Appendix — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Supreme Court brief1968
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UPREME COURT. U. &
DEC 9- 1967
~ JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK
m THE ; | js
Supreme Court of the Huited States ?
October Term, 1967:
No. | 897
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner, ;
v.
CIVIL:AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent.
—
a
APPENDIX B TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
a
Cuartes Picker,
Cart S. Rows,
25 Broadway, .
New York, N. Y. 10004,
Counsel for Petitioner.
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INDEX
= . PAGE
Order E-22022, dated April 12, 1965 ccm Bl
” Order E-8833, dated December 20, 1954°(19 0. A.B.
a casi . B11
~ Order E-10117, dated March 23, 1956 (23 C. A. B. |
307, 312) . Bagg
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Appendix B .
— OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ‘BOARD
° caer ge aoe B-22022
Untrep States or AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
ie
' Wasurneton, D. C.
Docket 1706 et al.
Rrorenep TRANSATLANTIC FINAL Mar. Rate Case -
Cm <i>
_
Decided: April 12, 1965
‘The fair and reasonable final mail pay for the international
operations of Trans World Airlines, Inc., for the
period February 5, 1946 through December 31, 1953, |
after offsetting excess earnings of $2,859,000, from its
domestic operations for the periods February 5, 1946
- through March 13, 1947 and January 1, 1951 through
Détember 31, 1953, and after taking account of the tax
-eredit, is $48, 633,000.
Two-thirds of the losses caused by the. 1953 navigator
strike resulted from failures of -honest, economical, :
and efficient management, and are therefore disallowed
for all purposes. :
The remainder of the losses caused by the 1953 navigator
strike and-all of the losses caused by the 1946 pilot
strike were incurred under honest, economical, and
efficient management, and are recognized i in computing
the break-even need of the carrier’ s international Op-
erations. :
References in bold type are to pages in the Record.
c
~)
=?
w@
By Boyp, Chairman:
. B2 F
: (16680, 16681) :
~
“. A fair and reasonable rate of return for the carrier’s in-
ternational operations during the period. under review,
eliminating the risk of strike losses, 1 is seven percent.
In screening the results of. carrier’s domestic operations
_ for offset purposes, its 1946 strike losses are recog-
nized in. computing its domestic: break-even need.
A fair and reasonable rate of return for offset purposes
for the carrier’s domestic operations during the offset
period defined herein, eliminating the visk of strike
‘losses, is eight percent. ur, ,
Accruals to a’reserve for taxes deferred due to accelerated ,
amortization, not representing taxes actually paid. by
the carrier, are not allowed as a proper tax expense:
in -determining domestic earnings during the offset
Se cachanail | Peay
16681
The rate fixed Sitiiie is subject to adjustment to ‘reflect _
properly such actual tax credits as may ultimately
accrue to the carrier as a result of the payback re-°
om hereby.
Avreanantes:
‘Same as in initial decision, and also
Thomas F. Meagher, Jr., for the Postmaster General.
ae 16682 t .. :
. -
OPINION OF THE Boarp
4
We have before us for decision, on remand by the
courts, the last remaining phase of the Transatlantic Final °
CR — ¥ ~_——— ee em ol
<8 prey soe
tye
v ws
-—_—_——_——--y-_ -
ce
(16682, 16683)
Mail Rate Case, involving a determination of the proper
mai] compensation for the international operations of --
Trans Wor Id. Airlines, Inc.,.for the period February 5,
1946, through December 31, 1953.
A brief review of the prior proceedings i in the case will
assist in. understanding the ‘specific issues that we must
here decide! The Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case
was a consolidated proceeding directed to fixing final mail
_ratés for the transatlantic operations of the three United
States air carriers who were then providing such services.”
As to TWA, he ‘only carrier with which we are here
concerned, the mail rate to be established ,embraced the
_entire early life of its scheduled transatlantic services
which were inaugurated on February 5, 1946. Since the
Board at that time followed: the, general practicé of fixing.
‘separate rates for the international and domestic opera-
tions of multidivisional carriers like TWA, the proceeding
‘did not include any issue going to the mail rates for TWA’s
"16683 '
_..domestic operations.$
After hearings and all other si tisadisi ine: in the
juin had been completed but before the Board had
. issued a final decision, the. United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Delta Air Lines v. Summer-
i: field, 347 US. 74 (1954). The Court there held that under
4 Transatlantic Final Mail. Rate Case, 19 C.A.B. 464 (1954), 21 C.A.B.
484 (1955), 23 C.A.B. 307 (1956), 28 C.A.B. 959 (1958). “s
2 In. addition to TWA, ‘the carriers ‘involved were American - Ovestens
Airlnies and Pan “American World. Airways. Final transatlantic mail
_ rates for the two latter carriers have since been established, and they are
. no longer in the case. Order E-18072, March 5, 1962.
. In American AiP et al., Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 558 (1951), the Board |
established final mail rates for TWA’s domestic operations. Under that
a
order, effective January 1, 1951, the carrier's domestic operations were
placed on a future. service rate that provided just compensation for |
transporting the mail, but. contained no element of subsidy based upon
“need.” TWA has remained on a servicé rate ——— . at all times
since then. ¢ ’
- me
-
(16683, 16684)
the Act the Board in. fixing subsidy rates must°do so on
the ‘basis of the “need” of the.carrier as a whole, and that,
_accordingly, in fixing rates for the foreign operations of a
carrier having both foreign and domestic operations, the.,
Board ‘is. required to offset any “excess” earnings from
the carrier’s. domestic operations against the “heed” of its
‘foreign operations. In the light of the‘court’s decision in ~
Delta, the Board reopened the proceeding for further
hearings on the question.of whether TWA’s domestic divi-
sion. had any excess earnings that should be offset against
the “need” of its international division in determining
the mail rate for its transatlantic operations.4
Thereafter, the Board issued its decision in the so-called
¢
. “transatlanti¢ phase” of the case, in which, jt disposed of-
all issues: relating to the fixing of the rate of TWA’s
transatlantic — ae
16684
as such> After further hearings and appropriate pro- -
*cedural steps, it ‘subsequently also issued its decision’ in
the so-called “offset phase” of the case, in which it deter-
mined the excess earnings of TWA’s domestic division,
and applied that excess to the need of the international .
division as previously determined to arrive at TWA’s final
transatlantic mail rate for the 1946-1953 period.®
In the course of its decisions disposing of the numerous
issues in the proceeding, the Board among other things
a Transatlanti¢ Final Mail Rate Case, 19 C.A.B. 682 (1964). ;
5 Transatlantic, Fina} Mail Rate Case, 19 C.A.B. 464 (1954), reaffirmed,
21 C.A.B. 484 (1955). The Board established January 1, 1954, as the
cut-off date between the past and prospective rate periods for the Snr-
_¥ier’s international operations; fixed a “need” mail rate for these opera-. -
tions during the past period February 5, 1946-Décember 31, 1953, subject
to such adjustmefits as might be called ‘for by its determinations on the
offset isxne; and ‘fixed a final future service mail rate. for these opera-
tious after December 31, 1953.. TWA has remained on a service mail rate
internationally at all times since December 31, 1953. :
6 Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, 23 C.A.B. ‘807 (1956).
b.
Bm. °°
Q 2 Meee Pe oe
refused to: recognize as part of the carrier’s break-even
need, in both the tramsatlantic and offset phases, strike
‘losses incurred by TWA’s international and domestic di-
(16684, 16685)
_ visions during the past period under review, primarily on
grounds (a) that’as a matter of general policy the Board
should not attempt to assess strike. fault or to intervené
in. labor disputes on the side of either management or
labor, and (b) that the risk of strike losses should in any
event be borne by the carrier’s rate of return on invest- .
ment, rather than by its break-even need. In the offset
. phase, the Board also refused to recognize as a deduction
in computing the excess earnings of TWA’s domestic ©
division the accruals to a “deferred” tax reserve set up by
TWA on the books of its domestic oe
16685 + #§#3=|
division ‘that were designed to meet anticipated ‘tax liabil- -
ities expected to accrue in future years as a result of ac-
celerated amortization of emergency facilities which the
carrier had acquired. The effect. of these two determi-
nations was to decrease the need of ‘TWA’s international. .
division and to increzse thé excess earnings of its domestic
division that were available for offset against this need.
, Upon appeal by TWA from the Board’s orders, the
court, without passing on any part of the merits of the
appeal, vacated the orders as to°-TWA and remanded the |
ease to the Board for further consideration on the ground
that the then.Chairman of the Board, who was one of thé
three-member majority voting not to allow TWA’s tax-
reserve accruals’as an expense in the offset phase, should
have disqualified himself because, in his prior capacity as
Solicitor of the Post Office Department, he‘had signed a
brief to the Board dealing with other issues in the case.? .
“4
(C.A.D.C. 1958).
\
?
Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F. 24 90
A ee eT
ee
B6
(16685, 16686)
On the same day, the court in a companion casé involv-
ing an appeal by American Overseas Airlines from the
same set of orders vacated those orders as to AOA and
rematided the case to the Board for further proceedings
on the ground, inter alia, that under the Act the Board
could: not disallow strike losses as a matter of general
policy, but must determine the proper treatment of such
losses on the basis of appropriate findings of fact under
the specific mail-rate Me sO
16686
standards set forth in section 406 of the Act.8 |
Following these two court deeisions, the Board reopened
the Transatlantic Mail Rate Case for further hearings on
the question of the extent, if any, to which TWA’s subsidy.
mail rates for 1946-53 should include allowances for losses
caused by its 1946 pilot strike and its 1953 navigator strike,
and for deferred taxes related to the accelerated amortiza-
tion of its equipment.® It is those two questions which
must be resolved here.
Public hearings were held before Examiner James _S. |
+ Keith, who thereaftey issued his initial decision in which
he found that the losses resulting from the 1946 pilot
strike and the first four days of the 1953 navigator strike
‘should be recognized as an expense in computing TWA’s
scion
8 American Overseas Airlines v. Oivil Aerqnautics Board, 254 F. 2d
744 (C.A.D.C. 1958). . The grounds for the Board’s refusal to recognize
the AOA and the TWA strike losses were identical; all pafties presented ~
the strike-loss issue to the court.as a single question of law governing
the appeals of both carriers; and nothing in the court’s decision suggests
an intept to lithit its scope to the situation of AOA alone. ola.
«9 Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, 28 C.A.B. 959 (1958).
The Board also included as an issue in the reopened proceeding a third
question as to the amount that. should be allowed TWA for capitalized
interest on equipment-purchase funds. The parties by stipulation agreed
on the disposition of that issue, the examiner adopted that disposition
in his initial decision, and the Board did not grant review. Accordingly,
the ixsue is not before us, except to the extent that the disposition which
has been made éf it must be taken into account in computing the dollar
amount of TWA’s final mail pay.
wd B7
(16686, 16687)
break-even need, but that the losses from the remaining
period of the navigator strike should be disallowed under
the statutory standard of honest, economical, and efficient
management; that the . Lass
16687
rate of return for TWA’s transatlantic operations should
be reduced from the 7 percent previously fixed by the
Board to 6.9 percent, in order to compensate for the re-
moval of the risk of strike losses from that rate; and that
- TWA’s accruals to its deferred tax reserve should be rec-
ognized as an expense. The Board exercised its right of
discretionary review as to both the strike-loss ‘and the
_ deferred-tax issues.1® . All parties filed briefs and the
Board heard oral argument.
Upon consideration of the record and the contentions of
the parties, we find that we are in agreement with the ex-
aminer’s ultimate conclusion that all of TWA’s 1946 strike
losses and one-third of its 1953 strike losses should be rec-
ognized in computing its break-even need but that the
balance of its 1953 strike losses’ should be disallowed.
However, we conclude that the rate of return for PW4A’s
transatlantic operations should not be reduced to 6.9 per-
cent as proposed by the examiner, and that-accruals to its
deferred tax-reserve should not be recognized as an ex-
pense. Even as to the issues on which we agree with the -—
examiner’s ultimate conclusions, our reasorfs for arriving
at these conclusions differ from his in material respects,
which we now proceed to discuss. The portions of the
examiner’s initial decision which we adopt as our own,
except as modified herein, are attached hereto as Appen-
dix A.
10 Bureau counsel sought review of the examiner’s determinations on
both issues; TWA sought review only of the examiner's partial disallow-
ance of its 1953 strike loss and his reduction of its international rate of
return to 6.9.percent; the Postmaster General sought review only of the
examiner’s allowance of the carrier’s deferred-tax _accruals. S
BS
(16688)
16688
The Strike Loss Issue
All parties agree that the court’s decision in the AOA
case, supra, is practically, even though perhaps not |
technically, controlling here. As is discussed later, the
parties advance conflicting views as to what the AOA
decision requires of the Board. However, out of thescon-
flicting interpretations of that decision, two points emerge.
with clarity and are agreed to by all parties. First, in
determining the treatment of TWA’s strike losses for
subsidy computation purposes, we are to give no consid-
eration to the possible effects of our determination on the
bargaining position of lalor or management in future
labor di§putes. We accept the court’s ruling on this point,
and have excluded all such matters from our considera-
tion.
Second, if we find | on the record. before us that either or
both of the strikes which TWA experienced would not
have occurred, or would not have continued, under honest,
economical and efficient management, then to that’ extent
we are barred by the express language of the statute from
making any allowance for the losses thus ineurred in com-
puting the carrier’s need for subsidy. Accordingly, we
will proceed to assess TWA’s management performance :i ‘in
connection with these two strikes.
Honest, economical, and efficient management. During
the. review period TWA suffered two strikes. The first,
which occurred in 1946, involved its pilots, and resulted in
‘a total cessation of all of the carrier’s services—both inter-
national and: domestic—for 25 days. The second, which
occurred in 1953, involved its navigators, and. atrectes | the
earrier’s international services for 12 days.
4
B9 ny ae.
(16689)
16689
The examiner’s description of the events leading up to—
and surrounding both the 1946 pilot strike and the 1953.
navigator strike is clear and comprehensive, and we adopt
it as our own. We-also adopt his conclusion that the cost
‘of the pilot strike and thé first four days of the navigator |
strike was not the result of any lack of honest, economical, -
and efficient management on the part of TWA, but that. the
cost of the remaining period of the 1953 strike was attrib-
utable to a-lack of economical and éfficient, management
on the carrier’s part. We wish to add only a few comments
of our own on this issue.!! ° |
Unlike the examiner, we are not so certain that TWA’s
insistence in 1946 on industry-wide bargaining through the
_ Airline Negotiating Committee (ANC), in the. face of
strong opposition by. the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), which represented the TWA pilots, to any.
change in the existing pattern of individual carrier
negotiations, was a wise act. Further, we cannot accept
the argument that, because the Board approved ‘under
section 412 the agreement among carriers setting up ANC,
TWA was therefore justified in insisting on industry-wide
hargaining. The Board’s approval of the organization of
ANC signified no more than that it found the agreement
11On brief, bureau counsel argues that the burden of proof on the
issue of honest, economical, and efficient management is on the carrier
and that TWA has here failed to meet this burden; he takes exception
to the failure of the examiner to.rule on this issue. In response, TWA
cites language from the AOA decision which, it insists, places the burden |
on bureau counsel to demonstrate'a lack of: proper management. The
issue of burden of proof was not before the court in AOA, and. we do
not believe the court intended to express an opinion on this point.
Accordingly, we reaffirm our long-standing rule that the burden of proof
as to honest, economical, and efficient management is on the carrier, but
find that, to the extent noted above, TWA has sustained that burden.
B10
(16690)
16690
in 1 question’ not to be in and of itself contrary to the public
interest...
If the strike ned occured during thé period when TWA
was refusing to bargain individually with ALPA, we
might very well have found a disqualifying lack of eco-
nomical and efficient management. In the actual event,
however, even if TWA’s earlier insistence on industry-
wide bargaining was unwise, there is no substantial basis ©
for concluding that this insistence was a material cause of 7
the strike which actually took place.
Clearly, the immediate cause of the strike was ALPA’s
desire to enforce its demands for wage increases greatly in
excess of those recommended by the Emergency Board,
and not TWA’s earlier insistence on industry-wide bar-
gaining. If TWA had bargained indiyidually with the
union throughout, the strike might have taken place at a
different time, but would in all probability have taken
place nonetheless, and over exactly the same issue of wage
-inereases. It is equally plain that no criticism can be
leveled at TWA’s management for refusing to yield to the
. union’s ultimatum or grant its demands. «Whatever our
views on the wisdom of TWA’s stand .on industry-wide
bargaining, those views cannot affect our allowance.or dis-
allowance of TWA/’s strike losses in the absence of a find-
ing of proximate causation linking the one to the other.
The record here clearly establishes the absence of such
causation.
