Opposition Brief — American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Supreme Court brief1966

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- IN THE

Supreme Court of ‘the United States

~ Ocroser TERM, 1966 ~

No. 304

* = te

—_ 2

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS WORLD ‘AIRLINES,

Inc., Unttep Amr Lines, Inc., Petitioners, aire

; v. |

| Civ. AERONAUTICS Board, ET AL., Respondents.

“a

‘- BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SLICK CORPORATION

: IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI .

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether rulemaking by a sears agency dicen.

invalid when it limits existing authority of a class of

- those regulated.

| ‘STATEMENT

‘This respondent (an intervenor in the court below)

adopts the statement of the case contained in the brief.

on behalf of the Civil Aeronautics Hoare i in Sppostiios

to certiorari.

Se:

ARGUMENT

Pig

THE DECISION BELOw IS IN ACCORD WITH THE: APPLICABLE |

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

‘Petitioners contend, initially, that certiorari should

..° be granted because the Civil Aeronautics Board it-.

self represented to the court below, in — renee

ing en bane, that -

3 ie question of administrative law presented is -

of major importance to the administration of the

Federal ey Act and other similar regula-

tory statutes ...’’ (R. 253) *

The present contention by petitioners is a non-sequitur

in view of the ultimate decision below, which supports

the rulemaking determination by the Board. <A con-

trary decision would have created a problem of “‘major

“importance” to the administrative agencies; but the

- problem did not eventuate by reason of the revétsal

en bane. There is now no problem which would saci

the intervention of this court.

A. _ ta Daisnisiinese' tet Board Was Engaged in

. ° Routine Rulemaking

Petitioners’ statement of the case (Petition’ 3-14)

contains an excellent analysis of the Federal Aviation

Act insofar as herein material—and in some respects

immaterial.’ But petitioners eschew much discussion

?

* Record references follow those used by petitioners, see petition

page 5, note 3.

1 We consider the prmnner s of the tariff provisions to be essen- -

tially irrelevant, sinee if the Board’s rulemaking was valid then

. the tariff ‘consequences thereof. are valid as following automatically

_ in the train of the rule; compare Superior Oil Company v. Federal

Power Commission, 322 F. 2d 601, 610 chews 9, 1963), cert. den.

377 U.S. 922 (1964). % i

3

. of the séction which is, we submit, plainly: dispositive, o.

namely section 416(a) of the Federal Aviation Act /

(49 U.S.C. 1386) : @:

“‘(a) The Board may from time to time establish _

such just and reasonable classifications or groups’ -

_of air carriers for the purposes of this subchapter

_ as the nature of the services performed by such

‘ ". gir earriers shall require; and sueh just and rea- —

sonable rules and regulations, ursuant to and con-:

.’ sistent with the provisions of this pe mire pe =

«be observed by each such class or group, as

Board finds necessary in the —— interest.”’

Here the, Board was acting with reference to its

existing differentiation between passenger (“eomhi-

tiation’) and freight. (‘‘all-cargo”’): carriers.” With-

respect to this classification the Board was prescribing

_ .“4just and reasonable rules and regulations’’ of a par-

. ticular sort. Such prescriptions are necessary from

' time to time.in any area of administrative regulation; »

and any such action in reference to an ‘already exist-

ing classification necessarily may result in some limi-

“tation or change in pre-existing authority if it is to be ~

meaningful. This does no ke it invalid. United

_ States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) ;

' National Broadcasting Co. v. ‘United States, 319 U.S.

190 (1943) ; F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). >

_ This is, ve subniit, particularly clear where, as here,

the pre-existing authority, i.e., blocked space, has not

. previously been actually used by the class which claims

se Re e

SF Compare the exercise - the Federal ew p ne of

its similar statutory power of classification, in Superior Oil Com-

pany‘v. Federal Power Commission, .supra, page 2, n. 1 sie F.,

2d 601, C.A. 9, 1963, cert. dae 377 US. 922, Sarma \

4

©q .

_ oe

"Petitioners endeavor to distinguish the decisions of

.the Court. just cited by contending that they apply only

to “‘a threshold refusal to entertain a license applica- _

tion”’ (emphasis supplied), petition 21; but even if

this were a valid interpretation yof this court’s deci-

-siong—which we think it is not—we submit that a limi-

tation on hitherto unused authority is not significantly

different from a limitation on previously unheld au- -

. thority, i in the context of rulemaking.

1. The Nature of Rulemaking

We do not undertake here any ‘tia ‘enable of

the/ legislative or ‘‘rulemaking”’ function of adminis-

trative agencies, as distinguished from their adjudica-

tive function. The majority opinion en banc, below,

reviews the legal characteristics of . this dichotomy

(petition 21a-25a).. The classic statement in this‘court ©

is that of Mr. Justice Holmes. In Prentis v. Atlantic

Coast Line, 211 US. 210 (1908) he said:

“** * * A judicial inquiry snvisitteehhias: declares .

and enforces liabilities as they stand on Briay'o

or past facts and under laws supposed a lready to -

exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation

‘on the other hand looks to the future and changes

existing conditions by making a new-rule to be |

- applied thereafter to all or some ge, of those...

