plaintiff incurred, due to the accident, scars on

his head and chin, a nose deformity and fracture of nasal

bones, crepitus (grating) and pain when his neck moves,

NE R89

9a

| Opinion,-Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, .

by Femberg, J. ;

a bony elevation of the collar bone, atrophy of the shoulder

muscles and consequent loss of movement in abduction

and flexion, and restriction of trunk’ motion. These in-

juries are permanent, and the left arm will never be able

to be used for physical exertion. Plaintiff also suffered

multiple lacerations of the nose and forehead and frac-.

tures of the clavicle, rib and scapula. Shipowner’s witness,

Dr. Balensweig, agreed that ‘there was ‘‘mild’’ atrophy of

the left shoulder and that plaintiff could not go back ‘to

work as a carpenter. Finally, plaintiff testified he had

suffered a great deal of pain, as might be the expectéd

result of this accident.

Plaintiff was forty-seven years old at the time of the’

accident; he is now about fifty-three. The parties stipu-

lated that plaintiff’s work-life expectancy would be to age

sixty-five, and his life expectancy would be 27.1 years

,a8 of the date of the accident. Plaintiff’s average annual

"earnings over the last six years that he worked, based on

stipulated figures, were $3,693. Although plaintiff clearly

has proved an inability to continue in the occupation he

had engaged in at the time. of the accident, the ‘issue of

how much earning capacity plaintiff has been deprived of

remains. | :

The general principle is easily stated. The objective

is to place the libelant in the same economic position

. as would have been his if the injury had not occurred.

We seek to accomplish this goal by a formula which,

stated:in an oversimplified form, congists of determin-

ing what libelant’s annual earning power would have

been but for the injury, deducting what it will be there-

after, multiplying the result by libelant’s expectancy,

_ and discounting the product to present value. We rec-

ognize the delusive exactness of all this since, among

other defects, life expectancies are averages and the

ie

LEESON LENIN GER IS SIEM alike Dal a al ltt hl ion EINE Rae RS OP y gs)

10a

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of. Law,»

by Femberg, J.

formula assumes what we know to be usually contrary

to the fact, namely, that the injured party will be

fully employed; but it is the best we have. Difficulties

come in applying the formula to a specific case... .

Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F. 2d 664, 669

(2d Cir. 1960). The burden of proyjng damages and dam-

ages is, of course, on plaintiff, as well as the duty to miti-

gate damage. Pwuppioni v. Luckenbach 8.8. Co., 286 F. 2d

_ 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Litwinowice v. Weyerhaeuser SS.

Co., 179 F. Supp..812, 824 (E.D.-Pa. 1959). :

In this action plaintiff is not demonstrably unemployable. -

Of course, the court must consider such factors as age and

lack of varied experience. Nonetheless, the conclusion that

labor is now entirely foreclosed to Candiano is unwar-

Tanted'on the facts in this case. For the first year after

his accident, I conclude that plaintiff was unable to work

‘at all. Thereafter, plaintiff should have been able to, and:

will be able to, average one-third of his former éarnings °

as a carpenter in some other line of endeavor. Two-thirds

of plaintiff’s average earnings before the accident is

$2,462. About five years have elapsed since the accident,

for a total loss pf past earnings’ of $13,541 (one year at

$3,693 and four ‘years at $2,462). Plaintiff has asked for

pre-judgment interest. Taking into account the uncertainty

over the extent of his employability and the fact that no

deduction, in my discretion, is being made for income taxes,

I decline in the exercise of discretion in this admiralty ease

to award pre-judgment interest, as requested by plaintiff.’

. Plaintiff has a stipulated work expectancy of about twelve

*, more years for a total of lost futare earnings (12 times

*$2,462) of $29,544. In the exercise: of discretion, future

~farnings will be discounted at four per cent, Alexander v.

Nash-K elvinator Corp., 271 F. 2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1959),

a aT SPATE ONY CRE ALTE ENOL LEI OO LO OY SII, SEIT ITS LE IE EIT T LR ORIEN Ve

aay ware S

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. :

; Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

| /* by Feinberg, J. hoc

- producing $23,118. for loss of future earnings.” Plaintiff ;

proved medical and hospital expenses of $2,374.65. For

pain and suffering, including permanent physical damage, —

I award slightly under $11,000, which makes a round figure

of total damages of $50,000. °

_ Shipowner alleged and had the burden of proving plain-

tiff’s contributory negligence. Shipowner’s claim is that

Can Hino unreasonably remained in ‘the area in which

beams were being lowered although he knew that the oper-

ation. was in progress. It is. true that Nuccio, a carpenter

working with plaintiff, testified that shortly before the

_ accident he ordered the carpenters in the hold, including _

Candiano, away from under the opening because the hold

was to be covered: up. This witness lacked credibility, .

However; .e.g., he testified that he had discussed the case

with nobody. Under all the circumstances, I find that Ship-

owner has not met its burden of demonstrating contribu-

_ tory negligence by plaintiff. | ,

III

Shipowner has a claim over for indemnity against Steve-

dore, based upon breach of Stevedore’s warranty of ‘work-’

manlike ‘service. Mortensen v. A/S Clittre, 348 F. 2d 383

(2d Cir. 1965) ; DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.

2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1962). Improper securing of the

bridle in this case by longshoremen constituted a breach

of this warranty, for which Shipowner is entitled to re-

cover its judgment debt to plaintiff and its reasonable ex. °

- - penses of defending this action, including counsel fees and

disbursements. . ren os

Accordingly, plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused .

by the unseaworthiness of the vessel and he is entitled to

a judgment of $50,000 against Shipowner; the latter is‘.

s ARO eres Teeth os kee Ltr hd a a lie a ei eh al AO cena TERE ER MP rede PROC UT ery bw - ra . aa She es

12a

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

by Femberg, J. a

‘entitled to a judgment in like amount, plus its reasonable

expenses of defending the action, against Stevedore. The

foregoing constitute the, required findings of fact and con-

clusions of law.