Turning to the navigator strike, we agree with the ex-
aminer that the strike was an illegal-one, called in vio-
lation of the.no-strike pledge in the collective bargaining
agreement between TWA and the Air Line Navigators
Association (ANA), not in response to any violation by
TWA of the agreement, and not even in accordance with
the union’s own strike procedure. At all:
1
Bll
(16691)
16691
times prior to and during the strike, TWA acted strictly
in accordance with its legal and contractual rights and
obligations, whereas ALMA did not. From this stand-- ~*~
point, therefore, the blame for the strike must fall entirely
upon the union. ae ;
But good labor relations is not simply a matter of strict
observance of ‘and insistence upon legal and contractual
rights and duties; it is a matter also of relations among
human: beings, and due account must be taken of ordinary
human attitudes and emotions. Here, the navigators were
well aware that their jobs were ultimately forfeit, since
' their union had signed an agreement which left TWA free
to abolish their jobs and furlough them as ground navi-
gation aids became available. Plainly, however, no agree-
ment could ‘make them happy with ‘this situation. |
TWA must have known this, and must have known also
that the actual commencement of operations without navi-
gators on ‘the. European route segments would be a’
particularly critical time, when the emotions of the navi-
‘gators would be most likely to result in some outbreak.
At such a time, we think, wise management would have
made an exceptional effort to soothe the feelings of its em-
ploy-»s. .TWA could have done a great deal in this
dire: ion, without waiving any portion ‘of its legal or
concractual rights, simpy by taking ALNA into its. con-
fidence as to the details of its plans for the gradual
changeover to operations without navigators.
In particular (and this is the only point we would add to
the examiner’s findings of fact), it appears that TWA’s
- management knew on or about July 1, 1953—about the
time it discontinued the’ use of navigators -on the Paris-
Rome :
B12 |
(16692)
16692,
segment, and about ten days before the strike beyan—that
it would not in fact be necessary to furlough any naviga-
_tors at this time or for an indefinite future period. In all
probability, if the navigators had been aware of this fact,
the strike would not®have taken place, or at least would
not have taken place when it did. \Yet there is no evidence
in the record before us that TWA made any effort to
acquaint ALNA with this fact. Instead, when the union
itself requested a meeting to discuss its problems, TWA
appears to have assigned the whole matter a rather low
ity, deferring the request and routing it “through
annels.”
In short, while the immediate cause of the strike was
the unreasonable demand by ALNA for a job security
which it had already knowingly relinquished, and its un-
foufded assertion that TWA was violating the collective
bargaining agreement, still: we cannot escape the conclusion
' that a contributing cause was the ‘carrier’s failure to pse.
all reasonable means to avert a work. stoppage, specifically
by taking the navigators into its confidence as to its plans»
for their future.
We do not think, however, that this ieniiniden requires
us to disallow TWA’s strike losses in toto. The basie cause
of the strike was the navigators’ understandable but un-
justified desire to keep their jobs indefinitely, and this
TWA could not have conceded consistently with its obliga-
tion to avoid ‘wasteful and unnecessary expense. Ultimately
it did becotie necessary to phase out the navigators, and
there certainly’ is-a substantial possibility that,*had a
strike been avoided in 1953, it would nevertheless have
occurred at this later time. Accordingly, we think that
fairness requires that we attribute
ne ee
B13
(16693) °
16693
| only a fraction of the cost of the 1953 strike to the failure
of economical and efficient managemeut on TWA’s part.
WwW hat fraction, of course, is a matter of judgment.
Once the strike had begun, we agree entirely with the
examiner that it was unnecessarily prolonged by TWA’s
intransigence. It is apparent from the testimony: that,
within a very short time after their walkout, the naviga-
tors realized its futility; thereafter, their primary con-
cern was to return to work under circumstances which
- would not leave those individual navigators who had
- responded to the strike Syd by, refusing their flights to
.. bear the whole brunt o
the consequences of the union’s’
collective action. ALNA’s request for reinstatement of
the discharged navigators was not an unreasonable one, _
even though the strike itself was illegal; TWA. in fact ac-_
ceded to this request in the ultimate -settlement of the
strike. As the examiner found, if TWA had not so long ~
continued to insist on what amounted to unconditional
surrender on the union’s part, it could have achieved
preciscly the settlement it ultimately did at the cost of a
substantially shorter strike.
TWA insists that its firm position resulted in establish-
- ing once and for all its right to eliminate navigators from
its international flights, and thereby averted later strikes
on the part not only of the navigators but of radio’ opera-
- tors as well. This contention strikes us as pure specula-. :
tion, without any substantial support in the record. The
1952 collective bargaining agreement had already estab-
lished TWA’s right to eliminate navigators; the 1953
strike was obviously a failure from the start, as the
settlement agreement
B14
| (16694, 16695)
16694
acknowledged; and we cannot see that the unnecessary
prolongation of the strike contributed anything to future
: labor’ peace.
In summary; we find that a more communicative attitude
on the part of TWA would have appreciably reduced the
likelihood of a strike ; that a less intransigent attitude after
the strike had beater would undoubtedly have greatly re-
duced its length without requir ing any sacrifice of prin-—
ciples; and that the carrier’s failure to seek damages from
the union was inconsistent with its own professed justifica-
_ tion for its rigid attitude during the strike. However, in
view of the strike’s illegality and lack of justification on
_ the union’s part, and the substantial possibility that some
strike would have occurred even if the carrier had acted
more wisely, we do not feel justified i in wholly disallowing
. the carrier’s strike losses. |
Considering all of the foregoing factors together, it is ©
our judgment that the examiner satisfactorily resolved the
issue by attributing two-thirds of the strike losses to fail-
‘ures of honest, economical, and efficient management on
the part of the carrier. Accordingly, $669,000 out of
- TWA’s tot#l 1953 strike loss of $1,003,000 will be dis- .
' allowed under the statmnery test. |
16695
Other suggested grounds for disallowance. . Having de-
- termined that none of TWA’s 1946 strike losses and only
a portion of its 1953 strike losses should be disallowed
under the test of honest, economical, and efficient man-
agement, we must next determine whether: the carrier’s
remaining strike losses should be disallowed on anv other
ground. For, if they should, it would become unnecessary
‘
to pass upon the ene question posed by the court's
a B15
(16695, 16696) i ete
&,
£ ,
remand of whether the strike losses should be assigned to
the break-even element of TW.A’s rate as an expense or to:
the return element as a risk of doing business. Bureau
Counsel argues that the losses should be disallowed on the
dual ground that (1) the occurrence of strikes .does not
contribute to the maintenance and continued development ~
of air transportation for the purposes set forth in section. *-
406(b). of the Act, and (2) the strikes here disenabjéd
TWA from performing the only services for which the .
Board is empowered to provide. compensation tnder set-
tion 406, The examiner rejected this contention.
Although the primary basis for the Board’s prior re-
-fusal to recognize TWA’s strike losses was its conclusion
that as a matter of policy it should not ‘attempt to assess
strike fault or to intervene in labor disputes on thé side of.
either management or labor and that the risk of strike
losses should in any event be borne by the carrier’s rate of
return rather than its break-even need, .the Board addi-
~ tionally found that none of the basic purposes for which .
subsidy is intended would be fulfilled by recognizing strike
costs, even where not assigned as a responsibility of man-
agement, and that the Board should not provide subsidy
for periods when no service
16696
is performed. Upon further consideration of the matter
_ We now reach the opposite conclusion, and find ourselves
in agreement with the examiner. re
Bureau Counsel points to our consistent polic¢ of dis-
allowing such items as charitable contributions, entertain-
ment expenses, losses on military contracts and other serv-
ices ineligible for subsidy, and expenses ‘of prosecuting
unsuccessful route applications, among others,.. without
regard to considerations of honest, economical, and effi-
cient management, and argues that strike losses should be
7 oe eg
-
- *BIG
-. disallowed for the same reasons. The examiner, on the’
other hand, eonsidered strike losses more comparable to
losses ound by floods, fires, aircraft groundings, and
strikes in other industries which depress airline traffic, all
of which we have heretofore allowed’ in subsidy cases.
While none of these analogies are so close as necessarily
to be governing, we find the examiner’s analogies more.
pertinent than Bureau Counsel’s. The distinguishing fea-
ture of charitable contributions, entertainment expenses,
and the like is that they represent. activities which con-
sume ‘the funds of the_carrier for, purposes not contrib- -
uting to the maintenance and development of a sound
certificated air transportation system, undertaken at the
initiative of management and-completely within its control.
The distinguishing feature of the group of analogies cited
. by the examiner, on.the other hand, is that they-are all
hazards over whose incidence management has substan-
tially no control, encguntered | in the course of activities
which are a necessary. part of the carrier’s certificated
a _— 16697 |
~
oper ations . and which do contribute to the « «maintenance -e
and development of the air. transportation. system,
' Strikes plainly fit more nearly into’ the latter category:
_ than the former. They are not undertaken on management
’ initiative, but on thé initiative of employee groups who. are |
seeking to force management to grant wage and other
‘ demands which management deems it in .the best. interest
of the carrier to deny. . No airline of. any size can be run
‘without large groups of employees, yet the -hiring of em-
ployees obviously carries with it the risk ‘that’ they will
some day go out on strike; To: be sure, since labor rela-
tions are an.aspect of human relations, management has: ~
mueh greater power to prevert or at least to:minimize the
occurrence: of strikes than it does in. the. case of floods, ;
_ aireraft ‘groundings, and other natural and méchanical
(16696, 16697)
SNe Se een ee ee
a
)° R
‘B17/ Y
. (16697, 16698)
hazards. We'are not, are a prepared to assert that
management has it within its power to avoid strike fOsses
completely—particularly when it is remembered that we
are now considering only ‘strikes which are not directly
caused or prolonged by any failure of ‘honest, economical,
and efficient management.
than as activities undertaken, on na agement’s initiative, ‘
the argument on this point loses its fotee, Obviously strikes
do not contribute to the maintenance and development of
air transportation, any more than do floods, fires, earth-
quakes, aircraft groundings, or strikes in other industries ;
yet losses from all or:
-- Qnee strikes are seen as hazards encountered,: rather ~
16698
of these latter hazards have been held to justify increaxes
in mail pay.12 The analogy’ of aircraft grounding losses"
is particularly instructive. _When in the Big Four case13
the Board decided to Allo “ grounding losses for subsidy
computation- purposes, it did not-suggest that aircraft
groundings themselves contributed to the development of
air transportation. It found, rather, tliat such groundings
were an inescapable hazard connected with the introduc-
tion of new aircraft types; that the development of air
transportation required that carriers prudently but ex-
peditiously introduce hich new aircraft types; and that a
rule of subsidy rate-making which might have a tendency
to deter. carriers from introducing new aircraft types
by
12 Transatlantic Final Mail ‘Rate Case. 19 C.A.B. 464, 480 (195-4)
(TWA's own flood losses) ; Wicn Alaska Airlines, Mail Rates, 16 C.A.R.
237, 242 (1952) (fire losses in excess of insurance recovery): Kodiak
Airways, Mail Rates, Orders E-20637, 20690, 20694, and 20733. April 1,
14, and 24, 1964 (earthquake) : Amé¢rican Air, ct al.. Mail Rates. 16
C.A.B. 341, 343-7 (1949). (aircraft sroundings) ; Trans-Pacific Airlines.
6
ene F-16609, April 4, 1961 (restoration of Aloha and Hawaiian to snb-
sidy status during sugar strike). ‘.
13 American Air, et al., supra, 10 C.A.B, at 343-7.
-
B18
(16698, 16699)
would therefore be contrary to the objectives of section
406. The Board therefore allowed losses caused by’ such
aircraft groundings to be capitalized and amortized out of
. subsidy over a period related to the expected life of the
aircraft types themselves.
Here, TWA obviously could not have operated at all
without employing pilots,.and it could not have operated » —
its international routes during the period in question with-
, out employing navigators. Moreover, as the examiner’s
description of the background events makes clear, the 1946
— 16699
pilot strike was directly related to the introduction of new
_ four-engine aircraft types into airline service in the post- —
war period. Similarly, the 1953 navigator strike grew
directly out of the development of ground navigation aids
in Europe and elsewhere, which gradually made the fur-
ther. employment of navigators unnecessary. Both the
introduction of new aircraft types and the spread of
ground navigation aids were highly-’desirable develop-
ments in our domestic and international air transportation —
system. These developments carried with them, however,
the risk of just such labor unrest and ensuing strikes as
_in fact occurred. Accordingly, we find that TWA’s str ike
losses, to the extent we have found them not attributable
to any lack of honest, economical, and efficient manage-
ment, were caused by a hazard integrally related to ‘the .
development of air transportation, and hence should not
he disallowed for subsidy purposes on the basis here sug-
_ gested by bureau counsel:
The second argument pressed on us is that to make
allowance for TWA’s strike losses in computing its sub-
sidy mail pay would amount to granting it subsidy for
periods during which no mail service was in fact being
performed. The court’s decision in the AOA case does
not specifically dispose of this argument; nonetheless, in
oO
B19
(16699, 16700)
view of the outcome of that case, we must at least treat
this argument as suspect.14 ' .
= 16700
It seems to us, on reconsideration, that a refusal to
recognize strike losses on the datter ground would require
that we take a “keyhole view” of.the carrier’s operations—
a view which the Board has frequently refused to take
in other céntexts.5 Weare here fixing.. TWA’s inter-
“national mail pay, not for the 38 days during: which its
operations were impaired or halted by strikes, but for a
period of nearly 8 years, during almost all of which it was
duly performing certificated passenger, cargo, and mail
- Service, ;
To be sure, since Congress chose to tie subsidy to the
carriage of mail, it may well be that if a strike resulted in’
‘a carrier’s permanent’ cessation of its certificated mail
service we would be without authority to award it subsidy
for any period subsequent to the actual date of termination
of such service.!6 But that is not this case, for TWA went
on playing an important role in the development of air
transportation despite these strikes. As the AOA decision
emphasizes, the need provision of section 406 looks not so
much to the immediate service being performed as to the
- development of a sound air transportation system capable
cp
14 These, and other, alternate grounds suggested by bureau counsel
for reaffirming the Board’s earlier action were.all in fact relied on by
the Board. previously, were discussed in the relevant orders, were pointed
out to the court by Board counsel as independent justifications for the
Board’s actions, and were specifically mentioned by the court in the early
part of its opinion. Some of the alternate grounds were discussed fur-
ther in the court's opinion, while others were not; but there certainly .
is no basis for any assumption that the court misunderstood or ignored
them. ;
15 See, ¢.g., Braniff Airways, Mait Rates, 11 C.A.B, 431, 434 (1950) :
Wextern-Inland, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 201, 249-51 (1950); Capital Air.
lines, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 623, 625, 626 n. 9 (1951).
-16 Compare Florida Airways, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B, 1, 2-5 (1950).
_ (16700, 16701)
of performing services in the future. The fact here is that
TWA came out of ‘each of these periods of interrupted
service with fewer funds, therefore with prima facie less
ability to continue the development of air transportation,
- and thus with a correspondingly greater need for subsidy.
If the carrier is reimbursed by subsidy for its strike losses,
_ therefore, this added subsidy will relate to the carriage
' of mail and the performance of certificated service after
‘the respective strikes, and not during them.
