Appendix — City of Jacksonville v. Schumann

Supreme Court brief1968

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APPENDIX A

STATUTES 1

FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958

SECTION 101 (24) 49 U.S.C. §1301 (24) NAVIGABLE AIR-

SPACE.

“ ‘Navigable airspace’ means airspace above the minimum

altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under

this Act, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety

“in takeoff and landing of aircraft.” -

SECTION 104, 49 U.S.C. §1304, PUBLIC RIGHT OF |

TRANSIT

“There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in be-

half of any citizen of the United States a public right of

freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the

United States.”

SECTION 307(a), 49 U.S.C. §1348(a) AIRSPACE CONTROL

“The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop

plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the

navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order

the use. of the navigable airspace under such terms, con-

ditions, and limitations as he may deem necessary in order

to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization

of such airspace. He may modify or evoke such assignment

' when required in the public interest.”

REGULATIONS

14 C.F.R. 60.17 (F.A.R. 91:79) ‘MINIMUM SAFE ALTI-

TUDES

“Except when necessary for take off or landing, no per-

son shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:

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(a) Anywhere. An altitude which will permit, in the event

of the failure of a power unit, an emergency landing with-

out undue hazard to persons or property on the surface;

(b) Over congested areas. Over the congested areas of

cities, towns or settlements, or over an open-air assembly

of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest ob-

stacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet from the air-

craft...

(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 .

feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely ©

populated areas. In such event, the aircraft shall not, be

operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle,

or structure. ones

COURT RULE

FLORIDA APPELLATE RULE 4, 5c(6) PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI FROM DISTRICT COURT

TO SUPREME COURT

“Where any decision of a district court of appeal (1) af-

‘fects a class of constitutional or state officers, or (2) passes

‘upon a question certified by such district court to be of

great public interest, or (3) is in direct conflict with a de-

cision of another district court of appeal or of the Supreme

Court on the same point of law, petition may be filed with

the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari ‘to review |

such decision.”

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APPENDIX B

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT. OF FLORIDA

167 So. 2d 95

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, —

| ma. +; .

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appellees.

DECISION | +

3

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge,

The defendant city:in an action for “inverse condemna-

tion” has filed this interlocutory appeal from an order en-

tered by the Circuit Court for Duval County, denying its

motions to dismiss and strike addressed to the plaintiff’s

- second amended complaint.

In this appeal .the principal question before us for de-

termination is whether the said complaint_sufficiently al-

leges a cause of action against the defendant. A secondary

question is whethér certain portions of the ‘said complaint

should have been-stricken pursuant to the defendant’s said

motion to strike. .

The basic allegations of the plaintiffs’ second amended

complaint are substantially as follows: That the plaintiffs,

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_, 57 in number, are the owners of lands on which they reside,

in closé proximity to the Imeson Airport, which is owned

and operated by the defendant, a municipal corporatign.

That the city, commencing during World War II and there-

after, embarked upon a program of expanding the airport,

acquiring additional lands both by purchase and by con-

demnation, some of it lying between the. plaintiff's: proper

ties and the original airport location. That in 1962 the city

completed an extension of the Northeast-Southwest main

‘ runway, under the directives and requirements of the Fed-

eral Aviation Agency for instrument runways, in order that

the airport would become fully qualified to handle air-

planes, both military and commercial, propelled by turbo- |

jet engines. That the Northeast end of this extension of the

runway abuts a county road running through the plaintiffs’

residential area and the approach to that end bisects the

said road; so that the said area has been severed and cut

into two parts, lying on either side of the end of the ex-

tended runway. That the city provides facilities at the air-

port for the Florida Air National Guard/and maintains a

squadron of jet fighter pilots. who cufrently fly military

fighter planes “which are the fastest and most powerful

(and consequently noisiest) fighter planes in the world.”

‘That the city also provides landing and take-off ‘facilities

- for several commercial airlines, which daily operate ap-

proximately 90 flights in and out of the airport,at all hours. ©,

of the day or night, using jet transport planes, most of them .

four-engined.

The plaintiffs further allege in their said complaint: That

the said planes, both military and commercial, are operated .

every day through the air space above the plaintiffs’ prop-

erties, at altitudes usually below 500 feet, the most common

altitude being between 100 and 150 feet, with some flights

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below 100 feet. That all of the plaintiffs’ said properties are

within the area designated and defined by the Federal Avia-

tion Agency as “Area Recommended for Non-Residential

Development and The Exclusion of Places of Public As- _

sembly” in the Aircraft Noise Abatement Guide, published

by the said agency in 1960 for the use and guidance of air-.

port owners and operators who desire to provide airport

facilities for the operation of jet-propelled aircraft.

‘The plaintiffs then allege in their second amended com-

plaint that, by reason of the close proximity of the plaintiffs’ .

properties, jet aircraft operated by the said Air National

Guard and the said commercial airlines at times pass over

the said properties at altitudes below 500 feet, the greater

number of flights occuring at altitudes ranging from 100 to

~ 150 feet; that while the said aircraft pass over the said prop-

erties or in close proximately thereto, and while landing,

taking off, and warming up, and particularly while advanc-

ing the engines to near maximum power on the warm-up

pads and taxiing strips appurtenant to the runways, the

aircraft engines cause to be heard and felt “terrific and —

overwhelming vibrations, concussions and sound waves di-

re. on transmitted from said engines” against and upon

» plaintiffs’ properties; that there aré also emitted from

he said engines “exhaust fumes, fuel gasses and heavy

black-smoke which are direeted and transmitted” against

and upon the said properties, which gasses, fumes, and

smoke carry with them “dust, debris, earth, and stones”

which are propelled against and upon the said properties:

that the said vibrations and concussions cause dishes and

windows to rattle in the plaintiffs’ homes and make it im-

possible for the plaintiffs and members of their familites

» to carry on any conversation, and on occasion have caused

structural damage to the plaintiffs’ residences and have

‘caused objects to fall from tables and shelves.

ERY NIIP Ae PRE VP or

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On the subject of damages the plaintiffs allege in their

said complaint that the above conditions occur at all hours

of the day and night and at all times during the week, to

the permanent injury and damage to their properties; that

they are unable to secure an uninterrupted night’s sleep due

to the irregularity"of the said flights of jet planes; that the

‘plaintiffs have suffered great physical and mental discom-

fort, fear, and distress from the operations of the airport,

particularly since the advent of jet planes, and the value of

their properties “as residences or other use requiring the

presence of human beings or animals has been destroyed.”

