Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Peek v. United States
Supreme Court brief1966
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_ UNITED ‘STATES. ‘CORT OF APPEALS —
: Secale, |
Questions Presented
Constitutional Provisions
Reasons for Granting the Writ ..
Argument :
INDEX ee
Eee
— and ‘Oelads Below
Statutory Provision ...
Statement of the Case ?
iy , ae . : :¢ 5 . :
Constantin i ‘
" Agpendieds: a 7 | _ ©
_A-Verdiet of the Unjted States District Court
- Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern. Divi- -
sion, together with the ‘Judgment on the
Verdict .
B—The opinion of the United States: Court of
Appeals for the Highth Circuit
=
| C—The judgment-of the “Unitea States Court of
: Appeals for the ‘Eighth Circuit
D—The order of the United States Court of ae
peals for the Kighth Cirenit denying Petition
for Rehearing és
E—The order of the United States Court of Ap-°
-peals for the = eave sn i mandate.....
ee a INDEX ‘(cowruxvzp) |
aor ee PAGE
eo ' AUTHORITIES CITED
| United States v Vuesae 177 F.2d 833 (Th oi cir. 1949) vee
- . (Ind.):@ . 10. ,
‘ - United Stated v. Scott, 957 F.2d 374 (7th cir. 1958) a oe
e (DL)... a cess 10 |
| Starr’v. United States, 153 U.S. 614... 1B
' ° Constitution of the United‘ States eof America: ‘ “3
, . Sixth Amendment . . weeeeteeee
Statutes: . nee oo gui , ,
18 U,8.05-Se6, 1341 she i feneroaa aa
— U.8.C., Sec. 3006A, Subsection tai, 2 : q .
“Criminal Justice Act of 1964”? .......2, 8, 15, 17, 24
"Federal Bules of Criminal Procedure: =
Bale 16 ... sev e — nee 6
a Rule 15(e):.. re eee 317,25
© ll MN isco ae °°:
MS TR stiri thee thninsriai 15 -
Rule - phones ee 6
i,
ee
-.. IN THE i
af
: SUPREME COURT OF THE
panic
LOYD CARL RAY, Petitioner,
an
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO. THE |
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.
_ EIGHTH CIRCUIT
- >
Petitioner- prays that a Writ ‘of Certiorari. issue to -
review a final judgment. of the United States a of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The verdict of the United States District Court, East-
ern. District of Missouri, Eastern Division, appears in.
Appendix A, together with the Judgment on the Verdict.
The opinion of the United States Court.of Appeals for
the Highth Circuit appears in Appendix B. The judgment
ul
of the said Court of Appeals appears in Appendix C. The ~~.
' order denying appellant’s Petition for Rehearing appears
in Appendix D. The order of the oe court staying |
mandate appears in Appendix mm - ' ee
aa
|
/
JURISDICTION
‘The judgment was ‘entered oh October 21, 1966, and
a ‘rehearing: denied. on November 22, 1966.
The* United States @Burt of Appeals for the Kighth
Cirenit@ordered-a stay of issuance of mandate for a pe-
riod of 30 days from and after November 28, 1966.
tv
~ °
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
‘Point of law not yet decided by this Court. (Q.. #1)
In addition, there is no rule applicable to this precise. a a
case before the court. aa i ate : NA
—
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his rights under’ the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Bee. 3006A, Sub-
- section (e), as amended. .
2 Trial court crred i in making statements and com-
ments with reference to the case, in the presénce of the
_. Jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and deprived
him of a fair and impartial trial.
3. Trial court erred in ignoring petitioner’s motion
- for discovery and inspection at time of arraignment, and
his motion for funds with which to transport witnesses. ~
4. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his right to a fair and -
impartial trial due to evan hah esti articles dur.
' ing and before ial
Pas)
-
ya
———
&- Court erred in denying petitioner’s motion for Bill :
of Particulars. ie ae ais ’ i
°
ye 6. Appellate oun \ ame in giving binding force to.
recedents not applicable to this. case. . ‘
7. Petitioner was deprived of his right i, effective
assistance of counsel under: the Sixth Amendment to the
+, Constitution.
8. Petitioner was de Bent of his right to a fair trial
under Rules 17 (b) and“15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal -Procedure, relating to funds for = inflgmnts to °.
secure witnesses for trial.
9. Trial court erred in admitting into evidence © ma- |
terial of a questionable and improper nature. -.
10. Trial counsel was “incompetent to try a case. of
‘this complexity, and the Court erred in appointing counsel.
who by his own words was not at all familiar with Crim- __
inal ‘Law and rierieeeed or with the Criminal Justice Act 3
of —
ae CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
a
Axunnasnine 6. TO THE Constrrurion OF THE Unrrep. Srarzs ,
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL .
, PROSECU TIONS | :
“> all. criminal prosecutions, the scoused: shall enjoy
the right to a speedy. and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have —
been committed, which district shall have been previously _
ascertained. by law, and to be informed of the nature and
_, tesses against him; to have compuléory process for ob-..:
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
a , poe ' ° - :
—/ : e . —3— ; : : .. shy wr , .
P > . ‘
Me ee ; ’ sale isa EMA ote
taining iia in his ood, and to have the Assistance
| of Counsel for his defense.
” STATEMENT OF THE CASE
_ Loyd Carl Ray was indicted on eleven counts of mail ’
‘fraud under: Title 18, U.S.C., “Sec. 1341. The indictment .
was returned on the 23rd day of April, 1964. | |
The indietment was based upon allegations that Loyd
,.Carl Bay, acting ynder an alias of Willard T. Morton,
“set up a scheme to defrand a number ‘of citizens of St.
Louis, Massouri during the months of October, .November
and December of 1963, by use of the mails. (See indict-
ment and Bill of Particulars.) 7
The indictment specifically alleged that the said de-
fendant, Ray, set up a scheme or artifice to defrayd and
for obtaining money by: false fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations and promises in that he (Ray), acting under
the name of Willard T. Morton, did personally set-up the
Willard. T..Morton Travel Agency in Room 208, 7603
_ Forsyth Blvd., in Clayton, Missouri; that he opened two
bank accounts in the” City of St. Louis, Misouri; that he
* hired two salesmen and a secretary; and placed ads in
- various--newspapers to induce prospective’ purchasers to »
buy a tour to:Hawaii for the sum of $485.00. Two such
tours were scheduled for December of 1963, one called
the Christmas Trip and the other the New Year’s Trip.
_ Prior to the scheduled departure dates of the tours, the
travel agency closed and Willard T. Morton disappeared.
None of the clients received tickets to go on the trip or
any of their money’ back. In this connection, Morton was
- alleged to have used the mails to obtain the money in ad-
vance without ever having any intention of providing the
tours. The government claimed that the defendant, Loyd
a , Se .
. Carl Ray, was the ‘same Willard y “Morton who perpe-
* trated the fraud.
Defendant, Ray testified that, prior to his arrest,. he
had never been in St. Louis, nor had he at any time used .
tlie namd of Willard T. Morton. (p. 481, Reporter’s Tran-_
script, Vol. #2.) Ray further testified that he had in fact
been in the City of Denver, Colorado, on ‘each and every —
- day during the time Morton was operating in St. Louis ~
(ie, October, November and December, 1963), and that .
he had witnesses who had seen him every day in Denver
during this period; customers at his office, rn busi-
ness associates, etc.
Loyd Carl Ray was arrested in — Colorado on
March 14, 1964, and was brought before the U.S. Com-
missioner there. Ray was keleased on $5,000.00 bond and
- a preliminary hearing was set for mid-April. The prelim:
inary hearing was postponed until May 11, 1964 at the
request of the United States Commissioner. Said hearing
was to be in Denver, Colorado, the. place of Mr. Ray’s
vesidence. ; |
Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant Ray. ar-
ranged for some 40 witnesses (Denver residents) to ap-
pear at the hearing on his behalf and subpoenas were is-
sued on April 22, 1964.
However, on April 23, 1964 the Seitinnbit mentioned
above was retu:.ed in St. Louis, Missouri, allowing no
opportunity for Ray to clear himself at a preliminary
hearing in Colorado. This was in spite of the fact that
the United States Attorneys in both Denver and St. Louis
had been notified of the many people who could place Ray
in Denver during the time Morton was operating in St.
Louis, and reminded of the gravity of the mistake in in-
ee
dicting the wrong man. It is herein submitted to the court
that the secret and (from the defendant’s point of view)
premature indictment was returned because of, rather than
« in spite of, said notification.
On Friday, May 1, 1964, defendant Ray was notified
. bya letter, dated April 30, 1964, from the United States
‘District Court Deputy Clerk to appear the following Mon-
day, May 4, 1964, at 10:00 a.m., before the United States
District Court in’ St. Louis for arraignment.
.On May 4, 1964 Ray came before the court for ar- .
raignment (Hon. John K. Regan, U.S. Dist. Judge). A
plea of not guilty was entered to each of counts 1 to 11,
inclusive. A motion for discovery and inspection pursuant
to. Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was
made by Ray, speaking for himself. Said motion was ig-
nored by the court. Ray also. made a motion, speaking
. for himself, for funds with which -to transport. his wit-
nesses from Denver. to St. Louis. This motion was also }
‘ignored by. the court.
The court appointed J id M. Goodwin to poner
the defendant, presumably urider Rule 44 of the Federal
. Bules of Criminal Procedure.
7 case subsequently came on for trial on the 14th
day of September, 1964 (p. 2; Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist.
Court, No. 64Cr87(2)). On September 17, 1964, at the
hour of 11:15 p.m., ihe jury informed the court that they
‘‘could never reach a verdict,” whereupon the court de-
clared a mistrial, ordered the cause reset for trial (p. 3,
Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. .64Cr87(3) ). For
reasons unknown, the court would not allow defense at-
terney to poll the jury, or even talk to any of the’ queaee,
after the trial was over..
dstiiee Scion
Se
_ The cause came on aia for trial on October 25,
1965, whereupon, on October 28, 1965, the defendant, Loyd
Carl Ray, was convicted on nine of the eleven counts of |
indictment, to-wit: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. (p. 4,.
Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. 64Cr87 (3).)
On November 19, 1965 defendant appeared before
the United States District Court in ‘St. Louis for sentenc-
ing. Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or in
the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. Loyd Carl
Ray was then sentenced: to a four-year term and a three-
year term, to run consecutively, for a total of seven years.
The cause was appealed before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and argued on
September 12, 1966. Judgment of the trial court was af-
firmed by appellate court on October 21, 1966. :
_Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was filed on
November 10, 1966. An order denying Petition for Ke.
hearing was issued on November 22, 1966.
_ An order staying issuance of mandate pending cer-
tiorari proceedings in Supreme Court of the United States :
‘was entered ¢ on November 2, 1966..
"REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:
This petition is submitted in the hope that I am not
laboring under a misapprehension in my belief that jas-
tice should and will prevail. The law ought not to be so _
inflexible as to send a mari to jail for seven years for a
crime he did not commit, simply because there is perhaps
no legal ‘‘loop-hole,” or more properly, reversible error.
If there ‘is error at all, a new trial should be granted if
for no reason other than that seven years is a long, long i
time. ;
=o
The appellate court states in the opinion, “The
examination of the entire . record shows .. .’’ The
point i is,, that court did not have all of the an in the
case, any more than ‘the jury had all the facts in the case.
They had substantially only the government’s side of it
since the defendant was blocked at every turn from pre-
senting his side, simply due to inexperience and lack of
money, to say nothing of a prejudiced judge.
_ If the Supreme Court will not review this case, then
_ an innocent man will go to prison and that i is a wer good
reseon for granting the writ.
ARGUMENT
Point 1— Petitioner was deprived of his rights under
‘the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 3006A,
Subsection (e), as amended.
The defendant for all practical purposes was deprived cs
of his rights under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18
US.C., Sec. 3006A, as amended.
Subsection (e) of the Act dunks states that ‘Sexpert
or other services necessary, to an adequate defense’’ shall
be made available to an indigent defendant. The appellate
court argues in the opinion that “It is somewhat difficult .
to grasp appellant’s reasons’ (for wanting dase ate
expert).
) The ienpoctdnee of his own fingerprint expert to the
defendant can be gleaned from the fact that there was no
fingerprint evidence at the first trial, which ended in a
hung jury. The first trial was fully one year after the
alleged fraud was perpetrated. Then another year later,
at the second trial, all of a sudden the prosecution had
— This was a full two years after Tie offense.
Se
a piel
One must also consider that said fingerprints were on
papers and checks which were handled by the defendant
at the first trial, and one fingerprint was on a book pur-
portedly given to the postal inspector by John Primm, a
man who was a salesman in the scheme (p. 194,: Reporter’s |
Transcript, Vol. #1), who was actually an accessory to
the crime, and who had every reason to. ‘‘cooperate”’ with
_the postal inspector. Mr. Primm was not charged with
anything.
The fingerprints were ‘atu prints. It is hatin
that a qualified expert would have found that the prints
were not two years old, if he were asked to determine age.
The government contended that the fingerprints were
not available at the first trial because a ‘‘new process
which had just become known,’’ with which to develop
latent prints, was not known at the time ef-the first trial. —— 7
This contention is ; contradicted by government witness
Mooney (p. 339, Reporter’s Transcript, . Vol, #2). -
. Answer, ‘‘Yes, sir. This is a process developed by the —
Swedish scientist in 1954, called ninhydrin, and this will
‘develop a print. The ast means nothing on a print.”
(emphasis added. -
Since the process had been known since. 1954, aie
was ample time for the prosecution to use it between
the time of the purported crime in December 1963, and .
the first trial in September 1964. It is taxing credulity &
little to have fingerprints at the second trial, in October —
of 1965, when none could be found in 1963 or 1964.
ri ie? government further contended that certain of
the documents upon which they had developed latent prints
were not available to them before the first trial. However,
‘most of the customers from. whom the documents were
—10—
- procured were named in the indictment as being the
people defrauded. Government witness Kelley (p. 218,
Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1) testified that he gave the
“ letter, Government Exhibits 144 and 145, to Mr. Schnicker
on December 20, 1963. One must conclude that the govern- —
_ ment had the papers all the time, at both trials.
There are more examples, but the above will serve
, to show that an expert of his own would have. been im- =
. portant to the defendant.
_ Point 2— Trial court erred in ‘making re and
comments with reference to the case, in the presence of the
jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and —
him of a fair and impartial trial. |
It is conceded that the trial judge has a sini
amount of latitude in the conduct of a trial, but it is re-
spectfully submitted that reasonable norms were exceeded
to the defendant’s prejudice. :
_ The influence of a trial jnilee wen a pate is necessar-
ily and properly of great weight. (United States v. Levi,
- 177 F.2d 833 (7th cir. 1949 (Ind.)): In this connection it
was held in the case of United States v. Scott, 257 F.2d ©
- . 374 (7th cir. 1958) (Tll)) that it was the duty of the trial
judge to maintain an atmosphere of impartiality.
On page 268, Volume #1 of the Reporter ’s Tran-
_ -s¢ript, the court made the statement that both he, the
government’s attorney, and the government’s witness Wil-
z son, all worked for the postal department. The Circuit
Court considered this harmless error. How could this be
harmless? (see Opinion.) I have been taught since grade
' school that the government was. divided into. three
’ branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.
Yet the judge by his remark destroyed this fundamental
\
lh
_ concept by stating that he was aligned with the executive
| . ® brazich of the government insfead of ‘the judicial.-In addi-
. tion, the jury could conclude from the court’s remark in
the alternative that the postal department was the ——
department.
In the appellate sane ’s opinion a Cireuit-Sadge pa |
states: ‘‘The (trial): court’s comments. that he was sim-
ply trying to-see that ‘justice was done’ comes close
| \ . exceeding _ the bounds of judicial propriety when
\ taken in full context of the situation. It is doubtful the
trial judge intended it as such ....’? and ‘‘We submit the
-/ gourt’s charge cannot rectify actual and real prejudice..
< ' However, the charge does make clear to the jury the court
did not intend to influence . . .’’? (emphasis added.)
It is submitted that regardless of what the judge may
_ have intended, it is what he did that counts. The record
cannot show the tone of voice of this judge or his facial
expressions. His friendliness and good will toward all of
the government witnesses was as’ apparent as his hate for -
the defendant and all of his witnesses. He really should
have disqpalified himself because.a lot of his friends were |
victims of the fraud and testified for the government
(i.e, the Mayor, Dr. Clevenger, et al).
The appellate court overlooked J adge Regan’ 8 com-
ments to government witness Herpel (p. 52-53, are 8
Transcript, Vol. #1):
a . Recross — By Mr. Goodwin (defense attorney) :
Pi, ‘‘Question: Well, with reference to this $4,000 check
on December 13th, and the other one on-December 12th for
| three thousand: some odd ate that shows the actual
| cash was Great ‘
en PR Te Se
—12—
*¢ Answer: That indicates that he was.
“Question: That indicates he (Morton) was in theve
on those days, wasn’t it?
‘‘Answer: Yes.
‘The Court: Just a lente Just a minute. Now, pany
it indicate that he was in. there, or that the check was _
_cashed on. that dayt
‘‘The witness: Well; the check, more e likely, the - check
was cash
- Insight as to the judge’ s reason for asain witness
Herpel to change his testimony can be gained from the
record of the first trial. Defendant Ray had_a very good
witness, Layton Dix (p. 456, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol.
#2) (not a relative), who would place him in Denver,
Colorado on December 13th at almost the exact time of
- day when Morton was cashing a $4,000.00 check at his bank
in St. Louis. Judge Regan of course remembered this from |
the first trial.
The appellate court’s opinion sia ‘*He (trial:
judge) should never assume the role -of the prosecutor
or advocate’’ and ‘‘However, his comments should never
unfairly emphasize testimony nor add to or. ane the
. evidence given.”
In the. above example, the trial ri clearly caused
the evidence ~ to be changed.
In the. same opinion it is stated: “Counsel's at-
'. tempt to end his cross examination on a strong point
was virtually destroyed.”’ (by. trial judge.)
At every turn the appellate vent cancedes that the
. trial judge’s comments. were prejudicial, and yet excuses ,
him by saying he didn’t intend any. harm.
<P ys
—13—
|
The harm was done, whether he intended it or not.
I submit that the court’s charge cannot rectify the: -
damage or erase the prejudice from the minds of the jury.
The -court’s attention is ’ directed to the Reporter's
Transcript, Vols. #1 and #2, at the following pages, for
further’ examples of the trial court’s comments: Pp. 51,
52, 53, 60, 83, 19%; 199, 203, 262, 268, 276, 281, 282, 285,
286, 287, 325, 326 (here the Court is misquoting evidence
' concerning no papers in the office, see pp. 13, 14 and 96
for. proof), 327, 328, 419, 424 (here the court improperly
sustained an objection to a question as ‘being repetitious,
when in fact it was not repetitious), 484 (rude), 493, 494,
517, 518, 521, and 531. The court’s animosity can be seen
even in the written word. of the sentencing on pp: 559 and
560. ‘‘The Court (shouting): Tell us # where the money
went...”
_ The cougt’s comment that he wanted to see that “‘jus-
tice, was done’? (p. 285, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1), -
clearly indicates to the jury that such justice could only
be done*by seeing to it that the defendant was convicted...
Such indelible impressions as, the above, upon the minds
of the jury, cannot be removed by.a simple statement in.
the charge that he ‘‘intended”’ no harm. — .
