Brief in Opposition — Gibbons v. City of Chicago
Supreme Court brief1966
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| otfiee Supreme Court, U.S.
1'-. FELED.
. = JU 16_ 1966
. ae de ° JOHN F. DAVss eck
| Sapreme Court of the United States
OcToBER Term, 1966, ~,
_ No. 260. .
MILDRED GIBBONS, NAPOLEON C. ZBYSZEWSKEI,
AILEEN BIEL, IDA JACOBSON, GEORGE PAPAN-
_ ' TONATOS, LEON PERMAN, HYMAN M. STEIN,
ALLEN KLEIN, KUNIO SHIMIZO, er at.,
Petitioners,
CITY OF CHICAGO, A Muwrerpan ConyGnarsom,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION. _
. a
RayMonp F: Smmon, :
- Corporation Counsel of the City’ of Chicago,
511 City Hall, Chicago, Illinois 60602,
| | Attorney for Respondent.
-. Sypney R. Dresrn, —
Auten Hartman, = 3
Assistant Corporation Counsel, ta ‘
- Of Counsel. - P ee.
oF)
THE GUNTHORP-WARRER PRINTING COMPANY, CnIcAG0 aAGERID 56
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Rash 6ae
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Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Se eas bare sack - oO
Statutes°and Ordinances Involved........... ivagius .- 1
Questions Presented........... See teen caeeees ye
Statement. of the Case..........2...45. Miser ceivis a
Reasons For Denying the Writ: >
| A. . Factual determinations involving conflicts in
' testitnony and other evidence are not property
before this Court . (Rita takemiensetenas 8
B. The Illinois Mitie Court’s determination | :
upholding the validity and constitutionality of
the ordinance regulating self-service, coin-
operated laundries is well supported in law
Or Oe. baerankveeeteven eee O20. ene 9
‘ “Conclusion... . MiiNeeree nee CLARA Seen ise
BPDOMGIE Boo oe ve veneeccceghavccgecweccovsncecess i
PEE Ba os. ak ce hens a A Rue weeeuas ili
e
én
F : }
ii
| - AvTuorities. .
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27, 30.............-. . 19
Carlson v.. Curtiss, 234 U. S. 103, 106...-........:.,.
City of Chicago v. Miller, 27 il. 2d 211, 220, 188 N. B.
2d 694, cert. denied, << |) ae verre 10
| City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 19 Ill. 2d 204, 210, 166
N. E. 2d 29... es ccceccccncecccrcecsscegecseccess 9
“ Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, icicehtacse.. 10.
Gibbons v. — of Chicago, 34 Ill. 2d 102, 204 N. E.
2d 70. os ecececcees saeedeecscceacceces » ol, 8, 6 18
_ Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590...... ~ 2
. Heard v. Bolton, 107 Ga. App. 863, 866, 867, 131 S. E.
2d 835, 838 ..... Ce gracacgecceccogecsccsccncscecs 19
Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 203, 188 N. E. .
_ 2d 700, cert. denied, 375 U. See ae 12.
Lincoln Federal Labor Union, A.F. L. v. Northwestern
_ Iron & Metal. Co., 335 U. S. 585, 586... . 5. .....20:. 10
Merchants’ Nat*l Bank y. Richmond, 256 U. S. 635,
Be Seah hnesacegeacvetitas. ye 0 Bs tae,
” Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, ©
By OE Wie Me ly Ms ode ccteccoccccceecees seovt 8
. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340
U. &. GOA, GOB... 22 cecccccsccweccccccccccncccees.
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 DEE nticcnnensace ss 10
Schact v. City of New York, 40 Mise. 2d 303, 243 |
a RP ee ar Be 18
Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 509, 198
WE, TE, BB GB, nccccccgcccccnccccccese havnnns tess |
Soon Hing v: Crowley, 113 U. 8. 708.......... 40.2.0. 19
schemata sinadiamn aint ‘.
ili :
| Sendia v. Binford, Pe is Oe wiv awaier ces cges 10
‘Van Sciver v. Zoning Boaril of Adjustment, 396 Pa..
646, 656, 657, 152 A. 2d T17, 123, T24 cece e eee ee 20°
Williams v. Mayor and City Conneil of Baltimore, 289
Dh Cc OR Sader eae ee bees evans: 10
Statutes: ~
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1965, Chapter 24, ;
Par. 1-2-1. exh e iia a car cay crus wie 1,9
- Par. fay. ee ee 19.°
io ita SEE TE OE OEE ee ee 1,9
BT og PEE Ee Oe Ne Nee 1,9
WO ME a ss oo ued vauas SEER aOR NE
Me NR, Crt oe eee eet 1,9
ae Y Raven ear sneer tte mere
Pas. 14-486. «5. 0060 ANB sede Teton eee 1,9
ree ee 1,9
Ordinances : |
‘Municipal Code of Chicago, 1939, as amended to
and including January 1, 1966, Chapter 145
ek ee er ee ee nee A
ee ae a ero ere
. . | renee Teer
ann Sis ay ee ee
Sec. 145-245 .....:..... Sap Paley Wi el eh 1,3
We. TORIES oir beaks die vnectsic. soe eta 1,3
f
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBER Macha 1966. ~
No. 260.
MILDRED GIBBONS, NAPOLEON C. ZBYSZEWSKI,
AILEEN BIEL, IDA. JACOBSON, GEORGE -PAPAN-
TONATOS, LEON PERMAN, HYMAN M. STEIN,
ALLEN KLEIN, KUNIO SHIMIZ0, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
CITY OF CHICAGO, A Municipan CoRPORATION,
- Respondent. |
° 4 . 3) d
‘ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF sme. STATE OF —
RESPONDENT ’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION.
Opinion of the Pm Court of the State of Hlinois..
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois
= , herein has been reported in 34 Ill. 2d 102 and in 214 N. E.
2d 70. 7
Statutes and Ordinances.
