Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc.

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Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

DEC S 1965

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1965

2 No. 806 1

CLARK MARINE CORPORATION,

| Petitioner,

versus

%

CARGILL, INC., CARGO CARRIERS, INC.,

LLOYD GRAVING AND TOM BETTS,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BENTON & MOSELEY

114 St. Louis Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Dopp, HIRSCH, BARKER, AVANT & WALL

429 Government Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Attorneys for Petitioner

Franklin Press, Inc. «ge Baton Rouge. La.

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

J 00 2

,s ̃ Ä—I—.ꝛꝛññ ̃ ̃ ̃̃ 2

„ . 2

, 4

. „ ciccceinccccnasscensinnscotcesnnsensassianeiis 4

REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT 17

[ — ¶ ¶ ¶ů ů — 37

INDEX TO APPENDICES

JUDGMENT BELOW WD... Appendix A 39

OPINION BELOW WW „ Appendix B 58

ORDER DENYING REHEARING .......... wae Appendix C 59

AUTHORITIES CITED ©

CASES

Page

United Exhibitors v. Twentieth Century Fox Film

Dist. Corp. (DC Pa.), 31 F. Supp. 318 3, 18, 21

United States v. Griffith, 68 S.Ct. 941, 334 U.S. 100 ........ 28

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 Fed.

D J.... 30

Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 233 Fed.

r 3, 18, 22

Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods

Corp., No. 422, October term, 1964, cited 85 S.Ct.

% 3, 32, 34, 35

OTHER AUTHORITIES N

Toulmin’s Anti- Trust Laws, Vol. 6, Chapters 3, pages

76 through 103; page 963

United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Com-

pany, 67 F. Supp. 636, affirmed (Ca 7) 173 F. 2d

79

.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir. 148

Fed. 2d 416, 432

United States v. Patten, 226 U. S., Page 543, 33 S. Ct.

Page 145, 57 L. Ed. 333, 44 L. R. S., N.S. 325

—— — ee

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1965

CLARK MARINE CORPORATION,

| Petitioner,

versus

CARGILL, INC., CARGO CARR'ERS, INC.,

LLOYD GRAVING AND TOM BETTS,

2

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES GOURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT |

The petitioner, Clark Marine Corporation, a corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana, and at

all times during the trial of this case and at the present time

in bankruptcy with the Referee in Bankruptcy in the Eastern

District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge Division, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered

May 7, 1965, sustaining the final judgment of the United

1

Respondents.

2

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,

Baton Rouge Division, dismissing plaintiff's action filed under

the Sherman Anti-trust Act.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the District Court is cited,

Clark Marine Corporation v. Cargill, 226 F. Supp. 103, ‘and

is Set out in full in Appendix 1-A, infra. The per curiam of

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which adopted the opinion

of the lower court is cited in 345 Fed. (2) 103, and is set out

in full in Appendix B, Page 58, infra.

JURISDICTION |

This action was brought under the Sherman Anti-trust

Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, 12 and 15, and was timely appealed from

the District Court to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals after

final judgment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirm-

ing the lower Court’s decision and was rendered May 7, 1965.

An extension of time in which to file an application for

rehearing was granted until June 28, 1965, as per order dated

May 17, 1965, and an additional forty days extension was

granted through August 9, 1965, by order dated June 14,

1965; and an additional extension was granted to September 1,

1965; on September 14, 1965, the Court entered an order

denying the petition for rehearing. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.A. 1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The following questions are presented by the present

application: . ö

9

3

(1) Does a bankrupt corporation have a different cri-

teria to meet in proving a violation under the Sherman Anti-

trust Act from that criteria which is applied to non-bankrupt

petitioners, and in this regard clarification as to an apparent

conflict should be given by this Court as between this Court’s

opinion in Buckeye Powder Co. u. Dupont Powder Co., 233

Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 3, 1915), affirmed 248 U. S. 55 (1918), and the

doctrine laid down in United Exhibitors v. Twentieth Century

Fox Distributors Corporation, 31 Fed. Supp. 316.

(2) Did the Court of Appeals’ error by improperly ap-

plying the existing principles under the law as to what con-

stitutes a‘ violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act in this

case, basing<such an analysis on the lower court's findings

of fact and stated positions on the evidence presented, specific

emphasis being placed on the vertical integrated nature of

the defendant companies that inherently create monopolistic

opportunities.

*

(3) Did the Court of Appeals’ error in sustaining the

lower court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff on rebuttal to enter

into an examination of the marine operation that succeeded

petitioner’s bankrupt corporation in every respect, and thus

rebut the contentions of the defendant that the motives of the

customers to this industry in choosing their local service was

governed by price, quality, service, capital structures and

location but rather by hoped for reciprocity, said position of

the Court of Appeals and lower court being contrary to the

principle set out by this Court’s recent opinion in the case

of Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,

No. 422, October term, 1964, cited 85 S. Ct. 1220.

(4) Did the Court of Appeals substantially err in accept-

4

ing the conclusion of the lower court that Cargo Carriers,

Inc., obtained a complete dominance of the fleeting and har-

bor towing business in the Baton Rouge Port as to grain barges

because of superior service and management on the part of

the said Cargo Carriers, Inc.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statute involved in this action is the Sherman Anti-

trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, et seq., the pertinent text of which

is set forth in Appendix C, Page 60, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action seeking damages under the Federal

Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, et seq. Complainant is Clark

Marine Corporation, a Louisiana corporation presen ly in bank-

ruptcy, and the defendants are Cargill, Inc., a Delaware Cor-

poration, and Cargo Carriers, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary

corporation of Cargill, Inc., Mr. Lloyd Graving, the Baton

Rouge manager of Cargill, Inc., and Mr. Tom Betts, the Baton

Rouge manager of Cargo Carriers, Inc. The complaint alleged

that these four conspired to monopolize all of the docking,

fleeting and switching and repair services in the Baton Rouge

Port. 2

In order to properly understand the matters pertaining

to this application, it is felt that it is absolutely necessary

to review definitions with which the court might not be fami-

liar, before reviewing the undisputed chronziogical history

of the events leading up to and including the alleged viola-

res- e- eee ae ee or ee

tions of both sides on certain facts.