. — to its power * * *.”? 211 U.

th's legislative type of hearing, such as confronted it

-here, the Civil. Aeronautics Board is not seeking to

.. determine rights of a particular carrier: vis-a-vis an-

other.carrier, but rather is. dealing in terms of cate-

| -gories and classifications of carriers, looking toward

’ the future. In-such a proceeding ‘‘it is not necessary . |

that - full. panoply of judicial ene be used. f:

_

5

Hannah v. Suaibes 363 US. 420, 449) (1960). As has.

been stated by the court below in a oie eariuicns

analogous situation ;

“# * * While fact finding may to some extent he

involved in the process, the due process. require--— |

ments of confrontation and cross-examination, the

hallmarks of the‘ judicial inquiry, are not neces-.

sarily present. Rather the quasi-legislative in-.

' quiry tends to consult broad relevant data avail- |

_able from surveys, studies and published experi-

ence, free from the limitations of confrontation

and cross-examination. Initially, the quasi-legis-

lative inquiry depends on staff work. As here, the ©

staff report often is presented to the interested

_ public with the invitation to appear at'a public

_ hearing to oppose or’ praise. From a practical

_ standpoint, with respect. to some forms of quasi-

legislative inquiries, * * * * this is the only feasible

way to proceed.’’ Jones, et al. v. District of Co- —

lumbia. (116 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 304;. .323 FF. 2d

306, 309 (1963).)

The estéblished distinction rene the logielative:

and judicial types of function of the administrative

agencies is grounded i in practical as well as logical con-

siderations. This is clearly demonstrated kere. The

-. record before the Civil Aeronautics Board indicates on

_ its face the large number of parties involved and the ©

complexity of issues and potential issues which were

‘ adumbrated. Whether or not such was the purpose of

the demands for hearings of an adjudicative type, the

inevitable result of such a proceeding would have been ~

to postpone any effective delineation of carrier roles in -

this: area for many years in the future; and as will

appear from an examination of the history of air

freight in the Civil Aeronautics Board, see II, below, -

- the passenger (‘combination’) carriers may well have

3

| 6 Ok

sipaiait that the struggling all-cargo carriers could not |

‘survive until-the termination of a proceedify of such

complexity and duration. Such a consideration in-

volves, we submit, a vue exercise of the hegumative

function.

IL

_ THE DECISION BELOW IS RIGHT ae

-\. The dissenting opinion below’ proceeds on the basic

. misconception that there has been no legally recognized

classification of freight or ‘‘all-cargo’’ carriers, as ‘dis-

tinguished from passenger, or ‘‘combination”’ carriers.

~ But such a classification was established by the Board

in 1947 and has.existed since. In that year, the Board

adopted a regulatién’ permitting’ qualifying carriers

- to engage in the carriage-of property only. Letters of

Registration were issued under-this regulation to nine -

carriers, including this respondent. In the Air Freight

oN Case, in 1949, the Board decided to regulate this class*

byway of certificate of public convenience and neces-

sity, and granted such certificates to four carriers, in-

cluding this, respondent. » The identity. of this class has ©

since been consistently recognized by. the Board and by

the aviation industry,‘ The dissent is in error in its.

assumption that ‘‘the Civil Aeronautics Board’s result

here is reached by a rule which has different impacts.

‘upon members of the same basic category.”’ (Peti-

‘. tion 37a). The all-cargo carriers are not ‘‘of the same -

basic category”’ as the combination carriers; they are.

of a different category and have been so- since 1947, ,

The fact that their certificates use the same word—

a

8 Section 292.5 of the Board s) Siiaaiahi Regulations adopted

May 5, 1947 (Serial No. 389).

4‘ E.g. Airfreight Certificate Renewal Case, 23 C.A.B. 186 (1956) ; ;

_ Domestic Cargo Mail Service Case, 36 C.A.B. 344 (1962).

7

a

7 Fy

Oviatt defining their authority, as do the cer-

tificates of the combination carriers, seems to have im- |

_ pressed the ee e.g. petition 33a, but. is of no .

—— :

CON CLUSION

Respondent ‘Slick Corporation submits that certi- |

orari should be. denied inasmuch as the decision below

is 1) in accord with the applicable decisions of this

— and 2) is plainly right. . :

© _ Respectfully submitted,

‘FREDERICK A. BALLARD |

— Ceci, A, Beastey, JR.

American Security Building

‘Washington, D. C. 20005

Attorneys for Respondent

The Slick Corporation

- Of Counsel:

~LipMAN RepMAN, Esq, '

815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006 |

August 29, 1966.

w

—. F Offige Supreme Court, U.S.