The statutory provisions involved have been set forth as
Appendix -A and the ordinance provisions involved: have -
been set forth as Appendix B, both located at the back of
this brief (hereinafter referred to-as ‘‘App.’’). Said pro- —
7 visions are cited in the following list:
- Tikpois Revised Statutes 1965 ,Chapter 24, paragraphs
1.2-1, 11-1-1, 11-5-2, 11-8-2, 11-16-1, a 1}-30-4,
11-42-8, 11-60-1. a
Municipal Code of Chicago 1939, as wunibie to
January 1, 1966, "Chapter 145, Sections - 145-24. 1
- through 145-24.6.
e:
References to the Record. °
The Abstract of Record filed in the Illinois sinnied
Court has been designated -by the Clerk of ‘that’ Court as
‘*Record 26.’’ Therefore, reference to the record contained
bstract shall be set forth as ‘‘Rec.:26,’’ followed —
e in the abstract to which said reference i is made.
$
by
Questions Presented.
Do veauiabory ordinance provisions, founded upon statu-
tory provisions, requiring self-service, coin-operated laun-
dry operators to comply with the city’s heating. and
‘ventilating code, nuisance code and zoning code; to have
~ an attendant, meeting with certain standards of fitness, on
the premises between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 11:30
p.m.; to close such establishments between 11:30 p.m. to
6:30 a.m.; to submit floor plans of said establishments to
the city building’ department; and to pay a graduated
license fee baged upon the number of machines installed on
the premises, offend Amendments V and XIV of the United
-States Constitution? | ‘
(It must be noted that the ordinance shail’ do not
require attendants in self-service, coin-operated laundries -
‘‘during all open hours’’ as stated in petitioners’ ‘‘Ques-
tions Presented’’ (Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 3- 4), nor | has any
issue been raised concerning the desirability of requiring
attendants for those establishments seeking to remain open.
after 11:30 p.m., as stated in petitioners’ ‘‘Questions Pre-. -
sented’’ (Petitioners’ Brief, P. 4):) -
Statement of the Case.
As reproduced in ‘Appendix. B of this brief (App. iii-vi), :
Sections 145-24.1 through 145-24.6 set forth a comprehen-
sive regulatory ordinance concerning the establishmént and
3
use of self-service, coin-operated la dries. ‘Section 145-
_24.1 requires that self-service, coin- -operated laundry estab- —
lishments comply with the city’ s ventilating code, that such .
establishments be maintained so as not to run‘afoul of the
nuisance code of the city, and that they comply with the
zoning code of the city. Section 145-24.2 requires that an
attendant, i.e., responsible person, be on the premises of
- self-service, coin-operated laundries during certain hours
| operation, namely, between. 6: 00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. |
Section 145- 4. 3, as amended on April 17, 1964, sets forth
certain qualifications which -an attendant mus. possess, said —
qualifications to be passed upon by the division marshal in
. charge 6f:the bureau of fire prevention and the commis-
sioner of health, who shall issue a certificate of fitness, with . :
an annual fee established for the issuance or renewal of
such a certificate. Section 145-24.4, as amended on April 17,
1964, requires any person establishing a self-service, coin-
operated laundry to present plans, specifications and a
diagram of the portion-of the building in which the pro-
‘posed laundry establishment is to be located to the com-
missioner of buildings. Section 145-24.9 provides that no
self-service, coin-operated laundry shall be operaied be- °
tween the hours of 11:30 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. Section 145- -
24.6 provides for an annual license fee,graduated in accord-
ance with the number of machines to be installed in self-
service, coin-operated laundry establishments.
- Petitioners initiated this action against defendant City
-of Chicago, seeking to set aside. Sections 145-24.1 through
145-24.6, alleging that the power to regulate or license self-
‘service, coin-operated laundry. establisliments had not been |
conferred upon the City of Chicago by the State Legisla-
ture, that said ordinances deprived petitioners of due
process of law and of equal protection of the laws (Rec..26, :
p..7), and that said provisions were arbitrary, unreasonable, ~
confiscatory and void, bearing no reasonable: relationship
to the public health, welfare or safety (Rec. 26, p. 8). These
allegations were denied by respondent (Rec. 26, pp. 23-26).
The cause was referred to a Master in Chancery following
the entry of a temporary injunction. and the Master heard
_ the evidence offered by the parties and filed his report on
January 3, 1964 (Rec. 26, p. 30), concluding that the city
‘had the authority to pass.the ordinance in question for the
regulation of the industry; that it was a necessary ordi-
nance; and that certain provisions in the ordinance were
excessive and should be set aside, nevertheless holding that
they could be separated from those which, were nequeaatee
(Rec. 26, p. 93). - :
’ As previously noted, on April 17, 1964, the City Council
‘amended Sections 145-243 and 145-244 (App. v-vi),
said amendments having been designed to meet the Master’s a
objections, which the Chancellor: refused to. consider prior
to entry of the decree (Rec. 26, pp. 105-11), on May 5, 1964
(Ree: 26, p. 97). The Court held that the entire ordinance ~
passed on July 28, 1961 (Sections 145-24.1 through 145-
24.6) was void, invalid, unenforceable, beyond respondent’s
delegated auth@rity and unconstitutional, and permanently
enjoined its enforcement (Ree. 26, p. 102).
In support of those ordinance provisions requiring the
presence of an attendant during certain hours, to which ©
petitioners make particular reference (Petitioners’ Brief,
_ p. 5), the evidence revealed that the requirement of having
a responsible person on such premises between 6:00 p.m.
and 11:30 p.m. coineided with the busiest hours‘of opera-.
tion in self-service, édin-operated laundries (Rec. 26, p.
431), and that those same busy hours also coincided with
the hours of peak criminal ' activity within the City of
Chicago at which times the presence of such a responsible
‘person: would operate as a deterrent to crime in said laun-
dry establishments (Rec. 26, pp. 440, 441, 458, 459, 467, 468,
539, 541, 556, 563). ahr
4) pe
The evidence showed further that an attendant would.
supervise the activities of persons on the premises during
-. those busiest times; would be acquainted with the workings
of the machiner}; would have some basic knowledge of
good housekeeping, thereby nullifying the deus of fire;
and would be a person to watch over the premises and the
’ occupants and prevent anything that might occur on those
premises that would lead to the jeopardy of the occupants
or the building itself which may house apartments or other
‘property. uses (Rec. 26, p. 499). Self-service, coin-operated
laundries have experienced a number of fires in the City
of Chicago (Rec. 26, pp. 206, 247, 248, 249, 270, 295, 323,
333, 337, 367, 370, 379, 381, 401, 414, 576). *
An attendant could also - eliminate accumulations of
water, soap and other debris on the floor (Ree. 26, pp. 533,
593, 594), caused in part by overflowing washing machines
(Rec. 26, pp. 180,190, 217, 224, 269, 270, 271, 307, 323, 349,
364, 383, 389 440, 592). The’ presence of a properly in-
structed attendant in self-service, -coin-operated laundry
establishments would also insure the maintenance of
hyzienic and sanitary conditions in such establishments - =
well as to. maintain compliance with the -ventilation | re-
quirements of the Municipal Code of Chicago, particularly
where, as in such places of business, gas used for heating
is being piped into the premises and-where an accumulation
of moisture and humidity is to be found (Ree. 26, p. 515).
