Opposition Brief — American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Supreme Court brief1966
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- IN THE
Supreme Court of ‘the United States
~ Ocroser TERM, 1966 ~
No. 304
* = te
—_ 2
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS WORLD ‘AIRLINES,
Inc., Unttep Amr Lines, Inc., Petitioners, aire
; v. |
| Civ. AERONAUTICS Board, ET AL., Respondents.
“a
‘- BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SLICK CORPORATION
: IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI .
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether rulemaking by a sears agency dicen.
invalid when it limits existing authority of a class of
- those regulated.
| ‘STATEMENT
‘This respondent (an intervenor in the court below)
adopts the statement of the case contained in the brief.
on behalf of the Civil Aeronautics Hoare i in Sppostiios
to certiorari.
Se:
ARGUMENT
Pig
THE DECISION BELOw IS IN ACCORD WITH THE: APPLICABLE |
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
‘Petitioners contend, initially, that certiorari should
..° be granted because the Civil Aeronautics Board it-.
self represented to the court below, in — renee
ing en bane, that -
3 ie question of administrative law presented is -
of major importance to the administration of the
Federal ey Act and other similar regula-
tory statutes ...’’ (R. 253) *
The present contention by petitioners is a non-sequitur
in view of the ultimate decision below, which supports
the rulemaking determination by the Board. <A con-
trary decision would have created a problem of “‘major
“importance” to the administrative agencies; but the
- problem did not eventuate by reason of the revétsal
en bane. There is now no problem which would saci
the intervention of this court.
A. _ ta Daisnisiinese' tet Board Was Engaged in
. ° Routine Rulemaking
Petitioners’ statement of the case (Petition’ 3-14)
contains an excellent analysis of the Federal Aviation
Act insofar as herein material—and in some respects
immaterial.’ But petitioners eschew much discussion
?
* Record references follow those used by petitioners, see petition
page 5, note 3.
1 We consider the prmnner s of the tariff provisions to be essen- -
tially irrelevant, sinee if the Board’s rulemaking was valid then
. the tariff ‘consequences thereof. are valid as following automatically
_ in the train of the rule; compare Superior Oil Company v. Federal
Power Commission, 322 F. 2d 601, 610 chews 9, 1963), cert. den.
377 U.S. 922 (1964). % i
3
. of the séction which is, we submit, plainly: dispositive, o.
namely section 416(a) of the Federal Aviation Act /
(49 U.S.C. 1386) : @:
“‘(a) The Board may from time to time establish _
such just and reasonable classifications or groups’ -
_of air carriers for the purposes of this subchapter
_ as the nature of the services performed by such
‘ ". gir earriers shall require; and sueh just and rea- —
sonable rules and regulations, ursuant to and con-:
.’ sistent with the provisions of this pe mire pe =
«be observed by each such class or group, as
Board finds necessary in the —— interest.”’
Here the, Board was acting with reference to its
existing differentiation between passenger (“eomhi-
tiation’) and freight. (‘‘all-cargo”’): carriers.” With-
respect to this classification the Board was prescribing
_ .“4just and reasonable rules and regulations’’ of a par-
. ticular sort. Such prescriptions are necessary from
' time to time.in any area of administrative regulation; »
and any such action in reference to an ‘already exist-
ing classification necessarily may result in some limi-
“tation or change in pre-existing authority if it is to be ~
meaningful. This does no ke it invalid. United
_ States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) ;
' National Broadcasting Co. v. ‘United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943) ; F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). >
_ This is, ve subniit, particularly clear where, as here,
the pre-existing authority, i.e., blocked space, has not
. previously been actually used by the class which claims
se Re e
SF Compare the exercise - the Federal ew p ne of
its similar statutory power of classification, in Superior Oil Com-
pany‘v. Federal Power Commission, .supra, page 2, n. 1 sie F.,
2d 601, C.A. 9, 1963, cert. dae 377 US. 922, Sarma \
4
©q .
_ oe
"Petitioners endeavor to distinguish the decisions of
.the Court. just cited by contending that they apply only
to “‘a threshold refusal to entertain a license applica- _
tion”’ (emphasis supplied), petition 21; but even if
this were a valid interpretation yof this court’s deci-
-siong—which we think it is not—we submit that a limi-
tation on hitherto unused authority is not significantly
different from a limitation on previously unheld au- -
. thority, i in the context of rulemaking.
1. The Nature of Rulemaking
We do not undertake here any ‘tia ‘enable of
the/ legislative or ‘‘rulemaking”’ function of adminis-
trative agencies, as distinguished from their adjudica-
tive function. The majority opinion en banc, below,
reviews the legal characteristics of . this dichotomy
(petition 21a-25a).. The classic statement in this‘court ©
is that of Mr. Justice Holmes. In Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 US. 210 (1908) he said:
“** * * A judicial inquiry snvisitteehhias: declares .
and enforces liabilities as they stand on Briay'o
or past facts and under laws supposed a lready to -
exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation
‘on the other hand looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new-rule to be |
- applied thereafter to all or some ge, of those...