¢

Dated: New York, N. Y., March 15, 1966.

= Wicrrep Feiniina

; US.D J.

| \

FOOTNOTES ive

- * Plaintiff’s action on the civil side of the court was transferred

to the admiralty side by order dated April 22, 1963. In this opinion,

. for the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as. they

appeared in the original caption, e.g., ‘‘plaintiff” instead of “libelant.”

See Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Lower Fed-

eral Courts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 819, 827-28 (1963).

* See Réid y. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F. 2d 34,

37 (2d Cir. 1965).

. _ Ferrante v. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F. 2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert.

dismissed, 379 U. S. 801 (1964) ; Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.

2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964), Contra, Billeci v. United States, 298 F. 2d

703 (9th Cir. 1962). = = * .

. 5 See Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., supra note 3,

at 38 n. 5. | °

* Although Shipowner and Stevedore cite Massa as an example.

. Of operational negligence, it is more likely that the case simply held

' that the appliance in question, could be deemed réasonably fit. The-

court said (332 F.2d at 781): am ;

_ Nor can we say that the plaintiff and his co-worker had rendered

‘* the ship unseaworthy by placing the tongs in the wreng holes.

The doctrine of unseaworthiness requires no more than that a

ship and appurtenances be reasonably fit for their intended use,

* and the trial court was justified in*concluding that the pallets

were reasonably fit. (Emphasis. added.)

* Judge Marshall, in an opinion concurred in by Judge Friendly,

reversed a verdict for plaintiff because an alternative theory of un-

‘ .

.

”

13a

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

| by Femberg, J.

seaworthiness had erroneously been submitted to the jury.. Judge

_ Clark, dissenting, argued that both theories, including the claim of

inadequate lighting, were sufficient to sustain the verdict of unsea-

worthiness. Both Judge Clark and Judge Marshall agreed ‘that a

finding of unseaworthiness based upon inadequate lighting alone

would have been sustained. Judge Friendly, concurring in the re-

versal would not have found unseaworthiness because of inadequate

lighting in the hold unless there was a —- that the ship did not

have adequate portable lights at the disposal of the stevedores, citing

Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, 202 F. 2d 25 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 345.U. S, 965 (1953)+.and Ezekiel v. Volusia

re 5 297 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 843

(1 , ;

* (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) There was a dissent in.

Waldron, but it is clear that all.three judges (Medina, Lumbard and

Smith) agreed on the dictum. E.g., the dissent (per Smith, J.) re-

jected a defense to unseaworthiness “that the vessel had available

safe equipment which was not used.” F. 2d at ——. :

* It is unnecessary to deal with Stevedore’s argument (Post-Trial

Brief, pp. 1-3) that pre-judgment interest should be denied to long-

shoremen who, under the terms of the Longshormen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.G. § 901 et seq., do not bear the

.cost of their medical treatment and can receive disability compensa-

tion, thus making inapplicable the rationale for pre-judgment interest

stated in Petition of the City of New York, 332 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 379 U: S. 922 (1964). |

*° 1 Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions—Ass’n of Supreme

poe Justices, New York Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil 570

(1965). , |

14a.

Judgment ; ae

The issues in the above entitled action having _ .

_brought on regularly for trial before the Honorable Wilfred ~

Feinberg, United States District Judge on December 13,

‘ 14, 15 and 16, 1965 and the Court at the conclusion of the

evidence having reserved decision, and the Court thereafter

on March 15, 1966 having handed down its Opinion deci-

_ sion constituting the Court’s findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law in favor of. the. plaintiff as against the defend- .

ant and third-party plaintiff and in favor-of the defendant

and third-party plaintiff as against the third-party defend-

ant, itis ,

- OnveRED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That the plaintiff

Carmelo Candiano have judgment against the defendant :

. ‘and third-party plaintiff Moore-McCormack a, Inc.,

in the sum ‘of es and it is further,

ad

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND. DECREED: That the defendant and

- third-party plaintiff Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., have -

judgment against the third-party defendant John W. Mc-

Grath Corporation in the sum of $50,000 plus its reason-

able expenses in defending this action including counsel

fees and disbursements.

Dated: New York, N. Y,, March 16th, 1966.

Joun J. aegak JR.,

! Clerk.

March 25, 1966.

Cards taxed in favor. of defendant third-party plaintiff

as against the third-party defendant in the sum of $138. 59

and added to’ pray

Ps OHN J. OxEaR, JR,

Clerk.

15a

Judgment.

March 25, 1966. |

Cards taxed in the sum of $241. 76 in favor of plaintiff

as against the defendant third-party plaintiff and added

. to —

Joun J. Ovesr, Je, ~

Clerk.

- l6a

_ Judgment...

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Szooxp Cuicurr

At a Stated Term of the United States of Appeals, in

and for the Second -Circnit, held .at the United States

Courthouse in the City of New York, on the first day of ©

August one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.

Present : ‘Hon. a R. Waterman,

Hon. Leowarp P. Moore,

Hon. Irvine R. Kaurman,

Circuit Judges.

%

vv

Carmelo Candiano, ’

Ve

“Mobre-McCormack Lines, Inc., |

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-A ppellant,

John W. McGrath Corp.,

7 Third-Party ‘Def endant-Appellee.

7%

bs

_ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

This cause eame on to be heard on the transcript -of

record from the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

‘Plaintiff-Appellee,

17a

‘Judgment..

Ox ConsmERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said: District:

Court be. and it hereby is affirmed with costs to the

plaintiff-appellee. a ee

* A. Dante, Fusaro .

| : | Clerk

By: Vincent A. @ar.in .

Chief. Deputy Clerk

¢

. 18a

a

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing.

UN ITED STATES. COURT OF APPEALS

Szconp Circuit

At a ‘Stated Term of the United States Court of Appe Aopen

in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United S

Court House, in the City of New York, on the fourth day

- of December, one thousand nine sanired and sixty-seven. .