The plaintiffs re-aver their allegation that all of their prop-

erties are within the area recommended by*the Federal

Aviation Agency as not suitable for residential develop-

ment. : .

In paragraph numbered V of their said complaint,. the

plaintiffs. reveal what they conceive to be the nature of

their cause of action against the defendant city, as follows:

- “As a direct and proximate result of the increased »

operation of jet planes from Defendant’s Imeson Air-

» port, which increased operation has taken place with-

in the past two years, the Defendant has deprived the

Plaintiffs of the free and unmglested use and quiet

enjoyment of their respective properties, and De-

fendant has, by so doing, exercised dominion and

control over, -appropriated, confis¢ated and con-

demried “the properties of the Plaintiffs, without just

compensation, and without due process of. law, ‘con-

trary to the Constitution and laws of the State of

Florida and of the United States of America.”

In paragraph VI of their said complaint the plaintiffs

allege that by reason of the above-described conditions and

of the depriving of the-plaintiffs of their free and unmo-

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lested use, and quiet enjoyment of their properties, and of

the “confiscation and condemnation of their properties by.

the defendant the Federal Housing Administration and the ~

Veterans’ Administration” will not insure or guarantee any

loan to any person to buy, build, or construct any home or”

other building on the plaintiffs’ properties, and “no bank

or other prudent lending. institution will make a loan to any

person for such purposes,” and that: “By reason ‘of these

conditions, plaintiffs’ properties have been condemned and

made usel as residential property, by the defendant,

without due process of law, contrary to the ‘Constitution

and laws of the State of Florida and of the United States

of America.”

In paragraph’ VII the plaintiffs allege that, in conjunc- ;

‘tion with the defendant’s expansion of the airport and in .

pursuance to a resolution adopted by. it, the defendant had ©

filed in the Duval County Circuit Court a condemnation

action against certain of the plaintiffs, seeking to take an

. easement consisting mainly of the right to enter upon the

properties of the said plaintiffs for the purpose of cutting

trees and removing other obstructions above a certain

height over their properties for the purpose of maintaining

a clear zone for the flight of aircraft—the so-called “clear-

ance easement”—but the said plaintiffs cannot in that ac-_

tion compel the city to condemn more property or any

greater interest.

Finally, in the eighth and last paragraph: of their said

complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the operation of. the

‘said airport, as expanded by the defendant, “constitutes a

continual -trespass against the properties of the plaintiffs,

or a nuisance equivalent to the imposition of a servitude

upon the properties of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are thus

irreparably injured, and their me relief is in equity.’

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The prayer.of the plaintiffs at the conclusion of their

complaint is as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that an injunction

issue against the Defendant prohibiting further con-

tinuance of the trespass or nuisance, or in the alter-

native that the Defendant be required to exercise

its right of eminent domain as a means of making

restitution to the Plaintiffs, and each. of them, and

that the Defendant. pay to the Plaintiffs such at-

torney’s fee as to the Court seems reasonable.”

To the foregoing second amended complaint the-defend-

- ant city duly filed its motion to dismiss and motion to strike.

The stated ground for.its motion to dismiss is that the said

complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defend-

ant.-In its motion to strike the defendant moves to strike

- paragraphs VI and V of the said complaint‘and certain parts

of paragraph IV on the grounds that the said allegations are |

“redundant, ‘irrelevant, immaterial and séek to assert im-

proper elements of damage against this defendant.” From

the order of the Circuit Court denying the defendant’s said

motions'to dismiss and to strike,the defendant has taken the

instant interlocutory appeal.

While the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not .

contain the expression “inverse condemnation,” it is ap-

parent from the allegations of the complaint, and it is clear —

-- from the statements and contentions made by the plaintiffs

in their appeal brief, that they are attempting to allege in

their complaint a cause of action in inverse condemnation,

as an alternative to the remedy of injunctive relief. This

effort makes this a case of first impression in Florida, for

we know of no decision in.this state specifically recognizing

inverse condemnation based upon airport operations.

to the injunction, make an award for the taking . .

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In several jurisdictions, both state and federal, the courts

have upheld inverse condemnation as a legally-recognizable

cause of action, and it is our problem in the present appeal .

to determine whether such a cause of action should be rec-

egress: in the courts of Florida. .

Inverse cvnlionasitin has been defined as the popular

description of a cause of action against a governmental de-

fendant to recover the value of property, which hasbeen

taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though.

no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been

attempted by the-taking agency. Thornburg v. Port of Port-

land, 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of

Seattle, 391 P. 2d 540 (Wash. 1964). To the same effect but

_using different words, the New York Supreme Court, Ap-

pellate Division, in Trippe v. Port of New York Authority,

17 A. D: 2d 472, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 312 (1962) said that inverse

condemnation is a method of compensation wherein “an

owner asserting a claim for appropriation of his property

- may pursue his right by an action in equity for an injunc-

tion and for damages; the court may then, as an alternative

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Apparently the leading case decided by the state courts

involving an action for inverse condemnation against an air-

port authority charging a taking on account of a noise nui-

‘sance, is Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.

2d 100, decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1962. In

that case the plaintiffs owned and resided in’ a dwelling

house located about 6,000 feet beyond: the end of a certain

airport runway and directly under the glide path of aircraft

using it, and about 1,500 feet beyond the end of a second

‘Tunway, but about 1,000 feet to one side of the glide path of

aircraft using that runway. This action in inverse condem-

_nation was brought by the plaintiffs against the Port of

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Portland, which owned and operated the airport in question,

the Portland International Airport. The defendant had the |

power of eminent’ domain and had used it to surround it-

self with a substantial curtilege, but its formal acquisition

stopped short of the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs con-_

tended that flights from both of the said runways resulted

in a tking of their property. Their principal complaint was

that the noise from jet aircraft made their land unusable.

The two theories of their case were: that systematic flights

directly over their land cause a substantial interference

with their-use and enjoyment of their land, which inté

_ “ference cohstitutes a nuisance, a continuing nuisance a §

when maintained by government, amounts to the taking of,

an easement, or, more precisely, presents a jury question

whether there is a taking; and,“secondly, that systematic

flights which pass close to their. land but not directly over :

it, constitute the taking of-an easement, for the same rea- /

sons. At the trial the jury. denied to the plaintiffs the-com--

pensation which they sought in their action, and the plain- |

_ tiffs appealed. re icone

Ina scholarly opinion in the Thornburg case, the Supreme

“Court of Oregon said that the specific question before ha

was “whether a noise-nuisance can amount to a taking.”

discussing decisions involving this point, the court a

said:

“Since United States v. Causby, 328 U. ‘s. 256, 66

~_S:z Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946), and particularly

since Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.

