Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc.
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Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
DEC S 1965
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1965
2 No. 806 1
CLARK MARINE CORPORATION,
| Petitioner,
versus
%
CARGILL, INC., CARGO CARRIERS, INC.,
LLOYD GRAVING AND TOM BETTS,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BENTON & MOSELEY
114 St. Louis Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Dopp, HIRSCH, BARKER, AVANT & WALL
429 Government Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorneys for Petitioner
Franklin Press, Inc. «ge Baton Rouge. La.
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
J 00 2
,s ̃ Ä—I—.ꝛꝛññ ̃ ̃ ̃̃ 2
„ . 2
, 4
. „ ciccceinccccnasscensinnscotcesnnsensassianeiis 4
REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT 17
[ — ¶ ¶ ¶ů ů — 37
INDEX TO APPENDICES
JUDGMENT BELOW WD... Appendix A 39
OPINION BELOW WW „ Appendix B 58
ORDER DENYING REHEARING .......... wae Appendix C 59
AUTHORITIES CITED ©
CASES
Page
United Exhibitors v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Dist. Corp. (DC Pa.), 31 F. Supp. 318 3, 18, 21
United States v. Griffith, 68 S.Ct. 941, 334 U.S. 100 ........ 28
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 Fed.
D J.... 30
Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 233 Fed.
r 3, 18, 22
Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., No. 422, October term, 1964, cited 85 S.Ct.
% 3, 32, 34, 35
OTHER AUTHORITIES N
Toulmin’s Anti- Trust Laws, Vol. 6, Chapters 3, pages
76 through 103; page 963
United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Com-
pany, 67 F. Supp. 636, affirmed (Ca 7) 173 F. 2d
79
.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir. 148
Fed. 2d 416, 432
United States v. Patten, 226 U. S., Page 543, 33 S. Ct.
Page 145, 57 L. Ed. 333, 44 L. R. S., N.S. 325
—— — ee
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1965
CLARK MARINE CORPORATION,
| Petitioner,
versus
CARGILL, INC., CARGO CARR'ERS, INC.,
LLOYD GRAVING AND TOM BETTS,
2
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES GOURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT |
The petitioner, Clark Marine Corporation, a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana, and at
all times during the trial of this case and at the present time
in bankruptcy with the Referee in Bankruptcy in the Eastern
District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge Division, respectfully prays
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered
May 7, 1965, sustaining the final judgment of the United
1
Respondents.
2
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge Division, dismissing plaintiff's action filed under
the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and judgment of the District Court is cited,
Clark Marine Corporation v. Cargill, 226 F. Supp. 103, ‘and
is Set out in full in Appendix 1-A, infra. The per curiam of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which adopted the opinion
of the lower court is cited in 345 Fed. (2) 103, and is set out
in full in Appendix B, Page 58, infra.
JURISDICTION |
This action was brought under the Sherman Anti-trust
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, 12 and 15, and was timely appealed from
the District Court to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals after
final judgment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirm-
ing the lower Court’s decision and was rendered May 7, 1965.
An extension of time in which to file an application for
rehearing was granted until June 28, 1965, as per order dated
May 17, 1965, and an additional forty days extension was
granted through August 9, 1965, by order dated June 14,
1965; and an additional extension was granted to September 1,
1965; on September 14, 1965, the Court entered an order
denying the petition for rehearing. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.A. 1254 (1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The following questions are presented by the present
application: . ö
9
3
(1) Does a bankrupt corporation have a different cri-
teria to meet in proving a violation under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act from that criteria which is applied to non-bankrupt
petitioners, and in this regard clarification as to an apparent
conflict should be given by this Court as between this Court’s
opinion in Buckeye Powder Co. u. Dupont Powder Co., 233
Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 3, 1915), affirmed 248 U. S. 55 (1918), and the
doctrine laid down in United Exhibitors v. Twentieth Century
Fox Distributors Corporation, 31 Fed. Supp. 316.
(2) Did the Court of Appeals’ error by improperly ap-
plying the existing principles under the law as to what con-
stitutes a‘ violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act in this
case, basing<such an analysis on the lower court's findings
of fact and stated positions on the evidence presented, specific
emphasis being placed on the vertical integrated nature of
the defendant companies that inherently create monopolistic
opportunities.
*
(3) Did the Court of Appeals’ error in sustaining the
lower court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff on rebuttal to enter
into an examination of the marine operation that succeeded
petitioner’s bankrupt corporation in every respect, and thus
rebut the contentions of the defendant that the motives of the
customers to this industry in choosing their local service was
governed by price, quality, service, capital structures and
location but rather by hoped for reciprocity, said position of
the Court of Appeals and lower court being contrary to the
principle set out by this Court’s recent opinion in the case
of Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
No. 422, October term, 1964, cited 85 S. Ct. 1220.
(4) Did the Court of Appeals substantially err in accept-
4
ing the conclusion of the lower court that Cargo Carriers,
Inc., obtained a complete dominance of the fleeting and har-
bor towing business in the Baton Rouge Port as to grain barges
because of superior service and management on the part of
the said Cargo Carriers, Inc.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statute involved in this action is the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, et seq., the pertinent text of which
is set forth in Appendix C, Page 60, infra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking damages under the Federal
Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, et seq. Complainant is Clark
Marine Corporation, a Louisiana corporation presen ly in bank-
ruptcy, and the defendants are Cargill, Inc., a Delaware Cor-
poration, and Cargo Carriers, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary
corporation of Cargill, Inc., Mr. Lloyd Graving, the Baton
Rouge manager of Cargill, Inc., and Mr. Tom Betts, the Baton
Rouge manager of Cargo Carriers, Inc. The complaint alleged
that these four conspired to monopolize all of the docking,
fleeting and switching and repair services in the Baton Rouge
Port. 2
In order to properly understand the matters pertaining
to this application, it is felt that it is absolutely necessary
to review definitions with which the court might not be fami-
liar, before reviewing the undisputed chronziogical history
of the events leading up to and including the alleged viola-
res- e- eee ae ee or ee
tions of both sides on certain facts.
