Appendix — Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1966
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App. 1
IN THE
Siem Court of the United States
OCTOBER ‘TERM 1966
No.
Mamive Bros., é¢ al.,
; _ Petitioners,
\ | | agamst |
‘Banner SreamsuHip Linzs, Inc., et Mil.
‘Respondents,
against
ATLANTIC SreveponiNa Co. Inc., et.ano. e
Respondents.
GELMART Kittie MI1s, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
against
Barwer | STEAMSHIP Linss, Inc., e¢ al.,
. Respondents,
against
Antawntc Sreveporine Co. ‘Iyc., e¢ ano.,
7 Respondents.
Isaac Conex & Sons Corp., et al.,
: Petitioners,
against
BaRBER — LInEs, Inc., eal, ..
Respondents,
agamst
ATLANTIC ‘Sreveponina Co. Inc., et -ano.,
Respondents.
App. 2
‘Opinion of Trial Court
Appearanees
BicHaM, Berar, Jones & Houston, Esqs.,
Proctors for Libelants, 7 :
99 John Street, : ‘
New York, New York 10038.
Vincent L. Leen, Jr., Esq.,
Cuarues. W. Harvey, Esq. -
CHRISTOPHER R. Knautu, Esq., ~
Of Counsel.
_Haicut, Garpyer, Poor & Havens, Hinge.
Proctors for Respondents,
80 Broad Street,
New York, New York 10004.
TALLMAN BIssELL, Esq.; ‘
Tuomas R. H. Howarta, Esq,.,
Puiip V. Moyes, Esq,., a
Of Counsel. - d aacesiel
Huu, Berrs, Yamaoka, Freenitt & Lonacorsr, Esqs.,
Proctors for Impleaded-Respondents,
26 Broadway,
New York, New York 10004.
Eu Exiss, Esq.,
Rosert H. Peterson, Esq.,
Rosert W. Mutten, Esq.,
- Of Counsel.
Wyatt, District Judge.
These are three admiralty suits in personam, consoli-
dated for trial by a pre-trial order of Judge Sugarman
filed April. 3, 1963 (Rule 13 of Admiralty Rules of this
Court). They are to recover for damage caused to cargo
“App. 3
Opinion of Trial Court
| goods by high water which on ‘September 12, 1960, flooded .
Pier 5 in Brooklyn where the goods.were being held. The.
high water was associated with Hurricane Donna which
passed New York Harbor on the date given. There, is
no dispute as to the fact of water damage nor as: fo the
reason therefor.
After trial, the decision is that the libel -in each of the
‘three. suits must be dismissed on the merits. ©
‘1. The three separate libels .
"a. ‘The Mamiye Bros. suit (61. Ad. 779)
This libel was filed on June 28, 1961. The libelants,
thirty-eight in number, are the consignees or Owners or _
‘both of cargo items which were discharged to Pier 5,
Bush~Terminal, in “Brooklyn prior to September 12, 1960
from M/V Toreador or, as to one of the cargo items, from
M/V Turandot. Respondents are Barber Steamship
‘Lines, Ine. (“Barber”) and various other corporations,
‘partnerships and individuals engaged as owners and. op-
erators of .common carrier cargo vessels; some of the
respondents owned or operated or both the Toreador and
the Turandot. The libel alleged that when delivery of the
cargo items was made to libelants by respondents (this .
‘delivery would be after September 12, 1960), such cargo
items were not in the same good condition as when de-
livered to: respondents for carriage but were damaged in
fhe aggregate amount of: $147,460.44 because they were
“slack, wet, stained and deteriorated”.
App. 4
‘Olin of ‘Trial Court
| “In this suit, there are nine manor respondents «as fol-'
lows:
_ | ASS "Bankfart I
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ~ | A/S Tankfart IV
Dampskibsaktieselskabet _ AS ‘Tankfart dks
~ Den Norske Afrika-Og Australielinie
Wilhelmsens Dampskibsaktieselskab A/S Tankfart VI ~
A/S Tonsberg oe ‘
All have appeared i in ‘the. suit.
The bills of lading for the Toreador shipments ini the a
' one Torandot shipment show, however, that the named
respondents Barber and Wilh. Wilhelmsen had no owner-
ship in either of the two vessels: and were not parties to
the bills of lading, the contracts of carriage... The libel
. would on this account be dismissed as against them i in any
event. The other respondents were, owners ‘of the carry-
ing vessels, were parties to the contracts of carriage, ‘and
are proper parties réspondent. Respondents brought into
the suit—as impleaded respondents under Admiralty Rule
56 of the Supreme Court—the pier terminal operator
(which happened to be ‘also,-stevedore for respondents)
and an affiliate of the pier operator, the lessee of Pier 5,
respectively, Atlantic Stevedoring Co., Inc. and Atlantic
‘Piers Co., Inc. These two last named corporations are
subsidiaries of Barber. The petition to implead averred
that respondents had a.contract with Atlantic Stevedoring.
for stevedoring and terminal operation services; that in
the contract Atlantic Stevedoring agreed to inddinnity
respondents for any. liability imposed on respondents by
reason of the negligence of Atlantic Stevedoring; that the
App. 5
Opinion:of Trial Court
damage to the cargo items from the Toreador and Turan-
- dot occurred while such argo items were in the custody
of Atlantic Stevedoring on Pier 5; and that-if there was
any negligence, it was sole ely the-ne gligence of Atlantic
- Stevedoring “in the maintenance of the pier and the care
_ and -eustody of said shipments”. The petition to implead
‘further averred that Atlantic Piers’ was the lessee in
possession of Pier 5 in Brooklyn; that wher there -was
high water at Pier 5 on September 12, 1960, the cargo
items were in the custody of Atlantie Piers as the lessee of ,
Pier 5 and as bailee; and: that if there was any negligence
- causing the-damage by wetting to the cargo items it was —
solely the negligence of Atlantic Piers “in the maintenance
of said pier and the care and custody of said shipments”.
Respondents ask, therefore, that if they (respondents). are
held liable to libelants, there be recovery over in favor of )
respondents against the impleaded respondents.
b. The Gelmart Knitting Mills, Ine. ;
suit ;(61 Ad. 807). nae (9
This libel was filed on J uly 5, 1961. The libelants, some
twenty-one in number, are the shippers (consignors) or
owners or both of cargo items which are alleged to have.
been delivered to respondents at Pier 5, Bush Terminal, in
Brooklyn, for shipment to foreign ports by respondents on
vessels, the M/V Turandot, the M/V Tatra and the S/S
.Queensville. Respondents: are Barber and various other -
corporations, partnerships, and individuals engaged as
. owners and operators of commonecarrier cargo vessels;
- some,of the respondents owned or operated or both the.
Turandot, Tatra, and Queensville. Tle libel alleged that
after delivery to: respondents and while the cargo items
>
By x.
ae
ap 6 ‘)..
Onion of Trial Court
- were on Pier 5 in their custody the cargo “became dam-
aged by water” to the. extent of $32,768.83.
In this suit, theyo are 16 named respondents as follows:
Barber — A/S Tankfart V
American-West African A/S Tankfart VI
Line, Ine. . =
D/S A/S Den Norse Barber Mediterra’ ean Line,
Africa-Og <Australielinie Ine.
(there are many variants ,
/in the spelling of this word
in the papers; this: spelling
. is used uniformly because.
it is employed in ‘the |
printed bill of lading.) ”
Wilh, Wilhelmsen —
Wilhelmsens D/S A/S |
A/S Tonsberg
, A/S Tankfart I
| Barber Line ~
A. F. Klaveness & Co. A/S
A/S Solstad
D/S A/S International ’
' nor did he ever appear.
‘ment out by Queensville.
by the receiving clerk of the pier. operator) covering.