. Ct 531,.7 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1962), we know that ease-

ments can be taken by repeated low-level flights over

private land. Such easements have been found in

actions against the,federal government (Causby) and

“in actions against. municipal corporations (Griggs). —

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When such easements are said to have been taken, ©

‘compensation must be paid to the owners of the lands

_ thus burdened. This much appears to be settled.”

After a learned discussion of the authorities on the subj-

ect of the noise ‘of jet aircraft amounting to a nuisance and

such nuisance ripening into a “taking,” the Oregon Supreme ~

’ Court in the Thornburg case reached the following judicial

conclusion: » ie ae

‘ “Ig we accept, as we must upon-established prin-

ciples of the law of servitudes, the validity of’ the

propositions that a noise can be a nuisance; that a

nuisance can give rise to an éasement; and that a

-- noise coming straight down from above one’s land

can ripen into a taking if-it is persistent enough _

and-aggravated enough, then logically the same kind

_ and degree of interference with the use and -enjoy-:

ment of one’s land can also be a taking even though

the noise vector may come from some direction other

than the perpendicular.

_”__ “Tf a landowner has a right to be free from unrea-

«. sonable interference caused by noise, as we hold that

he has, then when does the noise burden become so

unreasonable that the government must pay for the

privilege of being permitted to continue to make the

noise? Logically, the answer has to be’ given by the

trier of. fact (subject to the usual exercise of the

proper function of the court in screening the evi-

dence). See Restatement, Torts, §826, Comment d.”

The judgment appealed from was then reversed and the

cause remanded for a new trial. :

An even more-recent case in the state courts involving

an action for inverse condemnation against an airport opera-

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- tor on account of the operations of jet aircraft is Martin v.

Port. of Seattle, 391 P. 24.540 (Wash. 1964). As in the case

before us, the question confronting the Supreme Court of

. Washington was whether the plaintiffs therein had stated

a claim for relief against the municipal corporation as the

owner of an airport. The defendant was the Port of Seattle,

owner of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and the

plaintiffs were property owners who sought, through this

action, damages for the taking or damaging of their prop-

erty for public use caused by nearby low altitude flights of

_ jet aircraft landing and taking off: from the said airport,

resulting in a decline in the market value of their properties.

The northernmost edge of the litigated area was approxi-

mately nine-tenths of a mile from the end of a certain run-

way, and jet aircraft in the process of landing passed over

the central part of the area at altitudes of less than 500 feet.

The lands of some of the plaintiffs were subjected to direct

overflights of the jet aircraft, while other plaintiffs suffered ~

no overflights. The Washington Supreme Court stated that

the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint was the noise and

vibration created by the jet aircraft rather than the physical

invasion. The plaintiffs claimed that, when the said aircraft

passed over or in close proximity, conversation is halted,

sleep is disrupted, fear is caused, etc., by the noise, and the

vibration in the houses makes it necessary periodically to

hammer back nails into sidings and to tighten light fixtures,

etc. The Supreme Court:of Washington agreed with the

lower court that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated a claim for

relief against the defendant, and — the —

‘appealed from.

In its discussion of the authorities in this field of law in

the Martin case, the Supreme Court of Washington had this .

to say about the nature of the cause of actian in the litiga-

tion before it:

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“Whether the ‘cause of action’ for the recovery of

compensation is viewed as resulting from the due ~

__ process provisions of the Constitution, or as result- .

ing from an adaptation of older ideas of éminent

domain and the condemnation of private property .

for public use, is. of little significance. When the

noise and intense vibration produced by low-flying

jet aircraft deprives the owner of land of an essential

" @lement in his relationship to that land, the result

should be the same whether the airport operator

himself brings the action to ‘condemn’ the right

to so interfere with the land, or the landowner is

forced to be the moving party.”

In both of the Oregon and Washington cases which we |

have just discussed, the courts cited and relied-upon the

following two landmark decisions of the United States

Supreme Court:

In the United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed.

1206 66 S..Ct. 1062 (1945), the United States Supreme Court

held that, repeated flights of aircfaft at such proximity to

the ground as to render property uninhabitable and di-

minish its value constituted a taking, notwithstanding the

fact that the aircraft in their path of glide to and from an air-

port had conformed to the thirty-to-one glide angle ap-

proved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The Supreme

* Court stated that it was a case of first impression and that

the problem presented was whether the respondents’ prop-

erty was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment

by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft

over the respondents’ land at low altitudes. The respond-

ents, Causby and his wife,.owned land near an airport

leased to the United States in North Carolina, on which land

stood their dwelling house and various out-buildings which

t , =! 30

- were mainly used for raising chickens. The Causbys filed .

this action against the United States in the U. S. Court of

Claims to recover for the alleged taking of their property

without compensation by flying airplanes across it at such

height as to interfere with its normal use. The Court of

Claims rendered judgment for the Causbys, and the United

States sought review by certiorari in the Supreme Court.

‘The evidence showed that the flights in question interfered

with the normal use of the Causbys’ property as a chicken

‘farm and interfered with the night rest of the Causby

family. About 150 of their chickens were killed by flying

- into walls from fright. Production also fell off. The result

was the destruction of the —- asa commercial chicken

farm.

In the Causby case the United States Supreme Court gave

the following as its reasoning leading to its conclusion that —

there had been a taking of the Causbys’ property within

the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States:

“We would not doubt that if “ United States

erected an elevated railway over respondents’ land

at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there

would be a partial taking, éven though none of the

| supports of the structure rested on the land. The

reason is that there would be an intrusion so im-

_ mediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s

full enjoyment of the property and to limit his ex-

ploitation of it. While the owner does not in any phy- -

sical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make

use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in

somewhat the same sense that space. left between

buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The

' superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so closé

2 31

to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the

use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the

landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a

claim to it and that invasions of it*are in the same

category as invasions of the surface.”

A somewhat analogous situation was before the Supreme

Court in the later case of Griggs v. County of Allegheny,

369 U.S. 84, 7 L. Ed. 2d 585; 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962). Griggs had

instituted eminent domain proceedings in the Court. of

Common.Pleas of Allegheny County, State of Pennsylvania,

which held that there had been a taking by the county,

which owned and operated an airport, of an air easement

over his property, and fixed compensation therefor. The

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on appeal (County of Al-

~ legheny v. Griggs, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A. 2d 123 (1961),

held that, if there had been a taking, the county was not

liable, and Griggs sought review of this reversal by cer- .

tiorari in the U. S. Supreme Cott, which reversed’and held

that the interference with Griggs’ property amounted to a

taking, in the coristitutional sense, of an’air easement for

which compensation must be paid by the county, the owner

and operator of the.airport (the Greater Pittsburgh Airport).