The Supreme Court of Illinois took cognizance of the fact
that there were positive functions to be #rved by requiring
attendants |to be on the premises of@self-service, coin-
operated laundries during their busiest hours in the eve-
"ning, as required by Section 145-24.2. 34 Ill. 2d 102, 106-08.
The Court went on to say that when those positive func-
tions of an attendant relating ‘to considerations of public
health, risks of fire and personal injuries are considered
in conjunction with the deterrence of crime and criminal
OP 6
_activity, both the requirement of an attendant and the
- closing provision of the ordinance were clearly justified. ©
The correlation between the deterrence of crime and
_eriminal activity and the presence of attendants during the
busiest hours of business in self-service, coin-operated laun- ©
- dries, which also coincide with the peak hours of criminal
activity in the City of Chicago (Ree. 26, pp. 441, 467, 539,
556, 563) is demonstrated by the\record. ‘With respect to ©
murders involving attendants ‘in self-service, coin-operated :,:
laundries (Rec. 26, @p. 472, 541, 559), there is no suggestion
or intimation that the persons involved could have qualified
as an attendant under Section 145-24.3 of the subject ordi-
nance (App. v), and, in fact, they could have been any
person who happened on the:premises, such as a janitor or
maintenance man (Ree. 26, pp. 445, 451) or a local drifter.
about whom the operators knew little and cared less (Rec.
26, pp. 578, 580, 582), thereby underscoring the need for
appropriate Aegulation. Pi éo%
It was the considered opinion of expert police witnesses
that crimes of larceny would decrease if an attendant were
present during the busiest hours of self-service, coin- |
operated laundry operations, and that an attendant would
serve to decrease and deter sex crimes, such as rape, in-
decent liberties and indecent exposure (Rec. 26, p. 458).
.. The presence of an attendant would also have a deterrent .
‘effect upon crimes of murder and robbery, because crim-
inals are less likely to enter such establishments and at-_
_ ‘tempt crimes of. this nature where attendants could witness
them (Rec. 26, p. 468). 7
The. record shows that women frequently’ patronize a
dromats alone at night and are likely objects for persons.
bent upon committing sex crimes (Rec. 26, ‘pp. 455, 458,
_- 469, 471, 482, 544, 547; 551-2, 564). \ Petitioners’ assertion —
__that no case of molestation of ns occurred at or near
self-service, coin-operated laundries (Petitioners’ . Brief,
2
= a a
p. 7 ), 3 is belied by the nected (Ree. 26, pp. 481, 544, ¢ 564). |
-_. The record’ also shows an incidence of indecent exposure
cases in* and about a coin- poperated laundries .
(Ree. 26, pp. 479, 480, 481).
Regarding crimes. ‘aux with. narcotics . in: self-
service, coin-operated laundries,: such’ ‘establishments have
Served as. gathering places for young people who, seeking
to get out of the weather and into warm, ‘well-lighted sur- —
roundings where they won’t be bothered, have... used self-
- Service, coin-operated laundries for ‘‘goof- -bgll”’ ‘parties.
A “‘goof-ball’’ is a barbiturate taken orally together. with
carbonated Arinks, which are available in laundromats
(Ree. 26, pp. 540; 542). The use of so-called ‘‘voof-balls’”’
produces an effect upon the human nervous system as ob-
noxious as the use of narcotics. \.- | :
‘The assertion in petitioners’ ‘Statement -of Case’’ that’
‘at least seventy-five percent of the matters set out in‘the —
police reports were routine reports of incidents, such as
juveniles congregating, “whieh do not constitute. crimes at
all (Petitioners’ Brief, p. 7), omits to: ,advise ‘this Court
that: the witness used the . word ‘‘erime’’ -only as re-
lated to those ‘eases involving violations of the Criminal
Code ‘of Illinois and that the incidents referred to were: .
such violations of city ordinances as nen police action
(Ree. 26, ‘pp. 458-59),
With respect to petitioders” anticipated increase in the
number of burglaries occurring in’ self-service, coin-
operated laundries which would be closed hetween the
hours. of 11:00 p.m..and 6:30 a.m., the record shows that
self-service, coin-operated laundries are not attractive to
burglars (Ree.- 26; pp. 566-67). Burglary, in such estab- _
lishments, in the sense of breaking in from the outside, is
very low for the reasdp that it would be a much more
serious offense to pry, Open the doon of .the establishment
than to break a coin receptacle, the. besiiabls proceeds of -
Ss "~which would be minimal in view of the risk (Rec. 26, pp.
_ 545-46)>~Burglaries are less likely in self-service, coin-
operated laundries-which are locked and dark because to a
thinking burglar, it could be logically assumed that the
- operator would take home with him the proceeds of the day
(Rec. 26, pp. 473-74). The Illinois Supreme Court held =
that the choice of deterrence, of one type of crime at the
expense ‘of an increase in another involved a typical legis-
lative judgment, 34 Ill. 2d 102, 108.
Reasons for Denying. the Writ.
A. Factual determinations involving confliets in testimony ‘
and other evidence are not properly before this Court.
The main thrust of petitioners’ argument,, under their
' «*Reasons for Granting the Writ,’’ is their dissatisfaction
with the resolution of factual issues by the Master in Chan-
cery and the Illinois Supreme Court. They devote eight of
the eleven pages of their argument to analysis and reargu-
ment of the facts. (Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 8-16.)
This Court has many times held that the place to resolve
conflicts in testimony and an interpretation. thereof is in-
_ the State Court, not in the United States Supreme Court.