A/S Tankfart IV Shue Denng
_ No citation was’ ever served on respondent James Denny
appeared. The bills of lading and: dock receipts show
that the several shipments (except for items 19,20 and
23 of Schedule A to. the libel) were delivered to Pier 5.
for shipment out by Turandot and Tatra. There is no
evidence in the record of delivery of anything for ship-
There are dock-receipts (signed
items 19, 20 and 23 of Schedule A to the Gelmart libel;
All the other respondents have.
App. 7 _
Opinion of Trial Court
these dock _ receipts are marked “Hold on Dock” but
without. the name of any ship; as to items 19 and 20 the
--receipts. indicate in typewriting that the shipment was-
to go by: “Barber Line” or “Barber Steamship Line” and
as to item 23 the dock receipt is unsigned but:is on a
printed form of “Barber Line”. Respondents appear
to make nothing of these differences and for present
purposes they are ignored. .
The following respondents were owners of the Turandot _
_and Tatra and as such parties to the contract of carriage
and to receipt of the om items by their agents at.
Pier 6: °-:- . Zi v
Dampskibsaktieselskabet Den ry Africa-Og
Australielinie
Wilhelmsens Dampskibsakieselskab
“A/S Tonsberg ,
A/S Tankfart I
“A/S ‘Tankfart IV
A/S Tankfart V ©
A/S, Tankfart VI
These are proper parties respondent. As to the other
named . respondents in ‘this suit, the, libel would bé dis-
missed as to them\in any event unless before entry of
‘the decree it could be shown that other respondents are.
proper because of the facts concerning items 19, 20 and
23 ofschedule A annexed to the libel. On substantially
the same averments as in the first suit, respondents by
petition brought into the second suit—as impleaded re-
spondents under Admiralty Rule 56 of the Supreme Court
«®@
App. 8° — 7 .
Opinion of Trial Court :
+-Atlantic Stevedoring and Atlantic Piers; “recovery over
jwas asked on the same basis.
ce. The Isaac B. Cohen Sons Corp. suit (61 Ad.. 1096) Neer
“The libel in this suit was filed on September 12, 1961.
‘Ten of the libelants are the consignees or owners or both
of cargo items which were discharged to Pier 5 in-
Brooklyn prior to September 13; 1960 from, the Toreador,
the Turandot and the Talleyrand. 'Pwelve of the libelants
are the shippers (consignors) or owners or both of cargo
items which are alleged to have been-delivered to respond-
ents at Pier 5 in Brooklyn for shipment to foreign ports © :
by. respondents on. the motor vessels ‘Tatra, Turandot and
Corneville. ’ Respondents are Barber and, various other
- corporations, partnerships ‘and individuals engaged as
owners and operators of common carrier cargo vessels ;
some of the respondents owned or operated or both the
Toreador, the Turandot, the Palleyrand and the Tatra. _
The Corneville, according to a bill of lading in evidence
(Ex. 11; item 17 of Schedule B to the libel) and according
“to savin from counsel for respondents, was owned by
_S/A Sangstad—not a party to any of the suits. There
could thus have been no decree in-any event as to. the
- deliveries for shipment by Corneville ud ms 17 and. 18 of.
Schedule B to, the libel).
‘As -to the cargo discharged to Pier 5 from Toreador, cons
Turandot and Talleyrand, the libel alleged that-when later
delivered to the ten libelants concerned, it, was not-in the |
same good condition as when delivered te respondents but
was damaged in ‘the aggregate amount of $17,171.51 be-
' cause it was “slack, wet, stained. and deteriorated”. As to
‘the cargo items: delivered: “by. the twelve libelants to re-
af
Ku
App. 9
Opinion of Trial Court. —
sacenyate for shipment to foreign ports, the libel alleged
| that after delivery to respondents 4nd while the cargo
‘items: were in their custody, the cargo “became Gamhaged
by water” to the extent: of. $22, 283. 08.
In. this suit, there are the same 16 named: respondents
_ as in the Gelmart suit (61 Ad. 807).. As already noted,
respondent James Denny was ‘never ‘served with, citation
and never appeared. ‘All the other respondents. have ap-
‘peared. The bills. of lading show that the-vessels from ‘
which the inbound shipments were discharged (Toreador,
Turaridot and Talleyrand) and the vessels to carry out the
outbound shipments delivered’ to Pier 5 (Turandot and
Tatra) were owned by the .following respondents :
Dampskibsaktieselkabet Den Norske Africa-Og |
A _Australielinie
«
Wilhelmsens_ fie epicaties |
_ A/S Tonsberg. cas
A/S Tankfart I
"A/S Tankfart Iv
A/S Tankfart V
a: A/S Tankfart VI
‘io are proper ‘partion scinniens As .to the other
named respondents in this suit, the libel would be dismissed
_as to them in any-event. There are averments in the libel
* (items 17 and 18 of Schedule B to the libel) respecting.
. dellbvestan of cargo items to Pier 5 for shipment by Corne-
villé. The owner of this vessel (as already noted) was
-
hee
App. 10
Opinion ) f Trial Court
S/A Sangstad, not a respondent, and uesitens no relief
could be given her#as to these items in any event.
On substantially the same averments as in the first two
suits, respondents by petition brought into the third suit— | ,
as impleaded respondents under Admiralty Rule 56 of the
Supreme Court—Atlantic Stevedoring and Atlantic Piers; }
pneery over was asked on \the Same basis.
”
2. The duty of respondents to the cargo
It appears without dispute that 1 the cargg items in suit”
were damaged to an extent not necessary now to determine
while.on ,.Pier'5 in Brooklyn; the damage was caused by
high water at Pier 5 on September 12, 1960 when Hurri-
cane: Donna struck the New York area.
_ It is not easy to determiné under what law the duty, of .-
the carrier to the cargo is to be determined: the Carriage
‘of Goods, By Sea Act of. 1936 (46 U.S.C, §§1300-1315;
_ “Cogsa”), or the Harter Act of 1893 (46 U.S.C. $§190-
196), or general maritime law.
Cogsa does not apply of its own force beeanse it is,
. applicable only “from ‘the time when the goods dre loaded
- on-to the time when they are discharged from the ship”.
46 U.S.C. §1301(e).
The Harter Act is applicable while the goodsgare in the
custody of the carrier before loading dnd also “between
_-the discharge of cargo from the vessel and its proper.
delivery”. Caterpillar Overseas S.A.\v. S.S. Expeditér,
318 F.2d 720, 723 (2d,Cir. 1963). And the same opinion
- points. out that normally “proper delivery” means Uelivery
to a fit and customary wharf (318 F.2d at 724). The dis-
’ charge of the inbound cargo to Pier 5 was delivery to a
. fit and customary wharf. The goods last discharged were
a
App. 11
Oninion of Trial Court ’
‘ so discharged on Friday, Sashiiiie 9, “1960. At that
time the wharf was fft and customary. The situation is
different from that in Lavatino Company y; Inc. v. American
President Lines Ltd., 337 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1964), where.
'. chestnutsewere discharged’ to an unheated pier at a time -
- when it was so cold that chestnuts were likely to freeze.
Absent valid contract stipulations, therefore it would
appear that the duty to the inbound goods should be found
in general maritime law arid the duty. ‘to the. outbound
‘ goods in the Harterz<Act.
In the suits at bar, however, there - ‘were relevant con-
ry tract stipulations.