16701
» Coverage of TWA’s strike losses—break-even need or
rate of return—tternational phase. There remains to be
determined what form of provision should be made for
_ the strike losses. Here, as elsewhere, the parties are in |
diametric disagreement. TWA “insists that the AOA ~
decision requires the inclusion of its strike.losses in its
break-even need, while bureau counsel insists that there
is nothing in that decision to keep us from ‘adopting
slightly more detailed and explicitsfindings and then pro-
ceeding to reaffirm the Board’s earlier stand that the risk
of strike losses is properly assignable to the carricr’s rate
of return. The examiner found that the strike losses
should be included in break-even need on the ground that
the AOA decision. compelled such treatment. Although
our own reappraisal of this issue leads us to the conclu-
sion that the strike losses should be recognized in com- ©
puting TWA’s. break-even need, our determination does
not rest on the belief that such treatment is required by
the AOA decision. —
It is clear that with respect to rates being fixed for a
future period the court unreservedly approved the Board’s
refusal to project and make provision for possible future
strike losses. As to past periods, the court equally strongly
emphasized that the Board must take into account the
| B21
(16701, 16702)
facts of the carrier’s operations as they actually occurred. |
However, even though some of the language of the court’s
opinion standing alone might suggest that where a strike
has taken place during an open-rate period the carrier’s
mail pay for that period must include direét break-even:
reimbursement for the strike losses unless they are dis-
qualified under the standard of honest, economical, and
efficient management, the opinion as a whole
16702
convinces us that the court intended no such result. As
we read that opinion the court left the way open for an
ultimate finding that strike losses are covered by a car-
‘Tier’s rate of return, provided only that any such finding
must be based upon the particular facts relating to the
operations. and rate of return of. the individual carrier
suffering the strike. Thus, we see the question before
us solely as one of whether as a matter of discretion and
sound rate-making policy, the losses should be treated one
way or the other, and our determination to include the
losses in break-even need rests entirely on our judgment
that this is the more desirable course under the facts of
the present case. : 7
The principal reason put forward for assigning TWA’s
risk of strike losses to the return element of its subsidy
need is that this would be in accordance, with the general
policy laid down by the Board in ‘the Braniff case in 1948,
to the effect that all abnormal risks which are neither -
predictable nor measurable should be met out of the rate
of return on investment.!7 However, since the announce-
ment of this general policy 16 years ago, there seems to
eo
17 Braniff Airways, Mail Rates, 9 C.AB. 607, 616-7 (1948).
\
‘
B22
(16702, 16703)
» s
have been no case in which the Board has applied it
except in the earlier orders in the present case.'8
The original Braniff case held that losses caused by air~
_eraft groundings should be absorbed by the rate of return;
_but this specific application of |
16703
the supposed general policy was reversed in the Big Four
ease, Where the Board held that grounding losses should
be met out of ‘the break-even element over a period of.
years.19 And in an’earlicr phase of this very case, the
Board held the Braniff policy inapplicable to TW A’s flood
losses.2 It is true that fhe Board specified this as an
exception to the general policy, which it reaffirmed, and
gave as its reasor for treating flood losses differently from
strike losses that flood losses might bankrupt a carrier,
whereas there appeared to be no possibility that strike
’ losses might do so. The fact was, however, that the flood -
loss recognized for TWA was less than a third of the strike
losses we are now recognizing; and it seems to us on re-
consideration that in the case of most carriers—certainly
in the case of so large a carrier as TWA, whose.equipment
and facilities are widely distributed and not exposed to
any single natural .disaster—the likelihood of being
crippled by strike losses is far greater than the likelihood
of being crippled by losses caused by floods or other sim-
ilar catastrophies. Similarly, the reason given earlier for
treating grounding losses differently than strike losses—
that grounding losses were “developmental” while strike
18In National Airlines, Mail Rates, 22 C.A.B. 524, 529 (1955) which is
cited by Bureau Counsel, the Koard did disallow the carricr's strike losses,
»but an inspection of the opinion there shows that the disallowance was
based on the policy considerations later disapproved by the court in the
AOA case, rather than.on the grounds that the losses should,pe met out of
the carrier's rate of return.
19 American Air. ct al., Mail Ratcs, 10 C.A.B. 341, 343-7 (119).
20 Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, 10 C.A.B. 464, 480 (1954).
can
: B23 .
(16703, 16704)
losses were not—now seems to us lacking in substance for
reasons previously herein discussed. eo
In other cases, the Board has made provision in the
break-even element rather than the return element for
losses caused by fire and by earthquake ;
16704
and even provided temporary subsidy for the two Hawai-
ian interisland carriers, then on a service rate, when their
traffic drastically declined. because of the 1958 Hawaiian
sugar strike.*4' Bureau counsel attempts diligently to dis-
tinguish-each-of these cases from the present one,‘and in |
truth some differences do exist, but they do not seem to
have any relevance to the expressed rationale of the
Braniff doctrine. Accordingly, while the policy enunciated
in Braniff remains in effect insofar as future-period mail-
rate computations are concerned, we are ‘constrained to |
find: that it is not being and has not been followed in past-
period computations. !
. We find nothing elsewhere that would require or war-
rant a refusal to include.as a cost ih computing TWA’s -
_ break-even need the strike losses actually incurred by the
carrier in the exercise of honest, economical, and efficient :
management. Here we are fixing a past period rate for
TWA’s .international operations for a. period’ commenc-
ing on the date the carrier first ‘inaugurated inter-
national services in 1946 and continuing for the eight
succeeding yéars through 1953. Thus, we are faced
with the problem that would be encountered in fixing
a future rate were strike losses to be taken. account
of other than through the rate of return, of attempt- :
ing to forecast costs that are’ neither predictable nor
capable of accurate measurement, for here the amount
- of the strike losses are known, Nor do we have a situation
in which a carrier on a closed rate that was set prospec-
tively suffers a strike and reopens its rate seeking direct.
—_—_—
21 See cases cited in note 12, supra.
B24
| (16704, 16705)
reimbursement through break-even need of its strike losses
occurring after the date of reopening (thereby raising the
question of possible double provision for the strike
16705
losses), since the rate being fixed for TWA covers its in-
ternational operations from their inception. ‘Similarly,
the length of the open-rate period here involved minimizes
the risk of double compensation that might be urged as
a basis for ‘refusing to compensate directly for. strike
losses occurring in a short open-rate period that is fol-
lowed by a closed period i in which future rates have already
been established.22 _
Certainly a justification for a rate-of-return treatment,
even in the case of past-period rates, might be found in the
incentive te avoid unnecessary strike losses which a policy
of assigning such losses to the. rate of return would give |
the carrier. However, this treatment could not have had
any effect- on TWA’s labor relations prior to its 1946
strike, in view of the fact that the possibility of such tr eat-
ment was not made, known to the carrier until 1949.23
(Even the Brantff case, which enunciated the general pol-
icy from which this treatment of strike losses might have
been deduced, was not decided. until 1948.)
TWA/’s 1953 strike presents a different picture, since the
Board had by then already announced the poliey of assign-
ing strike losses. to the rate of return, albeit perhaps not
in a form designed to have the maximum impact on the
carrier. However, we cannot very well treat the 1953
strike one way and the 1946 strike another unless we are
prepared to divide the period
. 22 We ‘express no opinion on the treatment that should be veoaaere
strike-losses in the two latter types of situations.
23 The possibility of this treatment first appeared in Order P2731 in
which the Board directed AOA to show cause why it should not disallow
that carrier's atrike losses.
;
st il
(16706)
16706 aa
under review into two parts and fix a separate rate of
return for each, something we certainly do not propose to
do at the present stage of this excessively prolonged case.
Since the losses from the 1946 strike are substantially
greater than the recognized losses from the 1953 strike, the
common-sense solution is to apply the treatment appropri-
ate to the 1946 strike to the entire period. ) |
Bureau Counsel urges that TWA grew and: prospered
during the period in question and thereafter, and conse-
quently cannot demonstrate’ any need for additional sub-
sidy to compensate it for its strike losses, in order to
enable it to. maintain and continue: the development of air
transportation. . Clearly, the need of the carrier is the
central touchstone for all subsidy determinations, How-
ever, it does not follow from this that we must or should
“disallow the cost of the strikes on such a basis.
‘Carried to its logical conclusion, this. argument would
require us to determine the allowance or disallowance -of
various items for subsidy computation purposes, not as at
Present on the basis of considerations peculiar to each
individual item, but on the basis of a broad qualitative
appraisal of the carrier’s achievements in the field of air
transportation during the period under review. While this
position has a certain surface plausibility, and while there
is some language in the court’s AOA opinion which might
appear to support such a simplified test, we are convinced
that it would be impractical to determine mail rates in this
way. It is undoubtedly true that TWA grew dramatically
during the period in question, in terms of passengers,
property, and ‘mail carried, revenues earned, capital in-
vested, and in numerous other
B26
ai (16707, 16708)
16707
respects. But if this were a sufficient basis to disallow
TWA’s &trike losses in computing its final subsidy mail
rate, it could equally serve as the basis for disallowing any
other item, regardless of merit.*4
In fixing subsidies we are constantly required to. rule on
the includability or excludability of items which represent
only a very small fraction of a percent of the carrier’s °
revenues or expenditures for a particular period. Neither :
we nor anyone else is wise. enough to know whether the
allowance or disallowance of an item would spell success
or failure for a carrier with an operating budget of tens
‘of millions. per year. Indeed, when dealing with a car-
rier of the size and financial strength of TWA, it would
hardly be more than the merest’ speculation -to assert that
even a million-dollar difference i in subsidy would mark the
difference between the carrier’s ability and _ its inability to
’ fulfill. the purposes of the statute.
Thus it is not a matter of choice but of absolute necessity
‘that we make our subsidy determinations on an item-by-
item basis; and we think it.is plain from a reading of
other parts of the AOA decision that we are statutorily
. Yvequired to do so. Accordingly, while a finding that a par-
ticular loss has disabled or is en to disable a carrier.
from carrying out a -
16708
its appointed role in the development of air transportation
may well serve as the basis for a compensatory increase in
24 TWA points out, moreover, that it actually received the subsilies in
question at the time under a succession of temporary rate orders, and
thus’ had. the use of the money while it was growing and developing in
the manner Bureau Counsel describes. . The latter's argument ‘therefore
seems particularly wenk as a justifieayion: for recapturing subsidies pre-
viously paid. Of course TWA has not proved that such a recapture
would disable it from continuing to grow and develop hereafter: but the
evident impossibility of such proof simply further demonstrates the fallacy
of this whole approach.
p éf.
Ee has +
.
B27
(16708, 16709)
subsidy,*5 a finding that the carrier has in fact fulfilled its
role in the development of air transportation during a
past period cannot by itself serve as the basis for dis-
allowing’ any paricular loss or expense incurred by that
carrier,
Moreover, there is a positive factor, applicable to both
the 1946 and the 1953 strikes, which supports the conclu-
_ sion ‘that assignment of these particular strike losses to
~ break-even neéd rather than to return is the more appro-
priate treatment here. As we have previously pointed out,
both -of these strikes were intimately bound up with the
advent of particular’ technological changes in air trans- -
portation—the 1946 strike with the introduction of large .
four-engine aircraft, and the 1953 strike with the establish-
ment of ground. navigation aids abroad which made ob-
solete the employment of. navigators. Both of these
technological innovations were of great importance and
were highly beneficial to the development’of air transporta-
_ tion, and it would have been most undesirable for carrier
managements in general and TW.A’s management ‘in
particular to have had any artificial incentive to avoid or
~ delay these developments, as might have been the result
of knowing that losses from these particular strikes would -
have to be met out of return on investment. This intimate
connection of these two strikes with the onset of desirable
technological developments distinguishes them from the
ordinary run-of-the-mill strike over wages, working con-
ditions, or the like, which is not connected with
16709
any particular technological development. In our opinion,
this consideration materially shifts the balance in favor of
25 See Trans-Pacific Airlines, Order E-12371, supra note 12, and other
cases there cited.
B28
| (16709, 16710)
‘ assigning ‘these particular strike losses to TWA’s break-
even need.
peer
In view of the: forexding,. we find that the purposes of
section: 406 will best be served by making provision for .
all of TWA’s 1946 strike losses, and for so much of its
1953 strike losses as are not. required to be disallowed
under the statatory test, a8 part of its international
break-even néed for the 1946-53 open-rate period.
The international rate of return. The exaininer con-
_ cluded that the seven-percent rate fixed previously in this’.
| case was intended to cover the risk of strike losses, and
‘that the return should now. be reduced to 6.9 percent to
_refleetthe élimination of this. risk as a result of the recog-.
nition of the carrier’s actual strike losses as part of its
» break-even need. We agree with the\examiner that the
rate. ‘previously fixed did inelude the risk-of strike losses,
‘and we -are convinced’ that the seven percent previously
- established would\afford TWA a fair return even had we
refused to. recognize, the strike losses in computing the —
- carrier’s ‘break-even need. However, it does not follow
from this that we. must’ now reduce the previously <estab-
lished rate of return to 6.9 percent, and we have concluded
. that we should not do so.
While the theory upon which the examiner eneied is - .
not spelled out in ‘the initial decision, it is apparent that he
took the seven-percent rate previously ‘determined and
simply. subtracted’ ‘therefrom the 0.1. percent which was
the> minimum figure for average. annual: after-tax strike
” impact on the airline: industry as a whole for the 1946-53 ©
period, as shown by bureau
“16710:
. insel’s ‘exhibits, thus arriving at a net rate of: return of
6.9 percent. "The Board, of course, has always used a cost:
of capital approach in fixing rates, and in arriving at a
»°
a é | 4
Te
| B29
(16710, 16711)
rate of return has used the traditional public utility ‘rate-
tnaking techniques of relying on guides such«as debt-equity
. ratios and applying fo them an informed. judgment to
arrive at a rate of return that will enable the carrier to’
. , attract capital and will adequately compensate the: in-
. vestors for their risks. However, the return has never
been computed by attempting to identify all individual
risks and to assign a precise value to them, and, indeed, it
would be totally impractical to attempt to do so.2® Simi-
larly, it would’ be impractical and unrealistic to adopt the
reverse procedure here.
It is clear beyond all question that the industry-wide risk ©
of strikes in the review period here was only a small frac-
tion of the seven percent rate of return. Although, under
the judgments that must be exercised, a proper rate might’ J
be 6.9 percent, just as the original rate might have been
7.1, our examination of the record convinces us that the
seven percent rate previously set is fair and reasonable,
even after the action we are taking herein, and should. not
be disturbed. '
Losses in the off set ghase. We now ‘arn to a considera-
tion of the appropriate form of treatment—coverage by the
break-even or by the return element—to be accorded
-TWA’s 1946 domestic strike losses. The examiner’ con- .
cluded that domestic strike losses should not be deducted.
' from the eight-percent return allowed the domestic division
in determining whether that ,
16711 .
division had excess profits to be offset against the interna-
tional division’s subsidy need. We agree, but we cannot
adopt the examiner’s reasoning.
’ 26 The seven-percent rate fixed initially had “tts origin in earlier cases ,
in which ‘no specific consideration was given to measuring or providing
» for the risk of strike losses as such.
B30.
(16711, 16712)
The examiner observed that TWA. was.on a closed
future-type mail rate during the offset period ‘in question;
that the domestic division’s rate of return for offset pur-
poses had been set by us at eight percent on the grounds
that this was an appropriate future-period rate of. return;
and that such future-period rates of return are intended to
cover all risks of unforeseeable contingencies, including in —
particular risks of strike losses. At this point, however,
_ the examiner. fell into a semantic trap dug bye TWA with
its insistence that to compute its domestic strike losses aud
- either add them to ‘its domestic revenues or subtract them
from its eight-percent return would amount to “penalizing
the carrier twice.”
As buredu counsel points. out, this is a fallacy—essen-
tially,-it is the fallacy warned against by Judge Prettyman
in the IWestern-Inland case,” of treating a carrier’s “need”
as a gross from which subtractions are made, rather than
as the net figure it is. Adding to the carrieNe‘actual
revenues a sum representing revenues it would have
received under other circumstances has precisely the same
_ effect on the carrier’s “need” as subtracting from its- actual
expenses a sum representing expenses which it would have -
avoided under other circumstances; if the latter is legiti-
mate, so is the former. If all profits in excess of a speci-_
fied rate of return. are'defined as excess
16712
profits, and if that rate of return is required to cover any
strike losses which may occur during the period in ques-
tion, then any strike losses -which do in fact occur must
be computed and deducted from the specified rate of re-
‘turn, . or (what is equivalent) such strike losses must be
added to profits and the specified rate of return then
"SF Aummerfield we Civil Aeronautica Beard, 207° F.2d 200, (CLAD.
1953), aff'd sub nom. Western Air Linea vy. Civil Acronautics Board, . 347
U.S. G7 (Ub). z
° an
: ~
a -
B31
(16712, 16715)
deducted, in ole to arrive at a correct figure for excess
profits.
_ The foregoing will seem to suggest that we must now
proceed to add $1,130,000 to TWA’s excess profits for
1946-53 available for offset. The explanation for our de-
cision not to do this lies in a closer analysis of the nature
of the rate of return being allowed TWA for offset pur-
poses. The crux of the matter is that this is actually not
a true future-period rate of return at all, but rather a
past-period rate of return comiomning certain exceptional
’ future elements.
The explanation for this seeming paradox lies in the i in-
teraction between the earlier TWA case and. the Delta-
CéS case.28 Even though the TWA case forbids us to
redetermine retroactively the previously fixed final. mail
rates under which TWA’s domestic division operated dur-
ae the offset period, the Delta-C&S case positively requires
to redetermine the need of that division for the sanie
po ll since this is part of that “need of the carrier-as a
whole” which sets an ‘upper limit to the subsidy it may
receive. Since this need is being determined after the fact,
the Western-Inland,”? Delta-Cés,
7 16713
_ and AOA ¢ cases all require us to base our determination
_on the figures from the carrier’s operations as they actu-..
_ ally occurred, not as they had previously’ been forecast.
