Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brown v. United States

Supreme Court brief1967

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SUPREME COURT, U. & ah -J° FILED

DEC 6 1967. *}

| JOHN F. == .

.

} ae IN ‘THE ; :

+ Supe Court of the Hnited States ry

, October TERM, - g ud

AMPLEX OF MARYLAND, INC., Petitioner,

eres a 7%. :

¢ :

OvurTBoARD MarINE CorporATION, Respondent.

Bs oor }

6

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT = -

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Roserts B. OWEN

Nestor 8. Fotey _,

701 Union Trust Building -

Washington, D..C. 20005

Attorneys for Respondent

Of Counsel: ici ,

CoviNavon & BuRLING _ +

70? Union Trust Building ~ :

Washington, D.C. 20005 .

»:

INDEX

. FF fat , Page

Qumerions PRESENTED .........., Hueeswese rererer ry soon 8

| CounTersraTEMEN sreeesbs Ae EN OE ae oeces 3°

1. The Procedure Followed at the Trial PSTORpER om nCE

2. Petitioner’ S Evidence rrr seennd -eusewanteseetes os: 2

3. Petitioner’s Th¢ories of Violation and the Findings of °

the Courts BOWW. oo vevectrcrevcceseevevesees eoebe, 18

Rasacers vou sum Deisin, ou.wus Wane .....0--scceeseoess: 21 .

I. The Antitrust Questibn for Which Petitioner Seeks

_ Review Is Not Presented, on Phis Binet Baga merch 21

II. The Question for Which the rE Seeks Review

Is Not Presented on This Record...............00005 28

III. There Is No Noteworthy Question of Procedure Here

ENVOBVOE cccccccecvevccneccccccessceceveonsccese’s 35

CONCLUSION ....:eecceccceee’ Rate tober ne Li trl it 36

CITATIONS

Cases:

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. .» 370

Week Ge CED: cpnectlonsetevacensasusehseonmienniese 35

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-0- Vac Co., 321 Uv. S. 275

CREE ene susuctasueseennssceensdseenetectecauleashs 2-

Graver Tamk & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, Co., 336 U.S. .

et GEE -nuccdeed 6aens cenestsnbevsedouscdacwadcente 2

Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F. oa 566 (4th Cir. 1963) .. 34

- Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Company, 368 U. S. 464 .

GEE Gkcuacccenvasedencasdcniedeussedevaresuaos 35

Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] “Trade

Reg. Rep. '{ 16,673, ‘at 21,560 (FTC 1968) ,....scccseees 28

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, (1948) .... 33 }

United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) . -18, 19,

ne

ATE nt me inn Scene

ii Index Continued

>». Clayton Act, Section 3 —— ;

* 15 U.S.C. $14 (1964) ..........6.. +++ +18, 20, 21, 28, 32, 34

Sherman Act, Section 1 earl =

15 U.S.C. §1 (1964) ......... !. «el, 3, 18, 19, 20, 28, 32, 34

Sherman Act, Section 2 |

15 U.S.C. cidgneeeseessseucedven - -1, 3, 19, 20, 28

Federal Rules of Chon Procedure 41 OUT éabsccdove earners 19

Miscellaneous: - ' een

. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1956) : peuseresses bocaé

Bain, Industrial Organization (1959) .......... Sosbedeees + 28

Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959) .......,..:.. tis on

Notes of Advisory Committee, Rule 41(b), 28 vseA, p.

‘ ...205 (1958 a Sau sie deb sdk eeaeaee ress cnessieeeese% 19

: Yachting Magazine, Octobers 1967, at 46 eunenvenecdseeeees 25

IN THE

—- Court of the United _—

OoroBER beat 1967

No. 668

AMPLEX OF MARYLAND, INC., Petitioner,

et ars. . |

OvuTBoARD MARINE CorPoRATION, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

| STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

"RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI :

?

This case turns entirely upon issues of fact. “The

plaintiff, petitioner here, was a marine dealer who al-

leged that an outboard motor manufacturer, respond-

ent here, refused to sell its outboard motors to the deal-

er and that, in'so refusing, respondent violated Sections

1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Petitioner-plaintiff

waived a jury and the case was tried to District Judge

_ (now Circuit Judge) Harrison Winter sitting without

2

a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s case the District

Court made findings of fact which, under familiar and

undisputed principles of law, réfuted liability on the

_ part of the manufacturer. Petitioner appealed, assert-

_ ing that the District Court had found the facts in-

correctly, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

. euit coneurred in the lower court’s findings and

affirmed. Given these concurrent findings by the two

courts below, it would seem prima facie that this is

not a case which should be reviewed on the facts by

this Court. Graver Tank .& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air

. Products €o., 336 U.S. 271 (1949) ; Goodyear Tire "

Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vae €o., 321 US. ‘275 (1944).

In its efforts to keep the case alive petitioner has

gone to quite extraordinary lengths in this Court. In

fact it is difficult to recognize the case from the petition.

By distortions built upon fragments” of fact without

record. citation, by frank reliance on matters outside

the record, and by the assertion of claims which were

- not mentioned in the courts below, petitioner has pre- -

sented an ingenious but entirely misleading picture of

an otherwise unnotewerthy case.

Moreover, the erroneous factual. picture set forth

' in the petition has apparently led the Department of

Justice to believe that the case involves a new and im-

portant question of antitrust law, with the result that

. the United States has filed a memorandum in support

. of the petition. With all due respect, respondent sub-

mits that the Government’s memorandum is not based .

upon a responsible reading of the record and that the

antitrust issue for which the Government seeks review

is not in fact: involved in the case at all. = actual

‘ nature of the case is as follows.

. , 3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

_ The only questions ay before this Court are :

as: follows:

(1): - Where an antitrust plaintiff’s oie shows, —

and the courts below concurrently find, that the defend-

ant-manufacturer is not engaged in a program to re-

_ quire its dealers generally to deal exclusively in its

products, but rather has a policy of not discriminating ;

against those who handle competing products, is a vio--_

lation of Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act

established. mérely by proof that the manufacturer

unilaterally refused to deal with a single dealer who

_ was handling competing products?

(2) Where an antitrust plaintiff, after introducing

its principal evidence, is offered and voluntarily ac-

cepts an opportunity to make a proffer as to all of -

- its remaining evidence, and where the District Court,

sitting without a jury, then accepts as true all facts

directly proved or proffered by the plaintiff, must that

District Court then draw all inferences from , those

facts in favor of the plaintiff in determining whether

the plaintiff has a cause of action, or may the Court

draw inferences from those facts as at the close of the -

plaintiff’s case?

| COUNTERSTATEMENT

1. The Procedure Followed at the Trial

At the beginning of the trial petitioner made an

opening statement to the Court (Tr. 7-23). At. the

close of the statement the Court was in serious doubt

as to whether the facts alleged in the opening state-

ment, if proved, would constitute a cause of action

under the Sherman Act.’ N evertheless, petitioner was

allowed to proceed with its case, and in the next four

~e--gnd one-half trial days petitionier presented the testi-

mony of five ‘witnesses, introduced voluminous docu-

mentary exhibits into evidence, and thus compiled a

trial transcript of about 760 pages. Petitioner’s prin-

cipal witnesses were as follows: | .

(1) Nicholas Canzona was the president and prin-

cipal stockholder of petitioner (R.A. 1, 4).? Generally,

he testified that petitioner operated a marine dealer-

ship in Arnold, Maryland, that in the spring of 1960

petitioner had been awarded a franchise to sell the so-

ealled ‘‘ Johnson” outboard motor manufactured by re-

spondent’s Johnson Division, that that franchise had

‘been renewed for the year 1961, that respondent had ~

refused to renew it for the year-1962, and that the -

reason for the refusal to renew was the fact that in

1961 the petitioner had begun to sell the so-called

‘*Mercury”’ outboard motor (R.A. 1%; Pl, Ex. 33, R.A.

196-99; P.A. 44-45).