In Milkwagon Drivers Union v.. Meadowmoor Dairies,
- Inc., 312 U. 8. 287,:the Court addressed itself to similar
-circuinstances, stating 312 U. 8. at 294):
‘It is not for us to make an ae evaluation
‘of the testimony before the master. We have not only
his findings but his findings authenticated by the state —
‘of Illinois speaking through her supreme court. We.
can. reject such a determination only if we can say
that it is so without warrant as to be a palpable eva-
' sion of the constitutional guaranty here invoked. The
_ place to resolve conflicts in the testimony and in its
interpretation was in the Illinois courts and not here.
- To substitute opr judgment for that of the state court ;
’ is to ee the mee of our Anthority.’ i
~.,
’
. 8
See also, Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,
340 U. S. 534, 538; Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Richmond, :
256 U. S. 635, 638; Carlson v. Curtiss, 234 U. S. 103,106. -
An examination of the testimony in the record, as\hereto-
fore set forth in the preceding ‘‘Statement of the Case,’’
demonstrates that the findings of fact as posited by the,
Illinois Sipreme Court are well supported nd substantial
oe evidence.
A8 this Court has indicated, therefore, a review of fac-
tual’issues. is not a proper basis for granting a writ of .
certiorari and respondent - —- — that the
— be denied.
’
= s
- B. The Illinois prone Court’s determination upholding ~
the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance regu-
- lating self-service, coin-operated laundries is well sup-
ported i in law and i in fact.
_. The .authority to regulate ‘nities: has lion delegated. '
directly, as well as impliedly, by the Illinois Legislature to. ~~
municipalities, as demonstrated by the collation of statu-
tory grants of power relating to this subject: setoforth in
Appendix A hereof (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 24, pars. 1-2-1,
. N\
11-1-1, 11-5-2, 11-8-2, 11-16-1, 11- 20-5, 11-30-4, 11-42-8, 11- © °
60-1) (App.. i-ii). Having proceeded from legislative
authority, the rule obtains that there is a presumption
favoring the validity of the ordinance. City of Recatur v.
Chasteen, 19 Ill. 2d'204, 210, 166 N.E» 2d 29. ‘
~ The question of whether there is, any connection between
the ordinance provisions under attack and the police power
exercised thereby, and the question of whether the ordi-
_nanée is a reasonable exercise of that police power, is pri-
marily a matter for legislative determinatio& which will
' not be disturbed by the courts unless there is a palpably
arbitrary exercise: of said power. Schuringa v. City of
10
Chicago,’30 Ill. 2d 504, 509,198 N.E. 2d 526. The ordinance
provisions need not be scientific, logical or consistent, but
need only have a reasonable basis’ when considered with
* reference to the ‘purpose of the Legislature. City of Chi-
cago v.: Miller, 27 Ill. 2d 211,220, 188 N.E. 2d 694, cert. |
denied, 375 U. S. 11. The judicial function in this resp@ct
is exhausted with the discovery that*the relation between:
the means and the end:is not ‘wholly vain and fanciful or
an illusory pretérise. Willams v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 289 U, S. 36, 49, ~
This Court has recently announced that it has retarsiea
_ to the original constitutional proposition that courts will ‘
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the .
judgment of legislative bodies which are elected to ‘pass
laws. In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, this Court, —
quoting from Olsen v. N ebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246; Sproles
v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 388; and Lincoln Federal Labor
Union, A.F. L. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U: S.
525, . 536, reaffirmed the principles enunciated «in a
cases, stating (372 U. S- at 730-31) :
‘© We are not concerned : . . with the wisdoni, add
or appropriateness of the legislation.’ Legislative
bodies. have broad scope to experiment with, economic
problems, and this Court does not sit to ‘subject the
State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our Government and wholly beyond the
protection. whith the general clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to secure.’ It is now settled
_ that States ‘have power to legislate against what are
_ , found to be injuridus practices in their internal com-
mercial and business affairs, so long as theit laws do
not. run afoul of some specific. federal constitutional .
prohibition, or of some valid federal law.’ ”’
Petitioners nevertheless ask this Court to. et as a super-
legislature, to weigh the wisdom of legislation which, in ‘the
Skrupa ease, this Court said it would emphatically refuse —
"'< to do. 372.U. S, at 731. : \
: . 8
ey acne \
The question of whether there is a reasonable relation- Pad
ship between the ordinance regulating ‘self-service, coin- —
_ operated laundries and *the traditional objectives of the
police power has been decided i in favor of the validity and —
constitutionality of the ordinance by. the Illinois Supreme
Court. The abstract of record considered by the Illinois .
Supreme Court is voluminous,. containing 599 pages (Rec. -
26). The abstract contains testimony ‘df thirty-five wit-
nesses who. testified for petitioners, nine witnésses who’
- testified for respondent’, in addition to references to six
petitioners’ exhibits and three respondent’s exhibi
- eonflict in testimony and other evidence. has been resolved. ay
by the Illinois Supreme Court in favor of the validity of
the ordinance and petitioners’ discussion under its ‘‘Rea-
sons for Granting the Writ”’ is no more than a rehash and
reargument of that evidence. Nevertheless, respondent.
will answer various contentions made so that this Court
may not be misled thereby.
Petitioners. seek mileage from an alleged financial im-
- paet said to be caused. by the subject ordinance on the busi-
~~“ness sought to be regulated, the attempt being made_to__.
show that theirs are nickel and dime businesses, barely
. funetioning day to day, with imminent. loss to themselves
- and the entire community of the valuable services they are
‘said to render. The record shows, however, that peti-
tioners’ type. of business, even without application of the -
ordinance regulations at issue, results in such varying
circumstances as from three to five,such laundry stores
closing each week because their owners cannot. pay their:
bills (Rec. 26, p. 428) to those establishments re returning to
their owners as much of a profit as approximately $10,000 —
per year (Rec. 26, pp. 171-72). Among the factors bearing :
upon whether a self-service, coin-operated laundry store —
will make or lose money is the nature of the neighborhood
in which it is located (Ree. 26, pp. 240, 282, 395), the
Ge
12 .
>
‘amount of competition enc ntered in that particular neigh-
borhood Rec. 26, pp.-154, 228, 236,, 282, 283, 292, 298,
311, 372, 394, 428), the age of the store and the type and ©
maintenance of equipment (Rec. 26, pp. 236, 282, 394), as
well as: the business practices of the individual entrepre-
neur. (Rec. 26, p. 236). One such operator was frank to
admit that he wished to sell his stores-because they do not
yield sufficient returns on the investment, including stores .