Lesser y — j FILED

IPR ks COURT. Us S SEP 211966

Speen Court of the United ‘States

OcroeBER TERM, 1966

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS WoRLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Unirep Arr Lines, INnc., Petitioners,.

v. . |

Civin Arroxautics Boarp, ET AL, Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS |

Ls.

oo ——

(RR RH EE EA CR RN TT TS TT TT

~Howarp (, Westwoop Y

WituiaM H. ALLEN

Kpwarp J. Grenter, Jr. :

701 Union Trust Building

Washington, D.C. 20005 . . ~

Cart 8S. Rowe

25 Broadway

New York, N. Y. 10004

Warren FE. Baker

640 Shoreham Building -

Washington, D. C. 20005

H. Tempieton Brown

. Of Counsel: ; pom am

oS ’ ha LOYD M,. IVETT

Covinarom® Busisne 231 South LaSalle Street

CHADBOURNE, PaRKE, | = Chicago, Tllinois 60604

Wuiresme & Wo xrFr. |

Attorneys for Petitioners

Mayer, Frrepiicn, Spiess,

Tierney, Brown & Piatr

September 1966.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The Respondents’ Appeal to Irrélevant Labels ......... Pare

' II. The: Respondents’ Invocation of an Irrelevant ‘Statutory

FEU. nevseevevecierseveies bende eeegue tuhexers _3

. TIL. The Nature of Blocked ian COS ae

IV. The Illusory Assurances ‘that Petitioners ‘Will Not Be

Hurt by Their Competitor’s Low Blocked Space Rates 9

V. The Inadequacy of the Board’s Rulemaking Proceeding:.- 11

“Conclusion ....... _ ier Pee oa bape eee cee ia bass 14

Appendix—Remarks, Before the Federal Bar Association, Sep-

. tember 8, 1966, of Joseph B. Goldman, “General

| Counsel, Civil Acronanties ME kb b-0n0sGci G08 la

.. INDEX TO CITATIONS

Cases: : nae

Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948) ........ ‘2

' . Arizowa Grocery Co. v. Atchisos, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 US. 370

CHP) cedisvccecectwesvebetes ceseavetessncgestecsess 9

CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U. 8. ey WED sk ckeccesscexs 3,7

Chicago, B. & Q.R:R. v: United States, 242 F. Supp. 414 (N. D.

Ill. 1965), aff’d per curiam, 382 U.S. 422 (1966) .......... 13

FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943) 7

Flying Tiger Line v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp,,889 (D.D.C. 4965),

aff’d without opinion sub nom. Flying hy er Line v. Murphy,

D.C. Cir. No. 19,869, decided June 2, 1986, petition for cert, -

filed August 31, 1966 LOU GEE s eW csndencdntheeceerstse 5

Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 CRORE) s eseres ; oe

Movers Conf. of America v. Umited States, 205 F. Supp. 82

Cy Ms SUED a nied ou OG 06600) 6 0000 Cdasepedeseee sees 3

_ -Prentis v. Atlantic ‘oast Hine Co., 211 US. 210° -¢1908) sadene 2

Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F. 2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.

demed, 877 U.S. ‘922 (1964) Leave was oes SouGeweravebsnens 6

- United States v. Seatrain, Lines, 329 U.S. 424 CUNT) an ccicceis 7

United States v. Storer Broadensting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) 15

VU

Pe te Contents Continued |

. Disures and Regulations: : Page

Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5

U.S.C. § 1001 et seg.

i Gkecoususeeasesdnscen SRE eR PN Tee 13

Federal perwrees Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as. amended, 49

U.S.C. § 1301 et ‘seq.

RRC Nay yer rere ne reer c mere me

DEE. Uib dened dnadenseeesteneaks de etsenscetaenets 4

UE “kn hs 4.06 ek nue buedenta use ebbkesesstaneteents 6

000) eee ee ee 3

SE sale phndensandsbasaenednnneasaendatnanes ivekae 4

ID is nk hele Gh 6S RS ewe nea ekete ns Nek eunaeenes 4,5,6

CAB Economic Regulations, 14 C.F.R. Pts. 200-99

Generally ..............-. SeueasseGaassewevaswdesess 5

Bhs GON cheeses csedecdswenceseses Pshbbeasteseeeeteus S

a

: 5° o

| Supreme Court of ‘the Huited States :

OctoBER. TERM, 1966

=

a No. oe

. AMERICAN ‘AIRLINES, INC. TRANS Wortp ATRLINES, Inc. a

| -UNITEp AIR Lanes, INc., Petthionera, i

Sa : Vv.

Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD, ET AL., Respondents.

& e 7 ‘ ‘

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

.' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE -

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ad

* *

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

I. THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL TO IRRELEVANT LABELS

The briefs in opposition attempt to defend the action

_of the Civil Aeronautics Board as sustained by the

Court of Appéals by affixing labels like ‘‘legislative’’

and “prescriptive” to the Board’s action, When

action is ‘‘legislative’ rather than ‘‘judicial,”’ so

the argument runs, an agency may proceed by rule-

making rather than pursuant to more formal notice

and hearing procedures. .

oe -<

This is ener argumentation. © Where a statute

requires notice and hearing before certain action can

be taken it is quite immaterial whether the action is

characterized as ‘‘legislative’’ or “judicial. ’» Ratemak- ;

ing, Which was, the subject of Mr. Justice Holmes’

épinion in Prentis v, Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 US..

