Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Francosteel Corp. v. N. V. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche, Stoomvart-Maatschappij
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LIBRARY, ae
Peinialauesctls AUG 22 167
.* the © Supreme Court of the
United States
-Ooronrn Tam 1966
No.. 530
Fan comman ConPoraTion, a corporation,
ee ee
vs.
N. V. NEpERLANDSCH pe te ete.,
. @ corporation, — | pay
Respondents.
.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari a
To the Court of Appeal of the ‘State of California,
- First Appellate District
e.:
Lyman Henry ;
351 California Street f
San Francisco, California 94104
Coumsel for Petitioner
Srzepoen MoRzavy
351 California Street
San Francisco, California 94104
of Counsel
\
?
3 ‘mn y : fi? 7h ps 4 ad
SU)" Fubpiadietiont
a ern Q ion P : ted
ae Statute Involved
Statement of the Case.
ties | “Tis Gustin Pret I ot Gra important oth ee
ee ae The Question Presented Is Novel ae eles ve ee
IIL. - The Deron Below Dow Not Promote Uniformity , Seog
Condlusion scene ia
Appéndices. ; et soe
|
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
y Isbrandtsen Co.” ve ety (1962) us US, 119, bat 8.Ct.
|) 1011, 96 L.Ed. 1994____. ae ee ae
feo Seine v. The Flying Clipper (SDNY, 1958) 116-F. Supp.
B86 ae &:
"2
+ °
- Kemaley, Millbourn & Co. v. U.S. (2 Cir,, 1927) 19F.2d441.. 4
‘ue en Hn 1D. Cy 18) 6 Sup, ‘
he Siciaaataan . sas a
_ Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp. (1958) 3 a
US. 297, 79 S.Ct. 766, 8 E.Kd. 2 820___- - 5,7
Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. US. (SDNY, teen) 21 2a
998, reversed on other gruonds 30 F.2d 247 . 4
Singer Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Cunard: White Star, Ltd. (2961)
- 102 N.Y.S. 2d 762... 6
St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. A Campcakia Gecal Ooms
_ ‘mercial Do Rio De Janeiro (1923) \263 US. 119, 124-125,
> 4 St.Ct. 30, 31, 68 L.Ed. 201! 4
: ‘Stag Line, Ltd. v. F , Mango & Co. (1982) App. Css as
Tae $28, 41 Lloyd LR. — .-
ie ‘The St. Johns NF. (2 Cir, 1922) 280 F. 554... 4,8.
en ee 47 8.Ct. 261, 71 L.Ed. pa
ea : we
~~
Gilmore and Black, ‘The Law of Admiralty (1957) p. 119...
L Carver, Carriage of Goods by Sea (lich Be, 1963) me
| gy racebenectoctnns! :
J + pe QT
. $12.02 [4} p. 129.
- Tetley, Marine 0 Can Claims (1965), p. 16.
° wm. 3 rh x pea ny *
.
$
© $YBOK(5) eneeceeeneeennee oS BER
8 1301(6) ...... RN
i
[British Shipping Laws, Vol. 2]
‘ Pais . | 3 a Oe ‘os es ; : 3
us 28 US.C..§ 1257(8), 62 Stat, 929 ie
| 46 0.8.0.4. § 1808(6), 49 Stat. 1208, fe ; se
46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1815, 49 Stat, 1207-12 ,
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‘Petition for Writ of ‘Certiorari
: Tote Couto Appeal th State of Calor, :
A Nees sceppeccheycan : |
| ‘Francosteél Corporation, plaintift | ae ea below,.
Tespectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a Writ of
_ Certiorari to th» Court of Appeal of the State of bi coxscrees eee
First Agpalate: District, - . ,
\
%
thi ep Nicaea aches
fap aaahtnnereteiieg ny ay ee
: 867, and at wttteeccrsne PQA A copy of the a a
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ater . , ‘ Fes
ce Bea tick a Z Pe
. . ¥ £5 Fe 3c wa ES ae "rer Red ie if
3 Court of Appeal’s opinion is ‘jive hereto.’ The Califor-
+ nia sje tones Court denied a hearing, without nian.
” Review is sought-of an order® of the Court of Appeal :
_ dated and entered March 31, 1967, which affirmed a judg-
‘ment? dismissing the complaint, after a demurrer was
- sustained without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal
deriied a rehearing on April -28,. 1967.* The California
Supreme Court denied a hearing on May 24, 1967.5 The
statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on this Honor-
able Court is 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), 62 Stat. 929. |
Does the wilfal sict of an ocean’ carrier in stowing on
- deck, and thereby exposing to certain damage, goods agreed“
to be carried under deck displace the consensual contract of
carriage (ie. the bill of lading), render the: Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act inapplicable and relegate the parties to
their common law rights, so that the time for suit against
the carrier is governed by the doctrine of laches rather than
by the short, one-year time for suit provision contained i in .
§3 (6) of the Act? a
| STATUTE INVOLVED
The statute involved is the: Carriage of Goods by Sea”
7 Act’ The relevant portions of the Act, namely the. enacting
‘L. Appendix.
2. Reeord, p. 23.
ya a ee
ne) Id., p. 66,
6. Td, p. 109.
> PEED HS HOI, 49 Stat, 1207-1213,
re Oe ke
i —
clause and Sections 1, 36), 4(4), 4(6), 5. and 6s are set
forth i in full in Bye te . |
"STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts are as stated in the opinion below:
“Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment dismissing its -
complaint following the sustaining of a demurrer thereto,
without leave to amend, on the grounds that the action is
barred by the one-year limitation contained in subsection —
(6) of section 3 of the United States Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act. (Act., Apr. 16, 1936, § 3(6), 49 Stat. 1208, § 3(6),
, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1303(6).) 3 :
“The allegations of the complaint are esocatially as fol-
lows: that defendant, a common carrier of. goods by sea,.
issued certain bills of lading wherein it agreed to carry,
steel products under deck from Antwerp to certain United
States ports; tMi&t in wilful breach of these contracts, defen-
dant carried the goods on deck unprotected and exposed
to the elements, thus causing them to be in a badly-rusted
condition when delivered in March 1963 to plaintiff, the
“holder of the bills of lading; that by reason of defendant’s
\ breach of the contract’ plaintiff has suffered damages in
_ the amount of $12,022.11; and that defendant’s conduct con-
stituted a deviation so as to make defendant an insurer of
the goods and to deprive it of all defenses under the bills
of lading and under the United States es of Gente
by Sea Act.
“The complaint was filed on March 18, 1965, approxi-
cite mately two years after delivery of the damaged goods.”
7... “The text of § 3(6) aslo ot out in footnote 1 to the Court
of Appeal’s opinion, Appendix I, pp. 2-3. :
8.
-The-inapplicability of the Carriage of Goods by.Sea Act
was alleged in paragraph X of the Complaint.® The Act
_ was held applicable in the trial court’s ruling on ee
‘to the aie aes sail .
ARGUMENT |
Petitioner respectfully submits that certiorari should be
: ess for the os reasons:
“4. The Question Presented Is of Great Importance tothe Mart
time World.
‘The doctrine that a deviation, including on desk stowage -
; of goods shipped pursuant to an under deck bill of lading,
. annuls the clauses inserted in the bill of lading for the car-
Tiers berlefit, including time for suit provisions, was deeply
rooted in our pre-Carriage of Goods by Sea Act maritime
law" The reason for the rule was that the: cargo lost its
insurance when the vessel ‘deviated, so it was only just and |
. proper to put the vessel in ‘the insurer’s position.”
After 2, scholary review, the court below concluded that:
: “No determinative precedents on the scope of the one-year
' limitation (contained in § 3(6) of the Act) have been found
in either the cases construing section 3(6) or those dealing
” with other provisions of the Hague Rules. Nor do historical
_ precedent, legislative history, or the words of the act itself
9. Record, p. 8.
10. Id, p. 20.
11. Sidna Blumenthal & Cov, U8. 8. (SD DNY,, 1927) 21 F.2d
4998 reversed on other On 19 Fe 30 F.2d 71; Kemsley, Millbourn
. & Co. v. U.S. (2 Cir., 1927) 19 F.2d 441; "Ths Wildesino (1921)
272 US. 718, 47 §.Ct. 261, nt L.Ed. 491; St. Johns NF. Shipping
Corp: v. S.A. Companhia Geral Commercial Do Riv De Janeiro
a (1923) 263 U.S. 119, 124-125, 44 8.0%. 30, 31, 68 L.Ed. 201.
12. Jones v. The Flying Clipper (S.D.N.Y., LR 116 F. ol
886, 389; The St. fa teeta (2 Oir, yagi F. 553, 556-557.
* »
ae!
mandate a particular construction.”* Nevertheless, in vio- |
lation of a cardinal canon of statutory interpretation, it
held that the Act had worked a change i in the —* of an
i unjustifiable deviation!
