Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Candiano

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SUPREME, COURT. U, &

S

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLER

In THE | tunes

Supt Pine Court of the United States

venus Vines Tero, 1968

Me. 12 OZ i

Moore-M¢Cormacx Lungs, Inc.,

_ Petitioner,

v. yee,

CarMELo CanpiIAno, |

: Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

_UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS»

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Martin J. McHven,

James M. LeEonarp,

»“ 70 Pine Street, |

New York, N. Y. 10005.

Counsel for Petitioner. |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

“Opinions of the Court Below ........6...eeeeeece0. "¢.

. J urisdiction ; ae trier dusted eedudveeceseies 2

| Questions cg PIO ROE hha iSwheeseceaas 2.

Statement of the Case .............05..00.0005555, 3

Reasons for Caiiting the Petition for Certiorari.... 5

Arguinent ...... SEER Mines eh ks) deans 4 7

~Conelusion ..... Picea 3% 4 cgeebausecen : bene ee

“Taste or Cases Crrep

Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U. S06 ...... | 13

Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Ine, D.C W. D.

La., 1965, 249 F. Supp. 290.....0..6......0 06. 7

. Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc, 5 Cir,

1967, 376 F. 2d 443 Oe sons ua Gens hwkeenucs 20

Arena v. “Luckenbach S.S. Co., 1 Cir. 1960, 279 F. 2d

EE Wesket bi edsicacdssebcliesd ee 12

Berti v. Compagnie de Navigacion Crssiad Fabre, oe,

@ Civ, 1066, SID FF Ob BOT ovine ve ecse = -

Billeci_ v. U. S., 9 Cir., 1962, 298 F. 5 pepe 19

Ferrante v. Swedish American’ Liné, 3 Cir., 1964,

331 F. 2d 571, cert. denied 379 U. S. 801 ..... .-

Fréitas v. Pacific Atlantic Steamship vongeny, 9

-* Cir., 1955, 218 P20 808 eee eesti Se ce en ee i

EIR SOT

. TABLE OF CONTENTS

: ue - ; ‘PAGE ~

Grillea v. U. S., 2 Cir, 1956, 232 F. 2d 919 ........13,16

. Holley v. The S.S. Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp.

212: 186 F. Supp. | er. See Tere rere 10 (ftnte.)

Huff v. Matson. Navigation Go., 9 Cir., 1964, 338-F.

SEE Puc cuncdueGorendsecusceeinettenedaaws ~.

Knox v. U, S. Lines Company, 3 Cir., mm, 294 F.2d |

ee a case Se vc cacauduacdssuvedisaudeeus veeehees 15

~ Manhat v. U. S., 2 Cir., 1955, 220 F. 2d 143 ........ 19 .

Mascuilli v. U. S., 387 U.S. 287 ... gismuees ; elecees 418

Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 2 Cir., 1964,

332, F. 2d 779; cert. denied 379 U. S. 914 ...... 20

MeQuiston v. Freighters & Tankers S.S. Co., 5 Cir,

1964, 327, F. 2d 746 ........... Porro FO

. Michalie v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U. S. 325 . 15

“Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. g. 539 . 4, 13, 1 15.

. Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, 2 Cir., 1966, 355 F. 2d ~

| ee ésbans ER ae EN SRE Tee Se eo vesied 16-(ftnte.) —

“Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346.U..S. 406 ........... os ®

_ Price v. SS. Yaracuy, 5 Cir., 1967, 378 F. 2d. 156 . 16

*Puddu v.. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1962,

A PPeerrrrrrrrrrrrrer tir ri err i ere 18, 20

‘Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 2 Cir,, 1966, 364 F.

Be a sadineke eecdanidae kntwenenas rere 7

Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410 .................. 10

Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Ciiidinnitiitins Co., 2

_ Cir., 1965, 340 F. 2d Bh eee c cece eee cence ee en 7,14

Robichanx v. Kerr McGee Oil Industries Co, Ine., 5

Cir., 1967, 576 F. 2a ON kasehistasshececeses: OO

——

_ TABLE OF CONTENTS fo = iii -

PAGE

Royal Mail Sie Ltd: v. Peck 9 Cir., 1959, 269 F. 3

i, MME da lcanan na daw aslek So Kuna ee isecens cove. 16

Ryan Stevedoring Co<y. Pan-Atlantic, SS. Corp, 350

U. WN PAdewh es oby ks sekbs dec onditees. cc: Pe

: Scott v. Isbrantsen, 4 Cir, 1964, 327 F. 2d 113. 15

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. Si 85 ...... a

Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 2 Cir., 1966, 360

LL | FeORBn aia Tinea cura 7, 18

+ ~ Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 9 Cir., 1964, 326 F.

We OE akicdeesetukoues eeianaen (enawaeeeseens 20.

_ Thompson v. Calmar, 3 Cir., 1964,. 331. F. 2d 657

Vickers v. Tumey, 5 Cir, 1961, 290 F. 2d 426 . .. .16 (ftnte.)

StaTvuTEs Crrep °

_ 28 U.S.C, See. 1254(i piiitbed tes eerrree Seer arcee ed

33 U.S.C. See. 901 ........ H petvcnevecesessescecess My GO

$3'U.B.C,,Bee. 906 ..52.020.ceveeecececes erapavnas 2,9

eee |

INDEX TO APPENDIX

‘PAGE

Cc

Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

- by Feinberg, J. ............. bl eadaks esusus la

Silent eens evecteve settee eee eeees Peay —s

: Judgment Seas. sete veka . rineevenee 16a

7 Order Denying Petition for Rehearing ‘ or eae Sore 18a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals Sec-

‘ond Circuit ieee iconssadsenes ss a eeteeecde wees 19a

wt

pe

In THE _-

Supreme Court of. the Huited States.