210 (1908), quoted in Slick’s brief in opposition (p. 4),

is’ a classic example of quasi-legislative action. A

ratemaking order looks to the future in the prescription

of a new rule for application to future events. ‘Very

often, moreover, it deals with classes of parties or even

with the universe of: those regulated; sweeping mini- |

mum or maximum rate orders are typical. See, @.9.;:

Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).

Yet there is no doubt of the necessity, under the usual

_ regulatory statute\—including the Federal Aviation Act

—that ratemaking be performed on a record developed

' after notice in an intr hearing.’

Licensing, which \s what’is involved in this case,

‘also looks solely to - the : ‘future; therefore it also is

| “legislative”? i in the sense in which respondents use that

1 This. has just been recognized unequivocally by the Board’s

General Counsel—one of the. signatories to the Board’s brief in ©

-opposition—in an important. address. made on September 8, 1966,

to the.annual convention of the Federal Bar Association in Wash-

ington. The Board has reproduced the address and made it gen-

erally available. It is printed as an appendix hereto. (Pp. 1a-79,

- infra). Recognition of the absolute requirement of notice.and evi-

dentiary hearing for ratemaking ¢unless rates are to be fixed as a

condition to the grant of an exemption from the requirements of —

the Federal. Aviation Act) appears at. pp. la-2a, infra.

We refer to this address in other connections in this reply brief.

It is a thoughtful and candid discussion, forthrightly informative

for the benefit of the year’s most important gathering of the legal

officers of the federal government agencies and interested members

of their bars.

an

word. ‘ Again, however, there is no doubt that under the

usual statute the grant or denial—and under ‘the

Federal Aviation Act the alteration, amendment, mddi- .

fication or suspension—of a license may be effected .

only after notice and evidentiary hearing. It has been

SO held, under another statute that required notice

cand hearing before a license could be changed, when it -

- was sought. to change the certificate authority of an

_ entire class of earriers without following the notice

.--and hearing procedure. Movers Conf. of America v.

United States, 205 F. Supp. 82, 86 (S. D. Cal. 1962).

(Three-judge court). °

The Flying Tiger Line, sole present tee of

the Board’s blocked space policy’ statement and re-

sulting orders, has not filed a brief in opposition in

‘this case. Rather, in another case pending here, it

has. stated its agreement with the petitioners in the

present ease that the rulemaking procedure pursuant to

. which the Board has acted is unlawful. Flying Tiger

finds ‘‘compelling”’ the authorities cited by petitioners

" . and accepts the substance of. the reasoning set. forth

by — at pages 14 to 29 of their petition.”

1 THE RESPONDENTS’ INVOCATION OF AN .

IRRELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION .

The briefs in opposition. scarcely advert to. Section -

401(g) of the Act, the basis of this Court’s decision in,

‘CAB y. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961), that: an

airline certificate of public convenience.and necessity

cannot be modified without an evidentiary hearing.

Pl air they. cite the Board's directive from Congress

4 pa _

2 See. Petition for Ouctiorant, Flying Tiger Ling’ v. Murphy, No.

_ this Term, pp. 24-26. . : Pee ek og

, 6

ma

to consider certain things as inthe public interest,

Section 102; its authority to make rules ‘‘pursuant to

‘and consistent with the provisions”’ of the Act, Section .

204(.a) ;* and its power to establish such classifications

_of air carriers ‘‘as the nature of the services performed,

by ‘such air carriers shall require,’ Section 416(a).:

. Neither singly nor in combination do these pfovisions

sanction what the Board has done in this case.

Section 416(a).is particularly emphasized by the

respondents. -The Board says that ‘‘the distinction

between combination and all-cargo carriers has been

recognized for regulatory purposes ever since . the

Board certified a group of, all-cargo carriers, to serve |

as specialists in this field some twenty years ago.”’

' (Br. in-Opp. pp. 2-3). And Slick says that ‘‘the Board _

was acting with reference to its existing differentiation

betwéen passenger (‘combination’) and freight (‘

The Board cites ‘‘49, U.S.C. 1373’’ for the Board’s ‘‘broad

rule-making powers.’ (Br. int Opp. p. 7). This is § 403 of the

Act, dealing with the filing, publication and observance 6 tariffs.

It gives the. Board some rulemaking .powers but scarcely broad

ones. This section provides for regulations only governing the

form and manner of filing, posting and publishing tariffs and the

information to be contained in thein, § 403(a) ; it also- permits the

Board, by regulation or otherwise, to pePmit the ling -of tariff

changes on less than the statutory 30-days notice ‘‘or modify. the

requirements of this'section. with respect to filing ang posting of .

, tariffs, either in particular instances or by general ordép applicable

, to speciafor peculiar circumstances or conditions,’’ § 403(c). Since

§ 403 was never invoked in the rulemaking proceeding that led to -

_ the-blocked space policy statement find in any case could have no

_«, Pertynence, ‘we assume that the citation is an inadvertence and that

_ +*the intended reference was to § 204(a), 49 U'S.C. §.1324(a).