In the Griggs case, one “approach area,” as designed by

the county,-to the northeast runway passed* over Griggs’

home, which was 3,250 feet from the end of the said runway.

The “slope gradient” of thé approach area provided a clear-

ance of 11.36 feet between the bottom of the glide angle and

Griggs’ chimney. The low-altitude over-flights caused

Griggs and the occupants of his property to become nervous

_and distraught, their sleep was disturbed, etc. .

After discussing and re-affirming its holding in the Caus-

by case, supra, the Supreme Court in the Griggs case said -

2

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32°

the following on the question as to who took the air ease-

ment in the constitutional sense:

“It is argued that though there was a ‘taking’, ©

someone other than respondent was the taker — the

airlines or the'C. A. A. acting as an authorized rep-

resentative of the United States. We think, however,

that respondent, which was the promoter, owner,

‘and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances

the one who took the air easement in the constitution-

al sense. Respondent decided, subject to the approval

-of the C. A. A., where the airport would be built,

what runways it would need, their direction and

length, and what land and navigation easements

would be needed : ji

In the final three sentences of its opinion, however, the

Supreme Court uses language that we think touches the

very heart of the concept of inverse condemnation:

“Without the ‘approach areas,’ an airport is indeed

‘not operable. Respondent in designing it had to ac-

quire some private property. Our conclusion is that

by constitutional standards it did not acquire

enough.” ov.

Reverting now to the case before us on ‘this appeal, we .

think that the allegations in the plaintiffs’ second amended

complaint fall squarely within the rules laid down in the

above-discussed four decisions of the Supreme Court of

Oregon, Washington, and the United States, as averring a

constitutional taking of their property, requiring the pay-

ment to them of just compensation by the owner and opera-

tor of the airport. The facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ said

complaint, are, we believe, substantially the same as the

basic facts involved in the said four decisions. This being

"33

_ so, the sole remaining inquiry is whether there exists any .

_ legal reason why the_rules recognized in those decisions —

should not ‘be recognized and applied in Florida. We see no

such reason.

This is a case of first impression in this State. We know

of no Florida case specifically recognizing inverse condem- _

nation based upon airport operations, although this court

in our recent decision in Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, —

opinton filed June 9, 1964, not yet reported, we adverted

to that type of action by way of pure obiter dictum.

The constitutional provisions applicable in Florida are

consistent with, if.they do not affirmatively require, the

recognition of the concept of inverse condemnation. In ad-

dition to the provisions of the United States Constitution

applied in the Causby and Griggs decisions, Section 4 of

the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of Florida

provides: “All courts in this state shall be open, so that

every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods.

a

person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of.

law, and right, and justice shall be administered without

sale, denial or delay.” Section 12 of the Declaration provides

in pertinent part: “No person shall. . -be deprived of life, ~:

liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken without just compensation... .”

On the subject of condemnation Section 29 of Article XVI

of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part: “No

private property, nor right of way shall be appropriated to

the use of any corporation or individual until full compen-

sation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first se-

cured to him by deposit of money. . .”

The concept of inverse condemnation can be readily ac-

cepted if we acknowledge the doctrine that a continuing

PRCT i

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trespass or nuisance may ripen in toa constitutional taking

of property within the ken of constitutional provisions pro-

hibiting the taking of property without the payment of

just compensation. Such a doctrine has been recognized in

several decisions of the appellate courts of Florida.

For ‘instance, in State Road Department of Florida v.

Tharp, 146 Fla: 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941), the owner of a water

mill filed a suit to restrain the continuing of a trespass by

the State Road Department which had ‘erected a bridge

_and a fill which obstructed channels in which water flowed

after it left the millrace, resulting in raising the elevation

of the water in the millrace and in reducing the mill’s ca-

pacity, or to require the department to exercise its right of

eminent domain as.a means of making restitution to the

owner. The said owner contended that the building ‘and

maintenance of the fill amounted to a taking of his property

without due process of law. The chancellor declined to issue ’

the injunction, but granted to the department the privilege

of exercising the right of eminent domain as a means of-

making restitution to the owner. A motion to dismiss was

denied and on final hearing the chancellor granted the re-

lief prayed for; and the department appealed.

In affirming the chancellor’s decree in this Tharp case,

the Supreme Court of Florida, speaking through the late

Justice Terrell, said the following with respect to the basic

‘oman issues involved:

“If a State agency can deliberately trespass on

and destroy the property of the citizen in the manner

shown to have been done here and then be relieved

from making restitution on the plea of nonliability

of the State for suit, then the constitutional guaranty

of the right to own and dispose of property becomes

35

‘i

nothing more than the tinkling of empty words. Such -

a holding would raise administrative boards above

the law and clothe them with an air of megalomania.

that would eternally jeopardize the,property right of

the citizens. It would reverse the or Saree

in this Loomtey and*head it into a Biind.alley.

hiieatanin democracy is a distinct departure from

other democracies in that we place the emphasis on

the individual and protect him in his personal prop-

erty rights against the State and all other assailants.

.The State may condemn his*property for public use

and pay a just compensation for it, but it will not be

permitted to grab or take it by force and the doctrine

of nonsuability should not be ‘so construed. Forceful

taking is abhorrent to every democratic impulse and

alien to our political concepts.

“lg American democracy survives and lives up to

the function of its creation, it must do so by adher-

ence to the code of moral and legal conduct promul-

gated by the Constitution, one provision of which .is

the sanctity of private property. No principle has

contributed more to the material development of the

country or done more to stabilize and balance its

citizenship. To be a property owner and a taxpayer

is one of the surest incentives to a dependable citizen-

ship. It gives the citizen a stake in his government

second to no other influence. It is one of the first

duties of constitutional government to protect, and

where the sovereign has a right to condemn for -

public use, it will not be permitted to appropriate

except by orderly processes. The current of the law

on this point will not lead to any other conclusion.

“Supporting this thesis, Section 12 of the Declara-

democracy —

’

¢ 36 ° “te

tion of Rights provides that no person shall ‘be de-

prived of his property without just compensation and —

Section 29 of Article 16 of the Constitution contains

a similar specification with reference to corporations

and individuals for the preservation of property

rights.. The latter provision is mandatory that the

.compensation be made before the property is ap-

propriated.” ae

™

: -

On the authority of the just-quoted decision of the Su-

preme Court-of Florida, the above-quoted provisions of the

Florida Constitution, and the above decisions from other

- jurisdictions, we hold that in the present case the allega-

tions of the plaintiffs’. second amended complaint are suf-

ficient to state a claim for relief — either injunctive relief

or by way of inverse condemnation — so that the chancellor

correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the said .

