Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Candiano
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SUPREME, COURT. U, &
S
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLER
In THE | tunes
Supt Pine Court of the United States
venus Vines Tero, 1968
Me. 12 OZ i
Moore-M¢Cormacx Lungs, Inc.,
_ Petitioner,
v. yee,
CarMELo CanpiIAno, |
: Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
_UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS»
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Martin J. McHven,
James M. LeEonarp,
»“ 70 Pine Street, |
New York, N. Y. 10005.
Counsel for Petitioner. |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
“Opinions of the Court Below ........6...eeeeeece0. "¢.
. J urisdiction ; ae trier dusted eedudveeceseies 2
| Questions cg PIO ROE hha iSwheeseceaas 2.
Statement of the Case .............05..00.0005555, 3
Reasons for Caiiting the Petition for Certiorari.... 5
Arguinent ...... SEER Mines eh ks) deans 4 7
~Conelusion ..... Picea 3% 4 cgeebausecen : bene ee
“Taste or Cases Crrep
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U. S06 ...... | 13
Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Ine, D.C W. D.
La., 1965, 249 F. Supp. 290.....0..6......0 06. 7
. Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc, 5 Cir,
1967, 376 F. 2d 443 Oe sons ua Gens hwkeenucs 20
Arena v. “Luckenbach S.S. Co., 1 Cir. 1960, 279 F. 2d
EE Wesket bi edsicacdssebcliesd ee 12
Berti v. Compagnie de Navigacion Crssiad Fabre, oe,
@ Civ, 1066, SID FF Ob BOT ovine ve ecse = -
Billeci_ v. U. S., 9 Cir., 1962, 298 F. 5 pepe 19
Ferrante v. Swedish American’ Liné, 3 Cir., 1964,
331 F. 2d 571, cert. denied 379 U. S. 801 ..... .-
Fréitas v. Pacific Atlantic Steamship vongeny, 9
-* Cir., 1955, 218 P20 808 eee eesti Se ce en ee i
EIR SOT
. TABLE OF CONTENTS
: ue - ; ‘PAGE ~
Grillea v. U. S., 2 Cir, 1956, 232 F. 2d 919 ........13,16
. Holley v. The S.S. Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp.
212: 186 F. Supp. | er. See Tere rere 10 (ftnte.)
Huff v. Matson. Navigation Go., 9 Cir., 1964, 338-F.
SEE Puc cuncdueGorendsecusceeinettenedaaws ~.
Knox v. U, S. Lines Company, 3 Cir., mm, 294 F.2d |
ee a case Se vc cacauduacdssuvedisaudeeus veeehees 15
~ Manhat v. U. S., 2 Cir., 1955, 220 F. 2d 143 ........ 19 .
Mascuilli v. U. S., 387 U.S. 287 ... gismuees ; elecees 418
Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 2 Cir., 1964,
332, F. 2d 779; cert. denied 379 U. S. 914 ...... 20
MeQuiston v. Freighters & Tankers S.S. Co., 5 Cir,
1964, 327, F. 2d 746 ........... Porro FO
. Michalie v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U. S. 325 . 15
“Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. g. 539 . 4, 13, 1 15.
. Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, 2 Cir., 1966, 355 F. 2d ~
| ee ésbans ER ae EN SRE Tee Se eo vesied 16-(ftnte.) —
“Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346.U..S. 406 ........... os ®
_ Price v. SS. Yaracuy, 5 Cir., 1967, 378 F. 2d. 156 . 16
*Puddu v.. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1962,
A PPeerrrrrrrrrrrrrer tir ri err i ere 18, 20
‘Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 2 Cir,, 1966, 364 F.
Be a sadineke eecdanidae kntwenenas rere 7
Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410 .................. 10
Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Ciiidinnitiitins Co., 2
_ Cir., 1965, 340 F. 2d Bh eee c cece eee cence ee en 7,14
Robichanx v. Kerr McGee Oil Industries Co, Ine., 5
Cir., 1967, 576 F. 2a ON kasehistasshececeses: OO
——
_ TABLE OF CONTENTS fo = iii -
PAGE
Royal Mail Sie Ltd: v. Peck 9 Cir., 1959, 269 F. 3
i, MME da lcanan na daw aslek So Kuna ee isecens cove. 16
Ryan Stevedoring Co<y. Pan-Atlantic, SS. Corp, 350
U. WN PAdewh es oby ks sekbs dec onditees. cc: Pe
: Scott v. Isbrantsen, 4 Cir, 1964, 327 F. 2d 113. 15
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. Si 85 ...... a
Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 2 Cir., 1966, 360
LL | FeORBn aia Tinea cura 7, 18
+ ~ Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 9 Cir., 1964, 326 F.
We OE akicdeesetukoues eeianaen (enawaeeeseens 20.
_ Thompson v. Calmar, 3 Cir., 1964,. 331. F. 2d 657
Vickers v. Tumey, 5 Cir, 1961, 290 F. 2d 426 . .. .16 (ftnte.)
StaTvuTEs Crrep °
_ 28 U.S.C, See. 1254(i piiitbed tes eerrree Seer arcee ed
33 U.S.C. See. 901 ........ H petvcnevecesessescecess My GO
$3'U.B.C,,Bee. 906 ..52.020.ceveeecececes erapavnas 2,9
eee |
INDEX TO APPENDIX
‘PAGE
Cc
Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
- by Feinberg, J. ............. bl eadaks esusus la
Silent eens evecteve settee eee eeees Peay —s
: Judgment Seas. sete veka . rineevenee 16a
7 Order Denying Petition for Rehearing ‘ or eae Sore 18a
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals Sec-
‘ond Circuit ieee iconssadsenes ss a eeteeecde wees 19a
wt
pe
In THE _-
Supreme Court of. the Huited States.