_.:While no evidence was taken on the ealiest nor was any
' argument invited with respect thereto, the court, below may
have been influenced by the remark of a well known com-
mentator (quoted in footnote 2 to the lower court’s opinion)
to the effect that the reason for the rule with respect to
_ deviation no longer exists, because at present cargo policies
~ “usually” provide that the risk will be “held covered” in
_ the event of a deviation.” This vague generalization gives :
one no clue as to just what percentage of cargo policies —
‘“ currently being issued- contain a “held covered” « clause. Nor
does it tell us how many current cargo policies insure against
total loss only and, henge, afford no protection against the z
additional risks of damage inherent in on deck stowage. Nor
does it suggest how many cargos are shipped uninsured. .
But, it does seem certain that marine insurers will either
cease writing, or demand increased premiums for writing,
““held covered” cargo policies, if they are deprived of their -
heretofore certain right of en against on deck
deviators.
: Sound public policy. would seem to require that liability |
- for the hazards of on deck oe continue to be imposed
13. Appendix I, p. 28.
14. Statutes which invade the masitions joi are to be
_read with a presumption favoring the retention of long established
-and familiar principles, except when an intent to the contrary is
evident. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson (1952) 343 U.S..779, 783, 72
S.Ct. 1011, 1014, 96 L.Ed. 1294. This principle was applied to the
Carfiage of Goods by Sea Act in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill
ebay Be fore. (1959) 359 U.S. 297, O04-906, 79 S.Ct. 766, 771,
ea * Appedin t. p. 7.
¢
on wilfully deviating shipowners, rather than upon innocent —
_ ¢argo owners and/or their insurers. Certainly the opposite
result should not be reached without a clear and compelling
indication that such was the intent of Congress.
th The Question Presented Is Novel. Pe agit
~The effect, if any, of the Carriage of. Goods a by Sea ‘Act
- of the maritime law of deviation has never been con-
_ sidered by the Court. Nor do the decisions of the lower
federal and state courts provide any certain guideposts.
Superficially, the Potter* and Singer™ ger™ cases seem to- sup-——
port the a “with respect to § 3(6),
but as the court below note: . (other) authorities
raise a doubt as to whether. Potter ond Singer stand for the
_. proposition that the ‘limitations period of section 3(6)
_ ‘applies despite any ‘deviation, or merely establish that a -
failure to deliver, or an over-carriage is not such a breach
of the contract (or deviation) as to render the contract a
nullity and to take Ge case out of the operation of the
statute.’ |
: The casce dealing with the impact, if any, of the $500 per
package limitation contained in § 4(5) of the Act on the law
- deviation are chaotic. As the court below aptly put it:
_* “... it appears that defendant’s reliance on Poseidon
resembles'a sand castle in danger of engulfment from.a
rising tide of contrary opinion.” 3
16. Potter v. North German. Lloyd (WD. Cal., 1943) 50 F..
Supp. 173. +
osiery. Mills, Inc. v. Cunard White a, Ltd.
17. Singer H
(gel) IO NYS 2d 762,
18.: Appendix I, p. 19. 7 he ,
19. Tapa eo |
. \ Ay
_ We respectfully submit that the time has come for the~.—
Court to finally lay to rest the contention that the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act worked a change in the law of deviation
to the benefit: of wilful deviators. .
lll, The Decision Below Does Not Promote Uniformity. |
2 The U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is setietherttaly a
an enactment of the Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by
- the Brussels Convention of 1924. The Rules were, in turn, —
_ based-upon the pic pioneering Harter Act of 1893” and have
been adopted by virtually every maritime nation except
. Russia and Red China.”
_ As is clearly spelled out by the enacting ain and by:
§ 1(b) of the U.S. Act,” the Rules have application only to
consensual contracts of carriage, i. .2., to contracts evidenced
by a bill of lading or similar document of title: The reason
for this is obvious. The intent. is to restore - equality of
bargaining. by limiting the carrier’s freedom of contract.
_. No such regulation is necessary in the absence of a bill of
lading, because the general maritime law makes a common ihre
carrier absolutely liable for the safe arrival of the goods,
‘except for Act of God, etc.” .
‘The House of Lords has held that an iinet geo-
graphical deviation displaces the statutory exception con-_
tained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.™ This is but
20. Robert C. Herd & Co., supra, 359 US. at p. 01, 79 S.Ct,
‘at p. 769. ;
21. Longley, Common Carriage of Cargo (1967 ) p. 278,
22, Appendix II, p. 30.
wie and a The Law of Admiralty ( 1957 ) pp.
. 24. Stag Line, Lid. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. (1982) App. Cas.
828, oe LR. . Elan
@ logical: application :of this ‘Court’s holding, under the _
pioneer Harter Act, that an o eviation displaces the . ~
bill of lading an and relegates the thaition to theircommon law _~
‘
recent commentator on the American, British,
“Canadian and French Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts states
categorically that an on deck deviation deprives the carrier
of the benefit of the rules (i.e., of the Acts), “. . . including
. the per package limitation or.the one year delay for suit.’”™ .
__ In view of the foregoing, we are at a loss to understand ee
_why the court below felt constrained to hold, in the interests .
of a “aniform” international definition of deviation, that
unauthorized deck carriage is not a deviation and therefore - |
‘does not displace the Rules. Perhaps the eourt’s difficulty
is semantic. Technically, “to deviate” means to stray or
wander geographically, but on deck stowage of goods which
_ ean be safely. carried only under deck is at least as repre-
hensible as straying geographically from the agreed route
and in the words of this Court renders the carrier. liable
“as jor a deviation.””
25. St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. 3 supra.
26. : Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims. (1965), pp. 15-16. See also
Longley, Common Carriage of ay (1967) B lag vo [4], pp. 129-
131; and I. Carver, Carriage of Goods by Sea (11th Ed., 1963)
§ 299 [British Shipping Laws, Vol. 2].
21. St. Johns NF. Shipping VOB Ore, BOL, at p. 31.
. $
. 9 reps
The decision below extends the enalea’ of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act to wilful wrongdoers with no necessity
therefor. It is respectfully submitted that the petition for
-, Writ of Cortiorari be granted,
" Respectfully submitted,
Lyman Henry
Counsel for Petitioner
_ Sreppen MoRgavy
of Counsel - pace
- August 18, 1967 |
‘(Appendices Follow)
2: ;
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California.
First Appellate District—Division One \ - 7
_ _ [Civ. No. 23412.—Filed Mar. 31, 1967.] __
Francosteel Corporation, -
Plaintiff and Appellant, |
HS - s
N. V. Nederlandsch:Amerikaansche,
Stoomvart-Maatschappij,
| i aso ee Respondent.
. .
Der Ne nec
| OPINION —
Appeal from a: judgment of the Superior Court of
the City and County of San Francisco. J — Karesh,
Judge. Affirmed. ;
Action for damages for breach of contract and devia-
tion of carriage of goods. Judgment of dismissal after
| demurrer was sustained without leave to amend
’ Stephen McReavy, Ellis J. Adler, Hall, Henry, .
Olivet & McReavy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
. B. Frederic Fisher, Lillick, Geary, Wheat, Adams &
Charles for Defendant and Respondent.
Fe on ok pk ok Lal deel, ee eels ot ds ee ee te 1h ee eee _- -
. .
. .
G .
are ee ee a ih ”
° .
Sims, J. —Phintitt has appealed from a alieanee: dis.
missing its complaint following the sustaining of a demur-
rer thereto, without leave to amend, on the grounds that _
_ the action is barred by the one-year limitation contained in +
. subsection (6) of section 3 of the United States Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. (Act., Apr. 16, 20 E28) Se
sesiaet aca 1303(6). ) SRE
9 ; Shae | Appendix ot , f
- ‘The allegations of the complaint are essentially as fol-
‘lows: that defendant, a common carrier of goods by sea,
issued certain bills of lading wherein it agreed to carry steel —
_ products under deck from Antwerp to certain United States .
ports; that in wilful breach of these contracts, defendant
earried the goods on deck unprotected and exposed to the _
. elements, thus causing them te be in a badly-rusted condi- -
' tion when delivered in March 1963 to plaintiff, the holder. of
~~ the bills of lading; that by reason of defendant’s breach of
the contract plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of ©
$12,022.11; and that defendant’s conduct constituted a devia-_
- tion so as to make defendant an insurer of the goods and-to
deprive it of all defenses under the bills of lading and under
the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
_, The complaint was filed on March 18, 1965, approximately.
two years after delivery of the damaged goods. The statu- . .
nature of such loss or damage be
ee eee rere be ee bere of Coearye
in respect of loss or damage unless within
after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered:
* f . ‘ .
eal - { + ~“
- i bie as fa 3
Plaintiff contends that the on-deck storage of the goods i in
violation of the agreement to carry them underdeck consti-
tutes a:deviation under maritime law; and that the effect-of
the deviation is to displace the provisions ‘of the bill of
lading and the statute, and to make the carrier liable as an ©
insurer, subject to suit until such time as action may be
barred by laches, It zelies on the law governing restrictive
provisions in bills of lading as established prior to the adop-.