Moreover, as we have pointed out before, the only need of
a carrier recognized by section 406 is its need under
honest, economical, and efficient management; hence we
are bound to eliminate from TWA’s domestic figures for-
the offset period those expenses and losses which were not
—_-—— +
28 Transcontinental & Western Air v. Civil Aeronautics Board. 236 U.S.
GOL ( 1949) ; ; Delta Air Lines vy. CREA, 347 US. 74 —-
29 Supra, note 26.
B32
(16713, 16714)
incurred under such management. These are all charac
_ teristics of a past-perigd determination.
~The manner of co uting excess profits likewise sug-
gests more a past-perjod than a future-period calculation,
in that such excess prpfits are defined as those in excess of
a return on*investment computed at precisely a speeified
rate. In contrast, a future-period rate of return is one
expected to be achieve exactly: only in a hypothetical
- “normal” year; the everyday risks of the business are ex-
pected to make the actual return fluctuate above and below
the prescribed rate, averaging out in the long run but not
necessarily over any fixed period? Thus the manner of
making the offset computation relieves the carrier of
‘numerous risks ordinarily covered by a future-period rate,
just as does an ordinary past-period computation.
All this points to the fact that our determination of
TW A’s domestic need for offset purposes is essentially a
typical past-period determination, comparable in every
important .respect to our determination of TWA’s inter-
national need for the same period. Accordingly, the ap- ~
propriate return element to be allowed is a past-period
return element, although as will be seen hereafter the
actual rate of return must take into account certain risks
not ordinarily included within a past-period rate.
16714
Since TWA’s domestic rate of return for offset purposes
is thus seen to be a past- period rate, it is no louger a fore-
' gone conclusion that strike losses must be met out of this
rate of return, as would unquestionably have been the case
if this were a true future-period rate of return. The risk .
of ordinary contingencies having been transferred from’
the return element to the break-even élement, it may well
be that the risk of extraordinary contingencies, such as
strikes, should likewise be so transferred. The relevant
considerations are exactly the same as in an ordinary
7) ae
4
B33
(16744, 16715),
past-period situation; principally, whether assignment of
the risk of strike losses to the return clement will have a ~
net incentive effeet tending to reduce the likelihgod of
stvikes while not pushing management in the direction of
other. uneconomic practices. In this case, a weighing of. |
all considerations—particularly the fact that a policy first
announced in 1948-49 could. net have helped motivate the
carrier’s actions in 1946—leads us to conclude that the
purposes of section 406 would best be served by assigning
the risk of strike losses ;during the offset period to the
break-even element rather than to the return element of
TWA’sdomestic need. ; ’
Since the rate of return previously fixed for TWA in the
offset phase, like that fixed in the transatlantic phase, was
intended to cover the risk of strike losses, the reassign-
ment of such losses ‘to the break-even element requires us
to review the carrier’s domestic rate of return. We have.
done this, and have concluded that no change should be
made in the return, _ |
In this connection, we wish to*note one particular factor
which distinguishes this domestic offset rate of return from
an ordinary past-period er see eh
16715
rate—a factor goncerning the risks cévered by the offset
rate. While the offset rate is not required to cover the
risks of ordinary short-run small-scale fluctuations, it is
required to cover certain_large-scale long-run risks which
*-are not present in the case of an ordinary past-period rate.
These exceptional risks arise out of the fact that while
' the carrigr’s domestic need: is being redetermined on a
« past period basis, its ‘domestic mail rate is fixed and not
subject to being redetermined. Consequently, if unfore-
seen contingencies combine to reduce the carrier’s domestic
profits to the point of eliminating its excess profits alto-
gether,.any further losses will be borne diréetly by its
EEO
.
B34
_ (16715, 16716)
stockholders, not by subsidy. On the other hand, of course, -
a can increase its domestic profits to the point where
its excess profits are sufficient to cover completely its in-
ternational need, then any additional profits beyond that
point will no longer go to reduce subsidy but will accrue
instead to its stockholders. :
.A graph of the carrier’s domestic profits retained vs.
domestic profits earned will thus be characterized by an
‘upward slope broken by a flat plategu, the width of the
plateau being measured by the-carrier’s international need.
In such a graph, three zone can be distitiguished: (1) a
lower zone, in which the éarrier’s domestic profits are less
than its approved domestic rate of return, and in which
this earnings deficiency is borne by its stockholders ; (2) a.
middle zone (where TWA actually found itself), in which
- it has démestic profits itt excess of its approved domestic
rate. of return.but not sufficient to cover completely its
international need, and in which the return to ‘its stock-
holders remains constant because small ,
16716 .
increases in domestic profits go via offset to reduce inter-
national subsidy, while small decreases in domestic profits
correspondingly serve to increase international .subsidy;
and (3).an upper zone,.in which its excess profits are
sufficient to cover completely its international need, and ~~
in which accordingly all further profits acerue to its share-
‘holders.
Here, even though the level of TWA’S domestic_ profits
during the offset, period put it in the middle zone where
the risk of ordinary fluctuations fe}l on subsidy rather than ~
on its stéckholders, it was required to bear the risk that
~ adverse conditionswould push it into the lower zone,
Where its stockholders would onee again be bearing the -
ordinary risks associated with a future period mail rate.
ST Lae SAAR A et
B35
(16716, 16717)
From an investor’s point of view, so long as TWA’s dom-
estic division earned less than its approved rate of return,
the risk of losses fell on the carrier’s investors, while on
the other hand, these investors were deprived of much of
their usual opportunity for: compensating profits, since
profits above the specified rate would be declared “excess”
and used to reduce the carrier’s international subsidy.3°
We have taken the foregoing unusual risks into ac-
count in redetermining TWA’s domestic rate of return for
offset. purposes. We have also taken: into account the
fact—significant because it is basically the actions of the.
investing community which determined what is a proper
‘rate of return—that
16717
during almost all of the period in question a prospective
investor in TWA’s securities would undoubtedly have
acted on the theory that its domestic division was bearing
all the ordinary risks associated with a future-period mail
rate, but similarly was in a position to reap the benefits
of a closed-rate status.4 In our judgment, this unusual
distribution of risks justifies a rat® of return more on the
order of an ordinary future-period rate than of an or-
dinary past-period rate; and the somewhat unfavorable
aspect of this risk distribution from the investor’s point
of view compensates for the elimination of the risk of —
strike losses.
30 As against this, of course, it should be‘ noted that TWA's excess
profits were-computed for the offset period as a whole, so that earnings
‘deficiencies during one part of the period could be and were made up out
of profits realized during the balance of the period before any profits for
the period as a- whole were declared excess. are, .
31 The Delta-Ca8 case, which. gave rise to the offset probleni and to the
unusual distribution of risks associated therewith, was only decided by the
Court of Appeals in May 1953, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
February 1954, after the period of the review was actually over.
B36
(16718)
: 16718
° a! ‘The “Deferred” tes Issue
a
°
ee:
Section 168. of the . Internal ais Code of 1954
(formerly section, 124A of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939) provides that the cost of new equipment which ©
qualifies 4s an “emergency facility” may be. depreciated
for income tax purposes over a period of five years rather
than over the longer period normally allowed.32 In the
years 1951-1953 TWA purchased certain equipment for
use in its domestic operations which qualified for accel- -
erated depreciation under the law and elected to avail
itself of the special tax treatment. The result was that
for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953, TWA’s actual tax pay-
ments were $2,990,123 less than they would have been had
the carrier depreciated the equipment on a ‘straight- line
basis.33
TWA accrued the $2.9 million in a reserve on its books
(allocable to its domestic division) on the theory that the
amount thus accrued would have to be paid in later years
when; for tax purposes, the equipment would be considered
as fully depreciated, thereby increasing the carrier’s
earnings that would be subject to income
fe
32 26 U. S.C. 168. Section 124A was enacted in 1950 following the out- ©
break of hostilities in Korea. The purpose of the section was to encourage
the investment of private capital in facilities needed for national defense
purposes during the Korean emergency by insuring investors that their
investment ty. the emergency facilities would be fully depreciated for tax
purposes by the end of the emergency.
33 As to a given item of property, the effect of using accelerated, rather
than straight-line, depreciation is to increase the depreciation in the early
years of the life of the property, with a resulting decrease in taxable
income, and to decrease the depreciation in the later years of the life of
thé property, with a resulting increase in taxable income. Under both
methods, the total depreciation over the useful life of the particular’
facility: is the sume.
4
B37
(16719, 16720) | .
16719 |
tax. TWA claims that the reserve represented a liability,
the payment of which was simply deferred until a future
day, and, as such, should be recognized as an expense in
determining the excess earnings of the domestic division
that are available for offset. : =”
The examiner agreed with TWA. His decision rested
essentially on his conclusion that, as held by the Board in
- the General Passenger Fare Investigation,*4 the normali-
zation of taxes through a deferred tax reserve is necessary ©
to carry out the intent of Congress in authorizing accel-
erated depreciation to grant taxpayers “what amounts to
an interest-free loan in the earlier years of the service
life of assets to be repaid in later years” and that, even
assuming a.valid distinction can be drawn between the
- treatment that should be accorded sueh reserves in subsidy
- mail rate cases and commercial mail rate cases, such dis-:
tinction should not affect the decision here, since TWA’s
domestic division was on a closed future service rate and
the Board is only screening the operating results of that
division for offset purposes. We reach the opposite con-
clusion and find that the accruals in the deferred’ tax
reserve should be treated as revenues of the domestic
division that are available for offset against the need of
the international division. v, oe
' ’ There is no dispute as to the basic facts that we deem to
be critical in the resolution of the deferred tax issue.
Those facts are as follows: (1).That mail rate fixed for
TWA for the 1946-1953 review
- 16720
period fully recognizes as an operating expense the car-
rier’s actual tax liability during those years. (2) TWA’s
---—
us Saha atiacsiin’s -
.
B38
(16720)
total mail pay under that rate is in excess of $49,000,000
and includes a subsidy element which exceeds by many
times the- $2.9 million in the deferred tax reserve. (3)
TWA is, and at all times since January 1, 1954, has been,
entirely self-sufficient both domestically and internation-
ally, receiving mail pay only under compensatory mail rates -
containing no element.of subsidy. (4) The carrier has had
the continuing right granted by section 406 to reopen its .-
compensatory service rates were it at any time to deem
them inadequate.
In the light of those undisputed facts, the question be-
fore us, in the final analysis, is whether this Board, hav- |
ing met TWA’s “need” during the period it required sub-
_sidy assistance and having established a rate that would
fairly compensate it for the carriage of mail in the future,
- should additionally underwrite with subsidy as an expense
of the past period $2.9 million the carrier accrued to meet
future tax payments, which, to the extent that they are
paid, will be paid at a time when TWA has no need for
subsidy. We conclude that TWA is not entitled to this
additional subsidy.
It is clear that under section 406 of the Act, as inter-
preted by the Board and the courts, ‘TWA’s tax claim
cannot be allowed’ for subsidy purposes. The: Board in
fixing TWA’s mail.rate for. the-1946-1953 period has recog-
nized as an expense the full amount of the carrier’s actual
‘tax liability for the period. The allowance for taxes is
not limited to taxes attributable to profits reflecting just -
compensation for the transportation of the mails, but
covers taxes on the carrier’s total profits, including profits
stemming from subsidy in an amount sufficient to meet
the carrier’s losses from its commercial services and yield
it a reasonable return on its investment allocable to those —
commercial services. |
al a as Mean Staite teen Pathan
wtncaihic
oe Bah.
e BAe ES DRT SWAT AS
.
. B39
(16721)
That: tax allowance is in accordance with the “actual
tax” policy adopted by the Board in Western-Inland Mail
Rates,35 and followed uniformly by it since that time in
fixing past period subsidy rates. The actual tax policy
-is consistent with the basic purpose of a tax allowance
-which is -to /assure that by treating taxes like any other
operating expense the carrier will in fact.receive the rate
of return to which it has been found entitled. Further,
the tax allowance made by the Board accords with the
court’s ruling in the Western case, supra, that in fixing
past period subsidy’ rates, as in this case, the Board must
act on the basis of “known facts,” not hypothesis. The
“known facts” are that TWA in the 1946-1953. review
- period was not liable for and did not pay out in taxes any
part of the $2.9 million in the reserve.37 '
The service mail rates for both the domestic and inter-
"national decisions of TWA that have been in effect since
January 1, 1954, provided’ an‘ appropriate allowance for
taxes, computed on the constructive basis
ee ee
"3514 (A.B. 201. 251-255 (1950).
36 The Board's actual tax policy was challenged by Western in its ap-
peal: from the Western-Inland Mail. Rate Case and was affirmed by the —
Court of Appeals, Western Air Lines vy. Ciril Aeronautics Board, 207 F.
2d 200 (1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 67 (1954). °
37 We find no merit in TWaA’'s contention, which the examiner accepted
that the Board's tax policy is one of “actual tax liability” and not “actual
*, tax payment”-aml that, accordingly, recognition of the deferred tax. reserve
a8 an expense would be consistent. with that policy. “ Characterized ac-
curately, the Board’s policy of allowing for actual taxes is a tax return
‘the Bureau of Internal Revenue, together with any adjustments made by
the Rureau as of the most recent practicable date prior to the Board's
order establishing final mail rates.” Western-Inland Mail Rate Case, supra,
p. 251, fn. 23.
Tae eee ~ B40
(16722, 16723)
16722
normally followed in fixing future period rates.38 At no~
time has TWA. challenged the sufficiency of its service
rates, Thus, TWA has receivéd just and reasonable mail
compensation, including an. appropriate allowance for
taxes, for its. services since January 1, 1954, and, being
entirely self-sufficient, can establish no “need” within the
meaning of section 406 of the Act-for the amount. accrued,
in the deferred tax reserve in 1951-1953 for any period
‘subsequent to 1953. -Should the carrier at some future
date deem its service mail rates to be: inadequate, it has
the right to file a petition reopening those rates.
Against this background, recognition as an expeise of
the amount aecrued by TWA to provide for the higher
taxes the carrier expected to pay at some future date
would be inconsistent with the unchallenged finding that
TWA is now self-sufficient, and would be in direct conflict . © —
with the holding of the courts that the subsidy paid,to ai ©
carrier by the Board under the provisions of section 406
of the Act cannot: exceed the carriér’s “need.” Western
Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, supra.3®
The question remains whether section 168 requires that ._
the Board recognize the amounts accrued in the tax reserve
as an expense. We are convinced that it does not.
16723
. Seetion 168 did not purport to, nor did it, result in -
either an amendment or a pro tanto repeal of section 406
of the Act. The problem here is not whether, as TWA
ve.
me eee ewe +
38 That allowance, of course, was ‘limited, as it is na ‘all serv ice mail
' rates, to taxes allocable to the carrier's mail service. —
39 Also, recognition of the deferred tax reserve could hardly the veron-
ciled with the court's decision in Transcontinental & Western Air v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, aupra, which held that the Board cannot fix u new
. mail rate for a carrier and make it -retroactive for a period in which a
finn! mail rate previonsly fixed by the Board was in effect and une het-
lenged vi the initation of a mail rate proceeding.
LAER e
' (16723, 16724)
| oe
contends, “special” legislation governs that which is .“gen-
eral” The problem is one of reconciling the provisions of
the tax statute and those of ‘section 406 of the Act.
The underlying purpose of section 168 was to encourage
the investment of private eapital in facilities needed for
' national defense purposes during the Korean conflict by
insuring that the cost of emergency facilities could, at the
taxpayer’s election, be amortized over the useful life of .
those facilities, which was deemitd to be five years.’ Sec-
tion 168 was available to all taxpayers—those engaged an
regulated and unregulated alike—and there is not the
slightest indication that Congress ‘contemplated: or in-
tended that the tax’ statute override all previously enacted
. regulatory’ legislation, in general, or the Federal en | |
. Aet, in particular.
In the recent decision. in Panhandle Eastern Pipe bins
Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n.,* the court said:
“We now ponsider briefly the policy underlying §167 ©
of the tax statute. Nothing in the language or legis-
lative history indicates that Congress considered its
regulatory consequences. Thus, to infer that the
° statute materially altered fundamental: principles of
- rate regulation—which require rates to reflect actual
* cost of capital—it must clearly appear that Congress
intended to benefit producers to the exclusion of con-
_sumers.”
It i is reasonable to assume that if Congress did not intend
its action in allowing accelerated depreciation for i inc@pe
tax purposes to alter fundamental principles of commer-
cial Fate regulation, it can even less be presumed to have
16724
intended ‘or con plated that its action would override
or nullify the . specific provisions of section 406 governing
39a 316 F. 2d 659, 662 (1963) :-
B42
(16724, _— .
the payment of subsidy to % air carriers, with the offect of
requiring the Board to underwrite with subsidy deferrals
made in anticipation of future tax payments which thes
carrier would be required to make, if at, all, only at a time
when it no longer has a “need” entitling. it to subsidy.