Ye J aaeaoeaa Tana, 1968

+

Moore-McCormack. Lines, Inc.,

| : 7 Petitioner,

v. ;

‘ ~ Carmeto CANpIANo, ae ee

; Respondent.

- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To THE. Howonaniz THE Carer Justice, and Associate Jus-

_- tices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Petitioner, Moore-MeCormack Lines, Inc., respectfully

prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the final

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit entered-on the first day of August, 1967,

affirming the judgment’ of the United. States District Court

for the Southern District of New. York, and the appeal

' docketed in the said Cdurt of. Appeals as No. 30,696 and

the order of the said Court denying rehearing entered on

- December 4th, 1967. .

Coulsdon of the Court Below

The opinion of the District Cet 1 is set. forth infra at

page la* and is reported i in 1967 A.M.C, 635. . ‘The opinion

“* Numerical references followed by: a are to. the cept

herein.

| Tehearing v was entered on December 4th, 1967.. The juris-

' diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., See. °°

Jaa cy 2

of the Court’ of Appéals for the Second Circuit is set forth

infra at page 19a and is reported at 382 F. 2d 961. The.-

opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second: Circuit

denying rehearing is set forth infra at payze 23a and is° -

reported at 1967 A.M.C. 2315.

‘Jurisdiction

T judgment of the Court of: Appeals was entered on

August Ist, 1967. The order denying the petition ‘for

Saas i

>

| | >

* Questions Presented |

1. Should a vessel be held to a breach of the warranty

of seaworthiness, pro tanto, when safe, proper and defect-

free gear is used'in a negligent a by longshoremen

~ employees of a stevedoret

2. Does ‘‘operational negligence”’ equate, instanter, with

unseaworthiness?

3. Assuming that unseaworthiness can be caused hy

negligence—but not instantaneously—is the test by which

the inception of unseaworthiness to be gauged a temporal

test or is the proper test based upon a consideration of

the nature of the operation involving the negligence? ”

4. Should this Court countenance the complete destruc-

tion of the provisions ,of ;the Longshoremen’s & Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C., Sec. 901 et seq.

and-in particular the exclusivity of liability provisions

thereof, 33 US.C., Sec. 905? ae be

3

‘Stein of the Case

' Carmelo Candiano, who was, at the time of his injury,

a longshoreman in the employ of John W. McGrath Corp., .

a stevedoring concern, brought this action to recover dam-

ages for injuries sustained by him while he was working.

_ aboard the S.S. MormacuAwx on February 18th, 1961. The

complaint of plaintiff contained the usual allegations of

negligence on the part of the shipowner [Petitioner herein]

_ and unseaworthiness attributable to the vessel. The Trial

Court, having tried the case non-jury, found that plaintiff ’s

‘injuries resulted from unseaworthiness of the §.S. Mor-

MACHAWK and that the plaintiff was-not contributorily’neg-

_ligent. The District Court made, in its Fay findings.

of fact which were adopted :by Petitioner i

the Second Circuit and which will be relied upon herein.

e appeal to

; ‘Respondent, ‘Candiano, was a ship’s carpenter working . -

in the lower hold of No. 3 hatch of the S.S. Mormackawx.

He was engaged in chocking* cargo. The accident occurred

‘shortly after midnight on the morning of February 18th,

1961, at which time a hatch beam became dislodged from

the ship’s gear, fell into the lower hold and struck Re-

spondent.

It appears that a group of longshoremen, also in the

employ of John W. McGrath Corp.; had been engaged in

replacing the hatch beam in the No. 3 tween deck hatch.

This pr gr was preparatory to covering up the No:

3 tween hatch, since the ship was close to sailing.

The ship ’s cargo fall was used by the longshoremen to

handie the bearn in question. This fall terminated in a -

large ring. Hanging-down from the ring were four wires,

the end. &

each wire having a cargo hook [called a pontoon. hook] on

° Erroneously rendered as. “checking” in the: District Court's

‘opinion. Jean

>

.

. 4 : . ‘

The beam was attached to the ring by having a hook

inserted in a hole in each of the two ends of the beam. The

remaining two wires were looped up and placed into the

ring itself. ; :

The Trial Court found that this arrangement would

‘have been safe and proper if the cargo hooks at the end

of the beam had been passed fully through their respective

choles and made fast to the standing part. of the bridle

thus forming a closed loop. However, the hooks were not

passed by the longshoremen fully through the apertures at

ithe ends of the beam. In lowering the beam one of the

hooks apparently became dislodged from the end of the

beam, causing the beam to falf into the hold.

The Trial Court_found that these circumstances war-

ranted a-finding of unseaworthiness against the 8.S. Mor-

MACHAWK. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of

Respondent [plaintiff below].

Petitioner appealed to. the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit. On August ist, 1967, the Court of Appeals

rendered its decision, affirming the judgment of the District

Court. Believing itself to be compelled, under the holding

of this Court in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U. S. 237,

to adopt a rule of law that operational negligence i in and of

itself constituted unseaworthiness, the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit expressed the view that it was —

constrained to affirm the District Court’s opinion on such

basis,

Petitioner sought rehearing. with respect to the Court of

Appeals’ decision and in so doing pointed out that the

Court of Appeals had before it only the summary of the

Mascuilli decision as contained in the Law Week version

[35 L. W. 3052]. This, Petitioner claims, did not correctly

reflect the thrust of Mascuill.

By decision dated December 4th, 1967 the Court of a.

peals. for the Second Cireutt denied rehearing, with a con-

5

eurring opinion by J udge Moore. The Court. of Appeals

found that'the fact pattern in the instant case did ‘‘under

modern concept of unseaworthiness present ‘unseaworthy’

facts’’.