"The bills of lading in respect of all the inbound Ship:
ments contained the following ‘provisions :
“This bill of lading shall ‘be governed by, have
effect subject to and be construed in accordance
with the statutory and other laws -of the United
—
_ 6 States of America, ineluding the Carriage of Goods
' by Sea Act of the United States, approved April
16, 1936 and shall have effect subject to the Car-
riage of Goods By Sea Act * *-*” -
_. “The Carrier shall not be liablé as carrier prior to ©
the loading of the goods on board’ the vessel, or
after the goods have left the vessels tackle’on un-
loading. While the goods are in its actual custody
before they are loaded on the vessel and after they .
are discharged therefrom either at the port of des-
tination or transshipment or elsewhere, thé liability»
of the Carrier shall be merely that of a bailee and
during such periods ‘the Carrier shall be entitled
to’ all the exemptions. from liability contained in
App. 12
> os 8
Opinion of Trial Court
Section 4°of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act of 1936 as well as and in addition to all other.
exemptions and limitations set forth in this Bill
of Lading.” ,
_ “The provisions of the Carriage of Goods. By
Sea Act of the United States approved April 1936, |
shall, where applicable, apply to and govern the
“ rights and obligations of the Carrier and the goods
owner before the goods are loaded on and after
_ they are discharged from the vessel and throughout
"the entire time the goods are ‘in the custody of the _
Carrier.” 7
These provisions are contradictory, confusing and am-
_biguous. They purport to incorporate Cogsa-into the con-
tract, which may validly be done so long as the result is
not to diminish the liability of the earrier. 46 U.S.C,
_§1303(8); Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty,
‘page 125. At the same time they provide tlt i in the ai
vant ‘period the “Carrier shall not be liable as carrier”—
wholly * inconsistent with Cogsa—but “merely” as a
“baillee” followed immediately by a statement that the car= oa
- rier is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of Cogsa. Finally
Cogsa is expressly made applicable “where applicable”. to.
_the “rights and obligations .-. . before the goods are loaded
on and after they are discharged from the vessel” etc.
Where the problem is one of construction of ambiguous
language in a bill of lading, it seems better to adopt that
construction which is most favorable to the cargo, this
because the bill of lading is prepared by the. carrier.
Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 US. ©
104, 118 (1897); The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124, 137 (1895) ;
App. 13
Opinion of Trial Court’
: er" v. 8.8. American Flyer, 157 F.Supp. 422, 429
_'(S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified on other grounds 263 F.2d 497 ~’
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). See The
. Monrosa v. Carbon Black, Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 183 (1959).
I conclude, therefore, that as to the inbound goods dis-
charged to the pier, Cogsa’ applies — made a part of
“ahs the contract.
As to the outbound dived, the relevant bills of
. lading contained the following provision:
“1, “This bill’ of lading shall have effect subject
to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act of the United States of America, approved
April 16, 1936, which shall be deemed to be incorpo-
rated herein, and nothing herein contained shall be -
deemed a surrender by the Carrier of any of its
rights or immunities or an increase of any of its
responsibilities: or liabilities under said Act.: The
provisions. stated in said Act (except as may be
otherwise specifically provided herein) shall govern
before the goods are loaded on and after. they are
diseharged from the ship and throughout the entire
time the goods are in custody of the Carrier * * *”
Those words seem entirely clear. to incorporate Cogsa.
: into the bills of lading. Cogsa thus applies to all the out-
bound goods on Pier 5 because Cogsa was made a part of
the contracts.
- By agreement of the sinrti, therefore, respondents as
carriers owed a duty-“properly and carefully” to “handle,
stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge” the cargo. |
46 U.S.C. §1302(2). In other words, respondents are
liable for damage to the cargo caused by their negligence.
App. 14
?
* Opinion of Trial Court
The result would be the same under general maritime j
law. Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. .7, 23 (1859) ;
Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. 272, '280:(1851); Gilmore and
Black, cited above, at 120.
And the effect of the Harter Act, if ‘anda would
simply be to leave in effect the general maritime law duty
and. to make “null and void” any provision “relieving
. from: liability for negligence”. 46 U.S.C. § 190.
Respondents point to the provision in Cogsa relieving
_ the carrier from -responsibility for damage resulting from
“Act of God”: 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(d).
But this does not take away the issue of negligence, be-
- cause, as. will be seen, the Act of God exception is not
available to the carrier if the carrier was negligent in
failing to guard ‘against the natural event. claimed to be
the Act of God. | .
The caryiets are responsible, of course, for any negli-
gence of the impleaded respondents, Atlantic Stevedoring
and’Atlantic Piers, one or both of which had actual cus-
tody, of ‘the goods. A carrier is liable for any negligence
of those in whose hands it has placed the goods. David
Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard 8.8. Co., 339 F, 2d 295, 298. (2d
Cir. 1964).
Thus far, the parties appear’ to be in betaaian agree-
‘ ment with the analysis here made.
3. The Act of God exception and the burden of
_ persuasion on the issue of negligence
‘It must next be determined whether the burden of per-
‘suasion as to the issue of negligence rests on libelants or
on respondents.
‘App. 15:
Opinion of Trial Court
The matter is not without difficulty.
Respondents have pleaded, as an affirmative defense, i in
substance that Hurricane Donna was an “Act of God”.
These precise words are not used in’the answers but there
'. are general expressions (“. . . a cause or causes for
_ which neither the Carriers nor the vessels are liable . . .”)
which are sufficient to raise ‘the ‘point, made more explicit
in the brief for respondents (pp. 17-24).
The Act of God exception to liability of the carrier or
bailee exists under general maritime law (Carver, Carriage
_of Goods By Sea (10th ed.) 10-13) and under Cogsa (46
U.S.C. § 1304(d)). ‘ |
The definition of “Act of God” in the present context
seems generally to include, as an essential element, that
the damage from the natural event could not have been
prevented by the exercise of ee. care by the carrier
or bailee.. Ys
In The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375 (1897) the Court referred
with approval to the definition of Chancellor Kent, as fol-
lows (386):
“The act of God, said Chancellor Kent (2 Kent,
Comm. p. 597), means ‘inevitable accident, without
the interventio
again (volume 3, p. that ‘perils of the sea de-
note natural accidents peculiar to that element,
which do not happen by the intervention of man,
’ nor are to be prevented by human prudence.’ A
‘casus fortuitus’ was: defined in the civil law to be,
‘quod dammo fatali contingit, cuivis diligentissimo
possit contingere.’ It is a ‘loss happening in spite
of all human effort ‘and sagacity.’? The words ‘perils
f man and public enemies’; and.
>
of. the sea’ may indeed have grown to have a
° %,
' App. 16
se
ee a Tr
"broader sipiifiaation than ‘the act of God? but that
‘is unimportant here.” |
Judge McGohey appears to have assumed that an “act
of God” is not only’ one which causes damage but one as
to which reasonable precautions could not have prevented
' damage. In Moran Transportation Corp. v. N. Y. Trap
Rock Corp., 194 F.Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) Judge
McGohey said:
“Hurricane Hanei was not an Act of God. At
Tomkins Cove it was neither so sudden nor so
violent that Trap Rock’s experienced men who had
‘not less than twenty-four hours’ warning could not
have taken precautions to guard against it.”
‘The definition quoted by Judge Inch with approval in
The Empress of France, 49 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1930) is
this:
“By ‘act of God’ is meant some inevitable accident ‘
which cannot be prevented by human care, skill, or
_ foresight, but results from natural causes, such as
lightning, tempests, floods, and inundations.”
The exception for “perils of the sea” is very like in
“principle to that for an act of God. The former has been
defined in The — cess F, 144, 746 (2 Cir. 1914) as
follows:
“Perils of the ‘seas*® are piesa to mean those
- perils which are peculiar to the sea, and which are
of an extraordinary nature or arise from irresistible
force or overwhelming power, and which. cannot be
guarded against by the- ordinary exertions of human
- skill and pe iiamaaa “a
tee
Opinion.of Trial Court Sia at
App. red
Opinion of Trial Court
» This definition has been cited with approval. R. T. Jones
«Lumber Co. v. Roen S.S. Co., 270 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1959).
The significance for present purposes is in that. part of
the definition which makes’ an essential element of the
exception that the perils “cannot be guarded against by
the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence”.
- Gilmore. and Black, cited above, first deal with the
“perils of the sea” exception which they define vad 140) as_
follows:
“... a fortuitous action of the elements’ at sea, of
such force as to overcome the strength of the well-
‘found ship or the usual precautions of good seaman-
_——
» ship. Thus, in a sense, the absence of negligence as
¥ i: concurring. cause may be said to enter into the
very definition of a'sea peril, so that, in order to -
establish an exception under this clause, the. ship °
- would have to establish freedom from negligence.”