5

The industry that is the subject of this action is the

local fleeting and harbor towing services, and related bene-

fits, above water repairs and cleaning of barges in the Baton

Rouge Port. Fleeting and harbor towing, as such, was describ-

ed by the Court in its Findings of Fact (Tr. 1019, Appendix

A, p. 42), as follows:

“As these large tows (referring to river boats that are

pushing a number of barges in the fashion familiar on

the Mississippi River) reached the port areas (point

of destination of some of the barges in the tow), it is

obvious that they could not be simultaneously unloaded

into the elevator. (Grain elevator.) Consequently, it was

neccessary to ‘park’ these barges while awaiting their turn

for unloading. Consequently, an area convenient to the

elevator. had to be provided for a sort of parking place

for these barges. This area is referred to as a ‘fleet,’ and

because of the fact that these large towboats were rather

unwieldly, they were not suitable for ‘switching’ or mov-

ing the barges out of their tow and into the fleet. Con-

sequently smaller harbor towboats are used t6 ‘switch’

the barges from the tow to the fleet, and later from the

fleet to another town for return to its point of departure

or elsewhere. Ordinarily, the owner or operator of the

‘fleet’ charges.a certain rates per day to owner of

the barge for each day that the barge in the

‘fleet,’ and the owner of the switching boat charges either

a per hour fee or a per switch fee for switching a barge

in or out of the fleet. Also, it is not always practical to

unload the barges in the order in which they arrive at

the port because of the fact that it is necessary for the

elevator to mix and blend different kinds of grain in order

to fill certain orders, and consequently, they must take

the grain from the barge which is carrying the particular

type of grain needed for the mixing and blending then

in process.” (Comments in parentheses ours.)

6

‘

Fleeting and switching operators also as a natural out-

growth of that service, offered repairs that could be made to

barges not requiring a dry dock, as well as cleaning the

barges after they had been emptied. In the case of grain bar-

ges, this meant removing the loose grain still remaining.

(Tr. 131, 298) *

The Court understood (Tr. 1021, Appendix A), that

these auxiliary businesses were not to be considered as busi-

nesses in which the defendants intended to monopolize; that

only the fleeting and switching of grain barges were at issue.

Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to this, but did not intend for the

Court to ignore those activities which are the natural dividends

of a fleeting and switching business.

*

History of Industry in Port: Before 1955, the Port of Bat-

on Rouge was largely oriented to the petro-chemical industry

that was generally located north of the City of Baton Rouge,

along the east bank of the Mississippi River. At that time, two

companies offered services to the marine industry, that is,

the carriers who towed into and through the Baton Rouge

Port on the Mississippi River. One was Baton Rouge Coal &

- Towing Company, an old company owned by members of one

family, that of J. C. Werner, Jr., one of the witnesses‘ for

plaintiff during this trial. This company was primarily engaged

in the general towing business on the Mississippi River

(Tr. 64, 110), as well as offering the only limited general

fleeting area open to the public. The other company was

owned by Mr. Kenneth E. Hutton, and offered groceries and

supplies to the tugboats that plied their trade through the

Baton Rouge Port. Mr. Hutton also appeared as a witness for

plaintiff in this action, and also has an action pending the

outcome of this case under the Sherman Anti-trust Act. There

—

—

7

were other fleeting areas, but privately owned for the use

of their own equipment, Esso Standard Oil having such an

area (Tr. 94). The fleeting and harbor towing business was

admittedly a very limited activity in the Baton Rouge Port

at that time (Tr. 65, 66, 115, 268).

The Baton Rouge Port Commission, subsequent to the

year 1955, in an effort to increase the growth of the Port,

voted sufficient municipal bonds to finance the construction

of a general cargo dock facility, a grain elevator and dock

facility and a barge terminal. It was hoped by building these

facilities to increase international trade into the Port, since

the Baton Rouge Port is a so-called deep water port, avail-

able to oceangoing vessels. The barge terminal dock was

located in the northern part of the harbor 6n what is referred

to throughout the trial as the “Devil Swamp Canal,” the

same site of Plaintiff Clark Marine’s first operation. In the

center of the harbor, some five miles from the Devil Swamp

Canal, was located the general cargo dock and the grain eleva-

tor, both of these docks being available for deep water, as

well as barge traffic. (See defendants’ Exhibits 1, 2, and 3,

for a complete picture of the locations of, these various dock

facilities.)

The grain eleyator was initially constructed to house 2.5

million bushels of grain as of the date it opened in 1955.

Upon its completion, the dock and elevator were turned over

to the Cargill Company on a long-term lease-basis. (Court's

Finding, Tr. 1020, Appendix A, p. 42).

© 2

Cargill, Inc. is a huge corporation principally engaged

in the buying and selling of various types of grains and other

bulk commodities and through subsidiaries, it engages in sev-

OO a ee

: 8

eral other businesses, usually of a related nature, such as

stevedoring, towing, fuel sales, fleeting, etc. It utilized the

elevator at the time it opened, as it has throughout all of the

times pertinent to and considered in the trial, as a point of

assembly of grains for international shipment. This grain

was collected principally from its many elevators operated

throughout the northern portion of,the Mississippi River sys-

tem, including all of the navigable cennecting rivers of the

Mississippi River, as well as elevators in areas not accessible

by water, but by rail. After arrival in the port, the grains

are blended and placed upon oceangoing vessels for interna-

tional delivery, as ordered. (See Court's Findings, 1018, Ap-

pendix A, p. 42).

The elevator was and is now and Has continued to be the

only grain elevator in the Baton Rouge Port. (Tr. 24)

Cargill, Inc., has a wholly-owned subsidiary known as

Cargo Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as CCI“). This

“company is given the sole responsibility of moving the com-

modities owned or controlled by Cargill, Inc., on the river

system (Tr. 22,585). As such, it operates barges and tow-

boats and, in fact, operates what is believed by them to be

the largest river towboat in the world (Tr. 612). This equip-

ment is available first for the movement of Cargill commodi-

ties, but is also utilized in competing with other river trans-

portation companies in carrying commodities for customers

other than Cargill. CCI could not carry all of the commodi-

ties of Cargill and as a result a large portion (60%—see

Court’s findings Tr. 1018) of such business was contracted

for from the other carriers on the river system, constituting

Cargill as a very large shipper on the river.

*

9

It was admitted by the defendants that CCI personnel, :

in the furtherance of its responsibility to Cargill, also were

directly and solely responsible for the placing of all such

orders for Cargill commodity movements not handled in their

own equipment with the identical towing companies that

constituted most of the customers in the fleeting and towing

business in the Baton Rouge Harbor (Tr. 22). Thus, all

of the carriers of ein “destined for the Cargill elevator,

other than CCI, when given shipping orders were placed

in the position of reciprocation by using the local harbor

towing service of CCI. It was this power to place Cargill

shipping orders which Plaintiff asserts gave CCI the illegal

power of responsibility over these shippers forcing them to

use their local fleeting and harbor services. When Cargill took

possession of the grain elevator facilities in 1955, CCI like-

wise established offices in the Baton Rouge Port, in order to

coordinate the movements of the Port, as well as directly into

the elevator.