Present: Hon. Srerry R. WATERMAN,

Hon. Leonarp P. Moorr, “

Hon. Irvine R. KaurMay, |

z Circuit Judges.

,

+— *

»

Carmelo Candiano,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

. Ve

Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-A ppellant, .

J ohn W. McGrath Corp: * R

_ ‘Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. >

A petition for a rehearing having been } ed herein 7

‘counsel for the appellant,

‘Upon consideration thereof, it is

‘Ordered that said petition be and hereby-is denied.

Pers ”.. dd. Damme Fosaho

er aa Clerk »

ae 19a.

Opinion of the United States t of Appeals,

Second Circui

Carmelo Canpiano, Plaintiff-Appellee,

| ne os. aren

Moorz-McCormack Linz,’ Inc., Defendant-Appellant,

| | aerate

_ Joun W. MoGnraru Conp., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. :

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,

' August 1, 1967.

No. 30696. ” ;

Rehearing denied December 4, 1967.

Before: Waterman, Moore and KavrMay, Ct. JJ.

PERSONAL- Inguny—1311. Seawdrthiness—1312. What

Constitutes Unseaworthiness and Negligence—Srevepores

“12, Lisbility for Personal Injury and Death.

The Grillea doctrine of ** operational negligence’? is no |

longer a defense to a longshoreman’s persopal ‘injury

claim based op unseaworthiness. Although there is no °

logical basis for holding a soundly constructed and

completely equipped vessel-unseaworthy, the Supreme

Court in Mascwilli vs. U. S. used the term as a means

imposing absolute liability on ship-owner and steve-

dore. Any change in the law want be by legislation

or Supreme Court decision. j

?

20a

_ Opinion of the United States Court of mines

Second Circuit.

Manrmm J. 5. Mektvai (JosePH F. McGotprick, McHvax &

. Leonarp, James M. Leonarp, on Brief), for Defendant-

Appeltant, , i .

Ezexien Jasper (Max D. Kroncoxp, on Brief ), for Plaintiff-

. Appellee,

‘ Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, Wi-rrep

Fernsere, D>J., 1967 A. M. C. 635, which awarded plaintiff-

appelleedandiano, a longshoreman, recovery ‘for personal

injuries sustained while working aboard ship. Affirmed.

Lzeonarp P. Moors, Ct. J.:

Plaintiff, Carmelo Candiano (appellee), a-longshoreman,

. employed by the stevedore, John W..McGrath Corporation

_ (McGrath), was injured while working in the hold of the

S. S. Mormachawk owned by Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.

(Mormac). Plaintiff sued Mormac. which impleaded Mc-

-Grath as a third-party defendant. The district court ad-

judged mae liable to plaintiff in the sum, of $5000

and McGth liable ‘to Mormac for this amount plus Mor- ~

mac’s expenses for defending the action. Mormac appeals,

represented on appeal by McGrath’s counsel.

The facts as found by the trial court are accepted by

appellant Mormac, which challenges only the conclusions of

law hased thereon. The injury was caused by a beam,

which, while being lowered into the lower hold of the No. 3

hatch of the ship, fell and struck plaintiff. ‘The beam was

attached to the lowering mechanism by two hooks, one in-

_ serted in a hole at one end of the beam, the other hook in

a hole at the other end. The operation of securing the

beam was carried on by fellow employees. While the beam

was being. lowered, one of the hooks which apparently had

21a

Opinion of the United States Court of 4apem,

woeene Circuit. en

not om full- brought una the hole and secured, became

_ dislodged and the beam fell.

The trial court held that: once the negligent attachment

had been made, the ship was unseaworthy but also found

that “ [T]here. was an appreciable period of time after

the hatch beam was secured to the cargo falls and before.

the beam fell off as it was being lowered.’’ Whether such

“fan appreciable period of time’’ is sufficient to defeat the

application of the doctrine of operational negligence (the

district court found that it was) ‘is apparently no longer

the relevant inquiry to be made as the doctrine of opera-

tional negligence iow seems to have been rejected by the

Supreme Court ds a factor in the determination of liability.

See Mascuilli vs, United States, 387 I . S. 237, 1967 A. M. C.

1702, summarily reversing, 1966 A. M. C. 2503, 358 F.(2d)

133 QB Cir., 1966). — -

In Grillea vs. United States, 1956 A. M. C. 1009, 232

F.(2d) 919, 922 (2 Cir., 1956), this Circuit. distinguished

between the legal consequences flowing from operational

negligence and those flowing from unseaworthiness holding

that a ship is not rendered unseaworthy by a negligent act

that causes an accident during the progress of ‘work on

board so long as the act could be ‘‘considered as an inci-

dent in a continuous course of operation.’’ Grillea and &

lopg line of other decisions of this Court attempting to

define where operational negligence ends and unseaworthi-

ness begins would seem to be no longer controlling i in the \

light of Mascwillt. Although there is no basis in logic for y

attributing unseaworthiness to a vessel which is in every

respect soundly constructed and completely equipped .

merely because of the negligence of longshoremen or crew

members engaged in an operation on board, the term has

been created by judicial fiat and used for all practical |

purposes for imposing absolute liability ‘on shipowner and .

stevedore. |

c

ca tep Pe sMemere retail ee tat etal bee Oh ns ta et ene aE et ne eT

Npreye ‘ € . ;

2

’ SOIREE BD RN Mo

22a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit. :

In Mascuilli, the question before the Supreme Court on

certiorari, to which the Court gave an affirmative newer,

was: |

‘“Does denpirews condition caused by stevedore’s negli-

gent handling of proper equipment render vessel unsea-

The facts are to be found in the district court opinion,

1965 A. M..C. 1880, 241 F. Supp. 354 (E. D. Pa.; 1965). A

longshoreman Mascuilli had been killed during a loading

operation when one or more of his fellow longshoremen

negligently caused both the starboard and port vangs on

the loading boom to become taut simultaneously thus caus-

-worthy and its owner an for resulting injuries?’’