5
The industry that is the subject of this action is the
local fleeting and harbor towing services, and related bene-
fits, above water repairs and cleaning of barges in the Baton
Rouge Port. Fleeting and harbor towing, as such, was describ-
ed by the Court in its Findings of Fact (Tr. 1019, Appendix
A, p. 42), as follows:
“As these large tows (referring to river boats that are
pushing a number of barges in the fashion familiar on
the Mississippi River) reached the port areas (point
of destination of some of the barges in the tow), it is
obvious that they could not be simultaneously unloaded
into the elevator. (Grain elevator.) Consequently, it was
neccessary to ‘park’ these barges while awaiting their turn
for unloading. Consequently, an area convenient to the
elevator. had to be provided for a sort of parking place
for these barges. This area is referred to as a ‘fleet,’ and
because of the fact that these large towboats were rather
unwieldly, they were not suitable for ‘switching’ or mov-
ing the barges out of their tow and into the fleet. Con-
sequently smaller harbor towboats are used t6 ‘switch’
the barges from the tow to the fleet, and later from the
fleet to another town for return to its point of departure
or elsewhere. Ordinarily, the owner or operator of the
‘fleet’ charges.a certain rates per day to owner of
the barge for each day that the barge in the
‘fleet,’ and the owner of the switching boat charges either
a per hour fee or a per switch fee for switching a barge
in or out of the fleet. Also, it is not always practical to
unload the barges in the order in which they arrive at
the port because of the fact that it is necessary for the
elevator to mix and blend different kinds of grain in order
to fill certain orders, and consequently, they must take
the grain from the barge which is carrying the particular
type of grain needed for the mixing and blending then
in process.” (Comments in parentheses ours.)
6
‘
Fleeting and switching operators also as a natural out-
growth of that service, offered repairs that could be made to
barges not requiring a dry dock, as well as cleaning the
barges after they had been emptied. In the case of grain bar-
ges, this meant removing the loose grain still remaining.
(Tr. 131, 298) *
The Court understood (Tr. 1021, Appendix A), that
these auxiliary businesses were not to be considered as busi-
nesses in which the defendants intended to monopolize; that
only the fleeting and switching of grain barges were at issue.
Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to this, but did not intend for the
Court to ignore those activities which are the natural dividends
of a fleeting and switching business.
*
History of Industry in Port: Before 1955, the Port of Bat-
on Rouge was largely oriented to the petro-chemical industry
that was generally located north of the City of Baton Rouge,
along the east bank of the Mississippi River. At that time, two
companies offered services to the marine industry, that is,
the carriers who towed into and through the Baton Rouge
Port on the Mississippi River. One was Baton Rouge Coal &
- Towing Company, an old company owned by members of one
family, that of J. C. Werner, Jr., one of the witnesses‘ for
plaintiff during this trial. This company was primarily engaged
in the general towing business on the Mississippi River
(Tr. 64, 110), as well as offering the only limited general
fleeting area open to the public. The other company was
owned by Mr. Kenneth E. Hutton, and offered groceries and
supplies to the tugboats that plied their trade through the
Baton Rouge Port. Mr. Hutton also appeared as a witness for
plaintiff in this action, and also has an action pending the
outcome of this case under the Sherman Anti-trust Act. There
—
—
7
were other fleeting areas, but privately owned for the use
of their own equipment, Esso Standard Oil having such an
area (Tr. 94). The fleeting and harbor towing business was
admittedly a very limited activity in the Baton Rouge Port
at that time (Tr. 65, 66, 115, 268).
The Baton Rouge Port Commission, subsequent to the
year 1955, in an effort to increase the growth of the Port,
voted sufficient municipal bonds to finance the construction
of a general cargo dock facility, a grain elevator and dock
facility and a barge terminal. It was hoped by building these
facilities to increase international trade into the Port, since
the Baton Rouge Port is a so-called deep water port, avail-
able to oceangoing vessels. The barge terminal dock was
located in the northern part of the harbor 6n what is referred
to throughout the trial as the “Devil Swamp Canal,” the
same site of Plaintiff Clark Marine’s first operation. In the
center of the harbor, some five miles from the Devil Swamp
Canal, was located the general cargo dock and the grain eleva-
tor, both of these docks being available for deep water, as
well as barge traffic. (See defendants’ Exhibits 1, 2, and 3,
for a complete picture of the locations of, these various dock
facilities.)
The grain eleyator was initially constructed to house 2.5
million bushels of grain as of the date it opened in 1955.
Upon its completion, the dock and elevator were turned over
to the Cargill Company on a long-term lease-basis. (Court's
Finding, Tr. 1020, Appendix A, p. 42).
© 2
Cargill, Inc. is a huge corporation principally engaged
in the buying and selling of various types of grains and other
bulk commodities and through subsidiaries, it engages in sev-
OO a ee
: 8
eral other businesses, usually of a related nature, such as
stevedoring, towing, fuel sales, fleeting, etc. It utilized the
elevator at the time it opened, as it has throughout all of the
times pertinent to and considered in the trial, as a point of
assembly of grains for international shipment. This grain
was collected principally from its many elevators operated
throughout the northern portion of,the Mississippi River sys-
tem, including all of the navigable cennecting rivers of the
Mississippi River, as well as elevators in areas not accessible
by water, but by rail. After arrival in the port, the grains
are blended and placed upon oceangoing vessels for interna-
tional delivery, as ordered. (See Court's Findings, 1018, Ap-
pendix A, p. 42).
The elevator was and is now and Has continued to be the
only grain elevator in the Baton Rouge Port. (Tr. 24)
Cargill, Inc., has a wholly-owned subsidiary known as
Cargo Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as CCI“). This
“company is given the sole responsibility of moving the com-
modities owned or controlled by Cargill, Inc., on the river
system (Tr. 22,585). As such, it operates barges and tow-
boats and, in fact, operates what is believed by them to be
the largest river towboat in the world (Tr. 612). This equip-
ment is available first for the movement of Cargill commodi-
ties, but is also utilized in competing with other river trans-
portation companies in carrying commodities for customers
other than Cargill. CCI could not carry all of the commodi-
ties of Cargill and as a result a large portion (60%—see
Court’s findings Tr. 1018) of such business was contracted
for from the other carriers on the river system, constituting
Cargill as a very large shipper on the river.
*
9
It was admitted by the defendants that CCI personnel, :
in the furtherance of its responsibility to Cargill, also were
directly and solely responsible for the placing of all such
orders for Cargill commodity movements not handled in their
own equipment with the identical towing companies that
constituted most of the customers in the fleeting and towing
business in the Baton Rouge Harbor (Tr. 22). Thus, all
of the carriers of ein “destined for the Cargill elevator,
other than CCI, when given shipping orders were placed
in the position of reciprocation by using the local harbor
towing service of CCI. It was this power to place Cargill
shipping orders which Plaintiff asserts gave CCI the illegal
power of responsibility over these shippers forcing them to
use their local fleeting and harbor services. When Cargill took
possession of the grain elevator facilities in 1955, CCI like-
wise established offices in the Baton Rouge Port, in order to
coordinate the movements of the Port, as well as directly into
the elevator.