__ which show a considerable profit, and that the ordinance’
provisions under attack had no bearing on this decision
which he had made several months prior to passage of the
ordinance (Rec. 26, p. 241). A representative of one of
the largest laundry equipment suppliers in the industry ©
testified that the new ordinance would have no effect upon
his business and that his customers eould still make a_
reasonable profit on their businesses (Rec. 26, p. 291)..
The record thus demonstrates that the issue of how the.
" ordinance provisions will affect this industry is enigmatic,
to say the least. Notwithstanding the probability of some
adverse effect, the fact. alone that the ordinance may—op-—
— erate to impose burdens or yr restrictions on property which
would not have existed without the enactment of this pro-
vision is not determinative of the question of its validity.
Goldblatt w. Town of. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590; Kaukas v.
City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 203, 188 .N. E. 2d 700, cert.
' dented, 375 U.S. 8. - |
a Petitioners a sert that no ‘regulation is needed: due- to——
al injurids, quoting, out of con-
text, a so-called concession to that effect by.the Supreme
Court of ‘ling is (Pétitioners’ Brief, p. 10). Both the
record and the Supreme ‘Court opinion are in contradic-
tion_of that conclusion. The record shows that ‘a variety
of-risks to p patrons, other occupants of the building, and
to property, exist with respect to the operation of machjn-
ery and other equipment in self-service, coin-operated laun-—
13
dries, including shorting of initia wiring and blowing of
'.. ‘fuses (Rec. 26, p. 141), fires taking place i in and ‘about said:
machinery (Rec. 26, pp, 194, 201, 203, 206, 247, 248, 249,
270, 295, 323, 333, 337, “367, 370, 379, 381, 401, 414, 576),
clogging of machinery (Rec. 26; pp. 216-17), breaking of »
machine parts accessible to the public (Rec. 26, pp. 249-50,
369), burning out of* electrical motors and other glectrical
_ equipment (Ree. 26, pp. 369-70), overflowing of*water from
machines onto the ‘theta (Rec. 26, pp. 180, 190, 217, 224, .
269, 270, 271, 307, 323, 249, 364, 383, 389, 430, 530, 592), -
and ene of ventilating equipment (Rec. 26, p. ~
519).
One of senpieaiiiik*s witnesses, ‘Charlee L. Pierce, Bat-,
_talion Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the Chicago .
‘Fire Department, stated, in this regard (Rec. 26, p. 507):
‘‘The point we. are concerned about is that it is ‘good
fire prevention thinking to have somebody who will
recognize a hazard once it starts.and to eliminate it
if possible, then callin somebody to rectify it.
“Tf there is nobody in attendance and the motor is
- malfunctioning, there is nobody to notify an authority
_ that the motor is malfunctioning, that it is sparking, |
'. arcing, or overheated, and so on, until such time as:
it either burns itself out or causes a fire, then the
_ proper authorities are notified, namely, the owner of
the premises. You would not need any particular
special knowledge to recognize when the ‘motor was
—— malfunctioning; just be observing’ to see whether a
motor is sparking or arcing, and if you: have the God-.
- given sense of smell you could smell a motor burning
and you could smell the overheating of it ‘arid so on.’
‘The Illinois Supreme Court opinion bears fully upon this
point, as follows (34 Ill. 2d 102; 106-08):
‘<There appear to be few instances of either fires or.
- personal injuries due to negligence or accident in these
_establishments, and there has been no difference be- .
‘- tween attended and unattended laundries in the rates —
4
i &
A
14.
‘ . ; Cc . . . . .
. for insurance against’ fire and personal injury risks.
’ (See, however, Schacht v.:City. of New York, 2438
N.Y.S..2d 979, 279 (1963).) | A representative of the .
Chicago Fire Department testified that there had been. —
fires: relating to‘ washérs or dryers in such ‘establish-
ments, all of which wére.contained in the machines, ©
‘He testified, however, to the great value an attendant
would have in curtailing the risks of firé. The main .-
danger of fire appears to derive from failure to remove —~_ »
lint ‘from the dryers or from ‘placing improper “ma-
terials into them. . The main tisks of’personal injury
derive from the fact that some of the machines continue
spinning when they-are opened while iniuse. There 4 :
_was also testimony by a manufacturér of driers tha
he had heard that children. climbed | inside the ma-
chines to see who. could stay longest. Some
have overflowed on occasion, with the. quent risk
of injury and, if.a wire is ftayed or eut, of electrocu-
tion. But there was no testimony that any incidents
of the latter sort had occurred. . Laundry operators
testified/Ahat there were few overflows, and that the
. risks relating to maintenance of the machines were ©
cared for’ adequately by. existing maintenance ‘prac-
. tices.
‘Tf the water is maintained at the proper tempéra-" ay .
ture, a sterilizing effect is achieved. But there was .
testimony that disease might be communicated if —
- proper temperature i is not maintained: or an overload
of clothing is placed in the machines. Although the.
ee weights of the load limits are announced on the ma-
- ghines,. instances of. overloading undoybtedly ‘occur.
_ The risks. involved here are constant, and the require-
ment of an attendant: dufing peak business hours ap-
_ pears both reasonably re}vated to those. risks and rea-.
sonably adapted to curtail them. It seems fair to
summarize that attendants during the peak business
hours of 6:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. would perform few
positive business functions other than checking equip-
ment, preventing overloads or the insertion of improper
materials, cleaning the premises and changing money .
if there i is no automatic changer, most of which funé-
’
__ Se a aeae eS
tions are currently . performed to the patinfgotion of
the operators. But attendants would serve some func-
‘tions not presently served, for their presence on the
premises: during the peak. business. hours, at night,
would-afford constant assistance and would ténd to as-
ee sure proper use of the machines daring those hours.’’