As a direct and sole result of the presence of the grain

elevator in the Port, two new operations were created in 1955.

Both of these companies were the outgrowth of the existing

two principal operators in the Port. The first such company

to be created was Louisiana Marine Repairing Service Com-

pany. This company offered fleeting and harbor towing serv-

ices, and utilized boats owned by Baton Rouge Coal & Towing.

Mr. Johnny Jackson was a part-owner of the new company

and apparently the balance was owned by the same owners

of the Baton Rouge Coal & Towing Company, the J. C. Wer-

ner family (Tr. 67, 88, 1021, Appendix A). The second new

fleeting and harbor towing business began with the expansion

of Mr. Kenneth Hutton’s operation to include fleeting and

harbor towing (Tr. 268, 269). The Court, in its Findings of

0

“

a

oe

10

Fact, on Page 1024, Tr., Appendix A, p. 45), found that by

April 1, 1959, the date CCI entered this field with its own

operation besides the two companies named above engaging

in the fleeting business:

“Also a Captain Joe Hightower and a Captain Bert K.

Kleinpeter each had a small boat that was suitable for

switching and was available, when needed, to perform

harbor work.”

It is not seriously disputed that the grain business in the

Baton Rouge Port was the principal commodity that governed

the fate of the fleeting and harbor towing business. Finding

of the Court (Tr. 1020, Appendix A, p. 41). The evidence

showed that of the remaining non-grain barges, relatively few

were available to fleeting operators offering a public fleeting

area (Tr. 90, 115).

In 1959, the elevator’s capacity was increased from 2.5

million bushels of grain to 7.7 million bushels of grain, said

project again being financed by public funds in conjunction

with lease agreement with Cargill, Inc. During the same time

and partially because of the increase in capacity of the eleva-

tor, CCI contemplated entering into the fleeting and switch-

ing business and submitted a request for permission from

Cargill to allow them to establish such an operation in the

Baton Rouge Port, not only for barges that it owned or directly

controlled, but likewise for any other companies, who wishes

to utilize such services in the Baton Rouge Port. (Tr. 739,

Exhibits P-14, P16.) Pp

The Court found as a matter of fact that approximately

thirty-five (35%) per cent of the grain received by Cargill,

Inc., to the elevator moved to the elevator by railroad car

\ 11

and that the remaining sixty-five (65%) per cent of the

grain received moved into the port area and into the elevator

by river barge. Of the sixty-five (65%) per cent of the grain

moving in barges owned and managed by CCI, approximately

30% to 40% was carried by CCI. The Court actually found

40% (Tr. 1018, Appendix A, p. 41), but defendant, Mr. Lloyd

Graving, in his testimony, estimated 30% to 40% (Tr. 546).

The*Court also noted that some 115 million bushels of

grain were recorded as having turned over after the increase

of the elevator during one year’s period. These undisputed

findings thus show some 42 million bushels of grain, more

or less, shipped into the Cargill elevator by companies other

than CCI, after the increase in capacity of the elevator. It

was a portion of this business that CCI felt it could get in

order to insure a profitable operation in the Baton Rouge

Port. (See plaintiff’s Exhibit 14, Tr. 744). It is also this busi-

ness upon which this action is largely based.

Before granting permission to CCI to enter the said

fleeting and towing business, Cargill required CCI tb nego-

tiate with the Baton Rouge Port Commission as to whether

or not it intended to enter the fleeting and harbor towing

business, basing the request solely on what they considered

very poor service then being given by the existing companies

(Tr. 741). The Commission indicated it had no such intention

(Tr. 1023, Appendix A, p. 45). CCI, therefore, received permis-

sion from Cargill, Inc., to start its own business: Accordingly,

a form letter was mailed to prospective customer towing com-

panies under the signature of Captain Donald S. Wright, the

then operations head of CCI (See Exhibit P-16), dated Feb-

ruary 4, 1959, announcing the opening of the new fleeting

service as of April 1, 1959. Other solicitations were made

eA eA UG e

0

12

by certain other employees of CCI. These solicitations were

not limited to grain fleeting only. Exactly who did the solicit-

ing is somewhat at issue.

Regardless of the question of who did solicit business,

there is no dispute as to the fact that solicitation was carried

out and continued to be carried out by the defendant, CCI,

by personal contact and letter, and that. this same company,

CCI, was solely responsible for the issuance of all of the

excess towing contracts to all of the customers who carried

grain, of their fleeting and harbor towing business in the

Baton Rouge Port.

It is reiterated that it was Clark Marine's position that

it was this particular known combination of authority to give

towing contracts that makes it impossible to ever directly

compete in a free market with CCI for services to be ren-

dered these same towing companies in Baton Rouge who

receive these contracts, even in the absence of any threats

that they will lose this business if they do not use such local

service (See Reasons for Writs No. 2).

Regardless of how solicitations were carried out, it is

undisputed that within a very short time, all of the grain-

carrying barges in the Port were fleeted and switched by

CCI, and continued to be fleeted, except for an occasional

barge in the fleet of the Baton Rouge Coal & Towing until

Clark Marine obtained some business in October, 1961. The

actual takeover initially took from thirty to sixty days (See

Tr. 71, 76, 279, 393, and Judge’s Finding [Tr. 1034, Appen-

dix Al, also Exhibit P-18.) It is also undisputed that Ken-

neth L. Hutton, as well as Louisiana Marine filed bankruptcy

proceedings after each lost his portion of the graiff business

13

(Tr. 77, 88). Kenneth L. Hutton subsequently filed an anti-

trust suit similar to the instant case against Cargill and CCI.

said action still pending the outcome of this case (Tr. 315).

Captain Kleinpeter and Captain Hightower likewise left the

Port (Tr. 314).

The Court found nothing unusual about this remarkable

success, and held that it was the result of good management

and the rendering of better service (Tr. 1026, Appendix A,

p. 53). Later the Court noted again that CCI (Tr. 1034,

Appendix A, p. 53):

did acquire practically all of the fleeting and switch-

Re business in the Port of Baton Rouge insofar as grain

barges are concerned.”