As a direct and sole result of the presence of the grain
elevator in the Port, two new operations were created in 1955.
Both of these companies were the outgrowth of the existing
two principal operators in the Port. The first such company
to be created was Louisiana Marine Repairing Service Com-
pany. This company offered fleeting and harbor towing serv-
ices, and utilized boats owned by Baton Rouge Coal & Towing.
Mr. Johnny Jackson was a part-owner of the new company
and apparently the balance was owned by the same owners
of the Baton Rouge Coal & Towing Company, the J. C. Wer-
ner family (Tr. 67, 88, 1021, Appendix A). The second new
fleeting and harbor towing business began with the expansion
of Mr. Kenneth Hutton’s operation to include fleeting and
harbor towing (Tr. 268, 269). The Court, in its Findings of
0
“
a
oe
10
Fact, on Page 1024, Tr., Appendix A, p. 45), found that by
April 1, 1959, the date CCI entered this field with its own
operation besides the two companies named above engaging
in the fleeting business:
“Also a Captain Joe Hightower and a Captain Bert K.
Kleinpeter each had a small boat that was suitable for
switching and was available, when needed, to perform
harbor work.”
It is not seriously disputed that the grain business in the
Baton Rouge Port was the principal commodity that governed
the fate of the fleeting and harbor towing business. Finding
of the Court (Tr. 1020, Appendix A, p. 41). The evidence
showed that of the remaining non-grain barges, relatively few
were available to fleeting operators offering a public fleeting
area (Tr. 90, 115).
In 1959, the elevator’s capacity was increased from 2.5
million bushels of grain to 7.7 million bushels of grain, said
project again being financed by public funds in conjunction
with lease agreement with Cargill, Inc. During the same time
and partially because of the increase in capacity of the eleva-
tor, CCI contemplated entering into the fleeting and switch-
ing business and submitted a request for permission from
Cargill to allow them to establish such an operation in the
Baton Rouge Port, not only for barges that it owned or directly
controlled, but likewise for any other companies, who wishes
to utilize such services in the Baton Rouge Port. (Tr. 739,
Exhibits P-14, P16.) Pp
The Court found as a matter of fact that approximately
thirty-five (35%) per cent of the grain received by Cargill,
Inc., to the elevator moved to the elevator by railroad car
\ 11
and that the remaining sixty-five (65%) per cent of the
grain received moved into the port area and into the elevator
by river barge. Of the sixty-five (65%) per cent of the grain
moving in barges owned and managed by CCI, approximately
30% to 40% was carried by CCI. The Court actually found
40% (Tr. 1018, Appendix A, p. 41), but defendant, Mr. Lloyd
Graving, in his testimony, estimated 30% to 40% (Tr. 546).
The*Court also noted that some 115 million bushels of
grain were recorded as having turned over after the increase
of the elevator during one year’s period. These undisputed
findings thus show some 42 million bushels of grain, more
or less, shipped into the Cargill elevator by companies other
than CCI, after the increase in capacity of the elevator. It
was a portion of this business that CCI felt it could get in
order to insure a profitable operation in the Baton Rouge
Port. (See plaintiff’s Exhibit 14, Tr. 744). It is also this busi-
ness upon which this action is largely based.
Before granting permission to CCI to enter the said
fleeting and towing business, Cargill required CCI tb nego-
tiate with the Baton Rouge Port Commission as to whether
or not it intended to enter the fleeting and harbor towing
business, basing the request solely on what they considered
very poor service then being given by the existing companies
(Tr. 741). The Commission indicated it had no such intention
(Tr. 1023, Appendix A, p. 45). CCI, therefore, received permis-
sion from Cargill, Inc., to start its own business: Accordingly,
a form letter was mailed to prospective customer towing com-
panies under the signature of Captain Donald S. Wright, the
then operations head of CCI (See Exhibit P-16), dated Feb-
ruary 4, 1959, announcing the opening of the new fleeting
service as of April 1, 1959. Other solicitations were made
eA eA UG e
0
12
by certain other employees of CCI. These solicitations were
not limited to grain fleeting only. Exactly who did the solicit-
ing is somewhat at issue.
Regardless of the question of who did solicit business,
there is no dispute as to the fact that solicitation was carried
out and continued to be carried out by the defendant, CCI,
by personal contact and letter, and that. this same company,
CCI, was solely responsible for the issuance of all of the
excess towing contracts to all of the customers who carried
grain, of their fleeting and harbor towing business in the
Baton Rouge Port.
It is reiterated that it was Clark Marine's position that
it was this particular known combination of authority to give
towing contracts that makes it impossible to ever directly
compete in a free market with CCI for services to be ren-
dered these same towing companies in Baton Rouge who
receive these contracts, even in the absence of any threats
that they will lose this business if they do not use such local
service (See Reasons for Writs No. 2).
Regardless of how solicitations were carried out, it is
undisputed that within a very short time, all of the grain-
carrying barges in the Port were fleeted and switched by
CCI, and continued to be fleeted, except for an occasional
barge in the fleet of the Baton Rouge Coal & Towing until
Clark Marine obtained some business in October, 1961. The
actual takeover initially took from thirty to sixty days (See
Tr. 71, 76, 279, 393, and Judge’s Finding [Tr. 1034, Appen-
dix Al, also Exhibit P-18.) It is also undisputed that Ken-
neth L. Hutton, as well as Louisiana Marine filed bankruptcy
proceedings after each lost his portion of the graiff business
13
(Tr. 77, 88). Kenneth L. Hutton subsequently filed an anti-
trust suit similar to the instant case against Cargill and CCI.
said action still pending the outcome of this case (Tr. 315).
Captain Kleinpeter and Captain Hightower likewise left the
Port (Tr. 314).
The Court found nothing unusual about this remarkable
success, and held that it was the result of good management
and the rendering of better service (Tr. 1026, Appendix A,
p. 53). Later the Court noted again that CCI (Tr. 1034,
Appendix A, p. 53):
did acquire practically all of the fleeting and switch-
Re business in the Port of Baton Rouge insofar as grain
barges are concerned.”
After approximately the first month’s operation by CCI
of its new fleet, the evidence is ‘uncontested that the vessel
used for the switching of their fleet was chartered from
Baton Rouge Coal & Towing on a full found basis (Tr. 72),
subject to the direct supervision of the CCI office, and using
the same crews used by Louisiana Marine Repairing Service
in its switching operation (Tr. 73). Thus, the sole remain-
ing so-called competitor of CCI, until the appearance of Clark
Marine’s operation in the harbor, also furnished the vessel
and extra vessels used to handle all of the fleeting moves in
the CCI operation, solely for the CCI fleet to the obvious
exclusion of Baton Rouge Coal & Towing, using the same crews
and equipment supposedly previously guilty of rendering poor
service (Tr. 85, et seq).
