Petitioners Reply Brief — Ets-Hokin & Galvan, Inc. v. Maas Transport, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1967
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
a
=
SUPREME COURT,’ U. S
ge. « e
————}—_NOV_6 1967
*' . . United States
Octoser TERM, 1967 | a
~ No. 662
- Ers-Hoxmn & Ganvan, Inc.,a Foreign
Corporation, — eae he,
’ “
| . Petitioner,
vs. j rh
Maas Transport, Inc., a North Dakota
Corporation, and B. L. Lawrence, doing oe ae
business as Lawrence Transportation, q
E Respondents:
| _ On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit |
Reply Brief to Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
ed
Jzssz FetpMan
a Morey J. WatpMan
Raps E. Boougs .
GerHarp O. WINKLER
FELDMAN, WALDMAN & KLINE
. 235 Montgomery Street -
. San Francisco, California 94104
' Attorneys for Petitioner
SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94108
a re: .
hh the Supreme Court of the
_.. United States
Ocroszr TzRM, 1967
v 4 “No. 662 © hae
4 ’ . m i
_ ‘Bye-Hoamr & Gatvan, Inc. 58 Foreign
_ Corporation,
: | Petitioner, ".
VB.
‘Maas Transport, Inc., a North Dakota /
Corporation, and.B. L. LAWRENCE, doing
business as LaWRENCE —
Respondents. -
-
ey
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of pomares
for the Eighth Circuit
: “Reals Brief to Respondents’ Brief in. Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Tn opposing the Petition for Writ of. Cortiorati the Re-
spondents shave misstated certain facts i in the regord and,
raised additional questions whieh — a.
Respondents Had No Applicable Tariff'on File With the Interstate
_ Commerce Commission, and the Hauling Without Such ee Tariff :
_ Violated the Interstate Commerce Act.
Respondents seek to distinguish the cases cited By Pe- .
titioner i in its Opening Brief -by arguing that (i) they in--
volved situations where the carrier had one tariff on file
- with the Interstate Commerce Commission and sought to
charge the shipper a different tariff whereas here there was
no tariff on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission
_ atrall, (ii) Respondents: ‘are entitled to claim the benefits of
_ an intrastate tariff on file with the North Dakota Public
Service Commission and (iii) the hauls in question were |
not determined to be interstate in character until after
they were dver. » Je
It is submitted that these datinstions should not make
_ for a different result. The opportunity for mischief is just
as great, if not greater, when no tariff is on file as when
a different tariff is on file than the one sought to be charged.
Interstate shippers are entitled’ to the protection of the
impartiality and expertise of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission independent and apart from the action of state reg-
ulatory agencies. And the time when the interstate charac-
ter.of the haul is determined is completr'y immaterial.
Respondehts, at-Page 7 of their Brief, imply that an ef-
fective tariff for the hauls in question was on file by No-
vember 8, 1962. The Trial Court (R.-478), the Court of
Appeals, (Pet. Brief, App. “A”, p. 4, Lines 1-7), and the
Interstate Commerce Commission (Pet. Brief, p. 4, Fn. 1) _
all found to the contrary. °
II.
thistle Knew That They Were Violating the Interstate Com-
__ merce Act When They Began to Haul.
‘Respondents attempt to convey the impression that they
innocently thought this traffic to be in intrastate commerce.
; . '3
(Brief in Opposition 1-2, 4, 7, 11) The wees indicates
_ otherwise. |
- John Maas, president of Respondent ine Transport,
Inc., has been in the trucking business since 1926, engag-
- ing in interstate as well as intrastate hauls. (R. 108-110).
The fact that Respondent Maas applied for interstate au-—
thority- three weeks before the hauling began’ makes it |
obvious that Maas knew the haul was in interstate commerce —
and that Respondents were acting illegally when they began
to haul without authority. iit
‘TH. = Bs. ’
i Coiahinah Cities ih ts bein tien tliat.
oe ee eee
Circumvent Public Laws.
- The authorities cited by Respondents for their proposi-
tion that Petitioner should be estopped from raising the —
defense of invalidity of the contract do not involve ille- -
gality of contract and are inapposite. Union Insurance Co.
v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L.Ed. 617 (1872), dealt with
the validity of an insurance policy obtained by submitting
a false application. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Term., 359
U.S. 231 (1959), dealt with a Federal Employers’ Liability
Act action to recover damages for an industrial disease
brought after the statutory three year period of ‘limita-
tion. . tebe |
1. On August 6, 1962, Maas filed with the Interstate Gensiaes
Commission an “Application for Motor Carrier Certificate or Per-
mit” to “institute a new operation . . . as a common carrier by motor
vehicle, in interstate or foreign commerce . . between: [railheads]
_ on the one hand and on the other hand, [missile sites], and between
such launching sites. . . .’’ me Ex.7; R. re
" It is well settled that a contract which cannot be performed
without violation of a statute is void and estoppel cannot
apply, sinee, if. the rule were otherwise, private parties ~
_ could successfully avoid the requirements of legislation en-
_ acted for the protection of the public interest. As this ©
Court said in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326
U.S. 249 at 257 (1945):
“For no more than private contract can. estoppel be
the means. of successfully avoiding the requirements
of legislation enacted for the protection of a public
interest.” :
The reason for the rule is stated by this Court in Conti-
nental Wall Paper Co. v. Lowis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S.
