Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Peek v. United States

Supreme Court brief1966

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_ UNITED ‘STATES. ‘CORT OF APPEALS —

: Secale, |

Questions Presented

Constitutional Provisions

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..

Argument :

INDEX ee

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— and ‘Oelads Below

Statutory Provision ...

Statement of the Case ?

iy , ae . : :¢ 5 . :

Constantin i ‘

" Agpendieds: a 7 | _ ©

_A-Verdiet of the Unjted States District Court

- Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern. Divi- -

sion, together with the ‘Judgment on the

Verdict .

B—The opinion of the United States: Court of

Appeals for the Highth Circuit

=

| C—The judgment-of the “Unitea States Court of

: Appeals for the ‘Eighth Circuit

D—The order of the United States Court of ae

peals for the Kighth Cirenit denying Petition

for Rehearing és

E—The order of the United States Court of Ap-°

-peals for the = eave sn i mandate.....

ee a INDEX ‘(cowruxvzp) |

aor ee PAGE

eo ' AUTHORITIES CITED

| United States v Vuesae 177 F.2d 833 (Th oi cir. 1949) vee

- . (Ind.):@ . 10. ,

‘ - United Stated v. Scott, 957 F.2d 374 (7th cir. 1958) a oe

e (DL)... a cess 10 |

| Starr’v. United States, 153 U.S. 614... 1B

' ° Constitution of the United‘ States eof America: ‘ “3

, . Sixth Amendment . . weeeeteeee

Statutes: . nee oo gui , ,

18 U,8.05-Se6, 1341 she i feneroaa aa

— U.8.C., Sec. 3006A, Subsection tai, 2 : q .

“Criminal Justice Act of 1964”? .......2, 8, 15, 17, 24

"Federal Bules of Criminal Procedure: =

Bale 16 ... sev e — nee 6

a Rule 15(e):.. re eee 317,25

© ll MN isco ae °°:

MS TR stiri thee thninsriai 15 -

Rule - phones ee 6

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-.. IN THE i

af

: SUPREME COURT OF THE

panic

LOYD CARL RAY, Petitioner,

an

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO. THE |

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.

_ EIGHTH CIRCUIT

- >

Petitioner- prays that a Writ ‘of Certiorari. issue to -

review a final judgment. of the United States a of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The verdict of the United States District Court, East-

ern. District of Missouri, Eastern Division, appears in.

Appendix A, together with the Judgment on the Verdict.

The opinion of the United States Court.of Appeals for

the Highth Circuit appears in Appendix B. The judgment

ul

of the said Court of Appeals appears in Appendix C. The ~~.

' order denying appellant’s Petition for Rehearing appears

in Appendix D. The order of the oe court staying |

mandate appears in Appendix mm - ' ee

aa

|

/

JURISDICTION

‘The judgment was ‘entered oh October 21, 1966, and

a ‘rehearing: denied. on November 22, 1966.

The* United States @Burt of Appeals for the Kighth

Cirenit@ordered-a stay of issuance of mandate for a pe-

riod of 30 days from and after November 28, 1966.

tv

~ °

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

‘Point of law not yet decided by this Court. (Q.. #1)

In addition, there is no rule applicable to this precise. a a

case before the court. aa i ate : NA

—

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his rights under’ the

Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Bee. 3006A, Sub-

- section (e), as amended. .

2 Trial court crred i in making statements and com-

ments with reference to the case, in the presénce of the

_. Jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and deprived

him of a fair and impartial trial.

3. Trial court erred in ignoring petitioner’s motion

- for discovery and inspection at time of arraignment, and

his motion for funds with which to transport witnesses. ~

4. Petitioner was ‘deprived of his right to a fair and -

impartial trial due to evan hah esti articles dur.

' ing and before ial

Pas)

-

ya

———

&- Court erred in denying petitioner’s motion for Bill :

of Particulars. ie ae ais ’ i

°

ye 6. Appellate oun \ ame in giving binding force to.

recedents not applicable to this. case. . ‘

7. Petitioner was deprived of his right i, effective

assistance of counsel under: the Sixth Amendment to the

+, Constitution.

8. Petitioner was de Bent of his right to a fair trial

under Rules 17 (b) and“15(c) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal -Procedure, relating to funds for = inflgmnts to °.

secure witnesses for trial.

9. Trial court erred in admitting into evidence © ma- |

terial of a questionable and improper nature. -.

10. Trial counsel was “incompetent to try a case. of

‘this complexity, and the Court erred in appointing counsel.

who by his own words was not at all familiar with Crim- __

inal ‘Law and rierieeeed or with the Criminal Justice Act 3

of —

ae CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

a

Axunnasnine 6. TO THE Constrrurion OF THE Unrrep. Srarzs ,

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL .

, PROSECU TIONS | :

“> all. criminal prosecutions, the scoused: shall enjoy

the right to a speedy. and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have —

been committed, which district shall have been previously _

ascertained. by law, and to be informed of the nature and

_, tesses against him; to have compuléory process for ob-..:

cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-

a , poe ' ° - :

—/ : e . —3— ; : : .. shy wr , .

P > . ‘

Me ee ; ’ sale isa EMA ote

taining iia in his ood, and to have the Assistance

| of Counsel for his defense.

” STATEMENT OF THE CASE

_ Loyd Carl Ray was indicted on eleven counts of mail ’

‘fraud under: Title 18, U.S.C., “Sec. 1341. The indictment .

was returned on the 23rd day of April, 1964. | |

The indietment was based upon allegations that Loyd

,.Carl Bay, acting ynder an alias of Willard T. Morton,

“set up a scheme to defrand a number ‘of citizens of St.

Louis, Massouri during the months of October, .November

and December of 1963, by use of the mails. (See indict-

ment and Bill of Particulars.) 7

The indictment specifically alleged that the said de-

fendant, Ray, set up a scheme or artifice to defrayd and

for obtaining money by: false fraudulent pretenses, rep-

resentations and promises in that he (Ray), acting under

the name of Willard T. Morton, did personally set-up the

Willard. T..Morton Travel Agency in Room 208, 7603

_ Forsyth Blvd., in Clayton, Missouri; that he opened two

bank accounts in the” City of St. Louis, Misouri; that he

* hired two salesmen and a secretary; and placed ads in

- various--newspapers to induce prospective’ purchasers to »

buy a tour to:Hawaii for the sum of $485.00. Two such

tours were scheduled for December of 1963, one called

the Christmas Trip and the other the New Year’s Trip.

_ Prior to the scheduled departure dates of the tours, the

travel agency closed and Willard T. Morton disappeared.

None of the clients received tickets to go on the trip or

any of their money’ back. In this connection, Morton was

- alleged to have used the mails to obtain the money in ad-

vance without ever having any intention of providing the

tours. The government claimed that the defendant, Loyd

a , Se .

. Carl Ray, was the ‘same Willard y “Morton who perpe-

* trated the fraud.

Defendant, Ray testified that, prior to his arrest,. he

had never been in St. Louis, nor had he at any time used .

tlie namd of Willard T. Morton. (p. 481, Reporter’s Tran-_

script, Vol. #2.) Ray further testified that he had in fact

been in the City of Denver, Colorado, on ‘each and every —

- day during the time Morton was operating in St. Louis ~

(ie, October, November and December, 1963), and that .

he had witnesses who had seen him every day in Denver

during this period; customers at his office, rn busi-

ness associates, etc.

Loyd Carl Ray was arrested in — Colorado on

March 14, 1964, and was brought before the U.S. Com-

missioner there. Ray was keleased on $5,000.00 bond and

- a preliminary hearing was set for mid-April. The prelim:

inary hearing was postponed until May 11, 1964 at the

request of the United States Commissioner. Said hearing

was to be in Denver, Colorado, the. place of Mr. Ray’s

vesidence. ; |

Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant Ray. ar-

ranged for some 40 witnesses (Denver residents) to ap-

pear at the hearing on his behalf and subpoenas were is-

sued on April 22, 1964.

However, on April 23, 1964 the Seitinnbit mentioned

above was retu:.ed in St. Louis, Missouri, allowing no

opportunity for Ray to clear himself at a preliminary

hearing in Colorado. This was in spite of the fact that

the United States Attorneys in both Denver and St. Louis

had been notified of the many people who could place Ray

in Denver during the time Morton was operating in St.

Louis, and reminded of the gravity of the mistake in in-

ee

dicting the wrong man. It is herein submitted to the court

that the secret and (from the defendant’s point of view)

premature indictment was returned because of, rather than

« in spite of, said notification.

On Friday, May 1, 1964, defendant Ray was notified

. bya letter, dated April 30, 1964, from the United States

‘District Court Deputy Clerk to appear the following Mon-

day, May 4, 1964, at 10:00 a.m., before the United States

District Court in’ St. Louis for arraignment.

.On May 4, 1964 Ray came before the court for ar- .

raignment (Hon. John K. Regan, U.S. Dist. Judge). A

plea of not guilty was entered to each of counts 1 to 11,

inclusive. A motion for discovery and inspection pursuant

to. Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was

made by Ray, speaking for himself. Said motion was ig-

nored by the court. Ray also. made a motion, speaking

. for himself, for funds with which -to transport. his wit-

nesses from Denver. to St. Louis. This motion was also }

‘ignored by. the court.

The court appointed J id M. Goodwin to poner

the defendant, presumably urider Rule 44 of the Federal

. Bules of Criminal Procedure.

7 case subsequently came on for trial on the 14th

day of September, 1964 (p. 2; Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist.

Court, No. 64Cr87(2)). On September 17, 1964, at the

hour of 11:15 p.m., ihe jury informed the court that they

‘‘could never reach a verdict,” whereupon the court de-

clared a mistrial, ordered the cause reset for trial (p. 3,

Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. .64Cr87(3) ). For

reasons unknown, the court would not allow defense at-

terney to poll the jury, or even talk to any of the’ queaee,

after the trial was over..

dstiiee Scion

Se

_ The cause came on aia for trial on October 25,

1965, whereupon, on October 28, 1965, the defendant, Loyd

Carl Ray, was convicted on nine of the eleven counts of |

indictment, to-wit: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. (p. 4,.