= . @ . . or

<a

om

o”

5

mail and one that-is.licensed, to carry property and

mail or property only. But the fact is that this differ-

ence has not been regarded as especially significant in

the Board’s regulation of carriers. Under the Board’s

Economic Regulations, 14 O.F.R. Pts. 200-99, distine-

tions are not drawn between passenger and non-pas-

senger carriers in the regulatio of their transportation

of property except in a minor respect having to do with

' the nature and quantity. of charter and special service

flights that a non-passenger carrier can operate, 14

C.F.R. Pt. 207. And the cargo ‘‘specialist,’’ Flying

Tiger, is So. unimpressed by the Board’s classification

power that it lately has attacked the Board’s passenger

charter regulation as illegally discriminatory in limfit- -

ing the cargo carriers’ authority to operate passenger

charters in a.manner in which the combination carriers’

authority is not limited.‘

In any event, Section 416(a) empowers the Board

only to establish classifications of carriers based upon

the nature of the services performed by them. This is _

a power to recognize, for regulatory purposes, *differ-

ences in the kinds of service for which authority ‘is

held by various carriers. It is not in itself a substan-

tive power to prescribe what services particular

classes of carriers are authorized to perform, in dis-

_ regard of the procedures set forth in other provisions

of the Act that expressly deal with the way. the power |

to authorize service is to be exercised. Nor is such

substantive power supplied by the. further. authority

of the Board conferred by Section 416(a) to prescribe

‘Flying Tiger Line v. Boyd, 244 F: Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C. -

1965), aff’d without opinion sub nom. Flying Tiger Line v. Murphy, .

D.C. Cir. No. 19,869, decided June 2, 1966, petition for cert. filed

August 31, 1966 (No. 508).

‘ 6.

-“‘such just and reasonable rules and regulations, pursu-

ant to and consistent with [the economic regulatory

provisions of the Act], to be observed by each such

class . . ., as the Board finds necessary in the public

in ’? Regulations under Section 416(a) can only

be promulgated ‘‘pursuant to’’ substantive provisions

of the Act such as Section 401 and must be ‘‘consistent’?

therewith. The Board, then, is wrong in implying tha

its action here is sustained by a statutory power

‘define distinctions among classes’’ (Br. in Opp. p. 7)

and Slick is wrong in. asserting that regulations ad-

_, dressed to classes’may validly ‘‘result in some limita-

tions or changé in preexisting authority’’ (Br. in Opp.

p. 3)—if the procedure prescribed for limiting or

_ ehanging pre-existing authority has not been followed.

An agency’s power to recognize or establish classes

of the entities subject to its regulation is relevant .

when the agency, following the procedure prescribed

for it, takes action that affects one group differently

from another. That is all that was held concerning the ~

Federal Power Commission’s power to classify the

persons subject -to its jurisdiction in Superior O11 Co.

v. FP@, 322 F.2d 601, 621 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, ~~

377 U.S. 922 (1944), cited by Slick (Br. in Opp. p. 3

n.2).

‘This was imate the role assigned to Section

416(a) by the court below. It referred to the sections

of the Act now cited by the Board, including Section

416(a), and said that ‘‘this combination of powers... .

. suffices to sustain the regulation on the merits, .asswm-

ing no procedural bar.”’ (Pet. App. p. 18a) (Emphasis

added). Its decision that there was tio procedural bar

derived from the novel rule it expounded that action

that might have to be preceded by adjudicatory: process

\ , . i

i

is

_ if Siseoted against a single ‘carrier can be taken by

rulemaking if directed to all or an ascertainable class

of carriers, a rule for which it claimed no statutory

basis 1 in the Federal Aviation Act.

‘On either rationale, that of the court below ¢ or that

of the respondents, the question whether. decisions of

_ this Court*as to the’ integrity of the licenses of, regu-

- lated firms* may be evaded as the Board has sought

to evade them warrants consideration by this Court.

III. THE NATURE OF BLOCKED SPACE SERVICE

The Board says in its brief in opposition that peti- )

tionérs’ ‘‘certificates do not authorize—or even men-

tion—blocked-space service, nor did. combination car-

riers attempt to provide it until a blocked-space tariff

-_ was proposed by an all-cargo carrier.’’* (Br. in Opp.

p. 8). The Board proceeds to say that ‘‘combination

earriers are authorized to carry freight between the

points specified in their certificates”? and that ‘‘they

retain this authority under the [blocked space] rule.”’ .

(Ibid.) The apparent conclusion is that certificate

modification procedures were not necessary because the.

petitioners are still authorized to file sugh property

__ tariffs as in fact they had filed in the past. .

Of course, the certificates of the, petitioners do: not

mention ‘‘blocked-space service’’ any more: than, do

- those of the all-cargo carriers. The certificates of both

groups of carriers authorize the holders to engage in

the air transportation of ‘“property”’ —without quali-

5 CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961) ; United States v.

Seatrajn Lines, 329 U.S. 424 (1947) ; FCC v. National Broadcast-

ing Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).