Ye J aaeaoeaa Tana, 1968
+
Moore-McCormack. Lines, Inc.,
| : 7 Petitioner,
v. ;
‘ ~ Carmeto CANpIANo, ae ee
; Respondent.
- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
To THE. Howonaniz THE Carer Justice, and Associate Jus-
_- tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Petitioner, Moore-MeCormack Lines, Inc., respectfully
prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the final
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered-on the first day of August, 1967,
affirming the judgment’ of the United. States District Court
for the Southern District of New. York, and the appeal
' docketed in the said Cdurt of. Appeals as No. 30,696 and
the order of the said Court denying rehearing entered on
- December 4th, 1967. .
Coulsdon of the Court Below
The opinion of the District Cet 1 is set. forth infra at
page la* and is reported i in 1967 A.M.C, 635. . ‘The opinion
“* Numerical references followed by: a are to. the cept
herein.
| Tehearing v was entered on December 4th, 1967.. The juris-
' diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., See. °°
Jaa cy 2
of the Court’ of Appéals for the Second Circuit is set forth
infra at page 19a and is reported at 382 F. 2d 961. The.-
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second: Circuit
denying rehearing is set forth infra at payze 23a and is° -
reported at 1967 A.M.C. 2315.
‘Jurisdiction
T judgment of the Court of: Appeals was entered on
August Ist, 1967. The order denying the petition ‘for
Saas i
>
| | >
* Questions Presented |
1. Should a vessel be held to a breach of the warranty
of seaworthiness, pro tanto, when safe, proper and defect-
free gear is used'in a negligent a by longshoremen
~ employees of a stevedoret
2. Does ‘‘operational negligence”’ equate, instanter, with
unseaworthiness?
3. Assuming that unseaworthiness can be caused hy
negligence—but not instantaneously—is the test by which
the inception of unseaworthiness to be gauged a temporal
test or is the proper test based upon a consideration of
the nature of the operation involving the negligence? ”
4. Should this Court countenance the complete destruc-
tion of the provisions ,of ;the Longshoremen’s & Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C., Sec. 901 et seq.
and-in particular the exclusivity of liability provisions
thereof, 33 US.C., Sec. 905? ae be
3
‘Stein of the Case
' Carmelo Candiano, who was, at the time of his injury,
a longshoreman in the employ of John W. McGrath Corp., .
a stevedoring concern, brought this action to recover dam-
ages for injuries sustained by him while he was working.
_ aboard the S.S. MormacuAwx on February 18th, 1961. The
complaint of plaintiff contained the usual allegations of
negligence on the part of the shipowner [Petitioner herein]
_ and unseaworthiness attributable to the vessel. The Trial
Court, having tried the case non-jury, found that plaintiff ’s
‘injuries resulted from unseaworthiness of the §.S. Mor-
MACHAWK and that the plaintiff was-not contributorily’neg-
_ligent. The District Court made, in its Fay findings.
of fact which were adopted :by Petitioner i
the Second Circuit and which will be relied upon herein.
e appeal to
; ‘Respondent, ‘Candiano, was a ship’s carpenter working . -
in the lower hold of No. 3 hatch of the S.S. Mormackawx.
He was engaged in chocking* cargo. The accident occurred
‘shortly after midnight on the morning of February 18th,
1961, at which time a hatch beam became dislodged from
the ship’s gear, fell into the lower hold and struck Re-
spondent.
It appears that a group of longshoremen, also in the
employ of John W. McGrath Corp.; had been engaged in
replacing the hatch beam in the No. 3 tween deck hatch.
This pr gr was preparatory to covering up the No:
3 tween hatch, since the ship was close to sailing.
The ship ’s cargo fall was used by the longshoremen to
handie the bearn in question. This fall terminated in a -
large ring. Hanging-down from the ring were four wires,
the end. &
each wire having a cargo hook [called a pontoon. hook] on
° Erroneously rendered as. “checking” in the: District Court's
‘opinion. Jean
>
.
. 4 : . ‘
The beam was attached to the ring by having a hook
inserted in a hole in each of the two ends of the beam. The
remaining two wires were looped up and placed into the
ring itself. ; :
The Trial Court found that this arrangement would
‘have been safe and proper if the cargo hooks at the end
of the beam had been passed fully through their respective
choles and made fast to the standing part. of the bridle
thus forming a closed loop. However, the hooks were not
passed by the longshoremen fully through the apertures at
ithe ends of the beam. In lowering the beam one of the
hooks apparently became dislodged from the end of the
beam, causing the beam to falf into the hold.
The Trial Court_found that these circumstances war-
ranted a-finding of unseaworthiness against the 8.S. Mor-
MACHAWK. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of
Respondent [plaintiff below].
Petitioner appealed to. the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. On August ist, 1967, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, affirming the judgment of the District
Court. Believing itself to be compelled, under the holding
of this Court in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U. S. 237,
to adopt a rule of law that operational negligence i in and of
itself constituted unseaworthiness, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit expressed the view that it was —
constrained to affirm the District Court’s opinion on such
basis,
Petitioner sought rehearing. with respect to the Court of
Appeals’ decision and in so doing pointed out that the
Court of Appeals had before it only the summary of the
Mascuilli decision as contained in the Law Week version
[35 L. W. 3052]. This, Petitioner claims, did not correctly
reflect the thrust of Mascuill.
By decision dated December 4th, 1967 the Court of a.
peals. for the Second Cireutt denied rehearing, with a con-
5
eurring opinion by J udge Moore. The Court. of Appeals
found that'the fact pattern in the instant case did ‘‘under
modern concept of unseaworthiness present ‘unseaworthy’
facts’’.