They. then turn to act of God and refer (at 141) to the
language of an old Eniglish case, Nugent v. Smith, [1876]
_1 C.P.D. 423, 444, defining act, of God as follows:
. .*,..a@ mere short way of expressing this proposi-
tion. A common carrier is not liable for any acci-
dent as to which he.can show that’ it is due to
natural causes directly and exclusively, without
human intervention, and that it.could not have been
prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and
care ‘reasonably to be =< from him.”
. The authors then note (at 141-42) : « . absence of human
negligence. or fault as a concurring cause is a part of the
definition of the ‘Act of God’ ”. |
App. 18
. Opinion of Trial Court:
The first definition of “Act of God” given in 1 Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary Rawle’ S Third Revision (oe Rawle ed.)
p. 116 is:
. “Any accident due to anata) causes direetly and
- exclusively. without human intervention, such as *.
could not have been prevented by any amount of
foresight and pains, and care reasonably to have
been expected. *
And the following. statement is from aa Carriage of
Goods By Sea (10th ed.) 10:
“The meaning of ‘act.of God’ in this relation has
given rise. to much discussion: and difference of
opinion. The result of this seems to be that to
enable us to describe a casualty as arising from
~an act of God it must have two esseritial features.
First, it must have occurred independently of human ~ .
action; man must have been purely passive. Sec-
ondly, it must have been an event which thé ship-
ower gould not have avoided, or guarded against,
by any means which. he could reasonably be ex-
pected to use.”
It seems accepted on all sides that a shipper makes out
a prima facie case-against a carrier or bailee by showing
merely that the goods were not turned-out in as good
condition as when delivered by or for the shipper. The
' earrier or bailee must then bring the loss within an “ex-
ception” to his liability established by law or contract.
Gilmore and Black, cited above, at 162-163.
_ It would seem therefore to follow that the Act of God
exception by definition cannot be established tnless, and
until the carrier or bailee shows that the Toss could not ©
ee,
eke App. 19.
Opinion: of Trial Court
have been prevented by reasonable care and foresight.
This logic would mean that in the case at bar the burden is
/ ‘on respondents to-show the exercise by them of reasonable
care or, to put it another way, that the damage could not
*have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care.
The Majestic, above, is authority for this view. The
Court approved the award of damages against a ship
where luggage of passengers was wet by water amébwhere
the ship pleaded act of God. The Court said (166 °U.S.
at 386, 17 S. Ct. at 602): | °
\
\ “ .. the question still remains, on the doctrine
of eeslted exceptions, whether the injury here was .
by the act of God, for which the company was not
‘liable. “The burden in this . respect is on the car-
rier.” ; : ,
. The burden’ meant that the carrier: had to show that the
damage could not have been prevented by reasonable
care. The Court said (166 U.S. at 388,17 S. Ct. at 603):
“In our opinion the steamship company failed to
show that the accident :was one which could not have —
been prevented by human effort, sagacity and ~
ame. % ass | “a | )
“Citing The Majestic as authority and referring to the
common. law, rule, Carver, cited above, has this to say in
discussing the act of God exception (at 12): |
“What is needful is that the causes of the event \
shall have. been-so far beyond what could reason- .
ably be foreseen, or, if they might have been fore- .
* geen, shall have been so far irresistible that no ~
; App. 20
Opinion of Trial Court .
. foresight or endeavour of man, reasonably to be
' expected, would have prevented their operation.
“It is not enough for the shipowner to show that .
the. loss arose from natural, as distinguished from
human, causes, and to leave it to the other side to
show that there was some want of precaution or
_ eare on his part; he must himself show affirmatively
* that the causes were such that no reasonable amount
e?
of precaution and care would have enabled him to —
°
avoid or guard against them.”
“There is authority i in England that the burden of sieael {
as‘to negligence in respect of all the Cogsa exceptions
(46 U.S.C. §1304(2)(a)- through (g)) is on the ship —
(Gosse Millard v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine,
[1927] 2 K.B. 482, 436-437 ). The Act of God exception
was not specifically mentioned. °
In discussing the effect of Cogsa on burden of proof,
Carver, above, does: not ‘treat specifically the Act of God
exception but,criticizing the Gosse Millard decision, seems.
to say that the cargo should have the burden of proof
_ as to negligence in connection with nearly all the Cosga_ ;
.. exceptions: Carver, cited above, at 185-186.
‘Gilmore and Black, cited above, seem to state clearly
| that under Cogsa.the carrier has the burden of persuasion
as to negligence in an Act of God ‘situation. ‘They say.
(at 163, emphasis supplied): -
“Once the damage is established, the carrier, it
would seem has two main lines of possible escape.
He ‘may take up the burden of establishing that
the loss falls within 4(2) (a) to (p) [which in-
cludes Act of God as (d)]. If he does this success-
4 ,
App, 21.
Opinion of Trial Court
fully, then either (as in 4(2) (a)) he is exonerated
. regardless of: his negligence or (as.in 4(2): (c)
[perils of the sea; analogous to Act of God]) he
will, in. effect, already have established his own
freedom from negligence as a part of the process °
of bringmg. himself under the exception; or, if the
exception he has brought himself under is one to
which his own eontributing fault would disentitle
. him, the burden will shift to the wond-oad to prove i
the carrier’s negligence or other fault.’
>
There are, on the other. hand, old ducbiione which ,in
‘ce dicate that when-Act of God is pleaded and the na bal
event shown, the burden is on the shipper to prove negli-
gence in failing to take precautions. Examples are Clark
_ v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272, 280, 53 U.S. 272, 13 L. Ed. 985
(1851); Taney, C.J. and Wayne, J. dissenting, NV. & C.
Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 77 U.S. 176,10 Wall. 176, 190,'19
L. Ed, 909 (1869). Judge. Friendly has in effect put the
first of these cases to one side on its facts (Lekas &
Drivas, Ine. v. Goulandris, Las F. 2d 426, 431; 2d Cir.
1962): |
&
“The respondents i in Clark v. Barnwell had not only
established a peril of the sea asa cause but had
negated all others; [ibelants in ‘that case not merely. ~
*- failed to sustain a burden, but no evidence of negli-
-. gence ‘is found*in the record,’ 12 How. 283, 13 L.Ed.
985.” aa a
The authority of the two old pe Coast & cases has
been virtually destroyed by later decisions. _
Schnell v.-The ‘Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 55 S. Ct. 194,
79 L. ‘Hd. 373 (1934) is important in this connection.
App. 22
°
Opinion of Privat Court
Onions wére ditivenen on aor i in Spain in good
condition but were turned out in. New ‘York “damaged
ee by decay”. ‘The ship pleaded. no. liability because there
was an exception relieving the ship of liability for decay
. and further because the damage was. caused by “perils
of, the sea”, a defense ver like that of Act of God. The
evidence indieated that damage to the onions was caused
(a) by closing hatchesein heavy weather (a pert, of the
sea) and (b) by keeping the hatches ‘closed in fair weather
(negli ence). This Court concluded that since the. ship
chad failed to ‘prove (and could not prove) how much of -
‘.. the damage was due to the peril of the sea, the eargo could
“recover for the full damage (D. C..48 F.2d 247). The
Court of Appeals reversed (2 Cir., 70° FD 261) becagse
all the damage was from decay and thus prima facie shown
to’ be within a specific exception for decay; therefore the
cargo had the burden of proof to show that the exception
. » “was not conclusively established by showing that the decay
in whole or in part ‘as caused by negligence of the ship.