CCI established, in the use of their fleeting boat during
all times pertinent to this action, a standing instruction which
established a priority for use of their harbor boat. This priority
“>
14
placed the grain elevator’s needs first, CCI’s tows second, other
‘customer large line tows third, and so on. (See Exhibit P-12,
Betts Tr. 403.) If furthen boats were needed, they were to
be called, if one could be found, as needed, but only one full
time boat was kept by CCI’s — (See Betts, Tr. 414;
J. Smith, Tr. 463.)
CCI continued to operate the sole grain fleeting and
switching business until the appearance o Clark Marine in
January of 1961. (Defendant, Tom Betts, Tr. 393).
It is undisputed that in March, 1961, Clark Marine pur-
chased’ a towboat and began offering harbor towing and
switching services, as well as fleeting areas at its location,
immediately adjacent to the Baton Rouge barge canal terminal
in the Devil Swamp area. In conjunction with the offering
of the services of fleeting and harbor towing by Clark Marine,
a steam cleaning and general repair service had previously
been introduced, said steam cleaning and repair business being
offered on all types of barges from its opening date of January
of 1961. It is during the period of time between March of
1961 and September of 1961, before Clark Marine ak
moved its operation to the center of the harbor immedia
across from the CCI operation that Clark Marine alleges tha
- they were completely blocked by the defendants from receiv-
ing any harbor towing, except that which CCI itself dis-
patched to it, and also any fleeting of barges. During this
period of time, it is undisputed that Clark Marine had no
fleeting business of barges whatsoever (Tr. Clark, 157, Gar-
ner, 362), even though it was immediately adjacent to the
Baton Rouge barge canal dock where some two hundred
eighty-nine barges, more or less, were docked during the year
1961.. (See Exhibit P-11.)
5
*
a
a
1 ie
15
The Court adopted defendants’ explanation of the lack
of business and held that during this period Clark Marine,
because of its location, was not in competition with CCI’s
operation, a conclusion vigorously disputed in this writ, espe-
cially as to towing in the harbor which, of course, is free to
operate wherever the river flows. It was established by testi-
mony and exhibits also in a fashion undisputed thet Clark
Marine’s only harbor ‘switching during its stay in the Devil
Swamp Canal came with the direct authority of CCI’s dis-
patching office, when extra services were needed, and that
invoices for such services went to only CCI, and not to the
customers for whom the,work was performed. (See Defend-
ts’ Exhibits 100, 101, 102, O. V. Smith, Tr. 339, Garner, Tr.
pon It is further shown by the superintendent of pilots for
CCI, Captain John Smith’s undisputed testimony, that Clark
Marine was considered a competitor at all times it was in
existence by him and defendant Betts. (Tr. 463, et seq.)
Clark Marine opened its operation at what 4s termed
“Red Dog Landing” at the center of the Port, adjacent to and
across from CCI, on September 7, 1961 (Court’s Findings,
1030, Appendix A, p. 49). On September 15, an order was
issued prohibiting the Clark Marine vessel from docking barges
at the elevator. “On September 16th, the order was rescinded.
(See answer to plaintiff’s Interrogatories, No. 24.) On Sep-
tember 22nd, Clark Marine called upon officers of Cargill in
both Minneapolis, St. Paul, as well as in Baton Rouge, and
accused them of preventing Clark Marine from receiving any
business in the Baton Rouge Port, and further stating, through
its representative, that some barge lines were afraid to use
their services, even though they had indicated an interest to do
so. (See defendant, Graving, Tr. 561, and Clark, Tr. 167.)
After assurances that Cargill did not have such a policy, an
16
attempted meeting of the barge lines with Cargill was set up
to assure the said towing companies on this point, but Cargill
and one barge company refused to take part. (Defendant
Graving, Tr. 566, 567). After these conferences, Mr. Heinin-
ger, very able chief counsel for Cargill in this trial, was
retained to protect Cargill’s position in the Port (Tr. Heininger
492). After this attempted effort, Clark Marine did begin to
receive most of the harbor towing and fleeting business of
American Commercial and Mississippi Valley Barge Lines
and business from CCI itself. This business was not actually
received until the latter part of October, 1961. (See plaintiff's
Exhibt 24, which shows defendant’s own computation of plain-
tiff’s fleeting income; also Garner, Tr. 359, Clark, 167.) Clark
Marine, thereafter, experienced some increase in business on
all fronts, although not increasing its number of grain-carrying
customers, but not enough to avoid bankruptcy in July of
1962.
Clark Marine filed a petition under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act in an effort to reorganize and refinance its
operation on May 25, 1962, said action having the effect of
actually placing the company in the hands of the district judge,
G. Gordon West, who ultimately was the trial judge in this
action. Judge West under authority of said reorganization
actually operated the company until on his own motion he
placed the company in bankruptcy on July 11, 1962. Shortly
before the actual trial commenced the jury was waived by
> joint motion for both parties. The court then on its own mo-
tion split the issues limiting the first trial to the question
of whether or not the defendants had in fact violated the
Sherman Anti-trust Act, with the question of damages to be
raised later if a violation was found.
1 17
4
It has been the contention of Clark Marine that the
alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act first resulted
when CCI went into the fleeting and harbor towing business
and created a complete monopoly within the Port after April
1, 1959, and that this monopoly, in the form of a continuing
violation, was directly felt by the said corporation during the
period of time between March of 1961 and October of 1961,
and continued thereafter even though not as abusive as prior
to that date, te e ee
through the date of trial.
It was defendant’s principal contention that in order to
prove a violation of the Anti-trust Act Clark Marine had to
show it was properly capitalized, the desired business was
profitable; that Clark Marine used good business judgment
and that the bankruptcy resulted from the said violation; that
the defendants actually made no threats of withdrawing
contracts for towing, or giving contracts if their local services
were not used; and finally that the success that resulted in
the actual dominance of the fleeting and switching business
was the natural outgrowth of good management and superior
service on their part.
The Court ruled in the defendants’ favor on all points.