The court’s statément in the Panhandle. case ‘was, of
course, made with reference to accelerated depreciation
‘ under section 167 of the Internal: Revenue Code. However,
we have discovered nothing in the legislative history of
section 168 that would make it less apetionhls to that
’. geetion.
We recognize that unlike section 167, which was designed
to strengthen the economy generally, section 168 reflects
national defense considerations. But so does the Federal
Aviation Act. No useful: purpose would be -served by
speculating as to whether section 168 or the subsidy pro-
. visions of section 406 should be deemed to have the broader
national defense objectives. It. will suffice to state: that
both are responsive to the same interest, and it is difficult .
_ to conceive of a statute that gives broader recognition to
national. defense considerations than -the- ~provisions~ of —
section 406 which authorize direct subsidy mail. payments
*by the Government in an amount sufficient to make up all
lasses incurred by an air carrier under honest, economical
and efficient management to the extent this is required to
_ enable such carrier “to maintain and. continue the develop-
\ ment of air transportation to the extent and of the charac-
ter and the quality required for * * * the national defense.”
16725
Further, if TWA does not fully realize the benefits of
.rapid amortization, this. will be due to the fact that it
required subsidy in the past period for which the rates are
being fixed. The Board is not here determining that tax
savings from rapid amortization or depreciation should -
flow through to the consumer, and had -TWA been in a
subsidy-free status for’the years 1951-1953 it would have
r pe ~
SR Beda | AE. Feat
RR Src E LIES SIT ie UAE RO ai Nabe IM fy)
rr)
a) - ‘
aD Beda EES. Fr thn
oo ere
Pet ee Loe
re.
TEE TINS SABRE Ri Se wm dais
. ° (16725,16726)
B43
e
received the full benefits of section 168.4 All that the
Board is doing is declining to provide subsidy for. the past.
period in excess of the carrier’s established need to meet.
an anticipated tax liability to.become due at a time when.
the carrier has no need for subsidy. Sharh:
What has been said is applicable to TWA’s contention .
that the carrier having, in good faith, obtained certificates _
_ of necessity in order to qualify for the advantages of sec-
tion 168, it would be unconscionable now to “penalize” it
for. availing itself of the provision by treating the accruals
for deferred taxes as earnings available for offset, thereby
reducing the subsidy it would: have received had it not
elected to utilize accelerated amortization. Just as it is
’ elear that had TWA not required subsidy in the open
- period it would have realized all possible benefits of sec-
tion 168, it is similarly clear that had TWA not elected to:
_avail itself of accelerated amortization its actual taxes paid
under straight line depreciation would have been recog-
nized by the Board in determining the amount of its do-
mestic earnings that were available for offset in
16726
computing its need. However, the present result, unfor-
‘tuitate though it may be from the carrier’s standpoint, flows °
from ‘the actualities of the situation and not from any
deprivation by the Board.*!
40 Indeed, but for the issuance, subsequent to the time TWA elected to
avail itself of the right to utilize accelerated amortization, of the court's
. decision in-Delta requiring the Board to base subsidy on the need of the
carrier as a whole, TWA would have realized the full benefits of section
168 notwithstanding its subsidy status. ;
, . a
41 TWA’s contention that its action in accruing for taxes deferred under
section 168 represents sound accounting practice does not require extended.
comment. The short answer is that the Board is not here concerned with -
accounting, but with rate-making, and even full acceptance of the soundness
of the carrier’s treatment of the deferrals from an accounting standpoint
would not warrant recognition‘of the deferrals as an expense of the past
period in determining its mail rate. .
7)
4
B44
In this connection,. one additional matter should be
“noted. TWA paid income taxes in +1959 (the first year
in which .the accelerated depreciation could have resulted
in higher taxes), and in 1960, but those taxes were refunded
under the carry-back provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code as a result of substantial Josses suffered by the
carrier in 1961 and 1962. Although TWA’s current finan-
cial picture makes “it reasonable to assume that the carrier
will ultimately “use up” all of the tax credits accumulated
in past loss years, the fact remains that as a practical
matter TWA, at the time the case was submitted for
decision, still had not ‘paid out in daxes any part of the
$2.9 million.in the reserve and accordingly has had the
continued use 6f the amounts in reserve.
The preceding discussion is dispositive of TWA’s argu:.
ments based on the Board’s decision in the General Pas-.-
senger Fare Inv estigation. which recognizéd the accruals
to a deferred tax reserve as an expense. -In that case,:the _
_ “Board: was establishing standards, for determining the
reasonableness of air carrier passenger fares. It did not
have before it the question of the treatment that should
be accorded accelerated amortization or depreciation .
16727
in fixing subsidy mail rates, and did not, of course, give
-any consideration to the matter. Subsequently, in the
Reopened Pan American Mail Rate Case (Order E-18018,
February 13, 1962), the Board, in recognition of the differ-
. ences between commercial and subsidy ratemaking, refused
' to recognize accruals to a deferted tax reserve under sec-
tion 167 as a current expense in fixing subsidy mail rates.
The Board there stated that “notwithstanding the fact
that such deferred taxes would be allowable in computing
the level of passenger fares,” it would not. treat them
as an copes, since _ wegen of these deferred tax
:
(16726, 16727) 4
2a Ne Ly eT ET
es Pe Ce lS, C8 i ee PTR MIRE
oP B45
(16727, 16728)
accruals. would ‘“ inconsistent with our policy. of under-
writing no more than the carrier’s actual tax’ payment
for subsidy rate purposes * *:*.” For the reasons hereto-
fore set forth, we are convinced that’ the: Board’s action -
in the latter proceeding was correct, and should be fol-
- lowed as to accruals under section 168.
We find no merit in the contention that even if. a valid
distinction can be drawn between the treatment that
should. be accorded deferred tax reserves in fixing subsidy —
mail rates and other rates, there is- no justification for — es
such treatment in the present situation for the reason that
TWA’s. doméstic division is on a closed ser¥ice rate and ~
. the Board is not teexamining or refixing that rate but
is only screening the results of the division’s operations
for offset. purposes. In. an earlier phase of this case the
. Board rejected the argument that in determining the avail-
‘ability of domestic income for offset purpos.., it could not
screen the results of domestic division operatious but must
accept the carrier’s reported results.
16728
Beopénei Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, : 93 C.A.B.
307, 325. We agree with the Board’s earlier statements
rejecting that argument, and find them dispositive of the
‘present contention. The short of the. matter is that when
one division of.a carrier is on subsidy the entire carrier
must be so considered. Any other conclusion would’ defeat |
the court’s ruling in Delta, supra, that under the Act a
carrier’s subsidy entitlement is limited to the need of the »
carrier as a whole.
‘Tax credit provision. One final matter requires com-
ment, ‘A tax credit of $1,033,000 will accrue to the car- .
rier, at current tax rates, as a result of the payback that
will be required under our decision representing over-
-
@:
~
"0
B46
(16728, 16729)
payment of temporary mail pay. In accordance with cus:
tomary practice the amount the carrier will be required
~to refurid to the government will reflect that eredit. How-
ever, we cannot overlook the carrier’s present tax situation.
As a result of losses in‘ 1961, the carrier has substantial -
loss-carry: forward credits which it may apply to future
taxes under section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code.
There is no indication that TWA will fail to realize suffi-
~ cient taxable income during the generous carry-forward
_ period to exhaust those credits plus the still further tax.
eredits created by this decision. We, therefore, shall pro-
vide for refund of the full tax credit in computing TWA’s
mail pay. However, in fairness to the carrier.and in ac-
cordance with our actual tax policy, we shall make the final
mail pay subject to appropriate adjustment at the end of
the statutory period under section 172 to reflect
16729
its actual use of the tax credit generated by this decision,
- should the credit or any part thereof not be used 4 up 7
that time. iit
a ss
Con CLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing findings and ‘conclusions,
and subject to the provision hereinafter stated, we find that
the fair and reasonable rate of compensation to be‘ paid
‘under section 406 of the Act to Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
for the period February 5, 1946, through December 31,
1953, for the transportation of mail by aircraft, the facili-
ties used and useful therefor, and the services connected
therewith, between the points between which it was then
authorized to carry mail by its certificates of public con-
venience and necessity, other than certificates authorizing
(1) interstate air transportation as defined in the Federal
Aviation Act, and (2) air transportation between the
| United States and terminal poings j in Canada, i is the sum of e
.. B47
(16729, 16730).
$48,633,000.42 :
The compensation provided by the rate fixed bevel shall
be in lieu of and not in addition to the mail compensation.
heretofore received pursuant to temporary rate orders by
- “Trans World Airlines, Inc., for the services and period
covered hereby. |’ ‘
The rate. fixed herein i is subject to further adjustment to
reflect properly such actual tax credits as may ultimately
accrue to: the carrier as a result of the payback required
hereby. ae.
16730
We have considered all the. contentions of the parties
not specifically referred to herein, and have found them
to be without substantial merit. Except as otherwise in- |
-dicated, all applications, petitions, and motions herei will
be denied. }
An appropriate order will be entered.
Member ‘Minetti filed the ‘attached concurring and dis-
senting statement in which Vice Chairman Murphy concurs.
Members Gurney and Gillilland filed the attached joint
concurring and dissenting statement. Member Cunmead
also filed a further dissenting statement. ,
—— -——
42 The eiaee computations are set forth in sisi B-F, attached |
hereto. The examiner inadvertently listed the total losses stemming from
the navigators’ strike. as $1,083,000 rather than the correct figure of .
$1,003,000. The attached computations are based on the $1,003,000 figure.
B48
(16731).
16731
-Mriyett1, Memsér, With Wuom Vice Cyarrman Murprty
€oncurs, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
I concur with the majority’s disposition of the “deferred”
.tax issue in accordance with the Board’s historic actual
tax policy. I agree, also, that the losses stemming from
the last eight days of the 1953 navigators’ strike should be |
disallowed. I disagree with the decision to recognize the —
losses stemming from the 1946 pilots’ strike and the first
four. days of the 1953 navigators’ strike. I would disallow, ~
‘the carrier’s strike losses in ‘their entirety. Those losses
and, indeed, the risk of such losses are properly borne by
‘the carrier as part of the rate of return on investment
allowed in the Board’s subsidy computations and reflected
in. the Board’s determination of subsidy. Such was the
previous unanimous holding of this Board and I am not
persuaded that these. circumstances: now warrant a dif- -
ferent view. (19 C:A.B. 464, 466-469 (1954); reaffirmed
a result, in excess of $2,250,000. Considerations of the
elements of return on investment aside, it is clear that all
such losses — be disallowed in their entirety as they
were not incurred nor would they have continued “under
honest, economical and efficient management.” The. tech-
nique of: the majority in assessing the. carrier’s conduct
against the measure thus literally provided in section 406
. of the Act.is not persuasive.
Finding as I do that strike losses are historically com- ;
pensated for by the return element, I reach the issues, re-
garding the carrier’s “honest,
KY
e
' 21 C.A.B. 484 (1955). ) Had the majority: now disallowed.
the strike losses in their.entirety, there would be a reduci;
ek tion in the carrier’s subsidy, and savings to the public as -
=
tees Bisisiniss iat eeagtbate<Sieiibas ov
. .
wel ee
(16732)
PERCE ae TRG
’
B49
; oe 16732,
economical and efficient” management, or lack thereof,
as other grounds for. their disallowance contrary to the
‘subtle rationalizations indulged in by the majority. ’
_The 1946 Pilot Strike. As.World War II drew to a
close there became available -to the U.S. airlines for the
first time four-engine transport aircraft. of the type that
had been used by the military services during the war.
When these: new aircraft were introduced, there were, of
course, no agreements in effect covering pilots’ ‘pay for
the four-engine ‘equipment. TWA’s 1945-46 dispute with
the pilots was concerned basically with wage rates for the |
new four-engine aircraft. .
At the outset of seaetiations | in 1945, TWA, in accord-
ance with the long established practice in the airline
. industry, undertook to bargain with its pilots.on an indi-
vidual basis. Those negotiations went on for a period of
time without resolution of the dispute. In the meantime,
‘the major U. 8. airlines in the fall of 1945 had formed the
Airlines Negotiating Committee. (ANC), forthe specific
“e purpose of negotiating wages‘on an industry-wide basis
‘for the pilots of four-engine aircraft. Following the
organization of ANC, TWA abruptly discontinued its
individual negotiations with its pilots .and turned the
negotiations over to ANC.
-That change had an immediate and. on effect.
The union reacted violently and took the position that
TWA’s use of ANC as its bargaining agent, was illegal .
under the Railway’ Labor -Act. The union was further .
of the view that the change in the negotiations indicated -
B50 ;
(16733, 16734) —
| | 16733
that the major airlines as a group were using the TWA
situation as a‘test case for the establishment of pilot wage
rates on four-engine aircraft throughout the industry.
. After the initial negotiations between the pilots and
‘TWA failed to produce an agreement, efforts were ‘made to
sattle the dispute through the machinery provided by the
| ‘Railway Labor: Act. The history of those efforts is sct
forth in detail in the initial decision and will not be
. repeated here. It should be pointed out; however, that the —
basic issue of wages became intertwined with, and to a
substantial degree overshadowed by, the controversy as
to -whether negotiations between TWA’s pilots and the
company should be conducted on TWA’s side by the ,
company..itself or by ANC as its agent, and whether the ’
TWA dispute should be handled as a separate matter
or considered -in- the. context of an over-all settlement”
involving all of the airline companies and their respective
pilot employees. Throughout, TWA remained adamant in
’ its position that negotiations on its behalf should be
conducted by ANC, and ANC continued. to .insist ‘that the
pilot wage question of all the companies should be con-.
sidered concurrently.
Following several months of cinmenadiia efforts to
settle the dispute under the provisions of the Railway
‘Labor Act,: the pilots, sf) the late spring of 1946, gave
notice of. their intention to strike the company.. The i
appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board averted
a strike at fiat time:and in July 1946 the’ Emergency
Board issued its decision, setting forth its findings on the
TWA wage dispute. TWA agreed to accept
16734
the havrpeny Board finding but the pilots refused. In
October 1946, after more than a year of fruitless negotia-
oak A gia aa
re | <
tions and recourse to various procedures, the pilots finally
, went out on strike. It»was not until ‘after the strike
_ occurred that discussions between the pilots and TWA
were resumed: with TWA‘ bargaining for itself rather than
_ through ANC. With the assistance of the Mediation |
- Board, an agreement between the pilots and the company -
- was reached in November 1946 and the strike ended.
Under the Act, the Board is empowered to grant subsidy
_to an air carrier only to the extent that the need for such
assistance arise’ in the exercise of honest, écOnomical, and
. efficient management. It seems clear to me that where, as —
_here, the Bodrd is asked to underwrite with public funds
losses stemming from a dispute between labor and manage-
ment, the: test of economical and efficient management |
. requires, at a minimum, that the carrier must have taken _
all reasonable steps to avoid the strike with its nerne |
losses. That, TWA failed to do.
The history of the pilots’ dispute leaves no doubt in my
mind that TWA’s insistence on the use of ANC, far from
providing any reasonable expectation of avoiding the
strike, was a major factor in producing it. Further,.
even at that time it should have been obvious to a prudent
Management ‘faced with a difficult and cena labor situ-.
‘ation that this would be so..
The union insiste@® that resolution of the dispute be.
undertaken through individual negotiations between TWA —
and the pilots rather than n
16735
through ANC, the industry-wide bargaining committee.
The union’s insistence did not represent a demand for the
use of a new and novel procedure but only sought the ap-
plication of the bargaining techniques that were tradi-
tional in the airline industry.. That this insistence was
not unreasonable would appear to be borne out by the
a
~
: Ss) B52 ;
(16735, 16736)
a
~~
view of the President’s Emergency Board that industry-
wide bargaining can best be established through mutual
'. agreement of the parties: TWA persisted in its ‘deter-
mination te bargain only through ANC; with the result
that there ensued months of negotiations which not only
proved fruitless, but superimposed on the basic question
of wages the controversial and complicating question of
industry-wide bargaining.