- complaint. We also hold that the complaint’s allegations at-

i tacked by the defendant’s motion to strike are both relevant

“4 and material to the plaintiffs’ cause of action, so. that the

* chancellor correctly denied that motion also. Consequently,

the order appealed from herein must be and it is

Affirmed.

WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., CONCUR.

37.

FINAL ORDER

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY.

FLORIDA

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET’AL.,

- Plaintiffs, < -

vs. :

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A.MUNICIPAL.

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

. Defendant.

aM

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET.AL.,

Plaintiffs,

4

VS.:

_ CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

- CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Defendant.

- ORDER

This cayse came on to be heard upon final hearing, and

the Court having heard the witnesses and the argument of

counsel for all parties.

The District Court of Appeals for the First District has

‘held that the.complaint in this case stated a cause of actign.

for inverse condemnation. The Court ‘also stated that this

is a case of first impression in Florida, and it recognized

_ the propriety of inverse condemnation based upon airport

operations. As stated in the opinion, “Inverse condemnation.

has been defined as the popular description of a cause of

sin SSeust

38

action against a governmental defendant to. recover he.

‘ value of property which has been taken in fact by the gov-

ernmental defendant; even though no formal. exercise of

‘ the power of ae, domain has been attempted. by the

taking agency.” |

In the opinion, which i is ‘aetna’ as City of Seleenttle: etc.,

| . _ v, George Schumann, et ux, et al., 167 So. 2d 95, the case of:

Thornburg, v. Port of Portland, : 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100, is

quoted as follows:

‘ “Tf we accept,:as we must upon established princi-

ae ples of the law of servitudes, the.validity of the propo-

sitions that: a noise can be a nuisance; that a nuisance

can give rise to an easement; and that a noise coming

straight down from above. one’s land can ripen into

“a taking if it is ‘persistent enough and aggravated

enough, then logically the same kind and degree of

‘interference with the use and ‘enjoyment of one’s

land can also bea taking even though the noise vector

may come from ome direction other than the per-

: pendicular.

“Tf a landowner: has a right to ‘be free from unrea-

sonable interference caused by noise, as we hold that

he has, then when does the noise burden become so

_ + unreasonable that the government must. pay for the

* privilege of being permitted. to continue to make the

noise? Logically, the answer has to be given by the

trier of fact (subject to the usual exercise of the

proper function of the court in screening the evi-

‘dence). See Restatement, Torts, sé 826, Comment a.”

Then, ‘after mentioning three other cases, the Court said: ° -

“the sole remaining inquiry is whether there exists any

legal. reason why the rules recognized, in those decisions

oy 2m

39 |

should not be recognized and applied in Florida. We see no |

such reason.”

The Supreme Court of Florida pointed to the difficulties

arising from the widespread use of planes when, in the

case of Brooks et al. v. Patterson, Mayor, et al. 31 So. 2d 472,

they affirmed the Chancellor’s decree and said, at page 477,

“Under this.decree we must assume that the defendants

(City) will adopt rules and regulations governing the users

of the airport which, among ‘other things, will reasonably

prohibit. planes being flown over the property of plaintiffs

at a height less than will be required to prevent the vibra-

tion caused by the operation of the plane, doing damage to

the house or other property.of either of the plaintiffs, and

will also prohibit planes being flown over the property of

plaintiffs at a height less than that which will reasonably

eliminate shock and fright being reasonably experienced

by persons occupying plaintiffs’ property.” Overflights are

not necessary to cause fright, vibrations and noise as they

- can be experienced regardless of whether the wing tip of,

the plane passes a few inches over the land or misses it by

a few inches or a few yards.

In the matter of liability for smoke and oil from unburned

jet fuel, it is interesting to note that even in the earlier

cases before the United States Supreme Court, when they ©

held there must be an actual physical invasion before rail-

roads would be held liable for vibrations and neises from |

the operation of trains, they nevertheless have held such

a railroad company liable for damages caused by unneces-

sary gases and smoke. See: Richards v. Washington Terminal

Co., 233 U.S. 546, 58 L.ed. 1088. ;

From the allegations and testimony, it appears that plain-

tiffs reside on lands adjacent to or across a road from de- ©

fendant’s airport. Commercial jets regularly use the airport

Q rcrrernree:

REPL PRIETO HLS TOT ES

OS SP A EP EOLA RS

40

with approximately 100 jet flights each day, and a part of

the airport property is leased to the Florida Air National

Guard for the use: of its jet fighter planes. On December

11, 1962, the defendant placed in operational service an

extended Northeast-Southwest runway to accommodate the

larger jet planes and the fighter planes of FANG.

The evidence shows that the noise from the nearby jets

occur at, upon and from the extended runway at frequent

intervals and at all times of the day or night; that the noise

halts personal and ’phone conversation; radio and television

reception is disrupted, and the sound obliterated; sleep is

disturbed, and the noise is painful to many; the noise also

causes fear, particularly in small children; that, in addition

to the high pitched whine of the jets on landing, there is

a roar on takeoff and frequently a sharp concussion or ex-

plosion which occurs when the fighter jets’ after-burner is

used. That unburned jet fuel leaves a greasy. film on cars,

swimming pools, clothes, laundry, homes and furnishings;

that windows facing the airport must be kept closed winter °

and summer because of the frequency of the flights; and

that a kerosene odor is prevalent. That the jets cause vibra-

tions in the houses and of their contents, causing windows

and dishes to rattle, putty in window frames to loosen, pic-

tures to hang askew, shingles on the houses to loosen, and,

in some instances, structural damage to the homes in the

area. Plaintiffs also complain that when the commercial -

jets taxi and turn for takeoffs and when the Air National

_ Guard planes go through warmup procedures, dust,. small

rocks and other debris are blasted directly against their

properties. The cutting of trees by the defendant along the

road and on properties near the extended runway facilitated

the propogation of dust and debris in the area. Residences.

which abut the warmup pad or parking apron of the FANG

have especially suffered from the blasts of dust and other

%

41

debris which have sifted into the homes through doors and

windows onto floors, carpets, drapes, food, etc...

The accumulated effect of the foregoing elements, occur-

ring with such frequency has, in the opinion of a qualified

real estate appraiser, lessened the fair market value of each

of the plaintiffs’ properties, except the plaintiff Arthur H.

Ringel, and as to Mr. Ringel’s claim, the complaint will be

dismissed..(The Ringel home is not within the area herein-

after discussed.)