. (2) Paul Wright was a former employee of re-

, spondent, In 1960 he was employed as a salesman for

respondent’s Johnson Division, covering a territory

(‘Territory 23’’) which included petitioner’s place of —

business (P.A. 57, 58-59). It was Mr. Wright who

recommended that petitioner be given a Johnson deal-

ership in April 1960 and who recommended the re-*

1The doubt, while not expressed until later i in the trial, existed

from the outset (Tr. 516).

2«P. A.’ and “‘P.S.A.”’ refer, respectively, to petitioner’ s Ap-

pendix and Supplemental Appendix containing that portion of.

the record that was printed for the Court of. Appeals. ‘‘R.A.”’

_ refers to respondent’s printed: Appendix.

newal of the franchise for 1961 (P.A. 58-59; Pl. Ex.

33, R.A. 197). Mr. Wright left the respondent’s em-

ploy i in February “1 (P.A. 57).

(3) Mr. Elio Sen ~‘na was Mr. Wright’s nettle

successor as the Ji. %m salesman for Territory 23

_ (R.A. 65). It was Mr. Schiavina who recommended to ©

his supervisors that the petitioner’s franchise not be

renewed at its expiration at the end of September 1961

(R.A. 76-77; Tr. 701). : :

The foregoing witnesses were the principal actors in

the events which gave rise to the case, but at the con-—

clusion of their testimony there apparently was a ques-

tion in Judge Winter’s mind as to whether petitioner

had even begun te establish an antitrust violation (see

R.A. 81-83). Petitioner had made known that it in-

tended to call approximately forty additional witnesses,

but the District Court had some doubt that the addi-

tional testimony would add what was necessary for

petitioner to make out a case (Tr. 745-46; R.A. 81).

There was the possibility, therefore, of several weeks

_ of tri! resulting only in a waste of ‘effort on the part

of the « ‘ourt and the parties.

| Under these circumstances Judge Winter made a

‘suggestion’? as to which he invited “any comments —

now that you [petitioner] want to make’’ (R.A. 84).

The suggestion was that the ‘trial be recessed to give

the parties an opportunity to. brief the law. applicable

to the case and to give petitioner an opportunity to.

' prepare and to make a proffer of all additional evidence

that it proposed to offer (R.A. 84). Contrary to peti-

_ tioner’s statement in this Court that “‘the district

- court intimated that it was about to dismiss the case”’

6

(Pet. 2-3), the District Court when =e its sug-

gestion said,

“IT do not know tiie you have a witattiin case

or whether you do not, but I do have the basic feel-.

ing, which I have expressed to you before, and that

is that if I conclude that you do not have a possible

ease, in your interests, in my interests and in the

interests of the defendant, it is better to face it

“now.” (R.A. 84)

To this petitioner’s s counsel immediately and directly :

respouxded,

‘“‘T think Your Honor is very much correct, and I .

concur with everything said as to the preparation

of the brief and a proffer as to the testimony that

I would hope to offer and at that time, if it is Your

Honor’s opinion that based upon the brief and

- proffered testimony that.there is no case, that the

proceedings would be closed at that time and if —

plaintiff desired an appeal, he would take it at

that time.”’ (R.A. 84)

The suggestions in the petition (pp. 3, 23) mas in the

Government’s Memorandum (p. 2). that the Court

“‘required”’ .and ‘‘directed’’ the petitioner to truncate

its case against its will are. hardly accurate.

After approximately a week’s recess in the trial,

briefs were submitted, oral argument was held, and

petitioner ‘made a detailed proffer of the additional —

evidence, both testimonial and documentary, which it

proposed-to introduce, and in the course thereof gave

a full description of its proposed additional proof (pre- ©

sumably described in its best possible light from peti-

tioner’s standpoint) (P.A. 98-117).

Thereupon the District Court found and concluded

that petitioner’s total proof, both that already in evi- ~

7

- dence and that proffered, was insufficient to prove any

violation of law by.respondent, on any theory of the

law or facts advanced by petitioner (Pet. B-1-12;

_ P.A.-11-15, 17-22). Because nothing would have been

gained by proceeding further, the Court entered judg-

ment for respondent. ,

2. ‘Petitioner’ 8 Weldenes :

The facts established during cic cade case were

in material part as follows: :

1. Respondent Outboard Marine Pa (OMC)

manufactured, among other things, three different

- brands of outboard motors—J ohnson, Evinrude and

-Gale—each of which was manufactured and distributed

by a separate Division.. Each Division sold its out-

board motors to- independent dealers, who resold at

retail (Pl. Ex. 68, R.A. 204-05).

2. Respondent was one of 12 outboard motor manu- _

facturers in the United States. .For the purpose of

this case both courts below assumed that respondent’s |

three motoys' (Johnson, Evinrude, and Gale),- taken

together, constituted slightly less than 60% of the out

board motors sold in the United States in the relevant

period (P.A. 99; Pet. B-6, A-4, A-6). Among the other

eleven manufacturers. were the Kiekhaefer Division |

of Brunswick Corporation, which manufactures the

‘*Mercury’’ motor, and McCulloch Corporation, which -

manufactures the ‘Scott’? motor (P.A. 28).

3. Petitioner offered.to prove that the 12 outboard

motor manufacturers distribute their motors through ©

some’ 12,000 to 15,000 outboard motor dealers (P.A.

99). Respondent’s three brands are distributed

through a total of 8,700 dealers (Pl. Ex. 68, R.A. —

@

8

205). : There is, no evidence as to how many of those

8,700 dealers handle the Johnson motor (as distin-

guished from the Evinrude and Gale motors).

4, There is evidence that the majority of the 12,000- —

_ 15,000 motor dealers in the United States handle only

a single line of engines (Def. Ex. 9, P.A. 42). Peti-

tioner did not prove or offer to prove that the majority.

of respondent’s 8,700 dealers handle only one line of

engines, but it is undoubtedly the fact that most of

respondent’s dealers do concentrate on one or another

of respondent's lines,

5. On the critical question as to why the suhiority of .

all marine dealers handle only one brand of motor, the

only evidenge in the record is to the effect that most

dealers personally prefer to concentrate on one line

(Def. Ex. 9, P.A. 142), perhaps for the same reasons

that prompt most automobile dealers to concentrate on

one line * (e.g., in order to minimize the costs involved

in ¢arrying substantial inventories, training expenses

for service personnel, ete.). 7

6. Petitioner’ S own witnesses, Messrs. Wright ami

. Schiavina, testified that at all relevant times respond-

- ent had in force an affirmative policy of not declining

to do. business with a dealer because he was handling

competitive products. That policy was embodied in

_ printed instructions that were issued, and annually

_ reissued, to Johnson’s sales personnel (Def. Ex. 9, P.A. —

8 Although there is no evidence in the record that most automo-

bile dealers concentrate on one line, petitioner asserts in this Court

(Pet. 10) that the ‘‘30,000 franchised automobile dealers . . . deal

exclusively or primarily [in] the products of a single supplier”’,

_ and respondent is prepared to accept the assertion for the. —

of argument on the’ ‘instant petition for certiorari.

9

142; P.A. 88-89: R.A. 61-62, 64).4 The sam¢ witnesses

; also testified that Johnson’s management had in fact no

objection to petitioner’s or any other dealer’s handling

competing motors (R.A. 57, 64). As Mr. Wright testi- _:

fied, the Johnson salesmen customarily informed-the __

Johnson management when dealers were handling com-

petitive motors, and the management. would award a

dealership to sitch a dealer if he also offered promise,’

as a Johnson dealer (R.A. 57). In short, the petitioner’

affirmatively established on its own case, primérily .

through the testimony of an ex-employee of respondent,

that respondent does not require its dealers to practice

exclusive dealing. The suggestions made by the peti-

tioner and the Government to the contrary are not sup-

ported by the record (indeed, they are asserted without

record citation), and they are not true.