REASONS RELIED ON FOR ALLOWANCE
OF WRIT
1. Does a bankrupt corporation have a different criteria
to meet in proving a violation under the Sherman Anti-trust ;
Act from that criteria which.is applied to non-bankrupt peti-
tioners, and in this regard clarification as to an apparent
conflict of law should be given by this Court as between this
«>
—
18
Court’s opinion in Buckeye Powder Company v. DuPont
Powder Co., 233 Fed. 881 (C.C.A. 3, 1915), affirmed 248 U. S.
55 (1918), and the doctrine set out in United Exhibitors v.
Twentieth Century Fox Distributors Corporation, 31 Fed.
Supp. 316.
Stating the proposition another way:
Does a bankrupt plaintiff in proving a violation of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act with the question of quantum re-
moved by the Court’s splitting of the issues for purposes of
trial have to establish as the elements of such an action the
following facts: 7
(1) That the business in question be considered com-
pletely separate and apart from other related businesses and
in this manner make a showing of potential profit to the
plaintiff had the plaintiff been successful in obtaining business
in the absence of a violation of the Anti-trust Act.
(1) That the plaintiff be required to prove that it was a
properly capitalized corporation at all times pertinent to the
trial of the case.
(33 That a plaintiff in bankruptcy be required to prove
its bankruptcy was caused principally as a result of the viola-
tion.
(4) That the management of the plaintiff’s operations
were prudent and wise.
_ This case presents an unusually clear opportunity for this
court to determine one way or the other precisely how much
a bankrupt plaintiff’s internal problems have to do with the
5
19
proof of the violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by its
comipetitors illegal activities even though such internal prob-
lems have no connection with such activities. This is made
clearly possible here by the lower court’s splitting the issues
on its own motion just prior to the trial of this case. The
Court’s stated purpose in doing this was to eliminate any con-
sideration of evidence that did not bear directly on the ques-
tion.of the existence of activities on the part of the defendants
toward the plaintiff that would constitute a violation of the
act. The question of the relative merits of the actual services
rendered by the plaintiff as compared to defendants is not an
issue in this regard since plaintiff. obtained no business at
all for a major portion of its existence, and then when it did,
no question was raised as to their competency since their
two customers did not leave them.
The next obvious question is whether or not such a deter-
mination is of sufficient far- reaching importance to be con-
sidered by this Court in its already overburdened workload.
We take the position that it is for several reasons. (1) The
authorities on this point appear to be in hopeless conflict or
at least to apply separate criteria to plaintiffs that are bank-
rupt from those that are not. It is our position that such a
position is unjustified under the Act and prejudicial to bank-
rupts and should not be allowed to continue; (2) if the lower
court’s opinion is allowed to remain unchanged and uncom-
mented on, it would have the effect of defeating the purpose
of the Act by making the successful prosecution of actions of
this kind by bankrupts a virtual impossibility because of the
resulting unrelated burdens of proof added and prejudicial
nature of such burdens; (3) in the instant case the rights of
the plaintiff have been greatly injured under the circumstances
5 4
2
20
and the actual trial and judgment and this injustice should
be rectified.
Contrary to the trial court’s original reason for splitting
the issues it did allow the defendants full range in attempting
to examine plaintiff’s financial problems. A review of this
record will show that a vast majority of the defendants
exhibits (which exceed one hundred in number), and a great
portion of the testimony presented by the defendants in defense
of this action addresses itself solely to the financial condi-
tion and management decisions of the plaintiff, all of which
could have no bearing on the defendant’s activities. These mat-
ters all came in under objection of plaintiff as being incon-
sistent with the court’s splitting of the issues. These objec-
tions were made in the conference which immediately pre- /
‘ceded the trial when the defendants’ proposed introduction
of this evidence was made known to the judge and also dur-
ing the trial (Tr. 718) when appropriate. The Court allowed
all evidence presented under this heading to be introduced .
into the record and repeatedly stated that he would consider
only that which was pertinent to the issue before the court
and give no consideration to evidence on the question of quan-
tum. See Tr. 829 as an example.
; 4
To the contrary, a review of the lower court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law will show that the court discussed
at length its belief that Clark Marine was badly capitalized
and incredibly concluded that it would not have survived even
if it got all the fleeting and harbor towing business in the
port, clearly illustrating the devastating effect this evidence
had on the mind of the judge. This same question had previ-
ously been submitted to the court during extensive motions
for summary judgment which were denied and plaintiff at
21
that time and at all times thereafter relied upon the case of
United Eghibitors v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Distribut-
ing Corporation (D.C. Pa. 31 Fed. Supp. 316; also cited in
Toulmin’s Anti-trust Laws, Vol. 6, page 963). In this case the
Court even where no specific damage was prayed for con-
cluded that where an established conspiracy is shown, nominal
damages can be added to the injunctive relief sought. Thus,
even in the absence of any evidence of actual monetary losses
in the face of an established violation of the Act, this court
would have no difficulty finding a basis for granting relief with
damages.
Relying upon the rationale of this authority, and the
court's stated purpose, when the court split the issues plain-
tiff dismissed witnesses that had been called to testify on
the question of quantum, including some that were out of
state, and otherwise stopped any efforts to prepare to meet
this requirement. It was plaintiff’s repeated stated position
during the trial and one which was never overruled by the trial
court that this was all that was required of it in the con-
sideration of the issue befoté the Court. Why else would the
Court have split issues if he did not mean to limit the evi-
dence.
Admittedly, the question of precisely why Clark Marine
went into bankruptcy has its relative importance in the ulti-
mate determination of this action if a violation was found.
But regardless of what the answer or answers to that ques-
tion might be, it could in no way have had eveh the most
remote influence on the pure issue of whether or not plain-
tiff was injured by the illegal actions of the defendants in the
management of their business affairs. To state it another way,
Clark Marine’s financial structure, be it strong or weak, cer-
*
—— De wat
22
tainly could not have influenced the actions, one way or the
other, of the defendants in its use of monopolistc powers in
violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The only question
left by the court’s splitting of the issues was whether or not
defendants were singularly or jointly guilty of a violation
of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and whether the plaintiff suf-
fered as a result of such illegal actions. How much Clark
suffered is not an issue in the case, if the issues are to be truly
split. Upon splitting the issues in this fashion, the case should
have automatically assumed much the same character of
an action brought by the Federal Government subject only to
the plaintiff showing a right of action by being a competitor
in the business monopolized.
Defendants cite with some merit the case of Buckeye
Powder Company v. DuPont Powder Co., 223 Fed. 881 (C.C.A.