Chief Justice Fuller in Starr v. United States, 153
U.S. 164, says: ‘*The’ influence of the trial judge on the
jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that
his lightest word or intimation\is received with deference,
and may prove controlling. ” (emphasis added.)
. Point 3—Trial court erred in ignoring petitioner’s
motion for discovery and inspection at time ‘of arraign-
ment, and his motion for funds with which to. transport
. witnesses.
14
_ Defendant’s motions should not have been .ignored,.
" even though -they were perhaps improperly made. The}
court, in ignoring said motions, stated that he was going:
to appoint counsel, for the defendant. However at this.
‘point defendant was ng, there to. Tequest counsel, but: .
only to enter a plea of not guilty and to-see about what |
evidence was against him and money to ee wit-
_ nesses from Denver to St. Louis.
‘In a case of such importance to os defendant, it
. would seem that the court, if it truly wanted to see that
‘*justice was done,’’ would not ignore an indigent defend-
ant’s motion, simply because. it was made in other. than ;
. the usual form. fF
Point 4— - Petitioner was eet of his “Fight to a
fair. and impartial trial due to: the prejudicial newspaper _—
articles during and before trial.
‘The court erred in not coskeustinn the jury to ahotain :
from reading newspaper accounts of the trial, until after
the damage had already been done: Said instruction to the .
jury was not made until the second day’ of the trial. By
then the jury had. seen both the morning papers, and
evening papers from the day before. I think one may be
sure that natural curiosity would cause any juror to read
accounts of a proceeding in which he was involved.
The papers ran several columns every day concern-
ing the trial. They stated among other things that Ray
ran a-travel agency in St. Louis. Ray hired certain em-
ployees, Ray did this and Rady did that, as if it were a
fact. They also said that Ray had been arrested previously
in Denver for the same offense (not true), and printed’
' defendant Ray’s picture with the caption ‘‘Willard T.
Morton’’ under it. All of this was on the first day of the
— NE
ib.
j
yo
Point 5 — Court erred in- senciitis petitioner’s motion
for Bill of Particulars. :
By dunrying said motion the .court ‘effectively blocked
defendant’s chances for exercising his rights under the | .
‘ Criminal Justi¢e Act as it pertains to expert witnesses. ~
‘How »xould defendant use or ask for such experts if he
did nwt know. he needed them until it was too late?
_ Point 6— Appellate court erred. in giving Vinding
-force to precedents not applicable to this case.
It i is a salutary rule: of precedent making that a ‘diva |
can give no binding force to. a rule wider than is fairly a |
necessary to decide the actual case before it. In. the opin-
ion, Appellate Court states: “This court cannot but ob-
serve appellant wears shoes similar to a party seeking a
new trial'on newly discovered evidence under Rule 33.
". Such evidence not only must. be material, but -it must be
shown that on a new trial it would probably produce an -
acquittal.” And ‘‘Hindsight can always produce other
witnesses. who could have been called,’ and ‘‘Wé neces-
sarily cannot even know. what such experts might say.”
The court here apparently missed the ‘point of the
entire argument.”There is no contention that defendant’s
evidence is newly discovered, but ‘rather that he was de-
prived of-a fair trial because he was not pars | able
to present what evidénce he had.
. Hindsight is ‘not involved at all. Defendant Negentedliy
asked counsel to try to obtain funds for expérts, both for -
handwriting and fingerprints, and to bring his witnesses
from Denver to St. Louis. Defendant was advised that -
- such request had been made to the trial judge (in cham-
bers) and that’ the judge said ‘‘no.’? The fact. that some
_
of these motions do not ‘appear in the record goes to
point #10, concerning incompetent counsel~
As for the quixotic contention that ‘‘we necessarily
_ eannot even know what such experts might say,’’ it is
submitted that the defendant knows very well what they
might say, since he is in a position to know first hand
‘ that he did not in fact put his fingers on any’ of the docu-
-ments presented by the government, except perhaps
through the trickery of the Postal Inspector and/or the ~
District Attorney, in that they had these documents laying
around on the table during the first trial, for the defend-
ant to handle. See p. 218, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1,
wherein Government witness Kelley testified he gave said
documents to Postal Inspéctor Schicker immediately after
.the offense on December 20, 1963. Inspector Schicker had
these documents in his possession’ for a year. He had
Deed pate cone ah at 2 ene iti Ne a ante.
_ them before, during, and until a few days after, the first -
trial, when he then serit the documents by registered mail
* to the fingerprint expert for examination. The documents
were received by the fingerprint examiner on September
26, 1964 (p. 294, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2). The first
trial was over on ‘September 17, 1964. In that event, the
fingerprints would necessarily be one year too new to be
useful. (Dating from the time of the first tit, one year
after the offense.)
Point 7 — Petitioner was deprived of his right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution. .
e.: Se teak
pS LEE cannot be effective unless counsel is al-
. lowed to present all of his client’s case. Lack of money
should not cause a man. to be unjustly convicted. For all
of the reasons herein named, it is submitted that’ defend-
~
ce isthe Taal ANE Sih amar sD test heme iy inal nahi
as = =
ant had no ‘assistance at all except for the “‘cross exami- .
nation’’ ability of his attorney.
Point 8 — Petitioner was deprived of his right to a
fair trial under. Rules 17(b) and 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of, Criminal Procedure, relating to funds for indi-
gents to secure witnesses for trial.
P _ Assuming (but not admitting) the appellate court is
correct in arguing that petitioner’s right to a fair trial
was not denied under the Criminal ea Act because
(p. 46, Opinion) :
‘“‘The benefits granted under subsection (e) of the
Criminal Justice Act are similar to Rules 17(b) and’
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Kach of these provisions relate to funds for indigents
- _ to secure witnesses for trial.’’ And ‘‘If such services
| were deemed necessary, a sae could have ‘made &
request to the court ...”’ |
ins it follows that his rights under said Federal Bules
of Criminal Procedure were denied, because the fact _Te-
mains that the defendant could not afford to bring his 40
witnesses to’ the trial.
© There cannot be a fair trial ‘ee both sides are
heard. The importance of witnesses when the defense is
alibi and .mistaken identity cannot be sver-emphasized.
‘ Government witness Holden (p. 97, Reporter’ s Tran-
script, Vol. #1), testified Morton was in his’ office in St.
Louis every day, ‘‘Five, six days a week.’? Defendant
Ray’s forty witnesses (see Fletcher, 40 affidavits, p. 365,
Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), would have placed him in
Denver, Colorado every day during this same three-month
: period. Since there is not even a } direct air flight between
iGo «
Denver and St. Louis, it is not. possible to be in both cities
on the same‘day, during business hours (p. 472, Reporter’s
Transcript, Vol. #2). One can conclude that a jury would
acquit Mr. Ray if — had an opportunity to hear all of
the facts.
The Court’s attention is directed to the Supplemental]
' Addendum to the Record, where certain of the above-
mentioned forty- affidavits are reproduced as “examples of:
- what defendant’s witnesses would have said at the trial.
Many of the dates specifically mentioned, placing Ray in
Denver, are in direct conflict with Government evidence
placing Morton in St. Louis, such as the dates Morton _
opened bank accounts, efc. .
The appellate court’s contention that had the defend-
ant wanted these witnesses, ‘‘depositions could have been |
‘taken, or subpoenas issued, all: at government expense,’”
(footnote 6 of the opinion), overlooks fhe fact that
the defendant asked for funds for witnesses at his arraign-
-- ment. Defendant’s counsel, Mr. John Goodwin, again asked
the judge at the first trial, and was told the motion
' would be denied and therefore did not ask again at the
second trial. Admittedly Mr. Goodwin: should have made
another.motion at the second trial,.for the record, but
‘this goes to Point #10, concerning incompetent counsel.
The point here is. that it should be self-evident to
anyone that the defendant would want his‘ witnesses. Ex-
‘cept for the‘lack of money, they would have testified and
the whole thing would have been over at the first trial.
ee technicality, such as a motion not appearing in the |
record, should not prevent a new, and this time fair, trial.
Point 9 — Trial court erred in admitting into evidence
‘material of “a questionable and improper nature. -
ogee cg one — ye
=
The importance of deciding which evidence is proper
or improper can be readily seen. The fingerprint evidence
- presented at the second trial in’ October of 1965 was not
presented at the first trial in September of 1964. The
alleged fraud occurred in October, November. and De-
cember of 1963. After the offense in’ 1963, after Morton
- disappeared with the money, defendant Ray was not iden-
tified and. apprehended because of fingerprints, even
though his fingerprints. are on record due to his service
-record in beth the U.S. Marine me and the U.S. Navy.
‘If the fingerprints were genuine, and if in fact it was
possible to determine that they even belonged to Ray,
then why the great time lapse? Ray was not even arrested
until March of 1964, and then for very questionable rea-
sons, but those reasons are outside the scope of this -
ticular. argument.
If the Samet were actually made at the time
of the offense and it could be determined that they were
Ray’s, it would seem that he would have been identified
and arrested immediately. Particularly, since there has
never been any mystery about his whereabouts. He has
“resided in Denver for the past 16 years, and at the same
address in Denver for the past eight years.
The. question of the time lapse between the offense
and arrest would perhaps be easier to explain than. the
question of why no fingerprint evidence was available at
the first trial. A full year is more than ample time for
the government to develop a fingerprint, if any. existed.
The government’s contention that Postal Inspector
_ Schicker obtained the documents only after the first trial
was over is ridiculous.:In addition to the fact that the
people from whom he obtained said documents were named.
in the original indictment, consider the testimony of gov-
ernment witness Kelley (p. 218, Reporter’ s Transcript,
Vol. #1) concerning government exhibits 144 and 145,
upon which fingerprints are alleged. Mr. Kelley testified .
he gave these documents to the Postal Inspector Schicker
on December 20, 1963. Mr. Schicker did not turn these
documents.in to the laboratory until a few days after
the first trial, i.e. September 26, 1964 (p. 294, Reporter’s
- Transcript, Vol. #2).