Criminal Docket, U.S. Dist. Court, No. 64Cr87 (3).)

On November 19, 1965 defendant appeared before

the United States District Court in ‘St. Louis for sentenc-

ing. Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or in

the alternative, for a new trial, was denied. Loyd Carl

Ray was then sentenced: to a four-year term and a three-

year term, to run consecutively, for a total of seven years.

The cause was appealed before the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and argued on

September 12, 1966. Judgment of the trial court was af-

firmed by appellate court on October 21, 1966. :

_Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was filed on

November 10, 1966. An order denying Petition for Ke.

hearing was issued on November 22, 1966.

_ An order staying issuance of mandate pending cer-

tiorari proceedings in Supreme Court of the United States :

‘was entered ¢ on November 2, 1966..

"REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:

This petition is submitted in the hope that I am not

laboring under a misapprehension in my belief that jas-

tice should and will prevail. The law ought not to be so _

inflexible as to send a mari to jail for seven years for a

crime he did not commit, simply because there is perhaps

no legal ‘‘loop-hole,” or more properly, reversible error.

If there ‘is error at all, a new trial should be granted if

for no reason other than that seven years is a long, long i

time. ;

=o

The appellate court states in the opinion, “The

examination of the entire . record shows .. .’’ The

point i is,, that court did not have all of the an in the

case, any more than ‘the jury had all the facts in the case.

They had substantially only the government’s side of it

since the defendant was blocked at every turn from pre-

senting his side, simply due to inexperience and lack of

money, to say nothing of a prejudiced judge.

_ If the Supreme Court will not review this case, then

_ an innocent man will go to prison and that i is a wer good

reseon for granting the writ.

ARGUMENT

Point 1— Petitioner was deprived of his rights under

‘the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C., Sec. 3006A,

Subsection (e), as amended.

The defendant for all practical purposes was deprived cs

of his rights under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18

US.C., Sec. 3006A, as amended.

Subsection (e) of the Act dunks states that ‘Sexpert

or other services necessary, to an adequate defense’’ shall

be made available to an indigent defendant. The appellate

court argues in the opinion that “It is somewhat difficult .

to grasp appellant’s reasons’ (for wanting dase ate

expert).

) The ienpoctdnee of his own fingerprint expert to the

defendant can be gleaned from the fact that there was no

fingerprint evidence at the first trial, which ended in a

hung jury. The first trial was fully one year after the

alleged fraud was perpetrated. Then another year later,

at the second trial, all of a sudden the prosecution had

— This was a full two years after Tie offense.

Se

a piel

One must also consider that said fingerprints were on

papers and checks which were handled by the defendant

at the first trial, and one fingerprint was on a book pur-

portedly given to the postal inspector by John Primm, a

man who was a salesman in the scheme (p. 194,: Reporter’s |

Transcript, Vol. #1), who was actually an accessory to

the crime, and who had every reason to. ‘‘cooperate”’ with

_the postal inspector. Mr. Primm was not charged with

anything.

The fingerprints were ‘atu prints. It is hatin

that a qualified expert would have found that the prints

were not two years old, if he were asked to determine age.

The government contended that the fingerprints were

not available at the first trial because a ‘‘new process

which had just become known,’’ with which to develop

latent prints, was not known at the time ef-the first trial. —— 7

This contention is ; contradicted by government witness

Mooney (p. 339, Reporter’s Transcript, . Vol, #2). -

. Answer, ‘‘Yes, sir. This is a process developed by the —

Swedish scientist in 1954, called ninhydrin, and this will

‘develop a print. The ast means nothing on a print.”

(emphasis added. -

Since the process had been known since. 1954, aie

was ample time for the prosecution to use it between

the time of the purported crime in December 1963, and .

the first trial in September 1964. It is taxing credulity &

little to have fingerprints at the second trial, in October —

of 1965, when none could be found in 1963 or 1964.

ri ie? government further contended that certain of

the documents upon which they had developed latent prints

were not available to them before the first trial. However,

‘most of the customers from. whom the documents were

—10—

- procured were named in the indictment as being the

people defrauded. Government witness Kelley (p. 218,

Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1) testified that he gave the

“ letter, Government Exhibits 144 and 145, to Mr. Schnicker

on December 20, 1963. One must conclude that the govern- —

_ ment had the papers all the time, at both trials.

There are more examples, but the above will serve

, to show that an expert of his own would have. been im- =

. portant to the defendant.

_ Point 2— Trial court erred in ‘making re and

comments with reference to the case, in the presence of the

jury, which were prejudicial to the petitioner and —

him of a fair and impartial trial. |

It is conceded that the trial judge has a sini

amount of latitude in the conduct of a trial, but it is re-

spectfully submitted that reasonable norms were exceeded

to the defendant’s prejudice. :

_ The influence of a trial jnilee wen a pate is necessar-

ily and properly of great weight. (United States v. Levi,

- 177 F.2d 833 (7th cir. 1949 (Ind.)): In this connection it

was held in the case of United States v. Scott, 257 F.2d ©

- . 374 (7th cir. 1958) (Tll)) that it was the duty of the trial

judge to maintain an atmosphere of impartiality.

On page 268, Volume #1 of the Reporter ’s Tran-

_ -s¢ript, the court made the statement that both he, the

government’s attorney, and the government’s witness Wil-

z son, all worked for the postal department. The Circuit

Court considered this harmless error. How could this be

harmless? (see Opinion.) I have been taught since grade

' school that the government was. divided into. three

’ branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.

Yet the judge by his remark destroyed this fundamental

\

lh

_ concept by stating that he was aligned with the executive

| . ® brazich of the government insfead of ‘the judicial.-In addi-

. tion, the jury could conclude from the court’s remark in

the alternative that the postal department was the ——

department.

In the appellate sane ’s opinion a Cireuit-Sadge pa |

states: ‘‘The (trial): court’s comments. that he was sim-

ply trying to-see that ‘justice was done’ comes close

| \ . exceeding _ the bounds of judicial propriety when

\ taken in full context of the situation. It is doubtful the

trial judge intended it as such ....’? and ‘‘We submit the

-/ gourt’s charge cannot rectify actual and real prejudice..

< ' However, the charge does make clear to the jury the court

did not intend to influence . . .’’? (emphasis added.)

It is submitted that regardless of what the judge may

_ have intended, it is what he did that counts. The record

cannot show the tone of voice of this judge or his facial

expressions. His friendliness and good will toward all of

the government witnesses was as’ apparent as his hate for -

the defendant and all of his witnesses. He really should

have disqpalified himself because.a lot of his friends were |

victims of the fraud and testified for the government

(i.e, the Mayor, Dr. Clevenger, et al).

The appellate court overlooked J adge Regan’ 8 com-

ments to government witness Herpel (p. 52-53, are 8

Transcript, Vol. #1):

a . Recross — By Mr. Goodwin (defense attorney) :

Pi, ‘‘Question: Well, with reference to this $4,000 check

on December 13th, and the other one on-December 12th for

| three thousand: some odd ate that shows the actual

| cash was Great ‘

en PR Te Se

—12—

*¢ Answer: That indicates that he was.

“Question: That indicates he (Morton) was in theve

on those days, wasn’t it?

‘‘Answer: Yes.

‘The Court: Just a lente Just a minute. Now, pany

it indicate that he was in. there, or that the check was _

_cashed on. that dayt

‘‘The witness: Well; the check, more e likely, the - check

was cash

- Insight as to the judge’ s reason for asain witness

Herpel to change his testimony can be gained from the

record of the first trial. Defendant Ray had_a very good

witness, Layton Dix (p. 456, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol.

#2) (not a relative), who would place him in Denver,

Colorado on December 13th at almost the exact time of

- day when Morton was cashing a $4,000.00 check at his bank

in St. Louis. Judge Regan of course remembered this from |

the first trial.

The appellate court’s opinion sia ‘*He (trial:

judge) should never assume the role -of the prosecutor

or advocate’’ and ‘‘However, his comments should never

unfairly emphasize testimony nor add to or. ane the

. evidence given.”

In the. above example, the trial ri clearly caused

the evidence ~ to be changed.

In the. same opinion it is stated: “Counsel's at-

'. tempt to end his cross examination on a strong point

was virtually destroyed.”’ (by. trial judge.)

At every turn the appellate vent cancedes that the

. trial judge’s comments. were prejudicial, and yet excuses ,

him by saying he didn’t intend any. harm.

<P ys

—13—

|

The harm was done, whether he intended it or not.

I submit that the court’s charge cannot rectify the: -

damage or erase the prejudice from the minds of the jury.

The -court’s attention is ’ directed to the Reporter's

Transcript, Vols. #1 and #2, at the following pages, for

further’ examples of the trial court’s comments: Pp. 51,

52, 53, 60, 83, 19%; 199, 203, 262, 268, 276, 281, 282, 285,

286, 287, 325, 326 (here the Court is misquoting evidence

' concerning no papers in the office, see pp. 13, 14 and 96

for. proof), 327, 328, 419, 424 (here the court improperly

sustained an objection to a question as ‘being repetitious,

when in fact it was not repetitious), 484 (rude), 493, 494,

517, 518, 521, and 531. The court’s animosity can be seen

even in the written word. of the sentencing on pp: 559 and

560. ‘‘The Court (shouting): Tell us # where the money

went...”

_ The cougt’s comment that he wanted to see that “‘jus-

tice, was done’? (p. 285, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1), -

clearly indicates to the jury that such justice could only

be done*by seeing to it that the defendant was convicted...

Such indelible impressions as, the above, upon the minds

of the jury, cannot be removed by.a simple statement in.

the charge that he ‘‘intended”’ no harm. — .