2 tion of statutory controls, and asserts: that the historical :
background, legislative. history ‘and express terms of the
Carriage of Goods:by Sea Act demonstrate that its provi-
sions are not to be applied. where there i is an intentional
‘breach of the contract by carriage, of the nature alleged :
- here. It also asserts that it is inequitable and illogical to. *
‘permit defendant to claim the benefit of the statutory pro-
vision to eseape liability for an intentional wrong.
Defendant, in suppport of the applicability of the statute,
derives comfort from two trial court decisions which seem-
ingly support its position, and attempts to draw a favorable
analogy from decisions construing other provisions of the
act, It also appeals to the circumstances underlying the en-
actment of the statute, and the express provisions embodied
_ therein; and insists that they demonstrate that reason, com-
mon sense and sound public policy necessitate application, of
each
other. for’ and tallying the goods.” Apr. 16,
§3(6), 49 Stat. 208, $316 J USCA, 1908(6), wor de
6, aa amended at the Brussels Convention of 1924, but added ‘to the
: eee . Appendia sere
So far as can be ascertained, the case is one of the first
impression insofar as a deviation-or breach of the contract
of carriage of the nature asserted by plaintiff is concerned. -
Resort to the various criteria suggested by the parties leads
to the conclusion that a policy of international uniformity _
‘dictates that the “Provisions of Rule 6 of Article III of the
Hague’ Rules be applied-to an action where the alleged
: ‘deviation is ‘on-deck storage under a clean bill of lading.
+ Common Law Principles
The common law liability of the maritime carrier has -
been summarized as follows:
“Where, then, a shipowner. receives goods to be carried
-_for-reward, whether in a general ship with goods of other
_shippers, or in a chartered ship whose services are entirely
at the disposal of the one freighter, it is implied in common
law, in the obsence of expresscontract—
“That he is to earry and deliver the goods in stieby, |
‘answering for all loss or damage which may mane to them Mi
_. + While they are in his hands as carrier:
- “Unless that has been cansed by some act of God, or of the ©
King’s enemies; or by some defect or infirmity of the goods s
themselves, or their packages; or through a eentary sacri-
. fice for the general safety:
“And, that those exceptions are not a excuse him if he
had not been reasonably careful to avoid or guard against
the cause of loss, or damage, or has met with it after’a de-
parture from the proper course of the voyage; or, if the
_ loss or damage has been due to some unfitness of the ship to
s receive the cargo, or to unseaworthiness which existed when
"she commenced her voyage.” (Italics added.) (I Carver,
Carriage by Sea (11th ed. 1963 [British Shipping Laws,
Vol. 2}), par. 20, p. 20; and see Gilmore & Black, The Law
of Admiralty. (1957) § 3-22, pp. 119-120; and Knauth, Ocean
Bills of Lading ad P. 116. )
Appendix 5
' Prior to statutory regulation, the ehipowners were free to
contract concerning their liability, and “the carriers. devel- - .
oped the ‘free’ contract to a point where it could be said that
the carrier accepted the goods to be carried when he liked,
as he liked, and wherever he liked.” (Knauth, op..cit., p.
116; and see Carver, op. cit. par. 100, pp. 87-88 ; and Gil-
more & Black, op. cit., § 3-23, pp. 120-122.)
In the obsence of a specific statutory or a valid con-
tractual limitation, courts in maritime cases apply a doctrine
of laches. The rule governing the exercise of the court’s dis-
‘eretion has been stated as follows: “It is the sound legal -
discretion of cultivated reason, in which the circumstances
‘ of the parties, of the property, and of the transaction, the ©
wants and convenience of commerce, the demands of public
policy, and,.most especially, the analogies of the local
laws of limitations are fully to be considered and carefully
- weighed.” (Benedict’s Admiralty (4th ed. 1910) § 514, p.
345; and see Conty v. States Marine ‘Lines, Inc. (2d: cir.
1966) 355 F.2d 26, 27; and Gilmore & Black, op. cit.,§ 9-79,
-p. 628.) . :
- Deviation has been described as. follows: “To deviate,
lexicographically, means to stray, to wander. As applied in °
admiralty law, the term deviation’ was ofiginally and
generally employed to, express the wandering or straying
_ of a vessel from the customary course of.the voyage, but in
the course of time it has come to mean any variation in the
conduct of a ship in the carriage of goods whereby the risk
incident to the shipment will be increased, such as carrying
the cargo on the deck of the ship contrary to custom and |
' without the consent of the shipper, delay in carrying the.
goods, failure to deliver the goods at the port named i in the’
bill. of lading and carrying them farther to another port, or
bringing them back to the port of original shipment ‘and
reshipping wie Such conduct has been held to be a ra al
Re iligpenille
ture from the course of agreed transit and to constitute a ©
- ‘deviation’ whereby the goods have been subjected to greater
risks, and, When lost or damaged in consequence thereof,
clauses. of exceptions in bills of lading limiting liability
cease to apply: eee .]” (G. W. Sheldon & Co. v. Ham-
burg etc. Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft (3d Cir. 1928) 28
F.2d 249, 251; see also Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (1965)
pp. 204-211; I Carver, op. cit., par. 19, p. 19; and II id.
[British Shipping Laws, Vol. 3], pars. 705- 742, pp. 593-618 ;
Gilmore & Black, op: cit., §§ 3-40/3-42, pp. 156-162; Poor,
_ Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading: (4th ed. 1954)
§ 69, pp. 189-200; Knauth, op. cit., pp. 240-270.)
“By stowing the goods on deck the vessel broke her.
_ eontract, exposed them to greater risk than had been agreed
and thereby directly caused the loss. She accordingly became
liable as for a deviation, cannot escape by reason of
relieving clauses inserted in the bill of lading for her benefit,
- [fn. omitted] and must account for the value at destination.”
(St: Johns N.F. etc. Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral Com,
mercial (1923) 263 U.S. 119, 124-125 [68 L.Ed. 201, 44 S. Ct
_ 80]; and see The Delaware (1872) 81 U.S. 579, 598 and 604
(20 L.Ed. 779].)
In St. Johns N. F. ete. Corp. the issue was whether the
' shipper had a’sented to storage on deck. In resolving that
issue against the carrier, the court held that provisions of .
the bill of lading, which vurported to relieve the carrier of
-* liability for loss or damage from causes beyond his control,
and to limit the liability to $100 per package unless other-
wise stated, were rendered inapplicable by the deviation.
‘The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which was
affirmed, is informative in that it sets forth the reasons for
the rule, as follows: “The cargo was laden on deck contrary ©
to the’ requirements of the clean bill of lading issued there-
for, and vi reason thereof te bill of lading and all its
’
| Appendia : 7
clauses were wiped out, and the ship cannot claim the bene-
fits of any limitations therein contained. [Citation.] To so
stow the cargo was a deviation which changed the character —
of the voyage so essentially that the shipowner who has
deviated cannot claim tle benefits of the terms of the bill
of lading. It vitiates and avoids the contract of carriage.
[Citations.] The same rule prevails in England. [Citation.]
~~ The’ reason therefor is that the exemption clauses and limi-
tation in the bill of lading are for the benefit of the carrier
who has control of the shipments after its delivery to him.
By his bill of lading he declares the manner and place of
' earriage. The shipper having this notice, understands the
reasons attendant upon the character of the transportation,
and accepts the limitations and dangers. Freight rates are
fixed accordingly. The shipper protects himself accordingly"
with insurance. When the carrier voluntarily varies from
the method or place*of carriage contracted for, he leaves
the shipper with unknown.risks against which he has not
insured and he cannot recover on the insurance which
he obtains. The shipowner is in the same position as in the
case of deviation in route. [Citation.]” (The St. John N.F.
(2d Cir. 1922) 280 F. 553, 556-557 ; and see The Sarnia (2d
Cir..1921) 278 F. 459, 462-466, cert. den. 258 U.S. 625 [66
L.Ed. 797, 42 S.Ct. 382], in which the stowage on deck in-
validated a stipulation as to the value of the shipment.)?
Other cases unequivocally declare the principle that devia-
tion strips the ship of all excuses, and imposes upon her the
«
2. Gilmore & Black, the Law of Admiralty (1957) notes: “The*
reason for the old rule seems to have been that the cargo lost its
insurance when the vessel deviated, so that it-was felt appropriate
and just to put the vessel in the insurer’s position. But at present
cargo policies usually contain clauses which provide that, in the
event of deviation, the risk shall be ‘held covered,’ notwithstanding.
If and when the cargo owner learns of a deviation, it becomes his
duty to notify the insurance company, and to pay an additional ,
premium to be arranged.” (§ 3-41, p. 161.) ,
Loe ; Appendiz |
- liability of a common carrier, i.e., of an insurer. (Farr v.