. — to its power * * *.”? 211 U.
th's legislative type of hearing, such as confronted it
-here, the Civil. Aeronautics Board is not seeking to
.. determine rights of a particular carrier: vis-a-vis an-
other.carrier, but rather is. dealing in terms of cate-
| -gories and classifications of carriers, looking toward
’ the future. In-such a proceeding ‘‘it is not necessary . |
that - full. panoply of judicial ene be used. f:
_
5
Hannah v. Suaibes 363 US. 420, 449) (1960). As has.
been stated by the court below in a oie eariuicns
analogous situation ;
“# * * While fact finding may to some extent he
involved in the process, the due process. require--— |
ments of confrontation and cross-examination, the
hallmarks of the‘ judicial inquiry, are not neces-.
sarily present. Rather the quasi-legislative in-.
' quiry tends to consult broad relevant data avail- |
_able from surveys, studies and published experi-
ence, free from the limitations of confrontation
and cross-examination. Initially, the quasi-legis-
lative inquiry depends on staff work. As here, the ©
staff report often is presented to the interested
_ public with the invitation to appear at'a public
_ hearing to oppose or’ praise. From a practical
_ standpoint, with respect. to some forms of quasi-
legislative inquiries, * * * * this is the only feasible
way to proceed.’’ Jones, et al. v. District of Co- —
lumbia. (116 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 304;. .323 FF. 2d
306, 309 (1963).)
The estéblished distinction rene the logielative:
and judicial types of function of the administrative
agencies is grounded i in practical as well as logical con-
siderations. This is clearly demonstrated kere. The
-. record before the Civil Aeronautics Board indicates on
_ its face the large number of parties involved and the ©
complexity of issues and potential issues which were
‘ adumbrated. Whether or not such was the purpose of
the demands for hearings of an adjudicative type, the
inevitable result of such a proceeding would have been ~
to postpone any effective delineation of carrier roles in -
this: area for many years in the future; and as will
appear from an examination of the history of air
freight in the Civil Aeronautics Board, see II, below, -
- the passenger (‘combination’) carriers may well have
3
| 6 Ok
sipaiait that the struggling all-cargo carriers could not |
‘survive until-the termination of a proceedify of such
complexity and duration. Such a consideration in-
volves, we submit, a vue exercise of the hegumative
function.
IL
_ THE DECISION BELOW IS RIGHT ae
-\. The dissenting opinion below’ proceeds on the basic
. misconception that there has been no legally recognized
classification of freight or ‘‘all-cargo’’ carriers, as ‘dis-
tinguished from passenger, or ‘‘combination”’ carriers.
~ But such a classification was established by the Board
in 1947 and has.existed since. In that year, the Board
adopted a regulatién’ permitting’ qualifying carriers
- to engage in the carriage-of property only. Letters of
Registration were issued under-this regulation to nine -
carriers, including this respondent. In the Air Freight
oN Case, in 1949, the Board decided to regulate this class*
byway of certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity, and granted such certificates to four carriers, in-
cluding this, respondent. » The identity. of this class has ©
since been consistently recognized by. the Board and by
the aviation industry,‘ The dissent is in error in its.
assumption that ‘‘the Civil Aeronautics Board’s result
here is reached by a rule which has different impacts.
‘upon members of the same basic category.”’ (Peti-
‘. tion 37a). The all-cargo carriers are not ‘‘of the same -
basic category”’ as the combination carriers; they are.
of a different category and have been so- since 1947, ,
The fact that their certificates use the same word—
a
8 Section 292.5 of the Board s) Siiaaiahi Regulations adopted
May 5, 1947 (Serial No. 389).
4‘ E.g. Airfreight Certificate Renewal Case, 23 C.A.B. 186 (1956) ; ;
_ Domestic Cargo Mail Service Case, 36 C.A.B. 344 (1962).
7
a
7 Fy
Oviatt defining their authority, as do the cer-
tificates of the combination carriers, seems to have im- |
_ pressed the ee e.g. petition 33a, but. is of no .
—— :
CON CLUSION
Respondent ‘Slick Corporation submits that certi- |
orari should be. denied inasmuch as the decision below
is 1) in accord with the applicable decisions of this
— and 2) is plainly right. . :
© _ Respectfully submitted,
‘FREDERICK A. BALLARD |
— Ceci, A, Beastey, JR.
American Security Building
‘Washington, D. C. 20005
Attorneys for Respondent
The Slick Corporation
- Of Counsel:
~LipMAN RepMAN, Esq, '
815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006 |
August 29, 1966.
w
—. F Offige Supreme Court, U.S.