- Reasons for Granting the Petition
; for Certiorari ~—
The instant pitticn seeks a statement by this Court upon
an issue which has left maritime law in a confused and
chaotic state and which has’ engendered fundamental dis-
agreements among the various Circuits. The ‘issue®in-
volves the‘extent to which ‘‘operational negligence’’ may,
or may not, be identified with the doctrine of ‘‘unsea-
worthiness’’.
The panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit which below decided the instant case was
acutely, perhaps painfully, aware of the lack of harmony
in regard to this question both internally within the Sec-
ond Circuit and among the several Circuits throughout tlie
Country. © os |
‘At the time of the arguments of Alexander and
Candiano, there was a plethora of cases involving neg-
ligence and unseaworthiness and ‘a paucity of consist-
ency. No legal principle which might.serve as a guide
for the futuré could be gleaned from these Uecisions.
In this cireuit, the panels were hopelessly divided,’ .
other circuits achieved no greater consistency.? Analy-
ses of these conflicts have been ‘made in various deci-
*Compare Norfleet vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 1966 A. M. C.
80, 355 F. (2d) 359 (2 Cir., 1964); Guarracino vs. Luck-
enbach Steamship Co., 1964 A. M. C. 2240, 333 F. (2d) 646
(2 Cir, 1964); Massa vs. C. A. Vesesualen Navigacion,
. 1964 A. M. C. 1375,°332 F. (2d) 779 (2 Cir., 1964); Spin-
_ ell vs. Isthmian, 1965 A. M. C. 254, 326 F. (2d) 870 (2
Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 935, 1966 A. M. C.
2792 (1964) ; Mosley vs. Cia. Mar. Adra S.A., 1963 AM.C.
1951, 314 F. (2d) 223 (2 Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 375 U. S.
ae
_ (Footnote continued on following page)
7
PII LES LIES IANS RR OTS E MEME TS CLE ELLE LED ORE EBT RIEL ALES RIL IR POH ERE IRE : Seer anes ee
6
sions with care and discernment. Judges railed against
the necessity of staltifying their judicial minds by be-
ing required ‘to make \distasteful hair-splitting dis-
tinctions unrelated toany\intelligible concepts of right
and wrong’ (FRienpiy, Ct. J., in dissent in Skibinski
vs. Waterman S. S. Co., 1966 A. M. C. 873, 360 F. (2d)
(1964), cert denied, 387 U. S. 921 (1967)) and to make
‘trivial, meaningless and confusing distinctions’
_ (Kaurmay, Ct. J., in dissent in Radovich vs. Cunard
S. S. Co., 1966 A. M. C. 2426, 2431, 364 F. (2d) 149
(1966) ).’’ (25a-26a) . 3 , !
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
829, 1963 A. M. C. 2698 (1963) ; Puddu vs. Royal Netherlands
S. S. Co., 1962 A. M. C. 419, 303 F. (2d). 752 (2. Cir.
en banc 1962); cert denied, 371 U. S. 840, 1963 A.°M. C.
280 (1 ~Grillea vs. United States, 1956 -A. M. C. 1009,
. 232 (2d) 9TN(2 Cir., 1956) ; Potgnant vs. United States,
1957 A. M. C.-1955, 225 F. (2d) 595 (2 Cir., 1955); Man-
hat vs. United States, 1955 A. M. C. 513, 220 F. (2d)
143 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U. S. 966 (1955), with
Radovich vs.. Cunard S. S. Co., 1966. A. M. C. 2426, 364
F. (2d) 149 (2 Cir., 1966); Mosley vs. Cia. Mar. Adra
S.. A., 1966 A. M. C. 2017,. 362 F. (2d) 118 (2 Cir.,
1966) ; . Skibinski vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 1966
A. M. C. 873, 360 F. (2d) 539 (2 Cir., 1966), cert. denied,
387 U. S. 921 (1967); Reid vs. Quebec Paper Sales. &
Transportation Co.,.1965 A. M. C. 112,-340 F. (2d) 34 (2
Cir., 1965) ; Strika vs. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 1951
A. M. C. 54, 185 F. (2d) 555 (2 Cir., 1950).
* Fifth Circuit: 4
8 f vs. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 1967 A. M. C. 2090,
.
378 F. (2d) 271 (5 Cir.; 1967)5 Marshall vs. Ove Skou
Rederi A/S, 1967 A. M. C. 2537, 378 F. (2d) 193 (5 Gir.,
1967) ; Robichaux.vs. Kerr McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 1967
' A. M; C. 2082, 376 F. (2d) 447 45 Cir., 1967); Antoine
. vs. Lake Charles Stevedores, 1967 A. M..C. 2085, 376 F-
(2d) 443 (5 Cir., 1967) ;2 Smith vs. M/V Ginza, 1966
A. M. C. 2036, 362 F. (2d) 164 (5 Cir., 1966); McQuiston
vs. * cy and Tankers Steamship Co., 1964 A. M. C.
1489, 327 F. (2d) 746 (5 Cir., 1964); Neal vs. Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., 1962. A. M. C. 1959, 306 F. (2d) 313 (‘5
- Cir., 1962) ; cf. Morales vs. City of Galveston, 275 F. (2d)
191. (5 Cir.) ; vacated and remanded, 364 U. S. 295 (1960); -
1961 A. M. C. 2194, 291 F. (2d) 97 (5 Cir., 1961); aff'd,
370 U. S. 165, 1962.A. M. C. 1450 (1962). .
(Footnote continued on following page) °
?