‘ing one of the vangs.to break. The parts thereof. fell on

Maseuilli, who had been engaged in a different aspect of

the loading operation, and ‘inflicted mortal wounds, The

district court sitting without a jury expressly found that

the loading equipment was in a sound and safe condition.

Finding of fact No. 35 read as follows: -

‘*35. In summary, the Court finds that the vessel and all

of its.equipment was ‘in a seaworthy condition at all times,

and.remained so throughout the entire loading operations.

_ The accident was caused solely by the negligent operation

‘of the stevedoring crew using seaworthy equipment in

such a. manner as to cause the accident to occur so instan-

taneously that the Third Officer was unable to warn any-

one or prevent. its happening.’’ 241 F. Supp. at 362..

(Emphasis added.)

_ The-Third Circuit affirmed the holding that the vessel

was not unseaworthy: solely on the basis of the district |

court’s finding No. 35 that the accident-had been caused -

solely by the negligence ‘of the stevedoring crew. 1966

' _ A.M. C. 2503, 358 F.(2d) at 133. The Supreme Court

thereupon summarily reversed, citing Mahnich vs. Southern

S. 8. Co., 321 U. 8. 96, 1944 A. M. C. 1 (1944) and Crumady.

vs. J. H. Fisser, 358 U. S. 428, 1959 A. M. C. 580 wine

Arete Erg ee

ale ele

23a

Opinion of the United States. Court of Appeals,

fr Second Circuit.

Cf. Waldron vs, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U. S.

724, 1967 A. M. C. 579 (opinion stresses the ‘broad

. Temedial purposes of, the doctrine of unseaworthiness’’).

Appellant requests a reconsideration by this court of the

_ longshoreman-shipowner-stevedore triangle and points to

the virtual repeal by court decision of the .4aee s

and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, -33 U. S. Code,

sec. 901, et seq. The law in this field is now qnite clear; °

any change must be by legislation Or by Supreme Court

decision. : | | .

Affirmed. ., ; nade ; “

0 « Petition ror REHEARING.

1‘ ; o. |

\ United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,

he December 4, 1967.

No. 30696, -

Before: WarteRMAN, Moorz,* and Kavurman, Ct. JJ

Martin J. McHvan, for Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant,

_- Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. | |

| ‘Per Corum: | |

Petition for rehearing denied. Judge Moore concurs in

the denial of the petition for the reasons. set forth in his

“memorandum. - : u

LEeonarp P. Moorg, Ct. J. (concurring) :

The defendant-appellant Moore-MceCormack Lines, Inc.,

seeks by petition a rehearing and ‘reconsideration of the’ -

* Concurring.

. . -

SRR PFOA ES SGA MN TIMMS eA AED OMCPLE PS 8 DPS SONG AIO MEN ONE TORRE NER ost meer

vest prperes: 3) Bt ncy

>

24a

Opinion of the United State Court of loses

Second Circuit.

opinion, and decision of this court (August 1, 1967) in

Candiano vs. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 1967 A. M. C.

2312, 382 F. (2d)-961, which resulted in an affirmance: of -

a judgment entered on March 16, 1966, in favor of the

plaintiff against appellant, for personal injuries sustained

aboard a ship owned by appellant, The appeal was argued _

: ‘on December 13, 1966. The principl ground for rehearing

is the claim that this court misinterpreted the Supreme

Court’s decision in Mascuilli vs. United States, 387 U. 8.

237, 1967 A. M. C. 1702 (May 22, 1967) in relying upon

that decision as a basis for affirmance herein. In my opin-

ion, petitioner claims quite properly that Mascuilli being -

undecided at the time of the filing of its brief and of the

oral argument, it had no opportunity to present its views

as to the effect, if any, of Mascuilli upon this case.

/ On the same day (August 1, 1967) as this Court decided

the Candiano case, it handed down its decision in Alexan-

der vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, -1967. A. M. C. 2324

F.(2d) 963. The issues presented are substantially similar.

In the petition for a rehearing en banc in Alexander, coun- |

sel claims that ‘‘this Court has been misled by the incorrect

presentation of the supposed issue before the Supreme ©

Court in Mascuilli as printed in 35 L. W. 3052.’’ Refer-

- ence is made to the three specific questions contained in

the. petition for certiorari in Mascuilli and the argument is

made that the Supreme Court’s granting of the writ and

reversing the judgment does not justify an assumption that

that Court has rejected ‘*the doctrine of ‘operational neg-|

ligence’ * * * as‘a factor in the determination of liability.”’

Before considering whether a rehearing would or should

alter the decision, a brief review of the factual situations

- upon which liability is asserted must be made.

In Alexander the. corteatenation of events was the eeen:

ing of the steel by the crane operator and the striking by

the steel of the a —, If the dunnage had

Sc aikete tes aati ies ta pe + Sect can Gt hice eae taad eae ane Re newert a

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.

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25a

Opinion of the United-States Court of Aogedls,

Second Circuit.

not tion contains the aeeaibly sista eiliaten would

not have been of consequence. If a superabundance of

- caution had been’ exercised in the lowering operation, prob-

_ ably the dunnage would not have been propelled through

the air so as to strike the plaintiff. The‘jury’s findings

“of no negligence by the shipowner and of unseaworthiness |

establish the basis of that judgment.

In Candiamo the beam fell because the hooks sec ing a.

to the lowering meehanism had been improperly stted fed by

fellow employees,

At the time of arguments of Alexander oud “Candiano,

there was a plethora of cases involving negligence and

unseaworthiness and-a plaucity of consistency. No legal -

principle which might serve as a guide for the future could

be gleaned from these decisions. In thig circuit, the panels

were i area divided,’ other ‘seonita Wehisved, no greafer

-1 Compare ani vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 1966 A. M. C. 80,

355 F. (2d) 359 (2 Cir., 1964; Guarracino, vs. Luckenbach Steamship”

Co:, 1964 A. M. C. 2240, 333 F.(2d) 646 (2 Cir., 1964); Massa >

vs. C. A. Venesualen | Navi gacion, 1964 A. M. C. 1375, 332 F.(2d)

779 (2 Cir., 1964); S inelli vs. Isthmian, 1965 A. M. C. 254, 326

F.(2d) 870 (2 Cir.,-1964), cert. denied, 377 . S. 935, 1966 A. M. C.