- Reasons for Granting the Petition

; for Certiorari ~—

The instant pitticn seeks a statement by this Court upon

an issue which has left maritime law in a confused and

chaotic state and which has’ engendered fundamental dis-

agreements among the various Circuits. The ‘issue®in-

volves the‘extent to which ‘‘operational negligence’’ may,

or may not, be identified with the doctrine of ‘‘unsea-

worthiness’’.

The panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit which below decided the instant case was

acutely, perhaps painfully, aware of the lack of harmony

in regard to this question both internally within the Sec-

ond Circuit and among the several Circuits throughout tlie

Country. © os |

‘At the time of the arguments of Alexander and

Candiano, there was a plethora of cases involving neg-

ligence and unseaworthiness and ‘a paucity of consist-

ency. No legal principle which might.serve as a guide

for the futuré could be gleaned from these Uecisions.

In this cireuit, the panels were hopelessly divided,’ .

other circuits achieved no greater consistency.? Analy-

ses of these conflicts have been ‘made in various deci-

*Compare Norfleet vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 1966 A. M. C.

80, 355 F. (2d) 359 (2 Cir., 1964); Guarracino vs. Luck-

enbach Steamship Co., 1964 A. M. C. 2240, 333 F. (2d) 646

(2 Cir, 1964); Massa vs. C. A. Vesesualen Navigacion,

. 1964 A. M. C. 1375,°332 F. (2d) 779 (2 Cir., 1964); Spin-

_ ell vs. Isthmian, 1965 A. M. C. 254, 326 F. (2d) 870 (2

Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 935, 1966 A. M. C.

2792 (1964) ; Mosley vs. Cia. Mar. Adra S.A., 1963 AM.C.

1951, 314 F. (2d) 223 (2 Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 375 U. S.

ae

_ (Footnote continued on following page)

7

PII LES LIES IANS RR OTS E MEME TS CLE ELLE LED ORE EBT RIEL ALES RIL IR POH ERE IRE : Seer anes ee

6

sions with care and discernment. Judges railed against

the necessity of staltifying their judicial minds by be-

ing required ‘to make \distasteful hair-splitting dis-

tinctions unrelated toany\intelligible concepts of right

and wrong’ (FRienpiy, Ct. J., in dissent in Skibinski

vs. Waterman S. S. Co., 1966 A. M. C. 873, 360 F. (2d)

(1964), cert denied, 387 U. S. 921 (1967)) and to make

‘trivial, meaningless and confusing distinctions’

_ (Kaurmay, Ct. J., in dissent in Radovich vs. Cunard

S. S. Co., 1966 A. M. C. 2426, 2431, 364 F. (2d) 149

(1966) ).’’ (25a-26a) . 3 , !

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

829, 1963 A. M. C. 2698 (1963) ; Puddu vs. Royal Netherlands

S. S. Co., 1962 A. M. C. 419, 303 F. (2d). 752 (2. Cir.

en banc 1962); cert denied, 371 U. S. 840, 1963 A.°M. C.

280 (1 ~Grillea vs. United States, 1956 -A. M. C. 1009,

. 232 (2d) 9TN(2 Cir., 1956) ; Potgnant vs. United States,

1957 A. M. C.-1955, 225 F. (2d) 595 (2 Cir., 1955); Man-

hat vs. United States, 1955 A. M. C. 513, 220 F. (2d)

143 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U. S. 966 (1955), with

Radovich vs.. Cunard S. S. Co., 1966. A. M. C. 2426, 364

F. (2d) 149 (2 Cir., 1966); Mosley vs. Cia. Mar. Adra

S.. A., 1966 A. M. C. 2017,. 362 F. (2d) 118 (2 Cir.,

1966) ; . Skibinski vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 1966

A. M. C. 873, 360 F. (2d) 539 (2 Cir., 1966), cert. denied,

387 U. S. 921 (1967); Reid vs. Quebec Paper Sales. &

Transportation Co.,.1965 A. M. C. 112,-340 F. (2d) 34 (2

Cir., 1965) ; Strika vs. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 1951

A. M. C. 54, 185 F. (2d) 555 (2 Cir., 1950).

* Fifth Circuit: 4

8 f vs. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 1967 A. M. C. 2090,

.

378 F. (2d) 271 (5 Cir.; 1967)5 Marshall vs. Ove Skou

Rederi A/S, 1967 A. M. C. 2537, 378 F. (2d) 193 (5 Gir.,

1967) ; Robichaux.vs. Kerr McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 1967

' A. M; C. 2082, 376 F. (2d) 447 45 Cir., 1967); Antoine

. vs. Lake Charles Stevedores, 1967 A. M..C. 2085, 376 F-

(2d) 443 (5 Cir., 1967) ;2 Smith vs. M/V Ginza, 1966

A. M. C. 2036, 362 F. (2d) 164 (5 Cir., 1966); McQuiston

vs. * cy and Tankers Steamship Co., 1964 A. M. C.

1489, 327 F. (2d) 746 (5 Cir., 1964); Neal vs. Lykes Bros.

Steamship Co., 1962. A. M. C. 1959, 306 F. (2d) 313 (‘5

- Cir., 1962) ; cf. Morales vs. City of Galveston, 275 F. (2d)

191. (5 Cir.) ; vacated and remanded, 364 U. S. 295 (1960); -

1961 A. M. C. 2194, 291 F. (2d) 97 (5 Cir., 1961); aff'd,

370 U. S. 165, 1962.A. M. C. 1450 (1962). .

(Footnote continued on following page) °

?