Chief Justice Fuller in Starr v. United States, 153

U.S. 164, says: ‘*The’ influence of the trial judge on the

jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that

his lightest word or intimation\is received with deference,

and may prove controlling. ” (emphasis added.)

. Point 3—Trial court erred in ignoring petitioner’s

motion for discovery and inspection at time ‘of arraign-

ment, and his motion for funds with which to. transport

. witnesses.

14

_ Defendant’s motions should not have been .ignored,.

" even though -they were perhaps improperly made. The}

court, in ignoring said motions, stated that he was going:

to appoint counsel, for the defendant. However at this.

‘point defendant was ng, there to. Tequest counsel, but: .

only to enter a plea of not guilty and to-see about what |

evidence was against him and money to ee wit-

_ nesses from Denver to St. Louis.

‘In a case of such importance to os defendant, it

. would seem that the court, if it truly wanted to see that

‘*justice was done,’’ would not ignore an indigent defend-

ant’s motion, simply because. it was made in other. than ;

. the usual form. fF

Point 4— - Petitioner was eet of his “Fight to a

fair. and impartial trial due to: the prejudicial newspaper _—

articles during and before trial.

‘The court erred in not coskeustinn the jury to ahotain :

from reading newspaper accounts of the trial, until after

the damage had already been done: Said instruction to the .

jury was not made until the second day’ of the trial. By

then the jury had. seen both the morning papers, and

evening papers from the day before. I think one may be

sure that natural curiosity would cause any juror to read

accounts of a proceeding in which he was involved.

The papers ran several columns every day concern-

ing the trial. They stated among other things that Ray

ran a-travel agency in St. Louis. Ray hired certain em-

ployees, Ray did this and Rady did that, as if it were a

fact. They also said that Ray had been arrested previously

in Denver for the same offense (not true), and printed’

' defendant Ray’s picture with the caption ‘‘Willard T.

Morton’’ under it. All of this was on the first day of the

— NE

ib.

j

yo

Point 5 — Court erred in- senciitis petitioner’s motion

for Bill of Particulars. :

By dunrying said motion the .court ‘effectively blocked

defendant’s chances for exercising his rights under the | .

‘ Criminal Justi¢e Act as it pertains to expert witnesses. ~

‘How »xould defendant use or ask for such experts if he

did nwt know. he needed them until it was too late?

_ Point 6— Appellate court erred. in giving Vinding

-force to precedents not applicable to this case.

It i is a salutary rule: of precedent making that a ‘diva |

can give no binding force to. a rule wider than is fairly a |

necessary to decide the actual case before it. In. the opin-

ion, Appellate Court states: “This court cannot but ob-

serve appellant wears shoes similar to a party seeking a

new trial'on newly discovered evidence under Rule 33.

". Such evidence not only must. be material, but -it must be

shown that on a new trial it would probably produce an -

acquittal.” And ‘‘Hindsight can always produce other

witnesses. who could have been called,’ and ‘‘Wé neces-

sarily cannot even know. what such experts might say.”

The court here apparently missed the ‘point of the

entire argument.”There is no contention that defendant’s

evidence is newly discovered, but ‘rather that he was de-

prived of-a fair trial because he was not pars | able

to present what evidénce he had.

. Hindsight is ‘not involved at all. Defendant Negentedliy

asked counsel to try to obtain funds for expérts, both for -

handwriting and fingerprints, and to bring his witnesses

from Denver to St. Louis. Defendant was advised that -

- such request had been made to the trial judge (in cham-

bers) and that’ the judge said ‘‘no.’? The fact. that some

_

of these motions do not ‘appear in the record goes to

point #10, concerning incompetent counsel~

As for the quixotic contention that ‘‘we necessarily

_ eannot even know what such experts might say,’’ it is

submitted that the defendant knows very well what they

might say, since he is in a position to know first hand

‘ that he did not in fact put his fingers on any’ of the docu-

-ments presented by the government, except perhaps

through the trickery of the Postal Inspector and/or the ~

District Attorney, in that they had these documents laying

around on the table during the first trial, for the defend-

ant to handle. See p. 218, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1,

wherein Government witness Kelley testified he gave said

documents to Postal Inspéctor Schicker immediately after

.the offense on December 20, 1963. Inspector Schicker had

these documents in his possession’ for a year. He had

Deed pate cone ah at 2 ene iti Ne a ante.

_ them before, during, and until a few days after, the first -

trial, when he then serit the documents by registered mail

* to the fingerprint expert for examination. The documents

were received by the fingerprint examiner on September

26, 1964 (p. 294, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2). The first

trial was over on ‘September 17, 1964. In that event, the

fingerprints would necessarily be one year too new to be

useful. (Dating from the time of the first tit, one year

after the offense.)

Point 7 — Petitioner was deprived of his right to ef-

fective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment

to the Constitution. .

e.: Se teak

pS LEE cannot be effective unless counsel is al-

. lowed to present all of his client’s case. Lack of money

should not cause a man. to be unjustly convicted. For all

of the reasons herein named, it is submitted that’ defend-

~

ce isthe Taal ANE Sih amar sD test heme iy inal nahi

as = =

ant had no ‘assistance at all except for the “‘cross exami- .

nation’’ ability of his attorney.

Point 8 — Petitioner was deprived of his right to a

fair trial under. Rules 17(b) and 15(c) of the Federal

Rules of, Criminal Procedure, relating to funds for indi-

gents to secure witnesses for trial.

P _ Assuming (but not admitting) the appellate court is

correct in arguing that petitioner’s right to a fair trial

was not denied under the Criminal ea Act because

(p. 46, Opinion) :

‘“‘The benefits granted under subsection (e) of the

Criminal Justice Act are similar to Rules 17(b) and’

15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Kach of these provisions relate to funds for indigents

- _ to secure witnesses for trial.’’ And ‘‘If such services

| were deemed necessary, a sae could have ‘made &

request to the court ...”’ |

ins it follows that his rights under said Federal Bules

of Criminal Procedure were denied, because the fact _Te-

mains that the defendant could not afford to bring his 40

witnesses to’ the trial.

© There cannot be a fair trial ‘ee both sides are

heard. The importance of witnesses when the defense is

alibi and .mistaken identity cannot be sver-emphasized.

‘ Government witness Holden (p. 97, Reporter’ s Tran-

script, Vol. #1), testified Morton was in his’ office in St.

Louis every day, ‘‘Five, six days a week.’? Defendant

Ray’s forty witnesses (see Fletcher, 40 affidavits, p. 365,

Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), would have placed him in

Denver, Colorado every day during this same three-month

: period. Since there is not even a } direct air flight between

iGo «

Denver and St. Louis, it is not. possible to be in both cities

on the same‘day, during business hours (p. 472, Reporter’s

Transcript, Vol. #2). One can conclude that a jury would

acquit Mr. Ray if — had an opportunity to hear all of

the facts.

The Court’s attention is directed to the Supplemental]

' Addendum to the Record, where certain of the above-

mentioned forty- affidavits are reproduced as “examples of:

- what defendant’s witnesses would have said at the trial.

Many of the dates specifically mentioned, placing Ray in

Denver, are in direct conflict with Government evidence

placing Morton in St. Louis, such as the dates Morton _

opened bank accounts, efc. .

The appellate court’s contention that had the defend-

ant wanted these witnesses, ‘‘depositions could have been |

‘taken, or subpoenas issued, all: at government expense,’”

(footnote 6 of the opinion), overlooks fhe fact that

the defendant asked for funds for witnesses at his arraign-

-- ment. Defendant’s counsel, Mr. John Goodwin, again asked

the judge at the first trial, and was told the motion

' would be denied and therefore did not ask again at the

second trial. Admittedly Mr. Goodwin: should have made

another.motion at the second trial,.for the record, but

‘this goes to Point #10, concerning incompetent counsel.

The point here is. that it should be self-evident to

anyone that the defendant would want his‘ witnesses. Ex-

‘cept for the‘lack of money, they would have testified and

the whole thing would have been over at the first trial.

ee technicality, such as a motion not appearing in the |

record, should not prevent a new, and this time fair, trial.

Point 9 — Trial court erred in admitting into evidence

‘material of “a questionable and improper nature. -

ogee cg one — ye

=

The importance of deciding which evidence is proper

or improper can be readily seen. The fingerprint evidence

- presented at the second trial in’ October of 1965 was not

presented at the first trial in September of 1964. The

alleged fraud occurred in October, November. and De-

cember of 1963. After the offense in’ 1963, after Morton

- disappeared with the money, defendant Ray was not iden-

tified and. apprehended because of fingerprints, even

though his fingerprints. are on record due to his service

-record in beth the U.S. Marine me and the U.S. Navy.

‘If the fingerprints were genuine, and if in fact it was

possible to determine that they even belonged to Ray,

then why the great time lapse? Ray was not even arrested

until March of 1964, and then for very questionable rea-

sons, but those reasons are outside the scope of this -

ticular. argument.

If the Samet were actually made at the time

of the offense and it could be determined that they were

Ray’s, it would seem that he would have been identified

and arrested immediately. Particularly, since there has

never been any mystery about his whereabouts. He has

“resided in Denver for the past 16 years, and at the same

address in Denver for the past eight years.

The. question of the time lapse between the offense

and arrest would perhaps be easier to explain than. the

question of why no fingerprint evidence was available at

the first trial. A full year is more than ample time for

the government to develop a fingerprint, if any. existed.

The government’s contention that Postal Inspector

_ Schicker obtained the documents only after the first trial

was over is ridiculous.:In addition to the fact that the

people from whom he obtained said documents were named.

in the original indictment, consider the testimony of gov-

ernment witness Kelley (p. 218, Reporter’ s Transcript,

Vol. #1) concerning government exhibits 144 and 145,

upon which fingerprints are alleged. Mr. Kelley testified .

he gave these documents to the Postal Inspector Schicker

on December 20, 1963. Mr. Schicker did not turn these

documents.in to the laboratory until a few days after

the first trial, i.e. September 26, 1964 (p. 294, Reporter’s

- Transcript, Vol. #2).