- Hain 8.8. Co. (2d Cir. 1941) 121 F.2d 940, 944; The Pelotas
(5th Cir. 1933) 66 F': 24:75, 77;.Rudy Patrick Seed Co. v.. —
Kokusai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1935) 12
F.Supp. 727, 731, rev’d. (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. 2d 17, on
_ grounds the alleged deviation was authorized.) :
In United States v. Wessel, Duval & Co. (D.C. S.D. N.Y.
(1953) 115 F.Supp. 678, the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act were incorporated in a charter party
-between the parties to which the statute itself-would not .
_ -apply. In considering the effect of the incorporation of the
- provisions. contained in section.3(6), the court observed: ©
“The argument is that if the alleged breaches of duty on the
part of Wessel Duval amounted to a deviation then Wessel
Duval would be deprived of the protection of the one-year
limitation in section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. That provision reads: ‘In any event the carrier and the
ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss
or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should
have been delivered.’ Those words ‘in any event’ may well .
result in preserving this statutory limitation even though
the ship has been guilty of a deviation. Here, however, the »
Act ‘has effect only as-an agreement of the parties ; if the
agreement that, unless suit is brought within one year, the
_ ship shall be discharged goes by the board when the ship is -
guilty of a deviation, the agreement that unless suit is so
brought the ship shall be discharged ‘in any event’ will go
by the board too. The words ‘in any event’ have no greater
sanctity than the rest of the clause. — 5
“The authorities indicate and I hold that deviation does
‘deprive the ship of the protection of a provision in the con-
tract of carriage limiting the time for suit or claim. Stdney
Appendiz — ie a. a
Blumenthal & Co. Inc. v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 21
F.2d 798, not reviewed by the appeal reported 2 Cir., 30
F.2d 247; Rudy Patrick Seed Co. v. Kokusai Kisen Kabu-
_ shipi Kaisha, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 12 F.Supp. 727, reversed on’
other grounds 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 17; General Electric Co.. ve
Argonaut 8.9. Line, D.C.E.D.N.Y., 7 F.Supp. 720; but see
Singer H ostery Mills v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 199 Mise.
389, [102 N.Y.S.2d. 762].” (115 F.Supp. at p. 684.) The.
court found, however, that the alleged failure of the de-
‘ fendant to thake the ship seaworthy, upon wale the plain-
tiff relied, was not a deviation.
The cases cited-in- Wessel, Dyygl & Co. do. support-the~
principle that deviation abrogates contractual provisions
which purport to limit the time: within which an option may
* be commenced for loss or damage | to the goods which were
the subject of the contract of carriage. (See also K. emsley,
7 Millbourn & Co. v. United States a Cir. 1927) 19 a
441, 442.) -
Before further examining the effect of clnvdeits stowage
of cargo in violation of the terms of the contract of carriage :
_ upon contractual and statutory provisions limiting the ear-
.Tiers..obligations, note should be taken of qualifications to
the broad statements contained i in ‘the sachet cases in-
volving deviation. 3 |
“Deviation originally meant 4 and still means in most
‘jurisdictions) an intentional change in the geographical |
route of the planned voyage.” ( Tetley, op. cit., p. 19; and
see Gilmore & Black, op. cit., § 32-42, pp. 161-162; Knauth,
op. cit., p. 241.) The extension of the doctrine in the United
States to include nondelivery, deck carriage, and overcar-
riage, and the failure’ to distinguish between an intentional
‘and a negligent change in the geographical route’ of a
Planned voyage has been criticized. It is —" that
”
0: Appendic
deviation under the Hague Rules. is best considered as an
- intentional change in the geographical route of the planned
voyage. (Tetley, op. cit., pp. 17-24, passim; and see Gilmore
& Black, op. cit., §3-42, p. 161.)
* he harsh effects of the doctrine of deviation which
“substitutes one contract—an ‘insurer’s liability’ contract
implied by law in the cases—for another contract, that made
by the parties under the Harter Act or Carriage of Goods
_by Sea Act and expressed itt the bill of lading” (Knauth, op.
cit., p. 242) ,.also has been disparaged by some observers with
unreasonable, intentional and contributes to the loss (id., p.
243; and see Gilmore & seh op: cit., §§ 3-40/3-42, pp. 156- |
162, passim). 7 :
Legislative History:
exculpatory clauses in bills of lading used by the carriers led
to the adoption of the Harter Act of 1893. (Act, Feb. 13,
1893, ch. 105; 27 Stat. 445; 46 U.S.C.A., §§ 190-196.) This act
negligence and for failure to exercise due diligence in
making the vessel seaworthy, but in turn provides for limita-
tion of liability for errors of navigation, dangers of the sea,
acts of God, etc., if the owner had exercised due diligence
to make the vennel seaworthy. (See I Carver, op. cit., pars.
PP. 120-124; Knauth, op. ctt., pp. 18-122.)
International recognition of these principles was ulti.
- Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of
_ ° Lading at Brussels, August 15, 1924, which modified and
—— ~ adopted the “Hague Rules.” (51 Stat. 233, U.S. Treaty
““@ plea that it be strictly limited to where the deviation is -
+.
Dissatisfaction of American shipping interests with the
- prohibits stipulation relieving the carrier from. liability for —
240-243, pp. 204-208; Gilmore & Black, op. cit., §§ 3-23/3-24,
watele effected at the International Convention for the .
Series No. 931.) In 1936 the United States incorporated the —__
x
meiiln See
Appendia ~~ \- ee
“Hague Rules” with some clarifying scnendnsente as the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and in 1937 it ratified the
Brussels Convention subject to two understandings. (See
- Tetley, op. cit., pp. 284-296 and ascidian and ss op. cit.,
pp. 127-131.)
Acknowledgely, Harter and Cini were designed _ to
redress the inequality of bargaining power between carrier.
and shipper. Plaintiff contends that this intention, as openly
_ asserted in the Senate when the latter act was presented and
adopted, compels a construction favorable to the shipper,
and precludes divesting him of rights he would enjoy in the
absence of the statute unless it expressly takes them away.
This approach overlooks the fact that both enactments are
predicated upon compromising the demands of the carriers
for exoneration, and the demands of the shippers for the
imposition of even greater responsibility on the carriers.
“Neither the Hague Rules nor the [Brussels] Act of 1924
lay down a complete code of law covering the carriage of
goods under bills of lading. They simply replace a conven-
tional contract by a legislative bargain. The general prin- .
ciples of English law are still applicable to the carriage of
goods except as modified by the Act.” (I Carver, op. cit.,
par. 232 at p. 198; and see Gilmore & Black, op. cit., § 3-24:
at p. 123; and Knauth, op. cit., pp: 128-129.)
One salient fact does stand out. The international com-
plexion of the Hague Rules suggests that consideration be
given to international uniformity in the construction of the ,
act. “It is important to remember that the Act of 1924 was -
the outcome of an International Conference and that the
‘rules in the Schedule have an international currency: As.
these rules must come under the consideration of foreign |
Courts it is desirable in the interests of uniformity that | |
their interpretation should not be rigidly controlled by |
13° \ : oe :
domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that the.
language of the rules should be construed on broad prin-
ciples of general acceptation.” (Lord Macmillan in. Stag
Line, Lid. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. (House of Lords, 1931)
1932) App.Cas. 328 at: p. 350; and see Lord Atkin, id.,
at pp. 342-343; Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery
\ Corp. (1959) 359 U.S. 297 [3 L.Ed.2nd 820, 79 S.Ct. 766]
\ 301; Tetley, op. cit., pp. 25-27 and 29; I Carver, op. cit.,.
pars. 231-232, pp. 196-197; and (1965) First Supplement;
-_ and Knauth, op. cit., pp. 136-137.) .
_. The éore of Cogsa is found in sections 3 and 4. The
: former deals with the responsibilities and liabilities of car-
rier and ship. Subsection (1) .defines the carrier’s duty to
‘ provide a seaworthy ship, properly manned, equipped and
supplied, and fit and safe for the reception, carriage and ~
_ preservation of the cargo. Subsection (2) defines the car-
rier’s duty of care with respect to the goods. themselves
from loading to discharge. Subsections (3), (4), (5). and
(7) deal with the issuance of the contents of the bill of
lading, and the legal consequences flowing therefrom. Sub-
section (6) is the subject of this controversy (see fn. 1,
ee supra). Subsection (8) renders null and void and of no
| effect any attempt to relieve or lessen the obligations
imposed on the carrier by the act. | 3 \
Section 4 provides for the rights and immunities of the
carrier and ship. Subsection (1) grants immunity for loss’
’ or damage resulting from unseaworthiness, unless caused |
by want of due diligence of the carrier. Subsection (2)
establishes 17 categories of uncontrollable causes of loss.