LILI Pi MCS IGE MIRREN LLL AIE RIA! IIL VA LEED ELE LED EEG AO. LE EE LY EIEN IRENE BOE E RIS SNARE BN ANI NRE ARTE aeRO DN Sf pete SpE wy OY

7

eres , a

The almost hopeless conflict existing today on the issue

of ‘‘operational negligence’? has been noted ruefully by

Judge Marshall in Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transpor-

tation Co., 2 Cir., 1965, 340 F. 2d 34, by Judges Feinberg

(for the majority] and Kaufman [for the minority] in

Radovich v. Cunard 8.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1966, 364 F. 2d 149

~ and by Judge Friendly [dissenting] in Skibinski v. Water-

man S.S. Co., 2 Cir., 1966, 360 F. 2d 539, 543, among many

others. See also the discussion by Hunter, J. in the Dis-

trict Court opinion in Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores,

Inc., D.C.W.D.LA., 1965, 249 F. Supp. 290.

The opinions formulated by the various-Circuit Courts

reflect a deep and abiding uncertainty ~~ to~the present

_ Status of the law of unseaworthiness. “ue Circuits are

in great need of assistance and guidance from this Court.

_>\ Argument —

Petitioner believes that the flux apparent in the current

‘state of the law offers this Court an opportunity to re-

examine the basic concepts underlying the doctrine of un-

seaworthiness and to formulate guidelines by which the

lower courts may..administer and delimit the judicial en-

forcement -of that doctrine.- |

In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. 8. 539, 550,

Judge Frankfurter spoke of the particular obligation that

the Courts owe in regard to the formulation of the doctrines

of maritime law: |

- “No area of Federal law is’ judge-made at its souirce

to such an extent as is the law of admiralty. The evolu- ~

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Ninth Circuit: ka

Huff vs. Matson Navigation Co., 1964 A. M. C. 2219, 338

F. ( 205 (9 Cir., 1964); Blassingill vs?Waterman Steam-

ship Corp.,. 1964 A. M. C. 1932, 336 F. (2d) 367 (9 Cir.,

1964); Beeler vs. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 1964 A. M. C.

1976, 336 F. (2d) 108 (9 Cir., 1964); Billeci vs. United

States, 1962 A. M. C. 826, 298 F. (2d) 703 (9 Cir., 1962) ;

Titus vs. Santorini, 1959 A. M. C. 1042, 258 F. (2d) 352

~ (9 Cir., 1958). See also n. 10, infra.” ?

- ~ 7

sa “uipevnsenend LN TOME EARN TILT IT PM v7 “ EET LITE, ia . . ve ial Ga aes

8

tion of judge-made law is a process of accretion and

erosion. We are told by a great master that law is

civilized to the extent that it is purposefully conscious.

Conversly, if law just ‘grow’d’ like Topsy, unreflec-

tively and without conscious design, it is irrational.’’

The doctrine of seaworthiness has been an evolving

one and has beer motivated by the concern of this Court

to assure‘humanitarian treatment of longshoreren. How-

ever, until recent times, the circumference of the ‘‘unsea-.

worthiness’’ doctrine has been reasonably well defined. :\

That circumference has hitherto embraced the ship, its ,

gear and the adequacy of its*crew. Recent trends would .

expand the confines of the ‘‘unseaworthiness’’, doctrine so

as to include the totality of all shipboard accidents to land

based workers.. Such an expansion would, Petitioner’ sub- ..

mits, do violence to both the logical and historical basis

of the doctrine and to the Congressional intent a8 manifest

in the. Federal Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Com-

pensation Act, 33 U.S.C., See. 9@1, et seq.

Longshore work is concededly dangerous. Though much .

. progress in the realm of safety has been effected by Fed-

eral efforts and by the work of employer and labor groups,

there is a point of diminishing return. The incidence of

danger in longshore work remains high, largely because

of the inescapable human element involved. In the final

analysis, industrial safety in stevedoring operations de-

pends mainly upon proper and efficient performance of

duty by longshoremen and their co-workers—a perform-

ance which is not always obtainable no matter what stand-

ard of diligence i is employed by shipowner and stevedoring

companies alike.

Congress has. long since recognized that a high. Sneana

_ field, such as this, requires a special kind of bargain be-

_ tween employers and their workers. In 1927 Congress

enacted the Longshoremen’s .& Harbor Workers’ Com-

APL eRe Tae SiR i he he el ae ee ee Ce ee ee

. 4 abe . R

a

A PEE SAMOTP GOS eae 5%

°

sf

9

: pensation Act, 33 U.S.C., 901, et seq. Section 905 of Title

33 provided ‘that thé liability of an employer of 4 maritime

worker covered thereunder should be exclusively in com- -

pensation. ° ,

Judge Burton of :this Court clearly deseribéd the legisla-

tive purpose underlying this ‘‘bargain’’ betweenhe steve-

dore industry and its workers in Ryan Stevedoring Co. -

Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 350 U.S. 124, ~

129:

. “The obvious purpose of this provision is to make the

statutory liability of an employer to contribute to its

employee’s compensation the exclusive liability of such

employer to its employee, or to anyone claiming under

or, through such employee, on account of his injury or

death arising out of that employment. . In return, the

employee, and thdse claiming under or through him, -

are given a substantial quid pro quo.in the form of

an assured compensation, regardless of fault, as a

substitute for their excluded claims.’’ |

_ Recognizing a dichotomy between the stevedore em-

ployer and the shipowner who supplied the work area, this

Court evolved the current theory of seaworthiness. Pope

¢ Talbot v. Hown, 346 U. S. 406; Seas Shipping Co. v.:

Steracki 328 U. S. 85. Concurrent with the broadening of —

the-warranty of seaworthiness was the development of a

doctrine of indemnification whereby an offending stevedore

was required to recompense ‘a shipowner cast into liability

through the stevedore’s fault. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc.

v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U. S. 124. It has

been, pérhaps understandably, assumed that the shipowner,

in recovering indemnification from the stevedore, has been

made whole,and simnly acts as a passive conduit for the

imposition of an expanded liability on the stevedore. This,

however, is simply not the case. It is ultimately the ship-

owner and the public which bear the burden of the tragic

Pies scger tere ree Oo: Reet AS RTO aah adel ey hethapitiaad RE - res PIS Ee Ha al alti Nik Kaien ie 2) la

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waste* caused by transmuting a humanitarian compensa-

tion procedure into a wasteful synthetic tort battle.