2792 (1964) ; Mosley vs. Cia. Mar. SA. A. M. C, 1951, 314

» F.(2d) 223 (2 Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 37510. S. 829, 1963 a os

2698 (1963) ; Puddu vs. Royal Netherlands S. S°Co., 1962.A.M. C. |

419, 303 F.(2d) 752 (2 Cir., en banc 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.’S.

$0, 1963 A. C. 280 (1962) ; Grillea vs. United States, 1956 ©

M. C. 1009, "2 F. (2d) 919 (2 Cir., 1956) ; Poignant vs. United -

, 1955 A. M.C. 1955, 225 F.(2d) 595 2 Cir., 1955) ; Manhat

_, vs. United States, 1955 °A. M.C. 513, F.(2d) 143 (2 Cir.), cert. .

denied, 349 U. S. 966 (1955), with Radovich’ vs. Cunard S. S. Co.,

. 1966 A. M. C. 2426, 364 F.(24) 149 (2-Cir., 1966) ; Mostey vS>Cia

Mar. Adra S. A., 1966 A M. C. 2017, 362 F.(2d) 118 (2 Cir, 1966) ;

Skibinski vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 1966 A. M. C. 873, 360

F.(2d) 539 (2 Cir., 1966), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 921 (1967) ; "Reid

vs. Quebec Paper Sales & Transportation Co., 1965 A. M. & 112,

340 -F.(2d) 34 @ Cir., 1965) ; Strika vs. Netherlands Ministry of

— 1951 A. M. C. 54, 185 F. (2d) 555 (2 Gir., 1950). ;

‘

AD 2%. sna cose, Rozen he Gre OE A co OO AN EEN I OLAS LET RLEMGE a lat aha

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oo of the United States Court of. doit,

* Second Circuit. "”

consistency.? Analysis of these conflicts have been made

‘in various decisions with care and discernwhent.. Judges

railed against the necessity of. stultifying their judicial —

minds by being required ‘‘to make distasteful hair-

splitting distinctions. unrelated to any intelligible concepts

of right and wrong’’ (FRIENDLY, Ct. J., in dissent in

_ Skibinski vs. Waterman S. S. Co., 1966 A. M. C. 873, 360

F.(2d) (1964), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 921 (1967) and to

make ‘‘trivial, meaningless and confusing distinctions”’

-(Kaurmay, Ct. J., in dissent in Radovics vs. Cunard 8. 8. |

‘ Co., 1966 A. M. C. 2426, 2431, 364 F.(2d) 149 (1966).

This Court in 1962 attempted to cope with the problem by

. sitting en banc in Puddu vs. Royal Netherlands S. 8. Co., -

1962 A. M. C. 419, 303 F.(2d) 752. In Puddu by a six to two

vote, the oi sought to perpetuate Judge Learnep Hanp’s

2 Fifth Circuit: ae

Dugas vs: Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 1967 A. M. C. 2090, 378 F. (2d)

271 (5 Cir., 1967); Marshall vs.. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 1967

A. M. C. 2537, 378 F.(2d) 193 (5 Cir., 1967) ; Robichaux vs. Kerr

McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 1967 A. M. C. 2082, 376 F. (2d) 447 -

(5 Gir., 1967) ; Antoine vs. Lake Charles Stevedores, 1967 A .M. C.

2085, 376 F, (2d) 443 (5 Cir., 1967) ; Smith vs. M/V Ginza, 1966

A. M..C. 2036, 262 F.(2d) 164 (5 Cir., 1966) ; McQuiston vs.

Freighters an ‘Tankers Steamship Co., 1964 A. M. C ‘1489, 327

F.(2d) 746 (5 Cir., 1964); Neal vs. ‘Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.,

1962 A. M. C: 1959, 306 F.(2d) 313 (5 Cir., 1962) ; cf. Morales .

vs. “City of Galveston, 275 F.(2d) 191 (5 Cir. >: vacated and 4

manded, 364.U. S. 295 (1960), 1961 A. M. C. 2194, 291 F.(2d) 97

' (5 Cir., 1961) ; afd, 370 U. S. 165, 1962 A. M. C. "1450 (1962).

PO et igre

Ninth Circuit:

Huff vs.'Matson Navigation.Co., 1964 A. M. C. 2219, 338 F.(2d)

205. €9 Cir., 1964) ; Blassingill vs. W oterman Steamship Corp., 1964

‘A. M. C. 1932, 336 E.(2d) 367: (9 Cir., 1964); Beeler vs. Alaska

Aggregate €orp., 1964 A. M. C. 1976, 336 F. (2d) ‘108 (9 Cir., 1964) ;

Billeci vs. United States, 1962 A. M. C. 826, 298 F.(2d) 703 9 Cir.,

1962) ; Tiaus vs.. Santorini, 1959 A.°M. é. 1042, 258° ‘F.(2d) 352

(9 Cir., 1958). See also n. 10, oe

SALLE MELE LL LE BILDER INCI ace SOARED TAOS, IO il AIBN AES Be _—

ie eae

Opinion: of the United States Court of Appeals,

e Second Circuit.

‘previous (1956) apovendh'i in Grillea vs. United States, 1956

. A. M. C. 1009, 232 F.(2d) 919, by; the ‘‘incident in a-con-

tinous course of operation’’ theory (1956 A. M. C. 1013, 232

F.(2d) at 922). Subsequent cases (and quite to be ex-

pected) had to struggle with: what is ‘‘continuous’’? and

what is the ‘‘operation’’?, In Puddu the Court said both

that ‘‘Time is obviously irrelevant’’ (1962 A. M. C. 424,

303 F.(2d) at 757) and that it should consider whether the ©

‘‘incident?’ was in a continuous course of operation and a

‘‘momentary step of phase in the progress of work on

board’* (Grillea, 41956 A. M. C. at 1013, 232, F.(2d) at 922).