3, 1915), affirmed 248 U.S. 55 (1918). This case, although
not in point of fact, did deal with the admissibility of evidence
of the type considered here as being a portion of the charge
to the jury and was allowed on the basis that the plaintiff’s
motives might be relevant to the question of liability and
that the jury might consider the evidence on the question
whether the plaintiff’s failure was due to the defendant’s
oppression or to the plaintiff’s incapacity.” (248 U.S. at 64).
Here the plaintiff was also a bankrupt company.
Thus it would seem that on the one hand the company
that is not bankrupt need not prove even one dollar’s worth
of loss, just a showing of injury, in some instances, in order
to get not only injunctive relief but a monetary award while
on the other hand the bankrupt must be ready to prove from
the point of hindsight many elements that have no direct
bearing whatsoever on the existence of the violation of the
Anti-trust Act, even being subjected to a motive examination.
DDR nnen 2 *
23
We take the position that this Court should clearly state
that direct damage is all that need be proved in order to
lay the groundwork for proving an action in violation of
the Sherman Anti-trust Act. Next, we take the position that
it is contrary to reason and the intent of the statute to require
proof of profit, arbitrarily, since, as in the instant case, the
service considered was more in the category of a reduction
of an overhead rather than as a pure profitable business.
The very known existence of a monopoly of the kind con-
sidered is sufficient to discourage investors from making even
the usual effort for saving a company otherwise suffering
from financial problems. We take the position that capitaliza-
tion and business judgments have no bearing whatsoever at
this point in a cause of this kind.
4
A bankrupt plaintiff faces monumental problems in these
cases. It is practically impossible for them to retain able coun-
sel with experience in the anti-trust field, the present ease
being ng exception. It is likewise also almost an impossible
problem to raise sufficient funds to properly investigate facts
and to meet the never-ending energetic defenses that a large,
wealthy corporation’s many able counsel can present; again
this case being no exception.
To add to these burdens, the completely extraneous
requirements of explaining and defending every act on the
part of a panicked management faced with probable bank-
ruptcy is to present such a prejudicial, irrelevant and over-
whelming burden as to make the Anti-trust Act meaningless
to such a bankrupt. 2
@
24
2. Did the Court of Appeals’ error by improperly ap-
plying the existing principles under the law as to what con-
stitutes a violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act in this
case, basing such an analysis on the lower court’s findings
of fact and stated positions on the evidence presented, specific
emphasis being placed on the vertical integrated nature of
the defendant companies that inherently create monopolistic
opportunities.
—
—
It is plaintiff’s understanding of the law applicable to
this case that in order for plaintiff to have established a
violation it was required to show that a power of monopoly
or unreasonable restraint of trade in vertically integrated
companies did exist. After the proof of such existing power
is shown, then the plaintiff would be required to show that
a resulting restraint of trade or monopoly affecting the plain-
tiff took place. Upon completion of the proof on these points,
it is plaintiff’s understanding that a violation of the Sherman
Anti-trust Act is then presumed to exist, regardless of the
intent of the parties or the stated purpose for the combina-
tion. +
It is plaintiff’s contention here that the court actually
made findings on basic facts which, when applied to existing
law and reason, require a conclusion that these two defendants,
that is, Cargill and CCI, are in fact violating the Sherman
Anti-trust Act and did violate the said Act during the exist-
ence of Clark Marine Corporation to that company’s detri-
ment.
There is no dispute that Cargill and CCI are vertically
integrated companies, and that CCI, in effect, had the power
to threaten the loss of towing contracts over many of the
25
carriers if it chose to use it, arising out of the dual role
exercised by it in both engaging in the local fleeting service
and placing contracts with customers of that fleeting service
on behalf of Cargill, Inc., for the shipment of all of Cargill
commodities. As a matter of fact, the vertical nature of the
companies and the dual role of CCI are admitted by defendants
in the pre-trial order (Tr. 22). They simply deny ever using
this position to obtain business by the use of threats that
contracts would be withheld or given if the local service was
or was not used, and further deny that they would have been
effective if they were used.
That the contracts and solicitations by CCI for the
handling of fleeting and towing operations generally were
by the same personnel who were authorized to make cargo
contracts with these same customers is, we submit, under the
facts practically the equivalent of a legal conclusion. The
Court does not deal with this point under the findings of Fact
as the Court in its estimate of the legal principles governing
simply disregarded the relevance of this dual role, mani-
festly relying upon the viewpoint as revealed by the Court’s
comments, that unless plaintiff’s could show the intent to
use or the actual use of this dual role conjointly by threats
or promises or some other form of intimidation, no legal
remedy was available to Plaintiff. The feeling of the Court
as to the dual role itself is plainly established in its comments.
These comments were made following the testimony of
Gayle H. Chapman and Captain Bogle Caplener of independ-
ent grain carrier companies dealing with CCI, and filing of
affidavits of other barge line officers in which these gentle-
men stated in effect that when they moved their business to
CCI in 1959, they did so without giving any serious thought
7
as
26 5 —
to the dual capacity of “reciprocity” in the hands of CCI.
(Tr. 666, 667, 846, 847).
Following the evidence, Mr. Avant, for the plaintiff, was
arguing with the Court as to the admissibility of rebuttal
intended to show that these men simply were not telling the
truth about their company’s policies in this regard. We quote
a colloquy between Mr. Avant and the Court from page 875
of the transcript: \
“Mr. Avant: 2
“Your Honor, the purpose in calling Mr. Nelson is
simply this, Mr. Caplener testified, and other_repre-
sentatives of barge lines have testified in this case
by affidavit, in lieu of requiring them to be here,
that they did not consider—Mr. Caplener said they
did not even consider the business that they may do
with Cargill.
“The Court:
> |
“Of course, in that respect, Mr. Avant, that is com-
pletely irrelevant and immaterial. I am sure they
considered it. If they didn’t, they were poor busi-
nessmen, but they have no obligation not to con-
sider it. I am only interested in knowing what Car-
gill and Cargo did to make them feel that they must
do business with them, but I can’t quite conceive
of any barge line not considering the fact that Cargo
is a customer as well as a competitor.” (Emphasis
ours)
Again, on Page 877, the dialogue continues:
“Mr. Avant:
It tends to show that they do have a policy and that
27
they are influenced to a large extent by the fact that
they have business relations.
“The Court:
“I am sure they do. I said they would be mighty
poor businessmen if they didn’t. I think it is com-
pletely irrelevant and immaterial. I am interested
in whether or not there were threats by the defend-
ants against these plaintiffs. I don’t care how much
they considered it. I think it is rather ridiculous to
assume that they did not consider such things.”