After approximately the first month’s operation by CCI

of its new fleet, the evidence is ‘uncontested that the vessel

used for the switching of their fleet was chartered from

Baton Rouge Coal & Towing on a full found basis (Tr. 72),

subject to the direct supervision of the CCI office, and using

the same crews used by Louisiana Marine Repairing Service

in its switching operation (Tr. 73). Thus, the sole remain-

ing so-called competitor of CCI, until the appearance of Clark

Marine’s operation in the harbor, also furnished the vessel

and extra vessels used to handle all of the fleeting moves in

the CCI operation, solely for the CCI fleet to the obvious

exclusion of Baton Rouge Coal & Towing, using the same crews

and equipment supposedly previously guilty of rendering poor

service (Tr. 85, et seq).

CCI established, in the use of their fleeting boat during

all times pertinent to this action, a standing instruction which

established a priority for use of their harbor boat. This priority

“>

14

placed the grain elevator’s needs first, CCI’s tows second, other

‘customer large line tows third, and so on. (See Exhibit P-12,

Betts Tr. 403.) If furthen boats were needed, they were to

be called, if one could be found, as needed, but only one full

time boat was kept by CCI’s — (See Betts, Tr. 414;

J. Smith, Tr. 463.)

CCI continued to operate the sole grain fleeting and

switching business until the appearance o Clark Marine in

January of 1961. (Defendant, Tom Betts, Tr. 393).

It is undisputed that in March, 1961, Clark Marine pur-

chased’ a towboat and began offering harbor towing and

switching services, as well as fleeting areas at its location,

immediately adjacent to the Baton Rouge barge canal terminal

in the Devil Swamp area. In conjunction with the offering

of the services of fleeting and harbor towing by Clark Marine,

a steam cleaning and general repair service had previously

been introduced, said steam cleaning and repair business being

offered on all types of barges from its opening date of January

of 1961. It is during the period of time between March of

1961 and September of 1961, before Clark Marine ak

moved its operation to the center of the harbor immedia

across from the CCI operation that Clark Marine alleges tha

- they were completely blocked by the defendants from receiv-

ing any harbor towing, except that which CCI itself dis-

patched to it, and also any fleeting of barges. During this

period of time, it is undisputed that Clark Marine had no

fleeting business of barges whatsoever (Tr. Clark, 157, Gar-

ner, 362), even though it was immediately adjacent to the

Baton Rouge barge canal dock where some two hundred

eighty-nine barges, more or less, were docked during the year

1961.. (See Exhibit P-11.)

5

*

a

a

1 ie

15

The Court adopted defendants’ explanation of the lack

of business and held that during this period Clark Marine,

because of its location, was not in competition with CCI’s

operation, a conclusion vigorously disputed in this writ, espe-

cially as to towing in the harbor which, of course, is free to

operate wherever the river flows. It was established by testi-

mony and exhibits also in a fashion undisputed thet Clark

Marine’s only harbor ‘switching during its stay in the Devil

Swamp Canal came with the direct authority of CCI’s dis-

patching office, when extra services were needed, and that

invoices for such services went to only CCI, and not to the

customers for whom the,work was performed. (See Defend-

ts’ Exhibits 100, 101, 102, O. V. Smith, Tr. 339, Garner, Tr.

pon It is further shown by the superintendent of pilots for

CCI, Captain John Smith’s undisputed testimony, that Clark

Marine was considered a competitor at all times it was in

existence by him and defendant Betts. (Tr. 463, et seq.)

Clark Marine opened its operation at what 4s termed

“Red Dog Landing” at the center of the Port, adjacent to and

across from CCI, on September 7, 1961 (Court’s Findings,

1030, Appendix A, p. 49). On September 15, an order was

issued prohibiting the Clark Marine vessel from docking barges

at the elevator. “On September 16th, the order was rescinded.

(See answer to plaintiff’s Interrogatories, No. 24.) On Sep-

tember 22nd, Clark Marine called upon officers of Cargill in

both Minneapolis, St. Paul, as well as in Baton Rouge, and

accused them of preventing Clark Marine from receiving any

business in the Baton Rouge Port, and further stating, through

its representative, that some barge lines were afraid to use

their services, even though they had indicated an interest to do

so. (See defendant, Graving, Tr. 561, and Clark, Tr. 167.)

After assurances that Cargill did not have such a policy, an

16

attempted meeting of the barge lines with Cargill was set up

to assure the said towing companies on this point, but Cargill

and one barge company refused to take part. (Defendant

Graving, Tr. 566, 567). After these conferences, Mr. Heinin-

ger, very able chief counsel for Cargill in this trial, was

retained to protect Cargill’s position in the Port (Tr. Heininger

492). After this attempted effort, Clark Marine did begin to

receive most of the harbor towing and fleeting business of

American Commercial and Mississippi Valley Barge Lines

and business from CCI itself. This business was not actually

received until the latter part of October, 1961. (See plaintiff's

Exhibt 24, which shows defendant’s own computation of plain-

tiff’s fleeting income; also Garner, Tr. 359, Clark, 167.) Clark

Marine, thereafter, experienced some increase in business on

all fronts, although not increasing its number of grain-carrying

customers, but not enough to avoid bankruptcy in July of

1962.

Clark Marine filed a petition under Chapter X of the

Bankruptcy Act in an effort to reorganize and refinance its

operation on May 25, 1962, said action having the effect of

actually placing the company in the hands of the district judge,

G. Gordon West, who ultimately was the trial judge in this

action. Judge West under authority of said reorganization

actually operated the company until on his own motion he

placed the company in bankruptcy on July 11, 1962. Shortly

before the actual trial commenced the jury was waived by

> joint motion for both parties. The court then on its own mo-

tion split the issues limiting the first trial to the question

of whether or not the defendants had in fact violated the

Sherman Anti-trust Act, with the question of damages to be

raised later if a violation was found.

1 17

4

It has been the contention of Clark Marine that the

alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act first resulted

when CCI went into the fleeting and harbor towing business

and created a complete monopoly within the Port after April

1, 1959, and that this monopoly, in the form of a continuing

violation, was directly felt by the said corporation during the

period of time between March of 1961 and October of 1961,

and continued thereafter even though not as abusive as prior

to that date, te e ee

through the date of trial.

It was defendant’s principal contention that in order to

prove a violation of the Anti-trust Act Clark Marine had to

show it was properly capitalized, the desired business was

profitable; that Clark Marine used good business judgment

and that the bankruptcy resulted from the said violation; that

the defendants actually made no threats of withdrawing

contracts for towing, or giving contracts if their local services

were not used; and finally that the success that resulted in

the actual dominance of the fleeting and switching business

was the natural outgrowth of good management and superior

service on their part.

The Court ruled in the defendants’ favor on all points.

REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE

OF WRIT

1. Does a bankrupt corporation have a different criteria

to meet in proving a violation under the Sherman Anti-trust ;

Act from that criteria which.is applied to non-bankrupt peti-

tioners, and in this regard clarification as to an apparent

conflict of law should be given by this Court as between this

«>

—

18

Court’s opinion in Buckeye Powder Company v. DuPont

Powder Co., 233 Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 3, 1915), affirmed 248 U. S.

55 (1918), and the doctrine set out in United Exhibitors v.

Twentieth Century Fox Distributors Corporation, 31 Fed.

Supp. 316.

Stating the proposition another way:

Does a bankrupt plaintiff in proving a violation of the

Sherman Anti-trust Act with the question of quantum re-

moved by the Court’s splitting of the issues for purposes of

trial have to establish as the elements of such an action the

following facts: 7

(1) That the business in question be considered com-

pletely separate and apart from other related businesses and

in this manner make a showing of potential profit to the

plaintiff had the plaintiff been successful in obtaining business

in the absence of a violation of the Anti-trust Act.

(1) That the plaintiff be required to prove that it was a

properly capitalized corporation at all times pertinent to the

trial of the case.

(33 That a plaintiff in bankruptcy be required to prove

its bankruptcy was caused principally as a result of the viola-

tion.

(4) That the management of the plaintiff’s operations

were prudent and wise.

_ This case presents an unusually clear opportunity for this

court to determine one way or the other precisely how much

a bankrupt plaintiff’s internal problems have to do with the

5

19

proof of the violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by its

comipetitors illegal activities even though such internal prob-

lems have no connection with such activities. This is made

clearly possible here by the lower court’s splitting the issues

on its own motion just prior to the trial of this case. The

Court’s stated purpose in doing this was to eliminate any con-

sideration of evidence that did not bear directly on the ques-

tion.of the existence of activities on the part of the defendants

toward the plaintiff that would constitute a violation of the

act. The question of the relative merits of the actual services

rendered by the plaintiff as compared to defendants is not an

issue in this regard since plaintiff. obtained no business at

all for a major portion of its existence, and then when it did,

no question was raised as to their competency since their

two customers did not leave them.

The next obvious question is whether or not such a deter-

mination is of sufficient far- reaching importance to be con-

sidered by this Court in its already overburdened workload.

We take the position that it is for several reasons. (1) The

authorities on this point appear to be in hopeless conflict or

at least to apply separate criteria to plaintiffs that are bank-

rupt from those that are not. It is our position that such a

position is unjustified under the Act and prejudicial to bank-

rupts and should not be allowed to continue; (2) if the lower

court’s opinion is allowed to remain unchanged and uncom-

mented on, it would have the effect of defeating the purpose

of the Act by making the successful prosecution of actions of

this kind by bankrupts a virtual impossibility because of the

resulting unrelated burdens of proof added and prejudicial

nature of such burdens; (3) in the instant case the rights of

the plaintiff have been greatly injured under the circumstances

5 4

2

20

and the actual trial and judgment and this injustice should

be rectified.

Contrary to the trial court’s original reason for splitting

the issues it did allow the defendants full range in attempting

to examine plaintiff’s financial problems. A review of this

record will show that a vast majority of the defendants

exhibits (which exceed one hundred in number), and a great

portion of the testimony presented by the defendants in defense

of this action addresses itself solely to the financial condi-

tion and management decisions of the plaintiff, all of which

could have no bearing on the defendant’s activities. These mat-

ters all came in under objection of plaintiff as being incon-

sistent with the court’s splitting of the issues. These objec-

tions were made in the conference which immediately pre- /

‘ceded the trial when the defendants’ proposed introduction

of this evidence was made known to the judge and also dur-

ing the trial (Tr. 718) when appropriate. The Court allowed

all evidence presented under this heading to be introduced .

into the record and repeatedly stated that he would consider

only that which was pertinent to the issue before the court

and give no consideration to evidence on the question of quan-

tum. See Tr. 829 as an example.

; 4

To the contrary, a review of the lower court’s findings of

fact and conclusions of law will show that the court discussed

at length its belief that Clark Marine was badly capitalized

and incredibly concluded that it would not have survived even

if it got all the fleeting and harbor towing business in the

port, clearly illustrating the devastating effect this evidence

had on the mind of the judge. This same question had previ-

ously been submitted to the court during extensive motions

for summary judgment which were denied and plaintiff at

21

that time and at all times thereafter relied upon the case of

United Eghibitors v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Distribut-

ing Corporation (D.C. Pa. 31 Fed. Supp. 316; also cited in

Toulmin’s Anti-trust Laws, Vol. 6, page 963). In this case the

Court even where no specific damage was prayed for con-

cluded that where an established conspiracy is shown, nominal

damages can be added to the injunctive relief sought. Thus,

even in the absence of any evidence of actual monetary losses

in the face of an established violation of the Act, this court

would have no difficulty finding a basis for granting relief with

damages.

Relying upon the rationale of this authority, and the

court's stated purpose, when the court split the issues plain-

tiff dismissed witnesses that had been called to testify on

the question of quantum, including some that were out of

state, and otherwise stopped any efforts to prepare to meet

this requirement. It was plaintiff’s repeated stated position

during the trial and one which was never overruled by the trial

court that this was all that was required of it in the con-

sideration of the issue befoté the Court. Why else would the

Court have split issues if he did not mean to limit the evi-

dence.

Admittedly, the question of precisely why Clark Marine

went into bankruptcy has its relative importance in the ulti-

mate determination of this action if a violation was found.

But regardless of what the answer or answers to that ques-

tion might be, it could in no way have had eveh the most

remote influence on the pure issue of whether or not plain-

tiff was injured by the illegal actions of the defendants in the

management of their business affairs. To state it another way,

Clark Marine’s financial structure, be it strong or weak, cer-

*

—— De wat

22

tainly could not have influenced the actions, one way or the

other, of the defendants in its use of monopolistc powers in

violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The only question

left by the court’s splitting of the issues was whether or not

defendants were singularly or jointly guilty of a violation

of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and whether the plaintiff suf-

fered as a result of such illegal actions. How much Clark

suffered is not an issue in the case, if the issues are to be truly

split. Upon splitting the issues in this fashion, the case should

have automatically assumed much the same character of

an action brought by the Federal Government subject only to

the plaintiff showing a right of action by being a competitor

in the business monopolized.

Defendants cite with some merit the case of Buckeye

Powder Company v. DuPont Powder Co., 223 Fed. 881 (C.C.A.