The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 371 U. S. 840, 1963

A. M. C. 280 -(1962). In the ensuing years, 1962-1967,

the cases continued to be decided virtually without. rhyme

or reason. Judge Frrnserc (The trial judge in Candiano,

and now on this Court) has suggested with good reason

considering “whether the distinction [between operational.

’ negligence and unseaworthiness] should not be dispensed

with altogether.”? Radovich vs. Cunard Steamship Co., _

. 1966 A. M. C. 2426, 2431, 364 F.(2d) 149, 153 (2 Cir., 1966).

' Judge Hastie in his dissent in Thompson vs. Calmar, 1964

A. M. C, 2249, 331 F.(2d): 657 (3 Cir., 1964) thought it to °

. be ‘‘ridiculous'to apply. the concept of unseaworthiness to

. ‘such cases as these’’ (1964 A. M. C. at 2258, 331 F.(2d). at

ry é |

Now in 1967 confusion still reigns in a field wherein there

is a. vast amount of litigation in the federal courts—par-

ticularly in the seacoast circuits. There should be some

uniformity of rule—not only in the interest of justice but

also of fairly reasonable consistency. If the courts wish

to create (actually by judicial legislation) a principle that

any seaman injured on board a ship is entitled to. recover

and the only fact question which may be submitted to the

jury is his contributory negligence, if any, the trial courts,

FS Se SN RA EIT ROT PS ASR IAL OT SOREN secon ictal PAT LM. a oy ba aes DGMCKT ET al hie

\

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28a

Omnion of the United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

shipowners, longshoremen and insurante companies at least

will know the problems then facing them in , and out of , -

court.

But what has happened since Aitiniis and ‘Candiano

were argued (October 28, 1966 and December 13, 1966, re-

spectively) ?

On May 15, 1967, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in

Foster vs. Lykes Bros., 387. U. S. 908, wherein the Fifth

Circuit had affirmed the District Court’s denial of a re

covery to a seaman on the ground that negligence of a

. fellow longshoreman does not — a_ship unseaworthy |

(368 F.(2d) 326).

On May 22, 1967, the Supreme’ Cetin decided Mascutlii,

supra, in a brief. Per Curiam opinion as follows’ _—

A. M. C. 1702): |

“The petition for a Writ of Certiorari is ined and the

judgment is reversed. Mahnich vs. Southern S. 8. Co.,321

U. S. 96, 1914 A. MC. 1; Crumady vs, Joachim Hendrik

Fisser, 358 U. S.423, 1959 A. M. C. 580.”

The finding of the trial court in Mascuilli was specifically

noted by the Court of Appeals in its Per Curiam opinion,

1966 A. M. C. 2503, 358 F.(2d) 133 (3 Cir., 1966), the court

’ stating that the trial'court’s findings, including the finding

_ “that the accident was caused solely by the, negligent op-

eration of the stevedoring crew as stated in finding of fact

No. 35,” were not clearly erroneous.

On June 5, 1967, the Supréme Court denied certiorari in

Fenton vs. A. S. Glittre, et al., 387 U. S. 944, wherein this

Court had affirmed the dismissal of a Somplaint alleging

- injury caused by cargo falling because of the negligent

handling of a crane by a fellow oun (1967 -

A. M. C. 316, 370 F.(2d) 146).

Petitioner in Candiano argues that these denials indicate

that dadeiah Court did not intend to abolish the

‘

i

GOR EA RENT \ pe re Se ORLA REEL IGOMLE ED ASLAN GD LUD LOO A IE IL BE REISER ALLL AS ENE A ROLLY ABE. SOE BEAD

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_ elapse, before operational negligence was transfo

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

| _ Second Circuit.

i-)

doctrine of ‘‘operational negligence’? and . petitioner in:

Alexander contends that ‘‘Mascuilli is not authority for

the proposition that the doctrine of operational negligence ©

las now been rejected by the Suprenie Court as a factor

in the determination of. liability.’’ (Alexander, Pet. p. 5. )

What the law is today will depend upon the decisions of

the future.

The time element. in the operation is ‘‘obviously irrele-

vant.’’ Practically no loading or unloading operati

could be carried on which required a separate timeketper

for every man working in a gang. ‘ Assume t ‘ee

timekeeper set his stop-watch at the commencemnen

cording to his judgment) of the ‘‘operation,”’ it still wo

be necessary for the courts to fix the period per a a)

into

unseaworthiness.. And since notice to the shipowner no

longer of consequence, the time element is meaning SS

from the standpoint of giving the owner notice of, and an

_ opportunity to remedy, the defect.*

Since the Spring of 1967, the Fifth Cireuit has decided at

least four cases in this field. Chronologically on May 9,

1967, the Court in Dugas vs. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 1967

~ A.M. C, 2090, 378 F.(2d) 271, affirmed a directed verdict

in favor of the defendant where dunnage boards fell on the

| plaintiff. The hookup man (a fellow employee) had placed

a single sling instead of the required double sling, around

the load which was being lowered. The Court rejected the

argument that, during the 10 to 15 seconds which elapsed

between | the placing of the sling and the raising of the load

with thé’ resulting fall, an unseaworthy condition had beet,

' created, But, even assuming that there were an ‘‘unsafe

® Mitchell vs. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362: U. S. 539, 549, 1960

A. M. C. 1503 (1960); Alaska S teamship Co. vs. Pettersen, 347

U; S. 396, 1954 A. M. C. err

‘

LO GEE IELTS Sn a

. 2. a ; | bie 30a 7

| ne of the United States Court of Appeals,

ose Second (Circuit.

condition” in this ‘‘monientary interval,’’ the Court was

— that the Supreme Court’s affirmance after two

— ds of Morales (Morales vs. City of Galveston, 275

Fr. d) 191 (5 Cir.), vacated and remanded, 364 U. S. 295

(1960) ; 1961-A. M.-C. 2194, 291 F.(2d) 97 (5 Cir., 1961),

aff’d, 370 U. S. 165, 1962 A. M. C. 1450 (1962)) required or

at least permitted this result.

