Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — J. P. Stevens & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1967
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
INDEX”
| . ; Page No.
THBOPINIONS OF THECOURTANDOFTHE
$ /ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY BELOW .. 2
__ JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT -. ie |
. _. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW _ 2
‘CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED -.. 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ... me
REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED , A
“ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS WHY.A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE cee
GRANTED ____- 3 i cee |
I. THE “UNUSUAL” Dingcrivas Or THE - |
Lanon, Boarp In Tuts Case — = ae
A. The Requirement With Respect To The
Reading Of.The Employer’s Declaration .
And Confession To mangeeyes ae if.
r
- B. The Reauirement That The Employer’s
Declaration And Confession Shall Be -
Thrice Communicated To Employees,
And That It Shall Also Be Communicated -
To Employees At Plants And Locations
| Not Involved In This Case aes
i
| ®
oS ae Page No. |
II. THE “Frnpincs” AND CONCLUSIONS OF 3
ae LABOR Boarp In THis CASE -....<---.. 29
‘= 3
; A. The Employer’s a sn Of pinion | ~
With Respect To The Union, And The s+
Board’s Ruling Thereon __’ vicengecicamay SOS
y Aaa B. The Evidence Relating To The Discharge pas
a el CaP iees - Of Employees, And The Board’s ah.
fe = Treatment Of'Such Evidence » 3S
CONCLUSION cies ce cai ete 137
oer Appendix: ae.
| ans Of The Court Below ; Sas. ae
Decree Of The Court Below
niiphaaclatinnicaiipeiiianct
| | ‘Dicheon es nm Of The National Labor !
Hg | Relations Board __...._ | as ‘Sie
“ Cases: © ae
_ - Amalgamated Clothing Workers o f America,
_ AFL-CIO vs. National Labor Relations a
Board, 365 F. 24.898 (D. C. Cir., 1966) ..32, 33, 34
American Ship Building Co. vs. National
| Labor Relations Board, 380 U. S. 300,
, 834. Ct. 955, 13 L. Ed 2d 855 : wae. 26°
Armco Steel Company vs. National Labor . |
Relations Board, 344 F. ad 621 dass Cir., , 1968). 28
:
=)
a. :
Art M etals Cénistruction Co, vs.N alia Lobe
Relations Board, 110 F. ad 148 (2nd Cir., 1940)_.
Associeted Press vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57,S. Ct. 650,
81 L. Ed. 953 aticuisitionein A
‘ Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S. 616, Pe .
6 S.Ct. 524, 29.L. Ed 746 15, 20
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. vs-United States,
371, U.S. 156, 83 S. Ct. 239, 9 L. Ed 24207... 27
Carthage Fabrics Corporation, 101 NLRB
$41, 31 LRRM 1114 (1952) 44,125
A Consolidated Edison Co. vs. Naiional Lier’ :
° —
—
wae
a
Harry F. Berggren & Sons, wg 165
Relations Board, 305 U. §. 197, 59S. Ct.
* 206, 83 L. Ed 126° , 27. |
Escobedo VS. sata 378 he 8. 478 | ‘ eg 12
- Ww. Elson Bottling Co., 155 NLRB 714, ws
60 LRRM 1381 (1965) pion ae
NLRB.No. 52 (1967) 2 ma iY ae
Hartsell Mills Co. vs. National Labor Relations ee
Board, 111 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir., 194Q) - -
Insurance Agents’ International Union, AFL- .
CIO, 119 NLRB 768, 41 LRRM 1176 (1957) _.. 9
iii
eee os Page No.
Page No.
International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.vs. N ational
_° -*. Labor Relations Board and Scott’s,Inc., ©
a LRRM 2081 (D. C. Cir., 1967) ead 8,17;.18,19
’ Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144. NLRB 615, x
+54. LRRM 1109 (1963) dee kena SM, Se
oJ, S. Dillon & Sons Stores €o. US: National Ladot -
- Relations Board, 338 F. 2d 395 (10th Cir., 1964)... 33
“Malloy vs. Hogan, 378.U. S.1,84S. Ct.
1489, 12 L: Ed 24 653 IB
ak “Martel Mills Corp. vs. N iotesial Labor Relations
‘6, Board, 114 F. 2d 624 (4th Cir., 1940) 2. 40
| ; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 : 12
N ational Labor Relations Seend US. American .
Thread Co., 210 F- 2d 381. (Sth Cir. |. _) pee 42
N sien Labor Relations Board vs. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 615. Ct. 693,
85 L. Ed 930 _: 7 : ne °
~ | National Labor Relations Board vs. F. H.
McGraw & Co., 206 F. 24 635 (6th Cir, 1953) .. oe -
is gy os Nationalabor Relations Board vs. Ford
. Motor Co., 119 F, 24-326 (5th Cir., 1941) -...23, 28
National Labor ‘Relations Board vs. Kelco | .
-. Corporation, 178 F. 2d 578 (4th Cir., 1949)_.44,124
; National Labor Relations Board vs. Kingston. .
Cake Co., 206 F. 2d 604 (3rd Cir., 8} 29 °
iv: a | ey as
= _ National Likes Relations Board vs.M & B :
N ational Labor Relations Board vs.
‘ * National Labor Relations Board vs. Laney
& Duke Storage Warehouse Cov., 369 F. 2d.
852 (5th Cir., 1966) : cba newts Sf
: National Labor Relatigns Board vs. Local
' Union No. 1229, 346 U. S.$64, 748-Ct. 4: .
98 L. Ed 195 (1953) .. ical ., 39
7
ON otlnal Labor Relations Board ds. ouguien ra
. Furniture Co., 206 F. 24274 (4th Cir., 1953) :. 44
: National Labor Relations Board vs. Lyman 7 one 7
Printing Co., Inc., 356 F. 2d 844 (4th Cir,, Ra oe eee
1966) | : 31,34
Headwear Co., 349 F. 2d 170 — Cir.,
1965) alee 44, 124
_ National Labor Relations Board vs. Miami
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 222 F. 2d 341 |
(Sth Cir., 1955) tan 39
| Montgomery Ward & Co.,157,F. _ 7 genres
~ 2d 486 (8th. Cir. , 1946) —---40, 42 *.
| National Labor Relations Board vs. National hoe ee
» ° Biscuit Co., 185 F. 2d 123 (3rd Cir, oo seissadsilis 29
N ational Labor Relations Board vs. R.C. |
_ Can.Co., 340 F. 2d 433 (Sth Cir., 1965) er) 44,125
National Labor Relations Board vs. Ray
| Smith Transport Co.,193 F.2d 142. See
— Cir., secs , TEES 83
o
’ Page No
"National Labor Relations Board vs. Seven- cae
Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 73 S.Ct.
/. 287, 97 L. Ed 377 | 7 _. 28
- National Labor Relations eats VS. Southwire | ae
| Noone 352 F. 2d 346 (Sth Cir., 1965) 32
~ National Labor Relations Board vs. Stafford,
206. F. 2d 19 (8th Cir. , 1953) one 4l
National Labor Relations Board vs. Thompson
* Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F..2d 807 |
(7th Cir., 1962) 24
N ational Labor Relations Board vs. Fhreads, .
, ree, 308 F. 2d 1 (4th Cir. , 1962) Sa 32, 33
N itional Labor Relations ini vs. U: weed cn
Works, Inc:, 287 F. - 689 (4th Cir. deed, ee 39
“National Labor Relations Board vs. Wagner : .
Iron Works, 220 F. 2d 126 (7th Cir., 1955) ae 42
Ohio ‘amie réephone Co. vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 192 F. 2d 664 ca
(6th Cir., » 1951) — iy 40
Olmstead vs. United States, 277 U.S. ie |
© 48-S. Ct. 564, 72 L..Ed 944 __ “16, 20
Reliance Manufacturing Co. vs. N. ational Labor
- Relations Board, 125 F. 24 311 (7th Cir., 1941)... 23
Renfro Hosiery Mills, ic.,122NLRB112, | |
43 LRRM 1221 (1959) 45, 125 -
;,
: a | - Page No. ~
Republic Steel Corp, vs. National Labor Relations
Board, Sit U.S. 7, 61 S. Ct. 77, 85 L. Ed 6... 27
Shell Oil oe vs. N wien Labor Relations -
Board, 196, F. 2d 637 (Sth Cir., $982) "3 -
| Stein-Way Clothing an Po . 131 NLRB
9132, . LRRM 1015 C7 eae nn en 45,125
Suprenant M pineiectaliee C ompany vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 341 F.
2d 756 (6th Cir., 1965) SEM Ae 31
Texas Industries, Inc. vs. National Labor .
Relations Board, 336 F. 2d 128 eu Cir., ae.
1964) - ot ; ees - a
< ? / i ‘ts
Truck Drivérs and Helpers Local No. 728
vs. N ational Eabor Relations Board,
364. F. 2d 682 (D. C. Cir.; bah — | 33
Union Carbide C orporation vs. N wiles!
Labor Relations Board, 310 F.2d 844 noe Sate
(6th Cir., 1962) : 33
Universal Camera Corporation vs. National — as
as . Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,71 ~— : 6
S. eats 95 L. Ed 456 Sn ene moni y BO
Wellington Mills Division, West Point Mfg.
Co. vs.’National Labor Relations Board,
330.F. 2d 579 (4th Cir., 1964); cert. den..
379 U.S. 882, 85S. Ct. 144, 13 L. Ed
2d 88 (1964) - | | Coe
vii -
2
Statutes: .
28 U.S.C. §1254 _.
29 U.S. C. §158(c)}
29 U.S. C. §160(c) .
29 U.S. C. §160(e)
29 U.S. C. §160(f)
29 U.S, C: A. §160(c)
Constitution of the United States: -
> First Amendment to the Constitution .
of the United States
Fifth hiiidloea to the Constitution
of the United States -.
a: ‘4
¢ ?
IN. THE ccm
Supreme Court of the United States. —
OCTOBER TERM, 1967
NO.
J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC., Petitioner
vs. | i
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and md
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO, , Respondents Ni
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO. THE
_ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS |
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT —
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
- Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
>
The Petitioner nm the Court for a Writ of Certiorari
directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, to. the end that this Court may review a
‘ . Decision which that Court has rendered in a case involving -
1
eae
_ the parties above-named. And: the Petitioner respectfully
"shows to this Court:
THE OPINIONS OF | THE COURT AND OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY BELOW
The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
‘the Second Circuit has not yet been printed in the official
reports, but may be found in the following unofficial re-
ports:—65 LRRM 2829 (1967) and 56 Labor Cases ©
$12,054 (1967). The Opinion is also printed, along with
the Decree of the Court, in the Appendix to this Petition.
The case came to the Court of Appeals for the’Second
~ Circuit upon Petitions for Review of a Decision and Order
of the National Labor Relations Board. The Decision and.
Order of the Board, 157 NLRB No. 90 (1966), i is also
printed in the Appendix to this Petition.
ee
aT RISDICTION: OF THIS_couRT-
The rp ae of the Court below was handed down-< on
.July_7, 1967. The judgment or décree of that Court is
‘ dated September 1, 1967, and was entered by that Court
ofthatdate. > | | | cae
Jurisdiction to review the decree of. the lower Court is
conferred on this Court by the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§1254. ,
_ QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW |
This case embodies a number of rulings and directives
by. the National Labor Relations Board, which are ex-
traordinary. and extreme in nature. The salient questions -
°
raised by thesé as oak directives may be stated as .
follows:
is
(1) Is it within. the vennepiiee of the Labor Board to
compel an émployer to assemble his employees and read to it
them a public confession of guilt in words and terms dic-
tated by the Labor Board?
(2) In lieu thereof, may the Board send an emissary
_ into the employer’s Plants to read such declaration to the
assembled employees in the employer’s stead? )
(3) Is it within the prerogative of the Board to compel
a three-fold communication of such declaration to the em-
ployees, that is, by reading it to them, by posting it in front
of them, and by mailing it into their homes? .
(4) May’ the Board require’ the employer to post ee
.to mail th this declaration-to the employees i in Plants and at .
‘Tocations which Have never been involved, nor mentioned,
in any of the Board proceedings in any way whatever? :
(sy “May the Board prohibit. the employer from ex-
pressing to his employees his “sincere belief” that the - -
Union would not work out to their “benefit,” but “in the ~
long run would itself operate” to their “serious harm”?
(6) When the Board conducts lengthy hearings at vari-
ous locations on a great variety. of factual issues, and 443
witnesses testify, the majority of them for the employer,
but never upon conflict of testimony on any material ques-
tion of fact—not once on any such conflict does the Board
find any witness for’the employer to be telling the truth «
_or any witness for the-Union or the Board to be telling 2
wo but ad truth—in such situation is: it —
be
4
‘upon any reasonable view, to consider that the employer
has had a fair trial? |
Fee eS proceedings before the Board, relative to ‘the
discharge of employegs, when there is no evidence. that the’
employees would not have been discharged had they been
uncénnected with any Union—and: when the’ employer
affirmatively shows reasonable, and. often undisputed,
. cause for their discharge, and asserts that under the cir-
“cumstances the . employees would. have. been discharged —
“whether connected with any Union or not—is the Board
' to bé sustained in ruling that nevertheless the discharges
| were unlawful?
. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
/ robe. ‘PROVISIONS INVOLVED —
| Portions of the Constitution of the United States and
of the National Labor ocarrapame Act pertinent to this case -
are as follows: pos
_ “Congress waar make no > law. _. abridging the free- :
dom of speech . . Wee | abe
Fi irst Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States |
“No person shall-be . * deprived of ite, iid or
“property, without: due silos of law . |
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States
“The cca of any views, argument, or opinion,
or the dissemination théreof, whethet in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be ‘evi-
P
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the pro-.
visions of this subchapter, if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
29 U.S.C. §158(c)
“No aia of the Board shall. require the reinstate-.
ment of -any individual as an employee whe has been
suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any
back pay, . — individual was suspended or discharged
forcause.”- 29-U.S.C. > §16Q(€)
o one
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of proceedings brought by the Na- |
tional Labor Relations Board against J. P. eoyeen & Co.,
Inc., now Petitioner before this Court.
This Company owns and operates textile. plaints “i ‘in a
“number.of States from New England southward, princi-
pally, however, in the States of North Carolina and South
‘ ° Carolina. There are 43 such Plants in these two States,
employing some 28,000 people. :
The Labor Board, in its proceedings, ruled that unfair ;
labor practices had occurred in 19 of these 43 Plants during
- the approximate period mid-1963 to mid-1964. The hold-
ing of the Board was that the Company, in such Plants,
had wrongfully discharged employees in violation of Sec- .
tion 8(a) (3) and (4) of the National Labor Relations
| __ Act and had otherwise, at these Plants, interfered with em-
ployee rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
' (Appendix,’ p. 3a).
In making such ruling, the Board adopted pro forma,
and with only minor variations, the findings and conclu- .
1The Appendix to this Petition.
+ é
fae .
6
"sions of its Trial Examiner (Appendix, p. 40a). But as
to “remedies,’?. the Board improvised a number of direc-
tives which it described as not “conventional” (Appendix,
p. 22a, J. A. 18). The Court below refers to them as
~“unusyal” (Appendix, p. 3a): - ie
. , hese novel remedies had née : heen requested by any .
party. to the case at any time. They had not been recom-
mended or suggested by the Board’s Trial Examiner. Prior
to ordering. them, the Boatd did not give any notice or
hold any hearing, or invite any discussion or argument,
on any question as to whether these re edies, or any like
_them, ‘would be appropriate or should b considered in”
this case or in any case.
Upon the issuance of the Board? 5 Decision: and Order,
the Company, ‘as authorized by 29 U.S.C. *§160(f),
* promptly filed a Petition for Review in the United States. .
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—the Plants in-
volved ‘being located within that Circuit, and the unfair
*. labor practices having been alleged to have occurred there,
| and all the Labor Board hearings and proceecmnge —
been conducted there. ;
. At the same time, the Textile Westen: ‘Union of
America, AFL-CIO, which -had” initiated the charges
against the Company before the Labor Board, filed a Peti-
~~ tion (or Review in the ‘United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, upon a claim of aggrievment that
the Board failed to find the Company’ e* of “each and °
_every wrong alleged in the Complaints.
After transfer proceedings, the review of the, Board’. ’s
Decision and Order was undertaken, over the Company’ Ss
~ 1*J, A.” refers to the printed Joint Appendix filed by all parties
_. with the United States Court of Appeals for.the Second Circuit, a
copy of which i is now on file with this Court.
'
\
@ 7.
F :
protest, in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Later, in deciding the case, the Second Circuit Court ex-
pressed “doubt” as to “whether it would not have made
_better sense” for the case “to have been heard” by the
~ Court of Qppeals for the Fourth Circuit (Appendix, p.
20a). | ies. | ne |
The Court werit on, however, to rule that the Decision of _
the Board should be sustained and that it would enforce
__-the Board’s Order “with minor modifications” (Appendix,
REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED sore
This case presents a clear and revealing picture of the
Labor Board in the process of extending and expanding its —
own powers. | as |
Steadily favored by the two concepts that its “fact-
- finding” is ‘virtually conclusive and that the shaping of —
“remedies” is essentially. within its sole discretion—the . é
Board has reached a position from which it can now view
its horizons as almost limitless. Pele
Moving ‘ingeniously and persistently, the Board has |
largely freed itself from the restraints which Congress
carefully sought to place upon it, in the amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act, twenty years ago. The
strong admonition of this Court that “reviewing Courts”
have a positive “responsibility” to see to it that “the be
’ Board keeps within reasonable groun ” have by now
been substantially-swept away. . 7 :
1Universal Camera Corporation vs. National Labor Relations:
Board, 340 U. S. 474, 490, 71 §. Ct. 456, 95 L: Ed 456, 468.
S.--s
x .
Sy AC RAE HE Na OR eH
_croaching hand of government.