‘¢The insidious notion that ‘the story will have a happy

. ending for the ship’ apparently stems from the invalid

assumption’ that frustrating the legislative intent of —

the ‘Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905’ will hurt orlly the stevedore

and make no ‘economic difference’, Reed v., The Y aka,

' 373 U. S. 410, 414 [1963], to the chipowner. This is

not. so. . . The stevedore must and does pass the

cost of its ‘third-party liability back to the shipowner

' by increasing the stevedoring rates to cover the initial

exposure. The shipowner, in turn, must and does pass

along this additional stevedoring charge to its cus-

tomers, .°. . thereby placing further economic burden

upon our... ocean commerce.’’** -

It is possible to view the doctrine of “seaworthiness’’ in

either: of : we fashions :

1. The weiniende of seaworthiness ‘should be cmmteeed

so as to aici any and all shore based: maritime workers

’

* Litigation procédures are crude and wasteful, often productive

of little cial benefit to other than attorneys. ‘Compare, for ex-

ample, the testimony of Thomas E. Byrne before the House of

Representatives Sub-Committee on the Merchant Marine [June 26,

27, 28, 1961] which was considering the Bonner Bill. Mr. Byrne,

commenting on the gross economic inefficiency of liability suits, hed

the example of the litigation entitled Holley v. The S.S. Manfred

Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212, 186 F. Supp. 805. He pointed out that

the widow of the deceased longshoreman therein involved netted, as

a result of that protracted litigation, the additional sum of $1, 597.45

over what she would have received in benefits under the Compensa-. |

tion Act. The process cost the stevedore-employer some $24,293.71

over what its liability should have been under the Compensation Act.

What a tragic economic waste !

** [Brief amicus curiae in support of petition for certiorari filed

_ by American Merchant Marine Institute in ‘Waterman Steamship

Corporation v. Skibinski, October Term 1966 No. 378.]

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who are injured aboard ship to have a recovery based on

tort principles. |

2. The warranty of seaworthiness should be construed -

so as to limit tort recoveries to those which fall ‘within a

. ¢learly discernible body of maritime law—separate and

distinct from and not co-extensive with the range of cover-

age afforded by Congress in the Longshoremen’s & Harbor -

Workers’ Compensation Act. ° |

Till the advent of the ‘‘operational negligence’’ decisions

which have sprung mainly from the Third and Fourth

Gireuits, Federal Courts generally have been quite positive

‘in proclaiming that the doctrine of seaworthiness does not

automatically mean: tort recovery for any shore based

maritime worker injured aboard ship. .

Thus, in Berti v. Compagnie de Navigacion Cyprien

Fabre, 2 Cir., 1954, 213 F. 2d 397, a new trial was granted

to the shipowner. It appeared that a cable from a winch

dislodged a beam which fell and struck plaintiff. The

Court said simply:

“If plaintiff’s injuries resulted solely from the manner

in which the work was done under American’s super-

vision, he has no recourse against Cyprien.’’ 213 F. 2d

A similar factual situation was considered by the Ninth

Circuit in Freitas v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Com-

pany, 9 Cir., 1955, 218 F. 2d 562. Hefeagain, a winch opera-

tor, pulling at an angle, dislodged a strong-back below. In

rejecting the claim of the plaintiff-longshoreman who had

been hit by a falling hatch board the Court said:

‘‘The Petterson case is inapposite. Unlike the situa-

tion in Petterson, the accident in this instance was

directly brought about by an improper, if not fool-

hardy, use of the ship’s gear.’’ 218 F. 2d at page 564.

o

, 12

In Arena v. Luckenbach Steamship Company, 1 -Cir.,

1960, 279 F. 2d 186; the First Circuit placed itself in the

company of those who rejected the concept. of ‘operational

unseaworthiness.’’ There the large rolls of printing paper

were being loaded, carried on boards 5’ by 8’. Some con-

tention was made that end boards should have been used

"instead of side boards. At any rate the plaintiff was in-

jured by falling rolls. The Court _—— of the unsea-

worthiness claim as follows:

“The board was not defective _ simply - because the

longshoremen who loaded it neglected to do so in the

proper fashion ... A vessel is not unseaworthy simply

because the improper type of equipment was used by -_

some one unless, also, it appears that the proper type

was unavailable. ”? 279 F. 2d at page 188. ,

The ‘operative facts involved in -the ‘aalesit case are

clear: enough. Some longshore co-workers of respondent,

took perfectly safe, proper and seaworthy gear; supplied .

by the ship, and made it fast to a hatch beam in an un-

safe and improper way. The action was an incident in

the course of raising the hatch beam from the deck and

lowering it into position over the No. 3 ’tween deck hatch

opening, No defect of winch, hook or other gear inter-

vened ; no finding was made that any appurtenance of the ,

vessel was, in any manne, defective or unsuited to its

function. e

The question which was presented to the Court of:

Appeals was solely and simply this: Did the negligent

failure of Respondent’s co-workers to pass the cargo hooks

fully through the ends of the hatch beam render-the ship

_ legally unseaworthy so as to cast Petitioner in liability

to Respondent?

That the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had

difficulty in squaring the finding in Respondent with any

coherently predictable principle is apparent from the read- .

ing of its initial opinion and the opinion denying rehearing.

esas

eee as

Initially, the Second Circuit fel€ itself bound by what. “

it conceived to be th® compulsion ‘OL the decision of this

, Court in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U: S. 237. ‘The

_ Court of. Appeals noted, in its original opinion, that its

- F. 2d '919, 922, had.drawn a distinction. between unsea- ..

worthiness on the, one hand and operational negligence

prior decision in G'rillea v. United States, 2 Cir., 1956, 232

on the other. The Second Circuit adverted to a “long line

of other decisions’’. of that Court which sought to draw

'

a dividing line between what was (compensable) sea-

worthiness and (uncompensable) operating negligence.