However, less than a week later (May 15, 1967), the

same Fifth-.Circuit in a cése where there was no claim

of negligence but solely a question of an unexplained

escape from the cargo sling of the steel beam which struck

and injured the plaintiff,-reached a quite different result.

Marshall vs. Ove Skou Rederi, A/S, 1967 A. M. C. 2537,

378 F.(d) 193. The trial court had found that ‘‘the equip-

ment used in the loading operation was not shown to he

unseaworthy”’; the appellate court found that the gear was .

properly opérated and that there was no evidence of negli-

gence by any of the participants in the operation. The

court had difficulty in’ finding ‘transitory unseaworthi-

ness’* saying,.‘‘But this accident occurred under the

most antiseptic conditions possible. The winch was oper-

~ated ‘properly. The load struck nothing. .The sling did not

break. No new agency affected the sling. The loading

_ operation was done without negligence. The sling simply

did not perform its single assigned purpose of retaining

its load without dropping it while moving it from point

A to point B’’ (1967 A. M. C. 2537, 378 F.(2d) 193, at p.

- 198). The Court imposed liability because the shipowner- 2

must have been _aware-of- “anticipated .operating condi-

tions.” There ‘‘the force and hazard to be incurred—

“For the origin of this concept, see Polanint vs. United States, .

1955 A. M. C. 1955, 225 F.(2d) 595, 597 (2 Cir., 1955). See also

Grillea Vs. United States, 1956 A. M. C. 1009, 232 F. _— 919, =

(2 Cir., 1956).

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— of the United States Court of pone

Second Cérowit. »

single, obvious and great—by this cargo sling was the

simple one of the force of gravity * * * which, unless

guarded against by operating proficiency,. would cause

the tilted beam to slip from the sling and fall and hurt

someone’? (1967 A. M. C. 2537, 378 F.(2d) 193, at p. 198).

Regardless of the Court’s explanatory conclusion that

‘‘The present case is of failure of equipment to function

while in normal use in a situation of high and known

hazard and without the effect of any external force or

event,’’ the decision actually.would appear to stand. for

the proposition that: the accident happened, therefore the

ship must be considered unseaworthy.. Judge Rives’ con-

currence, ‘relying on Van Carpals in this circuit and

Walker and Mills in the Fifth, supports this conclusion;

* There is simply no explanation for the accident, except

_ either the choice of an improper method of loading or the

unfitness of the‘sling used to lower the beam.’* The first

hypothesis, however, would appear to involve operational

_negligence; the second is not supported by. the facts be-

cause thé equipment was found by the trial court to be ..

without defect and of the type customarily used for this

Operation ©

. To aad * the confusion, the Fifth Circuit on April 13,

1967, had decided Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores,

Inc., 1967 A: M. C. 2085, 376 F.(2d) 443 and Robichauz Vv.

Kerr McGee Ou Industries, Inc., 1967 A. M. C. 2082, 376

-. F(2d) 447. In. Antoine, the plaintiff was injured when.

pinned against the side of the ship by a load being lowered

into the hold. The trial court had concluded that ‘‘opera-—

tional diamoncaicl could not be characterized as ‘‘unsea-

?.

5 Van Carpals vs. S. S. ‘Asie Harvester, 1962 A. M. C. 395; .

297 F. i 9 (2 Cir., 1961) ; Walker vs. Harris; 1964 A. M. C. 1759,

335 F (2d | 185 (5 Cir., 1964) ; Mills vs. Mitsubishi Ship ping Co.,

1966 A. M. C. 1318, 358 F. (24) 609 Cir., 1966).

eng Hae AOD LENA NOES BOREL OE HOTT ST RT PE Se RATES

32a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

_ Second Cirowit. ;

. worthiness’’ and dismissed the case. On appeal, the ‘out

affirmed. But, on the assumption that that court had

_ never ‘“Soxpressed itself, until now [April 1967], in the

specifie area of ‘operational. negligence,’ ’’ it then pro-

ceeded (after analyzing many cases) to come to the con-

clusion that ‘‘It would serve no useful purpose to rehash

the many decisions by the Supreme Court and the various

Coyrts of Appeals since Steracki, supra (1967 A. M. C.

2089, 376 F.(2d) at 446). However, since to that court’

‘it does not appear that the Supreme Court has gdne so

far as to hold that the shipowner is liable for ‘instant |

_ unseaworthiness,’ based upon the very act of a fellow

longshoreman which causes the injury’’ (1967 A. M. C.

at 2086, 376 F. (2a) at 445), the dismissal. was affirmed. In

Robichaua, the same panel remanded for specific findings

as to whether the alleged negligence created ‘an unsea-

‘ worthy condition. In both cases as well as in the court’s

- analysis of the Ninth Circuit cases, the time element’ was

stressed, the court in Robichaua indicating that if ‘‘ap-

_ pellant was injured after the negligence took place, rather

than at the time of the negligent act, the vessel would,

under the law,’ be considered unseaworthy, Beeler v.

Alaska Aggregate’ Co., 1964~A. M. C. 1978, 336 F.(2d)

108 (9 Cir., 1964) and Blassingill v. Waterman Steamship

~ Co., 1964 A. M. C. 1932; 336 F.(2d) 367 (9 Cir:, 1964) ;. not

otherwise (1967 A. M. C, at 2085, 376 F’.(2d) ‘at 449).

The time element (‘‘momentary interval of time’’)

stressed in Antoine, Robichauz, and Dugas as a deter-

mining factor was not mentioned in Marshall. There the -

element against which the shipowner should: have guarded

was said to be the force of gravity.