6 Slick makes. something of the ‘same point when it relees to

‘hitherto unused authority.”’ ‘(Br. in Opp. Dp. 4).

*~

‘le

8

fication. The Board treated this authorization as en-

compassing: blocked space service for both groups of

carriers until four days after its policy statement was

issued, and for the all-cargo carriers thereafter. (See

Pet. pp. 8-11).

Whatever may be said in the Board’ s brief in oppo-

sition, the Board’s General Counsel, a signatory. to

that brief, has forthrightly acknowledged more re-

‘cently. (note 1, supra) that ‘‘the blocked-space

type of rule making ... permits a diminution in the

existing rights of a given class of licenses, without a

hearing.”’? (P. 7a, infra)... And so, indeed, it does.

Blocked space is nothing but a low rate for a particu-

lar kind of contractual arrangement with a shipper of

property. An, undiminished ‘‘property’’ certificate

authorizes it. It takes a ‘‘diminution in the existing

rights’’ of a carrier holding: a ‘property’ certificate

to withdraw from that carrier the right to file a blocked,

space tariff. If ‘‘diminution in the existing rights”’

under a carrier’s. certificate is not ‘‘modifiecation”’ of -

that certificate, surely merest semantics have triumphed

over logic.

In any case, the, statements in the Board’s brief in.

opposition portend. sweeping significance for the deci-

~ sion below—which the Board’s General Counsel’s more

recent statement does not, attempt to disguise. Any -

combination of reduced passenger fares and some

other element—no reservations, closely-spaced seating,

ete.—can be decked out as a new kind of ‘‘service’’

just as easily as can blocked space. If the words of

the brief in opposition are taken at. face value, the

Board may now regard ifself as empowered, merely by

adoption of a pglicy statement, ‘to authorize carriers

. A, B and C, but not carriers X, Y and Z, to provide

9

‘‘no-reservation service’”’ or ‘‘economy-class service,” ~

for example, if only the combination of elements in the

‘ tariff terms for the ‘‘service’’ is something different

froin what-has been done theretofore. Such examples -

are no more extreme than, afd no different in principle

from, what the Board has done with respect to blocked —

space. In short, the Board now proclaims that manage-

ments’ tariff innovations can be controlled by rule-

‘making without evidentiary hearings. This is. novel,

even revolutionary, in the relationship between govern-

ment and private management with respect to private

initiative in rate competition. Cf. Georgia v. Pennsyl-

vama R.R., 324 U.S. 489, 458-59 (1945); Arizona

Grocery Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F. hy. 284 U.S. 370

(1932).

IV. THE ILLUSORY ASSURANCES THAT PETITIONERS WILL

NOT BE HURT BY THEIR COMPETITOR'S LOW BLOCKED

SPACE RATES

Certainly there would be the: same isla ie by the

Board in thé kind of passenger fare situation we have

suggested as there is in this case on the allegedly

“‘experimental”’ nature of its action, with verbal assur-

ances that the Board would not permit the disfavored

carriers to be seriously hurt. The Board plays on this

theme in various ways in its brief in opposition.

1. The Board says that petitioners have not yet suf-

fered significant diversion of their freight business.

(Br. in Opp. p. 9). If that is so it is because of Slick’s

demise and Flying Tiger’s choice not- to engage in

all-oit promotion of blocked space until this litigation )

is terminated. The year ending in May 1966 in which ©

the Board says that Flying Tiger’s and Slick’s share

of the air-freight market declined slightly from a

previous twelve-month period (Br. in Opp. p. 9 n.7)

10

‘included nine months in which Slick’s service was sus-

pended. Flying Tiger, which did very well in the most® —

~ recent twelve-month period for which the Board gives —

figures, with its traffic growing at a rate quite commen-

surate with the growth rate of petitioners’ freight —

traffic, has'made no secret of the fact that it has been

waiting for this litigation to end before it seeks seri-

- ously ‘to capitalize on its blocked space monopoly. In

its annual report to stockholders for 1965 Flying Tiger

noted that its-“‘ ‘blocked space, program... for a long

time was under court’ consideration,”’ during which .

time “‘the Company did not stress the development of

this program.’’ With the decision of the court below

- on March 2, 1966, the report went on, ‘‘the Company

‘ plans to actively pursue this method of ace

" (P.4).

2. The Board points.out that, in desig petitions

. for reconsideration of its promulgation of the blocked © .

space policy, it stated the obvious—that the policy was —

| subject to change and might someday be changed. (Br. —

in Opp. p. 6). If this is taken: to mean that the certifi- _

cates of petitioners and the other combination carriers —

have been temporarily suspended in part rather than

altered, modified or amended, the Board’s action is still

illegal. Suspension as well as alteration, modification

or amendment i is subject to Section 401(g).

3. If its own assurances are not: enough, says the

Board, then‘surely it is sufficient that the court below

“noted that the petitioners would have an adequate —

remedy if the assumptions on which the Board’s policy

was based changed and the Board refused to take ap-

propriate action to modify it....’ (Br. in Opp. p. 7).