7. In April 1960, upon recommendation of Mr.

Wright (R.A. 56), the Johnson Division awarded a

‘Johnson dealership to petitioner (Pl. Ex. 11, R.A. 192-

95), and respondent began selling Johnson motors to

petitioner in May (R.A. 17). The dealership was en-

* Typical of petitioner’s use of matter which is not in the record

is its reference to a 1956 Federal Trade Commission cease and

desist order and hearsay evidence as to the supposed attitudes of

certain of respondent’s salesmen (Pet. 6-7). The District Court

- refused to receive in evidence either the cease and desist order

or the hearsay testimony (Pretrial Order, P.A. 9; P.A. 80, 64-65).

Neither of these evidentiary rulings was challenged by petitioner

in the Court of Appeals. below, and petitioner therefore has no

right to rely upon the excluded matter in this Court. For the

same reason the Government’ s reliance upon the same excluded

- evidence is also improper (Gov. Mem. 7-8 n. 13). If the Federal ..

Trade Commission proceeding is to be considered at all, it should

‘be borne in mind that the evidence in that case related to conduct

which took place in late 1940’s, long before the promulgation of

the written policy referred to in the text. )

Re ie aie ge

tered under a written dealer agreement which contained

no provision for renewa]jgand which expi#ed by its own 7

express terms on Septem yer 30, 1960 (Pl. Ex. 11, R.A.

192-95).

8. Before it conte the dealership to petitioner, the -

Johnson Division management knew that petitioner

was successfully handling a competing motor, Scott,

under ‘a franchise agreement with the manufacturer

(Pl. Ex. 6, R:A. 186-89; Def. Ex. 15, R.A. 96; P.A. 77). malts

_ The Johnson dealership was nevertheless awarded, and

. petitioner sold both Johnson and-Scott motors there- -

after. As petitioner admits, wane offered a full line

_ of engines (Pet. 6). |

_, 9.-Mr. Wright testified that soon after the award <. anne

petitioner’ s franchise he “suopested” to petitioner that -

it give up its Scott franchise and ‘‘phase out”’ the Scott

motor (P.A. ‘41, 67): Mr. Wright (who -had left re-~

spondent’s employ five years before the trial and could -

in: no sense. be regarded as hostile to petitioner or

— toward respondent) also stated unequivoeally

that his action violated company policy and was never

reported by him to any superior (P.A. 69-72). More-

over, he made clear, that at no time did the management

feof the Johnson, Division ‘“‘ever make any objection, to

.fpetitioner’s] oe of: competing. lines * motors”

. (R.A. 57)2

10. Petitioner continued. ‘to handle Scott engines

throughout its relationship with respondent. - At the be- «

ginning of 1961 petitioner had on hand approximately

20 Scott engines, and in the spring of 1961, a year after -

; . fr>, : are fh

5 Compare petitioner’s erroneous assertion (made without record

citation) that, respondent ‘‘required’’ petitioner ‘‘to agree to

, ‘phase out’ ’’ the Scott engine (Pet. -6).

u

the alleged ‘‘phase-out’’ suggestion bya. Mr. Wright, E

petitioner purchased ‘about. 20” new Scott engines

(R.A. 14, 15, 17; Tr. 602-03, 632), thus putting itself -

ina position to sell’ as many Scott engines in 1961 as

it had sold in any preceding year (R.A. 15, 16). To

support this project the petitioner advertised its Scott

“engines ahead of its Johnson engines (R.A. 23-24; Def.

Ex. 19, R.A. 129). Petitioner continued tox handle

- . Seott engines ‘until 1962, when Scott cancelled peti-

tioner’s franchise (R.A. 41). |

11. When the first Johnson agreement ‘expired in

-- September 1960, Johnson awarded petitioner a new

dealership agreement for the ensuing year: (Pl. Ex.

33, R.A. 196-99), obviously knowing that petitioner.was

handling Scott, as well as Johnson, motors (R.A. 56-

57; P.A. 59). Neither of petitioner’ s Johnson dealer

agreemeits contained any provision restricting its right

- to deal in competing motors (Pl. Ex. 11, R.A. 192-95;

- Pi. Ex. 33, R.A. 196-99). ~~

Ps ~ 12. In or about March 1961 Mr. Schiavina cua

_Mr. Wright as the Johnson sales representative for

Territory 28, which included Arnold, Maryland, peti-

bs tioner’s place of business (P.A. 24; R.A. 95,-65). At. °

that time petitioner was handling both the’ Johnson

and the Scott motor, and Mr. Schiavina never made any

’ objection to petitioner’ ~ ne of that A oes rae

brand.°

13. Following his arrival in the ‘ain ‘Mr. Schia-

_ ¥ina submitted a series of written reports on petition-

“er’s operations to the Johnson management in Wau-.

. , ® Despite lengthy testimony as to conversations between Schiavina

and petitioner, ‘the latter has nevér suggested that Schiavina had

any objection to petitioner’s handling of Scott. °

. 9

kegan, Illinois. On March 8, 1961, le sepintdd that

petitioner’s “Display”? was ‘‘“Poor’”’; that its ‘‘Atti- ~

tude” was “Fair” and that its ‘Service Facilities”

were ‘‘Poor” (Pl. Ex. 73, P.A. 137-38). The report

also included these comments: ‘‘Place of business little

on the squalid side and can stand improvements”’; ‘‘It

_is.a question in my mind how long he can stay solvent’’ ;

aa ‘“‘Not happy with this>operation”’.

(14. Another, employee of respondent, Service Repre-

sentative Lee. Clayton, also visited petitioner’s place

of business in the spring of 1961 and reported in writ-

ing -to the Johnson management on April 6 that, while

petitioner’s service arrangements might eventually be

good, petitioner’s ‘‘shop condition’’ is ‘a mess: at 3

present, being completely changed around” (Pl. Ex.

72, R.A..207-08). For this reason, as among the possi-

ble “Servite Station Listings’ of ‘“‘AA’’, “A” or

‘‘None’’, Mr. Clayton recommended no service station

- listing. Mr. Canzona himself testified that the pro-:

jected improvements which prompted Mr. Clayton’s

earlier optimism for petitioner’s service arrangements

were never actually made (R.A. 2-3).

15. Mr. Schiavina visited ‘petitioner’s place of busi-

ness again in May and reported in writing to the John-

son management/on May 10, 1961, that, although peti- —

tioner had € some improvements. in his place of

business, S¢kfavina was still dissatisfied: ‘‘We dis-

euss[ed] his squalid condition and he agreed that he

has to clean it up” (PI. Ex. 74, P.A. 139).

16. On J uly 20, 1961, Mr. Schiavina submitted stil

another written report (a so-called ‘‘dealer review’’)

to the Johnson management, commenting that peti-

tioner’s ‘‘Service’’ was ‘‘ Poorly. organized—squalid—

13

can stand improvements” (Pl. Ex. 22, P.A. 143-44).

Mr. Schiavina also concurred with Mr. Clayton’ s

recommendation that petitioner be given no service

station listing.. The report concluded as follows: |

‘‘Recommend 1962 Dealer Agreement be held pending

‘further investigation in this area. I [am] very dis-~ a

_. appointed with this dealer’s service shop set-up. He is

not keeping a stock and record book’’. :

17. During the period of Mr. Schiavina’ s dealings

with petitioner the Johnson management and Schiavina

received complaints concerning petitioner’s servicing

of motors of customers who had bought Johnson motors

(RA. 65-66, 73).

18. In the same period Snell had continuous

eredit difficulties with petitioner (R.A. 18). As Mr.

Canzona admitted, petitioner was “slow pay”’ with

respect to its various suppliers, including respondent —

(P.A. 35; R.A. 18; Def. Ex. 16, R.A. 98-125; Def. Ex.

20, R.A. 130-51; Def. Ex. 32, R.A. 158-77).

19. The courts below treated it as established that in

the summer of 1961 Schiavina learned that petitioner

had taken’ on a franchise to sell Mercury motors (in

addition to Johnson and Séott) and that he protested

- to petitioner: about this additional franchise (see Pet.

A-5). There is no evidence that, if these events oc-

curred, Schiavina so advised the Johnson management.