Lesser y — j FILED
IPR ks COURT. Us S SEP 211966
Speen Court of the United ‘States
OcroeBER TERM, 1966
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS WoRLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Unirep Arr Lines, INnc., Petitioners,.
v. . |
Civin Arroxautics Boarp, ET AL, Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS |
Ls.
oo ——
(RR RH EE EA CR RN TT TS TT TT
~Howarp (, Westwoop Y
WituiaM H. ALLEN
Kpwarp J. Grenter, Jr. :
701 Union Trust Building
Washington, D.C. 20005 . . ~
Cart 8S. Rowe
25 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10004
Warren FE. Baker
640 Shoreham Building -
Washington, D. C. 20005
H. Tempieton Brown
. Of Counsel: ; pom am
oS ’ ha LOYD M,. IVETT
Covinarom® Busisne 231 South LaSalle Street
CHADBOURNE, PaRKE, | = Chicago, Tllinois 60604
Wuiresme & Wo xrFr. |
Attorneys for Petitioners
Mayer, Frrepiicn, Spiess,
Tierney, Brown & Piatr
September 1966.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The Respondents’ Appeal to Irrélevant Labels ......... Pare
' II. The: Respondents’ Invocation of an Irrelevant ‘Statutory
FEU. nevseevevecierseveies bende eeegue tuhexers _3
. TIL. The Nature of Blocked ian COS ae
IV. The Illusory Assurances ‘that Petitioners ‘Will Not Be
Hurt by Their Competitor’s Low Blocked Space Rates 9
V. The Inadequacy of the Board’s Rulemaking Proceeding:.- 11
“Conclusion ....... _ ier Pee oa bape eee cee ia bass 14
Appendix—Remarks, Before the Federal Bar Association, Sep-
. tember 8, 1966, of Joseph B. Goldman, “General
| Counsel, Civil Acronanties ME kb b-0n0sGci G08 la
.. INDEX TO CITATIONS
Cases: : nae
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948) ........ ‘2
' . Arizowa Grocery Co. v. Atchisos, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 US. 370
CHP) cedisvccecectwesvebetes ceseavetessncgestecsess 9
CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U. 8. ey WED sk ckeccesscexs 3,7
Chicago, B. & Q.R:R. v: United States, 242 F. Supp. 414 (N. D.
Ill. 1965), aff’d per curiam, 382 U.S. 422 (1966) .......... 13
FCC v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943) 7
Flying Tiger Line v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp,,889 (D.D.C. 4965),
aff’d without opinion sub nom. Flying hy er Line v. Murphy,
D.C. Cir. No. 19,869, decided June 2, 1986, petition for cert, -
filed August 31, 1966 LOU GEE s eW csndencdntheeceerstse 5
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 CRORE) s eseres ; oe
Movers Conf. of America v. Umited States, 205 F. Supp. 82
Cy Ms SUED a nied ou OG 06600) 6 0000 Cdasepedeseee sees 3
_ -Prentis v. Atlantic ‘oast Hine Co., 211 US. 210° -¢1908) sadene 2
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F. 2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
demed, 877 U.S. ‘922 (1964) Leave was oes SouGeweravebsnens 6
- United States v. Seatrain, Lines, 329 U.S. 424 CUNT) an ccicceis 7
United States v. Storer Broadensting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) 15
VU
Pe te Contents Continued |
. Disures and Regulations: : Page
Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 1001 et seg.
i Gkecoususeeasesdnscen SRE eR PN Tee 13
Federal perwrees Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as. amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et ‘seq.
RRC Nay yer rere ne reer c mere me
DEE. Uib dened dnadenseeesteneaks de etsenscetaenets 4
UE “kn hs 4.06 ek nue buedenta use ebbkesesstaneteents 6
000) eee ee ee 3
SE sale phndensandsbasaenednnneasaendatnanes ivekae 4
ID is nk hele Gh 6S RS ewe nea ekete ns Nek eunaeenes 4,5,6
CAB Economic Regulations, 14 C.F.R. Pts. 200-99
Generally ..............-. SeueasseGaassewevaswdesess 5
Bhs GON cheeses csedecdswenceseses Pshbbeasteseeeeteus S
a
: 5° o
| Supreme Court of ‘the Huited States :
OctoBER. TERM, 1966
=
a No. oe
. AMERICAN ‘AIRLINES, INC. TRANS Wortp ATRLINES, Inc. a
| -UNITEp AIR Lanes, INc., Petthionera, i
Sa : Vv.
Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD, ET AL., Respondents.
& e 7 ‘ ‘
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
.' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE -
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
ad
* *
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
I. THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL TO IRRELEVANT LABELS
The briefs in opposition attempt to defend the action
_of the Civil Aeronautics Board as sustained by the
Court of Appéals by affixing labels like ‘‘legislative’’
and “prescriptive” to the Board’s action, When
action is ‘‘legislative’ rather than ‘‘judicial,”’ so
the argument runs, an agency may proceed by rule-
making rather than pursuant to more formal notice
and hearing procedures. .
oe -<
This is ener argumentation. © Where a statute
requires notice and hearing before certain action can
be taken it is quite immaterial whether the action is
characterized as ‘‘legislative’’ or “judicial. ’» Ratemak- ;
ing, Which was, the subject of Mr. Justice Holmes’
épinion in Prentis v, Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 US..
