Memorandum in Opposition — Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1967
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_OctoRER TERM, 1966
No. 7164:
Burr OAKs Corporaiion, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
CoMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
atts Va rer oe:
ON PETITION FOR A@WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
‘STATES. COURT ‘OF APPEALS FOR°THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT .
. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION —
Petitioner Burr Oaks Corporation was organized:
- for the purpose of developing, subdividing and selling —
‘improved lots from a parcel of land owned by peti-
tioners Elkind, Watkins and “Ri¢z (Pet. 35). The
corporation’s common stock was issued (for a total of
$4,500 in cash) one-third each to the wives of Elkind &
. and, Watkins and one-third, to two brothers. of Ritz.
- (Pet. 36). Shortly thereafter Elkind, Watkins and.
Ritz transferred their land to the corporation. Al-
though the land had a fair market value of not more
1 The Individizal’ petitioner’s wives’ are Wirtiog only tiedsitive
_ they filed joint returns with their husbands for the yee ae
question. wh 3
* 240-382—66. ig iag SD
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_ than’ $165,000, the corporation gave Elkind, | Watkins
and Ritz 6 percent promissory notes in ‘the total
‘amount of $33,000: (each receiving | a $110,000 note) .
(Pet. 37-38). .
‘Elkind,, “Watkins 2a Ritz: saieieniler dominated.
the corporetion’s affairs, and, without the knowledge o :
: of. the holders of the common stock’ or the board of -
directors, the corporation rhadé transfers of part of
‘the land back to them without charge or for less than
would have been realized from sales to- third parties -
- (Pet. 38-40). Elkind, -Watkins. and. Ritz received
- $64,000 apiece- during the years 1959-1961, as install- -
ment payments on the notes (Pet. 41-42). The .
‘corporation -has never distributed anything to its
common. stockholders (Pet. 42). ._The Tax. Court con-.
cluded that Elkind, Watkins and Ritz never had any |
intention of enforcing. the notes against the corpora-
tion. but placed: their land at the risk of the business,
using the notes only to obtain a continuing interest in
. the ‘corporation that would enable them to withdraw .
frorh ‘the corporation the developer’s profit norinally t
- inherent in the subdivision and sale of ai land (Pet.
+ 3B, 42, 46).
If the transaction had the dae effect Wopait for by
. petitioners, (1) the corporation would have been able ©
-- to use the inflated purchase ‘price as its cost basis in
_ ‘the land, eliminating substantially all of its profit on
the sale of the lots and minimizing its income tax lia-:
bilities, and (2) Elkind; Watk s and Ritz would have .;
vobtained capital gain treatment on the:difference be- .
tween the purported selling price to the corporation :
= tele original cost basis in the end...
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Both. courts tno ssiihdahd agreeing with the Com-
“missioner, concluded that in reality Elkind, Watkins
and Ritz had made an equity investment in the corpo-
-@ ratioh-to the extent of the land which they transferred
to it and that the promissory notes which they re-
. _ eeived in exchange for the land constituted, in sub-
® stance, preferred ‘stock in the corporation. “Conse-
*. quently, thé unified transaction whereby Elkind, Wat- .
@ kins, Ritz and their relatives transferred the land and
$4,500 cash to the. corporation upon its organization
constituted an exchange of property for stock within
-
4
“the purview of §351(a) of the 1954 Code,.and the i
' gorporation’s basis in the land was :the same as the
basis which it had in the. hands of the transferors.
1954 Code §362(a). Thus,-the payments by the .. .
corporation to Elkind, Watkins and Ritz constituted,
‘not payments on indebtedness, but proportional re-
“demptions of preferred stock, taxable to them as divi- °
dend income undér § 302(d) to the éxtent of the corpo- Kes
ration’ s earnings and profits.. (Pet. 21-56.) © |
The decision below is correct, and. there is rio con-
flict of decision or other basis for further ‘review. .
Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 18), this
_ is not “the first case where payments on instruments
which were pure debt obligations under general Jaw
principles were taxed to the recipients as dividends on
- stock.” See, é.g:, Gooding Amusement Co. v: Commis-:
sioner, 236 F.2d 159 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 352 -
U.S. 1031; Fellinger v. United. States, 363. F..2d 826
~ (CA. 6). Moreover; it is well established that the
form of a. transaction i is. not determinative of whether rN :
oi i tess debt instrument in plassaassd panes
>
” genuine iieebiedinenn: or an n equity incirialinanathé See,. :
_) @g- Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 399:(C.A..2); _
'_. P.M. Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F. 24 786 —
. CRB Aronov* yy Construction Co. v. United States, -
223 -F. Supp.. 175 (M.D. Ala:), affirmed, 338 F. 2d --
* + 337 (C.A. 5); Arlington Park Jockey Club v. Sauber,
262 F. 2d 902 (CsA. 7); Gooding Amusement ‘Co. Vv. ~
Commissioner, green > As the lower courts found, the.
.transfer of the land to: the ‘corporation by Elkind, ..
Watkins and Ritz had all of the characteristics of an:
' equity investment. ye
The principal thrust’ of sities seu ae
ever, is that Commissioner v.~Brown, 380 U.S. 563, -
~ tacitly abolished the. fundamental proposition that a
transaction may be treated differently in the pradtical
— reference of federal income taxation than state law
‘y and the labels selected by the parties would Buggest..
* In Brown, this Court merely held that when property ©
ae disposed of at a reasonable price in arm’s-length |
Ae dealing to a buyer who i is not controlled by the seller, ee
the transaction constitutes a “sale” even though the
es A purchase price is collectible only out of the property
tfansferred and. its profits’ To be sure, in reaching
that result, this Court noted that the transaction there —
involved was a “sale”? under general law (p..571), but
that was the beginning. of the inquiry, not the end’ of
- it. The instant case_did not. involve a arm’s-length bar-
gaining, the purchase price was more ‘than twice the ‘ye°
i fair market value of the property transferred, and the. :
transferors controlled the transferee. Moreover, the _.
questionsin ‘the present: case is whether the purported _
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“note? ; aetniaity constitute te eqhigy interests so that § 351 |
will .apply. Finally, it is clear that Brown did not
‘overrule sub. ‘silentio all of the tax * deeisions in the
: ties as Viewed under state law.
~ Phe- betition for a writ. of certiorari should be.
denied’ | ° 4 ae
_- Respectfully submitted, .
: THURGOOD Marsan, -
Soa eae Solicitor General.
ef Pe | Minoneu Rocovin;
Tt ose "” Assistant Attosgney General.
_ G@uerv’E. ‘ANDREWS, :
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DECEMBER 1966 fo. :
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- the fransdetion controls and substitute, instead a.
| mechani¢al_ reference to the labels chosen. by the par- |
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