_ 20. -In the summer of 1961, being dissatisfied with

_ petitioner as a Johnson dealer, Schiavina investigated

and found a potential new dealer six miles away. The

new prospect was Nat Gates & Sons, an established

marine dealer whom Schiavina described to the John-

son management as ‘‘one of the best dealers in this

* Annapolis area’’ (Def. Ex. #1, i“ A. 148).. Under an

-

earlier arrangement with respondent ’s Evinrude Divi-

sion, Gates had achieved the extraordinary sales rate of

500 Evinrude motors per year (R.A. 79-80)..

21. In reporting to the Johnson management with

respect to Gates’ potentiality as a Johnson dealer,

Schiavina advised his superiors that Gates was then

handling Mercury motors and intended to continue to

do so (Def. Ex. 46, Pp. 147). “

29. Shortly thereafter Schiavina recommended to

‘the Johnson management that petitioner’s Johnson

franchise not be renewed and. that the franchise be

‘awarded to-Gates (Def. Ex. 47, P.A. 148). The courts

below treated it as established that Schiavina recom-

’ mended non-renewal of petitioner’s franchise because

petitioner had taken on the third line of motors (Mer-

—eury) (Pet. B-4, A).

23. Respondent decided to ‘ian astieegt sJ dis

franchise to lapse and to award the franchise to Gates. —

Phe decision was made not by Mr. Schiavina, but by

his superiors in the Waukegan office’ which had been

receiving complaints about petitioner from its field

’ personnel and customers and had been experiencing —

credit difficulties with petitioner (R.A. 65-66,73; P.A.

35; R.A. 18, 64). :

24. Following thé award of ‘the Johnson franchise to

Gates, the latter continued to sell both Johnson and

Mercury motors with the full knowledge of the Johnson

management (see Def. Ex. 46, P.A. 147). Ultimately

Gates ceased handling the Mercury motor when Mer-

™The decision not to renew the petitioner’s J ohnson franchise

-was actually made by a Mr. .Kalbfus, Johnson’s Director of Sales,

and three levels above Mr. Schiavina i in the Johnson hierarchy (Pl. .

' Ex. 46, P.A. 119). 3 ;

15. -

oury: terminated his franchise against his wishes (see

Def. Ex. 49, P.A. 150).° )

25. Insofar as Schiavina’s ‘personal conduct is‘ con-

cerned, the net result was that he had recommended ~

the non-renewal of a dealer’s Johnson franchise because

(according to the courts below) the dealer was also

handling Mercury, and he had simultaneously recom-

mended that the same. Johnson franchise be given to

another dealer who was handling Mercury. In evaluat-

_ ing this conduct it should be borne in mind that in the

early months of 1961, before petitioner had taken on

the Mercury motor, Schiavina had become thoroughly

dissatisfied with petitioner on the basis of its ‘‘squalid”’

eondition, customer complaints, and financial irrespon-

sibility ; that before taking on Mercury petitioner had

already been spreading its selling energies and financial

resources over a vast array of products (Def. Ex. 19,

R.A. 129; R.A. 58); and that the addition of still

another line (Mercury) might well have tended to

reduce the effectiveness of petitioner as a sound John- |

son dealer—while Gates had been a fine dealer who

had demonstrated an ability to sell 500 outboard mo-

tors a year. |

2%. There is no specific malitidets in the record as to

_the number or proportion of respondent’s dealers that

in fact dealt in competitive motors, except with respect

to respondent’s Johnson dealers in its Territory 23,

8 The implication in the Petition (p. 7) and in the Government's

Memorandum (pp. 2-3) that respondent somehow persuaded Gates

to get rid of the Mercury motor is totally without foundation and

is in fact refuted by affirmative proof. (Def. Ex. 49, P.A. 150).

When petitioner persisted.in implying, during the trial, that re-

spondent had forced Gates to relinquish the Mercury franchise,

the District Court expressly invited petitioner to use compulsory

process to elicit Gates’ testimony as to why he had ceased to be

a Mercury dealer, but petitioner refused (Tr. 837-39; see Pet. B-5). _

16

the territory in which Messrs. Wright and Schiavina ©

successively served as district manager. There, of the

approximately 100 Johnson dealers in the territory -

(R.A. 63), ten dealt in competitive motors (R.A. 59; .

P.A. 91-93),:a fact which was known to respondent’s

management and to which that management mAéde no

objection (R.A. 57; and see, @.g.; Pl. Exs. 62-64, R.A.

, 200-03; Def. Exs. 4-7, R.A. 88-92; Def. Ex. 46, PA.

147; Def. Ex. 50, P.A. 151).°

27. The petitioner strongly suggests—and the Gov-

ernment’s memorandum states flatly—that all of the —

Johnson dealers who dealt in gompetitive motors ‘‘were.

in rural areas where substitute dealers were hard to

find’? (Gov. Mem. 3; see Pet. 9). This is not a re- .

sponsible reading of "the record. Of the ten dealers

who handled competitive motors in Territory 23‘in the

relevant period, only three were shown to be located in

rural areas (P.A. 80-81, 96,97). As to the other seven,

either the record does not show the character of the

_ area: (1.¢., rural vs. urban), or it shows that the par-

ticular dealer was soem 3 in an urban area a (P. A. 96,

97).

28. Mr. Wright-testified that during his oveiieh years

in respondent’s. employ (P.A. 57) there were eight

occasions when he approached a dealer who was han-.

dling competing motors and suggested that the dealer

cease handling the competing motor and concentrate

entirely on the Johnson motor (P.A. 65-75). There is

® During Mr. Wright’s tenure in Territory 23, six of his dealers

were handling competing motors (P.A. 66, 71, 77, 78, 91, 92, 94-95;

R.A. 59). When.Mr. Schiavina succeeded Mr. Wight te Terri-

tory 23, the Johnson Division added four more such lers on

Schiavina’ 's recommendation (P.A. 91-92, 147), thus b the

total’ number of dealers who were handling — motors in

the territory to ten.

17

not the slightest suggestion in the record that on any

‘of these occasions Mr. Wright ‘‘threatened’’ that, if the

dealer continued to handle competing motors, the J ohn-

son Division would refuse to deal with-him.” More-

over, Mr. Wright’s suggestions were not notably suc:

cessful. In three of the eight cases the dealer accepted

the suggestion and gave up handling the competing

motor (P.A. 65-67), but in the other five cases the

dealer flatly refused to give-up his competing line of

engines and continued to handle them‘as before (P.A.

65-74). There is no suggestion in the record that,. when

such refusals occurred, any retaliation was fortheoming

from Mr. Wright or anyone else.”

29. During his testimony with respect. to his eight

efforts to persuade a dealer to stop handling competing: -

motors, Mr. Wright (and, indeed, counsel for peti-

‘tioner) made very clear that at the time Wright made

these efforts respondent’s policy prohibited discrimina-

tion against dealers handling competing motors, that

his suggestions that particular dealers give up handling

competing motors constituted deviations from his in-

structions from his superiors, and that, none of his

efforts to persuade dealers to handle respondent’s

10 Petitioner’s offer of proof included proffered testimony that in

1959 a former employee of the Johnson ‘Division approached a

Philadelphia dealer and ‘‘demanded that they cease handling a.

Neptune outboard motor’’, a ‘‘low priced, small horsepower spe-

cialty product’? (P.A. 109-10). The proffered testimony did .not

includé any testimony as to a threat of cancellation or as te the

circumstances surrounding the ‘‘demand’’.

11 Compare petitioner’s erroneous statement that Mr. Wright

testified that ‘‘he had personally recommended cancellation of a

number of dealer franchises for the sole reason that the dealer

refused to give up a competing line of outboard engines, PA63

[and 64-65]’’ (Pet. 7). The statement is untrue; there is no evi-

dence to that effect either atthe cited pages or elsewhere.

18

motors alleiedy was known to any of his superiors

(P.A, 65-72). , |

. Petitioner's Theories of Violation ‘ind the Findings

of the Courts Below.

In the District Court and the Court of Appeals below

petitioner rested its entire case on the Sherman Act.