_ The prospect is that’ the Board will range ever more
widely, overturning established principles and limitations
of law, one after another—unless_ this Court sees fit to
intervene. "
Although this has been the overwhelming and unde- .
niable trend, there has been, and.there is, reluctance and
dissent among the Courts. Thus, for example, two United |
. States Courts of Appeal are in specific disagreement with ©
the Court below in respect to the requirement of assem- .
bling employees and reading to them-a declaration pre-
scribed by the Labor Board. These are the United States»
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the United ~
States Court of Appeals for the District of Clupbie.’ .The
latter Court expressly considered and expressly dis-.
approved the ruling on this. matter by the Court below in
the sear case.
- There-can 1 be no doubt but that this i is ieee of far-
: reaching importance in the ever-continuing struggle to -
maintain the defenses of individual freedom and to protect
. the liberty promised by’ the Firgt and Fifth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States against the. en-
£9 Dd
- Not only i is this an issue on which the,Courts of Appeal _ |
_ are divided, it is also a controversy which, until and unless © |
it is put at rest by this Court, will persist, For the’Board is
Warehditse Co., 369 F. 2d 859 (Sth Cir., 1966); International
Union of Electrical, Radio ‘and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO vs.
National Labor Relations Board and Scott's, Inc., 66 LRRM 2081
(D:C. Cn., seid pa
zed Natio eo Relations Board VS. Laney é Duke Storage
‘
steadily on repeatedly increasing its issuance of orders.
directing the assembling of employees and the reading to
them of such forced confessions and recantations. A recent.
and typical example of an employer’s. s confession to em-
ployees, as decreed by the Board, reads as follqws:
“We violated the law when we had you vote on the
Union. We will not do this 7 - : We will not -
anyone over ‘the Union again.”
It has become obvious that the Board twill paaen
issue such edicts unless this Court raises a restraining. ha
It is, indeed, an openly avowed policy of the Board that
even within a Circuit. where a United States Court.of Ap- .
peals has invalidated. an Order of the Board, the Board —
will, if. it so chooses, continue to issue the same é“order in
all similar cases—even though it has not sought: in this
‘Court bad review. of ‘such adverse Court of Appeals de-
cision.”
_ On another of the questions presented byt this case, there”
is likewise a direct conflict among the United States Courts
of. Appeal. There are at least seven Court of Appeals: de-
cisions upholding the employer’ s expressing of his view
of the Union to his employees, in the same language which ~
the Board and: the: Court below have condemned in the
_., present case. Pde ee ; ~
7
‘Harry F. Berggren & Sons, Inc., 165 NLRB No. 52 2 (1967).
2"Tt has been the Board’s consistent policy for itself to detertaine
whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a Circuit Court of
_ Appeals.” Insurance-A gents’ International Union, AFL-CIO, 119
+; NLRB 768; 773,41 LRRM 1176 (1957); lowa Beef Packers,
Inc., 144 NLRB 615,'616,54 LREM 1109 (1968).
a“?
ae ai = ~ mens : =
10
On this subject, the present case raises the question as
to whether the Board is here depriving the employer of his
; fundamental right of. freé speech, under the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution. of the United States—and further
question as. to whether the Board is, at the same time, dis-
obeying the express mandate of its own statutory charter;
as set forth in Section 8(c) of that Act. On both such ques-
tions, there are, as stated above, seven decisions by United.
States Courts of Appeals in conflict with the decision of the
. Court below i in this cue, 0
None of these issues, ‘which have: been outlined ‘and
_ which are now precisely focused in this case, has been con-
sidered or passed upon by this Cour, Division and di-
vergence, with respect to them, will inevitably i incregse and
proliferate, until they have been resolved by this Court.
Still further, as to the questions presented in this case,
there can be no doubt but that all of them are questions
of gravity and of wide impoftance in the settling of na--
tional labor policy and in the interpretation and adminis-
tration of the National’ Labor Relations Act.
For these reasons, hereinafter amplified, the Petitioner
earnestly submits that this is a case meriting the ie oud
and the a of this Court. a ae |
i
Vv
a
|
ARGUMENT AMPLIFYIN EASONS. WHY A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
I.
_ The “Unusual” Directives Of The Labor Board
: In This Case ~
A. THE REQUIREMENT WiTH RESPECT To THe READ--
inc Or THE E LOYER S DECLARATION Axo Con-
_ FESSION To Emp OYEES
| Before reviewing for this Court the substantive rulings ©
of the Labor Board ang/the Couttbelow, the Petitioner
would respectfully tention some
| considerations be i
ment that, in the Plants as to which unfair labor practice
rulings have been made, the Company shall “‘convene dur-
ing working time, by departments and by shifts, all its
employees” and shall “read to. them” a declaration as
prescribed and worded by the Board (Appendix, p. 20, 25).
This declaration is essentially a confession. of guilt.
There is no doubt but that the impression of any audience
would be that the employer is being forced to confess that =
he has broken the law and ‘is being required to declare
that he will not do so again. And that, indeed, is the¢rue .
nature of the situation. For thé statement prescribed in
this case speaks repeatedly of this Company’s “discrimina-
tion” against employees in*terminating them and of its ”
“discriminatorily” withholding work a Db them (Appep*
dix, p. 31a, 658, 66a). rts
?
e most striking of ‘jan new directives is the require-
&
‘
12
The statement discussed in this case is lengthy. A short
- and terse confession, such as-has been hereinabove referred
to, simply reveals more er the nature of the per-
formance: ae
| “We violated the law when we liad you vote on the |
Union: We will not ‘do this again .. . We will not fire
anyone over the Union again. “ )
Let us. picture a situation in which an 1 official of the
Stevens Company is standing i in front of assembled em
ployees, reading the required statement-to them. There is
no evading or avoiding the fact that as the Company’s
official reads the Company’s signed statement, referring
to the Company’s discriminations, declaration and con-
fession is being made that the Company has discriminated —
—and that the Company has thereby violated the law—
and is guilty. |
This is an astounding edict for°an agency of our Gov-
ernment to hand down. In this land no citizen may be com-
pelled to confess guilt or declare himself a violator of the »
‘law—-or so it has been until now.
This Court has been at great pains of late to see to it
that no one is unduly influenced to Confess guilt. Miranda
vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; Escobedo-vs. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478. Yet here an arm of the Federal Government orders it,
and directs that it be done before aneange of fellow
citizens.
Even the convicted felon can never be nadie to con-
fess that he has violated the law, and hé can always and
1Harry F. Berggren & Sons, Inc., 165 NLRB No, 52 (1967).
Peis
Ae OR AE EM oF w/Aiave we ‘ .
\ . ; d -
.
'
. -
13
forever deny guilt and, nied, at every opportunity pro-
claim that he has been unjustly convicted. Why are the
rights of the employer in labor matters less?
As Judge Learned Hand, speaking exactly to this sub-
ject, said so sr sated
“Forcibly to compel anyone to declare that the utter-
ances of any official, whoever he may be, are true, when —
he protests that he does nof believe them,’ has implica-
tions. which we should hesitate to believe Congress could
ever have intended «.. . [T]oo long a history, and tao
dearly bought sabitieesd are behind such refusals . .
[W]e can very well understand: the sense of ken
. which anyone may feel at being forced publicly to de-
clare that he has committed even a minor dereliction of
which in his heart he does not believe himself guilty."
_ Art Metals Construction Co. vs.
National Labor Relations Board,
110 F. 2d 148, 151 (2nd Cir., 1940)
The Court below remarked that the statement required
by the\ Board in the instant case. “does not contain” lan-
guage, guch as was present in the case last quoted, by which
the Company would declare that it will “cease and desist” |
- from unlawful- actions (Appendix, p. 25a). The Court,
however, disregarded the fact that the statement here pre-
scribed, as hereinabove pointed out, does refer repeatedly
to “discrimination” —violative of the law—on the part of
the Company, and ‘to actions, “«discriminatorify,” and
therefore wrongfully and unlawfully, engaged in by the
Company. ~ :
14
. [W]e cannot believe that it was the intention | wa
of oni to countenance an administrative order the .
_effect of which is to require from one who denies that he
has violated the law a confession that he has violated it.
Such a notice as has been approved by this Court accom-
plishes the same result as the one ordered by the Board
‘and avoids the unnecessary humiliation’ involved in an
order which in effect requires the employer to ‘confess.
publicly a violation of the law which he denies, and has
the right to deny, even though he -~ have been found
guilty of the violation.” |
| Hartsell Mills Co. vs. National Labor
Relations Board, 111 F. "2d 291, 293
(4th Cir., 1940)
The lower Court said that it regarded the matter “stme-
what less emotionally” (Appendix, p. 25a). It is respect-
fully submitted that the Court has not sufficiently studied
‘the annals of human struggle nor plumbed the true depth _
of the feeling and resolution of men against coerced —
utterances. | .
It j is indeed a grievous mistake to deem the forcing of
~. public confession a small matter, which might pass un-
noticed. In such manner are fundamental rights eroded—
and freedom gradually, yet wholly, lost.
The yplinigte involved is not trivialin any sense. During
. centuries past, countless thousands suffered oppression and
>
ba
death rather than confess they had committed wrong
when they deeply and devoutly believed that they had not.
: He ‘i cannot see in the newly devised directives of
the Labor Board in this case an ominous trend—whether
so intended or not—backwards towards the same oppres-
sions, is one who will not learn from ‘the lessons of history
and of human experience. an
; OG
. [I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely: by silent
; approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful
- for the ccattnalinal rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon.”’
+, Boyd vs. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
635, 6S, Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed 746, 752
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead: vs. United
States, refers to Boyd vs. United Statés, from which
the foregoing language is quoted, as “a case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United
States,” and goes on himself to observe that:
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are: naturally alert-to
repel i invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
g
qrentent dangers to liberty lurk. in insidious encroach- ben
16
ment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without under-
e standing.” Olmstead vs. United States, 277 U: S.
Nissin preean ceon ines 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564,72 L. Ed 944...
957 (Dissent by Justice Brandeis)
And the eloquent admonition of Justice Sutherland, dis-
senting in Associated Press vs. National Labor Relations
Board,-has true application indeed to the situation now
before this Court:—“Do the people of this land—in the’
providence of God, favored, as they sometimes boast,.
‘ above all others in the plenitude of their liberties” desire
to preserve them, he asked.
“Tf so, let them withstand all beginnings of encroach-
ment. For the saddest epitaph which can be carved ip
memory of a vanished liberty is that-it was lost because
‘its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving! hand while
yet there was time.” _ |
| Associated Press vs. N ational Labor |
Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 141,.
57S. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed 953, 965
What “liberty,” under the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of thé United: States, does a citizen have—what
“freedom of speech,” under the First Amendment, does he
have—when he is forced by his own Government to stand
in public and declare as true that which he does not believe
to be true—a declaration indeed of his own guilt? For him
the centuries have rolled back and his constitutional liberty:
_ and freedom of speech have indeed “vanished,” as if they
" were concepts yet undreamed.
As has been hereinbefore noted, two United States
Courts of Appeal are in direct disagreement with the Court
er ry aN NITE TIO EM ABRIL ON. wae BORN re her ect hatin
: .
—
i
3
é
below on this matter. Not long before the decision in this
case, there came before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth -
Circuit a case in which the Labor Board had issued a
“remedy” directive, which ordered the employer to read
a notice “to each employee, singly or collectively.” It does.
not appear that the notice in that case involved any con-
fession of violation of the law—as does the notice in the
" present case. Nevertheless, the Court inethat case struck
down the “reading” requirement. | ee
“The requirement of the Recommended Order that
the Notice be read ‘by management to ahy employee
who requests it, as amended by the Board .to require
it be read to eac! ~>rployee, singly or collectively, is
unnecessarily eml.arra. © g and humiliating to manage-
ment rather’ than effectuating the policies of the Act”.
3 National Labor Relations Board vs.
Laney & Duke Storage.W arehouse Co.,
369 F. 2d 859, 869 (5th Cir., 1966)
Since the decision in the present case, the same issue
‘has reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in the case of International Union
. of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO vs.
National Labor Relations Board-and Scott's, Inc., 66
LRRM 2081 (D. C. Cir., 1967). In that case, decided as
; recently as September 6, 1967, the District of Columbia # :
Court, of Appeals took specific note of the decision by the
Second Circuit Court in the present case, but nevertheless
declared:
“The ignominy of a forced public reading and.a ‘con-
fession of sins’ by any employer, any employee, or any -
~
Union representative makes such a remedy incompatible
with the democratic principles of the dignity of man”
International Union o f Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-.
' CIO vs. National Labor Relations
q Powe and Scott’s, Inc.,66 LRRM |
* 2081 (D. c. Cir., 1967) -
It is cubienitied, \however, that beyond. ‘Sinniaasaths
principles,” there is here involved the ultimate principle
of individual liberty and fréedom—“the cherished rights
of mind and spirit”’—guarantged to every citizen by a
written Constitution—against the encroachment of any -
and all power, including that of Government itself. |
It is to be observed thag in deciding the present case, 7
the Court below gave the ‘Company “the alternative”
“éption of having the. notice read by Board an lad
tives, rather than by its own officials” (Appendix. p.
26a). If, however, the employer must assemble his em-
_ ployees and open his premises to an agent of the Labor
Board, who stands and reads the employer’s confession
' for him, the true nature of the situatign is not altered or
- disguised. The forced declaration of the employer is
~ simply being spoken for him by a forced agent.
Certainly, also, on such a stage, the Cieanient 3
. . being cast in an entirely new and most unflattering role—
as its nee solemnly — in public view the involun-
1Malloy vs. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, >, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12L. Ed 2d
653, 657.
19
>
tary confession of an American. citizen. It may safely be
said that.such a scene has not been enacted in this land
since the founding of this a.
The Court of. Appeals for the © District of Columbia
specifically considered this “alternative”, as put forward
by the Court below, and unhesitatingly rejected 7
is “This procedure, however, creates a problem more
severe than the one it supposedly solves.
“Board involvement in a ‘reading of the order would ,
inescapably draw the Board into the very conflict areas
it should remain aloof from, except for the need to
judge”. — - International Union of Electrical,
Ay Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
C10 vs. National Labor Relations
. Board and Scott’s, Inc., 66 LRRM
2081 (D.C. Cir., 1967).
- The Court below. says that it should not disapprove :
Board. orders merely because they are “imaginative”, and
the Court refers to suggestions on “the need for creative
orders” in the administration of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (Appendix, p.23a). -
But surely it will be recognized that a trend toward
“imaginative” and “creative” orders is the road to gov-
ernment by men and not by,law—and a throw-back to- |.
ward bygone oppréssions, which the founders of this Na-
tion sought to prevent forever.
If it be answered that the*Labor Board is merely trying .
to institute a more effective “remedy” for a wrong, it
a
20° a
becomes necessary to remember the einltten that “un-
constitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely:- by silent approaches and slight deviations from .
legal modes of procedure’’—and the clear warning by
- Judge Brandeis that:—“Experience should teach us to’
be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment’s purposes are beneficent-..{T ]he greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning, but without Mhderstanding™..
B. T Requirement THAT THE EMPLovER’ Ss DECLA-
__ RATION AND CONFESSION SHALL BE THRICE ’Com-
MUNICATED To EMPLOYEES, Anp Tuat It SHALL
_ .Atso \ Be’ CommunicaTepD To EMPLOyEES AT
_ Prants Anp Locations Nor Invotvep In Tuts
_ Case 7 |
Turning to the further “remedy” directives here at is-
__ sue, the Board, with the support of the Court below, orders
not only the reading of the Company’s s statement to the
employees, but also orders that the Company shall post.
signed copies of it on Plant bulletin boards and likewise: .
mail signed copies into the homes of the employees (Ap-
pendix, p. 24a). , |
Apart from, and in addition to, the elenients of com-.
_ pulsion and of forced ‘confession’ described above, the
“question ‘naturally arises:—Why such triplicate “com-
munication”. If, for example, the declaration has been -
placed on the Plant bulletin boards, where the employee
1Boyd vs. United States, supra. \ |
2Olmstead vs. United States, supra.
Ds ee ea
A
_ regularly reads notices, does he need—and does he desire
_ receiving exactly the same statement at his home? And
<2 he not surfeited indeed with this “communication” when —
he returns to the Plant and is taken off his job and read
the same declaration a ean seem that he is being .
somewhat over-notified.
It would appear that the Board’s true purpose is not so
much notification or ‘communication, as it is the placing .
_ of the Company in as many postures of obeisance as the
Board can devise.., #5
Next, the Board, and the Court below, order that the
Company’s declaration be posted and mailed to employ-
ees, not only at the Plants wheke unfair labor practices
were found to have occurred, but: also in all the Com-
pany’s 43 Plants in North Carolina and South Carolina,
and to all the Company’s 28,000 employees throughout,
those States. | ? on
In support of this the Court says that “the Board has
found that the Company’s practices were ‘so extensive
and so well-publicized that they must, inevitably have had ,
- a coercive impact’” at all the other Plants of the Com-
pany in these States, and that posting and mailing at all
Plants and to all employees in North Carolina and South.
_ Carolina “is therefore needed to remedy the coercive —
| atmosphere” (Appendix, p. 24a).
As to this pronouncement, it must be respectfully point-.
ed out that there’is not in the record. any shred of evi- |
f dence to support it—and the Company. emphatically called :
this to the attention of the Court below. . ee
. A 4
Ld “ita fants gs <Maeraanin eines ri om CO EL .
. ; F)
22:
There jis no evidence thf the Company’s allegedly ’
4S
wrongful actions. were, “well publicized” or indeed “pub- i
licized” at all. There is no: evidence ‘that there has been
at any time, or in any way, any “coercive impact” or in- - |
fluence or effect whatever upon any employees.in any of . .
the Company’s other Plants in North Carolina and South
‘Carolina’.
. The “coercive sininisliene” a to as existing in
_< of rhetoric, not of record. There is not a syllable nor a
scintilla of evidence as to “atmosphere” or attitude or
other conditions of employees in any other Plants of the
Company beyond those involved in this case’.
- quickly spring from nape” and “creative” orders
‘described, on the subject of the Union,: which was posted in some
beyond the Plants involved in this case—for this Company state-
that is, the Plants involved in this case.