Subsection -(3) exonerates the shipper from responsibility -
for loss or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship
\
Appendia
delimits the consequences of reasonable deviatioris.*
_ One commentator has observed: “The Act of 1936 applies
the test of reasonableness to voyage clauses and deviations,
as to other situations. Under the 1936 Act, it will. always
be a question whether any“deviation is reasonable and hence.
excusable. The new Act therefore seems to have enlarged
thé rights of the carrier in. this respect.” (Knauth, op. cit.,
p. 255.) 2 iy R$
Subsection (5) provides for a limitation of $500 per
package unless a higher value is declared by the shipper.‘
Subsection (6) defines the rights and obligations of the car-
rier and shipper in regard to inflammable, explosive or dan-
gerous cargo when shipped either with or without the con-
sent and knowledge of the carrier, : |
Existing Precedents
of section 3 (6) will bar any action for loss or damage to —
8. Subsection (4) provides: ‘Any deviation in saving or at-
tempting to save life or property at sea, or any reasonable devia-
tion shall net be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this
liable for. any loss or damage resulting therefrom: *Provided, how-
- ever, That if the deviation is for the purpose of loading or unload-
ing cargo or passengers it shall, prima facie be regarded as unrea-
sonable. © (Asterisks designate a proviso added to Hague Rules,
Article IV, Rule 4 in the United States Act.) : .
4. Subsection (5) provides in‘ part: “Neither the carrier nor
the ship shall’in any event be or become liable for any loss or dam-
\
age to or in connection with *the transportation of* goods in any
amount exceeding per package *lawful money of the United
States, or in case of not shipped in per customary
e
where the shipper is free from neg . Subsection (4)
goods which have been carried unless it is commenced within ©
one year of the delivery. (See Western Gear Corp. v. States
Marine Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1966) 362 F'.2nd 328, 330-331, and
cases ‘cited; American Oil Co. v. Steamship Iontan Challen-
ger (2nd Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 509, 510; and Hellyer v. Nippon
: Yesen Kaisya (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1955) 130 F.Supp. 209.)
The “loss or damage” referred to in the statute does not -
include, however, the right of a cargo owner to recover from
the vessel or the carrier idemnity for salvage which he has
’ paid. It is applied to instances involving damage directly to
the cargo and to cases where there has been a delay in, or
failure of, delivery or departure. (States Steamship Co. v.
American Smelting & Refining Co. (9th Cir. 1964) 339
F.2d 66, 68-69, cert. den. 380 U.S. 964 en 85 8.Ct.
1109}.) :
In Potter v. North German Lloyd @. C.N.D. CalS. D. 1943)
50 F.Supp. 173 an action was brought on May 26, 1941 to
recover froni Hamburg, Germany, in July 1939 and destined
for Portland, Oregon, but never delivered because the vessel
stopped and abandoned the voyage in Costa Rica upon the
outbreak of the war in September ‘1939. The goods, which
__ were there transferred to another ship for storage, were lost
_. when the second ship was burned and scuttled some 18
months later. The defendant, among other defenses, relied
upon the provisions of section 3(6) of Cogsa. The plantiff
"claimed the delay constituted an unlawful deviation which
nullified and rendered all bill of — defenses unavailable
to defendant.
The court schawvtodaed that the retention of the goods in
. Costa Rica for a.period over 17 times the duration of the
usual voyage originally intended, was “wstrong circumstance
which, if not justified by the defendant’s privileges under the
bill. of lading defenses on which defendant strongly relies,
Sonate — Appendia @ 15
would make defendant’s position most difficult with respect
to plaintiff’s contention that there was a deviation by reason
of such long delay.” (50 F.Supp. at p. 173.) « ‘ 3
_ It coneluded: “If however the“one-year time limit for
bringing suit provided in the@arriage of Goods.by Sea Act,
‘46 U.S.C.A. § 1303(6), applies to this casé, the decision of it
will be necessarily controlled by such statutory time limit.
with the result that plaintiff’s action, will be defeated
_.Whether the question as to deviation and its Telated ques-
tions are decided in plaintiff’s favor or not.
“There can be no question but that the courts of this coun-
try, as required by 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300, have been applying
to carriage contracts for ocean shipments in foreign trade to
and from American ports the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ~
supra, and Section 1303(6) thereof which in material part _
". provides that: ‘In any event the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage un-
~ less suit is brought within one year after delivery of. the
goods or the date when the goods should ‘have been.de-
livered. ...’ (Itali¢s supplied.) See The Argentino, D.C., 28
F.Supp. 440, 442 (Syl: 2); The Zarembo, D.C., 44 F.Supp.
915'921 (Syl. 11, 12); Thé Cypria, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 816, 820
(Syl. 6, 7). Said section 1303(6) does not apply to this case.” + |
_(d., pp. 173-174.) >. FOU Ad. Ries Swe dei
_ [See fn. 5] Upon finding that the goods “should have been
delivered” more than a year before suit was filed, the court
dismissed the suit.®
5. . Defendant asserts that because the matter is one involving
_ concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts, and because it
necessitates the interpretation of a federal statute, this court is
bound to follow the decisional law of the Potter case, supra. (See ~
Urie v. Thompson’ (1949) 337 U.S. 163, 174 [93 L.Ed..1282, 69 S.Ct. .
1018; 11 A.L.R.2d 252]; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 248, 250
ey P.2d 768]; Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co: (1940) 16
al.2d 460, 471 [160 P.2d 895]; Mackenzie v. Hare (1913) 165
- aes pee ee
eases: Hosiery Mills v. Cumard White Star, Lid. (1951)
- 199 Mise. 389 [102 N.Y.S.2d 762], involved overcarriage of
goods which were. shipped: from Belfast ‘to New York, but . |
returned and then reshipped again to the destination. The
action ‘was commenced 17 months after the actual delivery
of the goods in poor condition. The. defendant’s answer
asserted both the provisions of section 3(6) of Cogsa and a
clause i in the bill of lading which incorporated similar pro-
visions of the British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924.
\ The Municipal Court observed: “The manner in which the -
' shipment was made was a substantial deviation from the con- |
tract of carriage as provided in the bill of lading and con
a stituted an overcarriage. In my opinion, the deviation made
- the carrier an insurer. [Citations] .. . There is no question
that under the maritime law and under New York State law,
_ as quoted above, a substantial deviation by the carrier from
performance as required by the bill of lading has serious
effects upon the agreement between the parties. If the car-
Cal. 776, 779 [134 P. 713, Ann. Cas. 1915B 261, L.R.A. 1916D 127],
aff’d (1915) 239 U.S. 299 [60 L.Ed2d 297, 36 S.Ct. 106]; United -
: Conerete Pipe Corp. v. Laborers’ Local No. 89 (1964) 231 Cal. App.
2d 315, 318 | 41 Cal.Rptr. 816]; B, C. “ge Contracting Co. v.
Continental as. Co. (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 49 rial Cal. Rptr.
; Monarch Wine Co. v. Butte (1952) 113 pa 833, 834
- "837 [249 P.2d 291]; and Crenshaw Bros: v. Southern » Pac. Co.
_ (1919) 40 Cal. App 603, 612 [181 P. 252].) 7
The doctrine
of federal supremacy manifested by the OEE
cases in no way dictates that a state appellate court is bound to
follow the precedent of a federal trial court. In fact the law of .
this state declares that under such circumstances “the decisions of -
the lower federal courts on federal questions are merely persua-
sive.” (Rohr Aircraft Corp ane ae | mw Pl San Diego (1959) 51 Cal.
2d 759, ned bay moe 524}, without comment on this point,
(1960) 362 As aL A 23 1008, 80 5.6 1060) and see Peo-
ple v. Estrada (1965) 234 CalL.A pp.2d 136, 145 [44 Cal.Rptr. 165, a
11 A.L.R.3d ].) Nor Rms 4 courts, ‘when directed to —
apply state law, bound. the legal precedent of «state tral ourt
which does not have force on other courts within state.
the
(King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers (1948) 333 U.S. —
| 158, 161-162 [92 608, 68 §.Ct. 488].)
e
eet eed
“
3 Appendix 17
Tier breaches its contract, it should be estopped from claim-
ing advantages which accuré to it solely by reason of the con-
tract. The courts hold that such exceptions are invalidated.”
(199 Mise. at p. 391 [102 N.Y.S.2d at-pp. 764-765].)
_. It concluded: “However, I feel that the entire contract is
_ not nullified and those provisions remain which have not been
_ affected by the breach which occurred. Be that as it may, the
question of shipments by sea to or from ports of the United |
States is a matter of Federal regulation, more especially so
when the shipment is governed by a bill of lading. The Car- -
riage of Goods by Sea Act (U.S. Code, tit. 46, §.1300 et seq.)
_ Tegulates the rights and obligations of the carrier and the
shipper in the instances and in the particulars provided for
in the act. Subdivision (6) of section 1303 provides : [quoting
the provisions relied on by defendant herein]. - iia?