Not only did petitioner not assert any claim under >

Section 3. of the Clayton Act, but when the Court of

Appeals referred to the latter statute in its opinion,

petitioner objected, characterizing the Court’s discus-.

sion of Section 3 of the Clayton Act as being ‘‘irrele-

- vant’’.? In this Court petitioner makes brief reference —

to Section 3 of the Clayton Act (Pet. 20), but in the

courts below it affirmatively eschewed any such theory

of liability.

With respect to its theory under Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, petitioner’s position has undergone ’a

series of changes. In its Complaint its Section 1 posi-

‘tion was that respondent and certain dealers in the- -

Baltimore area had conspired together to put petitioner

out of business as a Johnson dealer (P.A. 3), but proof

was lacking and the charge was dropped.” ‘Then in

its final argument to the District Court, after it had

completed its evidentiary submission, petitioner began

to talk in terms of a ‘‘combination’’ between respondent

and its dealers‘ generally with respect to the handling

‘ of competing motors, citing United States v. Parke,

Davis & Co:, 362 US. 29 (1960). Apparently recog-

12 Petition for Rehearing to the Court of Appeals (p. 12).

18 This Section 1 theory was never mentioned in the vou of

Appeals and has necessarily been abandoned. -

14 See ‘‘Plaintiff’s Memorandum”’ filed in the District Court on -

April 4, 1966 (p. 23), and Petitioner’s Brief in the Court of

Appeals (pp. 21-31). .

19

nizing, however, that it had not proved or offered to

prove such a ‘‘combination’’,.petitioner simultaneously

insisted before the District Court that. ‘‘the thrust”’

of its case was not a violation of Section 1 but was ‘“‘a

Section 2 offense’’ (Tr. 766; see also’ Tr. 761, 768, 835).

Finally, in the Court of Appeals petitioner decided to

reassert its Parke, Davis theory as well as a » Gorges

under Section 2. — .

Despite the somewhat confusing fluidity’ of petition. +)

er’s position, both of the courts below nevertheless ac-

cepted as true all of the factual propositions presented

by the plaintiff, both in the form of evidence.and in the

form of the proffer of proof.* Having accepted these ©

factual propositions as trué, the question then was

- whether tliey established any of the ultimate facts

(‘feombination or conspiracy’’, ‘‘intent to achieve a

' _ monopoly’, ete.) which would give rise to Sherman

Act liability."* The District Court found as a fact that

none of the requisite elements of liability were present,

and the Court of Appeals explicitly concurred i in those’

16 The Government is simply wrong in its, unspecific statement

that the Court of, Appeals below ‘‘refus[ed] to treat as true...

the facts set out in petitioner’s offer of proof’? (Gov. Mem. 6'n.

12). No evidence proffered by petitioner was treated as untrue °

by either of the courts below. :

16 The Government i is wrong in suggesting that, once the District

Court had taken as true ‘‘all of the relevant facts in the offer of

proof’’, the courts below were then required to draw ‘‘all infer-

ences favorable to petitioner . ... from such, facts’’ (Gov. Mem.

2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) makes clear that in a case ‘‘tried

_ by the court without a jury”’, if the defendant moves for dismissal

at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence on the ground that the

plaintiff has failed to make out a case, ‘‘[t]he court as trier’ of

the facts may determine them’’, weighing the evidence and draw-

ing inferences as at the conclusion of the case. See Notes of Ad-

visory Committee, Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A., p. 205 (1958 ed.)..

This is exactly what was done ‘by the District Court below.

a

20

findings.. The liltimate facts as thus concurrently

found by both courts are; in summary, as follows: |

(a) There was no ‘‘combination”’ or “‘eonspiracy”’

among the respondent and its dealers (or anyone else)

so as to give rise to liability under Section 1 of the

Sherman Act, either under a Parke, Davis theory or

otherwise (Pet. B-1-2, A-6). As observed by: the

Court. of Appeals, there simply was no ‘‘joint or con- __

curring action’? among respondent and its dealers so ~

as to bring the case within the Parke, Davis doctrine

(Pet. A-8). ; a -

(b) Similarly, both the District Court and the Court

of Appeals found that there was: no conspiracy to.

monopolize under Section 2 (Pet. B-2, A-6).

(ec) Both courts found that there was no evidence

to show that respondent enjoyed monopoly power

(either the ability to fix prices or to exclude competi- ©

tion) or that respondent had done any act tending to

strengthen its alleged monopoly position (Pet. B-3,

B-4, A-6). :

"(d) With respect to petitioner’s theory that there

had been an “‘attempt to monopolize’’ in violation of

Section 2, both courts found that. there was no specific

intent to monopolize and that if there had been such

_ , intent, there was no dangerous possibility that the at-—

tempt would be successful (Pet. B-8-11, A-6). -

There is one additional factual issue which was con-

sidered by the Court of Appeals but not by the’ District

Court—namely, whether respondent had entered into

arrangements with its dealers with respect to their

handling of competing motors in such a way as to raise

a question under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The

21

District Court did not consider the issue because peti-

tioner never raised any Section 3 question at the trial

level. The Court of Appeals considered ‘the issue sua

sponte but concluded.that, since there was no evidence.

of any ‘ ‘joint or concurring action’’ between respondent

and its dealers with respect to the handling of com- ©

peting motors, there was no factual basis for a finding

of a violation of Section 3 (Pet. A-8).

“It should be emphasized ‘that in this Court nies

does not quarrel with any of the substantive principles

of antitrust law applied by the courts below. As will

fully appear from the following analysis, petitioner’s

only disagreement with the courts below is that it

disagrees with their concurrent findings as to the facts.

REASONS FOR THE DENIAL OF THE WRIT

I. THE ANTITRUST QUESTION FOR WHICH PETITIONER

SEEKS REVIEW IS NOT PRESENTED ON THIS RECORD

A quick reading of the first ‘‘QuestionPresented’”

by petitioner might leave the impression that this case

involved significant new questions of antitrust law.

The fact of the matter, however, is. that although that

' “question presented’? may be interesting in ‘terms of

abstract theory, it is not raised by the r fay gioco in.

‘this case. The ‘‘question’’ contains a majof premise

and five subsidiary provisions, but, as demonstrated

immediately below, nothing in the record supports

either the premise or any of the subsidiary points. (The

Government’s view of-the case will be discussed sepa-

rately in Part II, Pp. 28-34, infra.)

Petitioner’s premise is that the case involves: a man-

-ufacturer who has made it a practice “‘to cancel the

franchises of dealers who refuse to stop selling the

A hay ae |

soidiaie of sniiiidliad manufacturers” ‘Pet. 2). rt ee

other points the alleged ‘practice’ (Pet. 19) is de-. .

_seribed as an “‘exclusive dealing policy’’ (e.g., Pet. 10,

‘12, 18) embodied in ‘‘oral understandings with the mia-.

-jrity of its 8,700 dealers’? (Pet. 20) with respect to

- their handling of competing products. “The theme, in

other words, is a ‘pattern of conduct “permeating re-

ee spondent’s ‘relations with its dealers generally,_all for

_ the purpose of “systematically préventing’’ such déal-

ers from handling. competing products (Pet.. 10-11). |

7 "Given the state. of the record, these are extraordinary

“claims: "Witnesses called_by the petitioner itself estab-

lished that respondent’ 's policy, as practiced by its man- -

af agement. and directed to its employees, was not-to dis-

criminate against dealers who handled competing prod-

ucts (Def. Ex. 9, P.A. 142; P.A. 71-18; R.A. 56-57),

oo and it was also’ established that, when one. ef respond-

ot ON ph

eal

| ent’s former salesmen tried to persuade a few. dealers to

give-up competing products (unsuccessfully in five out —

-of eight cases),’’ he was knowingly violating: his orders

and did not téll his superiors‘of the violation (P.A. -

"69-72; R.A, 61-62). There was not a shred of evidence

that respondent had “‘oral understandings with the’

majority of its 8,700 dealers’’ on the subject of com-

petitive products or on any: ‘other ‘subject.