- In speaking of the existence of a , “coéreiv stmonphere” , it
fact that during the course of the Unions organizing efforts among
the Respondent’s emplo} the specific requests of the Union
and at times and places chosen by the Union—the Board has con-
Board elections, decisively against the Union—and that in one
Plant; the Respondent’s largest, the Board conducted a re-run elec-
yet ‘the employees went to the polling place and voted the vane
—r bya majority more than twice as large a as before.
‘
‘
Thus is to be seen the érror and injustice elichs can so’
\ * would seem that some attention should be paid to the undeniable.
other Plants and among employees. elsewhere is a matter —
| “1The ‘Court mentions a statement by the Company, hereinafter :
of the Plants and in some instances mailed to eniployees (Appen- :
dix, p. 24a). This. reference is, however, completely adverse to’
\ the@argument -that posting and mailing shouldbe now ewtended
- Ment was issued only in such Plants, and was‘confined. to them, .
ducted elections in 8 of, the Respondent’s Plants; and in every.
_ginstance the employees have voted; by secret ballot in such Labor -
tion, holding it at the-Wnion’s insistence away from the Plant, and ~
dip Shaaban nt 3
, * : ‘
. = Pete My siete. sees de Ine
23
rd
of administrators—orders. which may be derived, as in this.
instance, from divination or assumption—rather than
from anything in the record.
<a
“Notwithstanding that there was no charge of unfair
"labor practices as to three of the plants, and that the
~ charge was dismissed as to one, this order requires that
notices be posted i in all of them. In support of this pro-
. vigion, the Board argues that the unfair labor practices
were system-wide, centrally directed and coordinated
and, therefore, the order should apply to all plants. It
“~ ___ cites in support of its position NV. L. R. B: vs. Express.
~~ publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 438, 61 S. Ct. 693, 85 L..
Ed-930. In our judgment, there is nothing in this case
which supports the Board’s position. On the other hand,
in N. L. R. B. vs. Ford Motor Co.,.5 Cir., 119 F. 2d.
326, ‘the ‘court expressly held against the Board’s con- |
’ tention in a similar situation. The court found the Board”
was without jurisdiction to make an ‘order broader than
| _ the subject matter of the complaint. We agree with this
lent conclusion. Furthermore, we think that petitioner, if it,
at some future time, should be charged with ‘an unfair
labor practice at a plant or plants not included in the
instant proceeding, would be'entitled to a hearing before ;
- * the Board, rather than this court in a contempt pro-—
ceeding”. Reliance Manufacturing Co. vs.
eis Pian National Labor Relations } Board, 125
. on see F.2d 311, 321-322 (7th Cir., 1941)
7
+. * ‘Respondent company contends, that there was 1i0 |
ramen evidence that it had followed “7 unlawful
| 24
hiring practices at any ‘iis other than Paducah;
and with this contention, we er
“tn accordance with the foregoing, the order of the
Board is modified by deleting the requirement that
respondent company post the copies of the notice re-
quired by the Board, at’ places or projects inal than
~ the project at Paducah, Kentucky”. . zi
fa _. National Labor Relations Board vs.
er. F.H. McGraw & Co.,206F.2d
635, 641 (6th Cir., 1953)
To the same effect are the decisions in:
Shell Oil Co. vs. National Labor Relations Board, 196
F. 2d 637 (5th Cir., 1952).
‘National Labor Relations Board vs. Thompson Ramo
Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F. 2d 807, 811 (7th Cir., 1962).
On the whole subject of remedies, the Labor Board :
deems that it has a very wide latitude, “to°tailor™ and
devise orders which will “effectuate the policies of the
Act,” and that in this it has developed a superior talent
and discernment, which is generally acclaimed as adminis-
trative “expertise”.
‘The first and einenneiiel caveat with respect to this
proposition is that if accepted at face value, it would mean
that the power of the Board is virtually limitless. For, as
becomes apparent in the present case, there is practically
. nothing that the Board might not require of an A Cgeeyes
in the guise of “tailoring a remedy’”’.
4H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 NLRB 714, 60 LRRM 1381
(1965).
.
ip ck ed a ri it a8 en
22.
It is vital to note that the National Labor Relations
Act does not itself give any presumptive validity whatever .
‘ to “remedy” devising by the Board——as it expressly does
_ give, on the other hand, to the “findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact as supported by substantial
_ evidence on the record considered as a whole”, 29.U.S.C.
160(e). :
So far as the provisions of the Act are concerned,
“remedy” directives are left unqualifiedly within the judg-
ment of the Courts. In contrast to -fact-findings.by the
Board, the Statute leaves the Courts completely free to
analyze, appraise and balance remedy orders according to
the Court’s own wisdom and discretion—“enforcing, modi-
fying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in
whole or in part the order of the Board” entirely as they,
the Courts, may see fit, 29 U.S.C. 160(e).
This consideration is of particular force where, as here,
the remedy directives are innovations and,.as the Board
itself recognizes, beyond “the conventional” (Appendix,
p. 2799). Indeed, if the arguments and considerations set
forth herein are of any value whatever, this Court is in a
better position to evaluate and judge the new “remedies”
than the Board, for, as has been hereinabove pointed out,
this Petitioner has never at any time presented—nor been
afforded any occasion to preserit—these arguments and —
considerations to the Board. ps
Moreover, the réal truth is that the Labor Board has no -
more “expertise” for appraising these remedies, against
the background of the law and the sound rights and in-
terest of all the parties, than do the Courts—nor indeed
i
26°
as much—sophisticated phraseology, in behalf of the
Board, to the contrary notwithstanding.
- It is respectfully submitted that reviewing Courts should
not be too reddy to relax their scrutiny, and too willing
to agtee that the- judicial function is largely preempted,
when someone, on behalf of the Board, raises the magic
talisman of “expertise” ‘or ‘intones a solemn incantation
about “tailoring a remedy”. ;
“Reviewing Courts must be sotlelians by a feeling
. that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial
_ function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility
for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable
_ grounds”, Universal Camera Corporation vs.
\ National Labor Relations Board, —
340 U. S.'474, 490, 71 S. Ct. 456,
95 L. Ed 456, 468
cs
“The deference owed to-an expert tribunal cannot be
. allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in
the unauthorized. assumption by an agency of ‘major
policy decisions properly made by Congress”. ,
American Ship Building Co. vs.
National Labor Relations Board,
380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S. Ct. 955,
' 13 L. Ed 2d 855, 867
oe ‘[U]nless we make the requirements. for ad- |
ministrative action strict and demanding, expertise . . .
can become a monster which rules with no practical —
limits on its discretion’ . . . “Congress did not purport —
27
to transfer its legislative power to the unbounded dis-
cretion of the regulatory body’ % | ty
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. vs.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167,
| 33 §. Ct. 239, 9 L. Ed 24.207, 215
“We have said that ‘this authority to order affirm-
ative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive
jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the em-
ployer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged
in unfair labor practices even though the Board be of |
the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectu-
ated ‘by such an order’. We have said that the power
to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive.
“Tn that view, it is not enough to justify the Board’s
requirements to say that they would have the effect of
deterring persons from violating the Act. That argument
proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect is suf- °
ficient: to sustain an order of the Board, it would be
free to set up any system of penalties which it would
deem adequate to that end”. 5
| Republic Steel Corp. vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. m
“7 11-12, 61S. Ct. 77, 85 L. Ed 6, 10,
quoting Consolidated Edison Co. vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 305
U.S. 197, 235-236, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
L. Ed 126, 143-™44
&phis is not to say that the Board may apply. a
. remedy it has worked out on the basis of its experience, .
without regard to- circumstances which may make its
application’.to a particular situation oppressive and .
therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of the |
Act”. . — National Labor Relations Board
vs. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S. Ct. 287,
OTL. Ed 377, 383
“Nothing in the statute, nothing in any of the de- —
cisions lends countenance: to the view: that Congress ©
_intended to make of the Circuit Courts of Abpeals mere’
rubber stamps, mere perfunctory executors .of the
Board’s unrestrained will. They make the contrary quite
clear. It is, therefore, for this court, in the performance
of its function under the statute, to say not blindly but
in the exercise of an informed discretion, first, whether
‘the findings are supported by the evidence, and, second,
whether the Board’s orders are appropriate under the
statute”. ~-- National Labor Relations Board
vs. Ford Motor Co.,.119 F.2d 326,
330 (Sth Cir., 1941)
“The Supreme Court has made it clear that national ~
labor policy is for the Congress and not the Board
todetermine”. Aymco Steel Company vs. _
National Labor Relations Botrd,
344 F. 2d 621, 625 (6th Cir., 1965) =
er ; oe 2
“The powers conferred upon this court by the Na-
' tional Labor Relations Act to enforce the orders of the
Board are equitable in nature and may be invoked only
eee ee ete Pee ere ere re te ae ks oo
ae
29.
- if the relief sought is consistent with the principles of ©
equity”. National Labor Relations Board. |
i vs. National Biscuit Co., 185
"B24 123, 124 (3rd Cir.,,1950)
“Furthermore; we are convinced that this is not a
case in which administrative expertise is of compelling
weight ... [H]e is no friend of administrative law who
thinks that the Commission should be left at large’.
' National Labor Relations Board. |
vs. Kingston Cake Co., 206 F. 2d -
604, 611 (3rd Cir., 1953)
The Petitioner respectfully urges that ‘this is a ‘case
which justly :calls for the dttention of this Court. The
- “remedy” decrees which have been issued inthis case by
" the Labor Board, and upheld by the Court below, definitely
have in them the seeds—if ‘not yet the full flower—of
government controlled more and more by the will of man
rather than by the rule of law. © ee
i.
The “Findings” ‘And Conclusions Of The Labor
Board In This Case
A. Tue EmpLover’s Expression OF OPINION WITH
Respect To THE Union, Anp THE Boarp’s RUL-
ING THEREON
In the present case the Board ruled, and the Court be-
low agreed, that a statement regarding the Union, made
by the Company in the Plants where the Union was con-
« 30
ducting an organizing campaign, was unlawful (Appendix,
p. 19a-21a). The pertinent portion ‘of that statement read
as follows:
“To All Employees
Since the Union is putting on a campaign to get in here,
a good many questions have arisen with regard to the fol-
_ lowing matters. We have decided to state the Company’s
position on these subjects as Clearly as we can for every- =
body: alike: am
(1)This matter is, of course, one of concern to the
Company. It is also, however, a matter of serious concern
to you and our sincere belief is that if this Union were
to get in here; it would not work to your benefit but, in
the long run, would soba: operate to. your serious harm. :
w .. =,
——_ cee and the ruling of illegality, cone upon the -
- words: —* [O]ur sincere belief is that if this Union were to &
’ get in here, it would not work to your benefit but, in the
long run, would itself operate to your serious harm.”
It is to be noted that any. possible implication that the
_ Company would visit “harm” upon employee¢if the Union
_ came in, is specifically and studiously guarded against. The
‘ belief voiced is that the Union “would itself —. to
the employees’ “harm.”
‘Surely it will not. be argued that an employet cannot
sincerely believe—or should not be allowed to believe—or
in any event should not be allowed to express to his em-
ployees a belief—that the intervention of a Union would
“in the long run” not work out to their best interests. Cer-
31
tainly it is possible ‘for an employer “sincerely” to enter-
tain such a “belief.” Is it now to be unlawful: for him to
say so?
Seven times prior to the present case, this same express-
ing and phrasing of opinion has been considered by United
States Courts of Appeal in four different Circuits. In each — |
and every instance, as hereinabove pointed out, the Courts ~
of Appeals have held that under. the Constitution of the
United States and under the express provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act itself, the employer i is not to be .
condemned. for making such a statement to his employees.
The Court below i is the first and- only Court to rule other-
wise.
; “Nothing ‘in this wording do .we And to ‘ania the
bounds of section 8(c). granting an employer the right
to express and: disseminate its views on unionization.”
National Labor Relations Board vs.
. Lyman Printing Co., Inc., 356 F; 2d.
844, 846 (4th Cir., 1966)
“We are of the opinion that the posting of the notice
to all employees on the bulletin boards was protected by . |
- Séetion 8(c) of the Act and did not constitute an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) thereof. ,
Suprenant M anufacturing Company
vs. National Labor Relations Board,
341 F. 2d 756, 760 (6th Cir., 1965)
“This respondent seeks to leave no one in doubt of
its opposition to unionization of its plant. This it has a
32
right to ba so long as it does so in a fair presentation of
its views.” = National Labor Relations Board vs. ”
Southwire Company, 352 F. 2d 346, .
348 (Sth Cir., 1965)
“It is. apparent that Koppen did. voice opposition. to
the union and the intention to use every proper means —
to prevent it from eit into the Plant.
“Certainly the Act dots not require that the Company =
favor the Union or that it refrain from opposing the
~ Union, nor does it prohibit the Company from express- —
to prevent it from comiing into the Plant... |
-“Koppen’s speech did not contain. any discernible
threat of reprisal or force, or promise. of benefit, relating
to protected’ union activities. What he said appears to
be unqualifiedly privileged under the ania of sec-
“tion 8(c) of the Act.”
National Labor Relations Board vs.
Threads Incorporated, 308 F. 2d 1,
8, 9 (4th Cir 1962)
“But we cannot uphold the Board’s ruling that the
notice violates the Act. Another panel of this court has
~ recently considered the innuendoes that could fairly be
drawn from a nearly identical notice. —
Clothing Workers vs. NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.) .
It concluded that the gn used ‘in and of itself can-
~ hm AF
ni de dite tala aiid cnt add Aen gine MER 8.
4 * ‘
Kian wna Rete esteem om * . Kune ae
33 |
not:reasonably be construed as a “threat of reprisal or
_ force” as required by the Act.’ We agree.” ,
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local
_ No. 728 vs. National Labor Relations |
Board, 364 F. 2d 682, 684
(D. C. Cir., 1966)
“We are of the opinion that’ this finding and conclu-
sion of the Board was in error, The statement by Cal- .
houn was manifestly no more than a pronouncemiént of
his opinion‘and contains no discernible threat of reprisal.
We held in NV. L. R. B. vs. Threads, Incorporated, 308
F. 2d.1 (4 Cir. 1962), that a substantially similar state-
ment by an employer to his assembled employees was |
unqualifiedly privileged under the provisions of section
8(c) of the Act . . es
: Wellington Mill Division, West Point
Mfg. Co. vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 330 F. 2d 579, 583 (4th Cir.,
1964) /cert. den. 379 U.S. 882, 85
S. Ct/144, 13 L. Ed 2d 88 (1964)
Such was also the ruling in the case of Amalgamated
Clothing - “Workers of America, AFL-CIO vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 365 F. 2d 898 (D. C. Cir., 1966).
To the same effect are the decisions i in Union Carbide Cor-
poration vs. National Labor Relations Board, 310 F. 2d
844 (6th Cir., 1962), Texas Industri , Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 336 F. 2d 128, 130 (Sth: Cir., a)
- 1964), and J. S. Dillon & Sons Stotes Co..vs. National
Labor -Relations Board, 338 F. 2d 95, 400 (ee Cir.,
1964).
. >
\ ae ; ; eae . Company’ s. statement: that it must be pronouriced’ illegal.
Presumably the “setting” the Court refers ‘to consists of
} : _, the other unfair labor practices found against the Com-
ba stiyie eh pany in this case. ee < . ;
os ;
* of National Labor Relations Board vs. Lyman ‘Printing
7 he same Courts:were upholding the Tight, of the employers
1 y ae. 5 ‘ involved” to express to employees the ‘same opinion and be-
| ‘Hief which. fe td is now condemned for expressing.
Moreover e words of the Statute are sufficiently ex-
7
“setting. . : They, read as follows: ‘x,
£
‘ provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains
5 ae no thréat of reprisal or. force or promise of benefit. °
“29 U.S.C. §158(c).
"i “it self more precisely, 1 more en 4 or more emphatically.
- Workers of. America, AFL-CIO vs.’ National Labor Relations
‘Board, 365 F. 24898 (D.C. Cir:, » 1966). |
"wise eons 2%
* fie The Court bélow says, 'adiebuee, 4 that the « particular,
~ a red setting’ in this case” gives “sufficiently dark a hue” to the
But i in-all the cases et to above, save only the case
Co., Inc:, sich “settings” of other unfair labor practices.
. aniaed, that-is;. findings, of unlawful practices were being ©
affirmed by the reviewing Courts, at the same time that:
e plicit cand positive that they are’ not to be undone by a’
“The. expressing of any views, 3, argument, or opinion, —
ee ort the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
a dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the |
: Iti is s difficult to ‘see*how Congress could have saan oe
*“Fidopting a» dictuni ‘trom’ the casé of hniliniianed Clothing
RAL Rend er ten ere Sd eos
’
- Z
ra
; 35 : @ . ;
.«. The phrase “if such expression contains” is to be par-
‘ticularly noted. Thus, unlawful meaning or implication
must be contained in the expression itself. It nay not be
imported and infused from other acts or events. If coercion
cannot be derived from the content of the statement itself,
then its utterance is not a violation of the law——no mattef
what other violations of law may be found.
| Section 8(c) does not conclude with any provision to the |
effect “this Subsection shall not be applicable” in a situa- _
tion where the person accused is-found guilty of sufficiently .
serious and accompanying unfair labor practices. But the
Board and the Court below add exactly such a provision .
to the Statute. There is no avoiding the fact that their
decision on this matter necessarily constitutes such a “‘read-
ing”—or rewriting—of the Statute. And’such a rewriting
obviously and in major degree undoes what Congress wrote.
B. Tue Evivence RELATING To Tue DiscHaRGcE OF
EMPLOYEES, Anp THE Boarp’s TREATMENT OF
. SucH EvipeNnc 6 +X
The ‘findings of the Labor Board relate mainly. to the
ing of the Board, accepted and endorsed by the Court be-
employees were wrongfully discharged at 19 Plants, which
- are involvéd in this case.