However, the Second Circuit believed that this Court had

intended, in Mascuilli, to abolish all distinction between

‘operational negligence and“ unseaworthiness and, accord- °

p egug eaw ’

ingly, decided that the authority: of Grillea had been over-

ruled by’ pronouncemehtt of this Court.

Petitioner (in its petition for rehearing) suggested to

“the Second Circuit that its”apprehension of the extent and

rationale of.the Mascuilli decision was in error, The Sec-

ond Circuit, though seemingly admitting its error as to the

scope of Mascuilli, nonetheless denied the petitionor re-

hearing. In so doing, the Court retreated to what must be

Sescribed, in all fairness, as less than a precise statement

of its conception of the presently existing doctrine of. un-

seaworthiness. ,

But starting with the basic proposition that a vessel.

may be rendered unseaworthy by the actions of the

stevedore’s employees, Alaska 8.9. Co. v. Petterson, 347

U. 8. 896, and that unseaworthiness may arise during the

course of the work the vessel is engaged in, Mitchell v.

Trawler Racer, Inc., 363 U. S. 539, we may then proceed —

to a consideration of the knotty problem involved in

- ascertaining when wrongful conduct becomes transmuted

from what we have, ti now, been calling ‘‘negligénce’’

into what wé have, till now, been calling ‘‘unseaworthi-

ness’’, ae rts oes?

14

There are three conceivable tests which could: be used

_ to fix the criteria for.judging whether or not: “‘negligence’’

has become transmitted into “‘unseaworthiness”’, These

fy are: fi .

A. ‘Operational N aplioneee” .

Any negligent act, occurring aboard a ship which causes

* injury, entitles the victim to a.tort recovery against-the .

ship, provided both the nature of the act and the status

of the victim have a sufficiently maritime flavor. In this

interpretation of the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine,

negligence and unseaworthiness coincide both temporally

and functionally. ‘‘The alchemy is instantaneous”’ (34a).

B. “The Temporal Test’’ .

N egligence may produce unseaworthiness—but only ~

after the Iapse of some legally significant period of time.

Cc. -“‘The Functional Test’’

N egligence may produce ilies ae: only _

after the magngunty periormed atic has ‘‘come to

rest”’.

It.is true that there are some who feel that the drawing

of any. dividing line between unseaworthiness and negli- |

gence creates an artificial distinction which might well place

an intolerable burden on the Courts charged with enfore-

ing the doctrine. Thus Mr. Justice Marshall, then sitting

in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of New York, said in Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales &

. Transportation Company, 2 Cir., 340 F.2d 34, mie

‘One does not have’ to be unduly cynical ‘to look :

askance at this -distinction, for every act of negli-

“gence, no matter how short-lived, creates an unsafe

condition for those exposed to it. Under the rubric

of a ‘breach of the warranty of seaworthiness’ courts ©

15

had had shipowners responsible for accidents result-

ing from unsafe conditions of the work place, regard-

less of whether the shipowher had actual or con-

structive notice or the means: or ‘opportunity of |

correcting them, and, if.all ‘assessments of fault are

_ to be truly irrelevant, it is not at all clear why this

responsibility dges not encompass any conduct at the

work place which creates a threat to the safety of the

other workmen.”’ [emphasis Supplied] “

Though Mr. Justice Marshall was careful to recognize

the fact of a distinction, wherever that distinction lay, “

other Circuit Courts have-not beén so meticulous. Thus it

. 1s difficult to square certain decisions of the Third and

Fourth Circuits with any ‘other rationale save acceptance _

by thosé Courts of an identity between operational negli-

. gence. and unseaworthiness. Cf. Thompson v. Calmar, 3

Cir., 1964, 331 .F. 2d 657; Ferrante v. Swedish American

Line, 3 Cir., 1964, 331 F. 2d 571, cert. denied 379 U. S. 801;

Knox v. United States Lines Company, 3 Cir., 1961, 294 F.

2d 354; Scott v. Isbrandtsen, 327 F. 2d 113. See also Huff

v. Matson Navigation Co., 9 Cir., 1964, 338-F. 2d 205.

Nonetheless there is both historical and logieal justifi-

cation for. rejecting the notion that unseaworthiness and

negligence are interchangeable concepts.

In its various pronouncements, this Court has always

carefylly—adhered to a recognition that. negligence and

unseaworthiness represented two distinct concepts. For

example see Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,.364 U. a: 2

. ~ 325, 327, and Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S.

_ 539. The historical and jurisdictional reasons which have

‘preserved: a’ distinction between negligence and unsea-

worthiness are too well known to require extensive elabo-

ration here. However, that distinction has been faithfully | ~

- adhered to, until recently, by the various Circuit Courts.

?

: nih

16

b-: Thus, in Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Peck, 9 Cir., 1959, 269

+ F. 2d 857, 860, the Court said:

‘**Negligence and unseaworthiness are not equivalent.