“This provision of the Act is all inclusive ; it is of the sub-
Stance of the rights between the parties. Granting that a
breach has occurred and even assuming that the provisions
_ of the bill of lading have been nullified and the carrier has
become an insurer, under our Federal law which governs this
. action, the shipper, unless he has in sore manner been re- .
lieved from the one-year limitation, is bound to begin the
action for a breach within one year after delivery of the
goods should have been delivered. eats
“There are no facts set forth showing that the consignees
were lulled into a sense of security, misled, imposed upon,
_ deceived or had been subjected to any fraudulent practice
which prevented them from instituting this action within one
year after delivery df the machinery. The bill of lading ex-
pressly states that the carriet and the ship arg discharged
from liability unless suit is brought within ‘one, year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have
beén delivered and thére’is no reason why the consignee
18 7 ' Appendiz ;
should not be held to compliance with this provision of
the bill of lading and the similar provision contained in the
s Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: (Switzerland General Ins. Co.
of Zurich v. Navigazione Libera Tirestina S.A., 2 Cir. 1937,
_ 91 F.2d 960; Potter v. North German Lloyd, D.C.N.D.Cal.
S.D. 143, 50 F. Supp. 173; Matter of Wheeler, 191 Mise. 33, 35
[76 N.Y. 8.2d 159] ; Zontte Products Corp. v. Mediterranean
Navigation Co., 183 Mise. 962 [52 N.Y.S.2d 603].)” (Jd., pp.
391-392 [102'N.Y.S2d at pp. 765-766].)
Singer was followed, for the principle that the widvidiote
of section 3(6) are all inclusive, in a trial court decision in
Albert v. Isbrandtsen Co. (1957) 7 Mise.2d 67 [160 N.Y.S.2d
772}. In that case the court held that the provisions of the act
applied to. bar an action for damages which ensued following ~ .
’ the failure to deliver a bill of lading. The dock receipt which °
had been given incorporated by reference the provisions of a
bill of lading which in turn made the provisions of Cogsa .
applicable. The court stated: “While defendant may have
breached the contract in that it did not deliver the bill of
lading, the entire contract is not nullified and the provisions -
‘not affected remain in force [citation].” (7 Misc.2d at p. 69
‘ [160 N.Y.S.2d at p. 774]. An appeal was dismissed (1960) 12
App.Div. 2d 581 [214 N.Y.S.2d 236].)
Singer has been _Tecognized by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as standing for the prop-
_osition “that the statute of limitations in the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, has been strictly applied by the Courts
to bar untimely suits.” (Western Gear Corp »v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., supra, 362 F.2d 328*at p. 330; and see
States Steamship Co. v. American Smelting & senkglies
Co., supra, 339 F.2d 66, 69). | :
| ~ ‘The United States District Court for the s thern Dis-
trict of New York has sot been so charitabl¢. In United
Pi, Rath inact i as
Astin ras ; <i 19
States - v. Wessel, Duval @ Co., supra, 115 F. Supp. 678,
as set forth above, it is saseeted that Singer is a muta-
tion of the general rule that a deviation deprives the car-
rier of a contract provision limiting the time for suit.”
_(115 F.Supp. at p. 684.) In Jones v. The: Flying Clipper —
(D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1953) 116 F.Supp. 386, the court suggested
that Potter and Singer each conflicted with dictum in -
Switzerland General Ins: Co. v. Navigazione Inbera Tries-
- tina, 8.A. (2d Cir. 1937) 91 F.2d 960, 963, which indicated
that a deviation would deprive the carrier of the benefit
' of the time limitation clause. (116 F.Supp. at p. 390).
' Finally, in Hellyer v. Nippon Yesen Kaisya, supra, 130
- F.Supp. 209, the two cases are referred to as standing
for the proposition that “the failure to deliver the subject
matter of the contract has been held not to constitute
such’ a fundamental breach as to vitiate the contract .
between the, parties.” (130 F. Supp. 211; and see Tetley,
-op. ctt., pp. 199, fn. 6, and 200, fn. 10.) ° .
The foregoing authorities raise a doubt as to whether
Potter and Singer stand for the proposition that the limi-
tations period of section 3(6) applies despite any devi-
ation, or merely establish that a failure to deliver, or an
overcarriage is not such a breach of the contract (or devia-
tion) as to render the contract a nullity and to take the.
case out of the operation of the statute.
Plaintiff also asserts that even though the bill of lad-
ing is not displaced when the breach (or deviation) oe
unintentional and involuntary (see The Malcolm Bacter,
Jr. (1928) 277 US. 323, 332-333 [72 L.Ed. 901, 48 S.Ct. -
516]), the carrier cannot escape liability by the clauses
in the contract or statute when the breach is intentional.
(St. Johns N.F. etc. Corp. v. Companhia Geral Commer.
cial, supra, 263 U.S. 119, shih 3
20 | Appendiz :
It was einevied above than on-deck stowage under a clean.
: “bill of lading is not universally considered a deviation, and
it has been suggested that deviation, which would create
rights apart from the provisions of the Hague Rules or of
pills of lading based thereon, be limited to geographical —
deviation which is more generally recognized. Nevertheless,
it has been postulated that whether on-deck stowage in vio-
lation of the contract of carriage be termed: “deviation” or
not, the carrier should not have the benefit of Article II,
_ Rule 6 under such circumstances.
_ “The carrier contracts to carry cargo sade deck and a
clean bill of lading is an undertaking to that effect: It is
submitted that unauthorized carriage on deck is a breach
' - sufficient to annul the contract.
“Thus, if goods are carried on deck and no statement to
that effect appears on the face of the bill of lading, then the
bill of lading contract is null, or can be annulled, because the
whole nature of the contract has been vitiated. As a result
~ the Rules do not apply, there being no contract of carriage.
The carrier, therefore, does not have the benefit of the Rules,
including the per package limitation or the one year omey
for suit.” (Tetley, op. cit., p. 19.)
Other commentators suggest a contrary conclusion inso-
far as the time within which suit may be brought ‘is-con-
cerned. “A goods-owner will lose any remedy he has against
the carrier unless he issues a .writ against him within one
> * year, ...” (I Carver, op. cit., par. 274, p. 233; italies added.)
“Can any event stop the running of the one-year limit? The
Convention and Act are silent as to suspension of the run-
ning of the one-year limit upon the right to sue. No suspen-
' gion of the time is granted. The time limit being statutory,
it is absolute in the terms of the statute.” (Knauth, op. cit.,
p. 276 and see pp. 275-277.)
ee prone vie ae
“Tt has sometimes been questioned whether this time
- limitation is applicable i in cases of deviation. The decisions
hold that it is, and this is sustainable on two grounds:
(1) a statute is not displaced by a deviation, (2) the para-
graph commences with the words ‘ in any évent,’ indicating ~
_ that the statutory bar applies no matter what has happeaed.
[Citing Potter and Singer].
“The language of the statute that ‘the carrier and the ship
shall be discharged from all liability’ unless suit is season-
ably brought indicates that the liability is extinguished, and |
that the carrier’s defense is not merely one of procedure.
“Under our admiralty practice, suit may be commenced by °
the filing of a libel without service of process. Consequently
it is only in a very rare case that this provision could cause
- any injustice.” (Poor on Charter Parties — ed. Kaitos
supra, § 64, pp. 160-161.) |
Defendant turns to the express language of the statute
and urges that the words “in any evént” signify that the one- °
year clause is to be applicable “under any circumstances and
in all situations.” In United States v. Wessel, Duval & Co.,
supra, the court in suggesting that deviation would deprive
the carrier of a contractual limitation predicated on section
‘ 3(6) observed: “Those words ‘in any event’ may wel] ‘result
in preserving this statutory limitation even though’ the ship
has been guilty of a deviation.” (115 F.Supp. at p. 684; and
. see Poor, op. cit., supra.) |
On the other hand, the plaintiff with equal logic examines
the phrase “in any event” in its context (see fn. 1, supra)
and concludes that it imports that the limitation shall be
applied “irrespective of how or when or whether notice is
' given” as provided in the remaining provisions of the sub-
section itself. It contends that since the statute applies to
“every contract of carriage of goods by sea” (section 2), and
ee Appendia - |
“‘eontract of carriage’ applies only to contracts of carriage
_ eovered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title”
(section 1(b)), the statute cannot be applicable in the event
the bill of lading is rendered a nullity because of deviation
or breach (see Tetley, op. cit., pp. 15-16). 3
_ Farther pursuit of this approach leads to those authori-
ties which have construed the provisions relating to the
construction of the per package limitation contained in
subsection (5) of section 4 (see fn. 4, supra).
Amaeoene Precedents ;
_. The effect of deviation on the applicability ‘of the pro-
visions for limitation of liability contained in section 5 had
been the subject of litigation with varying results.
In Searoad Shipping Co. v, E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. (5th Cir. 1966).361 F.2d 833 (cert. den. 385 U.S. 973 [17
L.Ed.2d 436, —— S.Ct. ek, the court reviewed a judg-.
ment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Forida which had allowed the shipper recovery
of the total loss of its cargo on the basis that deck-loading
the cargo covered by a clean underdeck bill .of lading
amounted to deviation which makes the vessel an insurer.