LILI Pi MCS IGE MIRREN LLL AIE RIA! IIL VA LEED ELE LED EEG AO. LE EE LY EIEN IRENE BOE E RIS SNARE BN ANI NRE ARTE aeRO DN Sf pete SpE wy OY
7
eres , a
The almost hopeless conflict existing today on the issue
of ‘‘operational negligence’? has been noted ruefully by
Judge Marshall in Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transpor-
tation Co., 2 Cir., 1965, 340 F. 2d 34, by Judges Feinberg
(for the majority] and Kaufman [for the minority] in
Radovich v. Cunard 8.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1966, 364 F. 2d 149
~ and by Judge Friendly [dissenting] in Skibinski v. Water-
man S.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1966, 360 F. 2d 539, 543, among many
others. See also the discussion by Hunter, J. in the Dis-
trict Court opinion in Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores,
Inc., D.C.W.D.LA., 1965, 249 F. Supp. 290.
The opinions formulated by the various-Circuit Courts
reflect a deep and abiding uncertainty ~~ to~the present
_ Status of the law of unseaworthiness. “ue Circuits are
in great need of assistance and guidance from this Court.
_>\ Argument —
Petitioner believes that the flux apparent in the current
‘state of the law offers this Court an opportunity to re-
examine the basic concepts underlying the doctrine of un-
seaworthiness and to formulate guidelines by which the
lower courts may..administer and delimit the judicial en-
forcement -of that doctrine.- |
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. 8. 539, 550,
Judge Frankfurter spoke of the particular obligation that
the Courts owe in regard to the formulation of the doctrines
of maritime law: |
- “No area of Federal law is’ judge-made at its souirce
to such an extent as is the law of admiralty. The evolu- ~
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Ninth Circuit: ka
Huff vs. Matson Navigation Co., 1964 A. M. C. 2219, 338
F. ( 205 (9 Cir., 1964); Blassingill vs?Waterman Steam-
ship Corp.,. 1964 A. M. C. 1932, 336 F. (2d) 367 (9 Cir.,
1964); Beeler vs. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 1964 A. M. C.
1976, 336 F. (2d) 108 (9 Cir., 1964); Billeci vs. United
States, 1962 A. M. C. 826, 298 F. (2d) 703 (9 Cir., 1962) ;
Titus vs. Santorini, 1959 A. M. C. 1042, 258 F. (2d) 352
~ (9 Cir., 1958). See also n. 10, infra.” ?
- ~ 7
sa “uipevnsenend LN TOME EARN TILT IT PM v7 “ EET LITE, ia . . ve ial Ga aes
8
tion of judge-made law is a process of accretion and
erosion. We are told by a great master that law is
civilized to the extent that it is purposefully conscious.
Conversly, if law just ‘grow’d’ like Topsy, unreflec-
tively and without conscious design, it is irrational.’’
The doctrine of seaworthiness has been an evolving
one and has beer motivated by the concern of this Court
to assure‘humanitarian treatment of longshoreren. How-
ever, until recent times, the circumference of the ‘‘unsea-.
worthiness’’ doctrine has been reasonably well defined. :\
That circumference has hitherto embraced the ship, its ,
gear and the adequacy of its*crew. Recent trends would .
expand the confines of the ‘‘unseaworthiness’’, doctrine so
as to include the totality of all shipboard accidents to land
based workers.. Such an expansion would, Petitioner’ sub- ..
mits, do violence to both the logical and historical basis
of the doctrine and to the Congressional intent a8 manifest
in the. Federal Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C., See. 9@1, et seq.
Longshore work is concededly dangerous. Though much .
. progress in the realm of safety has been effected by Fed-
eral efforts and by the work of employer and labor groups,
there is a point of diminishing return. The incidence of
danger in longshore work remains high, largely because
of the inescapable human element involved. In the final
analysis, industrial safety in stevedoring operations de-
pends mainly upon proper and efficient performance of
duty by longshoremen and their co-workers—a perform-
ance which is not always obtainable no matter what stand-
ard of diligence i is employed by shipowner and stevedoring
companies alike.
Congress has. long since recognized that a high. Sneana
_ field, such as this, requires a special kind of bargain be-
_ tween employers and their workers. In 1927 Congress
enacted the Longshoremen’s .& Harbor Workers’ Com-
APL eRe Tae SiR i he he el ae ee ee Ce ee ee
. 4 abe . R
a
A PEE SAMOTP GOS eae 5%
°
sf
9
: pensation Act, 33 U.S.C., 901, et seq. Section 905 of Title
33 provided ‘that thé liability of an employer of 4 maritime
worker covered thereunder should be exclusively in com- -
pensation. ° ,
Judge Burton of :this Court clearly deseribéd the legisla-
tive purpose underlying this ‘‘bargain’’ betweenhe steve-
dore industry and its workers in Ryan Stevedoring Co. -
Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 350 U.S. 124, ~
129:
. “The obvious purpose of this provision is to make the
statutory liability of an employer to contribute to its
employee’s compensation the exclusive liability of such
employer to its employee, or to anyone claiming under
or, through such employee, on account of his injury or
death arising out of that employment. . In return, the
employee, and thdse claiming under or through him, -
are given a substantial quid pro quo.in the form of
an assured compensation, regardless of fault, as a
substitute for their excluded claims.’’ |
_ Recognizing a dichotomy between the stevedore em-
ployer and the shipowner who supplied the work area, this
Court evolved the current theory of seaworthiness. Pope
¢ Talbot v. Hown, 346 U. S. 406; Seas Shipping Co. v.:
Steracki 328 U. S. 85. Concurrent with the broadening of —
the-warranty of seaworthiness was the development of a
doctrine of indemnification whereby an offending stevedore
was required to recompense ‘a shipowner cast into liability
through the stevedore’s fault. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc.
v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U. S. 124. It has
been, pérhaps understandably, assumed that the shipowner,
in recovering indemnification from the stevedore, has been
made whole,and simnly acts as a passive conduit for the
imposition of an expanded liability on the stevedore. This,
however, is simply not the case. It is ultimately the ship-
owner and the public which bear the burden of the tragic
Pies scger tere ree Oo: Reet AS RTO aah adel ey hethapitiaad RE - res PIS Ee Ha al alti Nik Kaien ie 2) la
a : | eee
waste* caused by transmuting a humanitarian compensa-
tion procedure into a wasteful synthetic tort battle.