3, 1915), affirmed 248 U.S. 55 (1918). This case, although

not in point of fact, did deal with the admissibility of evidence

of the type considered here as being a portion of the charge

to the jury and was allowed on the basis that the plaintiff’s

motives might be relevant to the question of liability and

that the jury might consider the evidence on the question

whether the plaintiff’s failure was due to the defendant’s

oppression or to the plaintiff’s incapacity.” (248 U.S. at 64).

Here the plaintiff was also a bankrupt company.

Thus it would seem that on the one hand the company

that is not bankrupt need not prove even one dollar’s worth

of loss, just a showing of injury, in some instances, in order

to get not only injunctive relief but a monetary award while

on the other hand the bankrupt must be ready to prove from

the point of hindsight many elements that have no direct

bearing whatsoever on the existence of the violation of the

Anti-trust Act, even being subjected to a motive examination.

DDR nnen 2 *

23

We take the position that this Court should clearly state

that direct damage is all that need be proved in order to

lay the groundwork for proving an action in violation of

the Sherman Anti-trust Act. Next, we take the position that

it is contrary to reason and the intent of the statute to require

proof of profit, arbitrarily, since, as in the instant case, the

service considered was more in the category of a reduction

of an overhead rather than as a pure profitable business.

The very known existence of a monopoly of the kind con-

sidered is sufficient to discourage investors from making even

the usual effort for saving a company otherwise suffering

from financial problems. We take the position that capitaliza-

tion and business judgments have no bearing whatsoever at

this point in a cause of this kind.

4

A bankrupt plaintiff faces monumental problems in these

cases. It is practically impossible for them to retain able coun-

sel with experience in the anti-trust field, the present ease

being ng exception. It is likewise also almost an impossible

problem to raise sufficient funds to properly investigate facts

and to meet the never-ending energetic defenses that a large,

wealthy corporation’s many able counsel can present; again

this case being no exception.

To add to these burdens, the completely extraneous

requirements of explaining and defending every act on the

part of a panicked management faced with probable bank-

ruptcy is to present such a prejudicial, irrelevant and over-

whelming burden as to make the Anti-trust Act meaningless

to such a bankrupt. 2

@

24

2. Did the Court of Appeals’ error by improperly ap-

plying the existing principles under the law as to what con-

stitutes a violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act in this

case, basing such an analysis on the lower court’s findings

of fact and stated positions on the evidence presented, specific

emphasis being placed on the vertical integrated nature of

the defendant companies that inherently create monopolistic

opportunities.

—

—

It is plaintiff’s understanding of the law applicable to

this case that in order for plaintiff to have established a

violation it was required to show that a power of monopoly

or unreasonable restraint of trade in vertically integrated

companies did exist. After the proof of such existing power

is shown, then the plaintiff would be required to show that

a resulting restraint of trade or monopoly affecting the plain-

tiff took place. Upon completion of the proof on these points,

it is plaintiff’s understanding that a violation of the Sherman

Anti-trust Act is then presumed to exist, regardless of the

intent of the parties or the stated purpose for the combina-

tion. +

It is plaintiff’s contention here that the court actually

made findings on basic facts which, when applied to existing

law and reason, require a conclusion that these two defendants,

that is, Cargill and CCI, are in fact violating the Sherman

Anti-trust Act and did violate the said Act during the exist-

ence of Clark Marine Corporation to that company’s detri-

ment.

There is no dispute that Cargill and CCI are vertically

integrated companies, and that CCI, in effect, had the power

to threaten the loss of towing contracts over many of the

25

carriers if it chose to use it, arising out of the dual role

exercised by it in both engaging in the local fleeting service

and placing contracts with customers of that fleeting service

on behalf of Cargill, Inc., for the shipment of all of Cargill

commodities. As a matter of fact, the vertical nature of the

companies and the dual role of CCI are admitted by defendants

in the pre-trial order (Tr. 22). They simply deny ever using

this position to obtain business by the use of threats that

contracts would be withheld or given if the local service was

or was not used, and further deny that they would have been

effective if they were used.

That the contracts and solicitations by CCI for the

handling of fleeting and towing operations generally were

by the same personnel who were authorized to make cargo

contracts with these same customers is, we submit, under the

facts practically the equivalent of a legal conclusion. The

Court does not deal with this point under the findings of Fact

as the Court in its estimate of the legal principles governing

simply disregarded the relevance of this dual role, mani-

festly relying upon the viewpoint as revealed by the Court’s

comments, that unless plaintiff’s could show the intent to

use or the actual use of this dual role conjointly by threats

or promises or some other form of intimidation, no legal

remedy was available to Plaintiff. The feeling of the Court

as to the dual role itself is plainly established in its comments.

These comments were made following the testimony of

Gayle H. Chapman and Captain Bogle Caplener of independ-

ent grain carrier companies dealing with CCI, and filing of

affidavits of other barge line officers in which these gentle-

men stated in effect that when they moved their business to

CCI in 1959, they did so without giving any serious thought

7

as

26 5 —

to the dual capacity of “reciprocity” in the hands of CCI.

(Tr. 666, 667, 846, 847).

Following the evidence, Mr. Avant, for the plaintiff, was

arguing with the Court as to the admissibility of rebuttal

intended to show that these men simply were not telling the

truth about their company’s policies in this regard. We quote

a colloquy between Mr. Avant and the Court from page 875

of the transcript: \

“Mr. Avant: 2

“Your Honor, the purpose in calling Mr. Nelson is

simply this, Mr. Caplener testified, and other_repre-

sentatives of barge lines have testified in this case

by affidavit, in lieu of requiring them to be here,

that they did not consider—Mr. Caplener said they

did not even consider the business that they may do

with Cargill.

“The Court:

> |

“Of course, in that respect, Mr. Avant, that is com-

pletely irrelevant and immaterial. I am sure they

considered it. If they didn’t, they were poor busi-

nessmen, but they have no obligation not to con-

sider it. I am only interested in knowing what Car-

gill and Cargo did to make them feel that they must

do business with them, but I can’t quite conceive

of any barge line not considering the fact that Cargo

is a customer as well as a competitor.” (Emphasis

ours)

Again, on Page 877, the dialogue continues:

“Mr. Avant:

It tends to show that they do have a policy and that

27

they are influenced to a large extent by the fact that

they have business relations.

“The Court:

“I am sure they do. I said they would be mighty

poor businessmen if they didn’t. I think it is com-

pletely irrelevant and immaterial. I am interested

in whether or not there were threats by the defend-

ants against these plaintiffs. I don’t care how much

they considered it. I think it is rather ridiculous to

assume that they did not consider such things.”