Some of the owners have been paid for “clearance ease-

ments” which permit the cutting of trees, shrubs and the

like, but those easements have no bearing on this case as

there was no easement for noise, vibration, etc. “Avigation |

easements”, which have been taken from some of the plain-

tiffs, are in a different categury in that they permit the

passage of planes, jets included, over the property and

necessarily included the noise, fumes and vibration from

such planes. I cannot subscribe to the theory of plaintiffs

that when the avigation easement was taken it included

only that. area within the specific limits of the easement;

nor, on the other hand, can I subscribe to the defendant’s

theory that when the easement was taken, it included every-

thing from that time forward. In the case of avigation ease-

ments, if there is any new damage from jet planes which

was not anticipated at the time of the avigation easements,

and therefore not included in such easements, then such

damage must relate from the time of the extension of the

Northeast-Southwest runway and be based on facts and

conditions not evident when the avigation easements were

obtained. If the easements have been extended as plaintiffs

claim, then plaintiffs mayshow such additional taking.

Such damage, if any, will be held ‘to be an uncompensated

expansion of the existing easement.

patel eae aman ernetnsneeneenen

rote reg oe

i no a

ee a ae -

42

EDA,

Reasonable noise must be endured as the price for living

in an industrial society and for having deliberately selected

property immediately adjacent to the airport as a homesite,

_ but fairness will require reasonable compensation for opera-

tions. that immediately, directly and unreasonably limit the

use: and enjoyment of private property.

In this instance, the noise from the jet aircraft is more

than simple “industrial noise” which must be suffered by

those who choose to live in an industrial area. The sound- .

track admitted into evidence is clear proof of the severity

of the noise, although almost everyone is familiar with ‘the

penetrating and high pitch sounds of the jet engine. There

is little, if any, relationship between the noise emitted from

a large jet aircraft and the noise suffered by those who live —

near a railroad track or a busy highway. It may not con-

stitute an actual complete appropriation of the property,

but the creation of disturbances which substantially iner- |

fere with the use and enjoyment of property achieves the

same end and ‘the noise, vibrations, concussions, etc. are

sufficient to constitute an actionable invasion of the prop-

erty.

Although plaintiffs, by their bill of complaint, allege that

planes overfly their properties, violating their immediate

_ airspace, it is clear that the gravamen of their complaint is

the noise, vibration, dust, fumes and exhaust smoke rather

than: physical invasion of their property. They’ do not seek |

- recovery for any technical trespass, but for unreasonable

interference with the use and enjoyment of their property.

In fact, there are no overflights in the case of several plain-

tiffs.

‘The defendant argues here must be a “physical inva-

sion” of property before there can be a “taking.” Even so,

just what constitutes “physical invasion”? If, on lands ad- |

jacnt to mine, there is an atomic explosion and my house

is destroyed by the concussion, has there not been a “physi-

cal invasion” of my property by the air blast? Or can it be,

as defendant seems to contend, that unless there are-over.

flights which would cause the blast to come to my property

from a vertical direction, there can be no recovery? My

house is destroyed regardless of whether the direction of -

the force is vertical, or lateral or horizontal. Surely, if the _

result is equivalent, the right of recovery should be equiv-

alent. If the explosions frequently reoccur’ over a period

of years, my property would be effectively taken without

any other physical i invasion.

When the land of an individual is diminished in value for

the public benefit, then justice requires that the public pay.

When the interference with the use of the land is of suffi- °

cient directness, severity, peculiarity and magnitude that

the owner is denied the enjoyment of his own property,

then fairness and justice requires that he be compensated.

Neither these plaintiffs, nor anyone else whose constitu-

tional rights have been denied, are required to yield to the

summum bonum—the gteatest good for the greatest number;

unless it appears that their damage is “inconsequential” or

“incidental” and not “substantial”.

Plaintiffs seek to either enjoin the troublesome flight

operations, or to compel the defendant City to condemn an

‘ easement ‘ ‘in perpetuity consisting of the right to create

noise, vibrations, concussions and sound waves, together

with the further right to direct and transmit exhaust’

fumes, gases, smoke, dust, debris, earth and stones pro-

pelled by,and/or emitted from aircraft turbo-jet engines

from the airport property of the defendant over, across,

against and upon the lands.of the plaintiffs.” (Taken fom

plaintiffs’ contention at Targument.) |

cas

.

SOP CLE PEON EEE PUM NE Oh

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44 ¢

From:the evidence and the law, it clearly appears there

has been a “taking”, to some extent, of a tefhporary ease-

ment in the plaintiffs’ properties. The big question remain-

ing is just what has been taken. The Federal Aviation Agency

has recommended that no suburban residential develop-

- ment, or place of public assembly, be constructed within.

one-half mile of each side of a jet runway nor within 15,000

feet fromm the end of such runway. I recognize that there

must be some arbitrary line beyond which, for practical

as well as legal purposes, it cannot be said there has been

a “taking”. Based on the evidence in this case, one-half -

smile frora each side of the runway is a reasonable limitation,

though there may be some inconvenience beyond that point.

I do not, however,.believe that a\ distance of nearly three

_ miles from the end of the runway is reasonable, practicable, ,

or necessary, nor is there apt to be a “taking” at such dis-

-_ tance. The testimony shows rather positively that jet planes

_ can and do reach an altitude of approximately 1,600 feet

within one mile of the end of the runway. However, as none

of the present plaintiffs have property more than one-half

mile beyond the end of the runway, it is unnecessary to de-

termine the outside limit which might constitute a “taking”

beyond the end of the runway, except insofar as it may be

pertainent to determine at what point the “one-half mile

_ from.-each side of the runway” should be terminated: In

this particular litigation, a distance of 3,000 feet from: the

end of the runway, while arbitrary, is also reasonable.