The. following objection by defense counsel will be

found at pp. 295-296, Reporter’s Transcript, ‘Vol. #2: “A

—I received these exhibits from Inspector Schicker, and

"was requested to conduct an examination to determine if

any latent fingerprints could be developed on any of these

exhibits. Along with that request, I processed Govern-

ment’s Exhibits 144 through 148 with a ninhydrin process

to develop latent fingerprints, and several latent finger-

prints were developed on these exhibits, sir.’’

Mr. Goodwin—‘‘If the Court please, before we get

any further into this, I want’to object to it for the reason ©

that there is no showing of where these documents were,

other than the fact that he received them in the mail from

- Postal Inspector Schicker. There has been no showing

other than where the documents were originally obtained,

but nothing with reference to where they have been in the -

meantime, in whose possession; and what was done with :

them.’’

"All of the documents upon which fingerprints are al-

leged dre transportable, which causes them to be question-

able and improper in themselvés.

‘On page 191 of the Reporter’s enaihi Vol. #1,

defense counsel Goodwin objected thus: ‘‘If the court

we

pee

please, it speaks for itself’ It is simply a typewritten note.

It hasn’t any signature or anything else on it. It is a type-

written, note. He has no way of knowing who typed this.”

- Whereupon the court proceeded with its own direct -

examination of the witness, as was its custom, and later.

admitted ‘the questionable note into evidence.

The appellate court apparently overlooked the gov-

ernment’s new witnesses: and conflicting testimony when

they state in the opinion: ‘‘In the second trial the gov-

ernment used the same lay witnesses and produced two

new witnesses who were handwriting and fingerprint ex-.

_ ~perts as well.” (p. 33 of the Opinion), and ‘‘Outside of the

testimony concerning the fingerprints, it is agreed the evi- —

dence produced at both trials was generally thé same.’’

The following three government witnesses are examples

of new and untrue testimony. ‘

Mr. McGowan (p. 161, Reporter’s Rineiitel,: Vol.

#1), is the man who runs the Mainlander night club,

where Morton’s pre-tour party was arranged. Obviously,

the government and everyone else knew about Mr. Me-

_ Gowan from the beginning, and yet he did not testify at

- the first trial. The reason was that McGowan did not

identify defendant Ray’s picture as being Morton. (p. 379,

Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2.) Upon learning this, Ray

called upon Mr. McGowan during the time of the first

_ trial (Fletcher, p. 378, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), in

the hope that he (McGowan) would testify for the defense,

since he ‘knew Morton and did not believe Ray was the

.. game person. However, although he knew Ray was not -

Morton, Mr. McGowan did not want to ‘get involved.”’

Upon advice of counsel, defendant did not subpoena Mc-

Gowan ’ because he would -have been at best a reluctant

witness.

During cross examination at the second trial, Mc-

....Gowanr was ‘asked by defense~counsel (p. 170; Reporter’s. ...

. Transcript, Vol. #1), ‘‘In other words, the first confer-

-. ence that you ever had with the Postal Inspector was after

the trial last September; is that your —

Answer — “Yes. 99 6.

7 Question — “Well, then how is it the Postal Inspector

came out to see you after the last trial, and not before?”’

Mr. Gilmore (District Attorney) — -** Your Honor, I

will object to that. a

- The Court —‘It will be sustained.” bie

The court here sustained an improper objection. More

important, the question remains unanswered. Why indeed

would the Postal Inspector not contact perhaps one of the

‘prime witnesses for his case?

It is submitted that McGowan was probably number

one on Inspector Schicker’s list of people to contact, back

in December of 1963. Because McGowan refused to identify

Ray as being Morton, he was not called to testify for the

government. From this. there is the inescapable conclusion

that the government, or at least the people working for the

government on this case, were not at all interested in the

truth, or justice, or the ‘‘whole story,’’ but rather only in

@ conviction. In this connection, there must have been

dozens of people in St. Louis who had dealings with Mor-

ton, but. who would not identify Ray as being the same

man and therefore were not called to testify. The gov-

. ernment’s testimony brought out that.Morton rented an

office, an apartment, placed newspaper ads, had a tele-

phone installed, organized parties, did his banking, lived

and worked in St. Louis for at least three months that we

-_— =

know of. Where then were all of these people? The other

tenants of the office building, or at least the landlord or

~~—.manager? Same thing concerning the apartment building

where he lived; the people from the newspaper, etc.? Out

~ of all the people in St. Louis, the government called very

few witnesses to identify Ray. Even some of the people

from the banks were not the people who actually cashed

- Morton’s checks. They saw them being.cashed from a

distance. (p. 40, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1.) One

‘ must conclude that all these other people contacted in the

government’s investigation would not identify eotentent

_ Ray as being Morton. 3

In the example of McGowan above, it can be seen that

Inspector Schicker was able to get him to change his opin-

_ ion and testify at the second trial, after all. That the meth-

ods used to effect such a chatige in McGowan’s testimony

were probably questionable can be seen in the earlier

example of manufacture of fingerprint evidence.

~The court commented that it did not think Inspector

Schicker was a villain (p. 558, Reporter’s Transcript; Vol.

#2), and that Mr. Schicker was a ‘‘career postal worker,’’

trying to do his job, to whom it makes no difference

‘whether anybody is convicted or not.’”? This was the un-

derstatement of the year. J udge Regan apparently thinks

that being a career postal worker makes one pure as the

driven snow, but I doubt it. If Mr. Schicker is not the

villain, then someqne certainly is, because these things do

not just happen all by themselves.

' Mr. Gross (p. 212, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #1) .

___also, did not appear at the first trial. He was a janitor

who cleaned Morton’s office. His testimony stated that

_upon leaving town with all the money Morton told him he .

was going home to ‘Denver. ’”? He then sie to iden-

2;

aa

tity Ray as Morton. Is it really necessary to say this —

testimony was ‘‘made up?” Just consider the big confi-

dence man leaving with all the loot, telling the janitor he

is going home to “Denver. ”

At the first trial, a teller from the Del Mar Bank

_..testified he cashed a check for $4,000.00 for Mr. Morton,

in person, on Friday, December 13, 1963. The teller’s name

- was Mr. Tonsing, I believe, and he placed the time of day.

at about 1:30 pm. Mr. Tonsing said he knew Morton

quite well, well enough in fact that he did not need to re- °

quire any identification before cashing a $4,000.00 check

for him. This teller did not identify Ray as Morton.-

At the second trial, the above described teller did not

appear; another ‘teller (Hartwell, p. 63, Reporter’s Tran-

script, Vol. #1), testified that he cashed the same check

for Morton while Mr. Tonsing was out to lunch. This

_ second teller, Hartwell, did identify the defendant as being

Morton. | The first teller could not be located by the de-

fense. It is submitted that this was ‘‘improper,”’’ to say’

the least. ,

Point 10— Trial cveneél. was incompetent to try a

case of this complexity, and the Court erred in appointing ©

counsel who by his own words was not at all familiar with.

Criminal Law and Procedure, or with the Criminal Jus-

a tice Act of 1964.

The appellate court had no right to assume defense

counsel, John Goodwin, was familiar with the new Crim-

_inal Justice Act of 1964, whén by his own words he was

“not (p. 266, Reporter’ s Transcript, Vol. #1). (Also see

Supplemental Transcript of Record ‘‘This is 4 somewhat\

unfamiliar role for me.’?) The court also makes -much

of the fact that all of the services (for experts and funds

for witnesses) were available with or without the Act.

pa SCT Sar er Oe

: court .

= a

(Opinion, footnote #6): ‘‘Such a contention over-

looks Rules 15(c). and 17(b) of the Fed. B. Crim. P.°

Upon counsel’s ex ‘parte application, within ‘the court’s -

discretion, depositions could have been was: or subpoenas *

issued, all at government expense.”’

(Opinion, footnote #7): : “However, such services

were tae pate a aN ,

(p. 44, ery “Trial ciel did not er any time

request handwriting or fingerprint experts, ass during

or after the trial.’’

(p. 45, opinion) : “Yet no request to hire experts was

made.’’ \

(p. 46, opinion) : ‘“‘If such services were deemed nec- |

essary, re could have made a request to the

oF.

(p. 46, seat “Yet the record ieee re-

quest made . . .? , a ae

It is submitted that if indeed such services were avail-

able, then they not only could have been requested, but

‘should have been requested. at ater

Mr. Goodwin was asked sentaiie by the defendant

to petition the court for funds for such ‘services. The de-

fendant was told by Mr. Goodwin that he had in fact made

such a motion and that it been denied by the court.

' Later’ it was discovered that said motion was not in the

record. Mr. Goodwin then said he had asked the judge

in chambers about funds for witnesses and \ was informed

by Judge Regan that they would be r . It is sub-

mitted that said motions should have ‘been anyway,

for the record. It is also submitted that Mr. Goodwin -

should not have lied to the defendant concerning the fact

96—

that the motions had been made. Defendant would have

made the motion himself if he had known =. Goodwin

had not done so.

Mr. Goodwin.- made practically no objections to the

_ questionable evidence and practices of the government

throughout the trial. The appellate court in the opinion

states, ‘‘There was no objection made at the time’ of ©

‘this examination,”’ in disgussing some of. the trial court’s

- comments.

.Mr. Goodwin withdrew an amortent objection to some

- fingerprint evidenge after a colloquy among the court and —

counsel (p. 296, Reporter’s Transcript, Vol. #2). This

objection should not have been withdrawn. eo

All of the: government’s ‘exhibits were received with- _

— out objection and there was no objection to the charge.

- Mr. Goodwin’s lethargic attitude can be seen in his

_ motion for a directed verdict of acquittal (p. 343, Re-.