Petitioners also take liberties with the record when
they assert that virtually the only crimes committed in -—
laundromats are instances of malicious mischief affecting
only the owner of the premises (Petitioners? Brief, p. 11),
_ and when they remove’ from context isolated statements
of Police Captains and - Commanders who testified with
respect to citime incidents in their .districts (Petitioners’
Brief, -pp. 12-13). Rather than to analyze the alleged
‘testimony of each and every witness set forth in Peti-_ -
tioners’ Brief, which would unduly lengthen and burden |
this response, a fair example of petitioners’ editorial re-
porting may be observed by considering the testimony. oft
the first witness, Captain James P.. Hackett. Captain Hac-'
_kett, at the time of his testimony, was Commander of the
Shakespeare Avenue Police District, who had previously
commanded the Task Force in backing up police districts
on difficult crime problems, and had commanded four othér —
police districts as well (Rec. 26, pp. 537- 38). Upon exam-
ination of the record, his alleged statement that “there —
were no attacks on women in laundromats”’ (Petitioners’
Brief, p..12) reveals the following (Ree: 26, p. 541):
‘‘As Commander in my District; I would ureter to
have this place with an attendant closed At 2:00.0’clo A
in ‘the morning ; I would prefer to have it closed
far as crime deterrence is concerned, because jae
,are going in there at night and you are always wor-
"ried somebody will.grab. one ing home. They are —
_ open to public view. She is sitting in there. Once in
* a while we have an occasion where people wander in
_ there and try to strike up an acquaintance with them,
“and they. get ‘ideas. We are always afraid some might : 2
“9 °
16
‘be attagked going eniin at late haiere: I have not had .
~~ an incident in this District, but Ihave heard of them.
.- “inthe past. When wé were downtown, as Deputy Chief, -
I watched all crime in the City because the crime
[reports] came in to us, every report and on ‘he air.
. These types of incidents were reported in the past.’’..
- ( Emphasis supplied.) 3 XN
Captain Hackett also made this statement (Ree. 26, p. 544) :
«-. .‘*Qne incident at 5900 South Paulina, I think that was —
_ the address, we had a number: of women going out of
there attacked. We even had a special watch on it.
I think it was on South Ashiand Avenue. These inci-
- dents occurred to the women after they left the laun-
dromat.’’ (Emphasis supplied. )
With rei to robberies, Captain Hackett testified (Ree.
26, 546) :
ae | Dini Fauen baie been pei Ca in laundromats, put
I carinot recall anyone in the district I commanded,
right ‘Off-hand.’? (Emphasis supplied.)
Captain Hackett i¢-alleged to have testified that the usual
type of incident in a laundromat: involved kids or drunks
trying to get money out of coin receptacles (Petitioners’
. Brief; p. 12) ; however, the sentence preceding his comment
‘reveals that this was not the usual incident in a. laundromat,
Ax
but the usual incident involving a theft ina —— :
as follows (Rec. 26, p. 546):
“The kind of episode that you would have in 4 theft,
_ that you had in a laundromat, would be. some’ kids |
trying to get $2.00 or $3.00 out of a coin receptacle,
or a drunk, drunks hanging out in there who think they
could get $2.00 or $3.00 or $10.00 or $15.00 easy..:
When: they get in the coin receptacle we call that a
larceny.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) |
Captain Hackett also stated, in this regard (Ree. 26, pp.
‘ R ) 5):
=
| “aT :
‘In the asindinned the machines are: ‘damaged; they
-get into their sealed closets; take tha money. -Most
of the crimes are getting into the coin receptacles,
ing their machines; that is the most in the area ‘I am
in now and that is pretty regular.”’ )
° A fair examination of. the record -would reveal similar, +
circumstances with respect to the testimony given by each .
of the police witnesses-as compared with the excerpts of
their testimony set forth in petitioners’ brief (Petitioners*
- brief, pp. 12-13)... . | “ ’
Many of the incidents about which the pelle officers were:
examined were contained in a survey covering a- limited.
period of time, from October, 1961 through January, 1962
(Rec. 26, p. 465). For that reason; the: police ‘officers, all
-into closets for supplies, stealing their supplies, damag- .
s.
<4
*
of whom were in a position ‘to know, testified with res ct |
to their professional experience in addition+o the incidents
‘referred to in the survey, and said ‘testimony. was by no
means in disregard of the record, as petitioners infer
(Petitioners’ Brief, p. 14). The Illinois Supreme Court
opinion with respect to crime and activities requiring police
supervision: took into consideration the opinions ofthe
police officers, based upon their experience, training, back-
ground and knowledge, stating (34 Ill. 2d 102, 108-09) :
‘‘Several representatives of the. Chicago Police De-.
partment expressed the opinion, based upon. their _
- experience, training, background and knowledge, that ©
~.the presence of an \attendant between the hours of
6:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. would have a deterrent effect
On crimes related to self-service, coin-operated laun- -
dries. Reports compiled by the Chicago Police De-. —
- ._partment show thatthe peak period of reported“crime
. for this type of laundry increases sharply about:5:00 —
p.m,, réaches a peak sometime after midnight, and
decreases sharply after 4:30 a.m. This period corre- —
lates with that during which thegpresence of an attend-
ant and compulsory closing are © reguirey. under the
<3
18
erdinance. There was testimony of numerous incidents
of crime of varying degrees of seriousness in connec-
tion with these laundries. Police officers testified that.
any warm, well-lighted place would contribute to cer-.
‘tain types of crime, but that open, unattended laundries ~
. are almost unique in their. attractiveness.. It was the’
opinion of, the police officers who testified that the
= incidence of larcenies of coins from“the machines.
‘would decrease significantly as a result of the attend-
ant and closing requirements. Certain types of preva-
lent sex crimes, such as indecent liberties and exhibi-
« tionism, would also decrease and the danger of rape
or similar-vielent sexual assault on unescorted women
would be reduced. ©
‘‘Over one-half ‘of -all police adtivity in regard to
self-service ‘laundries relates to the congregation of
juveniles .at night. Plaintiffs make much of the fact
that this conduct is not in itself criminal. But it is
nonetheless a large and important area of legitimate
police activity. - - = i
’ «Plaintiffs also argue that the requirements of an
attendant will increase the incidence of certain types
of crimes, such as sex exhibitionism, by guaranteeing
*a spectator, and that the closing requirement will in- —
crease*the incidence of burglary. But the choice of
deterrence of one type: of crime at the expense of an
increase in another involves a. typical Jegislative judg-
~ ment.- We are satisfied upon this. record that the at-
tendant and compulsory closing provisiorfs of the ordi-
. nance are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, (sée
Kaukas,v. City of Chicago, 27 Til. 2d 197, 201-203;
Queenside Hills Realty ‘Co. v. Sazl, 328:U.'S. 80, 90.