‘¢The insidious notion that ‘the story will have a happy
. ending for the ship’ apparently stems from the invalid
assumption’ that frustrating the legislative intent of —
the ‘Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905’ will hurt orlly the stevedore
and make no ‘economic difference’, Reed v., The Y aka,
' 373 U. S. 410, 414 [1963], to the chipowner. This is
not. so. . . The stevedore must and does pass the
cost of its ‘third-party liability back to the shipowner
' by increasing the stevedoring rates to cover the initial
exposure. The shipowner, in turn, must and does pass
along this additional stevedoring charge to its cus-
tomers, .°. . thereby placing further economic burden
upon our... ocean commerce.’’** -
It is possible to view the doctrine of “seaworthiness’’ in
either: of : we fashions :
1. The weiniende of seaworthiness ‘should be cmmteeed
so as to aici any and all shore based: maritime workers
’
* Litigation procédures are crude and wasteful, often productive
of little cial benefit to other than attorneys. ‘Compare, for ex-
ample, the testimony of Thomas E. Byrne before the House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on the Merchant Marine [June 26,
27, 28, 1961] which was considering the Bonner Bill. Mr. Byrne,
commenting on the gross economic inefficiency of liability suits, hed
the example of the litigation entitled Holley v. The S.S. Manfred
Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212, 186 F. Supp. 805. He pointed out that
the widow of the deceased longshoreman therein involved netted, as
a result of that protracted litigation, the additional sum of $1, 597.45
over what she would have received in benefits under the Compensa-. |
tion Act. The process cost the stevedore-employer some $24,293.71
over what its liability should have been under the Compensation Act.
What a tragic economic waste !
** [Brief amicus curiae in support of petition for certiorari filed
_ by American Merchant Marine Institute in ‘Waterman Steamship
Corporation v. Skibinski, October Term 1966 No. 378.]
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11
who are injured aboard ship to have a recovery based on
tort principles. |
2. The warranty of seaworthiness should be construed -
so as to limit tort recoveries to those which fall ‘within a
. ¢learly discernible body of maritime law—separate and
distinct from and not co-extensive with the range of cover-
age afforded by Congress in the Longshoremen’s & Harbor -
Workers’ Compensation Act. ° |
Till the advent of the ‘‘operational negligence’’ decisions
which have sprung mainly from the Third and Fourth
Gireuits, Federal Courts generally have been quite positive
‘in proclaiming that the doctrine of seaworthiness does not
automatically mean: tort recovery for any shore based
maritime worker injured aboard ship. .
Thus, in Berti v. Compagnie de Navigacion Cyprien
Fabre, 2 Cir., 1954, 213 F. 2d 397, a new trial was granted
to the shipowner. It appeared that a cable from a winch
dislodged a beam which fell and struck plaintiff. The
Court said simply:
“If plaintiff’s injuries resulted solely from the manner
in which the work was done under American’s super-
vision, he has no recourse against Cyprien.’’ 213 F. 2d
A similar factual situation was considered by the Ninth
Circuit in Freitas v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Com-
pany, 9 Cir., 1955, 218 F. 2d 562. Hefeagain, a winch opera-
tor, pulling at an angle, dislodged a strong-back below. In
rejecting the claim of the plaintiff-longshoreman who had
been hit by a falling hatch board the Court said:
‘‘The Petterson case is inapposite. Unlike the situa-
tion in Petterson, the accident in this instance was
directly brought about by an improper, if not fool-
hardy, use of the ship’s gear.’’ 218 F. 2d at page 564.
o
, 12
In Arena v. Luckenbach Steamship Company, 1 -Cir.,
1960, 279 F. 2d 186; the First Circuit placed itself in the
company of those who rejected the concept. of ‘operational
unseaworthiness.’’ There the large rolls of printing paper
were being loaded, carried on boards 5’ by 8’. Some con-
tention was made that end boards should have been used
"instead of side boards. At any rate the plaintiff was in-
jured by falling rolls. The Court _—— of the unsea-
worthiness claim as follows:
“The board was not defective _ simply - because the
longshoremen who loaded it neglected to do so in the
proper fashion ... A vessel is not unseaworthy simply
because the improper type of equipment was used by -_
some one unless, also, it appears that the proper type
was unavailable. ”? 279 F. 2d at page 188. ,
The ‘operative facts involved in -the ‘aalesit case are
clear: enough. Some longshore co-workers of respondent,
took perfectly safe, proper and seaworthy gear; supplied .
by the ship, and made it fast to a hatch beam in an un-
safe and improper way. The action was an incident in
the course of raising the hatch beam from the deck and
lowering it into position over the No. 3 ’tween deck hatch
opening, No defect of winch, hook or other gear inter-
vened ; no finding was made that any appurtenance of the ,
vessel was, in any manne, defective or unsuited to its
function. e
The question which was presented to the Court of:
Appeals was solely and simply this: Did the negligent
failure of Respondent’s co-workers to pass the cargo hooks
fully through the ends of the hatch beam render-the ship
_ legally unseaworthy so as to cast Petitioner in liability
to Respondent?