Despite the invitation extended in our ‘petition to

elucidate’ this point = peers the Board’s brief in

: mm

11

. Opposition leaves as shrouded in mystery as it was

_ when the court made the paraphrased statement the

question of how review of a refusal by an agency to

-amend a rule.is obtained—let alone how the dubious

availability of such review validates agency action —

otherwise unlawful. :

4, Finally, the Board says that i ‘the investigation

_ of the Flying Tiger and Slick tariffs that is pending

before the Board petitioners “will have full oppor-

tunity to object: that the rate levels of those tariffs

-prevent them from providing their certificated serv- _

- ice.’ (Br. in Opp. p. 9). This is cold comfort for the

petitioners. The Board’s view is that only if their

ability to transport property between the points named _

in their certificates is altogether destroyed, their in-

vestment of hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo —

service rendered completely val less, will they be

‘entitled to relief from their competitor’s low rates.

That is,not the kind of protection of license authority

that this Court has had in view in its controlling déci-

sions. (See note 5, supra). .

Vv. THE INADEQUACY OFr THE BOARD'S RULEMAKING

PROCEEDING ie

_ The: —— suggests, none too forcefully, ‘that the

third question raised by petitioners was waived below.

(Br. in Opp. pp. 9-10). That is the question whether

_ the Board, in promulgating its policy statement and |

then in transmuting it into a binding rule’ of conduct,

adhered even to the rudimentary legal. requirements

‘ as to notice and opportunity to comment in rulemak- -

| ing. The Board’s diffidence is understandable. The —

issue was before the court below. The point had been

argued tp the Board. The facts wearin lack of uotics 7

ae

“4 ; a

“6 13_ em a.

and opportunity to comment were stated by the peti-

tioners forcefully and clearly in the court below. The

Board devoted upwards of three pages of its brief

below to attempting to demonstrate that a conténtion

__ of “lack of notice and opportunity for comment under

- the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative

- Procedure Act ...lacks mérit.”” (Br. for. Respondent, .

D.C. Cir. Nos. 18,833 et al., pp. 16-20). In their answer

to the Board’s petition for rehearing en banc petition-

ers said that ‘‘even if the Board had the power it as-

_gserts to reduce the Petitioners’ certificated authority

by rulemaking rather. than adjudication, its decision ..

here would have to be reversed because it did not even

provide a fair rulemaking proceeding.’’ (Pp. 11-12).

‘The contention was renenee explicitly at the en bane

oral argument.

_ It is clear, moreover, that the question of the fair-.

ness of the procedure the Board followed, the adequacy —

of that procedure i in light of the nature and importance

of the issues and interests at stake, was inherent in

the case from the beginning. The court below engaged °

_- in an extended discussion of the adequacy’ of the

-Board’s procedure in that light. (Pet. App. pp. 264-

30a). Because, we submit, of a faulty appraisal of the

_ Board’s rulemaking. proceeding, the court concluded

that the procédure was adequate. Certainly that con-

clusion below: does not remove the issue from the case

here. a QD.

‘What is said in the Board’s argument on the merits

of this question was anticipated in our petition, except.

for one thing. The Board states that petitioners filed —

and the Board entertained petitions for reconsideration

after it had promulgated its policy statement and given ;,.

it effect as a substantive regulation, and after this liti-

: . gation had begun. It implies-that this somehow cured or?

mitigated the original lack of notice and opportunity to _

——

13

comment. (Br. in Opp. p. 10 n.8). When the ‘Board

ppblished its policy statement and then made it*a rule

substantive law, there was of course notice of-what:

s afoot.. That, indeed, precipitated this litigation.

- But Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act

- i§ designed to assure interested persons the right,

through making written comments, to participate i in the

‘formulation of rules. It is not enough under Section 4

_ to-afford them the privilege of objecting to rules al-

. ready made. In Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. United States,

242 F. Supp. 414.(N.D: Ill. 1965), aff’d per curiam,

882 U.S. 422 (1966) (Pet: pp. 35-36), where the ICC’s

repeal of a rule was set aside for lack of notice, those

complaining of the lack of notice had filed petitions

for reconsideration with the agency; the JCC, whose

whole contention was that the complainants had been_

dealt with fairly, did not even attempt to make this a

part of its argument in this Court (or, so far as ap-

pears, in the District Court). Rulings on petitions for

- reconsideration, especially after, litigation has begun,

are too likely to be briefs in support of the ofiginal :

action to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act.

_ One final point: btless unintentionally, the

Board’s reference to upplemental ‘notices of Janu-

ary 23, 1964, and June 22, 1964”’ (Br. in Opp. p. 10 n.8)

may be ‘misleading. The ‘supplemental notice’’ ‘of

January. 23 was the first notice in which ®locked space

_ was mentioned, It set forth only the Boa@d’s proposed

policy of enc cparasing pooling agreements between

combination a

- was the notice of oral argument, in which the addi-

d all-cargo carriers. ?The June 22 notice

tional question of whether the all-cargo carriers

should be allowed to sell blocked space to forwarders’

and shippers was raised; even. then it was not stated ©

_ that the Board. proposed to make this privilege exclu-

sive jto the all-cargo carriers. Sar his pp. 6-8). The.

ys

A.

a

s

a

_ written comments of petitioners and the other combi-

nation carriers were addressed to the first notice.