The. following objection by defense counsel will be
found at pp. 295-296, Reporter’s Transcript, ‘Vol. #2: “A
—I received these exhibits from Inspector Schicker, and
"was requested to conduct an examination to determine if
any latent fingerprints could be developed on any of these
exhibits. Along with that request, I processed Govern-
ment’s Exhibits 144 through 148 with a ninhydrin process
to develop latent fingerprints, and several latent finger-
prints were developed on these exhibits, sir.’’
Mr. Goodwin—‘‘If the Court please, before we get
any further into this, I want’to object to it for the reason ©
that there is no showing of where these documents were,
other than the fact that he received them in the mail from
- Postal Inspector Schicker. There has been no showing
other than where the documents were originally obtained,
but nothing with reference to where they have been in the -
meantime, in whose possession; and what was done with :
them.’’
"All of the documents upon which fingerprints are al-
leged dre transportable, which causes them to be question-
able and improper in themselvés.
‘On page 191 of the Reporter’s enaihi Vol. #1,
defense counsel Goodwin objected thus: ‘‘If the court
we
pee
please, it speaks for itself’ It is simply a typewritten note.
It hasn’t any signature or anything else on it. It is a type-
written, note. He has no way of knowing who typed this.”
- Whereupon the court proceeded with its own direct -
examination of the witness, as was its custom, and later.
admitted ‘the questionable note into evidence.
The appellate court apparently overlooked the gov-
ernment’s new witnesses: and conflicting testimony when
they state in the opinion: ‘‘In the second trial the gov-
ernment used the same lay witnesses and produced two
new witnesses who were handwriting and fingerprint ex-.
_ ~perts as well.” (p. 33 of the Opinion), and ‘‘Outside of the
testimony concerning the fingerprints, it is agreed the evi- —
dence produced at both trials was generally thé same.’’
The following three government witnesses are examples
of new and untrue testimony. ‘
Mr. McGowan (p. 161, Reporter’s Rineiitel,: Vol.
#1), is the man who runs the Mainlander night club,
where Morton’s pre-tour party was arranged. Obviously,
the government and everyone else knew about Mr. Me-
_ Gowan from the beginning, and yet he did not testify at
- the first trial. The reason was that McGowan did not
identify defendant Ray’s picture as being Morton. (p. 379,
Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2.) Upon learning this, Ray
called upon Mr. McGowan during the time of the first
_ trial (Fletcher, p. 378, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), in
the hope that he (McGowan) would testify for the defense,
since he ‘knew Morton and did not believe Ray was the
.. game person. However, although he knew Ray was not -
Morton, Mr. McGowan did not want to ‘get involved.”’
Upon advice of counsel, defendant did not subpoena Mc-
Gowan ’ because he would -have been at best a reluctant
witness.
During cross examination at the second trial, Mc-
....Gowanr was ‘asked by defense~counsel (p. 170; Reporter’s. ...
. Transcript, Vol. #1), ‘‘In other words, the first confer-
-. ence that you ever had with the Postal Inspector was after
the trial last September; is that your —
Answer — “Yes. 99 6.
7 Question — “Well, then how is it the Postal Inspector
came out to see you after the last trial, and not before?”’
Mr. Gilmore (District Attorney) — -** Your Honor, I
will object to that. a
- The Court —‘It will be sustained.” bie
The court here sustained an improper objection. More
important, the question remains unanswered. Why indeed
would the Postal Inspector not contact perhaps one of the
‘prime witnesses for his case?
It is submitted that McGowan was probably number
one on Inspector Schicker’s list of people to contact, back
in December of 1963. Because McGowan refused to identify
Ray as being Morton, he was not called to testify for the
government. From this. there is the inescapable conclusion
that the government, or at least the people working for the
government on this case, were not at all interested in the
truth, or justice, or the ‘‘whole story,’’ but rather only in
@ conviction. In this connection, there must have been
dozens of people in St. Louis who had dealings with Mor-
ton, but. who would not identify Ray as being the same
man and therefore were not called to testify. The gov-
. ernment’s testimony brought out that.Morton rented an
office, an apartment, placed newspaper ads, had a tele-
phone installed, organized parties, did his banking, lived
and worked in St. Louis for at least three months that we
-_— =
know of. Where then were all of these people? The other
tenants of the office building, or at least the landlord or
~~—.manager? Same thing concerning the apartment building
where he lived; the people from the newspaper, etc.? Out
~ of all the people in St. Louis, the government called very
few witnesses to identify Ray. Even some of the people
from the banks were not the people who actually cashed
- Morton’s checks. They saw them being.cashed from a
distance. (p. 40, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1.) One
‘ must conclude that all these other people contacted in the
government’s investigation would not identify eotentent
_ Ray as being Morton. 3
In the example of McGowan above, it can be seen that
Inspector Schicker was able to get him to change his opin-
_ ion and testify at the second trial, after all. That the meth-
ods used to effect such a chatige in McGowan’s testimony
were probably questionable can be seen in the earlier
example of manufacture of fingerprint evidence.
~The court commented that it did not think Inspector
Schicker was a villain (p. 558, Reporter’s Transcript; Vol.
#2), and that Mr. Schicker was a ‘‘career postal worker,’’
trying to do his job, to whom it makes no difference
‘whether anybody is convicted or not.’”? This was the un-
derstatement of the year. J udge Regan apparently thinks
that being a career postal worker makes one pure as the
driven snow, but I doubt it. If Mr. Schicker is not the
villain, then someqne certainly is, because these things do
not just happen all by themselves.
' Mr. Gross (p. 212, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1) .
___also, did not appear at the first trial. He was a janitor
who cleaned Morton’s office. His testimony stated that
_upon leaving town with all the money Morton told him he .
was going home to ‘Denver. ’”? He then sie to iden-
2;
aa
tity Ray as Morton. Is it really necessary to say this —
testimony was ‘‘made up?” Just consider the big confi-
dence man leaving with all the loot, telling the janitor he
is going home to “Denver. ”
At the first trial, a teller from the Del Mar Bank
_..testified he cashed a check for $4,000.00 for Mr. Morton,
in person, on Friday, December 13, 1963. The teller’s name
- was Mr. Tonsing, I believe, and he placed the time of day.
at about 1:30 pm. Mr. Tonsing said he knew Morton
quite well, well enough in fact that he did not need to re- °
quire any identification before cashing a $4,000.00 check
for him. This teller did not identify Ray as Morton.-
At the second trial, the above described teller did not
appear; another ‘teller (Hartwell, p. 63, Reporter’s Tran-
script, Vol. #1), testified that he cashed the same check
for Morton while Mr. Tonsing was out to lunch. This
_ second teller, Hartwell, did identify the defendant as being
Morton. | The first teller could not be located by the de-
fense. It is submitted that this was ‘‘improper,”’’ to say’
the least. ,
Point 10— Trial cveneél. was incompetent to try a
case of this complexity, and the Court erred in appointing ©
counsel who by his own words was not at all familiar with.
Criminal Law and Procedure, or with the Criminal Jus-
a tice Act of 1964.
The appellate court had no right to assume defense
counsel, John Goodwin, was familiar with the new Crim-
_inal Justice Act of 1964, whén by his own words he was
“not (p. 266, Reporter’ s Transcript, Vol. #1). (Also see
Supplemental Transcript of Record ‘‘This is 4 somewhat\
unfamiliar role for me.’?) The court also makes -much
of the fact that all of the services (for experts and funds
for witnesses) were available with or without the Act.
pa SCT Sar er Oe
: court .
= a
(Opinion, footnote #6): ‘‘Such a contention over-
looks Rules 15(c). and 17(b) of the Fed. B. Crim. P.°
Upon counsel’s ex ‘parte application, within ‘the court’s -
discretion, depositions could have been was: or subpoenas *
issued, all at government expense.”’
(Opinion, footnote #7): : “However, such services
were tae pate a aN ,
(p. 44, ery “Trial ciel did not er any time
request handwriting or fingerprint experts, ass during
or after the trial.’’
(p. 45, opinion) : “Yet no request to hire experts was
made.’’ \
(p. 46, opinion) : ‘“‘If such services were deemed nec- |
essary, re could have made a request to the
oF.
(p. 46, seat “Yet the record ieee re-
quest made . . .? , a ae
It is submitted that if indeed such services were avail-
able, then they not only could have been requested, but
‘should have been requested. at ater
Mr. Goodwin was asked sentaiie by the defendant
to petition the court for funds for such ‘services. The de-
fendant was told by Mr. Goodwin that he had in fact made
such a motion and that it been denied by the court.
' Later’ it was discovered that said motion was not in the
record. Mr. Goodwin then said he had asked the judge
in chambers about funds for witnesses and \ was informed
by Judge Regan that they would be r . It is sub-
mitted that said motions should have ‘been anyway,
for the record. It is also submitted that Mr. Goodwin -
should not have lied to the defendant concerning the fact
96—
that the motions had been made. Defendant would have
made the motion himself if he had known =. Goodwin
had not done so.
Mr. Goodwin.- made practically no objections to the
_ questionable evidence and practices of the government
throughout the trial. The appellate court in the opinion
states, ‘‘There was no objection made at the time’ of ©
‘this examination,”’ in disgussing some of. the trial court’s
- comments.
.Mr. Goodwin withdrew an amortent objection to some
- fingerprint evidenge after a colloquy among the court and —
counsel (p. 296, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2). This
objection should not have been withdrawn. eo
All of the: government’s ‘exhibits were received with- _
— out objection and there was no objection to the charge.
- Mr. Goodwin’s lethargic attitude can be seen in his
_ motion for a directed verdict of acquittal (p. 343, Re-.