(Emphasis ours)
These comments came at the conclusion of the trial and
by this time, both sides had submitted briefs on the law and
argued at length, and the Court was fully informed on the
contentions of each side. Further, it should be noted that
nothing in the finding of the Court rebuts these statements.
(See also like comments by the Court, Tr. 502, 514, 517, 523.)
The fact the Court plainly recognized that any good busi-
nessman would take into account such integrated interests
despite what the witnesses claimed to the contrary serves to
emphasize the deep conflict between the plaintiff and the
Court as to the legal ‘principles governing this case. The
Court simply dismissed the whole business upon the false.
legal premise that although there would be this conjoint
interest (by its very nature economically indivisible) it would
not afford any basis for legal relief unless it were connected
with a threat or a promise or some other form of intimida-
tion.
For the defendants to actually attempt to prove to the
contrary is the recognition by their many able counsel that
the Court was on thin ice legally in ignoring the relevancy
of this point. It is likewise a further indication of the absolute
control exercised by these huge companies over their custom-
ers, in being able to get otherwise responsible businessmen to
make such comments which the Court completely rejected as
“ridiculous” and which the plaintiff rebutted with such ease.
(See Prewitt Nelson’s impeachment of Captain Caplener, Tr.
884, 885.) :
It is plaintiff’s position that the lower courts are appar-
ently completely mistaken concerning the law on the subject
and had they understood the law properly in conjunction with
this clear understanding of the truth of reciprocity, they
would have found a violation of the Act. Plaintiff contends
that the very existence of the dual role obviates the necessity
of a direct threat. If an overt act is needed, then the act of
soliciting for business in Baton Rouge, when combined with
the giving of towing contracts for Cargill commodities, is act
enough.
A case that directly refutes the lower court’s position in
this regard is the landmark case of U. S. v. Griffith, 68 S. Ct.
941, 334 U.S. 100, where buying power as a monopolistic
power was considered in overturning the lower court’s finding
for the defendant of no conspiracy and
“no attempt to compel distributors to grant them privi-
leges not granted their competitors, or which gave them
any substantial authority over their competitors .. .”
(See Page 944.)
The Supreme Court, in ruling a violation of the Act in the
face of this finding of the lower court stated:
“A man with a monopoly of theaters in any one town
29 —
commands the entrance for all films into that area. If
he used that strategic position to acquire exclusive pri-
vileges in a city where he has competitors, he is employ-
ing his monopoly power as a trade weapon against his
competitors. It may be a feeble, ineffective weapon where
he has only one closed or monopoly town. But as those
towns increase in number throughout a region, his mono-
poly power in them may be used with crushing effect on
competitors in other places. He need not be as crass as
the exhibitors in United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., supra, in order to make his monopoly power effec-
tive in his competitive situations. Though he makes no
threat to withhold the business of his closed or monopoly
towns unless the distributors give him the exclusive film
rights in the towns where he has competitors, the effect
is likely to be the same where the two are joined. When
the buying power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate
films for his compefitive as well as his closed towns, he is
using monopoly power to expand his empire. And even if
we assume he is chargeable in legal contemplation with
that purpose since the end result is the necessary and
direct consequence of what he did. United States v. Pat-
tern, supra, 226 U. S. Page 543, 33 S. Ct. Page 145, 57
~ |
L. Ed. 333, 44, L.R.S., N. S. 325.” (Emphasis ours)
We consider this case governing on the instant case, and
completely parallel,
Notice here no threat was actually found to have been
made by defendant, yet a violation of the Act was found, which
is the very opposite view of that applied by the lower court
in the instant case. The effect of the combination of his
buying power was felt to be present in the negotiations, even
though no mention of.a threat was proved. Why threaten a
potential customer when it is not needed to get hig business?
As to the question of whether a monopoly did result,
30
the Court, in the instant case, found that “practically all of
the fleeting and switching business in the Port of Baton Rouge
insofar as grain barges are concerned. was acquired by
CCI (Tr. 1034, Appendix A, p. 53). We feel justified in adding
that a company with “practically all“ of a certain type of
business is a company that enjoys a monopoly. (See also Tr.
71, 76, 279, and 393.)
*
In discussing a situation not too different from the prob-
lems in the instant case, Judge August Hand in United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 Fed. Sup. 881, on Page 885,
states:
“As further reasons for directing a reconsideration of
the above issues, we were asked to determine whether
the vertical integration of the major defendants, which
was held not to be unlawful per.se, was cofiteived with
an intent to monopolize or was of such a character as to
confer a known monopoly power. If the power be estab-
lished, a specific intent to monopolize need not be shown.
As was said by Justice Douglas in United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 68. Ct. 941, 944, 92 L. Ed. 1236,
and referred to in United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173, 68 S. Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed. 1260:
‘It is, however, not always necessary to find a spécific
intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order
to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is
sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results
the consequence of a defendant’s conduct or business
‘arrangements. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525,
543, 33 S. Ct. 141, 145, 57 L. Ed. 333, 44 L. R. A., N. S.
325; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275,
62 S. Ct. 1070, 1076, 86 L. Ed. 1461. To require a greater
showing would cripple the Act. As stated in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 148 F. 2d
416, 432, ‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what
31
he is doing.’ Specific intent in the sense in which the
common law used the term is necessary only where the
act falls short of the results condemned 7 the Act.’”
(Emphasis ours)
Justice Hand found defendants owned at least 70% of
the first run theaters in 92 cities in the country.
“These figures certainly indicate, when coupled with
the strategic advantages of vertical integration, a power
to exclude competition from thesé markets when desired
If an intent to exercise the power be thought im-
portant, it existed in this case.. (At Page 894.)
Cargill had 100% RTS the Port of Baton Rouge
in the grain-storing business. CCI soon enjoyéd “practically
all” of the fleeting and switching of grain barges. It is sub-
mittecl that the lower Court’s own establish a pat-
tern recognizable as being classically like these well-established
landmark cases.
It is respectfully submitted that from the above authori-
ties the lower court should have considered the inevitable
and proven stifling effect the combination gave to the local
industry in fleeting and harbor towing. THé question that
should be answered was whether or not the combination
- stifled and restricted competition, and the answer, using the
lower court’s own observations, is that insofar as the plain-
tiff, the four operators who were first engaged in this busi-
ness and the present competitors are concerned, all uniformly
are unable to match the ever-tantalizing effect of a hoped
for bonus of more towing contracts as a result of using the
local services of CCI. Thus, from the facts found by the lower
court, a classic case of a violation of the Anti-trust Act is
shown, and the decision is therefore in substantial conflict
with rulings of this Court.