That the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
difficulty in squaring the finding in Respondent with any
coherently predictable principle is apparent from the read- .
ing of its initial opinion and the opinion denying rehearing.
esas
eee as
Initially, the Second Circuit fel€ itself bound by what. “
it conceived to be th® compulsion ‘OL the decision of this
, Court in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U: S. 237. ‘The
_ Court of. Appeals noted, in its original opinion, that its
- F. 2d '919, 922, had.drawn a distinction. between unsea- ..
worthiness on the, one hand and operational negligence
prior decision in G'rillea v. United States, 2 Cir., 1956, 232
on the other. The Second Circuit adverted to a “long line
of other decisions’’. of that Court which sought to draw
'
a dividing line between what was (compensable) sea-
worthiness and (uncompensable) operating negligence.
However, the Second Circuit believed that this Court had
intended, in Mascuilli, to abolish all distinction between
‘operational negligence and“ unseaworthiness and, accord- °
p egug eaw ’
ingly, decided that the authority: of Grillea had been over-
ruled by’ pronouncemehtt of this Court.
Petitioner (in its petition for rehearing) suggested to
“the Second Circuit that its”apprehension of the extent and
rationale of.the Mascuilli decision was in error, The Sec-
ond Circuit, though seemingly admitting its error as to the
scope of Mascuilli, nonetheless denied the petitionor re-
hearing. In so doing, the Court retreated to what must be
Sescribed, in all fairness, as less than a precise statement
of its conception of the presently existing doctrine of. un-
seaworthiness. ,
But starting with the basic proposition that a vessel.
may be rendered unseaworthy by the actions of the
stevedore’s employees, Alaska 8.9. Co. v. Petterson, 347
U. 8. 896, and that unseaworthiness may arise during the
course of the work the vessel is engaged in, Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 363 U. S. 539, we may then proceed —
to a consideration of the knotty problem involved in
- ascertaining when wrongful conduct becomes transmuted
from what we have, ti now, been calling ‘‘negligénce’’
into what wé have, till now, been calling ‘‘unseaworthi-
ness’’, ae rts oes?
14
There are three conceivable tests which could: be used
_ to fix the criteria for.judging whether or not: “‘negligence’’
has become transmitted into “‘unseaworthiness”’, These
fy are: fi .
A. ‘Operational N aplioneee” .
Any negligent act, occurring aboard a ship which causes
* injury, entitles the victim to a.tort recovery against-the .
ship, provided both the nature of the act and the status
of the victim have a sufficiently maritime flavor. In this
interpretation of the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine,
negligence and unseaworthiness coincide both temporally
and functionally. ‘‘The alchemy is instantaneous”’ (34a).
B. “The Temporal Test’’ .
N egligence may produce unseaworthiness—but only ~
after the Iapse of some legally significant period of time.
Cc. -“‘The Functional Test’’
N egligence may produce ilies ae: only _
after the magngunty periormed atic has ‘‘come to
rest”’.
It.is true that there are some who feel that the drawing
of any. dividing line between unseaworthiness and negli- |
gence creates an artificial distinction which might well place
an intolerable burden on the Courts charged with enfore-
ing the doctrine. Thus Mr. Justice Marshall, then sitting
in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, said in Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales &
. Transportation Company, 2 Cir., 340 F.2d 34, mie
‘One does not have’ to be unduly cynical ‘to look :
askance at this -distinction, for every act of negli-
“gence, no matter how short-lived, creates an unsafe
condition for those exposed to it. Under the rubric
of a ‘breach of the warranty of seaworthiness’ courts ©
15
had had shipowners responsible for accidents result-
ing from unsafe conditions of the work place, regard-
less of whether the shipowher had actual or con-
structive notice or the means: or ‘opportunity of |
correcting them, and, if.all ‘assessments of fault are
_ to be truly irrelevant, it is not at all clear why this
responsibility dges not encompass any conduct at the
work place which creates a threat to the safety of the
other workmen.”’ [emphasis Supplied] “
Though Mr. Justice Marshall was careful to recognize
the fact of a distinction, wherever that distinction lay, “
other Circuit Courts have-not beén so meticulous. Thus it
. 1s difficult to square certain decisions of the Third and
Fourth Circuits with any ‘other rationale save acceptance _
by thosé Courts of an identity between operational negli-
. gence. and unseaworthiness. Cf. Thompson v. Calmar, 3
Cir., 1964, 331 .F. 2d 657; Ferrante v. Swedish American
Line, 3 Cir., 1964, 331 F. 2d 571, cert. denied 379 U. S. 801;
Knox v. United States Lines Company, 3 Cir., 1961, 294 F.
2d 354; Scott v. Isbrandtsen, 327 F. 2d 113. See also Huff
v. Matson Navigation Co., 9 Cir., 1964, 338-F. 2d 205.
Nonetheless there is both historical and logieal justifi-
cation for. rejecting the notion that unseaworthiness and
negligence are interchangeable concepts.
In its various pronouncements, this Court has always
carefylly—adhered to a recognition that. negligence and
unseaworthiness represented two distinct concepts. For
example see Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,.364 U. a: 2
. ~ 325, 327, and Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S.
_ 539. The historical and jurisdictional reasons which have
‘preserved: a’ distinction between negligence and unsea-
worthiness are too well known to require extensive elabo-
ration here. However, that distinction has been faithfully | ~
- adhered to, until recently, by the various Circuit Courts.
?
: nih
16
b-: Thus, in Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Peck, 9 Cir., 1959, 269
+ F. 2d 857, 860, the Court said:
‘**Negligence and unseaworthiness are not equivalent.