Repeatedly, the Board and the Court. refer to’ these
‘discharges as “massive” wrongdoing on the part of the
Cotnpany — the implication being that this number of
terminattons is itself extraordinary (Appendix, p. 3a,
allegations of wrongful discharge of employees. The hold-" ,
“low, is that, during a period of approximately a year, 71
potion, TELE SE
Pe care 36° , ave
55a). It is submitted, however, that the fact of 71 em-
ployees being discharged, from among many ‘thousands, in
19 Plants over a } period ofa year—an average of less than
four in each Plant during the year—does not indicate, upon
the face of it; anything massive or even unusual. . ae )
Peng ig Poy OL.
What is unusual, and extraordinary, and completely
.astonishing—upon its very face—is the fact that after
hearing, through its Examiner, the conflicting testimony of
443 witnesses on a multitude of disputed and material
factual issues, the Board never once: ‘credits a Company
witness against a Union or Board witness and never once
discredits: a Union or Board witness against a Company
witness. | 3 ¥
The Court below says. that “this broadside charge .
almost entirely ignores the implications of the Board’s ~
dismissal of eight complaints against the Company” (Ap-
pendix, p: 16a). The broadside charge i is nevertheless true
"and correct. The rare dismissals, which the Court refers to, . !
occurred in situations where, without reference to any con- 4
trary testimony, the evidence against the Company was
patently insufficient, even if accepted, to make out a case. | |
None of these dismissals resulted from the crediting of any.
- Company witness over a Union or Board witness. |
A majority of the witnesses testified for the Company.
They included not. only supervisors and representatives of
management, but_rank and file employees and persons un- -
-coniiected with the Company as well. ‘Their testimony
. penetrated thoroughly, patiently and vipat into all the
celeoe details of the case. ep aig,
*
; . 7 * .
‘
° tm4 * “ “Y sol (4 ¥
> Loon ae enim =" . ee +. -
’ : } sate
37
_ Amidst the vast complexity and'ariety of factual issués,
which arose and developed during months of hearings at
various locations, the proposition that truth—no matter
where pursued—lay always on the side of the Board and
the Union in any material conflict of testimony, and never
on the Company’s side, confounds every principle of
natural probability. It does not comport with common
sense and human experience—that ‘on this wide and’ in-
tricate panorama, verity was the exclusive monopol of
witnesses on one side, and was never to be found’ mee dy
What the Petitioner suggests here goes beyond “mas- ;
sive bias” on the part of the Board and its Examiner
(Appendix, p. 7a). The question the Petitioner raises is
whether it received a trial at all—or whether the Board
proceedings were an elaborate and hollow ceremony.
When an. administrative agent listens to hundreds: of
witnesses, on opposite sides, narrating their respective
versions on hundreds of factual issues, and then on every
material conflict, without exception or. deviation, points
‘always, to the Union or Board: witnesses as possessor . of
the truth—and when the victim of such unvarying rulings
is told that he can get no relief in the Courts, bécause
administrative “findings” enjoy virtual conclusiveness and
finality—it is to him a frightening thing, and to ‘the gen-—
eral American public it is.incredible.
Whatever may or may not be done for this Petitioner in’
‘this case, it can safely be predicted that such a regime of
uncurbed administrative action cannot long endure as an
acceptable system of justice in this land.
u 3 ‘
——
| ployee is “discharged for cause,” there shall be no order
_ and Lloyd Edwards.
with the Union.'*
| nesses asserting that the employee was discharged on that
- account—and that he would have been so. discharged
management and supervision testified unequivocally and emphati-
‘ Randall Ross, Cornell Laughter, Dale Payne, Lillidg Hux,
38
In the discharge cases here, involved, it is substantially
conceded that in each instance, “there \existed -a valid °
ground of discharge” (Appendix, p. 15a). The pivotal,
question, says the Court, was whether such ground “was
the real one” (Appendix, p.. 15a).
In each instance, witnesses, after narrating and explain-
ing the ground, testified that it—and not Union affiliation
‘on the part of the employee—was the reason for the dis-
7 charge, and that the employee would have been dis: charged
for the reasons shown even if he had had no » connection -
Thus the ground for discharge being oe and wit-
~ whether connected with the Union ox not—and there being
no proof that were he non-Union he would not have been’
discharged: for the cause shown—the Board nevertheless
chooses to infer, that is “find,” that the employee was dis-
charged because of his being ‘connected with the Union.
“Yet the Statute affirmatively provides that if an em-
in his behalf. 29 U.S.C. $160(c). And the law is clear that
In thirteen of the cases, there was no evidence cutting that
management or-supervision were aware of any Union connection
on the part of. the employees discharged, and, on the other hand,
cally that they were not aware of any such. These Were the cases
of Herman Burgess, ‘John Eller, Eugene Evans, Albe ‘Sanders, “4
Rochella Hux, Adolphus Bell, Leroy ee Reginald Nicholson
a
. (39 . %
.
the burden is, and remains. ‘throughout, -upon the. Board
‘to prov&\that the employee was discharged because of
Union affiliation on his part..
as ‘Furthermore, in section 10(c) of the amended act,
as proposed in the conference agreement, it is specifically -
provided that. no order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual ‘or the payment to him.
of any back pay if such individual was suspended or dis-
charged for cause ...’” |
N otal Labor Relations Board 1 vs.
Local Union No. 1229, 346 U. S. 464, .
473,474, 74S. Ct. 172, 98 L. Ed |
195 (1953) .
“To conclude from such evidence that respondent dis-
charged Wingate because of her union activities requires’
the pyramiding of inferences which has been so often
rejected by the Courts.
“Tt must sheuye be ieniiaiiad that the burden of PS
proving discriminatory acts by the employer is and
remains upon the General Counsel .
. } ae National Labor Relations Board vs.
: Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 222
F. 2d +l, 344, 345 (5th Cir., 1955)
“Tf dlecrimination may y be inferred from mere partici
pation in union organization and activity followed by a—
discharge, that inference disappears when a reasonable |
is explanation is presented’ to show that it was not a dis-
charge for union membership.” :
National.Labor Relations Board vs,
United Brass Works, Inc., 287 F.2d .
689, 693: (4th Cir., 1961),
ae
“The mere fact that Medlin was active in the union
can not alone support a finding of discriminatory dis-
charge because there is here substantial evidence that
the ¢mployer discharged him for cause.” *
National Labor Relations Board US.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d
486, 492-493 (8th Cir., 1946)
«Tf his [the émployer ’s] explanation is a teasonable
one, the onus is upon the Board to establish the falsity
of this explanation and the,,truth of its own interpreta-
tion.” Martel Mills Corp. vs. National Labor
Relations Board, 114 F. 2d 624, 631
. (4th Cir., 1940)
“True it is that the Company discharged three em-_
ployees who had been engaged in the strike. But dis-
charge after participating in a strike without more is
not conclusive proof that they were discharged because
‘théy had so participated. Granting that an inference
* may be drawn from the mere fact of participation fol-
lowed by discharge that such: participation was its
cause, the inference- disappears when. a reasonable ex-
planation is presented that participation in the strike .
was not the cause of their discharge”.
» Ohio Associated Telephone Co. vs.
_National Labor Relations Board,
“192 F. 2d 664, 666 (6th ¢ Cir., 1951)
~ An Na who strongly desires and prefers to oper-
ate his Plant on a non-Union basis, may welcome the fact
that a Union activist has done, or failed-to do, something -
41
constituting clear ground for discharge.. Still .if a non-
Union employée would equally have been discharged for
doing, or failing to do, the same thing, then the true rule
-.is that the, employer i is not to be convicted of violating the
law upon discharging the Union employee. And further,
as has been emphasized, the true rule is that the burden
is on the Board to prove that such is not the case. -
‘Tn each case such membership may have been the
cause, for the union was not welcomed by the persons —
having authority to discharge and employ. If no other
reason is apparent, union membershipmay logically be
inferred. Even though the discharger disavows it under
_ oath, if he can assign no other credible motive or cause,
he need not be believed. But it remains true that the
discharger knows the real causé of discharge, it is.a fact
to which he may swear. If he says it was. not union
membership or activity, but something else which in
fact existed as a ground, his oath cannot be disregarded
-. because of suspicion that -he may be lying. There must
be impeachment af him, or substantial contradiction, or
if circumstances raise doubts, they must be inconsistent
- with the positive sworn evidence on the exact point”.
National Labor Relations Board
vs. Stafford, 206 F. 2d 19, 23
(8th Cir., 1953)
“Specifically we are in no-doubt that the evidence
completely fails to support the. finding that William —
Robinson was discharged because ofthis membership in, —
_ and activity on behalf of, the union. On the contrary,
it shows without contradiction or dispute that he was
42...
discharged for open and continuous insubordination and
disobedience of orders, and the order requiring his re-
_instatement with back pay is itself an unfair labor |
practice and -as such is prohibited by Section 10(c) of
the act which provides, ‘No order of the Board shall
require the reinstatement of any individual as an em-
ployee who has been suspended or discharged . . . for
" cause ...,’ 29 U.S.C.A. §160(c)”.
3 N ational Labor Relations aa.
vs. American Thread Co., 210
F. 2d 381, 383 (Sth Cir., 1954)
“In considering the propriety of these discharges the
question is not whether they were merited or unmerited,
just or unjust, nor whether as disciplinary measures
_ they were mild or drastic. These are matters to be de-
termined by the management, the jurisdiction of the
_ Board being limited to whether or not the discharges
“were for union activities or affiliations of the em-
ployees”. National Labor Relations Board
vs. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
_ 157 F. 2d 486, 490 (8th Cir., 1946)
“The Board may not ‘substitute its judgment for that
of the employer as to what is sufficient cause for dis-
charge’ . . . And discrimination ‘may not be inferred .
from an employee’s mere membership in a union . .
In every: case the burden is on the Board to prove that~
an employee’s discharge resulted from -_ union activi-
ties”: _ National Labor Relations Board vs.
| Wagner Iron Works, 220 F. 2d
126, 133. (7th Cir., 1955)
43 . + | 6
The Court below says that “most” of the Company’s
attacks on the Board’s findings are “entirely ‘frivolous”
and that “all” of them are “without merit” (Appendix, p.
19a). me /
This io pronouncement includes, for example, a
case in which the -Company is defending against rein-
“ statement of an employee, with back pay, not only on
grounds of plausible and -reasonable cause for discharge, ~
but also on grounds of the employee’ S own testimony that,
upon being told by her supervisor in the supervisor’s office
that she was being terminated for poor performance, she .
. . + said to the supervisor “give me my damned check”. and
_ “reached over” and “slapped him” (8434, 8550"). As she
expressed it:—“TI hit him as hard as I could”. (8434). Yet nme
the Board, with the approval of the Court, orders the
. Company to reinstate this employee with back pay’. * 4
The Board, in its Decision and Order, refers to a de-
. cision of- the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit as supporting its ruling in the case of this
e employee (J. A. 18-19). But upon referring to the opinion."
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it is quickly
_ to be seen that in that case the employee there involved
had not assaulted anybody.
_. In the case before the Fourth Circuit Court, that Court
made clear that it was dealing only with a situation in
» 1All references having no other designation than page numbers
" are references to the transcript of the record made at the hearings
before the National Labor Relations Board Trial Examiner, which + _
is now on file with this Court.
mM Tis Shirley Hobbs.
: 44 ~s
_ /which “an outburst of anger” in “no way harms or in-
"conveniences the employer”, There the evidence-was that
the employee, apparently in a conversation with another .
employee, “threatened to harm” a supervisor and “was
rude” to. a Company. official who “intruded upon” a dis-
cussion she was having with another officer of the Com-
pany. National Labor Relations Board vs. M.& B Heada- ..
F wear Co:, 349 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir., 1965).
The same Court has emphasized that “reinstatemenit of
employees” who have committed acts “of violence” is not
“proper action to ‘effectuate the policies; of the Act”.
National Labor Relations Board vs. Kelco Corporation, —
178 F. 2d 578, 581 -(4th Cir., 1949); National Labor Re-.
lations Board vs. Longview Furniture Co., 206-F.-2d 274,
276 (4th Cir., 1953).
_ It is likewise held that even though an Soa has
"been discharged in violation of the Act, the fact that he
later threatened to assault the management representative
who made the decision to. discharge him, bars him from
reinstatement and back pay, even though the employee did
not carry out such threat. National Labor Relations Board
vs. R. C. Can Co., 340 F. 2d 433 (Sth Cir., 1965).
Heretofore, the Board itself has specifically ruled, exact- ;
"ly contrary to its holding in the present case, that although
an employee was discharged in violation of the Act, when so
~ that employee, upon being informed by his supervisor that
he was to be discharged, committed a physical assault
upon the supervisor, he became thereby barred from rein- -
statement and back pay. Carthage Fabrics Corporation,
101 NLRB 541, 31 LRRM 1114, 1116 (1952). Such was
»
45
“also the holding of the Board’ in Relive Hosiery Mills,
Inc. y122 NLRB 112,43 LRRM 1221/(:1959)..' |
Indeed, sthe Board has made the same ruling as to a case
in which-an employee, discharged in violation of the Act, .
; assaulted “a fellow employee” whom “she suspected of -
having informed her employer of her Union activities.”
Stein-Way Clothing Company, Inc., /131 NLRB 132, 48 ‘x
‘LRRM 1015 (1961). | oy
-_
It may well be wondered whether the Court below re-
gards the reasoning of these authorities as “entirely frivo-
lous” or as simply “withoyt merit”—for they unquestion-
a ably support the Company’s contention i in the case of this
discharged employee. 7
It.is indeed difficult to catia how the Board and %
the Court can take.such a disdainful view of the Com-.
-pany’s defenses, in these discharge cases, in the light. of |
the facts presented by the record. A few further illustra-_
_ tions might be worthwhile.
Herman Burgess, for example, was not discharged on
. account. of any poor performance or misconduct on his —
-part. He was laid off in the course of a curtailment of per-
iS sonnel occasioned by the closing down of an old Plant and
the moving of operations to a new Plant nearby (8050, :
8072). _The Board does not question but that’the move
and’ the curtailment wete reasonable and necessary.
Burgess testified repeatedly and emphatically that “the
job” which he “considered to be” his; and which “the Com-
-. pany considered to be” his, “was sweeping” (8071, 8072). :
Burgess stated a that “sweeping” was still
46.
a
his “job” at the “time of the transfer to the new: Plant”
and that he “wouldn’t sive up the sweeping job” for other
‘ih (8050; 8051, 8052);
' The new Plant utilized only three sweepers (8072).-All
three of the sweepers in the new Plant had greater seniority ~
in that job than did Burgess, as Burgess himself testified
. (8073, 8076). Burgess was thereupon: laid off (8047- 8048;
8050). | era 7 :
There is no evidence whatever. ‘that, the Company, in
transferring employees to the new. Plant, applied or fol-
lowed seniority on any basis other than a “job” basis. The
Board does not contend otherwise. Yet the effect of the
Board’s ruling i is to.decree that the Company unlawfully
discriminated against Burgess because it followed, with
_Tespect to-him, its normal job seniority system.
At another time and at another Plant, one Charles Capps
was laid off due'to curtailment in the weaving of “samples”
on the looms (1286). Capps was a loom. fixer.
The evidence was undenied and. “unquestioned that,
among all the fixers “in the Plant” on all three shifts, _
Capps was the lowest in seniority (1287- -1288). The Board
apparently, however, found fault with the Company be-
cause Capps was not put back to work, when he thereafter .
sought employment with the Company. -
But as to this, the Company explained that after Capps | !
was laid off, it learned that he had been discharged by
another employer—before applying for work. with*the
Company—because of his stealing property belonging to
the other employer (1297-1298). In testifying Capps ad-.
a
cr;
6$. * 47 :
mitted that he had been discharged by the other employer
“on account of taking some Company property,” and that - ee
this “probably”. came,to the attention of the Stevens Com-’ aa
‘pany after he had been “laid off” in the curtailment of
sample weaving ( 273). '
‘ James Goodwin was a warlhens employee at another
location. He .was Aischarged for deliberately leaving ‘the
-Warehouse, premises’ during working time, without per-
*
. mission, and driving approximately a half mile down the :
road to a cafe (3203-3207, 3259, 3263). In his testimony,
he admitted that he had no permission to do this. |
Goodwin’ 3 supervisor specifically testified thdt he -had
never known of any such thing happening before (3262). ;
Moreover, another employee was discharged for going with
_ Goodwin on this same occasion. The other employee, inso-
far as the management or supervision were aware, had not
been connected with the Union in any way or at any time.
‘The Board makes no complaint as to the Company’ s dis-
-\ charging him for committing the same offense as Goodwin.
David Collins worked as a laborer in another Ware-
house. He was discharged for refusing to straighten cases
in the upper tiers of the bins in the Warehouse (6674).
Collins admitted on the witness stand that, on the last
day he worked, when asked by his supervisor to straighten .
these’ cases, he refused to do so (6137, 6146, 6674). In his
testimony, Collins further admitted that his supervisor told
him that he thought “it was only fair” for Collins “to do
what” the other e mployees “had to do,” and that he, the
| supervisor “wasn’t going to require” Collins “to do any- a
a's)
48
5d
thing except what he [the supervisor] required the others
to do” (6132). :
Collins denied that he and the ‘other employee had -
always been required to straighten cases in the upper tiers
of the bins. His supervisor and three of his fellow em- .
ployees specifically and unequivocally contradicted him as
to this (6725, 6727, 6729, 6770). No witness corroborated
* Collins with respect to this work, which he admittedly
refused to do.. r
a)
It is unquestionably and naturally true, ‘as pointed out
_by witnesses’ throughout these cases, that many em: |
"_ ployees in the course of a Union organizing drive, becom
ing excited and distracted or enthusiastic and active, do
.Tapidly and drastically deteriorate in their k perform-
. ance. Some of them become suddenly hostile or defiant
toward management and supetvision and practically invite ©
discharge. Such . basic reality—confirmed. by repeated tes-
. timony in this case and by common knowledge and com-
‘mon sense as well—the Board and Court seem entirely un-
willing to accept or to take into account. ~
* Instead, they find severe fault with. the Company for we
' shifting, as they say, from a “permissive manner” of deal-
5a). : |
In the first place, as witnesses for the Company stressed,
_it is quite an exaggeration to picture a Company, striving
- for efficiency in a highly competitive industry, as operating
its plants in a “permissive manner.” It. would certainly not —
long remain in operation on such a basis. Moreover, it is
ing with employees to.a stficter regime (Appendix, P.
es.