\These -comments ‘‘demonstrated their awareness,’ to

__ use the Board’s words, (1) of the nature of the Board’s

proposal Respecting pooling agreements,and (2) of the

all-cargo: carriers’ ultimate goal of securing a monopoly »

of servicé in freighter aircraft. But for the latter

‘awareness no thanks. were due to. the, Board or its ~

notice. 'The all-cargo caypiers’ White Paper, presented

“%o the Board ex parte (Pet. p. 6),, hadleaked. More-

over, it was not an awareness that the. Board itself

. had under consideration a regulation not even. hinted

_ in its notice, whereby. it would go all or part of the

"way toward giving the all-cargo carriers the monopoly .

- they were hoping eventually to achieve. The combina- ~

tion carriers merely said that it would be illegal for

the Board ‘to attempt to do what the all-cargo carriers .

- were hoping might someday. be. done. We invite the

Court’s reading of the relevant — pages. (R. 193-

201; J.A. 129-37). ee :

: Much more was required in the way of notice and.

the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the

formulation of its blocked space. _— ang an

' the Board afforded.

3 aaetan “CONCLUSION .

‘In its brief in opposition Slick attempts to dis- .

- count the Board’s statement in asking for rehearing

en bane below that “the question. of administrative

law presented [by this case] is of major importance to

_the administration of the Federal, { Aviatog Act and

other similar regulatory statutes ....’? (P. 2): It says

that a contrary decision below would have caused a

“problem” of major importance for the administra- .

. tive agencies but. that since‘the decision was in favor

of the Board’s. power. to mee, by rulemaking ‘the

problem did not eventuate....’? It is an odd kind of

v>

~n. 6), the Board’s Gen

ab}

it is answered; Slick manages this difficulty only by its

Regardless of that, however, the General Counsel

oe question that i is important or not depending on how °

switch from “<questiori,”” which is what the Board said, -

. - to “problem,”? which is Slick ’s paraphrase.

of the Board, a signatory to the Board’s brief in oppo-

. + sition, regards the decision below as “of. coiisiderable i

significafice in the light which it throws oi the seope of ..

rule-making authority” and as holding ‘‘great promise —

for expanded use of rule making.’’ (Pp. 2a, 3a, infra)...

He made these. statements‘in his address to the Federal

Bar Association’ at its’ annual convention on Septem-:

ber 8,_to which we have referred. (Note ‘1, supra).

. His entire address, as published by. the Board, is |

. printed as an a to this — brief at peace .

la-Ta, infra. -

He said that the sit hile *‘euntaiued the Baerd’ *:

_ ~ aetion even though the rule had diminished the licenses

of the combination carriers. without hearing,” and he

‘said that one of the ‘‘ground rules” that the opinion.

suggests the court below ‘will followin its sympathetic © - .

approach "to rule making’’ is: that, ‘‘rule making can -

“be used even where the effect. is'to take action which

would. benefit one class of persons at the expense, so

to speak, of:another.’” ¢P. Ga, infra). And, although

the Board, is in its brief in opposition here by citation

analogizes this case to those cases, notably United

States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.; 351 US. 192 (1956),

earefully distinguished _ tween “rule making as.a

* means of carving out eat ories of license applications.

- that could be denied without-an adjudicatory hearing”’

(1.e., the Storer type case) and ‘‘the blocked-space type

@

in which threshohd limitations on license applications ~

~ . havé been sustained by this Court: (Br. in Opp. p. 8

il Counsel in his remarks-—~~

-of rule making that permits a diminution in the existing -

16 | note

- rights of a given is slem of aes without a hearing. oa

- (Pp. 6a-Ta, infra).

—_ the ‘‘blocked-space type of rule velaities” dimin-

ishing Ticense Tights. without a hearing, permissible

. within the terms~of the governing statute and. this

, Court’s decisions? That question is novel‘and of the

. utmost importance. The _ petition should be ns

Respectfully submittéd, | a5

at | Howarp 0. Wzstwoop ~

~ Wrenam H. AvtEN'

Epwanp J. GRENIER, JR.

701 Union Trust Building —

Washington, D:0. 20005 &

~ Cart 8, Rows

25 Broadway

Ngw York, N.Y. 10004

WakkEN E. BAKER

640 Shoreham Building -

Washington, D.C. 20005

H. TEMPLETON Brown

Rosert L. STERN :

FroyvoM.Rerr sw g

. +231 South LaSalle Street _

+ Chicago, Illinois ‘60604 .

cena : Attorneys.for Petitioners

Of Counsel: | Reet Sie = |

. CoviNeton & Buriina

_ GHapsourne, PARKE,

WHITESIDE & WOLFF

‘Mayer, FRIEDLICH, SPrEss,

‘TIERNEY, Brown & PLatr

September 1966 .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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