Nor was there any practice on the part of respondent

3 tity cancel the’franchises of dealers” for any anticom-

petitive reason. In this: connection it should be noted

that petitioner had available the names and addresses

- of a veritable army. of persons who for one reason or

“another had b-dropped out of — dealersip

i

17 See p. 17, supra.

le hee

~ &

a + 8

organization before the trial,” and it may ‘be assumed

that: substantial numbers of these persons were avail-

able to give evidence as to the reasons why they ceased

to be respondent’s dealers. Yet petitioner proved and )

offered to prove, at best, only a single cancellation of a

single dealer—namely, the petitioner itself. On the

record this is simply not a case involving any general

‘practice on the part of a manufacturer.” :

Turning to subsidiaty proposition (a), it is alleged

that one. of. the effects of this non-existent general

practice was to “‘preserve the manufacturer’s approxi-

mately 60% share of its national market.’” Assuming

the validity of the percentage figure (see P.A. 98-101),

there is no evidence that anything like the alleged

practice had any effect on the manufacturer’s market

share.” .. ra dl }

Subsidiary proposition (b) is that one effect of the

alleged practice was to ‘‘exclude competing manu-

facturers from approximately 8,700 (or some 58% to

72%) of the estimated 12,000 and 15,000 retail outlets

in the country’’. The allegation is purest fiction. To

begin with, petitioner never proved nor offered to prove «

*In answer to an interrogatory of petitioner, respondent fur-

nished the names and addresses of approximately: 4,000 persons .

who ceased to be dealers in respondent’s products in the period

1959-1965.

-” Both of the courts below concurrently found as a fact that

this record shows only ‘‘a single instance’’ of a refusal to deal on

_ the part of respondent (Pet, B-11, A-6). t

See also the petition’s surprising assertion that ‘‘there is no

serious dispifte here that this exclusive dealing policy has the

straight-forward effect of enhancing the sales volume (and market

share) of the defendant and shrinking that of its competitors”’

. . (Pet. 12-18). There is no evidence that such an “exclusive dealing

policy’’ exists or that it has had any ‘‘effect’”’ on sales or market

share, ‘‘straight-forward’’ or otherwise.

oe eal,

24

- how many of respondent’s ‘‘approximately 8,700”

dealers handle competing products and how many do

not." It was established that in a single geographical -

area encompassing about 100 dealers, ten handled com-

peting products without objection from the respondent,

_ but there is no data whatever as to the remainirig 8,600.

Indeed, neither during pretrial discovery nor at any

other time did petitioner ever ask for:such information.

In view of the fact that a majority of all marine

-dealers handle only a single line of engines (Def. Ex.

9, P.A. 142), there can be no doubt that the majority

of the respondent’s dealers do the same, but there is

nothing to show that this is because competing engines

have ‘been ‘‘excluded’’ by some action of the respond-

ent.” On the contrary, there is evidence in the record

that the personal preference of most dealers is to handle

only one line of engines (Def. Ex. 9, P.A. 142) (pre-

sumably to reduce the expenses of inventorying motors

and spare parts, to reduce training costs for service

employees, etc.) and that respondent’s management has

no objection'to a dealer’s handling a re engine

' (P.A. 76-78; R.A. 59-62, 64).

Nor is there anything to show that some conduct on

the part of respondent me had the effect (as further

21 For this reason there is no evidence to support petitioner’ 8

statement that respondent’ s ‘‘8,700 marine dealers... are operating

under similar exclusive dealing arrangements”’ (Pet, 21).

2 The petitioner also says that ‘‘Mercury and Scott’’ have been-

‘‘excluded from any significant share of the local market’’, refer-.

ring to ‘‘the Maryland area’’ (Pet. 8), but thé’statement is mis-

leading in several respects: (1) the cited testimony (P.A. 116-17)

‘says nothing about the ‘‘share of market’’, in terms of sales, of.

either Scott or Mercury; (2) the testimony relates only to one

small part of the State of Mafyland; and (3) there is no testimony

as to Mercury and Scott having been ‘‘excluded’’ by respondent,

_ even with respect to that small ‘part of Maryland.

25

suggested in Question 1(b)) of ‘‘stifling the growth of »

existing competitors and creating severe cost and: price -

barriers against the entry of new manufacturers.”’

Although the necessary market- and financial in-

formation might well have been ‘available through com-

pulsory process, the petitioner never even sought to

obtain or offer any evidence with respect to the market

_ shares or the “‘growth”’ of existing competitors or with

respect to costs and prices in the industry. The ¢on-

. cept of ‘‘barriers’’ to new entry apparently occurred to

petitioner some time after its loss in the court below ;

it was certainly never mentioned at any time before

the filing of the present petition. The suggestion is

without any evidentiary basis, and if its truth or falsity

were now at issue, it would soon become apparent that

’ it is factually wrong.” | |

Next it is suggested, in Question 1(c), that respond-" _

ent, through its alleged cancellation practice, has cre-

ated a ‘‘noncompetitive market structure at the dealer ©

level in virtually every local market in the United

States.’’ These are resounding words, but there was —

no evidence as to the market structure in any local

market in any part of the country.* It is also said

8 Although the fact is not in the record, respondent will take

the liberty (iim view of the liberties taken by: the petitioner) of

referring the Court to current issues ‘of popular boating maga-

zines in which a new entrant, Chrysler Corporation, is advertising

its new line of outboard motors. See, e.g. Yachting Magazine,

October, 1967, at 46,

*The petitioner also asserts that in the relevant market the

factor of “‘product differentiation’’ so operates that respondent

may ‘‘charge a substantially higher price than can be gotten ‘by --

others for products of ‘comparable quality’? (Pet. 10). There is

not a shred of evidence of such ‘‘product differentiation’’, and

there is equally little evidence that respondent obtains a higher

price for its products than do others.

26

in effect (in Question 1(d)) that coil has

brought about the “‘ruin’’ of ‘‘the larger dealers who

- attempt to sell a competing product”’,.and yet petitioner

never offered to show, that respondent had ever

ruined”? anyone. All the evidence shows is that a

single outboard motor dealer (the petitioner) lost its

Johnson motor franchise and that that dealer’s business

subsequently declined—and there was evidence that

the decline was the result of a host of factors unrelated

to the respondent.”

‘Finally, it is suggested in Question 1(e) ‘that the

respondent. has somehow managed to ‘‘impose on the

consuming public a stipercompetitive price for the

** Contrary to petitioner’s assertion (without record citation)

that ‘‘plaintiff’s business promptly collapsed with the withdrawal

of the ‘Johnson’ franchise’’ (Pet. 6), petitioner had greater busi-

ness success the year after the non-renewal of its franchise than |

it did while it was handling the Johnson motor (P.A. 40; R.A. 41)..

Thereafter its business gradually declined but for a number of un-

related reasons, including the following: (1) on the day peti-

_ tioner’s Johnson franchise expired, another supplier (the manufac-

turer of the well-known ‘‘Boston Whaler’’ boat) cancelled peti-

tioner’s boat franchise (Def. Ex. 24, R.A. 152); (2) in 1962

petitioner lost its Scott motor franchise (R.A. 41); (3) in 1963

. it lost its franchise for its largest line of boats (Def. Ex. 40, R.A.

184); and (4)--in 1965 it lost its franchise for Mercury motors

(R.A, 49). Significantly, from 1961 until 1966, when repeatedly

_ asked by stockholders and creditors why its business had declined,

Mr. Canzona repeatedly explained that in mid-1961 the marine

‘retail industry generally had gone into an economic recession,

that marine dealers generally were suffering lost salés and lost

profits, and that petitioner was suffering with the rest (Def. Exs.

29-31, R.A. 153-57). It was not until the time of trial that peti-

tioner decided that the loss of the Johnson franchise was the ‘sole

cause of its troubles: In view of these circumstances littie weight

should-be given to the Government’s flat statement (p. 3) that ‘‘as .

-@ result of the loss of ee s franchise, petitioner’s busi-

ness fail

‘ 87 ;

-

product, one that exceeds the level that would be ex-

‘pected to prevail in an effectively competitive market

by perhaps.as much as 15%”.* Again, the phrases are

resounding but without the slightest evidentiary basis.