- porter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), when he ended said motion
- with, “ey guess.’” -
On pp. 44-45 of the opinion the appillete court said ‘‘It .
is Maier credulity to say trial counsel’ was ‘caught by sur-
prise’ by such evidence. His cross examination demon-
strates a thorough technical knowledge of the subject.’’ |
(fingerprints. ) The court goes on to point out the several
technical .terms used by Mr. Goodwin. However, upon
reading the direct examination of this particular witness,
one will find that such terms. had already been used so
that even the jury understood them. When the U.S.
Marshal testified (p. 239, Reporter’s -Transcript, Vol.
_ #1), that he had fingerprinted the defendant, Mr. Good-
win said that he guessed he’d have to read up on finger-
prints during his lunch hour. This was the extent of his:
. so-called technical knowledge.
—27—
Mr. Goodwin is perhaps a fine civil lawyer. The peti-
. tioner would have no way of knowing. However, this case
was his first and only criminal case in a Federal court.
He relied upon his wits and his ability to.cross examine,
and was pretty good at it, at times, particularly during
the firSt trial when he still had a certain amount of en-
- thusiasm left. He should have ‘been replaced by the court
for the second trial. He had already done a lot. of work,
and just seemed to ‘‘run out of steam,’ at the second
trial. Had he even made just a couple of simple motions
’ for witnesses, the verdict would have been different. If he
was not incompetent, then he was at best indifferent.
The appellate court engaged in a flowery dissertation
on the last page of the opinion in which they say ‘‘the |
lawyer is the master of his client’s case,’’ and ‘‘His de- ©
cision becomes his client’s command, his judgment must
necessarily guide his client’s destiny.”’
It is submitted that: his client should not necessarily |
be bound by counsel’s judgment, when such — is.
80 obviously wrong.
} CONCLUSION |
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reason ‘that
’ every man has an absolute right to. personal freedom and
to ria this petition for a Writ of — should
| me air gris Petitioner ¢ O.
. 1225 South Birch Street
Denver, Colorado 80222
Telephone 757-1076 -
Appearing for himself
‘
\
\
baer Appendix A
— VERDICT OF THE TRIAL COURT
. ‘October 28, 1965
‘¢(Following the recess fer dinner, the jury resumed °
‘ite deliberations. At 9:45 P.M., a verdict of guilty, was re-
__ turned. At the request of counsel for the defendant, the
jury was polled, and the verdict was found to be unani-
mous. enh (p. 557, Reporter’s ee: Vol, #3.) ~
—_— ‘ON THE VERDICT
| November 19, 1965
“THE COURT: Defendant’ * einen for judgment of
acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial, has been
considered by the ‘Court and overruled in all respects. We
are now here for sentencing. Mr. Goodwin, do you -have
anything to say before: sentence is passod?”” (p. 558, al
porter’ s Transcript, Vol. #2. y~. <
“An right, Loyd Carl Ray, if you have nothing fur- :
ee ther to say, the Court now sentences you;-in accordance
- with the verdict which was returned into this court on
October 28, 1965, finding you. guilty in Count One, and
‘the ‘Court sentences you to serve four years in the cus- .
tody of the Attorney General of the United States, there
to remain until said sentence is complied with or you are
released by due process of law.
“On Count Two, i in accordance with the verdict of the
jury, the Court now sentences you to serve three years
in the custody of the Attorney Genera] of the United .
States, there to remain until said sentence is complied with
or you are released by due process of law; this sentence
to be consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count One;
=a
oe ee one eke) ee Ne Cee ee
- ,
Oe res Le ee 0 ry walt at ot ns it ae a i atin Shin Aa : ~ ~
- .
however, the sentence in Count Two will ni pursuant to
the provisions of Section 4208 (a) (2), which gives the
_ prison authorities the right to determine when you will
be released.
‘‘Pursuant to the ide, of the jury in the verdict
returned in this court on October 28, 1965, in. relation to
Count Three, the Court now sentences you to serve four
years in the custody of the Attorney General of the United
‘States, there to remain until said sentence is complied with
or you are released ‘by due process of law; this sentence
to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count:
One.
“In relation to Count Six, or to the verdict of
the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on
October 28, 1965, the Court now sentences you to serve |
three years in the custody of the Attorney. General of the ' |
United States, there to remain ‘until said sentence is com-
plied with or you are released by due process of law; this
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence:imposed in
Count.Two, but consecutive to the sentence imposed in
Counts One and Three, but to. be served according to the
provisions. of Section 4208 (a) (2).
‘In Count Seven, pursuant to the verdict of the jury
‘finding you .guilty, returned into. this court on the 28th .
day of October, 1965, the Court sentences you to serve
four years ‘in the custody of the Attorney General of the
United States, there to remain until said sentence is com-—
plied with or you are released by due process of law this
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence imposed
in One and Three.
‘‘Count Eight, pursuant to the verdict of the jut,
finding you guilty, returned into this court on the 28th —
‘day of October, 1965, the Court sentences you to serve
oe?
plied with or you are released by due process of law; this
sentence to run concurrently with the three-year sentence.
but to be in accordance with Section 4208 (a) (2) of the
United States Code.
‘‘Count Nine, einai to the verdict of the jury
finding’ you guilty, returned into this court on the 28th —
day of October, 1965, finding you guilty, the Court now
~ sentences you to serve four years in the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States, there to remain
until said sentence is complied with or you are released
by due process of law; this sentence. to run concurrently
with the other four-year sentences.
‘In relation to Count Ten, pursuant to the verdict
of the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on
the 28th day of October, 1965, the Court now sentences
you to serve three years in the custody of the Attorney —
General of the United States; there to remain: until said
- sentence is complied with or you are released by due pro-
cess of law; this sentence to run consécutively to the four-
year sentence, but to be pursuant to Section 4208 (a) (2),
Title 18, United States Code. i
‘In relation to Count Eleven, pursuant to the viahes
of the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on,’
the 28th day of October, 1965, the Court now sentences you
to serve three years in the custody of the Attorney Gen-
_ eral of the United States, there to remain until said -sen-
of law; this sentence’ to be consecutive to the four-year _
tenee is complied with or you are released by due process
sentence, but be in accordance with the’ provisions of Sec-
tion 4208 (a) (2), for a total of seven years.’: (pp 560-
563, Pe: s Transcript, Vol. #2.)
. three years in the custody of the Attorney General of the -
United States, there to remain until said sentence is com-
| 31
Appendix B-
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit.
No. 18,235. °
‘Loyd Carl Ray, pone org
v.
United States of ‘America, anillan:
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.
[October 21, 1966.]
Before VoczL, Chief J udge, Van OosteRHouT and ton
Circuit J —. | .
Lay, Circuit ‘J udge.
Loyd Carl Ray was indicted on eleven counts of walt
fraud under Title 18, U.S.C., §1341-in April of 1964.
The indictment charged that Ray acting under the alias of
Willard T. Morton, set up a scheme to defraud a number
of citizens by use of the mails. The scheme involved was
to induce prospective purchasers to buy tours to Hawaii.
A travel agency office was set up in St. Louis. Two sales-
men and a secretary were hired by Morton. Brochures
and various majlings were sent out-to attract a clientele.
The tours cost $485.00 each and were scheduled for De-
cember of 1963. Just before the trips were to take place,
‘ one called the Christmas Trip and the other the New
SARE PRIS EMA.
4
rt ah
rs
= on,
4 : aialetihis
Oe ON en Se a
Ee are a spines ela a ita Rai ei BIS SEA RP AR ei I te
.
Years Trip, the pre-trip parties were called off. The cli-
ents never received any tickets to go on the trip or any
of their'money back. The travel agency closed and Morton
disappeared. The government claimed there was never
any intention to provide the tours and that the defendant,
Loyd Carl Ray, was the same Willard T. Morton who
perpetrated the fraud.
Ray denied that he was Willard T. Morton and also
denied that he was ever in St. Louis during the time the
mail fraud“took ‘place. He produced relatives and lay
witnesses to. establish that “he was in Denver at all times
in question. Ray operated a travel agency in Denver dur-
ing the same period of time (October-December, 1963).
This case was originally tried in September 1964, and
ended in a hung jury. A new trial was ordered. On
~ October.25, 1965, the second trial began. A jury returned
a verdict against the defendant Ray ‘on nine of the eleven
counts of the indictment.
Mr. J chin Goodwin, a St. aii oe ee was appoint-
ed in 1964 to represent Mr. Ray before the first trial. He
acted as defense counsel in both trials. During the course
of the second trial Mr. Goodwin was reappointed: under
the Criminal Justice: Act, Title 18, U.S.C. §3006A as:
amended.’ Mr. Ray at that time qualified as an indigent
under:the Act. Appellant has retained other attorneys to Ne
perfect this appeal. :
Prior to the first trial, a satin for a bill of puitic: |
ulars under Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 7(f) was submitted on
behalf of Ray, which contained the following inquiry :
“Whe Criminal Justice Act was 1 August 20, 1965. On Ma
1964, tlie court a ted John win to resent the def
Ray under Rule 44 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. For authority of such °
Pn Se CS Wh ee ee oe ee
'‘*Please state the basis upon which it is alleged in
the indictment that.the said Willard T: Morton is the
same person as the defendant Loyd Carl ‘Ray?”’
’ The court, sustained the government’s objection to this
question. No further motion for a bill of particulars was —
. filed before the.second trial: No error is alleged herein
°as to the court’s ruling on the first ed of particulars
submitted.
In the first trial the government used certain hand-
writing experts, as well as a number of lay witnesses, who
identified Ray and Morton, the proprietor of the Willard
T. Morton Travel Agency, to be one and the same person.
) In the second trial the governaant used the same lay
witnesses and produced two new witnesses who were hand-
writing and ‘fingerprint ‘experts as well. These. experts,
Simeon Wilson from Chicago, Illinois, and Donald Gilbert
Mooney of Washington, D. C., were both connected with
the Post Office. Department Identification Laboratory.