- A finding of negligence is neither a substitute founda-

tion for nor a finding of unseaworthiness.’’. |

As recently as 1967 the Fifth Circuit took pains to ex-

_ plain that operational negligence and the legal doctrine of

unseaworthiness are not at all the same thing. In Price

v. 8.8. Yaracuy, 5 — 1967, 378 F. 2d 156, 160, the Court: °

said:

_ “Appellant does not take issue with the District

‘Court’s ruling that operational negligence of other- —

wise seaworthy equipment by a fellow longshoreman

does not make a vessel unseaworthy. The District

Court correctly stated the law of this Circuit.* ~~

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit itself ad-

hered to the proposition that the idea of negtigence was

‘not simply one of the forms which unseaworthiness might

take. In the landmark case of Grillea v. United States, 2

Cir., 1956, 232 F. 2d 919,** it was said:

! ‘However, it is at times hard to say siete a defeat

in hull or gear that arises as a momentary step or

phase in the progress of work on board should be con-

sidered as an accident in a continuous course of .

operation, which will fasten liability upon the owner

*In McQuiston Ve Freighters & Tenhers SS. Co., 5 Cir., 1962,

327 F. 2d 746, 747, the Fifth Circuit said “There can, of course,

be ‘no: dispute that a shipowner. is not liable for the negligence of

longshoremen acting as servants or employees of an independent

- stevedoring contractor, unless such negligence creates an unsea-

worthy condition.”

See also Vickers v. Tumey, 5 Cir., 1961, 290 F. 2d 426.

** This principle was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit i in Norfleet

v. Isthmian Lines, 2 Cir, 1966, 355 F. 2d 359.

<A,

only in case it is negligent, or as an unfitness of the

. Ship that makes her pro tamto ‘unseaworthy.’’ 232 F.

2d at page 922. . |

Thus it will be seen that both this Court and most of

the Circuit Courts have refused to obliterate the dividing

- line between operational negligence and unseaworthiness..

This does not at all mean that. operational negligence may

never ripen into an unseaworthy condition; it simply means

that the gestation of the negligence and the gestation of

the unseaworthiness should not be simultaneous.

The Second Circuit, in its opinion denying rehearing

herein, seized upon certain language from an opinion of

Judge Feinberg in the District Coutt as a basis for denying

rehearing, the impropriety of the standard ‘originally used

by the Court notwithstanding.. The Court pointed to the

faet that the District Court had held ‘that an ‘‘appreciable

period of time’’ intervened between the making-fast of the

cargo gear to the hatch beam and the actual happening of

the accident. It expounds thé view that the decisions which

have intervened between the original decision in ‘the instant

. ¢ase and the présent have only strengthened ‘‘the conclu-

sion that the negligent hookup followed .by ‘an appreciable

period of time’ ’’ would create an unseaworthy condition.

The Court of Appeals accordingly would appear to in-

terject some- temporal criteria into the consideration of

whether or not a negligent act has ‘‘ripened’’ into an

‘unseaworthy condition. This position was taken by, the

Court in spite of-the fact that it earlier sctitied that } the

time element in the operation is obviously irrele Ae

is difficult to speak with certitude, in view of these’ ap-

parently irreconcilable theses but it would seem that thé

~ Court of Appeals, has fallen back upon the temporal yard- »

stick as the measure of when negligence becomes unsea-

worthiness.

_ If this indeed is the case, it would be in contraventions

_. of positions previously expressed by the same Court. Thus

18

in Puddu v. Royal Netherlands Steamship seins 2 Cir.,

1962, 303 F. 2d 752, 757, Judge Hayes said in a concurring

opinion with respect to the so-called ‘‘temporal: test’’:

- . “The situation demands, then, that without regard to

fault, we fix a point of absolute liability. But logical

- coordinates for fixing a point, such as a time in which

a particular condition continues to exist, are entirely

lacking. Time ts obviously irrelevant since notice to

the shipowner is of consequence only if liability is

limited by fault.’? (Emphasis supplied.):

~ In Skibinski v. Waterman Steamship Corporation, 2 Cir.

1966, 360.F. 2d 539, 543, the following observation was

"made concerning the treacherousness of any temporal test.

‘If the test’is a temporal one, a more accurate stop

_<watch than I possess would be needed’ to explain why

Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transportation Co.; 340

F, 24-34 [2 Cir. 1965], ‘should have gone one way ’ and

Puddu v. Royal Netherlands 8.8. Co., 303 F. 2d 752

(2 Cir.] cert. denied, 371 U. S. 840, 83 S. Ct. 67, 9 L.

‘Ed. 2d 75 [1962], and Spinelli v. Isthmian 8.9. Co., 326

F, 2d 870 [2 Cir.], cert. denied, 377 U. S. 935, 84 S. Ct.,

1338, 12, L. Ed. 2d 298 [1964], the other.’’

Petitioner submits that a consideration of the body at

decisional law as it existed prior to the flights of the Third

and Fourth Circuit into ‘‘Operational Negligence” theory,

compels the belief that the proper test of the inception of

‘anseaworthiness is functional, not temporal.

A reading of the decisions post-dating Grillea (infra)

or (at least all those decisions which do not espouse the

' view that negligence and unseaworthiness are mterchange- .

able concepts) is instructive.. Petitioner believes that a |

pattern is discernible. This pattern teaches that.a prop-

erly formulated test of the inception of unseaworthiness

is a functional test directly related to the operation being

conducted. The Courts, we submit, have implicitly and

explicitly recognized the propriety of using a functional,

rather than a temporal, test as will be seen from a brief

review of some of the decisions in this area of law.

_. In Manhat v. United States, 2 Cir., 1955, 220-F.*2d 143,

three workers had been “engaged in their labors in a life

_ boat for some period of time (described by the Court as -

a ‘‘short period’’) before the life boat fell. -Apparénthy,

the releasing mechanism of the life boat had been made

operative shortly before. “The opinion of the Court in no

wise suggested that a judicial stop watch should be em-

ployed to count the number of seconds between the re-

leasing of the gear and the subsequent falling of the boat.