210 (1908), quoted in Slick’s brief in opposition (p. 4),
is’ a classic example of quasi-legislative action. A
ratemaking order looks to the future in the prescription
of a new rule for application to future events. ‘Very
often, moreover, it deals with classes of parties or even
with the universe of: those regulated; sweeping mini- |
mum or maximum rate orders are typical. See, @.9.;:
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
Yet there is no doubt of the necessity, under the usual
_ regulatory statute\—including the Federal Aviation Act
—that ratemaking be performed on a record developed
' after notice in an intr hearing.’
Licensing, which \s what’is involved in this case,
‘also looks solely to - the : ‘future; therefore it also is
| “legislative”? i in the sense in which respondents use that
1 This. has just been recognized unequivocally by the Board’s
General Counsel—one of the. signatories to the Board’s brief in ©
-opposition—in an important. address. made on September 8, 1966,
to the.annual convention of the Federal Bar Association in Wash-
ington. The Board has reproduced the address and made it gen-
erally available. It is printed as an appendix hereto. (Pp. 1a-79,
- infra). Recognition of the absolute requirement of notice.and evi-
dentiary hearing for ratemaking ¢unless rates are to be fixed as a
condition to the grant of an exemption from the requirements of —
the Federal. Aviation Act) appears at. pp. la-2a, infra.
We refer to this address in other connections in this reply brief.
It is a thoughtful and candid discussion, forthrightly informative
for the benefit of the year’s most important gathering of the legal
officers of the federal government agencies and interested members
of their bars.
an
word. ‘ Again, however, there is no doubt that under the
usual statute the grant or denial—and under ‘the
Federal Aviation Act the alteration, amendment, mddi- .
fication or suspension—of a license may be effected .
only after notice and evidentiary hearing. It has been
SO held, under another statute that required notice
cand hearing before a license could be changed, when it -
- was sought. to change the certificate authority of an
_ entire class of earriers without following the notice
.--and hearing procedure. Movers Conf. of America v.
United States, 205 F. Supp. 82, 86 (S. D. Cal. 1962).
(Three-judge court). °
The Flying Tiger Line, sole present tee of
the Board’s blocked space policy’ statement and re-
sulting orders, has not filed a brief in opposition in
‘this case. Rather, in another case pending here, it
has. stated its agreement with the petitioners in the
present ease that the rulemaking procedure pursuant to
. which the Board has acted is unlawful. Flying Tiger
finds ‘‘compelling”’ the authorities cited by petitioners
" . and accepts the substance of. the reasoning set. forth
by — at pages 14 to 29 of their petition.”
1 THE RESPONDENTS’ INVOCATION OF AN .
IRRELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION .
The briefs in opposition. scarcely advert to. Section -
401(g) of the Act, the basis of this Court’s decision in,
‘CAB y. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961), that: an
airline certificate of public convenience.and necessity
cannot be modified without an evidentiary hearing.
Pl air they. cite the Board's directive from Congress
4 pa _
2 See. Petition for Ouctiorant, Flying Tiger Ling’ v. Murphy, No.
_ this Term, pp. 24-26. . : Pee ek og
, 6
ma
to consider certain things as inthe public interest,
Section 102; its authority to make rules ‘‘pursuant to
‘and consistent with the provisions”’ of the Act, Section .
204(.a) ;* and its power to establish such classifications
_of air carriers ‘‘as the nature of the services performed,
by ‘such air carriers shall require,’ Section 416(a).:
. Neither singly nor in combination do these pfovisions
sanction what the Board has done in this case.
Section 416(a).is particularly emphasized by the
respondents. -The Board says that ‘‘the distinction
between combination and all-cargo carriers has been
recognized for regulatory purposes ever since . the
Board certified a group of, all-cargo carriers, to serve |
as specialists in this field some twenty years ago.”’
' (Br. in-Opp. pp. 2-3). And Slick says that ‘‘the Board _
was acting with reference to its existing differentiation
betwéen passenger (‘combination’) and freight (‘
The Board cites ‘‘49, U.S.C. 1373’’ for the Board’s ‘‘broad
rule-making powers.’ (Br. int Opp. p. 7). This is § 403 of the
Act, dealing with the filing, publication and observance 6 tariffs.
It gives the. Board some rulemaking .powers but scarcely broad
ones. This section provides for regulations only governing the
form and manner of filing, posting and publishing tariffs and the
information to be contained in thein, § 403(a) ; it also- permits the
Board, by regulation or otherwise, to pePmit the ling -of tariff
changes on less than the statutory 30-days notice ‘‘or modify. the
requirements of this'section. with respect to filing ang posting of .
, tariffs, either in particular instances or by general ordép applicable
, to speciafor peculiar circumstances or conditions,’’ § 403(c). Since
§ 403 was never invoked in the rulemaking proceeding that led to -
_ the-blocked space policy statement find in any case could have no
_«, Pertynence, ‘we assume that the citation is an inadvertence and that
_ +*the intended reference was to § 204(a), 49 U'S.C. §.1324(a).
