Appendix — Sligh v. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens Railroad

Supreme Court brief1967

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

APPENDIX A its $ 9°.

OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND ORDER

This is an action brought under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act, 45 USCA’ 51, et seq., for injury alleged to

have been sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the de-

fendant’s negligence. ‘The complaint alleges that defendant

is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate com-

merce; that plaintiff is an employee of defendant; that on

February 7, 1964, plaintiff was injured when ordered to

help move a motor car from defendant’s tracks; that

defendant’s negligence consisted of not providing sufficient

employees to move the motor car and of failing to maintain

its roadbed so that plaintiff had a safe footing; and that |

plaintiff suffered a permanent injury to his back. —

_ Defendant’s answer admits that it is a¢ommon carrier — *

by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; that plaiatiff

was one of its employees; and that the action is governed by _, -

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The defendant fur-

ther admits that plaintiff’s supervisor. instructed him and. |

three other employees to move the motor car, but denies

any negligence on its part and denies that plaintiff suffered

a permanent injury to this back as alleged. By way of a

second defense and in diminution of damages; defendant

plead contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The case was tried before me without a jury. It js the.

function of the trial judge when a case is tried without

a jury to weigh and appraise all of the conflicting testi-

mony, accepting that which is believed and rejecting that

which is not believed. -Burgess v. Farrell Lines, Ine. (CA

4) 385 F. 2d 885 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 1004.

In compliance with Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil |

Procedure (28 USCA), I find the facts specially and state

my conclusions of law therean, in the shove cause, as

follows: .

eee 10 Denpy RoBERT aaa Vv. em, NEWBERRY & Laurens R. R. Co. -

_ FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff was an extra gang laborer on the defendant

railroad and had worked for it since 1934, with a brief

interruption in his railroad service in- 1944 or 1945. His

immediate supervisor or gang foremgn was J. E. Sligh.

_ On February 7, 1964, the defendant was completing the

process of converting a spur track at Pinckney Street,

Columbia, South Carolina, into a side track. Prior to the

'- conversion, the railroad main line crossed Pinckney Street |

over a paved crossing. The spur track, coming off the

main line at some distance away from. Pinckney Street,

did not cross or reach Pinckney Street. The railroad was

extending the spur track across Pinckney Street and join-

_—ing it to the main line 6n the other side of Pinckney Street,

thus creating at Pinckney Street two parallel tracks,. one -

being the main line and the other being the side track.

In extending the spur track across Pinckney Street, the

railroad had to make a crossing of Pinckney Street, and

: incident thereto some dirt was graded and moved. In the °

: grading operation, however, the dirt was moved and. piled .

on the side of the spur track away from the main line, and ©

no dirt got on the main line crossing.

Toward the end of the working day on February 7, 1964,

the foreman gave an order to remove the motor car, which |

the men had been using, from the main line. The motor

car was on the main line at about the center of the paved

crossing over: Pirickney Street. The width of the paved

crossing was 37.5 feet.

The motor car was nine feet three inches long. The ~

motor of the car is in the front end, and the rear end is

the light end. Two parallel bars may be extended from

'.» each end of the car and these bars are three feet long when -

extended. The total weight of the car is 2,430 pounds.

_ When a motor car is moved, the two parallel bars on the

‘rear (light) end are extended, and four men lift the rear

end up (two men\ at each bar), “walk it around” so its

rear wheels are off the tracks, then the motor is activated |

——

APPENDIX — | be: eH ‘

and the car is driven under its. own power to the. place

where it is to be parked. The entire motor car is never com-

_ pletely lifted. Occasionally the front bars are extended and .

members of the crew bear down.on these while the other

members of the crew liftuponthe rear, 20

‘- A motor car is usually removed with four men as de-

geribed, and this is a sufficient number. The motor car

can be removed -with\ only three men, and occasionally, in

an emergency, two men can do the job. The plaintiff had

removed -this and similar motor cars on many previous

occasions, averaging about two or three times a week since

1945. é ;

When the order was given to move the car on February

7, 1964, the car was moved by the plaintiff, C. D. Bouk-

night, Jessie Lybrand and Sebie Letsy. All of these men

- had performed this duty many times before. The plaintiff's

~ eo-workers exerted their full’ strength in moving the car.