In view of the evidence and the law applicable to this

case, there has been a “taking” of a temporary easement in

the properties of those plaintiffs which are within one-half

mile of each side of the Northeast-Southwest runway, in-

cluding a distance of 3,000 feet from its Northeast end, for

the purpose of permitting any: plane to make noises, emit

~~ 4

45°

gases, fumes and smoke, to cause vibration and concussion,

and to disturb or blast dust and small particles of matter

against and onto plaintiffs’ said properties, for the period

beginning December 11, 1962, when the Northeast-South-

west runway became operational, ‘until December 11, 1968,

at which time all air operations at Imerson Airport should

be concluded. °

Although I am holding that there has been a “taking”,

I-believe that in such cases as this, where there has been

no actual physical invasion of plaintiffs’ properties, it is

not so much the character of the invasion as the amount

of damage which determines whether plaintiffs should be

compensated. This must of necessity be true. It is possible:

that there would be a great amount of actual technical in-

vasion, with little or no resulting damage. In such a situa-

. tion, -the damage may very. well be held to have been in-

consequential and endurable by the property owner and

therefore would-not justify the imposition of inverse con-

*. demnation. On the other hand, the character of the invasion

itself may, when considered by itself, not be unreasonable

at all but because of the resulting damage would constitute

a severe and remarkable deterioration of the use and en-

joyment of the property. Therefore, it is my opinion that

plaintiffs are not entitled to be compensated if they have

merely suffered simple inconvenience -which results from

the normal operation of jet planes; airspace in general is a

part of the public domain and it may be used by the public

so long as no substantial darhage is done the landowner. In

every home, everywhere in this country, there is the more

or less constant noise from airplanes; in every home the

TV is disrupted when a plane flies overhead: in every home

' there is some inconvenience caused by planes —-jet and

otherwise. To the extent the inhabitants have been incon-

_venienced, their homeplace has been made that much less

lar caitll

Sie © Sah aed ie ase

EE a ERO a SIA.

Y iiatade

ot Ria Sitar ttiasberaia Rc Shane Stpate on bes

4

46

desirable, but there can be no compensation for simple in-

convenience. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to be com-

pensated for such! taking only if, they suffer “substantial”

damage as distinguished from “consequential” or “inci-

~ dental” damage. If they have suffered only “consequential”

or “incidental” damage, then it will be a case of dammum

~ absque injuria for which they cannot be compensated.

Having made this determination, this case must next be

instituted as an eminent domain proceeding and a constitu-

tional jury empanelled to determine what, if any, compensa-

tion. should be paid to the various property owners for the

taking. | .

It has been determined by the Second District Court of

Appeal, in the case of F lorida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125

So. 2d 311, at page 320, that “Such condemnation hearing

cannot be condu¢ted.as an incident to the main proceedings

in equity; but; in order that the requirements of the eminent

domain statutes ‘be fulfilled, an independent action in con-

demnation is required.” Therefore, the defendant, City of

Jacksonville, will -be directed to institute condemnation

proceedings for the acquisition of such temporary easement

and to pay therefor such amounts, if any, as may be de-

termined by the jury. |

Because large airports attract business, industry and

residences, it is hoped that in building the new airport fa-

cilit?es, the City will acquire enough property and/or ease-

ments for airport purposes and that the County will ap-

propriately zone the adjacent surrounding area, so that a

new industrial complex, oriented to space and aviation in-

dustry, can be established without the necessity for further

* suits of this nature.

47

(NOTE: Although I have tried to rationalize the above

arguments in keeping with the language in the case of City

of Jacksonville v. Schumann, supra, 1 would personally favor

the reasoning and logic as expressed by the author of the

article, “Noise and the Law”, appearing in Volume 63,

Michigan Law Review 1373. However, if the Schumann de-

cision is to be changed, it must be done at appellate levels

and not in the trial court.)

It is thereupon, upon consideration,

‘ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the com-

plaint of the plaintiffs Arthur H. Ringel and Pear] Z. Ringel,

his wife, shall be and the same is hereby dismissed.

It is further is : —

‘ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the de-

fendant, City of Jacksonville, shall be and it is hereby di-.

rected to institute eminent domain proceedings within sixty

(60) days from the date of this Order to condemn a tempo-

rary easement which it has taken in fact in the properties

of those plaintiffs which are within one-half mile of each

side of the Northeast-Southwest runway, including a dis-

tance of 3,000 feet from its Northeast end, for the purpose

of permitting any plane to make noises, emit gases, fumes

and smoke, to cause vibration and concussion, and to disturb

or blast dust and small particles of matter against and onto

plaintiffs’ said properties, for the period beginning Decem-

ber 11, 1962, and ending December 11, 1968; as to those

properties in which the defendant now holds an avigation

easement, the defendant i is hereby directed to institute such

proceédings. to obtain the additional easement it has-taken

by virtue of the extended runway: during the aforesaid

period; and in each case a jury shall determine what, if .

Said Darra a at BR a aR I clin We os

48 ae ’

any, compensation shall be puns such | property owner for

such easement.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Jacksonville,

Duval County, Florida, this 26th day of J anuary, A. D. 1966.

/s/ Charles A. Luckie

JUDGE -—

49

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT OF: FLORIDA

199 So. 2d 727

}

,

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;

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3

:

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r

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL ~

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, |

VS. 7 :

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appellees. |

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

_vs. | ae

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appellees.

| DECISION at

JOHNSON, J. :

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of

Duval County, wherein the case George Schumann, et al -

v. City of Jacksonville, in one case and Edwin H. Brain, et

al v. City. of Jacksonville, in the other case, were consoli-

- dated for trial and on this appeal.

From an order directing the City to institute eminent —

domain proceedings in accordance with the prayer of the

complaints, the City, appellant herein, appeals. The same

order or decree was entered in each of the two cases.

PP ERT ee ree aO HNMR RARE IAI pI NTE Ie TT ¢

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- The basic auéstion before us now is whether there was

sufficient evidence before the trial court” to ‘support. the al-

legations of the complaint. ~The trial court took testimony

for about three days. At the conclusion thereof, he deter-

mined, that certain plaintiffs, five in number, ‘had given

avigation easements: over ‘he surface of their respective

properties in’coritemplation of .the defendant’s extension

of one. of its runways, and therefore summary judginents

were entered against them. Others had years earlier given

certain avigation easements, also, but prior to changes made

in the operation and extension of the airport which could

not lave been reasonably expected at the time of giving

such easements. As to these properties and plaintiffs, the

trial court made special limitation as to their damages, if

any, by limiting them -to the unexpected new, a

and new easements taken. | .

This cause has been before this court previously on an.

interlocutory appeal“? from an order denying a motion to

dismiss the 4mended complaint on the primary ground that -

‘ said complaint failed to state a cause of action. This court,

speaking through Honorable, Donald K. Carroll, in said

case, gave a very comprehensive review of the basic ques-

tion involved in that cause, which is of course the same as

here. This court determined that the complaint stated a

cause of action. for inverse condemnation, but pointed out .

further that under other provisions of our constitution, that

regardless of what it was called, the damaged property

~ owner was entitled to compensation when his property was

taken or its beneficial use to such owner destroyed.

(1) City of Jacksonville, v. George Schumann, ‘a al., 167 So. 2d 95,

(Fla. App. 1st, 1964).