This ‘‘rehash’’ has probably been no more fruitful than

the many previous reviews of cases by the various circuits .

searching for, but not finding, a rational basis for deci-

-sion. The real difficulty in the future will arise at the

SANE a a Cn eth ania” pecan , . ~ - IRR RS TL EONS ILE AE 8 SPIRE NRE patie 4 ON

" : , ?

4

0, Mee

Opimon of the United Siates Court of ints

Second Circuit.

trial ak: If thee are any facts to be determined by a

jury other than assessment of damages and contributory

negligence, how is the trial judge to charge? Is ‘‘opera-

tional negligence’’ to be mentioned at all? .When does the

‘‘operation’’. commence? How momentary isa ‘‘momen-

tary interval’’? Is ‘‘instant negligence” to be added: to.

‘‘instant unseaworthiness’’? Many other similar quate

- undoubtedly will arise.

Some guidance from ‘the Supreme ‘Court 4n this area

may be found at the end of the majority opinion -in

“Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362. U. S: 539, 1960

A. M. C. 1503 (1960), where the Court, apparently un-.

willing to state affirmatively a rule of absolute liability,

added a penultimate paragraph which has been used in

whole or in part by almost every trial judge since 1960,

either in the jury charge or in a non-jury decision. The —

Court, citing Sieracki® and Mahnich,’ had just said that

“the shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel’’ is -

“‘absolute’’ (Mitchell, 362°U. S. at 549, 1960 A. M. C.

‘at 1511). But the court straightway answered the ques-

tion: what is the duty which is absolute?, by stating ‘‘it is

a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reason-

ably fit for their intended use.’’ Were a trial judge to

follow, Mitchell, a charge, refreshingly simple could be

_ made, in substance: ‘‘The shipowner is not obligated to

furnish an accident-free ship but only a vessel and ap-

purtenances reasonably fit and suitable for their intended

use and service.’’ Based upon the Supreme Court deci-

sions between 1945 and 1960, the law may have been clear,

in 1960, namely, that a presage of tas can divorce-

© Seas —_— Co. vs. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 1946 A. M. C. 698

(1946).

* Mahnich vs. Southern S. S. Co., 321 Uz S. 96, 1944 A. M:C. 1,

(1944).

RAL EGE EESTI Stet EOE OER SE ME VELTS IE HENON CI MIS FNL SEN PLIN LG INGE EER IRR GEO LE SS FEN OLB LER ALIA LEC IS POT Re Heo A 2 TOON

- 34a

’

Opinion of th 4 Umited States Court of Appeals,

} Second Circuit.

ment of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negli-

gence’’ (Mitchell, 362 U. S. at 550, 1960 A.M. C. at 1512)

. had evolved, but this clarity has been considerably dimmed

by appellate decisions between 1960 and 1967., Negli-

gence would appear to create unseaworthiness from the

very moment of.the act. The words ‘‘reasonably fit’’ and

‘‘reasonably suitable’’ lose all significance if the happen-

ing of the accident in and of itself is regarded as an ade-

quate demonstration that. the ship was not in such condi-

tion. ‘See Marshall, supra. '

Both Candiano and Alexander under sail concepts

of unseaworthiness present ‘‘unseaworthy’’ facts. Even.

though operational negligence created the unseaworthiness,

it is‘ difficult to find any place for such a doctrine as a de-

fense against liability, if the very finding of operational

negligence is a simultaneous finding of unseaworthiness. _

The alchemy i is instantaneous.

In summary Mascuilli may be explained on the basis of

Crumady; namely, that the safety circuit breaker was im-

properly set so that the controller did not trip and thus”

cut off the power. Waldron (May 8, 1967) may have cre-

_ ated a doctrine of unseaworthy seamen. The Fifth and

Ninth Circuit cases speak of operational negligence and ~

_ try to set up a momentary time theory. The Third and

. Fourth Circuits, are virtually committed to an absolute

liability doctrine.”°. Were Candiano to be resubmitted to-

© Crumady | vs. J..H. ‘Fisser, 358 v. S. 423, 1959 A. M. C. 580

(1959).

® Waldron vs. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U. S. 724, 1967 |

A. M. C. 579 (1967).

* Thompson vs. Calmar, 1964 A. M. C. 2249, 331 F. (2d) 657

' . (3 Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 379 U. é. ‘913 (1964) ; Ferrante vs.

Swedish American Lines, 1964 A. M. C. 2268, 331 F.(2d) 571 (3

. Cir., 1964), cert. dismissed, 379 U. S. 801 (1964) ; Scott vs. Is-

brandtsen, 1964 A. M. C. 1126, 327 F.(2d) 113 (4 Cir., 1964).

iin adalat ere: aaah OR BES ER FEE IRIN a UIE FY AR CRW REL One shyry "

-

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Fe FE Rtas gS a ARS ne SPE ARETE I

Cae os aS,

a of the United States Court of Appeals, =

Second Circuit.

day, these intervening cases would only sevngihen the con-

clusion that the negligent hook-up followed by ‘‘an-appre-

ciable period of time’’ (as found by the trial court) would

create an unseaworthy condition. Ag to Alexander; the pro-

truding dunnage alone would haye produced a similar con-

clusion.

In my opinion, the whole process | of straining to impose

liability has become completely unrealistic. ‘As a basis for

decision, the term ‘‘unseaworthy”’ is utterly meaningless as

Noah Webster defined the word. From the time. notice to—

_ the shipowner of a defect-with a reasonable opportunity to

remedy it was written out of the law, the instances, to which

the word unseaworthy has been applied, to my mind have

_ advanced (or retrogressed) from the absurd to the ridicu- - |

lous... However, ‘believing the function of the courts to be .

adjudication in accordance with current applicable deci-

sions (and not judicial legislation) I adhere to the decisions |

already rendered in, Candidno and Alexander and, “hence,

believe that a rehearing by the Court would serve no use-

ful purpose. ' ae | ao

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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