Since the cargo could notshow what part of the damage -
was. due to negligence, the ship. was Nort “excused” (70
‘F.2d at 263). The Supreme Court ‘ittanimously reversed,
holding that the burden: was upon the carrier to bring
‘hintself within an exeeption; that this was true with re-
‘ spect to exceptions implied i in law such as “act of God or
the publie enemy” (293 U.S. at 304, 5) 8. Ct. at 196);
that it was also true in respect of exceptions agreed upon
in the bill of lading; that the burden is placed on: the
earrier because he ,is a “bailee” who has “an extraordi-
; nary duty” and usually has peculiar knowledge. of tliose
facts relied upon to relieve him ‘of the duty; and that the
law “annexes a condition” -to the exceptions “that: they
shall relieve the carrier from liability for loss from an
excepted eause only if in the coursé of the voyage he has
%
“)
= App 8
« Opinion of Trial oe
used due care to guard against it” (298 US. ‘at 304, 55
S. Ct. at 196). The Court took note of such cases as —
Clark v. Barnwell, above, and Railroad. Co. v. Reeves, 7
above, and in this conneetion said (293 U.S. at 304-305,
55S. Ct. at 196): »
.
“It is commonly said that when: the carrier*suc-_ -
ceeds in establishing that the injury is from an
excepted cause, the burden is then on the shipper to
show. that that cause would not have produced the
- injury but for the carrier’s negligence in failing to
guard against it. Such we may assume the rule.
to be, at least to the extent of requiring the shipper.
to give evidence of negligence where the carrier
has sustained the burden of showing that the im-
medgate cause of the loss or injury is an excepted
~ “peril.” ‘ 4
On its face, this language would not affect the analysis
here made because, by definition, ‘the carrier does not
_ establish the “excepted cause” of act of God unless freedom
. from negligence in “failing to guard against it” is itself
shown. ‘
But, assuming the quoted ie to refer to negligence
° with -reference to an act of God exception, the Supreme
Court appears to be limiting the old decisions to this effect:
if a prima facie case of due care is made out by the ship, -
then the burden of going forward with evidence of_negli-
gence is on the shipper and yep scone of
persuasion is left on the ship. Cf. Alliance“Assurance Co.
v.. United States, 252 F. 2d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 1958). °
A note appearing’ in the Texas Law Review einai
The Vallescura and other cases and says:
App. 24
Opinion of Trial Court.
. if the burden of the ship i is to show that the
. cause of the injury was, for instance, a peril of the.
sea, it cannot be satisfied without a corresponding.
exclusion of any other cause, including that of negli-
gence.
“Tf this is the case, ‘under the causal type . @X-
ception, can there really be a shifting burden? It
Would seem that if the ship actually carried the -
burden laid on her in Clark v. Barnwell, i.e., showed
the damage to have been in actuality the result of -
an excepted cause, such showing would, ipso facto,
leave the shipper without a case.
“To cloud such an analysis, however, ie 5 tabiber
problems arise. One*is- the question of separate
- eoneurring causes, each of which was responsible.
for part of the damage. This will be discussed later.
‘Another is the theory that although the loss be
eaused by a peril of the sea, the shipper may still
recover by showing that the use of diligence on
the part of the, ship would have avoided the
effects of the peril. It would seem however, that
analytically, an-attempt by the cargo to make such
a showing would’be in the nature of a rebuttal of —
the causation element of the ship’s primary burden —
—if (under the bill of lading exception ) that burden
contains a causation element. The diverse effects _ ale
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ type exceptions appear.” -As be-
fore stated, in the ‘cause’ type case, the question of -
proximate cause of the damage must be put in issue
first by the ship, as part of its case for the excepted
cause. Therefore, it would seem that an attempt by
the shipper to show the effieienéy of another cause
' App. 25
Opinion of Trial Court:
(negligence) must be inthe nature of a bianca
and of meeting the requirement that he ‘go for-
ward’ with some showing of negligence, in order to
prevent an instructed verdict.”
Note; Cargo Dathage at Sea: The Saas dy Liability,
27 Tex. L. Rev. 520, 533 (1949). . |
The length of this discussion may “sali have been’ ‘un-
necessary -in view of very plain language in a recent
Supreme Court decision, Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore &
Stahl, 377-U.S. 134, 84 S. Ct. 1142, 12 L.- Ed. 2a 194,
rehearing denied 377 U.S. 984, 84 S. Ct. 1880, 12 L. Ed.
2d 752 (1964), quoting and citing The Vellcsedie The
Supreme Court said (377 U.S. at 138, 84 S. Ct. at (1145):
“Accordingly, under federal law, in an action to
reeover from a carrier for damage to a‘shipment,
the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he
shows delivery in good condition, arrival in dam-
aged condition, and the amount of damages. There-
upon, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to
show both that it was free from negligence. and that
the damage to‘the cargo was due to one of the
excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability.” |
The case dealt with a railway carrier but, unless the pro-
visions of Cogsa can be said, to be to the contrary (which
seems not possible), the language seems sea to
‘maritime cargo-claims.
For the reasons indicated, the conclusion is that re-
spgndents have the burden of persuasion that damage’
en. Hurricane Donna could not have been guarded
against by reasonable care on their part. i
|. 4, Hutricane —_— and its effect
a
”
‘App. 26
Opinion of Trial Court
A hurricane is a tropical cyclone with winds of more
than-75 miles per hour (“mph”) which move counterclock-
wise in a circular fashion around a center area, or “eye”,
where there is little wind or dead calm. ~If a “tropical -
_eyclone has winds of: less than 75 mph it is usually called ©
a “tropical storm”. A hurricane is normally accompanied
by heavy rain. | 3 a 7
The effect of a storm or hurricane over water is to
raise the level of the water above the level of the normal,
‘astronomical, predicted tide. The difference between the
observed water level and the eacronegenre tide level is
“storm surge” or “hurricane surge”.
The: United States Weather Bureau has — offices
over the country, including one'in New York City; it also
has ins Miami a National Hurricane Center, which is a
specialized research and warning service.
During the course of a hurricane, National Hurricane
Center through Miami Weather Bureau issues every six
hours a numbered “advisory” or report of information.
These are issued at 5 and at 11, before noon and after
noon. Bulletins are issued in between; for an emergency -—
or if there is a radical change a special advisory i is issued
at any time.
Based on each advisory, the Center forecasts where ~
the hurricane will be 24 hours later; these forecast posi-
‘ tions are used within the Bureau and possibly by the Air
Force and Navy but apparently they are not. included in
the advisory. | : ,
Local offices of the Weather Bureau receive the hurri-
cane advisories and issue such local bulletins as seem
indicated by local conditions.
_ App. 27
a
Opinion of Trial Court
- Hurricane Donna was first observed on September 2,
1960 several hundred miles east of Puerto Rico moving
westward from the direction of the Cape Verde Islands.
In the first advisory (from San Juan) Donna was de-
scribed, as a “severe hurricane”. -It then moved west
northwest then west, passing north of Puerto Rico and
Cuba.
During September 9 (Friday) Donna moved at 10-12
‘mph north of Cuba toward the Florida keys. At 5 p.m.’
- Eastern Standard Time (“EST”) it was about a hundred
miles southeast of Key West, had slowed somewhat and .
was moving at 9 mph toward the west northwest, The
5 p.m. advisory stated that “no material change is ex- .
pected in intensity —_, or direction during the, next
' 12 hours”.
_ »At 11 p.m. EST on September 9, the center of Donna’
was 35 miles off the Florida keys moving, northwest at
7 mph. The 11 p.m. advisory stated: “Little change in
intensity and: speed is indicated during the next 12 hours
and the direction of movement will likely mange to slightly
more northerly”.