" certainly both reasonable and likely, as the excitement and
activity of a Union organizing campaign begin to effect the
attentiveness, or the attitude: ‘of employees toward their — , :
| work, that the Company ‘would exert greater and greater 3
effort toward maintaining efficiency and attention to the
job. the |
Charles Coley was a “pin-drafter tender” in one of the «
Plants here involved. Prior to the beginning of any Union
organizational effort, he had been given a written repri-
* . mand on account of defective work. Thereafter, he received |
additional written reprimands for the same thing and for..° >
failure to clean his machine in accordance with a posted ~-. .
schedule (4960-4969), vere ee »
_ On-the last day he worked, the clock on Coley’s machine
had been deliberately “cranked back,” so as:to make the
_ Machine start up without being cleaned—when it lad
automatically Stopped for the purpose of being cleaned
(4960-4969, 5052-5060, 5104-5108). On this occasion,
Coley was discharged. 2.
It was undisputed that Coley’s machine, because of the _
_____ clock on it having been “cranked back,” had started up,
without being cleaned and had run 325 yards of stock
in a dirty condition, after the point at which it should have
been cleaned and at which it automatically had shut down
for cleaning. | . ; a
. Walter Rackley worked as: a checker of cloth weights
_and yardage in still another Plant. For a good many days
prior to:his discharge, it had been coming to the attention 5
of his supervisor, that. he was making erroneous reports
™?e
~ 50
as to the rn and the weights of various bales of cloth
_, which he was supposed to have checked (4387, 4393).
In his testimony, Rackley admitted that his supervisor
had been “getting after” him about these errors before the
Company had any reason to be aware of any connection .
on his part with the Union (4147, 4148).
The Company brought forward Finite proof
| showing that on one occasion Rackley had set down a bale
of cloth as being 40 yards less than it actually was, and in
another instarice 107 yards less, in another 49 yards less,
in. another 33 yards less, and in another 32 yards less—
than the yardage which these bales actually contained
(4387, 4389, 4392, 4393). The effect of these ‘errors was
that the Company was “giving away”, to its customers,
; cloth to the extent of these yardages (4387).
in another instance, these doéuments showed that ;
Rackley’s errors were causing the customer to receive 85
yards less than it should-have received, and in another
instance 50% yards less than it should. have received™
' (4390, 4392): And a few days after Rackley’s discharge,
» by reason-of such continuing errors, another cloth bale
_ check sheet came in showing that he had set down a bale ~
of cloth as having 17434. ae less than it actually had
(4396). :
Instead of expanding further on illustrations or: ex-
“ amples ‘the Petitioner” will devote the remaining pages of
‘ this Petition to a brief summary and analysis of the evi-
dence bearing upon each of the employee discharges at
issue in this case. a ee peer
—
The Petitioner teailies that. an examination of the facts
So relating to these discharges i: isa burden which the Court. -
may not be disposed to undertake. The Petitioner prays
the Court’s patience, however, in such review of these facts ©
as the Court.may deem needful. For there-is ‘no other
refuge, than this Court, against the broad injustice and
error which the Petitioner earnestly contends’ are present |
_in this case. |
With respect to employee terminations, ‘the: Board’s
‘Trial Examiner. made findings and conclusions against the
Company in 69 cases. The Board made additional rulings
against the Company .i in the cases of two employees. The
. evidence bearing on these two additional cases will be first
briefly analyzed. Then will follow a short analysis of the
evidente in each of the 69 cases—in ‘the sequence of Os
hearings conducted for the various Plants. “--- +
_ - Leroy Sims worked:as a “roller frame tender” in the
' Company’s Republic Plant No. 2, at Great Falls, South
Carolina. He testified that the employee | who tended these:
’ same machines on the preceding work shift, left some of
them in bad condition, on several occasions, and that he, -
, Sims, becoming impatient at this; “quit” the 1e job (840, |.
845).. The uncontroverted testimony. was that Sims told.
_ his immediate supervisor, J. T. Temple, that he was quit-
ting, and then simply walked off the iat in the more of -
the shift (845, 1595).
Sims’. - Supervisor, Temple, testified that he asked Sims :
to wait and take up the matter with the General Overseer, |
James W:. Bankhead, who was not there: at that time but
who would be on hanid at the ead in of ~ shift the
“next afternoon (1612, 1759). Instead, as already noted;-
- Sims walked out and went “home” (845).
In his testimony, Sims stated that he was aware that.
some of the machinery had to be shut down, because of his
thus abruptly leaving the job (859). It is also undisputed
_ that after Sims quit, another employee was placed in his :.
- job, and that, at the time of the hearing, this employee still
- held the job (1611, 1613-1614), :
‘The Beard does not contend that there was anything
_ in the circumstances of the case constituting aconstructive
discharge of Sims, nor that ‘the ‘Company was guilty of
any wrongdoing with respect to the termination of Sims’
employment. Instead, the Board finds that the Company
committed a wrong in later failing to take Sims back: into
‘* its employment on anothef- ‘job (J..A. 12).
In support of this conclusion, the Board piléte to testi-
“mony. by Sims to the effect that after he quit, he was told
by the General Overseer, James W. Bankhead, that despite -
his quitting, Bankhead was “going to work something out”
in the way of another job and that, he, Sims, should “come
back prepared to go to: work Thursday” (846, 847 ). As
to this, i it is first .to be noted that Bankhead’s version is .
. entirely different. He testified that after Sims’ quitting, ra
Sims “asked” him if he “could give him a job,” and that
he told Sims that he “did not have anything open,” and | ‘
that Sims then stated that he would come by and “pick . .
up” his pay check “next Thursday,” which would be the
regular pay day, and “that was all that was said” (1696).
The Board, of course, chooses to credit Sims and to dis-
credit Bankhead. ;
aoe}
a
se
__And the Board then proceeds to “find” that the transi-
. tion from Bankhead’s promising “to work something out”
for Sims and thereafter failing to do so, was unlawful. The
proof of unlawfulness, says the Board, consists in the fact
*
work something out” for Sims, the Cémpany received’ an
that on the day after Bankhead told Sims — according
to Sim’s controverted testimony — that he would try “to
ra
affidavit signed by Sims, along with many other affidavits,
which had been filed by the Board in an injunction. pro-
ceeding brought against the Company under Section: 10(j).
of the National Labor Relations Act (J. A. 11). There is,
| however, no evidence whatever that Bankhead, who Sims
claims was trying “to work something out,” had any
knowledge of any Such affidavit. © -
. But upon Sims’ controverted evidence that Bankhead
told him that he, Bankhead, would try to find another
job for Sims and upon additional conjecture that. Bank-.
- head+was deterred from doing so by an affidavit which ~
_ Sims had. signed, the Board arrives at a “finding” that this
'_ employee, who by his own admission, abruptly walked off
his job and quit the Company’s employment, was ublaw..
fully discriminated against, when the Company failed: tov’
| “give him another job. sh Os;
a |
Herman Burgess worked in the Company’s Piedmont —
Plant, at Piedmont, South Carolina, His regular job was
that of sweeper, but from time to time he had worked on
‘various other jobs (8049). |
In the Spring of 1 964, operations in the Piedmont Plant A
were largely discontinued, and many of the* employees
were given employment in.a new Plant nearby, called the
:
+)
i a ee
| O-. > | _54 ae
‘Company’s S Estes Plant, where operations _ were being
started up (8050). The new Plant utilized only three .
sweepers (807 2). All three of the sweg¢pers in the new |
Plant had greater seniority in that Job thim’ did’ Burgess,
as Burgess himself testified «i 8073, 8076). Burgess. was
thereupon laid off (8047- 8048, 8050):
There is no evidence, as of the time of the hearing 1 in =
- the Summer of 1964, that he had been. terminated or sev-.
; ered from tHe Company’s employment. There is likewise .
no evidence that the Company, at the time of Burgess’ *
lay-off, was aware of his being in a any way connected with
‘ the Union.
Yet the Board. pronounces that the a, unlaw-
fully discharged Burgess. The Board points out that ‘Bur-
gess had performed “a number of different jobs i in the card-
ing room” and.“had seniority over many « other” employ: es
_ in this department (J. A . 13). Unmentioned by the Board.
‘is the repeated and emphatic testimony of Burgess that —
“the job” which hé “considered to be” his, and which “the
Company considered to “be” his, “was sweeping” =
. 8072). Burgess stated unequivocally that “ “sweeping” was
* still his “job” at the. “time of the transfer to the new.
Plant” and that he “wouldn’t give up the sweeping job””
for other jobs (8050, 8051 , 8052).
There is no: evidence whatever that. .the Company, in
transferring emplayges to the new Plant, applied or fol-
lowed seniority on any basis other than a “job” basis. The
Board does not contend otherwise. Yet it undertakes to
decree a system of departmental seniority for the -Com-
Liat 4 and declares that the adi unlawfully discrim-
3:
inated against Butgess by following a job seniority system
instead of a depértmental seniority system.
ts 20
af
It is submitted that: in this, the Board fundamentally
+ misconceives its function, *
--The Board relies on the fact that. the Company “did
-not call any Witnesses” with respect to the lay-off of Bur-
gess, Why Should the Company have called witnesses, *
since Burgess himself made it unequf¥ocally clear that the _
Company had followed job seniority in ‘his case, and
since there was no evidence whatever that this was not the.
| System and method which the Company consistently ©
followed in making all transfers to the new Plant? The
_- Company was content with the evidence on this subject.
of exactly where Burgess left it, for it shows no sort of unlaw-
ful ee on the part of the ‘Company. against -
Burgess. “ier
| ‘Republic Plant No. 1:
_ Edward Varnadore was a carding machine tender. He
_. Was discharged for failing to clean waste material or “fly” ©
from under. his “set” of carding machines (1084-1091,
1200, 1227, 1239, 1243), eg
The evidenice was uncontradicted that if too much. fly
' * accumulates in ‘the enclosed areas under the carding ma- .
chines, then “seconds” are caused in the cloth, which is the
Plant’s end product, and that accumulation of this. fly is
i very likely to cause damage to the carding machines. For
these reasons, a time schedule for cleaning the fly from |
_ the enclosed areas under the machines was set and strictly
- enforced. All of this Varnadore himself admitted (21 2-
212A).
}
©.
—
discharged for failure to clean waste from under’ the card- °
- #-
i}
\ _ 36.
Va nadore admitted that, on the occasion in question, he
did not ‘clean the fly from the-énclosed areas under any
= >of his machines (213): Witnessés testified that the accumu-
lation of Aly under Varnadore’s machines, in this instance, _
_ “was the worst” they had ever seen — - being piled up under
_ these machines all the way into the operating parts (1227,
_ 1243). One of these was Baxter Vincent, a noh-supervisory ~
: employee, who, on the next shift, cleaned this accumula-
tion of fly from under these machines.
The Examiner notes,that supervisor Nunnery: testified
that he could not recall-any other card. tenders having been
“ing machines. He strangely ignores the testimony of the
Plant Superintendent, Walter Lefler,-that he did recall
another card tender, one Hensley, having been discharged, ;
since Varnadore’s discharge, in the same department and
for exactly the same offense (1086).
The Examiner emphasizes that ‘Varnadore “had been
written up only once during -his employment, and that on
a matter not related to his work performance” (J. A. 68).
- _ Varnadore’s own testimony was to the contrary (219-221).
Ralph Harrison was a loom fixer. He was discharged
because of his poor performance i in this work, His super-
visor testified that he had been working as a loom fixer
' approximately two months and that throughout this time
“his work was poor and it was sloppy” (2069). The further
- testimony was that Harrison’s “weavers were complaining
about” his fixing of their looms, bit that Harrison “said
he just couldn’t fix them, he: just couldn’t keep up with
them. ”
‘
Se en
| : ant a rae Sora
a FS oe ;
The General Overseer testified that Harrison’s “section” a
“of looms “was the worst one in the whole mill”; that “the—
weave room was complaining”; and that. on ‘the last night x
Harrison worked he had never seen-this many flags on-a
"job in [his] life” (2086-2087). ; sae
The Superintendent of the Plant likewise stated that he
“saw more fixer flags on that section than [he] had seen
' on any section” in the period of “approximately five years”
that he had been Superintendent of this Plant (1102). |
Even a witness for the Board’s General Counsel, J. B.
- Knight, testified that when Harrison was discharged from
the job his “looms-were in need of repair” and his job was
~~ “in. bad shape” and down “in the floor” as it had been
when he went on'the job (713). .- . e. | .
The further evidence is that Harrison had been given
“two written warnings” about his work (2080).
_ Still further, the evidence was that “two or three more”
fixers were discharged in this same department for .poor
performance in loom fixing, all “within three months of-
the time of Harrison’s discharge” (1103). | |
The Examiner refers to the testimony of Mrs. Juanita °
Faulkenberry, but he ignores ler testimony to the effect e
_ «that “the job is running far better today” than it was
.., When Harrison was on it (698). Similarly, the Examiner
sharply finds fault with the Company, -in that the Com-
pany, after Harrison failed in his performance as a loom
fixer, did not transfer him back to the job of overhauler,
‘which-he had formerly held (J. A. 70). He completely dis-
regards the repeated and uncontradicted testimony that.
-
ed .
' 58
the overhauling work, from which Harrison was trans-
ferred, had been eliminated on all three shifts and never
ee “started back up” on any shift (2078, 2085, 2088-2090).
Jack Simpson was a “head slasher” tender. The evi-:
dence: was that the “warps” which came from Simpson’s
slasher room were “in bad shape.” Simpson’s supervisor
testified that “a blind man could see that they were in
bad shape, the worst that I had ever seen; I have never’
- seen anything that bad”; <and that these were “the bad
warps that Mr. Simpson was written up for” (1985).
The Superintendent of the Plant, Walter Lefler, testified
that he made careful statistical surveys to ascertain the
exact nature and source of the trouble and that Simpson
was twice given “written warning” about the bad warps
for which he was responsible and that when there was no
' improvement, Simpson was discharged (1092-1095). The
further evidence was that “the warps.coming out of there *
have improved greatly,” and that “that action with Simp- ;
_ son has cleared the bad warp situation” (1096- <i
Republic Plant No. 2
hain Wright worked as an “oiler and bander”
(1720). An important part of his job was to clean bobbin
machines and also to clean up the “spare” floor. The
‘Company brought forward clear and strong evidence that
Wright was discharged for failure to fulfill these tasks
(1489, 1721-1724, 1765-1770, 1787). Three witnesses,
J. W. Wood, Jr., G. M: Mendenhall and Alvin Bankhead,
testified.as t®Wright’s leaving his spare floor in a “filthy”.
_ condition and waste material on one of his bobbin ma-.
if
(|
eee
chines, In testifying, Wright stated that he did not know
who left the waste material on the bobbin machine and,
then later admitted that it was “his” (416-418).
‘The Examiner says (J.-A. 55), with respect to the*bob-
bin machine, that he does not understand why the super-
visor failed to instruct Wright to clean the machine
“instead of discharging him” — since at the time the super-
visor discovered the situation, there was approximately a
half hour of working time still remaining on Wright’s
> shift. In this, the Examiner takes no note of the evidence
(1753) that at the time, Wright had already stopped work
and was “washing up” preparatory to leaving. . ie
The Examiner further points out (J. A. 55) that there
was no evidence of Wright’s having been “written up,” -
that is, no*evidence of the Company having given him
_ any critical personnel action or “P, A.” report, prior to
. his discharge, nor any evidence of “any other person in
_the spinning department” -having been discharged “for
failing to. perform properly the duties of a cleaner.” As
to this, however, the Examiner is quite inconsistent, for
in other cases, as will later be’ pointed out, when the evi-
dence does show eatlier P. A: reports against the employee
discharged, and likewise the discharge of other employees.
for the same or similar offenses, the Examiner does not
regard such circumstances and such evidence as being of
any significance or value. toward acquitting the Company.
Idolene Steele was a spare hand.” Her usual work .
was that of cleaning the rollers on the spinning frames.
The uncontradicted testimony ( 1493-1494, 1725, 1771)
was that her assignment: on the last night she worked was
60
the same as usual, and that on this occasion she failed to
do twenty-five to thirty per cent of the job which had been
a assigned to her. This she did not deny. _ Ms
. Charles Knight ‘was a tender of finish drawing ma- ©
chines. The evidence for the-Company was that he was;
discharged for failing to “piece” or splice disconnected
ends of sliver coming from such machines. He admitted .
that he did not piece or splice such ends, but claimed that .
he was not required to do so. Supervisors J. W. Wood, Jr.
(1484- 1486), J. T. Temple (1590-1591), James Bank-
head (1689-1691) and Knight’s fellow employees, -who
_ were non-supervisory, Don Ray Roddey (1677), William
_F. Hancock (1683), and Joe Faulkenberry. (1678-1679)
all iestified to the effect that disconnected ends of sliver:
coming from finish drawing machines definitely had to be
pieced or spliced and that Knight’s assertion to the con-
trary was an absurdity; that the card room would vir-
tually cease to operate if such splicing were not done;.and .
that all tenders of*finish drawing machines well nner this
and had been so instructed. ea Tae
evidence is uncontradicted that he allowed the “Japs” to
run completely out of several of his carding machines, and
| , that this resulted in severe damage to one of them (1495-
"1496, 1524, 1592-1594, 1644-1650, 1660-1661, 1666).
Another card tender, Jesse E. Hilton, testified that he saw
the laps running out on Aldridge’s carding machines and,
as a favor to Aldridge, went to Aldridge, who at this time -
was in the smoking room, and told Aldridge what was.
happening, but that Aldridge said “well, I don’t care” and -
tC. '
ny
William Aldridge was a carding machine tender. The :
a»
e
‘chine (1524).