They compared Ray’s handwriting with that of Morton.
and determined that they were written by the same hand.
In addition, they testified that Ray’s fingerprints were
the same as those taken from certain documents and a
book that had been in the possession of Morton in St.
‘Louis: Outside of the testimony concerning the finger-
prints, it is agreed the evidence nr at both trials
. was generally the same.
_ Appellant raises two pelate of error on this appeal.
First, the court erred in making certain comments preju-
dicial to Ray depriving him of a fair and impartial trial.
Secondly, the appellant was deprived of his rights under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), as”
‘amended.
aes Appellant calls our attention to the trial court’s exam-
- ination of the first witness Shannon. After recross ex-
amination thé following questions. and answers took place:
‘The Court: Now Mr. Goodwin is asking you
about Morton, and Mr. Gilmore is askin you about,
the ‘defendant. Do you distinguish betwlen Morton oe
and the defendant?
‘‘The Witness: I think I did in relation——
; . ~ “The Court: Are they the same person?
‘‘The Witness: They are the same person, as far
- as I am concerned. Yes, sir. .
“The Court: All right.
_**The Witness: Mr. Ray is ‘Morton to me.
_ The Court: Any other questions, gentlemen?
‘‘Mr. Gilmore: No further questions.
‘‘The Court: All right. Step down.’’.
There was no objection made at the time of this examina-
tion. ; .
It is obvious from this interrogation the trial court |
wanted to know if the particular witness distinguished’ be-
tween Morton and the ‘‘defendant’’, Ray. One of. the
chief roles of the trial judge is to see that there is no
misunderstanding of a witness’s testimony. The judge
’ has a duty to comprehend what a witness says as much
as it is his duty to see that the witness communicates with
the jury in an intelligible manner. A trial judge can do
this in a fair and unbiased way. His attempt to do so
should not be a basis of error. Where the testimony is
confusing or not altogether clear the alleged ‘‘jeopardy’’ .
to one.side caused by the clarification of a witness’s state- |
ment is certainly outweightd by the desirability of factual -
understanding. The trial judge should strive toward ver-
dicts of fact rather than verdicts of confusion. There is .,
certainly no error on this point. McCoy v. Blakely, 217 |
F.2d 227; Nat’l Dairy Products -Co. v. United States 350
F. 2d 321 (1961).?
During the course of the cross examination of the ex-
pert Wilson, Mr. Goodwin asked the witness:
| ane And you and Mr. Schicker’ (post office in-
spector) actually have the. same employer, do you not,
sir?
‘A. Sure.
‘*Q. Post Office? ;
‘‘The Court: So does Mr. Saisie (government
prosecuting. attorney) and so dol. —
‘‘Mr. Goodwin: Well, I don’t—that is all.”
_ After recross by Mr. Goodwin with the expert Wilson,
the court questioned the witness. Appellant contends
this is further error. The court’s interrogation was
prompted by Mr. Goodwin’s last question to the witness,
which was as follows:
. *£Q. What you were saying is that you were trying
to say that there is a mathematical daicaameieds here.
It is by no means a certainty?
A, That would be correct.’’
The court then asked the following questions: )
‘The Court: Well, it is a mathematical probabil-
_ ity based on your pgaet as an —_ in this anes, E
isn’t it?
: 6A. This is correct. |
‘“‘The Court: And have you ever found where
these mathematical“probabilities existed —— ,
‘Mr. Goodwin: If the Court please, I’d like to
object to this.
*In the McCoy case, Chief Judge Vogel said: _
“A trial e- not only the right, but also the du
and lead the urors in the interests of justice” 217 F at 23.
>
“The Court: Well, I want to get it straight in
the record. Go ahead and make your objection, -
| " . Mr, Goodwin: My objection has been covered by
‘counsel for ‘the Government and by myself. I think
the Court unduly emphasizes something- which the
= -* to it.
“The Court: The Court has the duty, Mr. Good-
win, to see that justice is don, and that is what the |
: Court is attempting to do. (our emphasis) -
-“*Mr. Goodwin: If. the Court please, I meant no —
disrespect. I mearit no disrespect to Your Honor.
:. is ‘‘The Court: I am just telling you what I-am go-
ing to do, and I got it in the record so we don’t have
; any mistake about our respective positions.
7 ‘*Mr. Goodwin: My objection nails to his Honer’ -
ae comment.
“The Court: Now, Mr. Wilson, based on this .
- mathematical ‘probability, have you an opinion as to
whether. or not these prints were made by the same
finger, or thumb in this case?
“The Witness: May I put ‘it ‘this way, Your
Honor? The possibility that these two patterns could
occur coincidentally i in the hands of two different in- .
dividuals is so remote as. to be unworthy of any serious
consideration.”’ | .
a
-Counsel’s attempt to end his cross examniation on a ©
strong point was virtually destroyed. But Mr. Goodwin
perseveres and succeeds when, in a few short additional
‘questions, the witness: admits:
‘In the final analysis, this is for i jury to ds-
cide whether the prints are in fact identical or ‘not.’
ae a Se pen ah shad edit. sab teas cas oe wee ‘ bod SBT RN ed fata ate es Betas ae Mie! PRAT ithe GES Hons eerie 0B
_ Government is trying to emphasize, and gives weight alk
the evidence. Kansas City Star v. United States, 240 |
- Putnam case states:
! thinks = and express his- opinion upon the
The.error raised is not so much the examination by the
‘court but the fact the court stated he wanted to “eee that
justice was, done.’’ : ;
A federal judge hes the right to comment fairly upon -
F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923 ; Woodring v. United
States, 311 F.2d 417; Batsell v. United States, 217 F.2d
257. Such right is derived from the common law. Vicks-
burg Railroad v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 546 (1886); Capital
Traction Co. v..Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898). The court in the
‘‘In the courts of the United States as it is in
those of England from which our -practice is derived
the judge in submitting a case to the jury may at his
discretion: whenever he thinks it necessary to assist
_. them in arriving at a just conclusion, and upon the
evidence call their attention to parts of it which he
facts; . | ; st
However, as we a pointed out in the. Woodring
case, this is a right which the trial court must cautiously
exercise since it can very easily result in prejudice to.a liti-
gant’s rights. This is particularly true in a criminal case
where life or liberty may be in jeopardy. The trial court’s
comments can ‘disturb the balance of fairness of a jury
trial. He should never assume the role of the prosecutor
or advocate. His position is one ‘of neutrality and he
should never cross boundaries. It is a trial judge’s duty °
to see that the evidence is clear and understood. How- |
ever, his comments should never unfairly emphasize testi-
mony nor add to or change the evidence given. The
jtidge’s zeal to do so. when the evidence is:evenly balanced’ _
can easily create prejudice. Each case merits individual —
‘consideration. It may well be the less comment or inter-
ference by the trial judge with the examination of wit-
‘nesses, the less opportunity for prejudice to basic. rights —
to, a fair trial. Woodring v. United States, supra; Boat-
right v. United States, 105 F.2d 137; Stoneking v. United
States, 232 F.2d. 385.*
~The statement by the trial judge that the expert wit-
ness worked for the same employer as the court is certain-
ly a harmless one. At best it could have been avoided, but
we fail.to see this statement constitutes error. If such a
comment would so influence a jury, then the intelligence
and Andependence of a jury no longer deserves” our confi-
dence. \
The court’s comments that he was simply trying to see
that ‘‘justice was done’’ comes close to\ exceeding the
bounds of judicial propriety when taken in full context of — .
the situation. It is doubtful the trial judge intended it
4s such, but the court’s examination could lend itself to
the appearance that the court was emphasizing, through
one of the government’s: witnesses, a contention of the
government, to-wit, that the fingerprints were made by
the same person as the defendant. It would seem from
the record that the court did not have to intervene with
his questioning—at all at this point. There was tiot the
need for clarification here, as existed in his examination
of the witness: ‘Shannon. The court did instruct at the
conclusion of the case as follows:
¢ Of ‘A Jakes To Comment On
Tes a renege hy seer To the guy. ” 6 F.R.D. 317 (1947),
wherein Chief Justice Fuller in Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 is
quad on ony ing:
ee
_ witness admitted: ‘‘in final analysis’ this was for the jury |
. their scoumulative effect.*
“he harmless error statute, Rule $23), means that a criminal
jury, express any opinion as to the facts or comment
. directly upon the witnesses and their testimony. We feel
that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the
\.. es
‘‘Therefore if during this trial you have imagined
or gained the impression that the court had any
‘opinion in regard to this case so far as the facts are |
concerned ‘dismiss that impression from’ your mind
because the court meant to express neither by manner
nor by voice-any opinion on the facts.”
We submit the court’s charge cannot rectify actual and
real prejudice. However, the charge does make clear to
the jury the court did not intend to influence their deci- )
sion in any way.
It is significant the trial court did not, during the
presentation of the testimony or during his charge ‘to the
the recross examination by Mr. Goodwin, when the expert
to decide,’’ fairly brought the issue back into proper focus.
We find no prejudicial error in the comments made, or in
The second shied of reversal cuineliaini relies upon is
Criminal Justice Act. of 1964, §§ (e) as amended.
_ Subsection’ (e) reads:
**Services s other than counsel—Counsel for a de-
' . fendant who’is financially unable to obtain investiga-—
\tive, expert or other services necessary to an adeqnate
defense in his case may request them in an ex parte
application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry
in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are neces-
oa eon Seo ee a error. Bihn v. United
be \
WR eae AN oa te he iPS ati MS omg gadis enn os A ssid Niele x
sary and that the defendant ig financially unable to
obtain. them, the céurt shall authorize counsel to ob-
tain. the services on behalf of .the defendant. The
court may, in the interests of justice, and upon a find-
ing that timely procurement of necessary services
- eould not await prior authorization, ratify such ‘serv-:
ices after aed have been obtained : . .’’