- porter’s Transcript, Vol. #2), when he ended said motion

- with, “ey guess.’” -

On pp. 44-45 of the opinion the appillete court said ‘‘It .

is Maier credulity to say trial counsel’ was ‘caught by sur-

prise’ by such evidence. His cross examination demon-

strates a thorough technical knowledge of the subject.’’ |

(fingerprints. ) The court goes on to point out the several

technical .terms used by Mr. Goodwin. However, upon

reading the direct examination of this particular witness,

one will find that such terms. had already been used so

that even the jury understood them. When the U.S.

Marshal testified (p. 239, Reporter’s -Transcript, Vol.

_ #1), that he had fingerprinted the defendant, Mr. Good-

win said that he guessed he’d have to read up on finger-

prints during his lunch hour. This was the extent of his:

. so-called technical knowledge.

—27—

Mr. Goodwin is perhaps a fine civil lawyer. The peti-

. tioner would have no way of knowing. However, this case

was his first and only criminal case in a Federal court.

He relied upon his wits and his ability to.cross examine,

and was pretty good at it, at times, particularly during

the firSt trial when he still had a certain amount of en-

- thusiasm left. He should have ‘been replaced by the court

for the second trial. He had already done a lot. of work,

and just seemed to ‘‘run out of steam,’ at the second

trial. Had he even made just a couple of simple motions

’ for witnesses, the verdict would have been different. If he

was not incompetent, then he was at best indifferent.

The appellate court engaged in a flowery dissertation

on the last page of the opinion in which they say ‘‘the |

lawyer is the master of his client’s case,’’ and ‘‘His de- ©

cision becomes his client’s command, his judgment must

necessarily guide his client’s destiny.”’

It is submitted that: his client should not necessarily |

be bound by counsel’s judgment, when such — is.

80 obviously wrong.

} CONCLUSION |

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reason ‘that

’ every man has an absolute right to. personal freedom and

to ria this petition for a Writ of — should

| me air gris Petitioner ¢ O.

. 1225 South Birch Street

Denver, Colorado 80222

Telephone 757-1076 -

Appearing for himself

‘

\

\

baer Appendix A

— VERDICT OF THE TRIAL COURT

. ‘October 28, 1965

‘¢(Following the recess fer dinner, the jury resumed °

‘ite deliberations. At 9:45 P.M., a verdict of guilty, was re-

__ turned. At the request of counsel for the defendant, the

jury was polled, and the verdict was found to be unani-

mous. enh (p. 557, Reporter’s ee: Vol, #3.) ~

—_— ‘ON THE VERDICT

| November 19, 1965

“THE COURT: Defendant’ * einen for judgment of

acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial, has been

considered by the ‘Court and overruled in all respects. We

are now here for sentencing. Mr. Goodwin, do you -have

anything to say before: sentence is passod?”” (p. 558, al

porter’ s Transcript, Vol. #2. y~. <

“An right, Loyd Carl Ray, if you have nothing fur- :

ee ther to say, the Court now sentences you;-in accordance

- with the verdict which was returned into this court on

October 28, 1965, finding you. guilty in Count One, and

‘the ‘Court sentences you to serve four years in the cus- .

tody of the Attorney General of the United States, there

to remain until said sentence is complied with or you are

released by due process of law.

“On Count Two, i in accordance with the verdict of the

jury, the Court now sentences you to serve three years

in the custody of the Attorney Genera] of the United .

States, there to remain until said sentence is complied with

or you are released by due process of law; this sentence

to be consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count One;

=a

oe ee one eke) ee Ne Cee ee

- ,

Oe res Le ee 0 ry walt at ot ns it ae a i atin Shin Aa : ~ ~

- .

however, the sentence in Count Two will ni pursuant to

the provisions of Section 4208 (a) (2), which gives the

_ prison authorities the right to determine when you will

be released.

‘‘Pursuant to the ide, of the jury in the verdict

returned in this court on October 28, 1965, in. relation to

Count Three, the Court now sentences you to serve four

years in the custody of the Attorney General of the United

‘States, there to remain until said sentence is complied with

or you are released ‘by due process of law; this sentence

to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count:

One.

“In relation to Count Six, or to the verdict of

the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on

October 28, 1965, the Court now sentences you to serve |

three years in the custody of the Attorney. General of the ' |

United States, there to remain ‘until said sentence is com-

plied with or you are released by due process of law; this

sentence to run concurrently with the sentence:imposed in

Count.Two, but consecutive to the sentence imposed in

Counts One and Three, but to. be served according to the

provisions. of Section 4208 (a) (2).

‘In Count Seven, pursuant to the verdict of the jury

‘finding you .guilty, returned into. this court on the 28th .

day of October, 1965, the Court sentences you to serve

four years ‘in the custody of the Attorney General of the

United States, there to remain until said sentence is com-—

plied with or you are released by due process of law this

sentence to run concurrently with the sentence imposed

in One and Three.

‘‘Count Eight, pursuant to the verdict of the jut,

finding you guilty, returned into this court on the 28th —

‘day of October, 1965, the Court sentences you to serve

oe?

plied with or you are released by due process of law; this

sentence to run concurrently with the three-year sentence.

but to be in accordance with Section 4208 (a) (2) of the

United States Code.

‘‘Count Nine, einai to the verdict of the jury

finding’ you guilty, returned into this court on the 28th —

day of October, 1965, finding you guilty, the Court now

~ sentences you to serve four years in the custody of the

Attorney General of the United States, there to remain

until said sentence is complied with or you are released

by due process of law; this sentence. to run concurrently

with the other four-year sentences.

‘In relation to Count Ten, pursuant to the verdict

of the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on

the 28th day of October, 1965, the Court now sentences

you to serve three years in the custody of the Attorney —

General of the United States; there to remain: until said

- sentence is complied with or you are released by due pro-

cess of law; this sentence to run consécutively to the four-

year sentence, but to be pursuant to Section 4208 (a) (2),

Title 18, United States Code. i

‘In relation to Count Eleven, pursuant to the viahes

of the jury finding you guilty, returned into this court on,’

the 28th day of October, 1965, the Court now sentences you

to serve three years in the custody of the Attorney Gen-

_ eral of the United States, there to remain until said -sen-

of law; this sentence’ to be consecutive to the four-year _

tenee is complied with or you are released by due process

sentence, but be in accordance with the’ provisions of Sec-

tion 4208 (a) (2), for a total of seven years.’: (pp 560-

563, Pe: s Transcript, Vol. #2.)

. three years in the custody of the Attorney General of the -

United States, there to remain until said sentence is com-

| 31

Appendix B-

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit.

No. 18,235. °

‘Loyd Carl Ray, pone org

v.

United States of ‘America, anillan:

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

[October 21, 1966.]

Before VoczL, Chief J udge, Van OosteRHouT and ton

Circuit J —. | .

Lay, Circuit ‘J udge.

Loyd Carl Ray was indicted on eleven counts of walt

fraud under Title 18, U.S.C., §1341-in April of 1964.

The indictment charged that Ray acting under the alias of

Willard T. Morton, set up a scheme to defraud a number

of citizens by use of the mails. The scheme involved was

to induce prospective purchasers to buy tours to Hawaii.

A travel agency office was set up in St. Louis. Two sales-

men and a secretary were hired by Morton. Brochures

and various majlings were sent out-to attract a clientele.

The tours cost $485.00 each and were scheduled for De-

cember of 1963. Just before the trips were to take place,

‘ one called the Christmas Trip and the other the New

SARE PRIS EMA.

4

rt ah

rs

= on,

4 : aialetihis

Oe ON en Se a

Ee are a spines ela a ita Rai ei BIS SEA RP AR ei I te

.

Years Trip, the pre-trip parties were called off. The cli-

ents never received any tickets to go on the trip or any

of their'money back. The travel agency closed and Morton

disappeared. The government claimed there was never

any intention to provide the tours and that the defendant,

Loyd Carl Ray, was the same Willard T. Morton who

perpetrated the fraud.

Ray denied that he was Willard T. Morton and also

denied that he was ever in St. Louis during the time the

mail fraud“took ‘place. He produced relatives and lay

witnesses to. establish that “he was in Denver at all times

in question. Ray operated a travel agency in Denver dur-

ing the same period of time (October-December, 1963).

This case was originally tried in September 1964, and

ended in a hung jury. A new trial was ordered. On

~ October.25, 1965, the second trial began. A jury returned

a verdict against the defendant Ray ‘on nine of the eleven

counts of the indictment.

Mr. J chin Goodwin, a St. aii oe ee was appoint-

ed in 1964 to represent Mr. Ray before the first trial. He

acted as defense counsel in both trials. During the course

of the second trial Mr. Goodwin was reappointed: under

the Criminal Justice: Act, Title 18, U.S.C. §3006A as:

amended.’ Mr. Ray at that time qualified as an indigent

under:the Act. Appellant has retained other attorneys to Ne

perfect this appeal. :

Prior to the first trial, a satin for a bill of puitic: |

ulars under Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 7(f) was submitted on

behalf of Ray, which contained the following inquiry :

“Whe Criminal Justice Act was 1 August 20, 1965. On Ma

1964, tlie court a ted John win to resent the def

Ray under Rule 44 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. For authority of such °

Pn Se CS Wh ee ee oe ee

'‘*Please state the basis upon which it is alleged in

the indictment that.the said Willard T: Morton is the

same person as the defendant Loyd Carl ‘Ray?”’

’ The court, sustained the government’s objection to this

question. No further motion for a bill of particulars was —

. filed before the.second trial: No error is alleged herein

°as to the court’s ruling on the first ed of particulars

submitted.

In the first trial the government used certain hand-

writing experts, as well as a number of lay witnesses, who

identified Ray and Morton, the proprietor of the Willard

T. Morton Travel Agency, to be one and the same person.

) In the second trial the governaant used the same lay

witnesses and produced two new witnesses who were hand-

writing and ‘fingerprint ‘experts as well. These. experts,

Simeon Wilson from Chicago, Illinois, and Donald Gilbert

Mooney of Washington, D. C., were both connected with

the Post Office. Department Identification Laboratory.