(Emphasis ours)

These comments came at the conclusion of the trial and

by this time, both sides had submitted briefs on the law and

argued at length, and the Court was fully informed on the

contentions of each side. Further, it should be noted that

nothing in the finding of the Court rebuts these statements.

(See also like comments by the Court, Tr. 502, 514, 517, 523.)

The fact the Court plainly recognized that any good busi-

nessman would take into account such integrated interests

despite what the witnesses claimed to the contrary serves to

emphasize the deep conflict between the plaintiff and the

Court as to the legal ‘principles governing this case. The

Court simply dismissed the whole business upon the false.

legal premise that although there would be this conjoint

interest (by its very nature economically indivisible) it would

not afford any basis for legal relief unless it were connected

with a threat or a promise or some other form of intimida-

tion.

For the defendants to actually attempt to prove to the

contrary is the recognition by their many able counsel that

the Court was on thin ice legally in ignoring the relevancy

of this point. It is likewise a further indication of the absolute

control exercised by these huge companies over their custom-

ers, in being able to get otherwise responsible businessmen to

make such comments which the Court completely rejected as

“ridiculous” and which the plaintiff rebutted with such ease.

(See Prewitt Nelson’s impeachment of Captain Caplener, Tr.

884, 885.) :

It is plaintiff’s position that the lower courts are appar-

ently completely mistaken concerning the law on the subject

and had they understood the law properly in conjunction with

this clear understanding of the truth of reciprocity, they

would have found a violation of the Act. Plaintiff contends

that the very existence of the dual role obviates the necessity

of a direct threat. If an overt act is needed, then the act of

soliciting for business in Baton Rouge, when combined with

the giving of towing contracts for Cargill commodities, is act

enough.

A case that directly refutes the lower court’s position in

this regard is the landmark case of U. S. v. Griffith, 68 S. Ct.

941, 334 U.S. 100, where buying power as a monopolistic

power was considered in overturning the lower court’s finding

for the defendant of no conspiracy and

“no attempt to compel distributors to grant them privi-

leges not granted their competitors, or which gave them

any substantial authority over their competitors .. .”

(See Page 944.)

The Supreme Court, in ruling a violation of the Act in the

face of this finding of the lower court stated:

“A man with a monopoly of theaters in any one town

29 —

commands the entrance for all films into that area. If

he used that strategic position to acquire exclusive pri-

vileges in a city where he has competitors, he is employ-

ing his monopoly power as a trade weapon against his

competitors. It may be a feeble, ineffective weapon where

he has only one closed or monopoly town. But as those

towns increase in number throughout a region, his mono-

poly power in them may be used with crushing effect on

competitors in other places. He need not be as crass as

the exhibitors in United States v. Crescent Amusement

Co., supra, in order to make his monopoly power effec-

tive in his competitive situations. Though he makes no

threat to withhold the business of his closed or monopoly

towns unless the distributors give him the exclusive film

rights in the towns where he has competitors, the effect

is likely to be the same where the two are joined. When

the buying power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate

films for his compefitive as well as his closed towns, he is

using monopoly power to expand his empire. And even if

we assume he is chargeable in legal contemplation with

that purpose since the end result is the necessary and

direct consequence of what he did. United States v. Pat-

tern, supra, 226 U. S. Page 543, 33 S. Ct. Page 145, 57

~ |

L. Ed. 333, 44, L.R.S., N. S. 325.” (Emphasis ours)

We consider this case governing on the instant case, and

completely parallel,

Notice here no threat was actually found to have been

made by defendant, yet a violation of the Act was found, which

is the very opposite view of that applied by the lower court

in the instant case. The effect of the combination of his

buying power was felt to be present in the negotiations, even

though no mention of.a threat was proved. Why threaten a

potential customer when it is not needed to get hig business?

As to the question of whether a monopoly did result,

30

the Court, in the instant case, found that “practically all of

the fleeting and switching business in the Port of Baton Rouge

insofar as grain barges are concerned. was acquired by

CCI (Tr. 1034, Appendix A, p. 53). We feel justified in adding

that a company with “practically all“ of a certain type of

business is a company that enjoys a monopoly. (See also Tr.

71, 76, 279, and 393.)

*

In discussing a situation not too different from the prob-

lems in the instant case, Judge August Hand in United States

v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 Fed. Sup. 881, on Page 885,

states:

“As further reasons for directing a reconsideration of

the above issues, we were asked to determine whether

the vertical integration of the major defendants, which

was held not to be unlawful per.se, was cofiteived with

an intent to monopolize or was of such a character as to

confer a known monopoly power. If the power be estab-

lished, a specific intent to monopolize need not be shown.

As was said by Justice Douglas in United States v. Grif-

fith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 68. Ct. 941, 944, 92 L. Ed. 1236,

and referred to in United States v. Paramount Pictures,

Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173, 68 S. Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed. 1260:

‘It is, however, not always necessary to find a spécific

intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order

to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is

sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results

the consequence of a defendant’s conduct or business

‘arrangements. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525,

543, 33 S. Ct. 141, 145, 57 L. Ed. 333, 44 L. R. A., N. S.

325; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275,

62 S. Ct. 1070, 1076, 86 L. Ed. 1461. To require a greater

showing would cripple the Act. As stated in United

States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 148 F. 2d

416, 432, ‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what

31

he is doing.’ Specific intent in the sense in which the

common law used the term is necessary only where the

act falls short of the results condemned 7 the Act.’”

(Emphasis ours)

Justice Hand found defendants owned at least 70% of

the first run theaters in 92 cities in the country.

“These figures certainly indicate, when coupled with

the strategic advantages of vertical integration, a power

to exclude competition from thesé markets when desired

If an intent to exercise the power be thought im-

portant, it existed in this case.. (At Page 894.)

Cargill had 100% RTS the Port of Baton Rouge

in the grain-storing business. CCI soon enjoyéd “practically

all” of the fleeting and switching of grain barges. It is sub-

mittecl that the lower Court’s own establish a pat-

tern recognizable as being classically like these well-established

landmark cases.

It is respectfully submitted that from the above authori-

ties the lower court should have considered the inevitable

and proven stifling effect the combination gave to the local

industry in fleeting and harbor towing. THé question that

should be answered was whether or not the combination

- stifled and restricted competition, and the answer, using the

lower court’s own observations, is that insofar as the plain-

tiff, the four operators who were first engaged in this busi-

ness and the present competitors are concerned, all uniformly

are unable to match the ever-tantalizing effect of a hoped

for bonus of more towing contracts as a result of using the

local services of CCI. Thus, from the facts found by the lower

court, a classic case of a violation of the Anti-trust Act is

shown, and the decision is therefore in substantial conflict

with rulings of this Court.