The majority -does not deny that wisdom would have
dictated that TWA accede to the union’s request for in-
dividual negotiations and bargaining over wages on that
basis. The determination to recognize the losses rests
entirely on the conclusion that even had TWA negotiated
on an individual basis the strike would, nonetheless, have
ocearred and could have been avoided only by the com-
‘pany’s yielding to the total wage demands of the pilots. . 1.
find no basis in the record for that conclusion. On. the
contr ary, it appears equally, if not more, reasonable to
- assume that individual negotiations undertaken without
the irritating influence of the question of industry-wide
bargaining would have resulted in settlement without a
strike. Similarly, the terms of the settement finally
reached negate any assumption that a resolution of the
dispute vente <>
| 16736 |
of a atrike could only have been sihtervea through the com-
pany’s yielding to the wage demands of its pilots. Even
were I to reach a different conclusion on that matter, I
_would, nonetheless, disallow strike losses. The question
presented by the statute and which the Board must here
resolve is whether TW4A’s actions in the handling of the
dispute met the test of honest, economical, and efficient —
‘management. Since they did not, I can find no warrant in
the statute for recognizing the strike losses on the spec-
ulative assumption that had the carriér, contrary to the
B53. -
(16736, 16737)
demonstrated facts, acted economically and efficiently,
thereby satisfying the requirement of the statute, oe
Josses would, nonetheless, have occurred.
The 1953 Navigators’ Strike. I further conclude that
TWA was inefficient and uneconomic in: its handling of the
1953 navigators’ strike from its inception,- and that the
losses attributable to that strike monte be disallowed in
their entirety. |
The development of ground navigation facilities in the
1940’s made it clear that the services of navigators on
international flights would at some future date become
unnecessary.» That development created a serious labor
problem; for it confronted the navigators not with a griev-
ance over wages or working conditions, but with the shat-
tering prospect of a loss of their jobs. I do not suggest
that TWA or any other carrier should have continued to
: employ navigators or other personnel whose services, be-
_ eause of techndlogical developments, were no longer re- |
- quired. However, good labor-management relations in such
16737
a situation obviously called for maximum efforts by the
company to allay any unnecessary fears of its navigators
of early layoffs. TWA made no real efforts in that re-
gard but, on the contrary, throughout the period leading
up to and: during the strike, adopted a casual attitude
which ignored the seriousness and the urgency of the
problem and the understandable concern of the-navigators.
TWA had only to take the navigators into its confidence
regarding its plans for their future employment at some.
. time prior to the work stoppage and the substantial possi-
bility of averting a strike altogether — have been
_ realized.
The record shows that in 1952 the carrier viehetied
and received tentative Civil Aeronautics Administration
B54.
(16737, 16738)
permission to use ground navigational facilities and to
discontinue using navigators on its Paris-Rome flights
within Europe. TWA intended to put its plan into effect
a year later, but it made no effort to advise the navigators
of those plans. The carrier asserts that its reason for not
informing the navigators or their union was its desire to
effectuate the change in operations with a minimum of:
confusion and misunderstanding. We do not question the
e e e e ons -
carrier’s motives: However, it seems cleat to us that: it
éither knew or should have known that the navigators
‘were confused’ and worried about its plans, and should
have foreseen the necessity of communicating: and explain-
ing them. Nevertheless, TWA remained silent until J une
(of 1953. By that time the navigators were not only
‘ aroused but were justifiably | fearful. that this was a first
step in precipitously removing navigators from all inter- ;
national flights. wea Se
a "16738
A few days before the strike was called, TWA scheduled
and flew a survey flight from the United States té Europe
without a inion navigator aboard. That move, which was
to determine the feasibility of using ground navigational
' facilities, was-particularly ill-timed. The navigators’ job-.
anxiety reached fever, pitch. Their obvious concern re-
mained unabated with TWA’s continuing inaction. Finally,
the navigators struck. Actually, TWA did not furlough °
any navigators until 1958, some five years after the strike,
‘and again, it is clear that management, had it made the
- effort, could have allayed the navigators’ fears and prob-
ably prevented the strike. Its neglect to do so in these
circumstances must be adjudged as uneconomic and in- ©
efficient management.
I recognize that the strike was illegally called and that it
violated the then current working agreement and the con-
‘
ae B55 |
(16738, 16739) ea
tractual provisions which prohibited strikes ‘until all proce- ©
dures under the Railway Labor Act were exhausted. How- .
ever, I am not here concerned with the question of whether
_ TWA could and should have brought suit against’ the
union for its violations of the outstanding agreement. Our
task is to determine whether the strike losses should be ~
compensated for through subsidy under the provisions of
section 406 of the Act. As I read the statute, the mere
fact that the navigators may have acted unlawfully. does
not relieve the carrier of its obligation to conduct itself in
_ an economical and efficient manner if it is to iz ve its losses —
recognized for subsidy mail rate purposes. .n my view,
TWA’s management through its
___.16739 ae
failure to take the steps that I believe a prudent manage-
' Ment would have taken permitted the strike to occur when
it could have prevented it. Under these circumstances I
can find no justification for underwriting any part of the
ensuing losses with subsidy. pe PGP ge os EASES
/s/ @. JOSEPH Minerr1
/8/ Roserr T. Murpny. .
‘B56
: (16740)
16740
Guatey AND GILLILLAND, -Mempess, Concunnina AND ‘Dts-
SENTING: ,
ae
ee
We disagree with the Board's decision on the issue: of.
“deferred taxes” ‘and would affirm the Examiner on this
. point. We would recognize as an expense item the
. federal income taxes for which TWA became liable during
the 1951-1953 review period but which were deferred for
later payment under the provisions of section 124A of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (now section 168 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954). Since the Examiner has
reviewed the history of this issue and the reasons for his
decision so completely, we will not duplicate his effort
except to touch upon the highlights of the issue as it.
has been presented to the Board. —
The Examiner’s decision conforms to the ‘intent of
Congress which in 1950 after the outbreak of hostilities in
Korea provided for accelerated depreciation to encourage
industries to acquire facilities “certified as necessary to the
interest of the national defense during the emergency ©
period.” Not every industry or business could ‘take
_ advantage of this tax statute, but only those who were so
- certified ‘by the appropriate government agency. This
certification is not required under section 167 which was
first enacted in 1954 as part of the Internal Revenue Code,
and which permits any business to accelerate depreciation
during the early years following acquisition of equipment,
‘and the: two provisions should not be confused. Section
168, with which we are concerned herg, is no longer avail-
able to newly-acquired facilities and could only be used
for facilities acquired prior to 1960, while section 167 is
still applicable:
WSS TOS Cer ee eRe
BST id
(16741) — > 2 —
16741
Section 168, however, ‘did not exclude air carriers, om or
off. subsidy, but extended the benefits to all eligible tax-
payers. This provision reads:
“Kvery person, at his election, shall be ‘entitled to 2
a deduction with respect to the amortization . . . of
any emergency facility . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) _
The K@aminer’s decision also conforms to the only
federal court decision interpreting section 168, that being
City of Detroit. v. Federal Power Commission, 230 F. 2d -
810 (1955), cert. den. 352 U.S. 829 (1956), in which the
court upheld the Commission’s treatment of deferred taxes, ~
stating: ?
“. . . that the intent of Congress reflected in Sec-
tion 124A is not to benefit consumers but rather the
taxpayer in order to encourage construction of cer-
tain emergency types of facilities.”
Although. other decisions of this Commission and appeals
therefrom may be referred to, those decisions are applic-
able to the proper rate of return on. aceumulated reserves
for deferred taxes and are not pertinent to the issue here.1
. It is significant, however, that the Interstate. Commerce
Commission and the North Dakota Commission are the
only regulatory bodies which have denied normalization
of accelerated amortization.2
a’
The majority decision herein fails to recognize that it 2
is departing from its policy enunciated in the General
’ 1 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Live Co. F.P.C., 316 F. 2d 659 (1963),
cert. denied 375 U.S. 881 (198%). ps Tennessec Natural Gas Co.,
Opinion No. 417 of the Federal ¢ ‘ower Commission (Issued Feb. 3, 1964),
2 The position of the North Dakota Commission as to section 168, how-
ever, was rejected in Re Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 102 N.W. 2d 329
(1960).
~ (16741, 16742)
Passenger Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 293 (1960),
wherein accelerated depreciation of capital assets
16742 .
taken by air carriers was one of the factors which would
_ be recognized in determining passenger fare levels. The
Majority attempts to distinguish its treatment of deferred
taxes in a fare-level case from that involving a subsidy
rate case. The two cases cannot be distinguished, how-
ever,.in view of the intent and purpose of the ematid
scheme.
The fact that national defense is one ‘ea the. Shctews
which the Board must. consider in determining subsidy
under section 406(b) of the ‘Federal. Aviation Act’ should |
not be construed to deprive TWA of the benefits of a
.tax statute enacted for a similar purpose. ‘This is espe-
cially . significant since the Board encouraged and assisted |
TWA in securing a certificate of necessity under the tax
statute. TWA should not be penalized for becoming
independent. of subsidy before the deferred taxes were actu-
ally paid, or for subsequently incurring operating losses.
and thereby becoming eligible for a loss carry-back refynd
under different provisions of the tax statute.
_, Holding that the reserve for “deferred taxes” under
% section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is a
legitimate expense of the carrier recognizes the “need”
of the carrier under section 406 of the Act since the reserve ©
was earmarked for future payment and was in fact paid.
The decision of the majority to the contrary completely
disregards the tax statute and the intent of the Congress
in enacting that statute in the interest of the national
defense.
/s/ Cuan -Gurney
/3/f Wairtney Gu.itLanp
(16742, 16743) |
em 16743
GILLILLAND, Memeer,. FURTHER DissENTING :
Contrary to the Board’s finding, the entire cost of the
1953 navigators’ strike’ was incurred under honest, efficient,
and economical management, and should be allowed as an
expense in computing TWA’s breakeven need.
’ The Board concluded that two-thirds of the strike losses
should be attributed to. failures of honest, economical,
and efficient management on the part of TWA because
-. the carrier did not make’ “a special effort to soothe the
.- feelings of its employees” by advising them of future
‘management plans. In view of the circumstances of this
ease TWA’s actions cannot be considered by any criteria,
statutory or otherwise, as being unreasonable or consti-
tuting dishonest, uneconomical, or -inefficient management.
_ As the record clearly shows, and the Board concedes,
the strike was illegal, called. in violation of the nonstrike —
pledge in the collective bargaining agreement between |
TWA and the navigators, not in response to any viola-
tion by TWA of the agreement, and not even in accord-
ance with the union’s own strike procedure. Furthermore, |
- the record shows that, at all times priér to and during
the strike, TWA acted strictly in accordance with its legal
and contractual rights and obligations, whereas, the nav-
igators did not. — 7 | :
The primary.cause of the strike was the unreasonable
demand by PG ray :
16744 |
the navigators: for job security, which they had already
knowingly relinquished, and the unfounded assertion that
TWA was guilty of “provocative and unlawful evasion”
of the navigators’ collective bargaining agreement. Under’.
. Such circumstances TWA had no alternative but to refuse
o°
o
<
BGO
(16744, 16745)
to accede to the unreasonable demand of the union to
reinstate the discharged navigators. This was a lawful
and reasonable exercise of managerial judgment. The
Board, on the other hand, now alleges if TWA had advised
the. navigators that it would not be necessary. to furlough
them until some future date, the strike in all probability
. would not have taken place, or been prolonged beyond
July 13. This is pure speculation on the part of the Board
“and the statutory test of honest, economical, and efficient
management. jis a factual one and not eeuaintive: ;
TWA by. maintaining its position and insisting upon. the
preservation of its contract rights | until July 21 acted in
a legal and reasonable: manner; since it was then able to
resolve prospective questions with regpect to the elimina-
tion of navigators when ground radio: facilities became
available. Of utmost importance to TWA’s position was
the fact that the mediation agreement signed on July 21,
1963, contaimed an admission by the union ‘that it was in
. violation of the Railway Labor Act, the collective bargain-
ing agreement and, further, that the union fully recognized
_the inherent rights of the company to ‘operate flights with-
out navig#tors over any of ©
; ~~: 16745
After a prehearing conference the Board severed the
portion of the proceeding dealing with AOA, and prior to
the hearing Bureau. Counsel, TWA and the Post ‘Office
Department stipulated that the sum of $218,591 would be |
fair and reasonable allowance td TWA for éapitalization
interest on equipment ‘purchase funds in addition to the
amount of such allowance manne | in prior findings of the
Board.
Following the submission ‘of exhibits and written testi-
“mony a public hearing. was held and briefs were’ filed.
i
eae yes en ee
B61
(16746)
16746" .
°e
‘Unitep States or AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
os Wasuineron, D. C.
¢
© Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
ae at its office in Washington, D.C.,
| on the 12th day of April, 1965
REOPENED TRANSATLANTIC
Finat Mart, Rate Case
* (Trans World Airlines, Ine.)
Docket
_ ORDER | .
A full public hearing having been held in the above-en-
_ titled proceeding, and the Board, upon consideration of the
record, having issued its opinion containing its findings,
-conclusions, and decision, which is attached hereto and
. made a part hereof; i |
Iv 1s ORDERED:
“T.. Tat, subject to the provision stated in paragraph
3 hereof, the fair and reasonable rate of compensation to _
be*paid under section 406 of the Act to Trans World Air-
lines, Ine., for the period February 5, 1946 through Decem-
ber 31, 1953, for the transportation of mail by aircraft, the
facilities used and ‘useftl therefor, and the services con-
~“
*
ae .
Order No, E-22022 - .
- No.1706, etal...
nected therewith, between the points between which it was _.
*
r . ° : oC
B62
(16746, 16747)
then authorized to carry mail by its certificates of public
convenience and necessity, other than certificates authoriz-
‘ing (1) interstate air transportation as defined in the
Federal Aviation Act, and (2) air transportation between
_ the United States and terminal — in Canada, is' the
‘sum of $48, 633,000.
2. That the compensation provided by the rate fixed
herein shall be in lieu of and not in addition to the mail
compensation heretofore received by Trans World Airlines,
Inc., for the services and period speeified in n the preceding
paregraph. ln. e
3. That t! the rate of compensation fixed hereby .shall be —
subject to. further adjustment to reflect properly such .
actual tax credits as may ultimately accrue to the carrier
asa result of the payback required hereby.
| - 16747 |
4. That, except to the extent otherwise indicated,’ all
applications, petitions, and motions involved in this pro-
- eeeding are hereby denied; and
5. That this order shall be effective immediately,
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
| | Hanorp RB. Sanverson
Secretary ~
‘ (SEaL), ec ee 25
b.
| B63 .
- (16748) *
: “ee Appendix A
Excerpts from the Initial Decision
of
James 8. Keith
Reopened Transatlantic Final Mail Raté Case
Docket 1706 et al. ‘ - |
i ,
This initial decision is directed to a limited phase of thé —
above-entitled proceeding which concerns the. fixing of the
final mail pay of Trans World Airlines, Ine. (TWA) for
the period February 5, 1946, through December 31, 1953. ‘oa
- During the period ‘in question, under temporary rate %
orders, TWA’ received * mail pay in the amount of : Vs
$51,095,000- In. its so-called final’ decision on the last re- |
’ Maining phase of this proceeding the Board determined, —
_ among other things, that the fair and reasonable rate of
compensation for TWA for the period in question,. after
offset of excess earnings from the carrier’s domestic oper-
ations, was $42,942,000.1, Pg ps ec
Under this determination TWA would have been com-
pelled to repay $8,153,000 -to the Government. from the
amount of temporary com ation previously sreceived.
TWA sought a court review of the Board orders? fixing
its mail rates, and, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
‘ Aeronautics Board, 254 F..2d 90 (1958), the U. S. Court
—_——_—____
1 Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, 23 C.A.B. 307 (1956).
2 Orders E-10117, March 23, 1956, and- E-10176, April 9,. 1956, 7'rane-
atlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, supra, and earlier orders re-
flected in such decision. : os
B64
%
(16748, 16749)
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, without
passing on the merits of TWA’s appeal, vacated the
Board’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration
‘because of the failure of the then Chairman of the Board
to disqualify
16749
himself from consideration of the case in view of his prior
participation as Solicitor of the Post Office Department.
A companion case, involving American Overseas Airlines, .
Inc..(AOA), arising out of an appeal of the same orders,
was also remanded for reconsideration, this one because
of insufficient findings with reference to disallowance of
strike costs. |
As a result of the Court’s mandates in these cases the
Board invited each party to the proceeding to file’a state-
ment of its views as to how best accomplish an expeditious
| conipliance with the Court’s decision. Following a re-
sponse in the form of joint statements filed by AOA, TWA,
the Postmaster General, and Bureau Counsel, the Board
ordered’ the proceeding reopened to consider the follow-
ing issues: er 4
1. To what extent, if any, should the mail rates of AOA
_ «and TWA include allowance for costs incurred in con-
nection with TWA and~-AOA pilots’ strikes of 1946
and: 1947 and the TWA navigators’ strike of 1953?
2. What, if any, allowance should be made for deferred
taxes related to accelerated amortization taken by
‘TWA for tax purposes under Section 124A of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1950?
| What i is the proper, amount to be allowed TWA for
. eapitalized interest ‘on equipment purchase funds?