+ 262, (1909) as follows:
“We hold that such a judgment cannot be granted
without departing from the statutory rule, long estab-
lished in the jurisprudence of both this ‘country and
England, that a court will not lend its aid, in any way,
_ toa party seeking to realize the fruits of an agree-
ment ‘that appears to be tainted with illegality, al-
though the result of applying that rule-may sometimes |
be to shield one who has got something for which, as’
between man and man, he ought, perhaps, to pay, but
for which he is unwilling to pay.
In such cases the aid of the court is denied, ie
the benefit of the defendant, but because public policy
demands that it should be denied without se nial to
the interests of individual parties. g |
Iv.
The Record Clearly Shows That Petitioner Did Not Receive hay
_ Money from the United States Air Force for Cable Delay and Out-
of-Sequence Cable; Respondents’ Assertion to the Contrary Is *
Untrue. “(
Respondents assert that Petitioner’s position is devoid - %
of equity since it “received from the United States Air
, ; £ Ts , 3 .
Force a large ‘amount of money for cable delay and ont- —
of-sequence cable.” (Brief in Opposition, p. 4, p. 9, Head-
_ note 3, 'p. 11.) This assertion is false.
The record’is uncontradicted that the claim referred to i
; (Claim 44) was tentatively allowed, on J anuary 15, 1964,
| _ Solely for the purpose of negotiation (P. Ex. 147, R. 359,
7 _ E-266) -but later was rejected by the Air Force and sub- °
‘sequently waived by the contractor, by Supplemental .
“Agreement No. 23, in December, 1964. (R. 31, 359-366).?
. oy, : 5,
_.The Question of the Illegality of the Contract Was Raised in the
Pleadings and Decided by the Trial Court.
Respondents’ contention that the issue of illegality was’
not before the Trial Court was presented to and rejected
by the Eighth Circuit. (Appellees’ Brief, 22, 25-26;. Ap-
pellants’ Reply Brief,3-6). . ead
The question was raised before the Trial-Court in Peti-
tioner’s Amended Answer*, (R. 8) and Second Amended
~
2. The manner in which the Air Force viewed the claim is of
anterest here: ‘‘Complete analysis of this elaim requires one fur-
ther comment. The $80,676.43 claimed by the contractor involves
supposed added cost to the government for the random move-
ment of 108 reels of cable. This breaks down into approximately
$800.00 per reel. Average transportation costs for loading and ship-
ping a reel of cable from Bonham, Texas, to Minot, North Dakota, is
approximately $200.00. In other words, according to the contractor,
it costs far more to randomly move a reel-of cable a few miles from
the vicinity of the receiving point, than it does to ship a reel of
| - eable 1800 miles from Texas. This appears .so ridiculous that we
‘refrain from further comment.” (Pl. Ex. 139; R. 370, E-250 at 251).
| 3. “VI. Specifically denies that Maas Transport, Inc.’s inter-
state tariff covered said movement and in that regard alleges that
Maas’ interstate tariff was illegal, invalid and void with respect to
- the shipments alleged in the complaints.” (R. 8) ;
; 6 ;
Answer‘ (R. 10); it was raised during the trial by Motion
fo Dismiss (R. 279), by Motion to Strike the Inapplicable
Tariffs (R. 475), and by Motion for a Directed Verdict
(R. 475). ae ‘ :
| . CONCLUSION _ |
For the reasons hereinabove stated Petitioner respect-
‘fully reiterates its request that this Writ be granted.
Datéd at San Francisco, California! on November 6, 1967.
Jesse FetpMan
re Re ema: _Morry J. Witpmaw ae
Ratpu E. Bocues
GerHarp O. WINKLER.
FELDMAN, WALDMAN & KLINE
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94104 _
Attorneys for Petitioner —
° %
Y
& “Vi Specifically denies that Mass Transport, Inc.’s inter-
state tariff covered said movement, and in that regard alleges that
_Maas Transport’s interstate tariff was illegal, rte ‘and void
with respect to the shipments alleged in the complaints.” (R. 10)
=
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.