3. Did the Court of Appeals’ error in sustaining the

lower court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff on rebuttal to

enter into an examination of the marine operation that suc-

ceeded petitioner’s bankrupt corporation in every respect,

and thus rebut the contentions of the defendant that the mo-

tives of the customers to this industry in choosing their

local service was governed by price, quality, service, capital

structures and location but rather by hoped for reciprocity,

said position of the Court of Appeals and lower court being

contrary to the principle set out by this Court’s recent opinion

in the case of Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated

Foods Corporation, 85 S. Ct. 1220 (1965).

As shown the principal defense presented by defendants

was not to deny that the power of reciprocity did exist, but

simply to say that it was never used and that the customers

of the fleeting and harbor towing business actually gave no

real consideration to reciprocity. The defendants’ coritention

was that this was in every sense of the word a market as

free as any that had no reciprocity. In order to rebut this

evidence, plaintiff attempted to open an examination of the

fate of a company that in every respect succeeded the plain-

tiff’s operation excepting only its financial problems. We refer

to a company known as “228 Terminal Services, Inc.” prin-

cipally owned by Mr. Prewitt Nelson.

When the question of going into the operation of this

successor) of Clark Marine was originally raised in the pre-

trial order the trial court informed all parties that it con-

.

33

sidered this company after the fact and of no relevancy and

would therefore not allow the evidence to be introduced by

the plaintiff. The defense had prior to the beginning of the

trial caused to be issued an extensive and detailed subpoena

duces tecum to Mr. Nelson because of this stated purpose.

When the Court stated it would not allow such evidence, the

plaintiff acquiesced in this ruling and in order to accom-

modate Mr. Nelson lodged an objection to the subpoena at

the opening of the case which was allowed by the court. The

right to use Mr. Nelson on rebuttal however was reserved

and he was excused from the court room.

When the defense had completed its presentation and

had raised the defenses shown concerning the lack of effect

of reciprocity, the plaintiff then thought it quite relevant

to view just how valid these very elements had been as they

applied to the succeeding company. Accordingly, Mr. Nelson

was called, and on this point the court ruled that he could not

testify. An offer of proof was then made into the record (trial

record 888), with the court granting the usual right to sub-

mit a deposition on the subject as a substitution for the oral

offering. An attempt to take this deposition was made im-

mediately after the trial was completed but counsel for

defendants requested and obtained a delay from counsel for

plaintiff because of personal inconvenience. When again the

deposition was attempted the record had been filed in the

Court of Appeals and an objection was filed by the defense

to the untimely taking of this offer of proof. An answer to

this objection was made by the plaintiff showing the earlier

‘effort to take this offer of proof and claiming a violation of

confidence on the part of counsel for the defense. The Court

of Appeal then ordered that the deposition be taken and

accordingly and in due course it was done.

—

34

During the argument before the Court of Appeals a major

portion of plaintiff’s time was actually consumed in the court’s

considering whether or not the deposition was properly before

the Court, and ultimately this was the only point given any

comment in the per ériam handed down by the Court of

Appeals. In this fashion the issue was clouded by this proce-

dural matter and is discussed here only to attempt to direct

this Court’s attention past this to the real issue of whether

or not the plaintiff had the right on rebuttal to go into Mr.

Nelson’s operation, a point which is validly before this court

as it was before the Court of Appeals, regardless of the

timeliness of the taking of the deposition by reason of the

offer made in open Court.

It was and is our point that if Mr. Nelson’s operation were

properly financed, had a better location than defendants, bet-

ter equipment, equal or better prices and the usual elements

to be found in a free market consideration and still could not

get one new grain towing customer in the Baton Rouge port

from the defendants over an extended period of time, then

it was felt that this was valid rebuttal to the defenses con-

tention that reciprocity had no bearing on their phenomenal

success. Even more pertinent would be the explanation given

to Mr. Nelson by these customers for the refusal to even

consider a change to his business.

This Court recently considered this very evidenciary

question in the case of Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods

Corporation, 85 S. Ct. 1220 (1965). In this case the court was

dealing with the Clayton Act and specifically held that evi-

dence after acquisition and, thus after the fact, was admis-

sible in considering the existence of the continuing effect of

reciprocity as an anti-trust practice. The view was that such

Y

—

35 4

evidence even though being after the fact of acquisition was

excellent in determining the question as to whether or not

competition was stifled by reciprocity forces. This Court gave

specific recognition that such a consideration is continuing in

nature and therefore relevant so long as reciprocity was the

element considered.

The point raised by this reason for writ is whether or

not reciprocity under the Sherman Act, just as under the

Clayton Act, can be validly considered on evidence that took

place after the plaintiff’s bankruptcy, in determining if con-

tinuing reciprocity forces are still stifling the market in which

the plaintiff, though now departed, once existed. If plain-

tiff had successfully shown as it did in the disputed offer of

proof that Mr. Nelson could do no better than the plaintiff

had, even though located in the plaintiff’s exact location and

with considerably better financial structure, and even better

equipment and that he was unable to even obtain one new

grain towing customer during the period of time since he had

entered the business up to the date of trial, a period of over

a year, we feel that such a consideration under such cir-

cumstances falls within the meaning, the reasoning and the

rule set out in the Commissioner v. Consolidated Corporation

case as being a valid and highly effective way of refuting the

claim of a free market made by the defense.

4. Did the Court of Appeals substantially err in accept-

ing the conclusion of the lower court that Cargo Carriers,

Inc., obtained a complete dominancé of the fleeting and harbor

towing business in the Baton Rouge Port as to grain barges

because of superior service and management on the part of

the said Cargo Carriers, Inc.

36

It is our position that where a company such as the

defendant CCI enters an otherwise highly competitive field

and immediately obtains control of all of the business from

customers who are actually their competitors in the towing

business, then such a success cannot be viewed as anything

but unnatural. When it is further seen that these competitors

are subjected to a priority system of service which of neces-

sity favors CCI and Cargill over their own equipment and at

prices considerably greater than previously charged then no

amount of explanation can be given which could cover a clear

violation of the Sherman Act where the power of reciprocity

over these same customers is admittedly present.

It is our understanding that this court is loath to grant

writs on questions that are not of general concern. This

particular reason for writ is therefore added without exten-

sive explanation in order to assure its consideration if a writ

if granted for the reasons otherwise shown that do have gen-

eral and universal importance. Q

37

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted

that this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Dated at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, December 3, 1965.

Respectfully submitted,

BENTON & MOSELEY

114 St. Louis Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Dopp, : AVANT & WALL

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Attorneys for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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