‘Trial counsel was appointed to act for appellant under
the Criminal Justice Act during the\second trial in Octo-
ber 1965. The second trial commenced on October 25,
1965. At-noon on October 27; 1965, and before the govern-
ment rested, Mr. Goodwin was reappointed counsel under
the Criminal Justice Act.
soe argues he was not able to take advantage of
his rights under §§ (e) .of -the act, specifically to obtain
fingerprint experts to testify for the defense. It is some-
what difficult to grasp appellant’s reasons, but apparently .
‘he raises two: (1) Appellant: was not timely informed .
~~ fingérprint. experts were. to be used by the government
(the: government. did not use them in the first trial in
- :1964).* (2) Assuming (but not admitting) appellant’s trial —
counsel was forewarned concerning the government’ 8 fin-
sAlthough not raised as a point a error erat appellant is in-
directly challenging the trial court’s refusal to require the government
dy hy byt A Sa uire ‘them to inform
. & oe there were fingerprint aay. court Has long
' ROE Sek Sie: CG OF OHNE tS tae on for a bill of particulars
“a8 voy Yay Bee discretion of the trial court and that its ruling
% bed except for An j abuse of that discretion. Kansas
| : Cay mae Co. w United Sinton 200 F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923;
T v. United States, 298 F.2d 208: (1961). ’
_ .. & bill of. particulars: under Rule 7(f) is granted to particularize a
_ ° Charge involved and is cont 3 not an instrument to. require the gov-
. =. @mmment to disclose its evidence. Cooper v. United States, 9 Cir., 282
eal F.2d 527, 532; Cordova v. United States, 10 Cir. 303 F.2d 454; United
_ . States vy. Hanlin, D.C: Mo., 29 F.R.D. 397; United States v. Kelly, D.C.
Mo., 92 F.Supp. 672. ' reg
gerprint experts, he was appointed (under the Act) too
“late to effectively utilize defense experts since appellant:
was entitled to have such witnesses not only testify on
his behalf but also be present at the time the government
experts were on the stand.
iia ovate the purpose ‘of the Act cannot be
carried out if the accused is not afforded a sufficient op-
_ .portunity to take advantage of the Act’s provisions. Ap-
- pellant further mentions that he was at a distinct disad-
vantage because his defense was alibi and mistaken iden-
tity,.and most of the alibi witnesges were in Denver.*
Appellant concedes in his reply brief that they do not
at any time challenge the competency ‘of “—e Goodwin,
the trial attorney for Ray. :
Cssineet presumably argues that he could not nate
' adequate expert or investigative services, more particularly
- fingerprint experts, in time for adequate presentation of
“appellant’s defense. Theoretically, appellant says, since
_ trial counsel’ was -appointed belatedly he, thereby, was -
denied rights under §§ (e). However, a complete analysis
_. of the Criminal Justice Act, as set forth in the legislative
history as well as in the Act itself, fails to show that any
accused is given any greater substantive right under the
t
6A: t claims that he had affidavits of some 40 witnesses which
wo verify he was in Denver nt ad brings wile, sever ser
witnesses did not appear. Ap be
nental and twether bo-tawe oy Body he. produced a Conti-
‘Sach a contention sities Rules 15(c) and 17(b) of the Fed. R.
creti * ee 2% Te Senn ta _ A, 4.4 Saua
on, ons co ave en, or
a ee ee ee ee
“a
OD Ri cred ese ern Sens ait oniale it, betel beiawie tee 8
PgR ns tien ne ROU
.
Se alah Is Nl RS aH Fe
.
ee ht eee ~ «
odin SERRATE AA REAR ON preach s
per
Act than he previously had. See Vol. 4 U.S. Code Cong.
& Adm. News, p. 2990.’
The fundamental purpose of the Criminal Justice Act
_ is to provide legal assistance to indigent defendants in
criminal cases.* See Preamble to Criminal Justice Act of
1964, Pub. Law 99-455, 78 Stat.. 552, 18 U.S.C. 3006A;
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Honorebie James A aad
36 F.R.D. 67.
‘An indigent represented thereunder is not seenbded
any procedural rights of discovery or ‘defenses. The Crim-
inal Justice Act is a means of implementing, what the
courts have declared to be a constitutional demand (right
of counsel) under the Sixth Amendment and its inclusion
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353. Serious ‘‘equal protection” questions would —
arise if the Act provided indigents with — the non-
‘indigent defendant would not have.
"For a most theveushh and excellent ‘discussion, see Kutak, Criminal -
Justice Act of 1964, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703 (1966). See p. 737 where the
Allen Committee Report discusses §§(e). Such report states:
‘ “* * * the absence of a provision for defense services is ‘a fund-
amental deficiency of the present system,’ which reaches ‘serious
anyone ne The plan provides that counsel, whether appointed
or or retained: by a defendant who is financially unable to obtain
- . the services other than counsel necessary to an adequate defense,
may request them in an ex parte application to the court. The
ex parte natufe of the ee © insure that the defendant
not have to disclose defense prematurely. Although the
or tive history is replete with references to these services, no
ustive description of thefn has been found. The Allen Com-. |
mittee Report refers to counsel having at his disposal the ‘tools
- essential to conduct a ee ae, and later specifically men-
tions and pal kL e assistance of experts, transcripts
< proceedings an the like. an :
ane Se imp lementation, of such services is now more readily
provided. However on" ‘services were available tothe indigent be-
assage of the Act. See discussion in re. Bandy v. United
States, 8 ir., 296 F.2d 882, infra.
weThe sine qua non of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is. partici
pote by competent counsel.” Kutak, supra, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703
=:
a
In King v. United States, 355 F.2d 500 (1966), the
court presented a similar idea when it expressed disap-
proval of the lower court’s order to the government to pro-
duce their file on the defendant for the use of his court-ap-
pointed counsel. The court said: -
‘‘The rights of a defendant are not to be deter-
mined on an ad honjinem basis with respect to his
counsel, whether because, as the court observed in this
case, he is believed ‘reliable’, or, as the court stated
was its practice, by distinguishing between court-ap-
pointed and counsel the defendant personally chooses.
There should be no special relationship between court-
appointed counsel and the court and no special. favors.
Quite apart from which would seem to us the obvious
inequity, the court’s practice might’ well cause defend- _
ants who otherwise would not have done so, to seek
court-appointed counsel, thereby increasing the gov-
ernment’s financial burden under the Criminal J ustice
Act.’’ (n. 2, p. 702)
Possibly appellant is arguing that he was denied the
right of ‘‘effective assistance of counsel’’ under the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution because his trial counsel
did not have timely opportunity to present the proper
defense Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. This was the
approach taken in the case of United States v. Germany,
32 F.R.D. 421 (1963). There the court ordered that the
court-appointed counsel was entitled to reimbursement for
reasonable and necessary expenses in traveling to inter- —
view and depose an informer and view the scene of the
alleged crime. The Department of Justice would not honor
the order. The court held the defendant was ‘thereby ‘
denied his constitutional right to counsel and dismissed A
the indictment. The court wates:
ae
**This Court believes that, without more, upon a
certification of a court-appointed counsel for an in-
digent defendant to the effect that it is reasonably
necessary for him to incur expenses for traveling and
for subsistence in viewing the scene of the alleged
crime and in interviewing material witnesses, the
‘effective assistance of counsel’ mandate requires that
the money for said reasonably necessary travel and
subsistence expenses be made available'to him by the
- United States. However, this Court believes that Rule.’
15(c) of. the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
_ ‘bolsters the contention of the defendant, Ned Ger-
- many, in this case that his counsel is entitled to re-
imbursement for the expenses necessarily incurred by
him in rendering ‘the effective’ representation as re-
quired by the Sixth Amendment to the .Constitution.’’ |
Assuming appellant’s argument is intended to encom-
pass this theory, it is misplaced: Trial.counsel did not
at any time request handwriting or fingerprint experts
before, during or after the trial. Bandy v. United States,
8 Cir., 296 F.2d 882. We are only left to speculate why.
There probably was good reason.° |
We have thoroughly examined the record concerning
the cross examination of government experts. It is. taxing
credulity to say trial counsel was ‘‘caught by surprise’’
*
*Many reasons could exist for counsel’s not calling either a finger-
a or handwriting expert: (a) It may have been impossible to ob-
experts to disagree with the government’s statements as a matter
of scientific evidence or (b) at best such witnesses could say nothing.
more than what: counsel achieved in the cross examination of the
i — expert when the latter admitted. in the “final analysis -
was for the jury to decide” whether or not the prints were the
same, or (c) Mr. Goodwin being a Mor pee trial counsel (which
e t concedes) determined it would be better to break down the.
ent witnesses on cross examination than weaken his case by
in defense experts who possibly could be discredited com- ~~
the government.
‘3
by such evidence. His cross examination demonstrates a.
- thorough technical knowledge of the subject.”
However, whether counsel was forewarned or not —
makes little difference. He certainly had full knowledge of
such evidence prior to presenting his case-in-chief. Yet no
- request to hire experts was made. Appellant claims, how-
‘ever, retaining an expert at.the time of Goodwin’s re-
appointment under the Act would have been a futile .
gesture since the defense expert should have been in court
at the time of the actual testimony of the government’s
witnesses.’ Such a quixotic contention hardly merits dis-
cussion. We know of nothing under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the-Criminal Justice Act now or:
at any time which would provide the defendant with this -
as a matter of right. Furthermore, such prearranged .
presence could hardly be deemed indispensable to the
testimony of an expert .in the defense case-in-chief.