3 American Overaeas Airlines: v- Civil Aeronautics Board, 254 F. 28 744
(1958).
4 Order F-13220, 28 C. AB. 959.
B65
(16750, 16751)
16750
After a;prehearing conference the Board severed the
portion of the proceeding dealing with AOA, and prior
to the hearing Bureau Counsel, _TWA and the Post Office
Department stipulated that the sum of $218,591 would be |
fair and reasonable allowance to TWA for capitalization _
interest-on equipment purchase funds, in addition to the
amount of such allowance included in prior findings of the
Following the submission of exhibits and written testi-
mony-a public hearing was held and briefs were filed.
. 16751 |
I. Tue Sree Issues,
Scope of the Issues. During the mailpay period under
Teview in this case TWA experienced two strikes, a pilot
strike in 1946 and a navigator strike in 1953, with the
result that it sustained substantial losses.. These losses
were handled as expense items by TWA in computing its
_ Subsidy entitlement but the Board disallowed them on the
ground that “sound public policy requires that we refuse
to underwrite losses attributable to a labor controversy —
without. regard to responsibility therefor.” . The Board
did not attempt to determine whether these strikes or the
1947 strike of the AOA pilots and the losses attendant
thereto occurred or would have occurred notwithstanding
honest, economical, and efficient management. |
As noted above in the AOA Case the Board’s refusal
- to recognize strike losses on policy grounds was reversed
because of insufficient findings. The court noted that
~matters of general policy, apart from the terms of the
statute, are not to be used as guides for decision, and that
3 See Footnote 3. %
B66
TN ee nn
(16751, 16752)
a policy as to labor. disputes is not a factor to be con-
‘sidered in the determination of mail pay uhder the statute. -
In the order reopening this proceeding® the Board ad-
verted to the court’s mandate and outlined the matters
‘which it believed were pertinent-to consider: ~ _
“In remanding the AOA case to the Board, the
court made clear that we not only. are required to
pass upon the issue of managerial responsibility
‘for the strikes, but that ‘even if a finding be made
that the strike occurred regardless of blameless
2 16752
management, the problem still remains as to the ©
- amount of the need of the carrier for funds suffi-
cient to enable it to maintain and to continue to de- _
velop, ete. This latter is a question of fact to be
determined in each case.’.. Among the matters which
the court believed were pertinent in this connection
was whether the strike losses can and should be
charged against the carrier’s spe and, if so, how
much such return should be. We are also enjoined
to consider -the nature and extent to which mainte- |
_ Nance and development of the particular company
would contribute to the statutory purposes set forth
. - in section 406 and the amounts needed to achieve ~
_ these objectives. Accordingly, we will reopen the
record for receipt of evidence on all phases of the
issues of the strikes other than the issue of economy
and efficiency with respect to the two pilots’ strikes.”
6 Order E-13220, supra.
4)
'
fense?
B67
(16752, 16753)
Thus, at the prehearing conference and in the report
thereof issued October 26, 1961,7 it was determined that the .
strike issues to be decided herein are as follows:
1. Were the costs of the TWA pilot strike in 1946 and
the navigator strike in 1953 incurred under. honest, eco-
nomical and efficient management?
2. Is a7 percent rate of return provided-by the Board —
for a past rate period a proper rate of return? Does it
include an allowance for the risk or the possibility of strike
‘or strikes during such period? If such rate does not pro-
vide a fair return what should the proper rate be?
| | 16753
3. Does the 8 percent rate of return provided by the
Board for future rate periods include an allowance for the
risk or possibility that a strike or strikes will ogeur during -
such periods? : . . es ea .
4. Was the compensation awarded TWA by previous
Board orders in this case. for the past mail-rate period in
question sufficient together with all other revenues of the
carrier to enable TWA to maintain and continue the de-
velopment of air transportation to the extent and of the
character and quality required for the commerce of the
United States, the Postal Service, and the National De-
amplification.
7 See also: Notice to All Parties dated December 20, 1961, for further
iid
B68
(16753, 16754)
The 1946 Pilot Strike. On Saturday morning October
19,'1946, David L. Behncke, President of the Air Line
Pilots Association appeared in the office of TWA’s Presi-
dent, Jack Frye, and handed: the latter a memorandum
demanding substantial wage increases for pilots flying
Douglas Skymaster and Lockheed Constellation aircraft.
Mr. Behncke stated that these demands must be met by ~
TWA not later than Sunday wae October 20, 1946, just ,
30 hours away.
On Sunday morning Mr. Frye Salewered a written reply
to ALPA’s demands, in which he stated, among ened
things: ;
“I recognize that certain inequities exist, but it is
also apparent that this is a matter of too great im-
portance to the pilots and the Company to require
us to reach a full settlement on all points within the
time limit you imposed. I am, however, confident
that if representatives of the pilots will now meet
with representatives of the Company, beginning im-
mediately, at any point you may suggest, it. should
be possible to solve the problems. I therefore urge
_ you to set a time and place, ‘satisfactory to you, at
which such. discussions can be inaugurated.”
16754
-ALPA did not reply to this communication and without
notice the pilots stopped flying on October 21, 1946. They
remained on strike until November 15, 1946.
During the 25-day strike period TW4A’s domestic and
international services were at a standstill and the carrier
B69
(16754, 16755)
received no revenue whatsoever. To reduce its costs TWA
furloughed, without pay, most. of its employees. It re-
tained only a skeleton force necessary to protect-company |
property and to meet company commitments. Despite
these efforts to“economize, TWA sustained heavy operat-
ing losses. Its domestic division net losses, which amounted
to nearly $11 million dollars in 1946, would have been re-
duced by $1,130,000 had the strike not occurred and the
Atlantic division net loss for 1946 would have been cut by
$582,000.78 - ;
The chronology of events leading up to Mr. Behncke’s
demands of October 19 begin with the period immediately
following V-J Day when it became apparent that four-
engine aircraft of the Skymaster and Constellation type —
would be available for future commercial airline opera-
tions. The Federal government had advised the Major
airlines that these aircraft would be made available to
them, and on this basis TWA began planning to inaugurate
its newly authorized international service with such equip-
ment. —— We.
At this time rates of pay for pilots and co-pilots operat-
ing four-engine aircraft had not been established and since
_ it was evident that this would be a problem in the imme-
diate future, TWA addressed a letter .
16755
to ALPA inviting discussion on the subject: as well as
working conditions on TWA’s ‘international route. There- -
~~ red strike costs were computed by the Bureau and are not disputed
by . .
B70
(16755, 16756)
after, by mutual consent TWA and ALPA began negotia-
tions on rates‘of pay and working rules fer the pilots and
' eopilots of Skymaster and Constellation aircraft. Confer-
ences were held intermittently. between November 28 and
Deeember 12, 1945. On the latter date, when it appeared
that no agreement would be reached, TWA invoked the
services of the National Mediation Board. The case was .
docketed and a mediator was assigned to handle it. Within
the week the mediator gave up hope of securing a settle-
ment by agreement, and on December 19 a formal proffer
of arbitration as required by the Railway Labor Act was
submitted to the parties. The pilots accepted arbitration
but TWA withdrew its application and the case was closed.
The pilots association immediately notified the Media-
tion Board that it was invoking the Board’s services on ©
_the same issues and a formal application for mediation
was filed with the Board on December 21. The case was _
docketed_ and assigned for mediation to Board Member
Frank P. Douglass. |
Meanwhile, on December 18, pursuant to the existing
collective bargaining agreement TWA issued the usual
type of bulletin requesting its pilots to bid for the open-
ings on its new international routes. Although the offer -
was open until January 2, 1946, the pilots did not bid.
Hence, on January 8, 1946, pursuant to the provisions of
its collective bargaining agreement, TWA ordered its most
junior qualified pilots to report for duty. On February 5,
_ 1946, after these pilots were checked-out- in accordance
with CAA requirements, TWA inaugurated service over
its international routes. ° ea
16756
The mediation conference assigned to Member Douglass
Be FE? Pt Oe te
, BY
(16756) .
- began in Chicago on January 11, 1946, with all three. mem-
bers of the Mediation Board present. These meetings
were continued through Jahuary 14 but they ended in
disagreement on the latter date because of a controversy
over the right of the Airline N egotiating Committee (ANC)
to represent the airline carriers. This committee was
formed in the latter part of 1945. by the 13 major airlines
to act as their collective bargaining representative: in
negotiating agreements of rates of pay and rules for, flying’
. the new four-engine equipment both in domestic and: in-
ternational service Each airline had executed a power
of attorney to this committee to act as its collective bar--
_ Gaining representative. - “tees
On December 28 the chairman of the ANC _ notified
ALPA’s president of the ANC’s existence and requested
his cooperation in’ handling, on an industry-wide basis,
the ‘problems raised by the new equipment. On January
10, 1946, the president of ALPA replied that the union
“stands ready to deal singly with the duly authorized rep-
resentatives on behalf of a company * * * in the same
manner that each of the existing pilots’ employment agree-
ments were negotiated.” This message was supplemented
_ by another one on January 22 stating that counsel for the
pilots association had advised that the ANC “is in violation
of law.” , b nee td
When the ANC appeared at the mediation conferences
in -Chi¢ago to represent TWA this controversy became the
major issue. An agreement on the pay and rules issues
became impossible.
On January 24 the mediation proceedings were resumed
-
ad
BT.
(16756, 16757)
in Wadieaten under Board Member: Douglass arid the’
- meetings continued through January 27 when they were —
recessed until February 4. This time discussions were ©
16757
confined to the pay and rules questions of TWA’s case. The
pilots association apparently had no objection to dealing
with the ANC as the-representative of TWA.
However, before these proceedings were recessed the
Mediation Board accepted an application from ALPA for
_ mediation ‘of disputes involving the same issués on rates:
‘of pay and rules of the American Airlines, and it docketed
- this case; and also, just after the recess, on January ‘29,
ANC by telegram applied for mediation on behalf of each
of the other 11 airline companies represented by ANC.
These cases were assigned to Mediator Ross Foran who
was also assigned to take over the recessed proceedings in-
volving TWA. On. February 1 the Mediation Board ad-
. vised ANC and ALPA that all of these disputes would be
‘heard concurrently in New York before Mediator Foran
beginning February. 4.
ALPA vigorously protested the transfer of mediation
proceedings from Washington to New York as well as to
the concurrent handling of the cases. It also complained
of changing mediators and insisted that the mediation’ pro-
ceedings involving only TWA be resumed in Washington
as had been the understanding at the time of the recess on
J anuary 29.
At the divection of the Mediation Board, Foran resumed.
meetings in Washington February 6-12. The pilots’: rep-
_ resentatives understood that: only:the TWA case was being _
: (16757, 16758) _ woes f
B73
&,
\
\
Whereas the pilots insisted that it. must be limited to
16758 | yee
7
On February 12, at the request of ANC, the Mediation :
. Board transferred the conference to New York and by tele- -
requesting changes in existing contracts. which did not
On February 15, although much of the Chicago and
. Washington conferences had been ‘concerned wtih the
'. wording of the agreement to arbitrate, a formal proffer
of arbitration was again presented to the parties as had
been done December 19 but which was not accepted by
. TWA.
_ This time both ANC and ALPA accepted, the former —
on February 18 and the latter on February 21. From.
B74 |
é =f (16758, 16759)
. February 27 to March 8 additional uti were held in
» ‘New York in further attempts.to agree on the worsens “
the questions to be ir A 2 |
While these efforts were being made a pees ne one ee Bs:
de oped between ANC and the Secretary of the Media-
tion Board which prompted the former’ temporarily to aw
' withdraw its acceptance of arbitration. When‘the media- =
tor advised ALPA of these developments, the latter — noes
in a wire (March 11) as follows: :
“There is nothing purer that the association can
do except take the. strike vote which is now in
progress covering pilots and copilots in domestic
and international operations of TWA.” ~
16759
Mcanwhile as.a - result of.a communication between the
Secretary of the Mediation Siard and ANC on March 7,
the latter reinstituted ANC’s acceptance of arbitration on
March 12. The same date the Mediation Beare wired both ;
| parties as follows: |
“In view of tle likelihood that the’ ile will }
now be able to secure an arbitration agreement M™~:-. 7 :
~~ this dispute we urge that the strike vote be aban-
’. doned and both parties ‘cooperate with the mediator
_ in working out: ie details. of the question to be
arbitrated. r : '
When cneiiatiimeite' were being made for resuming meet- ”
ings in New York to work out the arbitration questions
further misunderstandings developed out. of the attempt.
to mediate the 13 airline disputes concurréntly. A joint
meeting for the purpose of wording the TWA arbitration
question could not be arranged until March 26 although
' the os acueecua , of ALPA arrived in New York on the
(16759, 16760)
20th prepared to do sb. They insisted, h@wever, that they
were not authorized to deal with' the other 12 cases. The
Mediation Board and ANC wanted all of the cases dis- -
posed of and there was maneuvering to get the arbitration.
to cover them all. : ;
In the interim while the acceptance of TWA’s-arbitration
had heen withdrawn, mediation of American Airlines’ case
had begun. However, a coriference lasting from February
27 to March 8 ended in a failure because the issues were.
the same in the TWA case. Between March 12 and 16,
‘because the mediator. felt that it would be helpful in,
resolving the TWA dispute, he settled a case involving
American Overseas Airlines which was not included iri the
13 other airline cases. However, he was unable to arrange
. a meeting of the parties for disposing of the. TWA case
because
ae. ee |
ANC still wanted to handle all’ of the cases together and
ALPA refused to deal-with ANC on this basis.
- . Thus, on March 26 when the meeting was finally held to
discuss the wording of the arbitration question it ended in
a deadlock. The ANC insisted that arbitration awarded |
-
‘must be applied to all of the cases while -ALPA took the
position that it must be applicable to TWA only. The
pilots’ representatives immediately left New York and the
next day notified the Mediation Board that the strike vote
, of all the TWA pilots had been completed and that they
had voted overwhelmingly for a strike. |
On the same day, March 27, the Mediation Board wired
ALPA that further mediation by the mediator was sus-
pended and that the Board Members themselves would
‘begin mediation in New York on April 1. On the ap-
pointed day,ALPA appeared by its attorney and another
representative but they would not discuss any issue other
B76
(16760, 16761)
than that involving TWA. The Board attempted for
three days to mediate all of the airline cases concurrently
and on April 3 made a formal proffer of arbitration to
both ANC and ALPA parties, meluding all, of the airline
cases. ANC accepted but the pilots gave no answer.
. ALPA notified the-Board that:it was proceeding with the
strike on TWA, ene sometime in the week of April
a,
Shortly ecnation, the Vistional Mediation Board found
that “these disputes * * * threaten substantially to inter-
rupt interstate commerce ;” and on May 7 the President of
the United. States created a three-man Emergency Board
to investigate the TWA dispute and those involying other
airlines.
16761
After hearings, the Emerency Board, on July 8, 1946,
rendered its report to the President unanimously recom-
inending a new pay scale for TWA’s international oper-
ations and that the disputes involving the other carriers be
referred back to the parties for further action. - On August
8, 1946, upon the expiration of the 30-day waiting period
prescribed by the Railway Labor Act, TWA put into effect
the wage-scale recommended by the Emergency Board.
’ The union announced. later to the press that it would not
~ aecept the recommendations of the Emergency Board.
It was thereafter, on Saturday morning, October 19,
1946, that the president of ALPA made the written de-
mands on TWA that resulted in the strike from October
21 to November 15, 1946: The demands involved wage
‘inereases amounting to approximately $3,000 a year per
pilot more: than’the Emergency Board recommendations.
On the date the strike began TWA communicated with.
the Chairman of the Civil, Aeronautics Board and other
Government agencies suggesting that the Government take
“~
a
—_—
(16761, 16762)
Co
B77
over control of the airline’ _It appears that several de-
partments
favored TWA’s request, but when the Chairman
immediately accepted this recommendation
fused. The following day, the Cha
union, but
agreement
minated their strike.
after 10 days of ‘further negotiations another
was signed by both parties and the pilots ter-
B78 ec.
(16762, 16763)
‘The 1953 Navigator Strike. With the outbreak of World
War II, TWA hired navigators for ‘its overseas military
operations with the Air. Transport Command. They were
used in areas or‘on routes lacking ground navigation faci-
lities and which required celestial navigation. Their
16763.
future depended on the continued absence of ground-based
radio communication facilities. .
By 1948 ground stations had been established on a num-
ber of international routes including those extending from
Shannon over the continent of Europe, and celestial navi-
gation was no longer necessary over these routes. In that
year TWA filed an application with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration requesting approval of its plans to. diston-
tinue navigators on certain European routes. However,
the proposal was dropped because of the questionable
availabilty of ground navigational aids. .