(2) Section 4, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution and Section

_ 12, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution. |

51

:* view of the decision by this court, supra, we are, as

pointed out earlier, confronted only with the factual situa- -

tion as it appears from the testimony and whether the trial

judge, before whom the testimony was taken, without a:

jury, rendered a proper determination based thereon.

sheer

.

Chan, bee ise Ste

We.think the trial court did a an excellent job i in decipher- .

ing all the evidence, some of which tended to be conflicting, | :

-and rendered a decision in which we cannot find fault and

with which we agree. :

Pangea EMU 4

In arriving at our conclusion, we point out that not all

plaintiffs may receive compensation. The amount of dam-

ages must be determined by a jury in another proceeding ©

in circuit court. The trial court herein only determined that |

the plaintiffs, except those against whom summary judg- -

-ment had -been rendered, each.had a valid legal cause of |

action for damages under the allegations of the complaint ~

and the. evidence in support thereof, properly leaving the

question of amount, if any, due each plaintiff to be fixed

_ by the jury in the subsequent trial of this issue.

While the issue of inverse condemnation in airport avia- oe

tion: projects “was a novel one in Florida, at the time this. i

_court.rendered its deciSion i in the former appearance of this

‘case before this court (167 So. 2d 95, supra), we think the

issue has now been settled by that decision, in which the

Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari,and which com-

mitted Florida to the view adopted in Thornburg v. Port of

Portland, 3) Martin v. Port of Seattle,“ and the two United

States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Causby,

328 U. S..256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206, and Griggs v.

"Allegheny County, 369 U. S..84, 82 S. Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed. 2d 585

w& ;

se i le ‘J

5

1} (3) Thornburg v. Port of Portland, .239 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 (1962).

(4) Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P. 2d 540 (Wash. 1964).

OI i ita iri sent

:

52

(1962). In these cases, it is in substance held that noise can

be a, nuisance and that such nuisance can give rise to an |

easement, and that such noise may come straight down

from.above, or from some other direction. That the land

owner has a right to be free from unreasonable interference

caused by the noise, and if such noise and/or intense vibra- —

tion produced by low flying aircraft deprived such owner of

an essential element in his relationship to his land,. com- .

pensation therefor should be made by the publit authority

‘responsible therefor, and it makes no difference whether

- the public, or condemning authority is the movant or the

land owner, through a process similar to that employed in

this case by the plaintiffs. |

_ . Most of the arguments raised by appellant are similar to

those raised in and settled by this court in the first appear-

ance of this case before this court. A repetition thereof in

_ this opinion to any further extent than already made, would

- serve no good purpose.

We think the evidence supported the finding of the trial

court inview of the guidelines laid ‘down by this court in— ;

its first decision in this case when here on interlocutory

appeal. ;

Appellant’s points one, three and five, as raised in its

brief, have been answered above and adversely to the ap-

pellant. = naa

As to appellant’s point two, we think this ‘point has also

been laid to rest by the decision in Griggs v. Allegheny

County, supra, and is therefore without merit.

We think we have partly dealt with appellant’s point

five, but here reiterate that the trial court made a broad

finding as to those plaintiffs who had given “avigation ease-

+

id

53

ments.” In substance, the court’s order was to the effect

that each plaintiff's problem had to be treated in the light

of the easement given, as to its substance and time of giving’

thereof.’ He did not rule that all such would receive dam-

ages, but left the element of damages, if any, to the jury .

to be later empanelled to try such issue. We can find no

error committed by the learned. trial judge, but on the

. contrary think his decree was well thought out, well worded

’ and very comprehensive in its coverage of the facts and we

agree with his detree and therefore affirm the same.

~ The City of J salemmatitie Vv. Edwin H.. Brain, et al, being

eur case numbered I-142, was consolidated for trial and for

purpose of appeal herein, with the Schumann case, supra.

In appellant’s brief four points are raised in which error is

. contended. These points are identical to four points raised

_ in the Schumann case and which points we have treated

supra. The same reasoning applies equally to both cases

with the same ultimate decision from both: the trial court —

and this court. We see no reason for disturbing the trial

court’s finding of fact. nor his ; application of the appropriate .

law:thereto.

In both eases, the trial court ordered the defendant (ap-

pellant) to institute eminent domain procéedings within

60 days to condemn the necessary easements.

We affirm this decree i in both cases.

_ WIGGINTON, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE, and

- SPECTOR, J. CONCUR.

fy

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Pato Cy Eye mer, o~

EE LAE S LOE TI OFT i bi aaa een yer)y

* _

.

WEB ee va.

54

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

' FIRST DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

‘CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORE er ee UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Appellant, s

vs.

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

en

oe

*

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

- CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

: Appellant,

| vs. |

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL., ‘

"Appellees. |

ORDER

Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing in the above styled

cause having been oomainenee,

| IT Is ORDERED that the Petition be and the same is.

; hereby denied.

WITNESS the Honorable John T. Wigginton, Chief

Judge, and Seal of the Court this 10th day*of July, A. D.

1967._

DISTRICT COURT OF. APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, OF FLORIDA »

. _ CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

a . e - Appellant,

, VS.

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appéllees.

; CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

"Appellant,

VS.

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Appellees,

ORDER

Appellant’s suggestion that decision be certified as -pass-

ing upon a question of great’public interest having been -

considered,

IT IS. ORDERED that the suggestion be and the same is

hereby denied.

WITNESS the Honorable John T. Wigginton, Chief

Judge, and Seal of the Court this 10th day of July,. A. D.

1967.

oe)

ma ORO ELT TT ETI THN

° \

Bpaginee

- —

hes

RSA RMN Graig oe TAI hivir ae inet Sey

: .

.

, 56 | | ~

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

| | | OCTOBER. 5, 1967

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

. See |

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET UX, ET AL.,

Respondents.

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,

. Respondents. '

‘This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court

‘ on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, jurisdictional briefs and

’ portions of the record deemed necessary to reflect jurisdic-

tion under Florida.Appellate Rule 4.5c(6), and it appearing

to the Court that it is without jurisdiction, it is ordered that

the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be and he same is here-

by denied.

57

' SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

‘NOVEMBER 1, 1967

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL |

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

| - Petitioner,

i. Ag °

GEORGE SCHUMANN, ET. UX, ET AL.,

, Respondents.

—_—

- ~ a

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, A MUNICIPAL ;

CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

vs. : .

EDWIN H. BRAIN, ET UX, ET AL.,

| Respondents.

«On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed by

Attorneys for Petitioner,

_ [TIS ORDERED by the Court that said petition be, and

the same is hereby denied.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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