They compared Ray’s handwriting with that of Morton.

and determined that they were written by the same hand.

In addition, they testified that Ray’s fingerprints were

the same as those taken from certain documents and a

book that had been in the possession of Morton in St.

‘Louis: Outside of the testimony concerning the finger-

prints, it is agreed the evidence nr at both trials

. was generally the same.

_ Appellant raises two pelate of error on this appeal.

First, the court erred in making certain comments preju-

dicial to Ray depriving him of a fair and impartial trial.

Secondly, the appellant was deprived of his rights under

the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), as”

‘amended.

aes Appellant calls our attention to the trial court’s exam-

- ination of the first witness Shannon. After recross ex-

amination thé following questions. and answers took place:

‘The Court: Now Mr. Goodwin is asking you

about Morton, and Mr. Gilmore is askin you about,

the ‘defendant. Do you distinguish betwlen Morton oe

and the defendant?

‘‘The Witness: I think I did in relation——

; . ~ “The Court: Are they the same person?

‘‘The Witness: They are the same person, as far

- as I am concerned. Yes, sir. .

“The Court: All right.

_**The Witness: Mr. Ray is ‘Morton to me.

_ The Court: Any other questions, gentlemen?

‘‘Mr. Gilmore: No further questions.

‘‘The Court: All right. Step down.’’.

There was no objection made at the time of this examina-

tion. ; .

It is obvious from this interrogation the trial court |

wanted to know if the particular witness distinguished’ be-

tween Morton and the ‘‘defendant’’, Ray. One of. the

chief roles of the trial judge is to see that there is no

misunderstanding of a witness’s testimony. The judge

’ has a duty to comprehend what a witness says as much

as it is his duty to see that the witness communicates with

the jury in an intelligible manner. A trial judge can do

this in a fair and unbiased way. His attempt to do so

should not be a basis of error. Where the testimony is

confusing or not altogether clear the alleged ‘‘jeopardy’’ .

to one.side caused by the clarification of a witness’s state- |

ment is certainly outweightd by the desirability of factual -

understanding. The trial judge should strive toward ver-

dicts of fact rather than verdicts of confusion. There is .,

certainly no error on this point. McCoy v. Blakely, 217 |

F.2d 227; Nat’l Dairy Products -Co. v. United States 350

F. 2d 321 (1961).?

During the course of the cross examination of the ex-

pert Wilson, Mr. Goodwin asked the witness:

| ane And you and Mr. Schicker’ (post office in-

spector) actually have the. same employer, do you not,

sir?

‘A. Sure.

‘*Q. Post Office? ;

‘‘The Court: So does Mr. Saisie (government

prosecuting. attorney) and so dol. —

‘‘Mr. Goodwin: Well, I don’t—that is all.”

_ After recross by Mr. Goodwin with the expert Wilson,

the court questioned the witness. Appellant contends

this is further error. The court’s interrogation was

prompted by Mr. Goodwin’s last question to the witness,

which was as follows:

. *£Q. What you were saying is that you were trying

to say that there is a mathematical daicaameieds here.

It is by no means a certainty?

A, That would be correct.’’

The court then asked the following questions: )

‘The Court: Well, it is a mathematical probabil-

_ ity based on your pgaet as an —_ in this anes, E

isn’t it?

: 6A. This is correct. |

‘“‘The Court: And have you ever found where

these mathematical“probabilities existed —— ,

‘Mr. Goodwin: If the Court please, I’d like to

object to this.

*In the McCoy case, Chief Judge Vogel said: _

“A trial e- not only the right, but also the du

and lead the urors in the interests of justice” 217 F at 23.

>

“The Court: Well, I want to get it straight in

the record. Go ahead and make your objection, -

| " . Mr, Goodwin: My objection has been covered by

‘counsel for ‘the Government and by myself. I think

the Court unduly emphasizes something- which the

= -* to it.

“The Court: The Court has the duty, Mr. Good-

win, to see that justice is don, and that is what the |

: Court is attempting to do. (our emphasis) -

-“*Mr. Goodwin: If. the Court please, I meant no —

disrespect. I mearit no disrespect to Your Honor.

:. is ‘‘The Court: I am just telling you what I-am go-

ing to do, and I got it in the record so we don’t have

; any mistake about our respective positions.

7 ‘*Mr. Goodwin: My objection nails to his Honer’ -

ae comment.

“The Court: Now, Mr. Wilson, based on this .

- mathematical ‘probability, have you an opinion as to

whether. or not these prints were made by the same

finger, or thumb in this case?

“The Witness: May I put ‘it ‘this way, Your

Honor? The possibility that these two patterns could

occur coincidentally i in the hands of two different in- .

dividuals is so remote as. to be unworthy of any serious

consideration.”’ | .

a

-Counsel’s attempt to end his cross examniation on a ©

strong point was virtually destroyed. But Mr. Goodwin

perseveres and succeeds when, in a few short additional

‘questions, the witness: admits:

‘In the final analysis, this is for i jury to ds-

cide whether the prints are in fact identical or ‘not.’

ae a Se pen ah shad edit. sab teas cas oe wee ‘ bod SBT RN ed fata ate es Betas ae Mie! PRAT ithe GES Hons eerie 0B

_ Government is trying to emphasize, and gives weight alk

the evidence. Kansas City Star v. United States, 240 |

- Putnam case states:

! thinks = and express his- opinion upon the

The.error raised is not so much the examination by the

‘court but the fact the court stated he wanted to “eee that

justice was, done.’’ : ;

A federal judge hes the right to comment fairly upon -

F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923 ; Woodring v. United

States, 311 F.2d 417; Batsell v. United States, 217 F.2d

257. Such right is derived from the common law. Vicks-

burg Railroad v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 546 (1886); Capital

Traction Co. v..Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898). The court in the

‘‘In the courts of the United States as it is in

those of England from which our -practice is derived

the judge in submitting a case to the jury may at his

discretion: whenever he thinks it necessary to assist

_. them in arriving at a just conclusion, and upon the

evidence call their attention to parts of it which he

facts; . | ; st

However, as we a pointed out in the. Woodring

case, this is a right which the trial court must cautiously

exercise since it can very easily result in prejudice to.a liti-

gant’s rights. This is particularly true in a criminal case

where life or liberty may be in jeopardy. The trial court’s

comments can ‘disturb the balance of fairness of a jury

trial. He should never assume the role of the prosecutor

or advocate. His position is one ‘of neutrality and he

should never cross boundaries. It is a trial judge’s duty °

to see that the evidence is clear and understood. How- |

ever, his comments should never unfairly emphasize testi-

mony nor add to or change the evidence given. The

jtidge’s zeal to do so. when the evidence is:evenly balanced’ _

can easily create prejudice. Each case merits individual —

‘consideration. It may well be the less comment or inter-

ference by the trial judge with the examination of wit-

‘nesses, the less opportunity for prejudice to basic. rights —

to, a fair trial. Woodring v. United States, supra; Boat-

right v. United States, 105 F.2d 137; Stoneking v. United

States, 232 F.2d. 385.*

~The statement by the trial judge that the expert wit-

ness worked for the same employer as the court is certain-

ly a harmless one. At best it could have been avoided, but

we fail.to see this statement constitutes error. If such a

comment would so influence a jury, then the intelligence

and Andependence of a jury no longer deserves” our confi-

dence. \

The court’s comments that he was simply trying to see

that ‘‘justice was done’’ comes close to\ exceeding the

bounds of judicial propriety when taken in full context of — .

the situation. It is doubtful the trial judge intended it

4s such, but the court’s examination could lend itself to

the appearance that the court was emphasizing, through

one of the government’s: witnesses, a contention of the

government, to-wit, that the fingerprints were made by

the same person as the defendant. It would seem from

the record that the court did not have to intervene with

his questioning—at all at this point. There was tiot the

need for clarification here, as existed in his examination

of the witness: ‘Shannon. The court did instruct at the

conclusion of the case as follows:

¢ Of ‘A Jakes To Comment On

Tes a renege hy seer To the guy. ” 6 F.R.D. 317 (1947),

wherein Chief Justice Fuller in Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 is

quad on ony ing:

ee

_ witness admitted: ‘‘in final analysis’ this was for the jury |

. their scoumulative effect.*

“he harmless error statute, Rule $23), means that a criminal

jury, express any opinion as to the facts or comment

. directly upon the witnesses and their testimony. We feel

that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the

\.. es

‘‘Therefore if during this trial you have imagined

or gained the impression that the court had any

‘opinion in regard to this case so far as the facts are |

concerned ‘dismiss that impression from’ your mind

because the court meant to express neither by manner

nor by voice-any opinion on the facts.”

We submit the court’s charge cannot rectify actual and

real prejudice. However, the charge does make clear to

the jury the court did not intend to influence their deci- )

sion in any way.

It is significant the trial court did not, during the

presentation of the testimony or during his charge ‘to the

the recross examination by Mr. Goodwin, when the expert

to decide,’’ fairly brought the issue back into proper focus.

We find no prejudicial error in the comments made, or in

The second shied of reversal cuineliaini relies upon is

Criminal Justice Act. of 1964, §§ (e) as amended.

_ Subsection’ (e) reads:

**Services s other than counsel—Counsel for a de-

' . fendant who’is financially unable to obtain investiga-—

\tive, expert or other services necessary to an adeqnate

defense in his case may request them in an ex parte

application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry

in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are neces-

oa eon Seo ee a error. Bihn v. United

be \

WR eae AN oa te he iPS ati MS omg gadis enn os A ssid Niele x

sary and that the defendant ig financially unable to

obtain. them, the céurt shall authorize counsel to ob-

tain. the services on behalf of .the defendant. The

court may, in the interests of justice, and upon a find-

ing that timely procurement of necessary services

- eould not await prior authorization, ratify such ‘serv-:

ices after aed have been obtained : . .’’