The Court of Appeals found that neither notations on the
bill of lading concerning stowage, nor alleged consent or
custom justified a departure from the general rule that
underdeck storage was signified by the bill of lading. It
upheld the trial court’s finding of deviation and noted that
the loss—a trailer containing the cargo which had been
‘stored on deck went overboard—was related to the devia-
tion. The court concluded: “There being no legal justifica-
tion for this on-deck stowage of cargo shipped pursuant to
an under-deck clean bill of lading, this stowage amoynted
to a deviation casting the shipowner for the loss which was
directly and:causally related to. the deck stowage.” (361
F.2d at p. 838. y
eR re 68 ER TET nal
s oo Pe ‘
< ticaaties of other authorities referred to herein was |
expressed as follows: “And although one highly respected | S
authority raises .a question whether under Cogsa the awe-
some insurer consequence should now be visited on the
vessel for nongeographical deviations, [Footnote 7: Gilmore
& Black, Admiralty § 3-40, at 156 (1957), considering espe-
cially the impact of §4(4) and ‘the exemptions afforded
under § 4(2) of Cogsa, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (2), (4).] and one
Court of Appeals keeps a statutory, if not a contract, limita-
' tion alive, [Footnote 8: See Atlantic Mut: Ins. Co. v. Posei-
don Schiffahrt, G.m.b.H., 7 Cir., 1963, 313 F.2d 872, 1963
AMC 665, affirming N.D. IL, 1962, 206 F.Supp. 15, 1963.
AMC 669A," Rejecting Jones v. The Flying Clipper,
S.D.N.Y., 1953, 116 F.Supp. 386, 1954 AMC 259, the Seventh
_. Cireuit holds the $500 per package limitation applicable
~ notwithstanding a deviation.] we have no doubt that the _
insurer liability continues after Cogsa [Footnote 9: Knauth
leaves it in no uncertain terms.-‘It has beconie well settled —
that stowage of cargo on deck, when contrary to contract
or custom of under-deck storage, is such a fundamental
' breach of the contract of carriage as to displace the contract
clauses which might benefit the carrier, and constitutes the :
carrier an insurer of the safe arrival of the goods at destina-. -
tion’ Knauth, Ocean Bills of Lading 260 (1953).] to flow
from on-deck deviation where the damage is causally related.
[Footnote 10: Here, as in The Flying Clippér, note 8, supra,
there is no doubt about the causal relation between the
deviation and the-damage. The M-V Sealane weathered the
storm. Its underdeck arrived safely. The reasonably heavy,
but foreseeable, forces of nature did their damage because —
the cargo was deck loaded in a van trailer.]” (361 F.2d at .
pp. 835, 836.) 8G
No mention is made of an earlier opinion by another judge
of the District Court for the same Southern District of
st, eee ae Appendiz
| ‘Florida which held that liability was limited under section
4(5) “even assuming an unreasonable deviation” from on-.
deck storage. The judge concluded: “In Jones v. Flying
: Clipper the District Court held that on deck storage without
notation on the bill of lading was a material deviation which
-vitiated. the limitation. of liability. A contrary conclusion
was reached in Atlantic Mutual. It appears to the Court that
the reasoning of Atlantic ‘Mutual is more persuasive. The
statute appears plain that liability is limited to $500.00 in.
all cases in which the bill of lading is silent as to the value of
the cargo and this applies ‘in any event’ and to ‘any loss or
damage. »” (Nassau Glass €o. v. Noel Roberts, Ltd., -and
‘M/V Noel Roberts ee: S.D. Fla. 1965) 249 F.Supp. 16,
117.)
In Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v: Poseidon Schiffahrt (7th Cir.
1963) 313 F.2d 872 (cert. den. 375 U.S. 819 [11 L.Ed.2d 53,
84 S.Ct. 56]), the deviation consisted of an overcarriage and
a one and one-half year delay in delivery. It was found to be
unreasonable within the provisions of section 4. The court
acknowledged: “As a result of the rescission of the contract
of carriage arising out of the unreasonable’ deviation, the
contract is treated as not having existed, and the liability of -
the carrier becomes that of an insurer. S.9. Willdomino v.
Citro Chemical Co., 272 U.S. 718 [71 L.Ed. 491, 47 8. Ct. 261)
- . (1927).” (313 F.2d at p. 874.) |
The court upheld the action of the: District Court which
‘nevertheless had limited the liability to $500 per package
under the provisions of section 4(5). The opinion refers to
Jones.v. The Flying Clipper, supra, as follows: “In Jones,
the court reasoned that the doctrine of deviation was 40
‘ firmly entrenched in maritime law that such a drastic change
would have been expressed i in clear and. unmistakable lar-
guage. The court found no such language in the Act. We !
respectfully disagree with this bpsaperate and — that
Appendic =
of the district court i in ~~ instant case: ‘There i is ng ques-
tion about the fact that prior to the enactment of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act, the doctrine of unjustifiable
deviation was’ firmly entrenched i in maritime law. This doc-
trine had developed to circumvent the efforts of carriers |
_ to avoid justifiable liability through. insertion in shipping
contracts and bills of lading of provisions for minimum
: limitation of liability. It is equally certain that Congress
may not be found to have changed existing law withont —
expressing this change in clear and unmistakable terms.
- But it appears to this Court that the language ofthe statute,
if it constitutes a change of existing law, according to the
rule. applied to other statutes, is sufficiently clear and
unmistakable. No amount ‘of interpolation is gequired’ to
evaluate the’ weight of the phrases “in any event” and “any
~ loss or damage” upon the admonition that. “neither the
earrier-‘nor the 8hip shall in any event be or tecome liable NEY
for any loss or damage... unless....”? \
“In addition to the reasons stated by the district court,
our conclusion finds support in the fact that the package
limitation immediately follows § 4(4) of the Act, 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 1304(4) in which Congress, as we have already stated,
recognized’ the carrier’s liability for unreasonable devia- *~
tions. It is difficult for us to believe that Congress did not
intend this limitation to apply to the section next preceding
it.” (313 F.2d at pp. 874-875.) )
In Jones.v. The Flying Clipper, supra, 116 F.Supp. 386,
the deviation consisted of on-deck stowage under a clean bill
of lading. The causal connection between the deviation and
the sea water damage to eight cases of automobiles stowed
on the deck was not in dispute. The District Court judge
rejected the contention that the Carriage. of Goods by Sea
Act changed the prior rule which imposed full ey in .
the event of a deviation.
26 apes Appendix
‘He not only found no intent to jiees the wililiaia law
(116 F.Supp., pp. 388, 389)—as was noted in Posetdon,
supra—but also referred back to the reason for the original
rule which made the deviating carrier an insurer, because
the shipper may not have insurance covering the unantici-
_ pated additional risk as persuasive (id., p. 389; and see The
St. Johns N.F., swpra, 280 F. 553, 556-557). The opinion also".
notes ‘the difference in culpability when negligence is in-
volved, such as in making the vessel seaworthy or handling
cargo, and when an intentional breach of the contract of ©
carriage has occurred (id., pp. 389-390).
The court’s further fears that the carrier would violate
his obligations with impunity if his liability were limited
(id., p. 390) do not bear up under scrutiny. First, there is
no reason to believe that the carrier would gain by wilfully
incurring even limited liability, and, secondly, if Poseidon
. were the rule the shipper would still be free to declare the
. true value, although perhaps at a higher rate of carriage.
significantly for present purposes, the court noted _
Potter and Singer, swpra, and stated: “I do not consider.
‘these determinative of the issue presented under § 1304(5)
of the Act or controlling précedent, particularly so, since,
as counsel point out, a fime limitation clause raises other ©
issues. Moreover, Judge Augustus ‘N. Hand, writing for
the Court of Appeals, in a reference to the one year pro-
vision contained in the English Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 1924, which like the United States Act, 1936, was . .
‘based upon the Brussels Convention—Hague Rules, stated:
‘Nothing resembling a deviation has been shown to deprive
. the carrier of the benefit of the limitation’ [citing Swite-
erland General Ins. Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina,
§.A., supra, 91 F.2d 960, 963].” (Id., p. 390.)
Further reliance on the limitation of liability point is
placed on: Stag Line, Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango ¢ Co., Ltd.,
Appendix : Se
supra, [1932] App.Cas. 328;.Knauth, op. cit., p. 241; and
Robinson on Admiralty (1939) § 75, p. 533; id., pp. 390-391 ;
and see also The Pelotas, supra, 66 F.2d 75, 77. |
From the foregoing cases it appears that defendant’s
Teliance on Posiedon' resembles a sand castle in danger of
engulfment from a rising tide of contrary opinion. (See
criticism of the District Court decision (N. D. Ill. 1962,
206 F.Supp. 15) which was affirmed in Poseidon, Note, 36
Temple L.Q. (1963) 222; and Note on The Flying Clipper, |
102 U. of Pa. L.Rev. (1954) 797.)
Jones and each of the above commentators recognize a
distinction between: the effect of a deviation on the opera-
tion of the limitation of liability in section 4(5) and the '
operation of the limitation on the timne to sue in section
3(6). “While a deviation by on-deck’ carriage does mate-
rially increase the risk of damage to the cargo, no type
‘of deviation affects the time within which the shipper
-will have to bring suit.” (102 UW. of Pa. LiRev. at p. 80;
see also, 36 Temple L.Q. at p. 224; and 116 F.Supp., supra,
at p. 390.) | :
A Similar distinction between cause and effect’is found
in the cases construing the Fire Statute.