_The petitioner never proved or offered to prove the

prices of any of the various outboard motors on’ the

market, let°alone the proposition that the respondent

charged ‘‘supercompetitive”’ prices.?’

In sum, petitioner’s first ‘Question Presented”’

leaves one strong impression—namely, that after the.

court below had finally: disposed of its case, petitioner

did some hasty reading in the economic field and con-

structed a group of hypothetical economic propositions

for which there is no evidentiary basis in the record.

Of course, these economic theories had been advanced

_%° The petitioner also hypothesizes that respondent enjoys monop-

oly profits as a result of charging monopoly prices for its outboard

* motors, and tries to’support this thesis by certain computations as

_ to the profits earned by respondent’s multi-product business (Pet.

15). In fact there is nothing in the record as to the profits earned

by respondent on its outboard motor business. Moreover, although

a demonstration that petitioner’s computations are entirely . mis-

leading would require an unduly lengthy discussion here, it may

be noted that during the time petitioner was dealing with respond-

ent the latter’s after-tax earnings: averaged 9.9% as a percent of .

stockholders’ equity and 5.45% as a percerit of sales and that in

subsequent years respondent’s average profit rates declined (OMC

Annual Reports, Pl. Ex. 71, Tr. 628).. Even under petitioner’s

own economic theory (Pet. 15 n. 17) such profit rates “‘¢ould not —

be identified as supernormal’’,

_ On a-related theme petitioner repeatedly asserts that respond-

ent charges 15% more for its Johnson and Evinrude engines than ,

it does for its Gale engine (see, e.g., Pet. 11, 12). There is no evi-

dence to that effect. However, there is evidence that the Gale

motor was sold under a private brand (‘‘Sea King’’) to Mont.

_gomery Ward (P.A. 52) which would of course explain a price

differential if one existed. __ os :

28

elsewhere some years before the trial of this case in

1966,” and if petitioner had wished to raise such issues,

_ it had an ample opportunity to do so. - The simple facts

afe that petitioner did not even attempt to litigate

these issues, that they are not presented by this record,

and that this case is not a vehicle for whem review by

this Court. .

Il. THE QUESTION FOR WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS

-REVIEW IS NOT PRESENTED ON THIS RECORD

The Government’s view of this case, although based

upon some of the same erroneous factual impressions

set, forth in the petition for certiorari, differs from ©

petitioner’s view as to the applicable statutes. Peti-

tioner repeatedly told the courts below that ‘‘the

thrust’”’ of its case was an offense under the monopoly

provisions of Section 2 of the Shetman Act,” but the

Government apparently sees no substantial Section 2

question i in this case. The Government’s position here:

is that respondent engaged in a violation of Section 1

of the Sherman Act, although not the type of violation

which petitioner attempted to prove in the. District

- Court,** and that respondent also violated Section 3

of ‘the Clayton Act, although petitioner in the courts.

28 See petitioner’s reliance upon Bain, Barriers to New Competi-

tion (1956); Bain, Industrial Organization (1959); Kaysen and

Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959) (Pet. 11-15, ete.). See also Com-

missioner Elman’s opinion in Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965

Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 716,673, at 21, 560 (FTO

1963).

2° See pp. 18-19, supra. S Q =

80 Literally the Government ‘‘express[es] no view’’ as to the ap-

plicability of Section 2 (Gov. Mem. 6 n. 12), but the 7.

is reasonably clear that the Government has found no Settion 2

problem which deserves consideration by this Court.

51 See p. 18, supra.

29

below treated the latter statute as “irrelevant” (see

p. 18, supra). Because of these differences the Gov-

ernment’s thesis deserves separate treatment. | :

The Government’s ‘memorandum starts from the

factual premise that as a matter of practice respondent

has made ‘‘demands’’ on its dealers generally to handle

respondent’s motors exclusively. It is said that ‘‘deal-

ers have acquiesced in respondent’s exclusivity de-

mands’? (Gov. Mem. 3), so that there has been “tacit

acquiescence of distributors in exclusive dealing. ar-

rangements’’ (td. at 4), thus creating ‘‘an anticompeti-

tive program embodied in tacit agreements with ac-

3 » quiescent dealers’’ (td. at.10).

‘The motivating force, it is said, which es prompted .

respondent’s dealers ‘‘to fall in line’’ with this ‘‘un-

lawful program”? is ‘‘threats of refusals to deal’’ (id.

at 4, 12): ‘‘respondent has threatened dealers with the

' termination of their franchises for failure:to deal ex-

clusively with réspondent”’ (id. at 7). In addition we

‘are told that occasionally, when an ‘‘intractable dealer’’

has refused to knuckle under to the ‘‘threats’’, he has

been “‘‘eut off as an example to others’’ (id. at 4).

Indeed, it is said that respondent’s refusal to renew

petitioner’ s franchise was a warning to other dealers:

it ‘necessarily indicated to other dealers that respond-

ent’s threats of cancellation for handling competing

products were tobe taken seriously, and thus tended

to insure continued acquiescerice in respondent’s ex-

-clusive dealing arrangements’’ (id. at 9). Such were

respondent’s methods, the Government says, and “‘the

' question presented here’’, therefore, is whether a can-

oelled dealer has a “‘right to relief against .. . a sup-

plier .. + who uses refusal to coal as a means to secure

30.

compliance with an anticompetitive program embodied .

in tacit agreements with acquiescent dealers” (td. at

10).

Such is the Government’s theory; now let us get

back to the record. It simply does not support the

theory. In the context of an organization of 8,700

dealers, the relevant evidence is as follows: that

throughout respondent’s history, in.the course of the-

thousands of conversations between respondent’s sales-

men and its 8,700 dealers, theré were two occasions on

which a salesman ‘‘demanded”’ that a dealer deal ex-

clusively ; * that such demands violated the salesman’s ©

instructions;* that neither. of the two dealers ac-

quiesced in the unauthorized demand ;™ that on eight

.other ‘occasions a single salesman, Mr. Wright, who

has long since left respondent’s employ, deviated from

company policy by suggesting that a dealer discontinue

a competing line of engines; that on three of the eight

occasions the dealer followed this unauthorized sugges-

tion; and that on five of the eight occasions the dealer

' refused to deal exclusively in Johnson engines and

suffered no adverse consequences.* Although the Gov-

82 In view of the findings of the courts below, Mr. Schiavina’s

conversations with petitioner with respeet to Mercury engines

should presumably be regarded for present purposes as a ‘‘demand’’

for exclusive dealing (although Mr. Schiavina never om ar as

the Scott line of engines still being handled by petitioner).

only other such ‘‘demand’’ shown by the record was that inode

by a Mr. Jonas, a former sales representative of respondent —

p. 17 n. 10, supra).

es It was established by Mr. Wright; a former employee of re-.

spondent, that such demands violate company policy (P.A. 65-72).

% Petitioner refused to give up the. Mercury engine, and the

_ Philadelphia dealer to whom Mr.. Jonas made his ‘‘demand”’ con-

" "tinued to handle competing engines (P.A. 110).

85 See p. 17, supra.

81

ernment talks in terms of multiple ‘‘threats’”’ designed *

to keep respondent’s dealers generally ‘‘in line’’ with

_ an unlawful ‘‘program’’, the only threat of cancellation

- shown in this record is the alleged threat against the

__ petitioner, and if any “intractable dealer’’ has been

— “eut off’, the only one is petitioner.** Moreover, in

response to the Government’s hypothesis that ‘cut-

offs’’ have been used as warning “examples” to others,

the answer is that the only ‘‘cut-off’’ in the case is the . |

cut-off of petitioner and that bath courts below ex-

plicitly found that it was not done or used as a warning

to others.” :

So much for the ‘“‘demands”’, ‘‘threats’’, and ‘Sex.

amples’’.’ What then does the record show as to. the

Government’s hypothetical ‘‘tacit agreements” between

respondent and its dealers—the bricks and mortar of

the alleged: ‘‘anticompetitive. program’’? With‘ 8,700

dealers involved, and with 4,000 former dealers avail-

able to give evidence,” the record shows, at best, the —

possibility that three dealers entered into such tacit

agreements—and. that all three arrangements -were

86 See p. 23 n. 19, supra.

*" The District Court’s finding was as follows: °

‘‘The argument is made to me that this [7.e., petitioner’s

situation] would be a good éxample for. Outboard to cite to its

other dealers . . . to exert all sorts of pressures on them .. . to.

carry on exclusive dealing . . . but I think the answer to ‘that

is that there is not the slightest proof that this is what .