The removal was done with the motor car resting at about

the center of the crossing, where the paved surface was

free of dirt and debris. The plaintiff had an opportunity

to see and was aware of the condition of the track where

the motor car was being removed.” Plaintiff knew his own

_strength and capacity. He asked for no additional help.

. The other men present had other jobs to do, clearing up the

site and putting tools away before leaving for the day.

None of the men assisting in the lifting observed anything

leading them to believe plaintiff suffered an. injury when

he lifted the motor car. No complaint was made at the

_ time to the foreman, nor did he observe anything wrong.

with the plaintiff after the moving operation. Nevertheless,

the plaintiff visited his personal physician Dr. Sidney E.

Carter of Newberry, South Carolina, the next day and -

’ complained that he had hurt himself “while lifting rails”.

The doctor diagnosed difficulty as an acute back sprain.

After conservative treatment plaintiff was permitted to

return to work on February 17, 1964, Although.he told

‘ his foreman he had had trouble with his back he did not .

request light duty, nor did he report any injury to his .

.

12 Denny Rosert SLicH v. CoLuMBIA, NEWBERRY & Laurens R. R. Co.

back on the job. On February 17, 1964, he was put on a:

gondola car unloading cross-ties with two other men and

performed other duties. Three men are sufficient for un-

loading cross-ties. No complaint was made by him to the

defendant that his work was too strenous.

On February 20, 1964, plaintiff returned to Dr. Carter,

- who found about the same symptoms as before and again

prescribed conservative treatment. On February 24, 1964,

Dr. Carter finding nothing further wrong withthe plain-

‘tiff sent him to Dr. E. M. Lunceford, jan orthopedic sur-

geon of Columbia, South Carolina. s

Dr. Lunceford saw the plaintiff on March 2, 1964, and.

‘took x-rays. The x-rays showed a-congenital abnormality

of the first sacral vertebra. He found that the first sacral.

vertebra, instead of beirig rigid and immobile as in a

normal man, was movable and acting as a sixth lumbar

vertebra. He also found certain roughness or arthritic’

changes in the articular surfaces. None of this, he said, .

‘was referable to any alleged accident of February 7, 1964.

The lumbarization of the first'sacral vertebra was con-

genital and the arthritic changes were the result of years

of hard work, stress and strain and not the result of any-

thing occurring at any onetime. .

‘Dr. Lunceford’s diagnosis was essentially the same . as

that of Dr. Carter, a back sprain, for which he prescribed.

conservative treatment. The plaintiff responded well and

after the third or fourth visit, the muscle spasm and neur-

ological deficit observed earlier disappeared.

On july 28, 1965, almost a year and a half after the

alleged injury, Dr. Lunceford performed an_ operation,

correcting the congenital defect and cleaned the arthritic

accretions from the articular surfaces. Both of the con-

ditions which the operation corrected pre-existed the al-

leged injury of February 7, 1964, Dr. Lunceford testified

that there is every indication that plaintiff will have

optimum recovery from the operation, But because of a

back weakness disclosed by the congenital. abnormality,

plaintiff should not attempt to lift 150-300 pound objects

| wheel Ad hen maine eee ae ee oe

APPENDIX “2. 5 18

but that he should be able to lift moderately heavy objects

and perform remunerative work. ;

The defendant railroad was: not guilty of negligence as

' alleged in the complaint or as sought to be shown upon

the trial.. Adéquate, experienced and capable personnel

were furnished plaintiff to assist in the removal of the

motor car. The place from which the motor car was re-

moved was adequately maintained and clean of dirt and

debris. Defendant was. not negligent in placing plaintiff

on duty when he returned to work on February 17, 1964.

There was no injury to the plaintiff on February 7, 1964,

as alleged in the complaint, or on February 17,. 1964, as |

plaintiff sought to establish at the trial. :

Even if there had been an injury to plaintiff, as alleged :

‘in the complaint or as he sought to prove, no negligence of

the defendant played any part, even the slightest, in pro-

«ducing the injury.

_ . The bodily complaints onl the medical treatment thereof

were not referable to any negligence ‘on _the part of the

defendant. % :

eumcnrmieie OF LAW

Under the Federal: Employers’ Liability Act “the test of

a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason:

the conclusion that employer negligence played any part,

_ even the slightest, in producing the injury or death\for

which damages are sought.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific

Co., 352 U. S. 500, 506 (1957). However, a railroad is

not an insurer of the employer’s safety, and the bare

occurrence of an injury raises no presumption of negli-

gence, without proof of which there can be no recovery.

os cCracken v.. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.