= . @ . . or
<a
om
o”
5
mail and one that-is.licensed, to carry property and
mail or property only. But the fact is that this differ-
ence has not been regarded as especially significant in
the Board’s regulation of carriers. Under the Board’s
Economic Regulations, 14 O.F.R. Pts. 200-99, distine-
tions are not drawn between passenger and non-pas-
senger carriers in the regulatio of their transportation
of property except in a minor respect having to do with
' the nature and quantity. of charter and special service
flights that a non-passenger carrier can operate, 14
C.F.R. Pt. 207. And the cargo ‘‘specialist,’’ Flying
Tiger, is So. unimpressed by the Board’s classification
power that it lately has attacked the Board’s passenger
charter regulation as illegally discriminatory in limfit- -
ing the cargo carriers’ authority to operate passenger
charters in a.manner in which the combination carriers’
authority is not limited.‘
In any event, Section 416(a) empowers the Board
only to establish classifications of carriers based upon
the nature of the services performed by them. This is _
a power to recognize, for regulatory purposes, *differ-
ences in the kinds of service for which authority ‘is
held by various carriers. It is not in itself a substan-
tive power to prescribe what services particular
classes of carriers are authorized to perform, in dis-
_ regard of the procedures set forth in other provisions
of the Act that expressly deal with the way. the power |
to authorize service is to be exercised. Nor is such
substantive power supplied by the. further. authority
of the Board conferred by Section 416(a) to prescribe
‘Flying Tiger Line v. Boyd, 244 F: Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C. -
1965), aff’d without opinion sub nom. Flying Tiger Line v. Murphy, .
D.C. Cir. No. 19,869, decided June 2, 1966, petition for cert. filed
August 31, 1966 (No. 508).
‘ 6.
-“‘such just and reasonable rules and regulations, pursu-
ant to and consistent with [the economic regulatory
provisions of the Act], to be observed by each such
class . . ., as the Board finds necessary in the public
in ’? Regulations under Section 416(a) can only
be promulgated ‘‘pursuant to’’ substantive provisions
of the Act such as Section 401 and must be ‘‘consistent’?
therewith. The Board, then, is wrong in implying tha
its action here is sustained by a statutory power
‘define distinctions among classes’’ (Br. in Opp. p. 7)
and Slick is wrong in. asserting that regulations ad-
_, dressed to classes’may validly ‘‘result in some limita-
tions or changé in preexisting authority’’ (Br. in Opp.
p. 3)—if the procedure prescribed for limiting or
_ ehanging pre-existing authority has not been followed.
An agency’s power to recognize or establish classes
of the entities subject to its regulation is relevant .
when the agency, following the procedure prescribed
for it, takes action that affects one group differently
from another. That is all that was held concerning the ~
Federal Power Commission’s power to classify the
persons subject -to its jurisdiction in Superior O11 Co.
v. FP@, 322 F.2d 601, 621 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, ~~
377 U.S. 922 (1944), cited by Slick (Br. in Opp. p. 3
n.2).
‘This was imate the role assigned to Section
416(a) by the court below. It referred to the sections
of the Act now cited by the Board, including Section
416(a), and said that ‘‘this combination of powers... .
. suffices to sustain the regulation on the merits, .asswm-
ing no procedural bar.”’ (Pet. App. p. 18a) (Emphasis
added). Its decision that there was tio procedural bar
derived from the novel rule it expounded that action
that might have to be preceded by adjudicatory: process
\ , . i
i
is
_ if Siseoted against a single ‘carrier can be taken by
rulemaking if directed to all or an ascertainable class
of carriers, a rule for which it claimed no statutory
basis 1 in the Federal Aviation Act.
‘On either rationale, that of the court below ¢ or that
of the respondents, the question whether. decisions of
_ this Court*as to the’ integrity of the licenses of, regu-
- lated firms* may be evaded as the Board has sought
to evade them warrants consideration by this Court.
III. THE NATURE OF BLOCKED SPACE SERVICE
The Board says in its brief in opposition that peti- )
tionérs’ ‘‘certificates do not authorize—or even men-
tion—blocked-space service, nor did. combination car-
riers attempt to provide it until a blocked-space tariff
-_ was proposed by an all-cargo carrier.’’* (Br. in Opp.
p. 8). The Board proceeds to say that ‘‘combination
earriers are authorized to carry freight between the
points specified in their certificates”? and that ‘‘they
retain this authority under the [blocked space] rule.”’ .
(Ibid.) The apparent conclusion is that certificate
modification procedures were not necessary because the.
petitioners are still authorized to file sugh property
__ tariffs as in fact they had filed in the past. .
Of course, the certificates of the, petitioners do: not
mention ‘‘blocked-space service’’ any more: than, do
- those of the all-cargo carriers. The certificates of both
groups of carriers authorize the holders to engage in
the air transportation of ‘“property”’ —without quali-
5 CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961) ; United States v.
Seatrajn Lines, 329 U.S. 424 (1947) ; FCC v. National Broadcast-
ing Co. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
6 Slick makes. something of the ‘same point when it relees to
‘hitherto unused authority.”’ ‘(Br. in Opp. Dp. 4).