_ [was] done.’’ (Pet. B-9)

The Court of Appeals made the same finding:

‘“<[T}here was no evidence that the disenfranchisement of _

ae saagh ‘was held out threateningly as a deterrent to ae

dealers... .” (Pet. A-6)

88 See pp. 22-23 and n. 18, supra.

32

made by a salesman who has admitted that he was act- -

ing in violation of his instructions and without his

superior’s knowledge. Thus the Government’s ‘‘un-

lawful program”’ consists, at' best, of wnauthorized

‘tacit agreements’’ involving less than four one-hun-

‘ dredths of one percent of respondent’s dealer organi- ©

zation. Again, this is. simply not a case involving a

general policy or program or course of conduct or con-

certed action between a manufacturer and its dealers.”

Cf. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29

(1960) ft ORES

There is one additional factual point in the Govern-

ment’s Memorandum that deserves attention—namely,

the suggestion that the record in. this case shows that

respondent’s conduct ‘‘produced a sufficiently serious

foreclosure of outlets to respondent’s competitors to

establish the requisite anticompetitive effect. under —

either Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the

Clayton Act’”’ (Gov. Mem. 7). Apparently recognizing

that an ‘‘exclusive dealing policy’’ (if one existed)

could not be held to violate either statute in the absence

of some showing of anticompetitive effect, the Govern-

ment treats this record as demonstrating that for the

purposes of the Sherman Act respondent’s conduct has

_ unreasonably restricted the opportunities of its com-_

7

8° The Government’s approach to the factual issues in this case,

including the key factual issue of whether respondent engaged in

an anticompetitive program, is strangely at odds with the prin-

ciples governing appellate review of lower courts’ findings of fact.

| The Government urges that ‘the evidence below ‘‘would justify”’

_ findings contrary to those made by the courts below (Gov. Mem. 7),

whereas the only proper inquiry (if the facts are to be reviewed

at all) is whether the courts below plainly erred in their findings.

*,

—_

33

petitors in the market place “ and that for the purposes

of the Clayton Act respondent’s conduct might sub--

” ., Stantially lessen competition ‘or tend to create a

-Thonopoly.* a ‘

These are remarkable contentions. According to

' petitioner (Pet. 8, 11), there are somewhere between

12,000 and 15,000 marine dealers in the United States, -

and the total evidence of ‘‘foreclosure”’ is.that in 1958

a Johnson salesman ‘persuaded a. dealer to stop han- —

dling the so-called ““West Bend”? motor, that“at some

unknown time another dealer was persuaded to give up

the so-called..“‘Champion”’ motor, and that on a third

occasion a dealer was persuaded to ‘phase out’’ the

Scott motor—all of such persuasive efforts being conh-

trary: to the salesman’s instructions (P.A. 63-67 j a

With 12,000 to 15,000 dealers in the market and ‘no

. evidence as to the position which any of the three

specified moters enjoy as among the 12,000-15,000

“See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U:S. 495, 524

(1948), - : ,

*1 Compare, however, the Government’s astonishing statement -

‘that the -question of anticompetitive effect ‘‘is not before this

Court’’ (Gov. Mem. 7 n. 13). The Government is asking, im-

‘plicitly but clearly, for a reversal of the decision below because of

alleged violations of both of the above-mentioned statutes, and-

obviously a reversal on such grounds would be appropriate only if ©

the record contains a prima facie showing of the necessary anti-

competitive effect. Even the petitioner here concedes that it had

the burden of proof on this issue and that it cannot prevail here

¢

. unless it successfully carried that burden in the ‘District Court

below (see Pet. 10 n. 10).

“ The Government quite properly does not suggest that respond-

ent’s non-renewal of petitioner’s Johnson franchise had an anti-

competitive effect on the Mercury motor: The J ohnson franchise

was simply shifted from one Mercury dealer to another, leaving

Mercury’s position unaffected.

8 ; . eat 34 ‘

Adin it i8 simply unbelievable that the evidence of

_ these three unauthorized events constitutes a showing

of the anticompetitive effect required by Section 1 of

the Sherman Act: and Section 3 ot the Clayton Act.

- Finally, it may be appropriate ‘to observe that there

is ‘no justification for the Government’s suggestion that

the-Court of Appeals declared and applied in this case

a‘ legal principle of broad application that will ad-

versely affect the proper enforcement of the antitrust —

laws. The Government apparently believes that in this

and other cases in the Fourth Circuit there has been |

laid down' an absolute rule that, even where a manu-

facturer has established an anticompetitive exclusive

. * dealing program among its dealers generally, a dealer

who is cancelled because he will not participate in the

program never has a right to treble-damage recovery.

It is submitted, however, that the decision below does

not rest on any such broad basis, Both in the opinion

below (Pet. A-8), and in Osborn v. Sinclair. Refining

Co., 324 F. 24.566 (4th Cir. 1963), cited: in the opinion

below, the Court of: ‘Appeals recognized that, if such a

_ . joint program between a manufacturer and its dealers

exists, a cancelled dealer may in certain circumstances

_ have a cause of .action »for damages. The- Court’s

affirmance of the. District Court here was based on the

lack of evidence of ‘‘joint or concurring action’’ in

the form ‘of exclusive dealing arrangements between-

respondent and its dealers. It was, said the Court, the

“absence” of any “‘such additional circumstance’? that .

‘destroys the actionability” that might otherwise exist ‘_

under Osborn (Pet. A-8). In short, the Government’s

concern about the state-of the law in the Fourth Circuit

would seem.to be unwarranted: when an antitrust vio-

lation occurs, those who may be injured | will be pro-

tected in the 7a Circuit.

cae

Pc

35

I THERE IS NO NOTEWORTHY QUESTION OF PROCEDURE:

HERE INVOLVED

. Petitioner’ s sécond ‘question presen ” relating

» to the procedure used by the District Court, is also .

based upon misstatements: of fact and law. The word- .

ing of :the petition is clearly intended to suggest that

petitioner was ‘‘required”’ against its will to substitute

_.a proffer of proof for direct evidence (see Pet. 3, 6,

_ 23). In fact the trial court made clear that the peti-

_tioner ‘was free to proceed with its entire case if it

wanted to do so; moreover, petitioner wholeheartedly

~ aecepted the. Court’s suggestion for a possible shorten-

‘ing of the trial (see p. 6, supra). “ Thereafter both

courts below accepted as true_all of the basic facts to

_ which reference was made either in petitioner’s direct.’

~ proof or in its proffer.“ Although the: District Court

- was not obliged to-draw all inferences from those basie~

facts in a manner favorable to petitioner,® it leaned

over backwards to do so and still could not find an

antitrust violation. The patie findings of both

courts below that there was no such violation ian’

be pe acer ta by this Court.

%

48Tn view of the fact that the case went to: trial and that peti- °

‘tioner was offered an opportunity to put in all of the evidence that

it wanted, petitioner’s reliance upon Poller v. Columbia Broadcast-

ing Company, 368.U.S. 464 (1962), and Continental Ore Co. v.

Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), is misplaced.

_ Unlike the situations in Poller and Continental Ore, the procedures

used in this case did not raise any such questions as deprivation o.. ‘:

. the right to a jury trial or the resolution of factual issues on the

basis of affidavit testimony | whieh’ has not been tested by cross- - _

examination. 7

44 See p. 19 n. 15, supra.

45 See p. 19 n. 16, supra.

-

36

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ’

of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Roserts B. OWEN °

N ESTOR S. FoLEY

‘701 Union Trust Building

Washington, D: C.- 20005

Of Counsel: 7

Covineton & BuRLine

701 Union Trust Building” -

Washington, D.C. 20005 |

Attorneys for Respondent _

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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