_ According to a report by the Army Engineers: “All
indications pointed to the storm entering and continuing
into the Gulf of Mexico”. ae
During September 9, the location of Donna at the hodrs
indicated on September 10 were forecast by the wae
' Bureau to be as follows:
5 a.m.—slightly west of Key West
it a.m.—in Gulf of Mexico about 90 mee west of
- Fort ee
*
App. 28
Sciniaa’ ‘of Trial Deais
+5 p. m—in Gulf of Mexico about 60 to 70 miles
_ west of Tampa
11 p.m.—about on the Florida wést coast,
These: forecast lodations were farther to the west than
the actual track of Donna on September 10. The chief .
forecaster of the National Hurricane Center testified that
this was because “recurvature was anne por than antici-
pated”. : ;
Recurvaturé is a change in the direction of a hurricane
from a west or northwest movement to a north or north-
‘east movément. It is a consequence of a meeting of the .
west or northwest moving hurricane with southerly winds
or the mid latitude westerlies (winds which carry the jet
stream). The effect-is to turn the westerly slow moving
hurricane to. the north and northeast. Generally a ‘hurri- ©
cane moving from the direction of the Cape Verde Islands
is pushed west by the trade winds south of a line of high
pressure area extending west from the Azores and called
the “Bermuda High”. At the western énd of the Ber-
muda High, the hurricanes often meet the southerly winds —
or mid latitude west winds and are turned, or recurved,
toward thé north or northeast. The length of the Bermuda
High varies. When it is long and extends through Ber-
muda over a part of the United States, the hurricane will
go west into the Gulf of Mexico and any recurvature will
naturally occur out in the Gulf of Mexico and at a more
westerly longitude than when the Bermuda High is shorter
and does not extend to or over any part of the United
“States; in the latter case any- recurvature -will normally
occur off the east coast of the United States.
4 ly
i ae App. 29
vy,
‘Opinion of Trial eet
- The Bermuda High recedes from the west and shortens \ --
progressively from. August through the late fall months, :
tending to bring it about that any recurvature of a hurri-
-eane in September would be at a more easterly longitude
than in August. Recurvature in September while not in-
variable is more frequent than not.’
When recurvature occugs, the forward speed of the
hurricane increases; moving west before the trade winds —
the speed averages 12 mph; after recurvature the speed ~
'. may be two, three or five times that rate.
\ It is most difficult to forecast the point of recurvature,
and apparently also the extent, that i is, how sharp will be -
the curve around to the northeast; forecast of the path is
most difficult during the period. of recurvature; and it “is
more difficult to forecast, speed and en after recurva-
ture than before.
As already noted, the actual track of Donna’ on Sep.
tember 10 was not as far west as had been forecast; at ©
11 pm. EST on September 10 (Saturday), instead of
being on the Florida west coast (as predicted) Donna was
near Lakeland, some 50 miles to sine east, moving at shout
~ 12 mph.
On Sunday, ‘September 11, Donna contitiued to move in
a northeasterly direction and with increasing speed as
shown: by its speed at the following hours (EST). on
sia ss ii: 4
a eee
11 a.m. sake:
5 p.m. ' 23
‘9pm >: ° 35
| App. 30
Opinion of Trial Court
Beginning at 5 a.m. on September 11, the Weather
Bureau forecast positions for.Donna for the following day
were shifted well to the east of the forecast track up to
that time. As. it turned out, the forecast positions were
to.the east of the actual track of Donna.on September 12 _
by some 180 or 200 nautical miles (about 206 to 228 statute —
miles). . If Donna had taken the course forecast by ‘the
' Weather Bureau as her course from 5 a.m. September 12
through re p.m. September 12, she would have passed at —
. least 200 statute miles east. of the éastern tip- of Long:
Island and there wouid have been no pier flooding i in New
York Harbor. ;
The first hurricane warning issued by the Weather
Bureau for an area including New York City was at 9 p.m.
. EST on Sunday, September 11. This was a-special ad-
visory | cpragaag 38) headed: “hurricane emergency o
‘warnings 9 p.m.”
New York at that period of the year was on a time
one hour faster than at other periods. New York Con-
struction Law §52. In New York (and doubtless else-
where) the faster time is usually called Daylight Saving
Time (“DST”) and tlie slower time Eastern Standard
‘Time (“EST”). . |
The first ‘eantheninn warning from the Weather Bureau
to New York about Donna was thus issued at 10 p.m. DST
on Sunday, September 11, by the Miami Weather: Bureau;
this was repeated to.news media in New York by the
Weather Bureau office here, ‘This warning stated among
other things that on Monday morning, September’ 12, the
ve
(T\
Sd
. ‘aj
App. 31
Opinion of Trial Court '
eenter of Donna would be “a short distance off the East ©
end of Long Island”. At 11:55 p.m. local time Sunday,
September 11, the New York Weatheg Bureau office is-
sued a local. bulletin, warning, among other things, that.
tides may run from five to eight feet above normal on
Monday morning.
Donna did hit New York Har¥or on Monday, Septem-
ber 12.. As it approached here, the eye elongated to an
| ‘east-west distance of about 100 miles. There were high
- winds and heavy rains from at least 8 a.m. DST that
morning. The eye passed over Long Island between 2:30
_ p.m. and 3:30 p.m. DST. The western edge of the eye
brushed the New Jersey shore, the eastern edge was about .
100; miles east on Long Island, and the middle of the eye |
was thus in the western part of Suffolk County. :
During the passage of Donna and at 3:18 p.m. DST on
September 12, the water level in New York Harbor rose
to the highest level in history, despite the fact that the
storm surge of Donna was not the highest. One of the
chief reasons for this was that the passage of Donna co-
incided with the peak of the predicted astronomical tide.
Wave action at times brqught the water level higher than
*the statistically recorded levels; from pictures taken dur-
‘ing the hurricane, wave heights in New York Harbor were
estimated by Army Engineers-at about 5 feet.
The comparison between the water levels of Donna and
the four. highest levels during previous hurricanes or
' storms, for two points in a York Harbor, a are as _. a
lows: x , a
ro
w
App. 32
- Opinion of Trial Court
Heights in Feet Above Mean Low: Water .
_ The Battery Fort Hamilton
Donna ope 10.9 Z
February 19, 1960 2 ee 9.2
November 7, 1953°“ 9.7-—- 100 _.
November 25, 1950 92 ~-. BB
~September 14, 19 — 83 -. 9.0
Army Engineers (Ex. AE) for Donna and for November
- The foregoing figures are fe from the report of, the
7, 1953, with an adjustment of 2 feet 3 inches to translate
-feet above mean sea level to feet above mean low water.
The other figures are taken from Exhibits 9.and 10.
During the passage of Donna, the water level” in New ™
York Harbor rose rapidly and: fell even more =— :
wd. Pier 5 and Donna - i
ae Pier 5 in Brooklyn, where the goods in suit were lo-
\\ eated when water damaged, is in a row of piers extending
into Bay Ridge Channel out from the Bush Terminal
‘Warehouses in Brooklyn. . Pier 5 is about midway be- :
- tween The Battery and Fort Hamilton.
Pier 5 is 1310 feet long and 150:feet wide. The floor of
the pier is 10 feet above mean low water. The City of New |
- York requirement for piers in this respect is that they be
9 feet: above mean low water. The total floor area for
_-eargo of Pier 5, including track area, is 183,500 square |
‘feet: “The pier is covered. An asphalt roadway, 50 to 60,
feet wide, runs.down the center. ‘Cargo is stored on °
' either side of the roadway and partially in the roadway,
about 7 or 8 feet on-each side. Some sections of the pier
“are kept clear so as ‘to enablé loading and unloading to |
a°*
-
‘ ita
. App. 33°
eu » Opinion of Trial Court
a
-be done to and from the Wane in. ships alongaide. There
was an isolated section at the water end for géar and
pallets, there was office space midway the length of the
pier and also at the end, .and there was an area for keep- .
jing the small fork lift trucks used to handle cargo (“hi- —
los”). The pier would support cargo weight of about 4000 = *
tons. Four ships could tie up vei cand the pier at any ©
one: time.
As noted earlier, Atlantic Stevedoiing was the operator
' of Pier 5 under a contract with respondents.