‘Trial counsel was appointed to act for appellant under

the Criminal Justice Act during the\second trial in Octo-

ber 1965. The second trial commenced on October 25,

1965. At-noon on October 27; 1965, and before the govern-

ment rested, Mr. Goodwin was reappointed counsel under

the Criminal Justice Act.

soe argues he was not able to take advantage of

his rights under §§ (e) .of -the act, specifically to obtain

fingerprint experts to testify for the defense. It is some-

what difficult to grasp appellant’s reasons, but apparently .

‘he raises two: (1) Appellant: was not timely informed .

~~ fingérprint. experts were. to be used by the government

(the: government. did not use them in the first trial in

- :1964).* (2) Assuming (but not admitting) appellant’s trial —

counsel was forewarned concerning the government’ 8 fin-

sAlthough not raised as a point a error erat appellant is in-

directly challenging the trial court’s refusal to require the government

dy hy byt A Sa uire ‘them to inform

. & oe there were fingerprint aay. court Has long

' ROE Sek Sie: CG OF OHNE tS tae on for a bill of particulars

“a8 voy Yay Bee discretion of the trial court and that its ruling

% bed except for An j abuse of that discretion. Kansas

| : Cay mae Co. w United Sinton 200 F.2d 643, cert. denied 354 U.S. 923;

T v. United States, 298 F.2d 208: (1961). ’

_ .. & bill of. particulars: under Rule 7(f) is granted to particularize a

_ ° Charge involved and is cont 3 not an instrument to. require the gov-

. =. @mmment to disclose its evidence. Cooper v. United States, 9 Cir., 282

eal F.2d 527, 532; Cordova v. United States, 10 Cir. 303 F.2d 454; United

_ . States vy. Hanlin, D.C: Mo., 29 F.R.D. 397; United States v. Kelly, D.C.

Mo., 92 F.Supp. 672. ' reg

gerprint experts, he was appointed (under the Act) too

“late to effectively utilize defense experts since appellant:

was entitled to have such witnesses not only testify on

his behalf but also be present at the time the government

experts were on the stand.

iia ovate the purpose ‘of the Act cannot be

carried out if the accused is not afforded a sufficient op-

_ .portunity to take advantage of the Act’s provisions. Ap-

- pellant further mentions that he was at a distinct disad-

vantage because his defense was alibi and mistaken iden-

tity,.and most of the alibi witnesges were in Denver.*

Appellant concedes in his reply brief that they do not

at any time challenge the competency ‘of “—e Goodwin,

the trial attorney for Ray. :

Cssineet presumably argues that he could not nate

' adequate expert or investigative services, more particularly

- fingerprint experts, in time for adequate presentation of

“appellant’s defense. Theoretically, appellant says, since

_ trial counsel’ was -appointed belatedly he, thereby, was -

denied rights under §§ (e). However, a complete analysis

_. of the Criminal Justice Act, as set forth in the legislative

history as well as in the Act itself, fails to show that any

accused is given any greater substantive right under the

t

6A: t claims that he had affidavits of some 40 witnesses which

wo verify he was in Denver nt ad brings wile, sever ser

witnesses did not appear. Ap be

nental and twether bo-tawe oy Body he. produced a Conti-

‘Sach a contention sities Rules 15(c) and 17(b) of the Fed. R.

creti * ee 2% Te Senn ta _ A, 4.4 Saua

on, ons co ave en, or

a ee ee ee ee

“a

OD Ri cred ese ern Sens ait oniale it, betel beiawie tee 8

PgR ns tien ne ROU

.

Se alah Is Nl RS aH Fe

.

ee ht eee ~ «

odin SERRATE AA REAR ON preach s

per

Act than he previously had. See Vol. 4 U.S. Code Cong.

& Adm. News, p. 2990.’

The fundamental purpose of the Criminal Justice Act

_ is to provide legal assistance to indigent defendants in

criminal cases.* See Preamble to Criminal Justice Act of

1964, Pub. Law 99-455, 78 Stat.. 552, 18 U.S.C. 3006A;

Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Honorebie James A aad

36 F.R.D. 67.

‘An indigent represented thereunder is not seenbded

any procedural rights of discovery or ‘defenses. The Crim-

inal Justice Act is a means of implementing, what the

courts have declared to be a constitutional demand (right

of counsel) under the Sixth Amendment and its inclusion

in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Douglas v. California,

372 U.S. 353. Serious ‘‘equal protection” questions would —

arise if the Act provided indigents with — the non-

‘indigent defendant would not have.

"For a most theveushh and excellent ‘discussion, see Kutak, Criminal -

Justice Act of 1964, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703 (1966). See p. 737 where the

Allen Committee Report discusses §§(e). Such report states:

‘ “* * * the absence of a provision for defense services is ‘a fund-

amental deficiency of the present system,’ which reaches ‘serious

anyone ne The plan provides that counsel, whether appointed

or or retained: by a defendant who is financially unable to obtain

- . the services other than counsel necessary to an adequate defense,

may request them in an ex parte application to the court. The

ex parte natufe of the ee © insure that the defendant

not have to disclose defense prematurely. Although the

or tive history is replete with references to these services, no

ustive description of thefn has been found. The Allen Com-. |

mittee Report refers to counsel having at his disposal the ‘tools

- essential to conduct a ee ae, and later specifically men-

tions and pal kL e assistance of experts, transcripts

< proceedings an the like. an :

ane Se imp lementation, of such services is now more readily

provided. However on" ‘services were available tothe indigent be-

assage of the Act. See discussion in re. Bandy v. United

States, 8 ir., 296 F.2d 882, infra.

weThe sine qua non of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is. partici

pote by competent counsel.” Kutak, supra, 44 Nebr. L. Rev. 703

=:

a

In King v. United States, 355 F.2d 500 (1966), the

court presented a similar idea when it expressed disap-

proval of the lower court’s order to the government to pro-

duce their file on the defendant for the use of his court-ap-

pointed counsel. The court said: -

‘‘The rights of a defendant are not to be deter-

mined on an ad honjinem basis with respect to his

counsel, whether because, as the court observed in this

case, he is believed ‘reliable’, or, as the court stated

was its practice, by distinguishing between court-ap-

pointed and counsel the defendant personally chooses.

There should be no special relationship between court-

appointed counsel and the court and no special. favors.

Quite apart from which would seem to us the obvious

inequity, the court’s practice might’ well cause defend- _

ants who otherwise would not have done so, to seek

court-appointed counsel, thereby increasing the gov-

ernment’s financial burden under the Criminal J ustice

Act.’’ (n. 2, p. 702)

Possibly appellant is arguing that he was denied the

right of ‘‘effective assistance of counsel’’ under the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution because his trial counsel

did not have timely opportunity to present the proper

defense Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. This was the

approach taken in the case of United States v. Germany,

32 F.R.D. 421 (1963). There the court ordered that the

court-appointed counsel was entitled to reimbursement for

reasonable and necessary expenses in traveling to inter- —

view and depose an informer and view the scene of the

alleged crime. The Department of Justice would not honor

the order. The court held the defendant was ‘thereby ‘

denied his constitutional right to counsel and dismissed A

the indictment. The court wates:

ae

**This Court believes that, without more, upon a

certification of a court-appointed counsel for an in-

digent defendant to the effect that it is reasonably

necessary for him to incur expenses for traveling and

for subsistence in viewing the scene of the alleged

crime and in interviewing material witnesses, the

‘effective assistance of counsel’ mandate requires that

the money for said reasonably necessary travel and

subsistence expenses be made available'to him by the

- United States. However, this Court believes that Rule.’

15(c) of. the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

_ ‘bolsters the contention of the defendant, Ned Ger-

- many, in this case that his counsel is entitled to re-

imbursement for the expenses necessarily incurred by

him in rendering ‘the effective’ representation as re-

quired by the Sixth Amendment to the .Constitution.’’ |

Assuming appellant’s argument is intended to encom-

pass this theory, it is misplaced: Trial.counsel did not

at any time request handwriting or fingerprint experts

before, during or after the trial. Bandy v. United States,

8 Cir., 296 F.2d 882. We are only left to speculate why.

There probably was good reason.° |

We have thoroughly examined the record concerning

the cross examination of government experts. It is. taxing

credulity to say trial counsel was ‘‘caught by surprise’’

*

*Many reasons could exist for counsel’s not calling either a finger-

a or handwriting expert: (a) It may have been impossible to ob-

experts to disagree with the government’s statements as a matter

of scientific evidence or (b) at best such witnesses could say nothing.

more than what: counsel achieved in the cross examination of the

i — expert when the latter admitted. in the “final analysis -

was for the jury to decide” whether or not the prints were the

same, or (c) Mr. Goodwin being a Mor pee trial counsel (which

e t concedes) determined it would be better to break down the.

ent witnesses on cross examination than weaken his case by

in defense experts who possibly could be discredited com- ~~

the government.

‘3

by such evidence. His cross examination demonstrates a.

- thorough technical knowledge of the subject.”

However, whether counsel was forewarned or not —

makes little difference. He certainly had full knowledge of

such evidence prior to presenting his case-in-chief. Yet no

- request to hire experts was made. Appellant claims, how-

‘ever, retaining an expert at.the time of Goodwin’s re-

appointment under the Act would have been a futile .

gesture since the defense expert should have been in court

at the time of the actual testimony of the government’s

witnesses.’ Such a quixotic contention hardly merits dis-

cussion. We know of nothing under the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure or the-Criminal Justice Act now or:

at any time which would provide the defendant with this -

as a matter of right. Furthermore, such prearranged .

presence could hardly be deemed indispensable to the

testimony of an expert .in the defense case-in-chief.