- A finding of negligence is neither a substitute founda-
tion for nor a finding of unseaworthiness.’’. |
As recently as 1967 the Fifth Circuit took pains to ex-
_ plain that operational negligence and the legal doctrine of
unseaworthiness are not at all the same thing. In Price
v. 8.8. Yaracuy, 5 — 1967, 378 F. 2d 156, 160, the Court: °
said:
_ “Appellant does not take issue with the District
‘Court’s ruling that operational negligence of other- —
wise seaworthy equipment by a fellow longshoreman
does not make a vessel unseaworthy. The District
Court correctly stated the law of this Circuit.* ~~
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit itself ad-
hered to the proposition that the idea of negtigence was
‘not simply one of the forms which unseaworthiness might
take. In the landmark case of Grillea v. United States, 2
Cir., 1956, 232 F. 2d 919,** it was said:
! ‘However, it is at times hard to say siete a defeat
in hull or gear that arises as a momentary step or
phase in the progress of work on board should be con-
sidered as an accident in a continuous course of .
operation, which will fasten liability upon the owner
*In McQuiston Ve Freighters & Tenhers SS. Co., 5 Cir., 1962,
327 F. 2d 746, 747, the Fifth Circuit said “There can, of course,
be ‘no: dispute that a shipowner. is not liable for the negligence of
longshoremen acting as servants or employees of an independent
- stevedoring contractor, unless such negligence creates an unsea-
worthy condition.”
See also Vickers v. Tumey, 5 Cir., 1961, 290 F. 2d 426.
** This principle was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit i in Norfleet
v. Isthmian Lines, 2 Cir, 1966, 355 F. 2d 359.
<A,
only in case it is negligent, or as an unfitness of the
. Ship that makes her pro tamto ‘unseaworthy.’’ 232 F.
2d at page 922. . |
Thus it will be seen that both this Court and most of
the Circuit Courts have refused to obliterate the dividing
- line between operational negligence and unseaworthiness..
This does not at all mean that. operational negligence may
never ripen into an unseaworthy condition; it simply means
that the gestation of the negligence and the gestation of
the unseaworthiness should not be simultaneous.
The Second Circuit, in its opinion denying rehearing
herein, seized upon certain language from an opinion of
Judge Feinberg in the District Coutt as a basis for denying
rehearing, the impropriety of the standard ‘originally used
by the Court notwithstanding.. The Court pointed to the
faet that the District Court had held ‘that an ‘‘appreciable
period of time’’ intervened between the making-fast of the
cargo gear to the hatch beam and the actual happening of
the accident. It expounds thé view that the decisions which
have intervened between the original decision in ‘the instant
. ¢ase and the présent have only strengthened ‘‘the conclu-
sion that the negligent hookup followed .by ‘an appreciable
period of time’ ’’ would create an unseaworthy condition.
The Court of Appeals accordingly would appear to in-
terject some- temporal criteria into the consideration of
whether or not a negligent act has ‘‘ripened’’ into an
‘unseaworthy condition. This position was taken by, the
Court in spite of-the fact that it earlier sctitied that } the
time element in the operation is obviously irrele Ae
is difficult to speak with certitude, in view of these’ ap-
parently irreconcilable theses but it would seem that thé
~ Court of Appeals, has fallen back upon the temporal yard- »
stick as the measure of when negligence becomes unsea-
worthiness.
_ If this indeed is the case, it would be in contraventions
_. of positions previously expressed by the same Court. Thus
18
in Puddu v. Royal Netherlands Steamship seins 2 Cir.,
1962, 303 F. 2d 752, 757, Judge Hayes said in a concurring
opinion with respect to the so-called ‘‘temporal: test’’:
- . “The situation demands, then, that without regard to
fault, we fix a point of absolute liability. But logical
- coordinates for fixing a point, such as a time in which
a particular condition continues to exist, are entirely
lacking. Time ts obviously irrelevant since notice to
the shipowner is of consequence only if liability is
limited by fault.’? (Emphasis supplied.):
~ In Skibinski v. Waterman Steamship Corporation, 2 Cir.
1966, 360.F. 2d 539, 543, the following observation was
"made concerning the treacherousness of any temporal test.
‘If the test’is a temporal one, a more accurate stop
_<watch than I possess would be needed’ to explain why
Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transportation Co.; 340
F, 24-34 [2 Cir. 1965], ‘should have gone one way ’ and
Puddu v. Royal Netherlands 8.8. Co., 303 F. 2d 752
(2 Cir.] cert. denied, 371 U. S. 840, 83 S. Ct. 67, 9 L.
‘Ed. 2d 75 [1962], and Spinelli v. Isthmian 8.9. Co., 326
F, 2d 870 [2 Cir.], cert. denied, 377 U. S. 935, 84 S. Ct.,
1338, 12, L. Ed. 2d 298 [1964], the other.’’
Petitioner submits that a consideration of the body at
decisional law as it existed prior to the flights of the Third
and Fourth Circuit into ‘‘Operational Negligence” theory,
compels the belief that the proper test of the inception of
‘anseaworthiness is functional, not temporal.
A reading of the decisions post-dating Grillea (infra)
or (at least all those decisions which do not espouse the
' view that negligence and unseaworthiness are mterchange- .
able concepts) is instructive.. Petitioner believes that a |
pattern is discernible. This pattern teaches that.a prop-
erly formulated test of the inception of unseaworthiness
is a functional test directly related to the operation being
conducted. The Courts, we submit, have implicitly and
explicitly recognized the propriety of using a functional,
rather than a temporal, test as will be seen from a brief
review of some of the decisions in this area of law.
_. In Manhat v. United States, 2 Cir., 1955, 220-F.*2d 143,
three workers had been “engaged in their labors in a life
_ boat for some period of time (described by the Court as -
a ‘‘short period’’) before the life boat fell. -Apparénthy,
the releasing mechanism of the life boat had been made
operative shortly before. “The opinion of the Court in no
wise suggested that a judicial stop watch should be em-
ployed to count the number of seconds between the re-
leasing of the gear and the subsequent falling of the boat.