61 m
“lit another” ciragette and stayed on in the smoking room
approximately “eight or ten minutes” after that, while
his carding machine “tore up” (1570, 1581, 1582-1583).
The Examiner took no’ note whatever of this crucial
testimony on the part of Aldridge’s fellow card tender.
Instead, he cavils-at the fact that one of the witnesses
failed to “describe the nature or extent of the damage”
(J. A..62). He wholly disregards the fact that J. W. Wood, —
Jr., the Superintendent of the Plant, testified, without |
contradiction, that “it took approximatély $175.00 worth
of material besides two men’s labor” to repair the ma-
And here again, the Examiner observes that two of the
| witnesses could not “recall” a card tender being discharged
in this card room prior to Aldridge’s discharge. But here
| also, he ignores specific testimony of a card tender, who. .
is non-Supervisory, that he had. seen card tenders-“get
_ discharged” in this s_card’reem, prior to the time of. Al--
_.___—-dridge’s discliarge (1577).
F inally, the Examiner muses that in such a situation as
occurred with respect to Aldridge’s machines, it was “the _
practice” for a fellow employee, ‘upon observing the cir-
cumst@pces, to go and find the card tender in charge of __
such ma@hines and “call it to the tender’s attention” (J. A. -
62). He Strangely overlooks the fact that one of the most
significant features of Aldridge’s case is that this is exactly
what took place in this instance, and that ‘Aldridge never-
theless said he “didn’t care” and proceeded to light another
cigarette and stay in the ‘smoking room for another “eight
or ten minutes.” : |
. e
_ James Lee was a “direct” filling doffer. He was laid off
on account of production changes (1773)..The looms Weav- _
ing on direct spun filling were being reduced (1499). ‘This
necessitated taking one doffer off “on each shift” (1774).
There were three shifts, and the three doffexs who were.
youngest. in point of seniority were laid off (1774). James 3
Lee was one of these (1774)
The Examiner questions whether another doffer, Year.
* wood, did not have less seniority in the spinning depart- :,
ment than Lee, because, as he points out, the supervisor, -
ae Mendenhall, testified, at-one~point - that Yearwood. had
_ ‘been transferred into spinning approximately “ a couple of
_mdnths” before the curtailment (J. A. 64). But. Menden-
hall stated definitely, in his very next answer that Yer-
wood. “had more seniority than Mr. Lee” and “‘was.a-more ~
qualified doffer” (1775). And later, Mendenhall specifi-
“cally reiterated that Yearwood “had thore seniority in the
spinning room than James Lee did”-(1782, 1783).°
Lee was not given other work because there was no other
~ work “‘open” which he was qualified to perform (1774).
It is undisputed, that spinners were laid off in the same _
curtailment (1781), and yet no complaint _ been made
with respect to them.
Republic Plant No. 3. :
James Walden was a “tie-in -machine” operator. He
‘was discharged for tying “doubles” in an entire warp
beam — all the while knowing that he was doing. so.
Walden admitted that he “did go ahead tying it all in,
3
63
even though [he] knew it was defectively tying” (295,
296, 300). | ; ; aan
when Walden knew that: the machine was tying doubles,
| 2 re, and reported it to his super-
_ visor”; and that tie-in operators “have all been warned” to
“stop the machine when they know it is tying doubles”:
. and that he had never known “a tie-in operator to tie a
whole warp in, knowing it’s t ing double” ( 1299-4302).
Homer Carter, who was a tie-in operator and also fixer
on the tie-in. machine, testified that tie-in operators “are
Supposed to stop them [the tie-in machines ] off waen we
find that they’ are tying doubles” aft “report it. to our
‘second hand” (1459 He testified that “regardless of
- what was ‘the matter with this tie-in machine, whether
| sticking or not, and regardless of what.it took to fix it, if
the operator knew it:was tying doubles,” he was supposed. —
to “stop it off” and tell “his second hand” (1475).
-Henry W. Bogan, a witness for the Board’s General
Counsel, likewise téstified that if a tie-in machine operator
saw that his tie-in machine “was tying doubles,” and the
operator then “tried to fix it and started again and it was
Still making doubles,” as Walden said was the situation in
his’ case, then. the operator “should just quit and get-it
fixed,” that is, the operator should Stop the tie-in machine
and go to ‘‘the supervisor” (359-360). |
The Examiner states the matter with scant regard for
the evidence. He says that, on the occasion in, question,
Walden’s machine “tied several doubles in one. warp”
2
64
(J. A: 74). The testimony from all witnesses is ; that the
entire warp was tied in doubles. The Examiner then ob- -
serves that “believing there was something wrong with the
machine, [Walden] reported the trouble to Henry Bogan,
his immediate supervisor” (J. A. 74).-This is an under-
statement of ironical proportions, for Walden’ s.own testi-
mony is that he knew the machine was tying ‘doubles —
throughout. And in stating that. Walden “reported the
- trouble to,Henry Bogan, "his inimediate”supervisor,” the .
. Examiner slides over the crucial point of the case, namely,
that Walden reported the situation to Henry Bogan only
after he, Walden, had knowingly allowed the machine to
tie doubles i in the entire warp beam.
3 ~ Next, the Examiner says that “the testimony of Hyatt;
a weaver on Walden’s shift, ” “is to the effect that even
though a tie-in operator knows that his machine is tying .
doubles i in a warp, it is nevertheless quite all right for hin |
to‘continue to mistie an entire warp beam in such fashion
(J. A. 75). On. the contrary, the testimony of Hyatt, ‘a
witness for the Board’s General Counsel, was that:“‘what
is usually done” in such situation is to “stop ae go ask
the boss”. (340)..
The Examiner emphasizes that “prior to Walden noone |
had ever been fired for tying doubles” (J. A.7 5). He, of
course, takes no note of the fact that there is no evidence
of any tie- machine operator’s ever having gone ahead .
tying in an entire warp beam knowing that. the machine
was ‘tying doubles throughout, and Carter, ‘the General
Overseer, expressly testified, that he had never known of
ao oe ae
65
a tie-in operator’s doing so. It was for this deliberate mis-
deed that Walden was discharged.* __ 3 |
. Warming to his task, the.Examiner finally’ declares that
the Overseer, W. M. Carter, “attempted to frame ['Wal-
den] on the more serious charge. of failing to report” to
the supervisor the. fact that the tie-in machine was tying
‘doubles (J®A. 76). This is indeed a reckless indictment
_ .Of the Overseer, particularly in view of the fact that on this
“more serious @harge,” Walden admitted himself guilty,
‘in that he conceded that he didnot bring to any’ super-
visor’s attention the fact that the machine was tying dou-
bles, even. though he knew it was doing So, until after he
had tied the entire warp beam in doubles,
ng, we...
Three times in its-discussion of Walden’s case; the Ex-
aminer enthusiastically refers to Leland Burns, the Plant
Manager, as having called Walden “a damned ring leader”
in: the Union. (J. A: 77): The Examiner says that-he —
“note[s] particularly” this “description” of Walden. This
“description” the Examiner Teadily accepts from the wit- _
ness Hyatt who, on cross-examination, admitted that, in
giving a coniplete account and written statement of a con-
~ versation he had with Burns, he never once mentioned in
such statement that Burns had so spoken. of Walden
(350). And this same witness, whom the Examiner credits
. .Without a moment’s qualm or hesitation, in trying to:
_ explain why he never included in his written’ statement
such description of Walden by Burns, first said that he
“was scared” of the Board investigator, and then later
said that he hadn’t put it in his statement because he sup-
posed that he hadn’t “remembered it” (35 1,352),
c
Sr SPR BEE RIESE DR NER as Malo 8
~ Capps admitted that he had been dischargedtat
ie.
&
- Finally, the Examiner declares that “neither Burns nor.
' Smith [the Plant Superintendent ] denied any part of”
_ Hyatt’s account of the conve ation. in which Burns, with —
Smith present, is claimed to have described Walden in the
_” phrase quoted above. In, this, ‘the Examiner completely
ignores the testimony of both Burns and Smith with
respect to this conversation (965- 967, 1933-1937 A
‘But rather than weigh all such evidence the Examiner
seems: more interested ‘in indulging a predilection for —
rhetoric — as to which, it must be admitted, he is not
without talent. _ 3 |
Charles Capps was a fixer on sample looms. He was -
laid off due to ‘curtailment ‘in the weaving of samples |
(1286). Ameng~aill the fixers “in the Plant,” on all three
- shifts, he was lowest in seniority (1287-1288). .
- Other jobs of different nature came open after Capps . ”
_was laid off. He was not put to. work on any of them®
_ because, after he was laid off, the Company learned that a
' he} had , been discharged at another Company — before:
applying for work with the Company — ‘for stealing: .
property belonging . to the other Company (129 oe gue ¥
other
Company “on account of taking some Company property,”
and that this “probably” ame*to the Company’s atten-
-tion after he had been “laid off” ” in the curtailment in fix-
_ ing on sample weaving (273). . See,
The: Examiner persistently tefers: to the Carpeny as
having “discharged Capps,” whereas all ‘the evidence, as
pointed out above, is to the effect that he | was ane ~~ in
a curtailment (J. A. 82). |
J
is
Se %
67 F. | )
William Varnadore was a loom fixer on the third shift. -
. Another loom fixer, C. B. Trotter, brought a shuttle, which
was in bad condition, to the General Overseer, W. M. ~
Carter, Stating that it came from the looms that were in
~ Varnadore’s “up-keep” on the third Shift, and that it was
imposing an extra burden on him, Trotter, the first shift
~ loom fixer, to have to attend to shuttles which Varnadore i. 3 |
= should have attended to ( 1307).:This was specifically con-.
. . firmed by the first shift fixer (1803-1805). ere ©
Upon the Genéral Overseer’s bringing this to Varna-
dore’s attention, Varnadore violently declared that if the
Overseer “or anybody else”-said that the shuttle in ques- -
tion came out of one of Varnadore’s looms, then he was .~ -
a God damned son-of-a-bitch.” This Varnadore admitted \
_ Saying (723-724, 1307). cigeaeents canis |
_ Ona later occasion, a:loom ran entirely through Varna-
dore’s ‘shift making “seconds” in the’ cloth. Varnadore
should have seen this, because he placed his initials on the.
cloth ata point immediately adjacent to the defects ( 1310-~
1311). A few days later there was a long defective “streak”
in the cloth coming from a loom, which. Varnadore ad-
mitted he should have found and corrected (1312, 1874)...
Still later he started a’new warp on a loom improperly
(1876), eee Pie
_ On the day Varnadore was terminated, he spent “some -
seven hours” working on-a loom, and then took: the “flag”
down from the loom, indicating that he had fixed it, and
walked away from it. The supervisor, Alvin Brannon; not- ”
ee ing that the loom was still out of fix, repaired it within a
>
68.
“matter of five minutes (1313-1314, 1877-1879). Varna-
dore was then terminated for continued poor performance .
( 1314).
The Examiner resorts to an argument that he cannot be
© sure that the bad shuttle, which the General Overseer
showed Varnadore, was in fact one of the shuttles from
Varnadore’s “up-keep” or was indeed the shuttle which
had .been called to the Overseer’s attention by the first
shift fixer, Trotter (J. A. 85). He simply discredits the
testimony of the General Overseer and ignores the. testi-
mony of Trotter, the first shift fixer, in which Trotter —
identified by number the loom from which the shuttle
.came, further identified this loom and shuttle as being on
the “up-keep” of “Bill Varnadore,” and still further testi-
- fied that, in -his experiénce at fixing, he had “‘ne¥er run
~ across a shuttle that was. ‘warped like this and the. loom
not flagged and the weaver trying to run it” ( fR3- 1809).
_ The Examiner then strains to declare it “significant”
“that the Overseer, Carter,,did-not “call, Trotter to loom
3308 when Carter and Varnadore were inspecting “the
loom” and that Trotter was not present “when Carter -
. showed the shuttle. to Varnadore in his [Carter’s] office”
(J. A. 85). The Examiner overlooks the simple fact that
‘Trotter and Varnadore did not work during the same shift .
but on entirely. different shifts (1306).
Jarvis Capps worked as a loom fixer, but for a short
.while only. He allowed a loom to run for eight hours,
throughout “all the third shift,” making “seconds” (1322).
-On another occasion, he was allowing a shuttle to run, in
_aloom on his “up-Reep,” in a “splintered” condition (1323-
69
1325). In this situation, the shuttle had not yet begun to
cause seconds but it was imminent that it would begin to
do so. Finally, on the occasion which precipitated his dis-
charge; Capps permitted “harness sheaves,” which were
"in his “up-keep”-and in plain and prominent view, to wear
out without replacing them ( 1325-1327). He was then
discharged (1327, 1889-1891), ; 3
The Examiner devotes a great deal of strained, reason-
ing to the “splintered” shuttle, declaring that if the shuttle
was in bad condition, it could have caused seconds on the .
other shifts as' well as on Capps’ shift (J. A. 88, J. A. 89).
“Yet,” he. declaims, “Capps alone of the three fixers, was
held responsible.” The Examiner overlooks the simple fact
that-the loom in question was in the “up-keep” of Capps
. alone and_not in the “up-keep” of the other two fixers at .
all (1323). eae
.. Earl Roberts’ job was to “blow-off” lint and waste from
looms with an air hose. On a number of occasions, in the
process of this work, he carelessly splattered oil and grease
on cloth and on warp beams (1302-1305, 2033-2034). This
could cause the cloth to be “seconds” for as much as a
hundred yards (1303). oe
Roberts admitted that cloth had been shown to him .
which had been made “seconds” because of his blowing
oil and grease on it. And he admitted that, at least twice,
he had been reprimanded and warned about his careless- -
"ness in this respect (536-539), a
On the day Roberts was terminated, he got oil and
grease on a warp béam, and gn cloth which was ‘being
»
~ :
—
70
woven, on.two separate occasions — the last such occasion
being due to his failure to cover the loom on which he was
working. In this instance, he “blowed what looked like a
handful of grease on there, and. [it] got into the warp
- and wove into the cloth” (2033-2036). He was then dis-
_ charged for his continuing negligence. |
Billy Pressley‘was a cloth doffer. When a . white “flag”
was put up on a loom, it was his duty to come to that
loom and remove, or doff, the roll of woven cloth from
the loom (1820, 1850). The situation which occasioned his
discharge was as follows.
_ On the last night Pressley worked, hase was a “break-:
out” or “hole,” approximately. forty-seven inches wide in
the cloth being woven on a certain loom (1393). The
weaver on this loom, James Broughton, put up a flag to
indicate to Pressley that he should come and remove this
cloth from the loom before the hole in it became hidden
or “buried” in the roll of the cloth (1822). For approxi- [
mately six hours this flag remained up, but Pressley did
not come and doff the cloth during that time, nor at any
_ time prior to his leaving work that night (1315-1319, 1389, ;
1822-1824). The weaver, James Broughton, went and
looked for Pressley but could not find him (1822). .
By failing to doff this.cloth before the hole in it became
wrappéd up or—‘buried” in the roll of cloth, Pressley
allowed a situation to be created which could’ be of con-
siderable” danger to-cloth inspectors in the cloth room.
For there the cloth is run at high speed over an inspecting
frame, and inspectors have their hands against the cloth
. as it runs at this high speed. Serious injury had occutred.
ra)
te
ee
|
¥
71
as a result of holes or large defects being thus hidden in
the cloth (1316),
James Broughton, the weaver, testified that he had had
“similar trouble” about getting his cloth doffed by Pressley
and had complained to his foreman “several times” ( 1824) ,
For Pressley’s extreme neglect on this occasion, he was
discharged. : ; . . :
The Examiner says that such reason for discharge seems
to it “far fetched.” He does not explain what he considers -
to be “far fetched” about it (J. A. 93). |
Virginia Trotter was a magazine’filler. She had worked
for the Campany during a previous period of time, but
at the time of the termination in question had not been
working very long. Shortly before her termination, she .
received a personnel action report, or write-up, for “mixing
the filling” in the magazines at her looms (1330).
~ On the last day she worked, Mrs. Trotter again mixed
the filling in two looms (1330, 2016-2019). Supervisor,
M. C. Morgan, testified that this was “the first time” that
he had ever “found two looms mixed” (2022). Mrs. Trotter
was told to report to the General Overseer, W. M. Carter,
but instead of going to see Carter, she went to the payroll |
department and asked for her pay (1331, 1333, 1893).
Supervisor Morgan testified that he “was inspecting
"_ cloth” as “routine” matter and “found filling mixed” on
Mrs. Trotter’s “job” (2016, 2018). He further testified
that the mixed bobbins were plainly visible and “lined up
there right in front of your eyes” (2019). Still further he
stated that “mixed filling” is not “something that com- .
°
Ls 3 2
—
A An? REN Noe Cae
72
monly occurs” and that he had never “found two looms
mixed” before (2022).
- The Examiner declares that on neither of the occasions
in question “did Carter show the cloth in which the colors
+ were said to be mixed” to Mrs. Trotter (J. A. 98). He dis-
regards the specific and repeated testimony of the General
Overseer, W. M. Carter, that, on the first occasion, he did
show her “the filling and the cloth” (1330, 1434, 1436).
As to the second occasion, it has been noted above that
Carter had the filling and the cloth to show to Mrs. Trotter,
but that she failed to go see him, though told to do so.
Although the Company’s case with respect to Mrs.
_ Trotter does not depend upon the discrediting of her testi-
mony, it is interesting to observe that the Examiner seems
so determined to favor her that he “credit[s] her testi-
‘mony” even when she is, as he notes, contradicting the
testimony of her own husband (J. A. 97).
William Sibley was a carding machine tender. He ad-
mitted that prior to his discharge, supervisors had “got
after” him “about laps breaking, card webs, and: several
times about mixing the stock” (47). It was the careless
‘mixing of stock that brought about his discharge. In this
respect, Sibley’s record “was. worse than any one else’ -
_, (1079).