, (CA 4) 240 F’, 2d 484 (1957). |

“ said by the Four Circuit Court of Appeals in the

recent case of Ambold v.\Seaboard Air Line Railroad Com-

pany, (CA 4) 345 F. 2d 30,.33 (1965) : “While the Rogers

case emphasizes the liberal interpretation that must be

placed upon the statute, and defines the narrowly limited

-

’ .

< vm Kbvencith

Dated:

14 Denpy Roser SLIGH v. CotumsiA, NEwserry & Laurens R. R. Co.

Lf

i

area in which the courts are permitted to disturb jury ver-

| _ dicts in cases of this type, we do not understand the de-

cision to relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving

some act of negligence on the part of the railroad.” . (Cert.

den. 34 LW 3113). .

The Third Circuit Court: of Appeals’ refers to the re-

peated use of the phrase “with reason” in the Rogers case,

and concludes that the Supreme Court indicated no de-

-. parture from the normal requirement that the plaintiff, |

the party with the burden of proof, must .“ ‘present pro- °

bative facts from which the negligence and the casual re-

lation could reasonably be inferred.’” Dessi v. Pennsyl-

vania Railroad Company, (CA 3) 251 F. 2d 149, 151

(1958), cert. den. 356 U. S. 967.

Where there is a conflict between the plaintiff’s testi-

mony and the testimony of other witnesses called by the

_plaintiff, this is to be resolved by the trier of the facts. -

McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.

Co., (CA 4) 240 F. 2d 484 (1957). Where the case is

tried before a judge without a jury, the trial judge is

the trier of facts and has the function of weighing and

appraising the conflicting testimony. Burgess v. Farrell

Lines, Inc. (CA 4) 385 F. 2d 885 (1964), cert. denied,

- 879 U.S. 1004.

Applying the foregoing principles of law, the plaintiff

has the burden of proving that the defendant was .negli-

gent and that such negligence played some part in pro-

- ducing an. injury to the plaintiff, and having weighed the

_ testimony and evidence in this case, in my opinion the

plaintiff has not sustained his burden of giests

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED, That judgment i entered for the

defendant.

C. C. WYCHE

United States District Judge .

Spartanburg, South Carolina, ;

February 14, 1966.

APPENDIX i , | 15.

“ United States Court of Appeals ©

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT -

NO. 10,651

_DENDY ROBERT SLIGH, + Appeller,

—

COLUMBIA, NEWBERRY AND LAURENS |

RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee. _

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH |

CAROLINA AT COLUMBIA SOUTH

: CAROLINA

C..C. WYCcHE, District Judge

i—___

PER CURIAM:

Suing under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 ©

USC 51,:et seq., Dendy Robert Sligh asked damages from

~ the Columbia, Newberry and Laurens Railroad Company,

for injuries he suffered because of the railroad’s alleged —

negligence. The fault charged was the railroad’s failure to ~

provide sufficient employees for the job when they were re-

quired to raise and ‘move a motor car from the rails. Fur-

. ther neglect, the pinintitt declared, was aca he in the rail-

catcpnwtibcareh erhaintich Se wives naan Benalla aide iat entice Aalto S has win tao em iS! Sait os Blinn ERT ads

"pen Sm

BRR A re pn Feel BD WE

16 Denby RoBERT S.icH 'v. Cotums1a, NEWBERRY & Laurens R. R. Co.

--road’s inadequate’.maintenance of the track bed which de-

- nied the plaintiff-employee a secure. footing in this work.

In these circumstances the weight of the car, Sligh charges,

‘over-burdened the employees engaged in the movement,

causing him severé and permanent back injuries.

~ The parties stipulated for a trial without a jury, and

the District Judge on conflicting evidence found no negli-

gence on the part of the railroad which “played some part

in producing an injury to the plaintiff”. J uagment for the

_ defendant followed.

From our examination of the record, on Sligh’s appeal, |

we cannot say that these fact findings were “clearly er-

-roneous”, -F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) ; nor do we observe error of

law in the trial. ‘The judgment of dismissal must stand.

A t firmed.

~s

5

; a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.