The Toreador arrived at the, pier, directly from the -
Panama Canal, on September 7 @ discharge only, com-?
pleted” ‘discharge of cargo about 6 or 7 p.m. on Friday, ©
September 9, and sailed the same evening for Boston. The
weather on her. trip to Boston was good. — |
The Turandot had arrived at the: pier about September
8 to load only and her loading began that day or on Fri- .
' day,. September 9. The Tatra arrived at the pier ‘to load. .
resting on pallets.
- nature: not. usua
only on Saturday, September 10, or Sunday, September :
| -11; her loading-was to commence on Monday, September 12°
' At the close of business on Friday, September 9, about
80% of the space on Pier 5 was occupied by cargo; this
cargo wnt ol about 2500 tons in weight. Of the cargo. there,.
about 15% -was stacked in tjers about 10 to 12 feet high
pallet. is a wooden platform or
tray about six inch¢s high designe? for use in handling
truck to handle the. eargo by lifting the
The eargo not on pallets was of a
_stacked in tiers, such as long rugs,
graphite and the
App. 34 .
Qpinion of Trial Court
o
The labor on the pier *had to ‘be shtnined from’ or
.-. through the Waterfront Commission, established by com-
pact between the States of New York and New Jersey:
- Aecording to Commission rules, this labor must be ordered
_by 3 o’loek of each afternoon for the next morning and for-
. & Monday morning ‘by 3 o’clock in the aftrnoon of the
) preceding Friday. : o wy
Pier 5 is not normally PTAN on Saturdays or Sun-
days and at closing time on Friday, September-9, there
were no plans to operate Pier 5, and it was not operated,
on, the following Sé ay and Sunday. ee ‘
, On Monday~morning, September 12, the labor ordered
' for that day showed up at 8.am. ‘DST. There were 7
> “gangs” of 23 men (ineluding supervisor’ and 2 machine
operators) and 70 -“extra labor” or a total of 231 men.
oe When they reported there were already high: winds and
heavy.rain. The two ships refused to open hatches because
of the rain.» Some labor was receiving and delivering
eargo. All.other’ labor was put to work either placing
extra pallets | under ‘the cargo tiers (to raise them higher)
‘or nailing up doors which began to blow in during the
- morning., Through these efforts, extra pallets were placed
-- under about 3%. to 5% of the cargo: on the pier. -
_ Lunch hour for“abor was from noon to 1.p.m. DST.
ae About 1:20 p.m. DST, .the water level reached the floor ’
of the pier and all trucks were, ordered off. From then
until about 3:30 p.m. DST the pier..was flooded. . After
3:18 p.m. DST the water rapidly receded and as soon as
it had ‘left:.the floor, the work of reconstruction began. .
_- Sinee the floor of the pier is 10 feet above mean low
water, cargo on the ‘floor of. the pier would have been,”
statistically in about 8 to. 9 inehes of water and cargo on
‘
~~
‘4
App. 35 :
4
, ~
Opinion of Trial Court
one pallet would have. been. statistically in about 2 to 3
inches of water. But having in mind wave action the,
cargo must have been in water to a greater depth—a depth |
up to as much as 36 inches. The damage for which these
suits are brought came from this wetting. i
‘6. “The exelusion of business records Pa
Libelants attempted to show through cargo damagé .
surveyors that Pier 5 had been flooded a number of times
before Donna. Those witnesses were permitted to testify ©
_ to their obserPations of water damage to cargo on Pier 5
- following earlier storms, but their reports (Exhibits 5 and
6 for identification) containing what they were told as to
‘when the cargo arrived on Pier 5 and as to ‘when and .
why it was water damaged were excluded (SM 86-97, 108-
109). - The reason for the exclusion was that while the
reports’ may have been businegs records the particular
information was not within the knowledge cf the entrant’
- nor did it appear that the information.came {rém others
under fa duty to know the facts. Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. .
124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930); MeCormick on Evidence, 602-3.
The testimony of the surveyors does show, however,
that during storms-(or hurricanes) of November 25, 1950
‘and November 7, 1953 there was water above the floor.of
Pier 5. This would not appear from the statistics be- .
~eause the highest water level at Fort Hamilton during the,
1950 storm was 9.2 feet above mean low water and dur-
ing the 1953 storm it was 9.6 feet above mean low water;
the floor of Pier 5 is 10 feet above mean low water. But
‘wave action brings the water level at times above the
recorded figures, as already noted..
™ «
App. 36
Opinion of Trial Court
The excluded reports therefore would have —_ merely
cumulative in view of the findings made.
7. Reasonable care did‘not require that weer dam-
age from Hurricane Donna be foreseen and
guarded against
The evidence establishes that the water damage froin
Hurricane Donna could not have been “guarded against
by the.ordinary exertions of human skill and pradence”.
The Guilia, cited above.
The principal evidence is that at the close of the busi-
ness day on Friday, September 9, no one could reasonably
have been expected to prepare for Donna hitting New York
on Monday, September 12. Therefore respondents were
not negligent when on Friday, September 9, at about 6
_p.m. DST they left the cargo on Pier 5 in its then condi-
tion, that ‘is, mostly on one pallet, 6 inches from the pier
floor.
At that time, as already noted, Donna was about a hun-
dred miles southeast of Key West ang moving toward the
west northwest at about 9 miles per hour. The official
Weather Bureau advisory issued at that hour stated: “Sub-
‘ject to temporary and rather minor variations no material
change is expected in intensity speed or direction during
dhe next 12.hours”. |
The New York Times reported official Sincdasts for the
New York City area from the United States Weather |
- Bureau.on September 9, 10 and 11 as follows ( _— :
notice being taken thereof) : *,
from the i issue of September 9 (page 58, column 2):
“Fair, warm today and tonight; highest tempera-
ture in the high 80's; highest temperature humidity .
KY
in addition, The New York Times carried a news y tons .
in the issue of Saturday, September 10 (page 1, column
6
-*
—
App. 370 Palit
Wer”
‘Opinion of Trial Court
index in the high 70’s; mostly southwesterly winds -
between 10 and 15 miles an hour; lowest tempera-
ture in the high 60’s: Mostly. fair, continued warm
tomorrow.”
from the issue of September 10 (page 42, column 6): s
“Showers this morning followed by some cloudiness
today; highest temperature near 80; highest tem- ~
perature humidity index in the 70’s; southerly winds
becoming west to northwesterly between 10 and 15
miles an hour. Mostly fair tonight, lowest, tempera-
ture in the 60’s. Mostly fair, - as warm tomor-
row. ‘
from the issue of September 11 (page 95, column 1):
“Considerable cloudiness today; chance of showers
. by late evening; highest temperature in the 70’s ;
highest temperature’ humidity index in the low.
70’s; north to northeasterly winds 10 miles an hour;
} deals with periods of rain tonight and tomorrow;
lowest temperature in the 60’s.”
3) containing these statements:
“In New York, the Weather Bureau said the hurri-
cane would not produce effects on the weather here
for two or three days, if then. Friday night’s rains
were said not to be associated with the hurricane. a
‘From 7 am. EST on September 8 to 11 am. EST on
| September 11, Donna was passing through an ‘area from
which. no hurricane had ever come to cause significant
) v
a
Ww
S
App. 38
Opinion of Trial Court
damage in New York Harbor. Until 10 p. m. DST on Sun- |
day, September 11, there was no warning from the Weather
Bureau that Donna might reach New York Harbor. The
head of the National Hurricane Center testified that on
Friday, September 9, he had no concern that in sixty hours
Hurricane Donna would be in New York. The head of,
the Weather Bureau office in New York testified (SM 283)
that on Friday, September 9,
“the hurricane was still moving in a west-north-
west direction towards the southern tip of Florida
and very slowly, and since the advisories indicated,
and all the forecast information available indieated
that it would continue on about the same track, we
figured then that it would move very close to the
southern tip of Florida, at least; and for that
reason we did not become very excited about it
affecting the New York City area especially over
the weekend. “1 G
“Tf this was the belief of thie weather experts Shenae,
how possibly could the management of Pier 5 be found:
unreasonable in acting at the same time on .the same belief?