In Billeci v. United States, 9 Cir., 1962, 298 F. 2d 703, a
longshoreman was injured as the result’ of a malfunction
of a winch. A locking pin positioned in the strap was:
supposed to be used to-prevent the winch from falling out
of gear. The locking pin was not used for a period of one
_ and half hours prior to the accident—but the winch was in -
_ continuous use. .The Court, in finding against the plain-
tiff, drew a clearly distinguishable line-of demarcation
between a situation in which a negligent operation had ter-
minated (leaving the residue of a negligently created dan-
gerous condition) and a.situation where the operation caus-
' ing danger was still going on, , i
“The instant case is distinguishable from both Crum-
ady and Grillea. This is not a case where the negligent
‘act had terminated and an appliance was left in an
‘ unsafe condition. As the trial. court observed, the
locking pin does not remain in a fixed position during.
stevedoring operations, but must be moved in and out
whenever it becomes necessary to shift gears . . .
Plaintiff’s injury was sustained by the negligent use
of a seaworthy appliance at the very moment of in-
jury. As the trial court aptly said: ‘The vessel was
unsafe only so long as the negligence continued, whére=—
20
. %,
asin Grillea, the negligent act terminated shortly after
—it. began, but the unsafe. situation continued to exist,’ ”?
298 F. 2d 706, 707. ects
F : 6 *.
These, and similar decisions, teach that the significant
criteria are not temporal in nature. If time alone were
indeed the criterion it would be difficult to understand how
unseaworthiness can eventuate in a few seconds in one
situation, while in another a period of one and half hours
is insufficient to produce unseaworthiness. Did it take
some longer period of time to raise the improperly secured —
‘hatch beam in the instant case than to raise the two heavy
draft in Spinelli v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 2 Cir., 1964,
326 F. 24.870, where the Court of Appeals held that no
unseaworthiness was present? What is the significant
difference between the ‘‘appreciable’ period of time found
here by the District Court and the period of time which
it.took to highline the rain tent in Puddu v. Royal Nether-
lands Steamship Co., 2 Cir., ¥962, 303 F. 2d 752?
In many of the cases dealing with borderline situations.
the Courts advert to the ‘‘coming to rést’’ of the negli-
gently carried out operation. Thus in Robichaux v. Kerr
McGee Oil Industries Co., Inc., 5 Cir., 1967, 376 F. 2d 447, -
the Court of Appeals held that an unseaworthy condition
_ as distinguished from mere negligence would come into
being only ‘‘if the negligence of the fellow workers had
come to rest and the equipment had been left in an unsafe
condition’’ 376 F. 2d at p. 449. ‘The concept that the neg-
ligence and the conduct of the operation must have ‘‘come
to rest’’ was also advanced by the Fifth Circuit in Antoine
v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc.. 5 Cir., 1967, 376 F. 2d
Petitioner cannot imagine a distinction between the
facts involved herein and the facts which were present in
the case of Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 2 Cir., °
1964, 332 F. 2d 779, cert. denied 379 U. S. 914.
Q
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21
In’ the Massa case, four longshoremen were attaching
ship’s gear .(a tall, bridle and two plug type pallet bars)
- to a plug type pallet located on. the string piece of the pier.
The pallet which they wished to attach was the topmost in
a pile of three or four pallets. Inadvertently. two of the
longshoremen placed the plugs of the bridle on one side
of the pallet in the second pallet from the top rather than
in the top pallet. This meant that when a strain was
taken on the ship’s fall, the top pallet was being lifted
by one side of the bridle, ‘whereas the second pallet was
being lifted by the other side. - This strange arrangement
’ rose into the air for a few feet, then toppled, dumping cans
upon plaintiff in that case, causing him injury. It was.
alleged that the. improper positioning of*the plugs with
respect to the pallets had created an‘unseaworthy hook-up.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the negli-
gence-of the-tongshoremen was the sole cause of the
accident. s
This Court denied certiorari.
On the facts, petitioner submits, there can be no distinc-
tion between the improperly positioned plugs in Massa
and the improperly secured hooks in the instant case. In
Massa, an’ ‘‘appreciable’’ period of time had elapsed —
between the placing of the plugs, the signal to the gang-
_ Way man, the strain on the line and the rising of the draft.
Nonetheless, no unseaworthiness was found for the simple
reason that the negligence and the accident were part and
parcel of the very same. continuous operation. _
In the case at bar, the use of the ship’s gear to positi
a hatch beam was a single, integral operation of limite
scope and duration. The operation itself is but one step
in the process of recovering the square of an intermediate
ck hatch*-one step of many. She
The Trial Court found that the injuries suffered by re-
spondent eventuated as the direct result of negligence on
e ¢
22
the part of other longshoremen. The operation in which
the negligence was involved was still actually in progress.
At no time—whether we characterize the length of. time
it took from the insertion of the hooks to the actual hap- -
pening of the accident as ‘‘short’’, ‘‘momentary’’ gr, as
did the District Court, ‘‘appreciable’’—had the operation
of raising and repositioning the hatch beam terminated or
“come to rest’, At no time can it be said that the
workers, guilty of negligence, turned: their attention to
other tasks. At no time prior to the accident had the
negligence of these longshoremen become static rather’
than dynamic. ;
In failing to appreciate that the true test of a gestagion
_of unseaworthiness was functional rather than temporal —
the District Court [la] applied an erroneous: standard.
The Court of Appeals, in opting for the doctrine of
“operational negligence’’, also fell into error, though of
a different kind. te ?
,
Ye
| CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of respondent [plaintiff be-
low] should be set aside and the Lower Court directed:
to enter judgment in behalf of petitioner herein.
Respectfully submitted,
McHveu & Leonarp,
. Attorneys for Petitioner, \
70 Pine Street,
New York, N. Y. 10005.
Martin J. McHvau,
James M. Leonarp, -
| Of Counsel.
->-
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