10Mr, Goodwin’s cross examination of Simeon Wilson included the
following questions: Q. You don’t know what type fingerprints he
has, whether he has whorls or arches or—what are the other things?
Q. You don’t even’ know what his fingerprint style is, do you sir? |
Q. What percentage of the people would you say in this courtroom
have got whorl type fingerprints? . . . Q.. And a bifurcation simply
means where two lines join, two of these ridges join? Q. And you
expect if you have the others present. in the _— you would have to
-have some bifurcations, wouldn’t you? .Q. I seem to have read or
heard some place sir, that it requires at least 13 identifications or
es of a print to have an opinion on it...
The cross examination of Mr. Mooney , the other fingerprint expert,
includes the following questions: Q. You mean to say that P know
of.no process which by the use of aminoacid could transfer f
Q. Is there to your knowledge any international agreement with ref-
_ erence to fingerprints? Q. Fingerprinting was originated where? Q.
Where was fingerprinting first used? Q. ere was this whole system
first used? Q. . you sure it wasn’t England? Q. The-first method of
identification the English used wasn’t it? Q. Did you know under that
$ystem doesn’t it require a minimum of 13 points of identification?
(our emphasis) 5 ie : ‘
u]f the lack of knowledge prevented timely motion, it remains un-
answered why appellant did not call -handwri ——- Govern-
ment handwriting experts appeared at the first trial. These assuredly
were as significant and important as the fingerprint experts. —
A eae eee
| °17(b) nor A. we interpret the Criminal Justice Act as
In Reistroffer v. United
—1§6—
This claim also fallaciously assumes appellant could
not obtain such services before the implementation of the “
Criminal Justice Act. The benefits granted under §§ (e) -
- of the Criminal Justice Act are similar to Rules 17(b) and
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Each
of these provisions relate to funds for indigents to secure
witnesses for trial. In Bandy v. United States, supra, at
_ 888, Judge, now Chief Judge, Vogel, said:
_ «* * * We agree with United States v. Fox,
' .D.C.S.D. N.Y., 1937, 19 F. Supp. 463, that handwriting
experts are included under Rule 17(b), Federal Rules
_ of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Had Bandy em-
ployed a handwriting expert, his services would have
been’ paid for in accordance with the order of the
District Court.’’
If such services were deemed necessary, appellant
-eould have made a request to the court’? without being
reappointed under the Criminal Justice Act. Yet the record
is absent any request made and as such the matter must
be deemed intelligently waived. Bandy v. United States,
12Clearly no substantive rights are ted defendants A... A Rule
denied defendai t a gh eo
an ’s reque subpoena a wri expert to
testify on his behalf. On review the court stated:.
“It is well settled that Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 USCA, under which the motion for subpoena was
made, does not accord the indigent defendant an absolute rig hi to
rs ree ernment expense. There is and aust be
wide discretion vested in the District Court to prevent the abuses .
often ise of the < by defendants. This Court not disturb the
_" of discretion unless exceptional circumstances compel
District Judge Robert Van Pelt in United States ‘v. Pope,. 251 F.
S ‘Supp. 234, interpreted §§ (e) as follows:
“The Criminal: Justice-Act contemplates that counsel should be
afforded fullest opportunity to prepare their case; the rule in
allowing defense services is that judge need only be satisfied that
they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their
SS = not that the defense would be defective without
cnililiais
supra (waived right to handwriting expert when no re-
- quest was made under 17(b); Mark v. United States, 8
Cir., 326 F.2d 481, cert. denied 377 U.S. 947 (right to
speedy trial waived by defegdant unless asserted'in some | ©
manner); United States v. Miller, 2 2-Cir.,, 246 F.2d 486 |
(alleged defect in indictment waived by failure to. raise |
by pre-trial motion); Ford v. United States, 5 Cir., 201
F.2d-300 (waived statutory disqualification by juror, even.
_ though not known by counsel. at trial) ; Edwards v. United
States, 8 Cir., 333 F.2d 588 (contentions not brought to
attention of tria¥ court are waived unless record disclosed —
plain error affecting substantial rights).
The courts must presume that trial counsel pursues’.
the course of action at the trial he feels best for his client, |
‘and absent plain error involving substantial rights his
client is bound by the counsél’s choice. United States v.
Handy, 130 F.Supp. 270, aff’d 224 F.2d 504, aff’d 351 U.S.
454 (1955), where the court said at page 295:
‘‘Defendant’s counsel apparently made a deliber-__
_ ate choice not to seek delay or a change of venue. _
Many reasons could be .suggested for their decision.
We will not indulge in speculation. At all events there
was 4 waiver of any right they may have had.’’
In Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 873, reh den 352 U.S. 919 (1956), the court said
that ‘‘One cannot speculate upon failure to call a witness
and thereafter present such testimony as newly discov-
‘ered,’’ at 332. See also: United States v. Marachowsky, —
213 F.2d 235° (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 826; Blodgett v.
United States, 161 F. 2d 47 (1947); Apel v. United States,
- 247 F.2d 277 (1957).
This court cannot ‘but observe appellant wears shoes
_ similar to a party seeking a new trial on newly discovered
at.
, «
a eee WR ie PY cece ARAN AIS
4 ¢ : Pd
ee We Meee oe Sara ars en ee eT ae
| evidence under Rule 33. Such evidence not only must be
material, but it must be shown that on a new trial it would
probably produce an acquittal. McCroskey v. U nited States,
339 F.2d 385, 387 (8 Cir. 1965) ;. Ferina v. United States,
- 302 F.2d 95, cert. denied 371 U.S. 819 (8 Cir. 1962);
Connelly v: United States, 271 F.2d 333, cert. denied 362
U.S. 936 (8 Cir. 1959) ; stad v. . 312 F.2d 533: “s
- Cir. 1963).
In United States v. Keller, 145 F. ay 692 (1956), the
defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that, among _
other things, the statement of a handwriting expert was
new evidence which exculpated him from his conviction
for aiding and abetting in filing a false FHA certificate.
The court held that this ¢vidence did not justify a new
trial because, in part, it was not newly discovered: ‘The
‘entire issue of the authenticity of the signatures on the
- FHA Completion Certificate was joined when Ginter de-
nied forging the document . . . Ginter’s testimony was.
taken on the first day of the‘trial, yet defendant made no
request to adjourn in order to obtain the services of a
‘handwriting expert.’’ (Emphasis ours)
Under Rule 33, assuming appellant could produce wit-
nesses contradicting government fingerprint experts, clear-
ly a new trial could not be granted. Such allowance would
bring no end of litigation. Hindsight can always produce
other witnesses ‘who could have been called to corroborate
‘evidence presented. Certainly appellant does not -have
any better standing than a movant under: Rule 33. We
do not see how appellant’s position is enhanced raising
the issue on a direct appeal for the first time, when we
necessarily cannot even know what such experts might say.
7 We’ emphasize, however, trial counsel is not to be
criticized. In an adversary proceeding the lawyer is the
master of his client’s case..He guides the course of the
trial, always with the utmost allegiance to his client’s
-eause. His skill and competence are his tools. His deci-
sion becomes’ his client’s command, his judgment must
necessarily guide his client’s destiny. When-the verdict
is in, his only reward may well be satisfaction in render-
.. ing his all for the. cause. A lawyer’s actions. under fire -
_ should: not be measured by hindsight speculation. The
' jury resolved the case unanimously against the defendant.
The examination of the entire record shows trial counsel
did everything within his best judgment to provide appel-
lant with a fair trial. We fail to see how any rights were .
denied the appellant.
Judgment affirmed.
. A true copy. | , )
Attest: ; : ba
' Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Appendix C
JUDGMENT
United States Court Of Appeals
| For The Eighth Circuit
-
No. 18,235 — SEPTEMBER 7 1966.
Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, —
vs. |
_ United States of America.
Filed October 21; 1966, Robert C. Tucker, Clerk.
ee ee Pees Nag sated the tlaie fo Yl clit Ait lit a eh Sah tet pee 0 hy capes (mete
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.
oOo
This Cause came on to be heard on the record from
‘the United States District Court for the sie ‘District -
- of Missouri, and wag argued by counsel.
On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and.
adjudged by this Court, that the judgment and sentence of
the said District Court, in ™ cause, be, and the same is
hereby, affirmed.
And it is further Ordered by this Court that the de-
fendant in the said District Court, Loyd Carl Ray, do -sur-
render himself to the custody of the United States Marshal
for the Eastern District of Missouri, if not now in cus-
tody, in execution of the judgment and sentence imposed
upon him, within thirty days from and after the date of
filing of the mandate of this Court in the District Court.
October 21, 196
Appendix D
“United States Court Of Appeals
For The: Eighth Circuit —
~ No. 18,235 — Szrremser Tens, 1966.
‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, ete atm
a
United States of America.
: Appeal from the United States District Court for the:
_ Bastern District of Missouri.
the Supreme Court.of the United States that a
. writ of certiorari and record have been filed, the stay
hereby granted shall continue until the final disposition
a x <i eee See ee Te:
se Seen nin re UR lar BI TCS ps Sane sites ian
Petition of .appelldnt for rehearing filed in this
‘ cause having been considered, it. is now here ordered by
this Court that the same be, :and it is hereby, denied.
November 22, 1966
| Appendix E - .
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fighth Circuit
No, 18285
‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant,
Mypritets y af
United States of America. .
aggeel from the United States District rn for the
Kastern District of. Missouri. .
On Consideration of the motion of appellant} for a
stay.of the mandate in this cause pending a petition to
- the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of |
certiorari, it is now there ordered by this Court that the
issuance of the mandate herein be, and the same is hereby,
stayed for a period of thirty days from and after this
date; and if within said period of thirty days there is filed
with the, Clerk of this Court a certificate’ of the Clerk of
of the case by the Supreme Court.
November 28, 1966
ition for —
e+
%
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