10Mr, Goodwin’s cross examination of Simeon Wilson included the

following questions: Q. You don’t know what type fingerprints he

has, whether he has whorls or arches or—what are the other things?

Q. You don’t even’ know what his fingerprint style is, do you sir? |

Q. What percentage of the people would you say in this courtroom

have got whorl type fingerprints? . . . Q.. And a bifurcation simply

means where two lines join, two of these ridges join? Q. And you

expect if you have the others present. in the _— you would have to

-have some bifurcations, wouldn’t you? .Q. I seem to have read or

heard some place sir, that it requires at least 13 identifications or

es of a print to have an opinion on it...

The cross examination of Mr. Mooney , the other fingerprint expert,

includes the following questions: Q. You mean to say that P know

of.no process which by the use of aminoacid could transfer f

Q. Is there to your knowledge any international agreement with ref-

_ erence to fingerprints? Q. Fingerprinting was originated where? Q.

Where was fingerprinting first used? Q. ere was this whole system

first used? Q. . you sure it wasn’t England? Q. The-first method of

identification the English used wasn’t it? Q. Did you know under that

$ystem doesn’t it require a minimum of 13 points of identification?

(our emphasis) 5 ie : ‘

u]f the lack of knowledge prevented timely motion, it remains un-

answered why appellant did not call -handwri ——- Govern-

ment handwriting experts appeared at the first trial. These assuredly

were as significant and important as the fingerprint experts. —

A eae eee

| °17(b) nor A. we interpret the Criminal Justice Act as

In Reistroffer v. United

—1§6—

This claim also fallaciously assumes appellant could

not obtain such services before the implementation of the “

Criminal Justice Act. The benefits granted under §§ (e) -

- of the Criminal Justice Act are similar to Rules 17(b) and

15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Each

of these provisions relate to funds for indigents to secure

witnesses for trial. In Bandy v. United States, supra, at

_ 888, Judge, now Chief Judge, Vogel, said:

_ «* * * We agree with United States v. Fox,

' .D.C.S.D. N.Y., 1937, 19 F. Supp. 463, that handwriting

experts are included under Rule 17(b), Federal Rules

_ of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. Had Bandy em-

ployed a handwriting expert, his services would have

been’ paid for in accordance with the order of the

District Court.’’

If such services were deemed necessary, appellant

-eould have made a request to the court’? without being

reappointed under the Criminal Justice Act. Yet the record

is absent any request made and as such the matter must

be deemed intelligently waived. Bandy v. United States,

12Clearly no substantive rights are ted defendants A... A Rule

denied defendai t a gh eo

an ’s reque subpoena a wri expert to

testify on his behalf. On review the court stated:.

“It is well settled that Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, 18 USCA, under which the motion for subpoena was

made, does not accord the indigent defendant an absolute rig hi to

rs ree ernment expense. There is and aust be

wide discretion vested in the District Court to prevent the abuses .

often ise of the < by defendants. This Court not disturb the

_" of discretion unless exceptional circumstances compel

District Judge Robert Van Pelt in United States ‘v. Pope,. 251 F.

S ‘Supp. 234, interpreted §§ (e) as follows:

“The Criminal: Justice-Act contemplates that counsel should be

afforded fullest opportunity to prepare their case; the rule in

allowing defense services is that judge need only be satisfied that

they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist counsel in their

SS = not that the defense would be defective without

cnililiais

supra (waived right to handwriting expert when no re-

- quest was made under 17(b); Mark v. United States, 8

Cir., 326 F.2d 481, cert. denied 377 U.S. 947 (right to

speedy trial waived by defegdant unless asserted'in some | ©

manner); United States v. Miller, 2 2-Cir.,, 246 F.2d 486 |

(alleged defect in indictment waived by failure to. raise |

by pre-trial motion); Ford v. United States, 5 Cir., 201

F.2d-300 (waived statutory disqualification by juror, even.

_ though not known by counsel. at trial) ; Edwards v. United

States, 8 Cir., 333 F.2d 588 (contentions not brought to

attention of tria¥ court are waived unless record disclosed —

plain error affecting substantial rights).

The courts must presume that trial counsel pursues’.

the course of action at the trial he feels best for his client, |

‘and absent plain error involving substantial rights his

client is bound by the counsél’s choice. United States v.

Handy, 130 F.Supp. 270, aff’d 224 F.2d 504, aff’d 351 U.S.

454 (1955), where the court said at page 295:

‘‘Defendant’s counsel apparently made a deliber-__

_ ate choice not to seek delay or a change of venue. _

Many reasons could be .suggested for their decision.

We will not indulge in speculation. At all events there

was 4 waiver of any right they may have had.’’

In Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327, cert. denied,

352 U.S. 873, reh den 352 U.S. 919 (1956), the court said

that ‘‘One cannot speculate upon failure to call a witness

and thereafter present such testimony as newly discov-

‘ered,’’ at 332. See also: United States v. Marachowsky, —

213 F.2d 235° (1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 826; Blodgett v.

United States, 161 F. 2d 47 (1947); Apel v. United States,

- 247 F.2d 277 (1957).

This court cannot ‘but observe appellant wears shoes

_ similar to a party seeking a new trial on newly discovered

at.

, «

a eee WR ie PY cece ARAN AIS

4 ¢ : Pd

ee We Meee oe Sara ars en ee eT ae

| evidence under Rule 33. Such evidence not only must be

material, but it must be shown that on a new trial it would

probably produce an acquittal. McCroskey v. U nited States,

339 F.2d 385, 387 (8 Cir. 1965) ;. Ferina v. United States,

- 302 F.2d 95, cert. denied 371 U.S. 819 (8 Cir. 1962);

Connelly v: United States, 271 F.2d 333, cert. denied 362

U.S. 936 (8 Cir. 1959) ; stad v. . 312 F.2d 533: “s

- Cir. 1963).

In United States v. Keller, 145 F. ay 692 (1956), the

defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that, among _

other things, the statement of a handwriting expert was

new evidence which exculpated him from his conviction

for aiding and abetting in filing a false FHA certificate.

The court held that this ¢vidence did not justify a new

trial because, in part, it was not newly discovered: ‘The

‘entire issue of the authenticity of the signatures on the

- FHA Completion Certificate was joined when Ginter de-

nied forging the document . . . Ginter’s testimony was.

taken on the first day of the‘trial, yet defendant made no

request to adjourn in order to obtain the services of a

‘handwriting expert.’’ (Emphasis ours)

Under Rule 33, assuming appellant could produce wit-

nesses contradicting government fingerprint experts, clear-

ly a new trial could not be granted. Such allowance would

bring no end of litigation. Hindsight can always produce

other witnesses ‘who could have been called to corroborate

‘evidence presented. Certainly appellant does not -have

any better standing than a movant under: Rule 33. We

do not see how appellant’s position is enhanced raising

the issue on a direct appeal for the first time, when we

necessarily cannot even know what such experts might say.

7 We’ emphasize, however, trial counsel is not to be

criticized. In an adversary proceeding the lawyer is the

master of his client’s case..He guides the course of the

trial, always with the utmost allegiance to his client’s

-eause. His skill and competence are his tools. His deci-

sion becomes’ his client’s command, his judgment must

necessarily guide his client’s destiny. When-the verdict

is in, his only reward may well be satisfaction in render-

.. ing his all for the. cause. A lawyer’s actions. under fire -

_ should: not be measured by hindsight speculation. The

' jury resolved the case unanimously against the defendant.

The examination of the entire record shows trial counsel

did everything within his best judgment to provide appel-

lant with a fair trial. We fail to see how any rights were .

denied the appellant.

Judgment affirmed.

. A true copy. | , )

Attest: ; : ba

' Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Appendix C

JUDGMENT

United States Court Of Appeals

| For The Eighth Circuit

-

No. 18,235 — SEPTEMBER 7 1966.

Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, —

vs. |

_ United States of America.

Filed October 21; 1966, Robert C. Tucker, Clerk.

ee ee Pees Nag sated the tlaie fo Yl clit Ait lit a eh Sah tet pee 0 hy capes (mete

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

oOo

This Cause came on to be heard on the record from

‘the United States District Court for the sie ‘District -

- of Missouri, and wag argued by counsel.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and.

adjudged by this Court, that the judgment and sentence of

the said District Court, in ™ cause, be, and the same is

hereby, affirmed.

And it is further Ordered by this Court that the de-

fendant in the said District Court, Loyd Carl Ray, do -sur-

render himself to the custody of the United States Marshal

for the Eastern District of Missouri, if not now in cus-

tody, in execution of the judgment and sentence imposed

upon him, within thirty days from and after the date of

filing of the mandate of this Court in the District Court.

October 21, 196

Appendix D

“United States Court Of Appeals

For The: Eighth Circuit —

~ No. 18,235 — Szrremser Tens, 1966.

‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant, ete atm

a

United States of America.

: Appeal from the United States District Court for the:

_ Bastern District of Missouri.

the Supreme Court.of the United States that a

. writ of certiorari and record have been filed, the stay

hereby granted shall continue until the final disposition

a x <i eee See ee Te:

se Seen nin re UR lar BI TCS ps Sane sites ian

Petition of .appelldnt for rehearing filed in this

‘ cause having been considered, it. is now here ordered by

this Court that the same be, :and it is hereby, denied.

November 22, 1966

| Appendix E - .

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fighth Circuit

No, 18285

‘Loyd Carl Ray, Appellant,

Mypritets y af

United States of America. .

aggeel from the United States District rn for the

Kastern District of. Missouri. .

On Consideration of the motion of appellant} for a

stay.of the mandate in this cause pending a petition to

- the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of |

certiorari, it is now there ordered by this Court that the

issuance of the mandate herein be, and the same is hereby,

stayed for a period of thirty days from and after this

date; and if within said period of thirty days there is filed

with the, Clerk of this Court a certificate’ of the Clerk of

of the case by the Supreme Court.

November 28, 1966

ition for —

e+

%

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