' L..ed. 1096, 66 S. Ct. 850,) and that they do not violate
the constitution of Illinois or the constitution: of the
United States. 4 |
The police problems concerning self-service, eoin-oper-"
ated laundries are not limited to Chicago. In the City of
New York a similar situation arose and the closing require-
ments and requirement of an attendant in the New York
City ordinance were upheld in Schact v: City of New York, .
2
}
| 19°
40 Mise. 24303, 243 N. Y. 8. 2d 272, the Court atating (243
N. Y..S, 24 at 279):
‘‘The Police Department has found the incidents of
crime generally to be greatest between the hours of 6
+. P.M. and 2AM. “
‘Tt is surely a proper munigipal function to take *
reasonable steps toward the control and reduction of |
erime, particularly during these hours.
‘“This Court is unable to say that the city legislative
authorities are wholly unreasonable to the point of
irrationality: in believing that the police and fire prob-
lems will be somewhat. alleviated by not. permitting
laundromats—particularly unattended laundromats, °
though the statute is not so limited—to be open be-
_tween midnight and 6 A.M., and by requiring that be-
" tween 6 P.M. and midnight laundromats have someone
in attendance. abs ,
. The dosing of business establishments” by municipal ordi-
nance, such as laundries, during certain hours of the early
morning, was considered by this Court in Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U. S. 27 and in Soon. Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S.
703, wherein the San Francisco ordinance prohibiting wash-
ing and ironing from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M. was upheld. In .
the Barbier case, this Court stated (113 U. S. at 30):
‘That fourth section, so far as it is involved in the
case before the police judge, was simply a prohibition
: to carry on the washing and ironing of clothes in pub-
lic laundries and wash houses, within certain prescribed
limits of the city and county, from 10: :00 at night until
6:00 in the morning of the following day. _ The prohibi-
tion against labor on Sunday is not involved. The
provision is merely a police regulation within the com- .
_ petency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary :
. powers belonging to auon bodies.’’ (Emphasis . sup-
plied. ) 2
Petitioners cite the case of H my v. Bolton, 107 Ga.. rom .
863; 866, 867, 131 S. E. 2d 835, 838, in which an i ordinance
‘ *
«
sf |
G —
of the City of Griffin regulating self-service, coin-operated 2%
_laundries was under consideration (Petitioners’ Brief, pp..
16-17). As indicated in the quotation set forth, ‘‘conditions
_ may vary in different communities and circumstances sur-
rounding such an operation may be completely harmless in
one city or area and a crime breeding spot in. another.’’
The Georgia ene cites the Schact opinion as an example ©
of the latter type of case. It is respectfully suggested that
- the problems of cities the size of New York and Chicago —
may aiid do differ from a cecceneciied the size of the City
‘of Griffin.
Petitioners also rely upon language appearing in Van
- Sciver v. Zonitg Board. of Adjustment, 396 Pa. 646, 656,
657, 152 A. 2d 717, 723, 724. A careful examination of that
opinion, however, reveals that the court there considered a
question relating to an application for a variation under
the Philadelphia zoning ordinance, under which the Zoning
Board imposed the restrictions at issue there. Absent the
issue of validity of the comprehensive regulation which is
specifically related to the operations of self-service, coin-
operated laundries, such as the Chicago provisions, and
- absent evidence directly related to those issues as-is present
in the instant case, the quotation set forth by petitioners i is
obiter dictum. ‘J
The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court herein is.
correct, being well supported by the facts in the record
and by law, and being in consonance with an opinion in-
volving a city the size of New York, which is faced with
similar problems, and the petition for writ of certiorari
should be denied. |
2
Conclusion.
The ordinance in the instant case reveals a distinct and
- legitimate legislative purpose designed to meet actual and
impending problems relating to self-service, coin-operated
laundfies. It is neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor an
illusory pretensé. That petitioners deem themselves .the
only parties damaged by reason of the continuing incidents
requiring exercise of the police ‘ power must not be per- °
‘mitted to restrain the City of Chicago from fulfilling a
higher duty whieh it owes to the entire community. It is
fundamental that criminal activities such as are herein in-
‘volved are wrongs committed against society, not merely
the person whose rights of property may have been in-
vaded, and laws designed to prevent such criminal activi-
ties“are for the protection of the general: public. If per-
mitted to continue, successful criminal activity invites imi- -
tation, repetition and escalation.
Petitioners fail to show. that the opinion of the Illinois—
Supreme Court is in. conflict »with applicable decisions of
this.Court or has decided any Federal question in a way
so as to conflict with important’ questions of Federal law
determined by this Court. — .
Wherefore, respondents respectfully pray that the ,peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Hlinois
_be denied. | eu
aw
Respectfully submitted,
Raymonp F. Simon,
_ Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago,
511 City Hall, Chicago, Illinois 60602,
: | Attorney for Respondent.
> Sypyney R. Dresin, -— ay eee ‘:
Auten Harrmay, :* ee
Assistant Corporation Couns&,
Of Counsel.
sd
i 0-1 Dn ately aligns
*.
APPENDIX A.
‘Provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1965, ch. 24), insofar as they relate ‘to the issues of this
case, are as follows: | a
1-2-1. Ordinances and rules to execute powers—Limita-
' tions on punishments, ae :
§-1-2-1. ‘The corporate authorities of each municipality ~
may pass all ordinances and make all rules and regulations
proper or necessary, to carry into effect the powers granted
to municipdlities, with such fines or penalties as may be
deemed proper. 3 :
11-1-1.. Police ordinances, — ‘tain ie aeeeter _——<$<——
§ 1-1-1. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may pass and enforce all necessary. police ordinances,
§ 11-5-2. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may prevént or suppress riots, reuts, affrays, noises, dis-
tutbantes and disorderly assemblies. in any public or
private place. aS
-* : 115.2. Riots and disturbances.
‘11-82. Fire hazards
- § 11-8-2. The corporate authorities of each municipality as
may prevent the dangerous construction, installation and
“condition of chimneys, fireplaces, hearths, stoves, furnaces,
pipes, ovens, boilers, fuel conduits, electric wiring and any
other fire or heating apparatus used in and about any
building, -structure,,. . . and, if such enumerated are in
dangerous condition may. cause them to be removed or
placed in a safe condition. y/
RR Dn wn > emmy ane + -
-11- 16.1 Board: of health. meaty
ii
§ 11-16-1. The corporate authorities of each dcichpality
may provide for and maintain a board of health, consisting
of more men one person, and to preeene its powers and
- duties, .