3. Did the Court of Appeals’ error in sustaining the
lower court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff on rebuttal to
enter into an examination of the marine operation that suc-
ceeded petitioner’s bankrupt corporation in every respect,
and thus rebut the contentions of the defendant that the mo-
tives of the customers to this industry in choosing their
local service was governed by price, quality, service, capital
structures and location but rather by hoped for reciprocity,
said position of the Court of Appeals and lower court being
contrary to the principle set out by this Court’s recent opinion
in the case of Federal Trade Commissioner v. Consolidated
Foods Corporation, 85 S. Ct. 1220 (1965).
As shown the principal defense presented by defendants
was not to deny that the power of reciprocity did exist, but
simply to say that it was never used and that the customers
of the fleeting and harbor towing business actually gave no
real consideration to reciprocity. The defendants’ coritention
was that this was in every sense of the word a market as
free as any that had no reciprocity. In order to rebut this
evidence, plaintiff attempted to open an examination of the
fate of a company that in every respect succeeded the plain-
tiff’s operation excepting only its financial problems. We refer
to a company known as “228 Terminal Services, Inc.” prin-
cipally owned by Mr. Prewitt Nelson.
When the question of going into the operation of this
successor) of Clark Marine was originally raised in the pre-
trial order the trial court informed all parties that it con-
.
33
sidered this company after the fact and of no relevancy and
would therefore not allow the evidence to be introduced by
the plaintiff. The defense had prior to the beginning of the
trial caused to be issued an extensive and detailed subpoena
duces tecum to Mr. Nelson because of this stated purpose.
When the Court stated it would not allow such evidence, the
plaintiff acquiesced in this ruling and in order to accom-
modate Mr. Nelson lodged an objection to the subpoena at
the opening of the case which was allowed by the court. The
right to use Mr. Nelson on rebuttal however was reserved
and he was excused from the court room.
When the defense had completed its presentation and
had raised the defenses shown concerning the lack of effect
of reciprocity, the plaintiff then thought it quite relevant
to view just how valid these very elements had been as they
applied to the succeeding company. Accordingly, Mr. Nelson
was called, and on this point the court ruled that he could not
testify. An offer of proof was then made into the record (trial
record 888), with the court granting the usual right to sub-
mit a deposition on the subject as a substitution for the oral
offering. An attempt to take this deposition was made im-
mediately after the trial was completed but counsel for
defendants requested and obtained a delay from counsel for
plaintiff because of personal inconvenience. When again the
deposition was attempted the record had been filed in the
Court of Appeals and an objection was filed by the defense
to the untimely taking of this offer of proof. An answer to
this objection was made by the plaintiff showing the earlier
‘effort to take this offer of proof and claiming a violation of
confidence on the part of counsel for the defense. The Court
of Appeal then ordered that the deposition be taken and
accordingly and in due course it was done.
—
34
During the argument before the Court of Appeals a major
portion of plaintiff’s time was actually consumed in the court’s
considering whether or not the deposition was properly before
the Court, and ultimately this was the only point given any
comment in the per ériam handed down by the Court of
Appeals. In this fashion the issue was clouded by this proce-
dural matter and is discussed here only to attempt to direct
this Court’s attention past this to the real issue of whether
or not the plaintiff had the right on rebuttal to go into Mr.
Nelson’s operation, a point which is validly before this court
as it was before the Court of Appeals, regardless of the
timeliness of the taking of the deposition by reason of the
offer made in open Court.
It was and is our point that if Mr. Nelson’s operation were
properly financed, had a better location than defendants, bet-
ter equipment, equal or better prices and the usual elements
to be found in a free market consideration and still could not
get one new grain towing customer in the Baton Rouge port
from the defendants over an extended period of time, then
it was felt that this was valid rebuttal to the defenses con-
tention that reciprocity had no bearing on their phenomenal
success. Even more pertinent would be the explanation given
to Mr. Nelson by these customers for the refusal to even
consider a change to his business.
This Court recently considered this very evidenciary
question in the case of Commissioner v. Consolidated Foods
Corporation, 85 S. Ct. 1220 (1965). In this case the court was
dealing with the Clayton Act and specifically held that evi-
dence after acquisition and, thus after the fact, was admis-
sible in considering the existence of the continuing effect of
reciprocity as an anti-trust practice. The view was that such
Y
—
35 4
evidence even though being after the fact of acquisition was
excellent in determining the question as to whether or not
competition was stifled by reciprocity forces. This Court gave
specific recognition that such a consideration is continuing in
nature and therefore relevant so long as reciprocity was the
element considered.
The point raised by this reason for writ is whether or
not reciprocity under the Sherman Act, just as under the
Clayton Act, can be validly considered on evidence that took
place after the plaintiff’s bankruptcy, in determining if con-
tinuing reciprocity forces are still stifling the market in which
the plaintiff, though now departed, once existed. If plain-
tiff had successfully shown as it did in the disputed offer of
proof that Mr. Nelson could do no better than the plaintiff
had, even though located in the plaintiff’s exact location and
with considerably better financial structure, and even better
equipment and that he was unable to even obtain one new
grain towing customer during the period of time since he had
entered the business up to the date of trial, a period of over
a year, we feel that such a consideration under such cir-
cumstances falls within the meaning, the reasoning and the
rule set out in the Commissioner v. Consolidated Corporation
case as being a valid and highly effective way of refuting the
claim of a free market made by the defense.
4. Did the Court of Appeals substantially err in accept-
ing the conclusion of the lower court that Cargo Carriers,
Inc., obtained a complete dominancé of the fleeting and harbor
towing business in the Baton Rouge Port as to grain barges
because of superior service and management on the part of
the said Cargo Carriers, Inc.
36
It is our position that where a company such as the
defendant CCI enters an otherwise highly competitive field
and immediately obtains control of all of the business from
customers who are actually their competitors in the towing
business, then such a success cannot be viewed as anything
but unnatural. When it is further seen that these competitors
are subjected to a priority system of service which of neces-
sity favors CCI and Cargill over their own equipment and at
prices considerably greater than previously charged then no
amount of explanation can be given which could cover a clear
violation of the Sherman Act where the power of reciprocity
over these same customers is admittedly present.
It is our understanding that this court is loath to grant
writs on questions that are not of general concern. This
particular reason for writ is therefore added without exten-
sive explanation in order to assure its consideration if a writ
if granted for the reasons otherwise shown that do have gen-
eral and universal importance. Q
37
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Dated at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, December 3, 1965.
Respectfully submitted,
BENTON & MOSELEY
114 St. Louis Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Dopp, : AVANT & WALL
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorneys for Petitioner
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