In Billeci v. United States, 9 Cir., 1962, 298 F. 2d 703, a

longshoreman was injured as the result’ of a malfunction

of a winch. A locking pin positioned in the strap was:

supposed to be used to-prevent the winch from falling out

of gear. The locking pin was not used for a period of one

_ and half hours prior to the accident—but the winch was in -

_ continuous use. .The Court, in finding against the plain-

tiff, drew a clearly distinguishable line-of demarcation

between a situation in which a negligent operation had ter-

minated (leaving the residue of a negligently created dan-

gerous condition) and a.situation where the operation caus-

' ing danger was still going on, , i

“The instant case is distinguishable from both Crum-

ady and Grillea. This is not a case where the negligent

‘act had terminated and an appliance was left in an

‘ unsafe condition. As the trial. court observed, the

locking pin does not remain in a fixed position during.

stevedoring operations, but must be moved in and out

whenever it becomes necessary to shift gears . . .

Plaintiff’s injury was sustained by the negligent use

of a seaworthy appliance at the very moment of in-

jury. As the trial court aptly said: ‘The vessel was

unsafe only so long as the negligence continued, whére=—

20

. %,

asin Grillea, the negligent act terminated shortly after

—it. began, but the unsafe. situation continued to exist,’ ”?

298 F. 2d 706, 707. ects

F : 6 *.

These, and similar decisions, teach that the significant

criteria are not temporal in nature. If time alone were

indeed the criterion it would be difficult to understand how

unseaworthiness can eventuate in a few seconds in one

situation, while in another a period of one and half hours

is insufficient to produce unseaworthiness. Did it take

some longer period of time to raise the improperly secured —

‘hatch beam in the instant case than to raise the two heavy

draft in Spinelli v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 2 Cir., 1964,

326 F. 24.870, where the Court of Appeals held that no

unseaworthiness was present? What is the significant

difference between the ‘‘appreciable’ period of time found

here by the District Court and the period of time which

it.took to highline the rain tent in Puddu v. Royal Nether-

lands Steamship Co., 2 Cir., ¥962, 303 F. 2d 752?

In many of the cases dealing with borderline situations.

the Courts advert to the ‘‘coming to rést’’ of the negli-

gently carried out operation. Thus in Robichaux v. Kerr

McGee Oil Industries Co., Inc., 5 Cir., 1967, 376 F. 2d 447, -

the Court of Appeals held that an unseaworthy condition

_ as distinguished from mere negligence would come into

being only ‘‘if the negligence of the fellow workers had

come to rest and the equipment had been left in an unsafe

condition’’ 376 F. 2d at p. 449. ‘The concept that the neg-

ligence and the conduct of the operation must have ‘‘come

to rest’’ was also advanced by the Fifth Circuit in Antoine

v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc.. 5 Cir., 1967, 376 F. 2d

Petitioner cannot imagine a distinction between the

facts involved herein and the facts which were present in

the case of Massa v. C. A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 2 Cir., °

1964, 332 F. 2d 779, cert. denied 379 U. S. 914.

Q

SO ETL ADOT IN: SC LNAI IE GAM by AS TR PROT LL Pg TG eGR ARR SFEET RRR III TIDE AEE I NS RBI ERA FORO CS EN IRN IA SAAN RA Be

21

In’ the Massa case, four longshoremen were attaching

ship’s gear .(a tall, bridle and two plug type pallet bars)

- to a plug type pallet located on. the string piece of the pier.

The pallet which they wished to attach was the topmost in

a pile of three or four pallets. Inadvertently. two of the

longshoremen placed the plugs of the bridle on one side

of the pallet in the second pallet from the top rather than

in the top pallet. This meant that when a strain was

taken on the ship’s fall, the top pallet was being lifted

by one side of the bridle, ‘whereas the second pallet was

being lifted by the other side. - This strange arrangement

’ rose into the air for a few feet, then toppled, dumping cans

upon plaintiff in that case, causing him injury. It was.

alleged that the. improper positioning of*the plugs with

respect to the pallets had created an‘unseaworthy hook-up.

The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the negli-

gence-of the-tongshoremen was the sole cause of the

accident. s

This Court denied certiorari.

On the facts, petitioner submits, there can be no distinc-

tion between the improperly positioned plugs in Massa

and the improperly secured hooks in the instant case. In

Massa, an’ ‘‘appreciable’’ period of time had elapsed —

between the placing of the plugs, the signal to the gang-

_ Way man, the strain on the line and the rising of the draft.

Nonetheless, no unseaworthiness was found for the simple

reason that the negligence and the accident were part and

parcel of the very same. continuous operation. _

In the case at bar, the use of the ship’s gear to positi

a hatch beam was a single, integral operation of limite

scope and duration. The operation itself is but one step

in the process of recovering the square of an intermediate

ck hatch*-one step of many. She

The Trial Court found that the injuries suffered by re-

spondent eventuated as the direct result of negligence on

e ¢

22

the part of other longshoremen. The operation in which

the negligence was involved was still actually in progress.

At no time—whether we characterize the length of. time

it took from the insertion of the hooks to the actual hap- -

pening of the accident as ‘‘short’’, ‘‘momentary’’ gr, as

did the District Court, ‘‘appreciable’’—had the operation

of raising and repositioning the hatch beam terminated or

“come to rest’, At no time can it be said that the

workers, guilty of negligence, turned: their attention to

other tasks. At no time prior to the accident had the

negligence of these longshoremen become static rather’

than dynamic. ;

In failing to appreciate that the true test of a gestagion

_of unseaworthiness was functional rather than temporal —

the District Court [la] applied an erroneous: standard.

The Court of Appeals, in opting for the doctrine of

“operational negligence’’, also fell into error, though of

a different kind. te ?

,

Ye

| CONCLUSION

The judgment in favor of respondent [plaintiff be-

low] should be set aside and the Lower Court directed:

to enter judgment in behalf of petitioner herein.

Respectfully submitted,

McHveu & Leonarp,

. Attorneys for Petitioner, \

70 Pine Street,

New York, N. Y. 10005.

Martin J. McHvau,

James M. Leonarp, -

| Of Counsel.

->-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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