'11-20-5. Promotion of health,
_ §11-20-5. The corporate authorities of each municipality .
may do all acts and make all regulations which may be ,
necessary or expedient for the premotion of health or the.
suppression of diseases, including the regulation of plumb-
ing and the fixtures, materials, design and installation meth- ©
ods of plumbing systems subject to the — ‘of the — —
‘-Tilinois Plumbing Code Law... .
11-30-4. Construction of buildings and fire escapes. ,
§ 11-30-4. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may prescribe the strength and manner of constructing all
buildings, structures and their. accessories scar of the con-
struction of fire escapes, thereon.
11-42-8. ee a eae use: trailers
Cabins—Tents—Laundries—Bathing béaches..
-§ 11-42-8. The corporate authorities of each municipality
may locate and regulate the use and construction of .
laundries. ee ;
11-60-1. Issuance and revocation of licenses.
§1-60:1. .The corporate authorities-of each municipality .
may fix the amount, terms, and manner of issuing and ‘re-
voking licenses.
> ili
APPENDIX B.
Sections 145-24. 1 through 145-24.6 of the Municipal Code
of Chicago, adopted on July 28,4961, are as follows: )
ee
__Be e It Ordained by the Caty Council of the City of Chicago: ,
Section. 1. Chapter 145 of the Municipal Code of Chi-
cago entitled ‘‘Laundries and Laundry “Vehicles” is
amended by inserting the following new sections i in their
- proper numerical sequence :
Self-Service Coin-Operated Laultitey Establishments ;
| 145-24.1. Compliance.) Laundry establishments :
‘commonly known as-self-service ‘coin-operated ‘shall
comply with section 81-7, the general applicable -pro- . —
visions of chapter 99, and ‘the provisions of the ee
Zoning Ordinance.
145-242. Attendant. ) There shall be pour in.
every ‘self-service coin-operated establishment of this
type.an attendant between the hours .of 6: :00 P .-M. and
11:30 P.M.
” 145-24.3. Certificate of fitnese:) . person shall
- act as an attendant in any such laundry establishment, _
unless he shall be the holder ofa certificate of fitness ©
issued by the division marshal in charge of the bureau
of fire prevention and the’commissioner of health. Be-
fore the issuance of any such certificate, the division
marshal in charge of the bureau of fire prevention
- and the commissioner of health shall ‘examine the
applicant as to his qualifications to fill such position.
_ To receive a certificate of fithess the applicant must:
(a) be a citizen: of the United States ;
(b) be of. legal age; temperate habits and good
moral character ;
Se
(c) be able to speak a understand the English
language; = . \
(d) produce evidence of his employinésit or occu-
pation and residence for the previous 2 years;
(e) be familiar with the operation of the machines
-in the establishment ; and |
(f) be familiar with risks incident to .the-opera; |
tion of the machines. and capable of nee,
'__ the necessary precautions,
The annual fee for the “issuance ‘or renewal of any
such certificate shall be twelve dollars and shall bé paid
to the city collector.
Where a self-service coin-operated dry cleaning
establishment and a self-service coin-operated Jaundry.
establishment are operated on the same premises only :
-one attendant, who is the holder of a certificate of fit- _
- ness issued pursuant to section 121-13.3 of this code, .
‘Shall be required. ~- ° :
145-24.4. Plans.) ° Any pains establishing a laun-
dry of the coin-operated self-service type shall be re-
quired to submit to the commissioner ef buildings ‘for
fai appsciiel a complete set of plans and specifications |
-of the. building in which such establishment is to be
located and also a complete diagram of the floor plan :
of each room to be occupied by such establishment, -
showing the arrangement or setting of -all machinery
and equipment to be installed therein. Each.such plan
shalt be éxplicit and complete.
145-24.5. Hours of operation. ) No jativemaiatea |
self-service laundry now or. hereafter established shall
be operated between the hours of 11:30 P.M. and 6:30 —
°° |
145-24.6. Fees.) The anual license fee for each
self-service coin-operated laundry establishment is
hereby fixed as follows: $150.00 for each establishment
- having fifteen or less self-service °coin-operated ma-
chines and $5.00 for each machine in excess of Sfteen
machines maintained upon the premises. ©
oe
Vv
iin 2. The last paragraph i in Section 145-4 is here-
by repealed.
- SEcTION 2 This ordinance shall’ become effective Sep- .
tember 1, 1961;-provided, however, that persons’ licensed
prior to’ that date shall not be required to pay any further
fee for the year 1961 and persons licensed subsequent to ¢
‘effective date hereof ‘shall pay one-third of the fees pre-
scribed herein for the balance of the year 1961, —
Amendments to Section 145- 24.3 and 145-24.4, adopted
April 17, 1964, areasfollows: = - ;
Bel t Ordained by the City Council of the City of Didddige: :
Section 1. Section 145-24.3 of the Municipal Code of
Chicago is: amended by striking out subparagraphs (a), -
{b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) and a? in lieu hess
the following:
(a) be of legal age, temperate habits and good moral
character ;
(b) be able to speak and understand the English
'* Janguage; -
ve (c) produce, evidence of his employment | or. occupation
and residence for the previous 2 years; _ |
(d) be familiar. with the operations of the machines
in the establishment; and YY
(e) be familiar with r ish incident to the operation
‘of the machines ari — of oe saa neces-
sary precautions. | a ,
- Also by striking, out the sentence following said group of
subparagraphs and substituting therefor the following:
_ Upon compliance with the above and payment to the
““City Collector of an annual’ fee of $12.00 for the is-
suance or renewal of any such certificate, such certifi-
_cate shall be issued to the applicant. |
4
vi
ictiiain 2. Section 145-24. 4 of said Code i is amended to ‘
read as follows:
| ‘Any person establishing a laundry of the raat
wet _ self-service type shall be required. to submit to the —
es commissioner of buildings for his approval a complete
set of plans and specifications and a complete diagram
. of the floor plan of each room to be occupied by such
ee ' establishment, showing the arrangement or setting of.
ae | | machinery and-equipment to be installed therein.
___Each such plan shall. be explicit and complete.
x Section 3. This ordinance ‘shall become effective upon - iB;
its passage and due publication. ;
ee
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.