*~
‘le
8
fication. The Board treated this authorization as en-
compassing: blocked space service for both groups of
carriers until four days after its policy statement was
issued, and for the all-cargo carriers thereafter. (See
Pet. pp. 8-11).
Whatever may be said in the Board’ s brief in oppo-
sition, the Board’s General Counsel, a signatory. to
that brief, has forthrightly acknowledged more re-
‘cently. (note 1, supra) that ‘‘the blocked-space
type of rule making ... permits a diminution in the
existing rights of a given class of licenses, without a
hearing.”’? (P. 7a, infra)... And so, indeed, it does.
Blocked space is nothing but a low rate for a particu-
lar kind of contractual arrangement with a shipper of
property. An, undiminished ‘‘property’’ certificate
authorizes it. It takes a ‘‘diminution in the existing
rights’’ of a carrier holding: a ‘property’ certificate
to withdraw from that carrier the right to file a blocked,
space tariff. If ‘‘diminution in the existing rights”’
under a carrier’s. certificate is not ‘‘modifiecation”’ of -
that certificate, surely merest semantics have triumphed
over logic.
In any case, the, statements in the Board’s brief in.
opposition portend. sweeping significance for the deci-
~ sion below—which the Board’s General Counsel’s more
recent statement does not, attempt to disguise. Any -
combination of reduced passenger fares and some
other element—no reservations, closely-spaced seating,
ete.—can be decked out as a new kind of ‘‘service’’
just as easily as can blocked space. If the words of
the brief in opposition are taken at. face value, the
Board may now regard ifself as empowered, merely by
adoption of a pglicy statement, ‘to authorize carriers
. A, B and C, but not carriers X, Y and Z, to provide
9
‘‘no-reservation service’”’ or ‘‘economy-class service,” ~
for example, if only the combination of elements in the
‘ tariff terms for the ‘‘service’’ is something different
froin what-has been done theretofore. Such examples -
are no more extreme than, afd no different in principle
from, what the Board has done with respect to blocked —
space. In short, the Board now proclaims that manage-
ments’ tariff innovations can be controlled by rule-
‘making without evidentiary hearings. This is. novel,
even revolutionary, in the relationship between govern-
ment and private management with respect to private
initiative in rate competition. Cf. Georgia v. Pennsyl-
vama R.R., 324 U.S. 489, 458-59 (1945); Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F. hy. 284 U.S. 370
(1932).
IV. THE ILLUSORY ASSURANCES THAT PETITIONERS WILL
NOT BE HURT BY THEIR COMPETITOR'S LOW BLOCKED
SPACE RATES
Certainly there would be the: same isla ie by the
Board in thé kind of passenger fare situation we have
suggested as there is in this case on the allegedly
“‘experimental”’ nature of its action, with verbal assur-
ances that the Board would not permit the disfavored
carriers to be seriously hurt. The Board plays on this
theme in various ways in its brief in opposition.
1. The Board says that petitioners have not yet suf-
fered significant diversion of their freight business.
(Br. in Opp. p. 9). If that is so it is because of Slick’s
demise and Flying Tiger’s choice not- to engage in
all-oit promotion of blocked space until this litigation )
is terminated. The year ending in May 1966 in which ©
the Board says that Flying Tiger’s and Slick’s share
of the air-freight market declined slightly from a
previous twelve-month period (Br. in Opp. p. 9 n.7)
10
‘included nine months in which Slick’s service was sus-
pended. Flying Tiger, which did very well in the most® —
~ recent twelve-month period for which the Board gives —
figures, with its traffic growing at a rate quite commen-
surate with the growth rate of petitioners’ freight —
traffic, has'made no secret of the fact that it has been
waiting for this litigation to end before it seeks seri-
- ously ‘to capitalize on its blocked space monopoly. In
its annual report to stockholders for 1965 Flying Tiger
noted that its-“‘ ‘blocked space, program... for a long
time was under court’ consideration,”’ during which .
time “‘the Company did not stress the development of
this program.’’ With the decision of the court below
- on March 2, 1966, the report went on, ‘‘the Company
‘ plans to actively pursue this method of ace
" (P.4).
2. The Board points.out that, in desig petitions
. for reconsideration of its promulgation of the blocked © .
space policy, it stated the obvious—that the policy was —
| subject to change and might someday be changed. (Br. —
in Opp. p. 6). If this is taken: to mean that the certifi- _
cates of petitioners and the other combination carriers —
have been temporarily suspended in part rather than
altered, modified or amended, the Board’s action is still
illegal. Suspension as well as alteration, modification
or amendment i is subject to Section 401(g).
3. If its own assurances are not: enough, says the
Board, then‘surely it is sufficient that the court below
“noted that the petitioners would have an adequate —
remedy if the assumptions on which the Board’s policy
was based changed and the Board refused to take ap-
propriate action to modify it....’ (Br. in Opp. p. 7).