In 1949 during the negotiations on the collective bargain-
ing agreement between TWA and the union, tliere were dis:
cussions with reference to the elimination of navigators on
certain European segments, These discussions resulted in
an agreement providing under section 17(m), for sevérance
pay where navigators might be “hereinafter furloughed as
a direct result of the discontinuance of the use of navi-
gators over all or any of the compeny’ 8 routes or segments
thereof.”
The possible elimination of a on certain routes
again arose during the negotiations on the 1952-1953 col-
lective bargaining agreement which was docketed by the
National Mediation Board.6* This was evidenced by ~
TWA’s application with the CAA requesting approval of
their plans to eliminate navigators on certain of TWA’s:
European route segments, including those involving Paris-
' 8a After the negotiations reached an impasse and on a uteike vote of the —
union, TWA had petitioned for mediation.
.
A
B79
(16763, 16764)
Rome. The Civil Aeronautics Administration notified the
navigators of TWA’s proposal and requested their
| 16764
comments. The reaction of ‘the navigators is reflected
in a telegram to the National Mediation Board and TWA
on July 21, 1952, which states, in part:
“This wire is to notify you that the union will not .
tolerate this flagrant disregard of the agreement
and action of bad faith and intimidation on the
part of the management and unless. the Board in-
vokes immediately the status quo and the company
withdraws its application and immediately ceases
to interfere with the navigators performing their.
duties while there is a contract dispute between: the
parties, the union will revert to. its original position
prior to the carrier requesting the services of the
National Mediation Board.”
Despite the union’s strike threat, negotiations continued
under the auspices of the Mediation Board, and on Novem-
ber 7 and 8, 1952, agreements were reached, one for the
1952-53 period and the other for July 1, 1953-June 30,
1954. Each of these agreements contained a Section 17(m)
similar ‘to Section 17(m) of the 1949 agreement which
provided that a navigator. furloughed as a direct result
of the discontinuance of the use.of navigators over any
of the company’s routes who has not been recalled to duty -
within one year from the date of furlough must notify
the company of his election to accept one of the following
alternatives: (a) severance pay; (b) other employment
with TWA; or (c) remain on furlough.
On November 8, 1952, TWA by letter to the president .
of the navigators’ union, agreed to waive the one-year -
waiting period for election for the reason that:
é
\
‘
B80
(16764, 16765) .
“Because of the particular circumstances. existing
with regard to the present, and future utilization of
navigators and because it is recognized by the com-
pany that any future furlough of navigators will
probably be because of the discontinuance of navi- .
, gators over certain of the ee 8 routes or seg-
ments thereof.”
16765
The letter in question became part of Section 17(m) in
each. agreement on December 24, 1952... :
In April 1953 TWA’s application to discontinue naviga-
tors on the Paris-Rome segments was tentatively approved
by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and on June 5,
1953, it was officially approved by that agency to be effec-
tive June 8, 1953.
. On June 9, 1953, TWA’s general operation: nanager
iseued staff instructions -to implement the program, effec- |
tive July 1, 1953. Among other things, his instructions
directed that the navigators union be advised of the pro-
gram by June 9. Pursuant to these instructions “the
proper union heads were notified as to the date of im-
plementation.”
There is no evidence of any reaction by the navigators
until June 25, 1953, when the vice-president of the naviga- -
-tors’ union personally delivered to TWA’s president a
_ letter in which the union stressed advantages of ‘retainibe
navigators on the Paris-Rome segments of TWA’s routes —
and contended that TWA might be making a mistake in’
discontinuimg their use. The letter concludes with the
- following paragraph : i .
“In summarizing, we have shown by our figures,
after writing off navigational costs, the company
will realize a saving of over $6,000.00 per week on
this 600 mile Paris-Rome segment alone. This is
>
B81
(16765, 16766)
Progress which direetly reflects. savings to the com- . |
pany. We hope we will be able to meet with you at
your earliest convenience to discuss this matter
further.” aes
The letter was referred to TWA’s Kansas ‘City office on
June 29, 1953, for reply through regular channels.
16766
On July 1, 1953, TWA discontinued using navigators
- on its Paris-Rome flights. However, since TWA had in-
creased operations over other segments requiring celestial
navigation, it did not anticipate any immediate furloughs.
Hence, no furlough notices were issued as required by the
collective bargaining agreement. In fact no navigators
were furloughed until 1958, five years after the ‘strike. .
Despite the fact that immediate furloughs were not in-
‘ volved, on July 7, 1953, the president of the navigators’
union wired ‘TWA’s vice-president of Industrial Relations,
characterizing the carrier’s action as “provocative and un-
lawful evasion of navigators collective bargaining agree-
ment,” and demanding an immediate hearing in New York
City between management and union representatives, The <
telegram also advised TWA that the National Mediation
Board, was being notified that the company’s action “go:
undermines the basis upon which increment agreement was
‘predicated that it has _Teopened the agreement and re-
quires renegotiation at once and restoration to status quo
until question is resolved.” TWA immediately responded |
denying the charges of the union, and advising the union
that it would be available for discussions in Kansas City ©
at any time on or after J uly 10, 1953. :
_ A meeting of the union’s execiative committee was called
on the evening of July 9, 1953. Among those present was
the union’s attorney, one of the principal witnesses in this
case. He testified thatthe committee was “highly incensed
°-
B82
: _ (16766, 16767)
and confused by TWA’s-actions” and that it took the view
that a proposed survey flight by TWA from the United
States to Europe via Greenland without a navigator
aboard, was intended
‘16767
to provide a means of crossing the Atlantic without navi-
gators, and that the discontinuance of use of navigators
over the Rome to Paris segment was an initial step in a
plan to discontinue use of all navigators on TWA’s Euro-
pean routes. According to the witness, the committee
per sisted in the position tuken by the president of the
union in its telegram of July 7 that the increment agree-
ment contajned in the collective bargaining agreement with
. TWA assumed that there. would be no discontinuance of
the use of navigators on any portion of TWA’s routes
during the term of the agreement, and that the company
action constituted uot only a threat to job security but also:
a threat of reduction in pay, in violation of the intent of ©
the agreement. The committee took: the position that the
_ Adjustment Board method of settling disputes would not
be ‘adequate under these circumstances and that a strike
would be the only way to get the company to discuss the .
. problem with the union. The witness testified that he
informed -the committee that the International Union
would not approve or authorize a strike.
Notwithstanding the advice of its legal counsel at the
‘meeting and a subsequent promisé by the International
Union that it would seek to win redress against TWA: for
- any violation of the labor contract, the navigators called
a strike beginning at noon on July 10, 1953. The strike
was not authorized by any strike vote of the membership
and was called without the approval of the president of
the Transport Workers Union of America, ©.I.0., as_re-
quired by the union’s constitution.
During the afternoon of July 10 fhe usienfe attorney re-
ae , ae . 4 Bs3
(16767, 16768)
ceived a call from an employeé of the National Mediation
Board advising him that TWA’s vice-president of in-
dustrial relations was coming to New York City
r 16768
. that day, and suggested that the union’s attorney get in.
touch with that official to arrange a meeting. Attempts
by the union’s. counsel to reach TWA’s vice-president
failed, and-although a message was left for TWA’s vice-
president to contact the: union’s representative, there was
no answer to this message.
Meanwhile, TWA discharged each navigator that refused —
| his flight. On July 11 a member of the National Mediation
Board came to New York for the purpose of mediating the
- dispute. As ‘was the apparent practice at that time the
mediator met separately with each of the disputants, first
talking to TWA and then to representatives of the naviga- :
tors, including the union’s .attorney and an official of the
International Union. TWA would not discuss the strike
situation directly with union officials until the navigators
agreed to return to their jobs,. and the navigators would
_ Not agree to return to work: until TWA would agree to
reinstate the discharged navigators,
On July 12 TWA’s vice-president met with representa-
tives of the union’s interest (as distinguished from union
“3 Officials) but they could not reach an agreement. The
union’s counsel advised TWA that “the temperament of
the navigators was such-at that point that any suggestion.
of settlement without reinstatement of the discharged
employees would be unacceptable to them.” TWA, how- .
ever, refused to reinstate. the discharged navigators.
Thereafter, the mediator suggested a mediation agree-
ment under which the strike action would be annulled, the _
navigators would return to duty and there would be an
immediate conference on the status of .
B84 | :
ae =<, (16769, 16770)
) 16769 .
the dismissed strikers. This ‘ildaeeeit however, ’ ‘was re-
jected by the union and other proposed mediation agree- —
ments were. unacceptable to the parties. The discussions
-ended on July 13 without any progress and the mediator ;
returned to Washington. :
Finally, on July 20, TWA and union representatives —
agreed to discuss the matter further and ‘on July 21 a
mediation agreement was signed ‘which -provided for
reinstatement of all navigators. The agreement contained
an admission by the union that- it was in violation of the
Railway Labor Act and the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and that the union ‘recognized the inherent right of
the*company to operate flights ‘without navigators over
its routes or segments,
TWA’s-losses as a result of this strike which affectod
only its International Division were $1,033,000.
Were the Strike Costs incurred under Honest, Economic
and Efficient Management? The Bureau claims that
TWA’s designation and use of the ANC as its authorized
bargaining representative over the objection of the union
was the basic cause of the 1946 strike, and that TWA’s
failure to discuss the impact of eliminating navigators
on the Paris-Rome ‘segments on future job security of the
class of employees prior to the strike was, the principal
reason for the 1953 strike. On this reasoning, the Burean
concludes that TWA’s management was not honest, eco-
nomical and efficient in handling the strikes and that there-
fore the cost of the strikes should not be recognized as an
expense in fixing TWA’s final mail rate.
: 16770
A more prudent and reasonable approach to handling the
inflammatory pilot situation, according to the Bureau,
B85
(16770, 16771) _
would have been by a continuation of TWA’s individual
carrier discussions with the union rather than On an in- .
dustry-wide basis. As to the navigaters the Bureau con-
cedes that some blame for the 1953 strike must fall on the
union. However, the Bureau charges that TWA was im- —
prudent in handling its labor relations with this group
of employees, particularly after the strike was called. The
Buread theorizes.that the strike ‘would not have occurred
had TWA communicated with the navigators and explained
its proposal prior to taking its action, effective July 1; and
¢€
further speculates that once the strike oceurred, thé costs
‘complete surrender to the union demands, _Had it done so
the additional pilots’ salaries that TWA and other airlines
would have had to pay would have been substantial not
employees except for a skeleton force. In these circum-
_ Stances TWA insists that its management was honest, eco-
nomical and efficient in handling the pilot strike.
16771 :
As to the navigator strike, TWA contends that by stand-
eo,
B86 .
: (16771, 16772)
companiéd’ by a conference on the status of the strikers
and further by the union’ s insistence that talks be on the
union’s own terms.
With the advantage of hindsight it would appear that
‘_ TWAYs management, in handling the 1946 pilot wage and
rules dispute, would have been better off had it continued
individual negotiations with ALPA rather than delegating
its collective: bargaining functions to ANC. | Certainly, as
the events leading up to the strike show the industry-wide -
_ bargaining approach insisted upon by ANC. and the con-
. current. handling of each air carrier case by the Mediation
me a Board did not~facilitate a-settlement of the controversy.
_ But this does not establish that TWA’s saath Vil was
_. uneconomic and inefficient.
-. Assessing the situation ‘i in the light of the times, it would
: seem. eminently unfair to hold that TWA’s management
acted imprudently in dealing with its pilot strike. At the
" timie ANC was organized it was customary for most labor
organizations to want industry- wide. bargaining. “Henee,
it was not ‘unreasonable for. TWA and the other air car-
'. riers to create a committee which would facilitate this
method of bargaining. ;
. . Legally, there could be no question as to each carrier’s
- ‘right to designate ANC as its authorized bargaining repre-
~ seritative. The ony:
46772
problem was whether each carrier’s case eonid be dis-
ee. posed of on a consolidated basis, and the Mediation Board
resolved this by holding that the Railway Labor Act con-
templated separate-bargaining with each carrier. How-
_ ever, the Mediation Board favored concurrent mediation |
and a single arbitration agreement, and its position in
~ this matter was not. conducive to me the TWA
dispute. an ;
_While TWA’s management cclected AN C.as the carrier s
» *-
| B87
(16772, 16773)
bargaining representative and ANC insisted on an indus-
_ try-wide settlement, thé Mediation Board was. not com-
pelled to handle the various cases on a concurrent: basis.
If it had mediated each case separately and independently
‘of the other ALPA ‘may not-have been irritated to the
point of issuing the notice of strike for the week of April
21. Perhaps the TWA case could have been settled before
_ Teaching the Emergency Board stage. But having
. reached that stage, the strike could still have been averted
had the union accepted the Emergency Board reconimenda- |
tions which were satisfactory to TWA. *
No longer was a settlement of the TWA dispute geare
to an industry-wide settlement which had been ALPA’s
principal objections to the earlier negétiations. The
_ Emergency Board had'separated the TWA casé and issued
wage and rules recommendations respecting that carrier
alone. The other air carrier cases, according to the
Emergency Board, should be referred back to the parties
for negotiation or settlement on the basis of the TWA
recommendations. yf
Thus, after the Emergency Board Report of J uly 8, 1946,
it is difficult to assign ALPA’s displeasure with the Emer-
gency Board recommendations to any of the activities of
ANC. Its dissatisfaction apparently was related to the
Board’s wage-seale recommendations and this obviously led
16773
ALPA to its sudden demands of October 19 and the strike’
that began on October 21, 1946.
When it presented its wage demands to-TWA’s president
on the morning of October 19 it allowed practically no time
‘for discussion. TWA’s response was. conciliatory and
under these conditions, it could not be considered as __
provocative or imprudent. For the carrier to have sub-
B88
_ (16773, 16774)
- mitted to the demands without further negotiation would
have been uneconomic and inefficient.
* * * It is further found that after the strike began
TWA followed every reasonable means to terminate the
strike. at the earliest date and it made every reasonable
effort to reduce the cost of the strike. |
- Turning now to the navigator strike, the facts do not
warrant the.conclusion that TWA’s management was
responsible for this strike. .The 1949 collective bargaining
agreement between TWA and the navigators and those
subsequent thereto afford documentary proof of the
carrier’s intention to eliminate navigators on any of
TWA’s routes not requiring celestial navigation; and
the company’s application in the summer of: 1952 to the
Civil Aeronautics Administration requesting approval of
its plan to eliminate navigators’ on certain. European:
route segments, including those involving Paris-Rome,
apprised the union of the imminence of this plan. Further
indication of the seriousness of this plan must have been
evident to the navigators when, in November 1952, TWA
agreed to waive the one-year waiting period for furloughed .
navigators, and when several months later, in April 1953, _ .
the CAA tentatively approved TWA’s application to elim-.
inate navigators on the Paris-Rome segments. ee
16774 °
Thus, when the plan was officially approved by the CAA
on June 5, 1953, and the navigators were notified on June
9 that TWA would implement the program, efféctive July
1, the union should not have been taken by surprise. In
these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Bureau
. attributes the strike to TWA’s failure to discuss the impact
of its program on the future job security of navigators.
The successive collective bargaining agreements from 1949
on
B89
(16774, 16775) |
through 1953 incorporated provisions for softening the im-
pact of such a program. What then could be accomplished
by discussions with the union that were not provided for
by the current collective bargaining agreement? Perhaps
_ TWA could have been more explicit to the navigators that
‘no immediate furloughs were contemplated; but not hav-
ing received furlough notices in accordance with the col-
lective batgaining agreement, the navigators must have
been aware that no immediate layoffs were planned.
Hence, there was -no plausible basis for the union’s
‘ action in calling the strike. Its explanation that TWA’s
plan violated the increment agreement was a feeble at-
tempt to justify its action that failed to impress its own
counsel or the National Union. In fact, as late as June. 25
it had not made such a claim. Thus, up until the Strike
oceurred there can be no question concerning the efficiency
and economy of TWA’s management. It was pursuing an
economical and. efficient objective in- eliminating unneces- -
sary eosts and in pursuing this objective it did not act |
unreasonably’ or imprudently in dealing with its navi-.. .
gators, : | | | 7
After the strike occurred TWA refused to deal directly
with union officials until the navigators returned to work.
The navigators would
16775
not return to work until TWA would agree to reinstate
the discharged navigators. TWA did meet indirectly with
the union on July 11 through a mediator and. had direct
discussions with the union’s counsel (not an official of the
union) on July 12 and 13. However, since it was adamant
in its refusal to reinstate the discharged navigators and
the union was equally adamant about returning to work
without a reinstatement of the discharged navigators, the
discussions broke off. The B
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