With regard to the mixing of stock, the Plant Super- |
intendent, Walter Lefler, testified that this could contami-
nate as many as-“25,000 yards” of cloth or more (1080).-
On three different occasions, within a short period pre-
_ ceding Sibley’s discharge, his immediate supervisor, Rex
kr A se : a . . ’
Ae ° .
a
73 ae, na
Jacobs, found stock which had been mixed by Sibley. On
. the first of these occasions, Jacobs reprimanded’ Sibley
.orally. On the second occasion, Jacobs “wrote. him up”
and on the third occasion, Sibley was terminated (1081,
1199). | ie
a4 . Whitmire Plant =...
Donald Cudd and Jess Cudd were spinning frame
doffers: D. W. Stone, General Overseer in the spinning
. department, testified that Donald Cudd and “other doff-
ers” were “written up” some weéks before Donald’s dis- -
charge for “bad end piecing, loose end piecing and high
end piecing” (2223). Donald received three write-ups in
this connection, “counting the termination” ( 2224). On
_ these occasions bobbins which he had improperly doffed
were also “showed to him” (2224). The other doffers “im-
proved considerably.” Donald did not improve (2225),
At this time, due to complaints from customers “daily
inspecting” of the -doffing was undertaken. The. doffers
were told that the bad end piecing “would have to clear
up” and that if it didn’t, the Company would have to take
more drastic action (2227). .”
Donald Cudd admitted that not only he but other doffers
who were not connected with the Union received write-ups
(2183, 2184, 2185). He testified that when he was dis-
-charged by V. C. Taylor, his immediate supervisor, he was
showed five bobbins which “were pieced up too high”
and that they might have been his bobbins (2186, 2187).
His testimony was that on this occasion, Taylor told’ him
that he was “not improving” and that-he would therefore
_ be discharged (2188). oe |
g
74
Jess. Cudd was a long time employee, but for several
months prior to his discharge, he had become more and
more careless and inattentive toward his job (2229, 2231,
2299). His immediate supervisor, Samuel F. Reed, testi-,
fied that “he was growing progressively. worse,” and that
he went. to Jess and talked .with him about his “bad
‘piecing up, “dropping” bobbins on. the floor, and leaving
frames standing and doffing others® . . at least-a half a
dozen times or more” (2299). He received. two “write-
ups” prior to the time of his discharge (2232). He would
- 8
sometimes let spinning frames “stand two or three hours
at the time” (2300)? : *
On the last day that he worked, he left a frame standing
“from eight o’clock until after ten o’clock,” and upon |
being reprimanded about it, had no explanation except
that he “forgot” (2302). It had been only “a day or two
before that” that he had been reprimanded “about the
same thing” (2302). The testimony of his supervisor was
that “it looked as though at that’ time ‘that he was just
trying to do everything that he could to be throwed out”
and on this occasion he was discharged (2306).
' The testimony of General Overseer Stone and Assistant.
Overseer Reed, with respect to Jess Cudd’s becoming -pro-
gressively more neglectful in attending to his job, was
corroborated by A’sistant Overseer Jim Wilbanks, and by
Melvin D. Fowler, non-supervisory employee (2315-—
2319, 2345). «
Industrial Plant
‘Grady Fields was a doffer in the spinning department.
For several months prior to the time of Fields’ .termina-
RT
75
tion, ‘the Company had been planning machinery and
.' work changes in this department, which would necessitate
some curtailment in the number of employees (2517,
2671). It is undenied that the Company’s general pro-
cedure. in case of curtailment in personnel is to lay off
according to seniority (25 18). It is likewise uncontra- }
dicted that seniority was followed in the case of Fields;
that. he and another doffer were laid off; and that they —
were the doffers with least seniority in the department
(2518,2671, 2707), | :
Still further, it is not contradicted that three other. em-
playees were affected by this curtailment, and in accord-
ance with their respective seniority standings. These were
three section men or fixers who were moved down to doff-
ing on account of the curtailment (2670). This was spe-
_ cifically confirmed by Brice F. Henson, a witness for the
Board’s General Counsel «hom the Board strongly relies
_ upon (2410),
Henson further clearly testified that, in case of personnel
_ Curtailment, employees are. laid ‘off according to their re-
spective seniority standings, no matter that they are doing
Satisfactory werk ( 2413). Likewise, Henson confirmed
that the curtailment which had taken place was still in
effect (2414). f |
Yet the Examiner “finds” that the curtailment was not
genuine:and that the selecting of Fields to be included in
the lay-off was pretextual (J. A. 109). a
- The Examiner points to alleged remarks by Assistant
Overseer Sealy to the effect that Plant Manager Hartsell. _
had said that- the Company “was going to’ have to get
g
.
“
rid of” Fields (J. A. 109). It, of course, gives the Examiner
" no pause that Hartsell and Sealy flatly denied this (2731,
2733, 2734, 2735).
John Carter was a loom fixer. He was Methations for
taking it upon himself to “cut a bolt of cloth half:in two”
at a loom on which he was fixer (2519). The cloth on this
loom ‘had become entangled in a roller, but .as-a fixer,
Carter was not “at liberty to judge” whether. to cut the
cloth off the loom (2 526). In so doing,.he automatically
made “seconds” of all the cloth in the roll on both sides
of the cut which he made C2521). If, on the other hand,
_ the cloth were tintangled instead of being cut, it might
not be “‘seconds,” and the decision as to whether to cut .
it or not was always one for the superyisor (2527, 2599). -
Carter admitted ° that “the thing to do was to call a
_doffer or the supervisor” (2433). He claimed that he had -
done the same sort of thing before, but admitted that no
supervisor had ever.seen him do so (2447). He further .
admitted that his wife was the weaver on ‘this loom and
that by cutting the cloth, he got the loom back into opera-
tion immediately and that thereby she began to resume
_ piece rate earnings immediately (2444). 7
C. F. Kennett, loom fixing instructor, Charles J. Gibson,
loom fixer, and E. M. Wright, loom fixer, all testified-that —
in such situation a loom fixer should never cut the cloth. ———
and that all loom fixers had been so instructed (2756, “y ¢
' . 2763,2770)..
The Examiner says’ there is no evidence that any ‘loom
fixer “had ever befére been discharged for cutting cloth .
a
“fastened _on-the-front of her blouse-(2594).-
77
from a loom nor had Carter everbeen reprimanded for
. doing so” (J. A, 112). The Examiner, of course, pays no.
attention to the testimony that “this is something” that .
supervisors-had “never seen happen before” (2652), and,
as has been pointed out above, Carter admitted that no ro
supervisor had ever seen him do it before (2447, 2652).
Likewise, Carl A. Boling, a'witness for the Board’s Gen-
eral Counsel, testified to the same effegs (2484)..
The evidence. js that Carter had, . however, received
written reprimands on nine. different occasions (2476).
The Examiner discusses conversations which took place
‘between Plant Manager Hartsell and Carter, on the sub- ©
ject of the Union (J. A. 110). The Examiner says that
Hartsell “came to” Carter “on two. occasions at his job” —
and made certain remarks relative to the Union (J. A.
110). Hartsell. testified, on the contrafy, that Carter
brought up the subject .of the Union with him, -Hartsell
.* (2522). And Carter admitted that such might have been
the case (2439-244 ). As to the substance of the conversa-
tions, the Examiner, of course, automatically credits Car-
ter and discredits Hartsell. ra sacs
Doris Hicklin’s job was that of battery filler. On the
last day she worked, she came into the Plant wearing a
very lafge Union badge, some four inches, in diameter,
——
Mts. Hicklin admitted that she was clearly told by her
Supervisor that the large and conspicuous size of the badge
was creating distraction. among the employees; that it
would be entirely all right -for her to wear a smaller and
more y normal size e Union badge, but that she would not be
allowed to continue wearing the out-size. badge which she ©
_ had on (2499, 2594). She refused, however, to remove the —
Jarge badge and was thereupon terminated (2499, 2594).
The evidence was that there had been considerable dis-
traction and. disturbance in. Mrs. Hicklin’s department,
incident to, her appearing with the large and’ conspicuous
‘badge “ on her person. There was testimony, for example,
of one weaver standing up on his loom in order to get a
~ good look at her (2528). Further testimony was presented
to the effect that any sizeable or bulging objects or orna-
ments on.clothing constituted a hazard in the narrow aisles
between the rapidly moving machinery (2596, 2626).
Theré was still further evidence that Mrs. Hicklin: was
subject to fainting\spells, having “passed out” more than
once on the job, sq that an ambulance had to be called
for her (2652). It was pointed out that the large badge on
her shirtwaist could easily become a dangerous object if
it were to get in any way caught i in the running machinery.
Il testified that. on various, other
“factors of either hazard or dis-
traction ‘in the Plant; the Company had required em-
_ ployees not to wear “deck’’ pants, to change their haircuts
or to change bulky aide ‘and the like (2528, 2529,
2590). | aie |
The Examiner, however, ‘dictates that the Company ~
_ shall have nothing to say to the size; hazard or distracting
nature of a Union badge — no matter that the Company
clearly. and nepeeey informed the employee that she
Plant Manager Har
" occasions, because of
~
2:
Sf
was per fectly at liberty’to wear a more normal size Union
. badge (J. A: 113). oxy + Rae Tifa case
| "Black Hawk Tufting Plant =
iene ~—Richard-Wike-was-a-mender-inspector in the Com- ae
; i Pany’s Black Hawk Tufting Plant, in Greenville; South ¢— ( j
* Carolina. Approximately a week before he was discharged,
fe ot Gaston Jennings, Manager of several of the Company’s
_ Plants, was walking” through Wike’s department and saw
him “sitting on a box,” away from his work, “talking to a
a boy operating a tufting machine”’ (3012, 3074). Jennings. -
3 reported this to James D. Dunn, Wike’s immediate Super-
visor and to Frank Haddon, the Assistant Plant Super-
intendent (3074), " .° 3 z
Dunn went to find Wike ‘and found him still “sitting
ona box” and “talking” to an employee at another. ma-
Chine (3013, 3159), Upon bringing Wike back to his work,
Boss . Dunn found that Wike’s job had fallen’ “behind” (3160).
to, his ‘mending job then” (3160). On this occasion also, °
Wike’s work “was getting behind,” while he ran the oper-
ator’s machine (3161). Later, the ‘same day, Dunn again
found: Wike “sitting on a box” and “talking to another.
' Qperator”’ approximately ‘35 to 45 feet” away from his
* own job (3014, 3161;-3162). Qn this occasion Wike was
ti
_ posed “to stay at” their jobs and not even ie adel ar
* helping other folks at different. kinds of jobs” (2856,
2857). Haddon “emphatically testified ,that this was. not
permitted (3011). He explained that 4. a “relief
_ man” to take the place of operators wi needed to leave
»:.their machines, and. that whencthis relief man was not
available, the operator was at liberty to “call a creeler
_ from behind the machine to relieve him” (3011).
_ John Eller and Eugene Evans were “tufting machine” -
‘operators. They were both discharged because of. the fol-
lowing incident. Eller and Evans operated tufting ma-
= chines next to each other. These tufting machines have high °
Pressure. air hoses attached to them. Eller, as a prank, came
over: and turned the cut-off valve on Evans’ air ‘hose. ° —
Evans turned the air pressure back on his hose, and in
retaliation, sprayed air pressure onto Eller’s machine in’.
such manner a8 to blow lint and waste and “dust” material
_ into Eller’s face. The two men then got into a “bear-hug”
~-. scuffle-in front of these heavy. and fast-moving machines.
eo _ The supervisor. was coming by and saw what was taking
- place (3098, 3100). —- Lana’ =>
A written rule of the Plant stated that “playing or :
? -scuffling - ise absolutely prohibite x (2996). During this =
) same year there: were ninety-one injuries in this Plant, ©
requiring “the. attention of ‘a doctor. (2997). Ont of the
- ethployees got an arm caught in one-of the operating ma-
chines, resulting in the amputation of his arm (2997).
Reet Although the immediate ‘supervisor, Raines, promptly
gave ‘both these men written reprimands, the. Assistant —
Plant Superintendent, Haddon, upon: the matter coming
tt ips : \
as
Pe hee
to his attention, directed that they be discharged (3001).
The uncontradicted evidence is that, at the time Haddon’s
decision was made, neither he nor anyone else in super-
vision had seen Eller and “Evans wearing Union buttons
“or. had any indication“of any Union connection on their
" part (3003, 3009, 3102). And also confirming the fact that
the decision to discharge these men had been made before
they came into Haddon’s ‘office: wearing’ Union buttons,
there was uncontradicted evidence that, before Eller and
_ Evans showed up with Union buttons, arrangements had
already been made with other employees to work in their.
places (3101, 3139-3143),
had been “discharged for scuffling” in the Plant; that these .
' _ “Bix were discharged in the same year as Eller and Evans;
~~ ‘and that insofar as he knew these other employees who 2
"were discharged for sich horseplay were not “in any way
_connected with any Union” (90m). °
\u Haddon testified he knew of six other employees who
Jack Ross was a tufting machine operator. On the last |
day he worked, he allowed:a large defect to.run for-around
“178 yards,” and for approximately an hour and a half,
In. carpeting that was being woven on his machine (8148,
8176). His supervisor, Fuller, testified that he had never —
“seen a defect run for as long a time and in such, “a length
of carpet” without being ‘detected (8148). For this ex-.’
~ treme neglect, Ross was discharged (8146).
At the same time, the mender-inspector on this machine,
“Odell Payne, was also discharged, because it was likewise
his duty to observe such a major defect running: for so
%
BP : il
f . >
82
long a period of time (8176). But, strangely, no complaint
is made as to the discharge of Payne. |
The Examiner perversely raises question as to why the
. fixer was not also discharged (J. A. 121). He takes no note |
"of the testimony that the situation was not one which
would have come to the attention of the fixer, unless and
until he had been called.to.the machine (81 77).
As. to Ross, the Examiner likewise takes no notice of
the fact that, prior to his discharge, he had received sev-
eral written a for carelessness in his work (8210). .
—- Black Hawk Waihi:
\ James Goodwin was~an employee. in the Company’ s
’ Black Hawk Warehouse. He was discharged for deliber-
ately leaving the Warehouse and the Company’ S premises
during working time, without permission — and he admits.
that“he had no permission — and driving approximately
half a mile down the road to a cafe — being gone from
his work “some 20 minutes or more” ( 3203-3207, 3259,
3263).
Another employee, Scuddy Hellums was ‘Medianen for
— going with Goodwin on this same occasion. Hellums, inso-
far as the management or supervision were aware, had not
been connected with the Union in any way or at any time,
‘and no complaint is made as to the Company’ s discharg-
' @ing him. 7 f;
The Examiner says that ‘iain to lnpervieer]
Griffin himself, no one had ever been discharged for break-
ing this rule before Goodwin” (J. A. 123). He disregards
».. ° the fact that Hellums was discharged on the same occasion
x ees th
and for the same : offense along with Goodwin. And he —
ignores the fact that it would be entirely reasonable that
no one should have been discharged for leaving the prem- —
. Ises without permission prior t to this occasion, for Griffin
expressly testified that he iad never known of any such
_ thing happening before (3262). .
He even ignores Goodwin’s own siaiktiiser that he
“never went out of [the premises] during working time
before, without some supervisor sending” him (2911-—
2912). 7
“[I]t is at once evident that, to the mind of the ex-
aminer, ‘the burden was not on the Board to prove that
they [the discharges | were for union activity, but on -
the Respondent to prove. that they were for cause, and
also that, to his eager credulity, Straws in the wind,
offered in support of the Board’s case, became hoops of
steel, and trifles light as air were ‘confirmations strong
as proofs from Holy Writ.”
National Labor Relations Board VS.
Ray Smith Transport Co., .
193 F.2d 142, 144 (Sth Cir. ,1951) ,
Harold Robinson was a mechanic’s helper. Prior to his
discharge he had been reprimanded for various failures to
attend to his job as he should have ( 3367).
On the last day he worked, Robinson left an oil line
_Toose on a bale-moving machine. As a result the machine
squirted oil over the Warehouse fleor, under 2,000 pounds
pressure. The machine was found sitting in such a pool of |
oil that it couldn’t move for lack of traction in the wheels,
On this occasion he was terminated (3366, 3374).
Garvis Powers was another employee in the Black
- Hawk Warehouse. The evidence is that it was brought to
the attention of supervisor Griffin that’ Powers had been
operating .a lottery in the ‘Warehouse and that Griffin .
thereupon had Powers brought to the office and repri-
manded him about the lottery, telling him that if this
_ “happened again,” he would be discharged (4796). The
7 further evidence is that upon being so reprimanded, Powers
said “well, I’ll just quit. now,” and that Griffin thereupon
“went and got .his money and gave. it to him” (4796).
Powers’ immediate supervisor Ray Hinton, who was pres-
ent at this interview, confirmed that this is what happened’
* (4816). Powers’ own testimony was that he “did quit”
(4770). . |
_ In the face of all this, however, the Examiner “finds”
_ that Powers did not quit, but that the Company dis-
charged him, and without. justification (J. A. 129). The
Examiner purports to base this on another portion of
Powers’ testimony in which he stated that at the conclusion:
of his interview with Griffin, Griffin said to him “now, if
you want me to, I’ll go get your check right now,” to
which Powers said he replied “if you want to, go and get °
it.” Upon this, the Examiner. says that Powers’ leaving
was not “a quit either forced or voluntary,” but a dis-
charge by the Compaty (J. A. 128, JA. 129): ¥
The Examiner disregards Powers’ specific and unequivo-
cal testimony that he “did quit” (J. A. 128). The Exam-
iner further disregards the testimopy of Griffin and Hinton —
as to what took place in the interview. The Examiner, still
further, transforms Powers’ account of the interview into
a basis for a “finding” that Powers was discharged.
85
But this is not the full extent of the Examiner’s amazing
“handling” of the evidence in this case. Bearing upon
Powers’ credibility, there was the fact that he flatly‘and
repeatedly denied on the witness stand that he had had
any lottery tickets in his possession at the Plant (4771,
4776, 4777-4778). In this Powers was directly contra-
dicted by Hinton, who testified that he saw Powers with
the lottery tickets in his possession, selling them to other
employees and taking money for them (4811, 4814).