Despite the invitation extended in our ‘petition to
elucidate’ this point = peers the Board’s brief in
: mm
11
. Opposition leaves as shrouded in mystery as it was
_ when the court made the paraphrased statement the
question of how review of a refusal by an agency to
-amend a rule.is obtained—let alone how the dubious
availability of such review validates agency action —
otherwise unlawful. :
4, Finally, the Board says that i ‘the investigation
_ of the Flying Tiger and Slick tariffs that is pending
before the Board petitioners “will have full oppor-
tunity to object: that the rate levels of those tariffs
-prevent them from providing their certificated serv- _
- ice.’ (Br. in Opp. p. 9). This is cold comfort for the
petitioners. The Board’s view is that only if their
ability to transport property between the points named _
in their certificates is altogether destroyed, their in-
vestment of hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo —
service rendered completely val less, will they be
‘entitled to relief from their competitor’s low rates.
That is,not the kind of protection of license authority
that this Court has had in view in its controlling déci-
sions. (See note 5, supra). .
Vv. THE INADEQUACY OFr THE BOARD'S RULEMAKING
PROCEEDING ie
_ The: —— suggests, none too forcefully, ‘that the
third question raised by petitioners was waived below.
(Br. in Opp. pp. 9-10). That is the question whether
_ the Board, in promulgating its policy statement and |
then in transmuting it into a binding rule’ of conduct,
adhered even to the rudimentary legal. requirements
‘ as to notice and opportunity to comment in rulemak- -
| ing. The Board’s diffidence is understandable. The —
issue was before the court below. The point had been
argued tp the Board. The facts wearin lack of uotics 7
ae
“4 ; a
“6 13_ em a.
and opportunity to comment were stated by the peti-
tioners forcefully and clearly in the court below. The
Board devoted upwards of three pages of its brief
below to attempting to demonstrate that a conténtion
__ of “lack of notice and opportunity for comment under
- the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative
- Procedure Act ...lacks mérit.”” (Br. for. Respondent, .
D.C. Cir. Nos. 18,833 et al., pp. 16-20). In their answer
to the Board’s petition for rehearing en banc petition-
ers said that ‘‘even if the Board had the power it as-
_gserts to reduce the Petitioners’ certificated authority
by rulemaking rather. than adjudication, its decision ..
here would have to be reversed because it did not even
provide a fair rulemaking proceeding.’’ (Pp. 11-12).
‘The contention was renenee explicitly at the en bane
oral argument.
_ It is clear, moreover, that the question of the fair-.
ness of the procedure the Board followed, the adequacy —
of that procedure i in light of the nature and importance
of the issues and interests at stake, was inherent in
the case from the beginning. The court below engaged °
_- in an extended discussion of the adequacy’ of the
-Board’s procedure in that light. (Pet. App. pp. 264-
30a). Because, we submit, of a faulty appraisal of the
_ Board’s rulemaking. proceeding, the court concluded
that the procédure was adequate. Certainly that con-
clusion below: does not remove the issue from the case
here. a QD.
‘What is said in the Board’s argument on the merits
of this question was anticipated in our petition, except.
for one thing. The Board states that petitioners filed —
and the Board entertained petitions for reconsideration
after it had promulgated its policy statement and given ;,.
it effect as a substantive regulation, and after this liti-
: . gation had begun. It implies-that this somehow cured or?
mitigated the original lack of notice and opportunity to _
——
13
comment. (Br. in Opp. p. 10 n.8). When the ‘Board
ppblished its policy statement and then made it*a rule
substantive law, there was of course notice of-what:
s afoot.. That, indeed, precipitated this litigation.
- But Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act
- i§ designed to assure interested persons the right,
through making written comments, to participate i in the
‘formulation of rules. It is not enough under Section 4
_ to-afford them the privilege of objecting to rules al-
. ready made. In Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. United States,
242 F. Supp. 414.(N.D: Ill. 1965), aff’d per curiam,
882 U.S. 422 (1966) (Pet: pp. 35-36), where the ICC’s
repeal of a rule was set aside for lack of notice, those
complaining of the lack of notice had filed petitions
for reconsideration with the agency; the JCC, whose
whole contention was that the complainants had been_
dealt with fairly, did not even attempt to make this a
part of its argument in this Court (or, so far as ap-
pears, in the District Court). Rulings on petitions for
- reconsideration, especially after, litigation has begun,
are too likely to be briefs in support of the ofiginal :
action to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act.
_ One final point: btless unintentionally, the
Board’s reference to upplemental ‘notices of Janu-
ary 23, 1964, and June 22, 1964”’ (Br. in Opp. p. 10 n.8)
may be ‘misleading. The ‘supplemental notice’’ ‘of
January. 23 was the first notice in which ®locked space
_ was mentioned, It set forth only the Boa@d’s proposed
policy of enc cparasing pooling agreements between
combination a
- was the notice of oral argument, in which the addi-
d all-cargo carriers. ?The June 22 notice
tional question of whether the all-cargo carriers
should be allowed to sell blocked space to forwarders’
and shippers was raised; even. then it was not stated ©
_ that the Board. proposed to make this privilege exclu-
sive jto the all-cargo carriers. Sar his pp. 6-8). The.
ys
A.
a
s
a
_ written comments of petitioners and the other combi-
nation carriers were addressed to the first notice.