Since 1851 there has been a federal law limiting liability
for loss or damage from fire unless caused by the design
or neglect of the owner (Act of Marth 3, 1851, ch. 43,
$1, 9 Stat. 635, R.S., § 4282, 46 U.S.C.A., § 182; and see
46 U.S.C.A., § 1304(2)(b)). In 4/8 J. Indwig Mowinckels
Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd. (4th Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 134, the
opinion states: “Even though stowage on deck of cargo.
shipped under clean bills of lading constitutes a deviation,
this’ does \not deprive the carrier of his right to exonera-
tion undef the fire provision of the Carriage of Goods
— by Sea Act, just as it does not deprive the owner ‘of the
protection of the fire statute, unless‘ it was a cause of
the fire. mm: The Ida; 2 Cir., 75 F.2d 278, 279; Globe & |
. wo Appendiz )
eS Fire ted. Co. v. United. States, 2 Cir., 105 F.2d _
160, 166; The Venice Maru, D.C:, 39 F.Supp. 349, 353;
The Margaret Lykes, D:C., 57 F. Supp. 466, 470.” (199 F.
2d at p. 145; see, in addition to cases cited: Haroco Co.
v. The Tai Shan (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1953) 111 F.Supp. 638,
645-647, aff’d. per curiam opinion (2d Cir. 1955) 218 F.2d
822; and cf. The Elizabeth: Dantzler (D.C.E.D.Va. 1920)
263 F. 596-597 and The Indrapura (D.C. ~ 1909) 171
F. 929, 938-939.) .
It is concluded that tinea the sihaaiiben \construing
other provisions of law do not buttress defendant’s case,
they'do not necessitate that if be jettisoned.
Conclusion
No determinative precedents on the scope of mae one-year
limitation have been found in either the cases construing
section 3(6) or those dealing with other provisions of the
Hague Rules. Nor do historical precedent, legislative his-
tory, or the words of the act itself mandate a particular
construction. All must be correlated to determine a proper
result.
It may be assumed fiom the foregoing analysis that
insofar as a.deviation, or a breach of the contract which
“would at common law render the contractual provisions
void, contributes to or causes a loss, the carrier cannot
rely on provisions which permit it to escape liability for
the damages resulting therefrom. It does not, however,
necessarily follow that a provision which reasonably limits —
the time within which the shipper or consignee may pursue
his remedies, i is also invalid.
It is not correct to say that the act and the rules a8
not deal with deviation. Section 4(4) expressly makes
_ deviation a subject to be considered (see.fn. 3,: supra).
It is pageant: that even if a deviation is. eens, the
2 Appendia * 29
court, before deciding whether the provisions of the bill
-of lading and the act (or rules) are ‘to be displaced,
must determine. whether the deviation was a permitted
deviation for “saving or attempting to save life or prop-
erty at sea” or a “reasonable deviation.” ete
It is not unreasonable to construe the act (and the rules)
as contemplating that such an issue, as well as any issues
_ as to liability under the act, and the extent of the damages
flowing therefrom, should be pursued within the one-year
period. Such a construction promotes the uniformity which
is an acknowledged purpose of the act and rules, This is
particularly true in the case of overcarriage, or deck stow-
age, or any other breach of the contract of carriage which ig
not universally recognized as a deviation. It relieves the
carrier from harsh results which have no causal connection
with the breach itself, Even though it ultimately be proved
to be an intentional violation of the contract of carriage, the
shipper ‘cannot claim prejudice in having to ‘bring suit
. within one year, as provided by the act. There is nothing
inherent in the violation of deck stowage which prevents the
shipper from discovering his lgss and pursuing his claim
for damages. The development of worldwide instant com. -
munications obviates any requirement for years of waiting ~
for reports on the ship or cargo unheard of between far
distant ports. | | .
In short, the manifest purpose to expedite the channels —
of commerce along uniform lines dictates the conclusion
that a breach of a contract for underdeck stowage will not
entitle the shipper or consignee to avoid the discharge from
-liability conferred on the carrier and ship by the provisions
of subsection 6 of section 3 of the Carri ge of Goods by
Sea Act. : : nee o
The judgment is affirmed,
Molinari, P. J., and Elkington, J., concurred.
*
30 ny | daeaite
on _ Appendix II
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT
(46 U.S.C. $§ 1300-1315)
46 USC.
§ 1300—Be it enacted by the Senate isl House of Repre:
sentative of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, that every bill of lading or similar document of
title which is evidence of a contract for the-carriage of goods
by sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign °
trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions of this Act.
- TITLE I
"1301 Szcrioy 1, When ‘used in this Act—
(a) The term “carrier” includes the owner or the charter-
er who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.
(b) The term “contract of carriage” applies only to con-
tracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar
‘document of title, insofar as such doeument relates to the
carriage of goods by 8ea, including any bill of lading or any
similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a
charter party from the moment at which such bill of lading
or similar document of title regulates the relations wee
a carrier and a holder of the same.
(c) The term “goods” includes goods, wares, aidlinis
- dise, and articles: of every kind whatsoever, except live -
animals and cargo which by the contract of carriage is’
stated as being carried on deck and is so carried.
(d)- The term “ship” : means any vessel used for the car-
riage of goods by sea.
Appmdic ae
. (e) The term “carriage of goods” covers the period from
_ the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when
they are discharged from the ship. : ae Sere. Reeve
§ 1303 Szc. 3. (6) Unless notice of loss or damage and the
general nature of such loss or damage be given in writing
_ to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or
at the time of the removal of the goods into the custody of
the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract
of carriage, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of
the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the
' bill of lading. If the loss or damage is not apparent, the
notice must be given within three days of the delivery.
, Said notice of loss or damage may be endorsed upon the
receipt for the goods given by the pefson taking delivery
thereof. ‘e.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the
goods has at the time of their receipt been the subject of
joint survey or inspection... ;
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged
from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is
brought’ within one year after delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have been delivered: Provided, ~
That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or con- °° -
cealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact
shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring
suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have-been delivered. aud
"In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage
the carrier and the receiver shall give ali reasonable facili-
ties to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods,
- $1804 Szc. 4. (4) Any deviation in saving or attempting
to save life or property at Sea, or any reasonable deviation -
. Shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this .
> Appendiz
Act or of the contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not
be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom: Pro-
vided, however, That if the deviation is for the purpose of
loading or unloading cargo or passengers it shall, prima
facie, be regarded as unreasonable.
(5) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be
or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection
with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding
$500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in
case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency, |
unless ‘the nature and value of. such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the
‘bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not
be conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of
the carrier, and the shipper another maximum amount than
that mentioned in this paragraph may be fixed: Provided,
That such maximum shall not be less than the figure above ©
named. In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than
the amount of damage actually sustained.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible i in
any event for loss or damage to or in connection with the
’ transportation of the goods if the nature or value thereof
has been knowingly and fraudulently misstated by the ship- |
per in the bill of lading. | :
§ 1305 Szc. 5. A carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in |
whole or in part all or any of his rights and immunities or
to increase any of his responsibilities and liabilities under
this Act, provided such surrender ‘or increase shall be em-
bodied ini the bill of lading issued to the shipper.
The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to char-
ter parties; but if bills of lading are issued in the case of a
' Appendix | 33
ship under a charter party, they shall comply with the
terms of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be held to pre-
vent tlie insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful provision
regarding general average, __ : |
§ 1306 Szo. 6. N otwithstanding the provisions of the pre- ,
ceding sections, a carrier, master or agent of the. carrier, -
and a shipper shall, in regard to any particular goods be at -
liberty to enter into any agreement in any tertus as to the
responsibility and liability of the carrier for such goods,
and as to the rights and immunities of the carrier in respect
of such goods, or his obligation as to seaworthiness (so far
as the stipulation regarding seaworthiness is not contrary
to public policy), or the care or diligence of his servants or
agents in regard to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage,
custody, care, and discharge of the goods carried by sea:
Provided, That in this case no bill of lading. has been or
shall be issued and that the terms agreed shall be embodied _
in a receipt which shall be a nonnegotiable document and
shall be marked as such. _ Beet gods
Any agreement'so entered into shall have full legal effect: --
Provided. That this section shall not apply to ordinary
commercial shipments made in the ordinary course of trade
but only to other shipments where the character of condition
of the property to the carried or the circumstances, terms,
and conditions under which the carriage is to be performed
are such as reasonably to justify a special agreement, | |
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.