William Gamble, who had earlier been put on the witness
’stand by. the Board’s General Counsel in the Harold Rob-
-inson case and who had given testimony relied on by the
Examiner in that case, testified to exactly the same effect
(2936, 4828, 4830). In the face of all this, however, the
- Examiner still prefers to believe Powers. !
As to'the lottery matter, the Examiner declarés that he
sees “no reason to go into it,” other than “to say that
Hinton, on the previous. Friday, found a group of em- ©
ployees dealing in the tickets, did not reprimand any one
-- but Powers for violation of the rule against gambling, and
did not report the matter to Griffin until sometime the
\,, following Monday.” The Examiner chooses to ignore the
. fact that Powers was the employee who was running the
lottery and that it was he, not the other employees, who ~*
was selling the lottery tickets (4814, 4830). As to Hinton’s
not reporting the matter to Griffin “until” Monday, the
Examiner further chooses td°ignoré the fact that the lot-
tery incident occurred on Friday afternoon, after Griffin
had already left the Plant, and that Hinton did report it
to Griffin as soon as Griffin came to the Plant on Monday
morning (4812). ,
86 f
‘It appears that the Examiner was determined to rule in
favor of Powers, regardless of the evidence.
* Dunean Plant ar |
- Albert Sanders was a loom fixer. He became negligent
about using his gauge to “box” shuttles. This, in turn,
ecaused “slack picks” and “kinked centers” itt the cloth.
His supervisor recommended that Sanders be discharged.
The Superintendent overruled the supervisor and directed
that Sanders be given “another chance” to improve the
quality of his loom om isin: 3886, 3890, 3899-
3909).
The “seconds” continued, however, on Sanders’ Soisene.
His weavers complained about his. failure to fix their
looms properly. In ‘his testimony, Sanders admitted that
he was shown cloth which had come from looms on whic
he fixed and that, upon being shown. such cloth, he had~
agreed that it was “pretty bad,” and that he was then told
by his supervisor that this was due to “nothing but sorry
loom. fixing” (3435). His supervisor again recommended
to the Superintendent that Sanders be terminated and, on
this occasion, the Svnerintendent — that this should ©
be done (3908). 3
Sanders testified that so far as he knew, supervision and
management were not aware of any Union activity on
his part; that he never wore any kind of a Union button,
nor visited any employees in behalf of the Union, nor
handed out any Union literature, nor sent “any letter or —
notification” to the Company that he was in any way
connected with the Union (3442-3443). i
Be
s
Burrell’ Knight was a shuttle fixer in the shuttle shop,
_ which is an adjunct to the weave room. The evidence is
that Knight was not discharged but was laid off because *
of change and curtailment in work ( 4006, 4012). The evi-
dence was that some of the. looms in the weave room were |
' being changed from two shuttle operation to one shuttle —
- operation and that in some areas of the weave room, fila-._
ment yarns were being taken out and spun ‘or coarse yarns
_ were being | put in. The uncontradicted testimony was that
as a result of these changes, less-shuttle fixing was needed
(4006). eae
In deciding which shuttle fixer to lay off, Lollis, the
Superintendent téstified that although Knight had. more
seniority than another loom fixer, Turpin, there had been
complaints with respect to Knight’s shuttle fixing. and
Tumblin, the head man in the shuttle shop, had “recom-
mended” that Turpin, instead of Knight, should be trans- °
ferred “to the first shift,” that is, moved up (4010).
Knight, therefore, was the fixer who was iad off in the
curtailment, instead of Turpin. °
' Lollis, who made the decision to lay off Knight testified
unequivocally that he was not at the time “in ‘any way -
aware” ~ Knight “was connected with any Union”
(4014). ‘And. Knight similarly testified that insofar as he
knew, nothing had “ever” come “‘to.the. attention of the.
management or supervision” indicating “in any i i that
he was “in the Union” (3459).
Randall Ross was a “service man,” who brought y. yarn
to the winding machines. On several occasions prior to his
discharge he had received written reprimands (3718). The
-
88
evidence i is that on the last day he worked, he “mixed” or
brought the wrong yarn to a winder tender, Mrs. Meriam
Donnan (3724). On this occasion he was discharged «_—
(3727). Li sped
' The Examiner say$ that he belieyes that the yarn in
question was not mixed by Ross but entirely by’ the
_ winger tender, Mrs. Donnan. As to this, Ross himself
testified that he could “have been” the one who mixed the
_— (3540). He further testified that mixing of this sort
“can run into thousands of yards of cloth” and “make
seconds out of. it” (3 543). The General Overseer of the
department, N. J. Carroll, ‘testified that upon interviewing
Ross prior to his discharge, Ross admitted that “as far as
he could see” it was “absolutely his fault, not the woman’s”
(3727). ‘
Carrell and James Woodson, Once, explained in
complete detail:as to why there was no logical conclusion,"
. other than that the yarn had been mixed by Ross before
he delivered it to Mrs. Donnan (3661-3669, 3723-3724).
Carroll and Woodson testified that they had no knowl-
edge of Ross’ being connected with the Union in any way”
(3670). Ross hirnself testified that insofar as he knew, the/
supervision and management were not aware that he had
engaged in any activity in behalf of the Union (3547).
AD RS: Oh VE EI Ne
’ White Horse Plarit
Horace Anderson was a slasher tender. His supervisor,
Ralph Hayes, testified that for a period of several weeks
prior to Anderson’s termination, he had to “get after”
Anderson repeatedly about carelessness in his work and
j
j
$
i
staying away from his job (4514-45 17).On the last day
_ he worked, Anderson negligently ran\his slasher machine
under tension, so much so as to shear. off a‘ substantial
* quantity of steel. filings from the bearing of the machine
(4517-4523). The head slasher’ tender, Conley « ‘Wilton,
confirmed the fact that Anderson had so operated the
slasher machine on this occasion. Upon Anderson’s next
. coming in to work; he was discharged (4521-4523).
The Examiner sets up a straw man for the purpose of
knocking him down, by going into-an elaborate rational- |
ization to the effect that Anderson’s running the slasher >
under too much tension, which was undisputed, did not
* prove that Anderson was away from his job and that there-
fore there was no reason for this incident to have precipi- —
-tated Anderson’s discharge. The Examiner’s analytical
_ Process seems to take 1 no account of. the fact that the Com-
pany might very properly object to the extremely careless
manner in which Anderson was thus operating the machine,
whether he stayed on the job or wandered away from it.
Alyin Baker worked for the Company approximately
a month and then quit, as the Board finds. The Board says,
however, that this was “a forced quitting.”
_ The evidence is that Baker worked as a sweeper in the
spinning department and that his supervisor, Harrison was:
dissatisfied with his failure to.pick up*small pieces of white
waste from the floor as he swept. Consequently, on the
next to the last day-that Baker worked, Harrison was “in .
“behind him” repeatedly. to require him to pick up such
waste from the floor. This the Examiner finds to have been
an harassment of Baker; for, says the Examiner, he does
Cy
i "6 90.
| not believe that sweepers were normally required to pick
up and save such pieces of waste. _ |
As to this, the Examiner relies. upon the testimony of
Donald. Chappell. But the Examiner is inconsistent in this,
_ for Chappell testified that the sweepers were not supposed
to “pick up” any of the waste from the floor, no matter
how large or how clean (4660). Yet the Examiner finds
' that the sweepers were required to pick up the. “larger
waste” (J. A142),
‘Not only Harrison, but also Seslic 9 Rothell, Wiley Clark —
and Robert Bishop, all non-supervisory employees; testi-
“fied that the sweepers are normally and uniformly required :
to pick up and save all small pieces of clean waste (4686-_
, 4688, 4737, 4744, 4752). .
) In any event, Baker quit his job at the end or a day on
7 which, according to his own testimony no supervisor was: .
“bothering” or “riding” him “in any, way” (4643-4644).
The’ Examiner simply refers to this as a day on which .
“things were a little quieter” (J. A. 143), i ignoring Baker’s
—" testimony that he was not. being “bothered i in
any way.”
Walter Rackley was a checker of cloth weights and
yardage. For a good many days prior to his discharge, it
had been coming to the attention of his supervisor that he
was making erroneous reports as to the yardage and the
weight of various bales of cloth which he w was ‘supposed
~ to have checked (4387-4393). | Pa |
In his testimony, Rackley adtnitted. that his supervisor
had been “getting after” him about these errors before the
Dovecenctemisnapaues hi AF tha Shibata neve
: .
; . .
. ane “
re
Company had any reason to be aware of any connection on
his part with the Union. ( 4147,4148), oo }
He expressed the view that his supervisor, and his fellow
employees as well, were simply trying to “cause trouble”
for him (4148-4149, 4155, 4156). When his supervisor,
Osborne, brought him into the office and talked with him
for “about 45 minutes” about the errors he was making he,
according to his own testimony “wasn’t even interested” in oe
what Osborne was saying ( 4150-4151).
On the witness stand, Osborne produced documentary.
proof, the cloth bale check sheets, showing that on orfe
_ occasion Rackley had set down a bale of cloth as being -
_ 40 yards less than it actually was, and in another case 107
yards less, in another case 49 yatds less, -in another: ‘case ©
33 yards less and in another case 32 yards Jess —. than
the yardage which these bales actually contained (4387,
4389, 4392, 4393). The effect of these errors was that the
_ Company was “giving away” to its customers cloth to the
extent. of these yardages (4387). In another instance, |
these documents showed that Rackley’s errors were caus-
ing the customer to receive 85 yards less than it should
have received and in another instance 50 ¥% yards less than.
. it should have received (4390, 4392). And a few.days after
- Rackley’s discharge, another cloth bale check sheet came
in showing that he had set d a bale of cloth as having
17434 yards less than it actudlly had (4396). ge
The Examiner says that/these errors “could as well have
been Gambrell’s as Rackley’s” (J. A. 145). The Examiner
totally ignores the ‘testimony that Gambrell, the section
man in the clothsroom, had nothing to do with, and did
not in any way handle, the bales which Rackley had
mes
e .
"A ' % oa
. « f > = ee
F te .
. * ‘ o% ‘
“
| of cloth.
, cleared and sent “on to the press room, ¥ wi that the errors
“in question were, all of them, errors relating to bales which
‘Rackley had thus cleared and with which Gambrell had
not. had any dealings. or contact whatever (4464-4465).
Still: further, the Examiner refers to certain “defects”
_in the ‘cloth and says that they ‘ “were net chargeable” to
‘Rackley- (J. A. 145). In ‘this, the Examiner overlooks, or.
chooses to disregard, the fact that it was not. in. any sense
/ claimed that Rackley had anything | to do with “defects” in
the cloth. He was, dsstated above, a checker of the weights
“and the © yardage of bales of cloth . ,and ‘was discharged
agora of his errors with respect to weights and yardages
“defects” i in the
:
3 bea The “Slater Plana;
David Collins worked as a laborer r in the Warehouse at -
o | : the Company’ s Slater. Plant. He was discharged for re-_ ry
fusing’ ‘to “straighen cases in the upper « Aiers ob the bins ©
_ : 2 in the'warehouse (6674).
This | was a task vihich: ‘Collis, and pe laborers i in the *
‘warehouse, were often called on to do,.and had often done
» (6669, 6670). On the. last ‘day he worked, when asked to.
straighten these cases,-Collins, as stated above, said to
oo ‘ _his supervisor, ‘David Payne,. “this is where we are going
— “to have a parting” ( 6674). In his testimony, Collins ad-
“aa mitted that he told Payne that hé wasn’t “going” to com- .
‘ply: with Payne’s “instruction and that he told Payne that
- this was-where he’ and Payne “would part company”
( 6137, 6146). Collins: further admitted Payne told him
that he thought “it was Yad air” for Collins “to'do what”
an
93
‘6°
~ the other employees “had to do,” and that he, Payne,
“wasn’t going to require” Collins “to do anything except
what he [ Payne] required the others to do” (6132).
Collins denied that the other employees were required |
_ togo up on the forks of the lift truck to straighten cases in
the. upper tiers of the bins and further denied that he had ©
_ been previously required to do.so himself. On both these —
‘counts, however, he was specifically and unequivocally
contradicted not only by Payné. ‘but by his fellow em-
‘ployées Arthur Gilbert, Gilbert Whitman and J. W. Chas-
‘tain (6725, 6727, 6729, 6770). The: Examiner takes ‘no |
note of these contrary witnesses, ignores their testimony
entirely and “finds” the facts to be 4s Collins claimed. ~
With respect-to a conversation between Collins and
Edward Kirby, Personnel Director, the Examiner’s com- .
i ments constitute a striking revelation of his reasoning on
__ the subject of credibility. He says that he credits “Colling
e
: version of this conversation,” because it is consistent with
other “attempts of Company’ S supervisors to persuade |
, employees to leave the Union” (J..A. 151); In other words,
| ‘ since Kirby is a supervisor.and he has found other super-
visors to have violated the law, therefore he “finds” that
Kirby, violated the law.
\ With respect to this same-canversation, the Examiner
goes on.to say that since Collins claimed that Kirby, in
his conversation, tried to persuade him, Collins, to resign —
from the Union and he, Coltins, did hot do so, therefore. -
it must be that Kirby did try to persuade Collins to re-
sign (J. A. 150, J. A. 151). It is Submitted that this is
bewildering a indeed. :
| : Se 94 oa
Joseph Laughter was a “service man” to cloth graders. ©
-Prior to his discharge, he became negligent in failing to —
‘remove, or ‘doff, the cloth from the graders’ frames. This .
not only held up production but also reduced their earnings
' —+ they being workers on piece rates. Thereupon the cloth
- graders complained to the supervisors (6863-6868, 6892-
6910). Frankie Bailey, Ethel Morrison, Ethel Catlin, cloth
graders, all testified that such were the facts (6931-6935,
6939-6940, 6951-6954). The Company also tendered for
cross-examination Mrs. Sara Galloway, Mrs. Shirley Em-
bree, Mrs. Lou Hester and Mrs. Carrier Reeves as being
- cloth graders who would testify to the same effect. The
Board’s General Counsel chose, however, not to cross-
examine them (6947):
- W. K. Knox and Charles E. Finley, supervisors, further
testified that when Laughter was brought into the office
and told of these complaints, he accused Knox of “lying”
(6867,6896). Laughter testified that the complaint against
him “was a lie” and that he “could have told [Knox] he
_was lying” (6186, 6187).
In’ the face of all this, the Examiner chooses not to
“find” as he does in various other cases, that the evidence
of complaints was a, fabrication. Instead, he simply. an-
nounces his “opinion” that such complaints were “a pre-
text” for discharging Laughter (J. A. 155). |
James Cantrell was a “case marker.” He received writ-
ten reprimands for mislabeling cases and also for staying .
out from work “without sending in word.” Shortly prior to °
his discharge, when employees in his department were
gathered together for a meeting with their supervisor, he
95
‘engaged in conduct which the supervisor consideréd ‘to be —
| disrespectful. Mrs. Polly Burdett, a non-supervisory em--
ployee, testified that at this meeting Cantrell was openly -
“making fun” of Mr. Veal (6963). Upon the Superintend-
/ent’s interviewing Cantrell about this, -he walked out of
the office before the Superintendent had finished talking
‘with him ( 6787-6799, 6897-6910).
On the last day he worked, Cantrell went to eat his
lunch away from his work area and into an area where he
had been told not to eat. Upon being asked to move, he did
not comply and was thereafter terminated (6797, 6798).
The Examiner finds fault with the fact that, shortly
prior to Cantrell’s discharge, thé rules were changed as to
where employees in Cantrell’s department should eat—. |
or, as the Examiner says, old rules on this subject began
to be more strictly enforced — and that Cantrell’s, super-
visor held a meeting to emphasize this to the employees
_in the department, and ‘in general that the supervisors
began to be more strict about the employees grouping up >
. and talking(J. A. 157). He disregards theJeviderice that
the Company was having “particular trouble” with respect
to employees “ganging up” and talking with each other,
as excitement and discussion ‘about the Union campaign -
increased and as more Union leaflets began to be distrib-
uted at. the Plant entrances, and the like (6779-6780,
~ 6909). Under-such circumstances, it would certainly seem
not to have been unfeasonable that the supervisors should
have been exerting effort to allay such excitement and re-
strict such discussion in the Plant, |
a
William Looper worked as a warehouse “stacker.”
Prior to his termination, Looper received written répri-.
-mands for damaging Plant property and for staying in the
smoking area too much. The immediate cause of his dis-
charge was mismarking the “tags” which showed the. loca-
tion of cases of goods in the warehouse. On’ the last three,
days he worked, Looper ‘mismarked 4 cases on one day,
3 cases.on another day and 1 case on the next day (6677).
‘He was thereupon discharged, and evidence was offered
that after his discharge and in the same week, his super- -
visor found 28 more cases which Looper had mismarked
a (6675-6685, 6749-6752), = oa
fe be _ Looper testified that “cemntiones | it would tiles as much
| _ as fifteen or twenty hours or more to find one of these mis-
marked cases . . . with several men looking for it” (6281). —
Thomas Edens was a weaver. At a time when the gates .
around the Plant were locked, he climbed the fence and
went into the Plant and for this he was discharged (7052-
7053, 7458). Although Edens’ immediate supervisor, Cole-
man, had only seen fit to give Edens a written reprimand
*, _for—this,the evidence is uncontradicted that upon the. |
* Plant Manager, W. H. Fann, learning of the incident, he _
promptly directed that Edens be discharged (7053, 7458).
Although Edens claimed that now and then employees
did climb the fencé to go into the Plant, the various super-
- visors and employees in this area of the Plant premises,
A. L. Tucker, Walter Banks, W. W. Stevenson and Robert
J. Bailey, and Fann and Coleman as well, testified. spe-
a cifically and unequivocally that they had never known of.
-any such incidents (7054, 7089, 7097, 7103, 7150, 7457-
a
7”
7458).. The Examiner, of ‘eae, disregards all thew
- testimony.
Richard Bell was a “mill ends” clerk. Approximately. a
_ m
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.