\These -comments ‘‘demonstrated their awareness,’ to
__ use the Board’s words, (1) of the nature of the Board’s
proposal Respecting pooling agreements,and (2) of the
all-cargo: carriers’ ultimate goal of securing a monopoly »
of servicé in freighter aircraft. But for the latter
‘awareness no thanks. were due to. the, Board or its ~
notice. 'The all-cargo caypiers’ White Paper, presented
“%o the Board ex parte (Pet. p. 6),, hadleaked. More-
over, it was not an awareness that the. Board itself
. had under consideration a regulation not even. hinted
_ in its notice, whereby. it would go all or part of the
"way toward giving the all-cargo carriers the monopoly .
- they were hoping eventually to achieve. The combina- ~
tion carriers merely said that it would be illegal for
the Board ‘to attempt to do what the all-cargo carriers .
- were hoping might someday. be. done. We invite the
Court’s reading of the relevant — pages. (R. 193-
201; J.A. 129-37). ee :
: Much more was required in the way of notice and.
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the
formulation of its blocked space. _— ang an
' the Board afforded.
3 aaetan “CONCLUSION .
‘In its brief in opposition Slick attempts to dis- .
- count the Board’s statement in asking for rehearing
en bane below that “the question. of administrative
law presented [by this case] is of major importance to
_the administration of the Federal, { Aviatog Act and
other similar regulatory statutes ....’? (P. 2): It says
that a contrary decision below would have caused a
“problem” of major importance for the administra- .
. tive agencies but. that since‘the decision was in favor
of the Board’s. power. to mee, by rulemaking ‘the
problem did not eventuate....’? It is an odd kind of
v>
~n. 6), the Board’s Gen
ab}
it is answered; Slick manages this difficulty only by its
Regardless of that, however, the General Counsel
oe question that i is important or not depending on how °
switch from “<questiori,”” which is what the Board said, -
. - to “problem,”? which is Slick ’s paraphrase.
of the Board, a signatory to the Board’s brief in oppo-
. + sition, regards the decision below as “of. coiisiderable i
significafice in the light which it throws oi the seope of ..
rule-making authority” and as holding ‘‘great promise —
for expanded use of rule making.’’ (Pp. 2a, 3a, infra)...
He made these. statements‘in his address to the Federal
Bar Association’ at its’ annual convention on Septem-:
ber 8,_to which we have referred. (Note ‘1, supra).
. His entire address, as published by. the Board, is |
. printed as an a to this — brief at peace .
la-Ta, infra. -
He said that the sit hile *‘euntaiued the Baerd’ *:
_ ~ aetion even though the rule had diminished the licenses
of the combination carriers. without hearing,” and he
‘said that one of the ‘‘ground rules” that the opinion.
suggests the court below ‘will followin its sympathetic © - .
approach "to rule making’’ is: that, ‘‘rule making can -
“be used even where the effect. is'to take action which
would. benefit one class of persons at the expense, so
to speak, of:another.’” ¢P. Ga, infra). And, although
the Board, is in its brief in opposition here by citation
analogizes this case to those cases, notably United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.; 351 US. 192 (1956),
earefully distinguished _ tween “rule making as.a
* means of carving out eat ories of license applications.
- that could be denied without-an adjudicatory hearing”’
(1.e., the Storer type case) and ‘‘the blocked-space type
@
in which threshohd limitations on license applications ~
~ . havé been sustained by this Court: (Br. in Opp. p. 8
il Counsel in his remarks-—~~
-of rule making that permits a diminution in the existing -
16 | note
- rights of a given is slem of aes without a hearing. oa
- (Pp. 6a-Ta, infra).
—_ the ‘‘blocked-space type of rule velaities” dimin-
ishing Ticense Tights. without a hearing, permissible
. within the terms~of the governing statute and. this
, Court’s decisions? That question is novel‘and of the
. utmost importance. The _ petition should be ns
Respectfully submittéd, | a5
at | Howarp 0. Wzstwoop ~
~ Wrenam H. AvtEN'
Epwanp J. GRENIER, JR.
701 Union Trust Building —
Washington, D:0. 20005 &
~ Cart 8, Rows
25 Broadway
Ngw York, N.Y. 10004
WakkEN E. BAKER
640 Shoreham Building -
Washington, D.C. 20005
H. TEMPLETON Brown
Rosert L. STERN :
FroyvoM.Rerr sw g
. +231 South LaSalle Street _
+ Chicago, Illinois ‘60604 .
cena : Attorneys.for Petitioners
Of Counsel: | Reet Sie = |
. CoviNeton & Buriina
_ GHapsourne, PARKE,
WHITESIDE & WOLFF
‘Mayer, FRIEDLICH, SPrEss,
‘TIERNEY, Brown & PLatr
September 1966 .
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.