_ This thought is clearly expressed in Merchants Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. United Produce Co., 279 Ky. 519, 131,
S.W. 2d 469; 471 (1939), also a flood damage case:
“We find the tule in this character of ease to be
that a warehouseman is not responsible for loss're- .
_ sulting from an act of God, but-that such‘a plea will
not benefit him where he is warned of the approach-
ing calamity and fails to-use ordinary care to pro-—
tect: the goods or to remove them to a place of
safety. ‘ ‘ ie) ae
»
_ App. 39
| , Opinton of Trial Court -
. . The United States Weather Bureau bul-
letin of January 20th was published in the morning
newspapers on January 21st, and stated that a.crest
of 38 to 39 feet was expected the following Saturday
with a probability of 42 feet ‘early next week’ if the
‘rainfall -should be as heavy as it was Sunday and
Monday. The expert, advice of the United’ States
Weather Bureau was that the river would not reach
a stage of 39 feet until Saturday, and this would
lack reaching defendant’s basement by 4 or 5 feet;
if it reached a stage of 42 feet ‘early next week’ by
reason of the heavy rains continuing, still the river
would lack reaching the defendant’s basement by 1
. or 2 feet. Instead of defendant having warning and ©
notice of the unprecedented rise of 6.3 feet from
January 21st to January 22d, in a. river that was
then at the extreme high stage of 39.1 feet, it had
_ what is generally regarded as expert information
given out by the United States Weather Bureau that
there would be no rise above 39 feet, and that figure
was three days off, and under the most unfavorable
conditions the rise would not exceed 42 feet ‘early
. next week.’ After the meteorologist, who had
twenty-seven years’ experienee with the United .
_ States Weather Bureau, on January 20th predicted
in effect that the -defendant’s warehouse would be
safe by 5 feet until Saturday, there could have been
no negligence on the part of defendant in following
this prediction and assuming that the goods in its
‘ basement would be safe until the early pert of La
following week.”
App. 40
Opinion of Trial Court
The case for libelants is that hurricanes are erratic
: phenomena of. nature; no two are alike or follow the
same track; they cross, recross and recurve without seem-
ing to obey > any physical law; it is difficult to predict
' the course of a hurricane; the first part of September is
the climax of the ‘hurricane season. All these =—_ are.
true. -
Libelants then: conclude that reasonable -eare required
the pier operators to .protect the ’ eargo against the
possibility of Donna hitting New York. This conclusion
‘eannot be accepted. The conclusion would require pro-
tective efforts whenever any tropical storm or hurricane
| developed i in the Atlantic west of, the Cape Vérde Islands,
or in the Caribbean Sea, or’in the.Gulf of Mexico. Any
such disturbance could take a course which would affect
New York; prediction ‘is ‘almost impossible ; therefore, say
_ libelants, protective efforts are required.
_ This not only seems an- ‘unreasonable standard; its
_ application would result in economié waste. In all but
a féw cases, the extensive and: expensive labor involved
would be unnecessary. Since 1938, only five hurricanes
have seriously affected New York: or an average of not
' more than one every five years. | :
_ Under these. circumstances it seems entirely reasonable
‘and prudent to rely on Weather Bureau warnings and
to take action when such warnings have been given and
not before. .
. In discussing negligence, the following comment appears —
# in Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 302, ‘page 818:
“Abnormal conditions of nature. ‘The actor is not
required to anticipate or provide against concitey”
App. 41
: \
Qvinion of Trial Court
of nature or the. sspientien of natural forces which
are of so unusual a charseter that the butden of
providing for-them would be out of all proportion
to the chance of. their. existence or operation and —
the risk of harm to others involved in their pos-
' sible existence or operation. © It is. therefore not
- necessary that a particular operation of the natural
force be unprecedented. The likelihood of its re- .
currencé may be so slight that in the aggregate the .
burden of constantly providing against it would be
out of all proportion great as compared with
magnitude of - risk inivolved.3 in the possibility of
its recurrence.’
‘Moreover, not even the efforts which libelants suggest.
were required could have protected the cargo. Libelants
say that the cargo from Toreador (which sailed Friday
"evening, September 9) should: have been discharged to»
_ three pallets instead of ty-one. ‘This would have-raised
such cargo 18 inches above the pier floor. But‘the evi-
dence is that water came up on September 12 toa height
of 22 to 36 inches above the floor: <y
Tt is assumed that there had been occasions before
‘Donna when water rose above the floor of Pier 5 but this —
_ does not affect my view as to what might reasonably be
required of the pier operators in the period September .
_ 9-12, 1960. Unless they might reasonably have been ex:
pected to predict the ‘passage of Donna through an area
affecting New York Harbor, they could not reasonably ”
" expected to guard against it.
It is true that from 10 p.m. DST on Sunday, September
, 11, the pier operators knew or should have known that
%
App. 42
Opinion of Trial —
Donna was heading in such a Disiedties and at sadn a
speed as might produce high tides in New York Harbor .
‘on Monday morning, September 12. it is also true that°
nothing. was done about the cargo on Pier 5 until 8 a.m.
DST on Monday. As Libelants recognize, however, noth-
ing could have been done ahout the cargo at 10 p.m. DST
on Sunday night. Labor must be obtained from or through
_ the’ Waterfront Commission and the Commission was not
open on that Sunday night. Labor for Pier'5 for 8 a.m.
DST Monday had been ordered at 3 p.m. DST on Friday, »
all. in accord with Commission rules. The theory for
- libelants is that on Friday afternoon it, was negligence for
the operators of Pier 5 not to anticipate the coming of
Donna on Monday morning and protect against it by work-
ing on Saturday and Sunday. This theory cannot be ©
accepted in the face of the evidence of the location, speed
and direction of Donna during all of Friday. If this evi-,
dence gave the Weather Bureau experts no cause at that
time to believe that Donna. would affect New York Harbor, ,
it was reasonable for the ‘Pier 5 operators to act on the
same basis. « Fr Ep .
The evidence shows that respondents have not =
carried the burden of proof, but have established, that —
reasonable care would not have foreseen and prevented
the water damage from Donna. _
8. The World Sead “ @ecision
Libelants naturally place much reliance on World Prod-
ucts, Inc..v. Central Freight Service, Inc., 222 F. Supp.
3 .
849. (D.N.J. 1963), affirmed, 342 F.2d 290 (3d Cir., Febru- - |
ary 15,°1965). A warehouseman in, Raewaten, ‘New
Jersey, was held liable in a diversity case for water dam- «
.
App. 43
‘Opinion of Trial Court
age to goods in its warehouse during Hurricane Donna:
The warehousé. extended over the Hudson River.
Thére appear to be distinctions in fact between that case
and the case at bar. For exatyple, the. Edgewater ware- —
‘house was only 3 to 4 feet above “normal high tide” (222
F.Supp. at 852). If “normal high tide” is the same.as
“mean high water” then the warehouse was 7.6 to 8.6 feet
above mean low water, whereas Pier 5 was 10 feet above®
mean low water (mean iy water correction to mean sea.
level is assumed to be 2.3, the same as the mean low water
correction, see SM 257; but see SM 311). dee. 3
‘The Court also found that “on a number of. occasions
prior to ‘Donna’,.the waters of the Hudson must have
- Tisen to or dinive the level of the warehouse floor;” (222. ©
F.Supp. .at 852).
If there are no valid distinctions in fact between the — ne
cases, then I must respectfully disagree with the result .
reached in the World Products case. ,
The foregoing includes the findings of fact and conelu-
sions of law required by Rule 4614 of the Supreme. Cou -—
Admiralty Rules. 4
The decrees must be for respondents; dismissing ~
libels on the merits.
Submit decrees on notice.
‘Dated: New York, New York
May 5, 1965 —
ed B. —
‘United States District J a
a]
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.