Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gharibians v. California

Lie _<° rd Office Supreme Court, U.S.

ces COURT: © FILED

IN THE APR 30 1965

Supreme Court of the United Ska-¢gy fom: cx

October Term, 1

No wes, 7D

Hark GuarIBIANS, |

Petitioner,

US.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate

Department of the Superior Court of the County

of Los Angeles for the State of California.

Davip ARTHUR BINDER,

6331 Hollywood Boulevard,

Hollywood, Calif. 90028,

Attorney for Petitioner Haik Ghatibians.

Parker & Son, Inc, Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone MA. 6-9171.

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

Opinions below 1

Jurisdiction 2

Questions presented 2

Statute involved 2

Statement of the case 3

Facts 3

How the federal questions sought to be reviewed

were raised and passed upon by the courts below 4

1. In the trial court . a

2. In the Appellate Department of the Supe-

rior Court 5

Reasons for granting the writ and argument ampli-

fying same 6

Conclusion 13

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix “A” — Judgment of Trial Court ............ 1

Appendix “B” — Judgment of Appellate Depart-

ment of the Superior Court 1

Appendix “C” — California Penal Code §647(a)(1 2

Appendix “D” — Testimony of Police Officer ad-

mitted over objection 3

Appendix “E” — California Penal Code §647a(2) 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 6

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 =

Kelly v. — Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324

P. 2d 990 . 11

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 6

People v. Carskaddon, 49 Cal. 2d 423, 318 P. 2d 4 7

People v. Carskaddon, 170 Cal. App. 2d 45, 338

P. 2d 201 .. 7, 12

People v. Fernandez, 196 Cal. App. 2d 265, 16 Cal.

Rptr. 482 7

People v. McNair, 130 Cal. App. 2d 696, 279 P.

2d 800 ie A

People v. Moore, 137 Cal. App. 2d 197, 290 P.2d 40 7

People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App. 2d 895, 246 P.

2d 173 : 2

People v. Thompson, 167 Cal. App. 2d 727, 335 P.®

2d 249 7,

Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 7

Dictionaries

Webster’s Third International Dictionary ................ 8

Statutes

California Business and Professions Code, Sec. .

25658 3

California Penal Code, Sec. 290 11

California Penal Code, Sec. 470 11

California Penal Code, Sec. 647a 11

California Penal Code, Sec. 647a(1)............. a a, &, %.

California Penal Code, Sec. 647a(2) | 12

California Penal Code, Sec. 1203.4 11

California Penal Code, Sec. 1203.4a 11

United States Code, Title 8, Sec. 1251(a) (4) ........ 11

Textbooks

Dr. James C. Coleman, University of California at

Los Angeles, Abnormal Psychology and Modern

Life, p. 12 9

Rose, They and We, Professor of Sociology and An-

tropology at Smith College and University of Mas-

sachusetts, p. 15 10

nt ere er ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1964

| een

Hark GHARIBIANS,

Petitioner,

US.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate

Department of the Superior Court of the County

of Los Angeles for the State of California.

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to re-

view (the judgment of the Appellate Department of the

Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles for the

State of California in the above-entitled matter.

Opinions Below.

The trial court rendered no written opinion. A copy

of its judgment as found in the transcript of the docket

is set out in Appendix “A.”

The Appellate Department oi the Superior Court of

the County of Los Angeles for the State of California

rendered no written opinion. The judgment of the Ap-

pellate Department of the Superior Court is set forth

in Appendix “B.” |

re,

Jurisdiction.

1. The judgment of the Appellate Department of

the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles for

the State of California was filed on January 14, 1965.

2. Timely petition for rehearing or in the alterna-

tive for certification to the District Court of Appeal

was filed on January 20, 1965.

3. An Order Denying Rehearing or Certification to

the District Court of Appeal was filed on January 21,

1965.

4. The statutory provision believed to confer on this

court jurisdiction to review the judgment in question

by writ of certiorari is 28 U.S. 1257(3).

Questions Presented.

1. Whether California Penal Code Section 647a(1)

as interpreted by the California Courts to provide that

a defendant may be guilty of annoying or molesting

a child under eighteen years, if the defendant’s conduct

is “so lewd or obscene as to unhesitantly irritate a

normal person,” is void for vagueness.

2. Whether the principle announced in Escobedo

v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, is applicable to statements of

a defendant, which statements, though not per se ad-

missions or confessions, may be used to incriminate —

the defendant.

3. Whether the principle announced in Escobedo v.

Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, is applicable once an alleged vic-

tim has accused the defendant of a crime.

Statutes Involved.

The statute involved is California Penal Code Sec-

tion 647a(1). Said statute is printed in Appendix “C”.

—3—

Statement of the Case.

Facts.

Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation

of California Penal Code Section 647a(1).’ Trial was

had in the Municipal Court of Glendale Judicial Dis-

trict, County of Los Angeles, State of California. On

July 9, 1964, petitioner was found guilty of both counts.

The facts adduced at trial showed the following:

On April 4, 1964, at approximately 12:30 A.M. peti-

tioner met Patrick Bender Ryan and Rod Watters, both

age fifteen, at the corner of Cavanaugh and Mountain

Streets in Glendale, California. How this meeting was

arranged is disputed by the testimony. The parties

then went for a ride, during which period of time the

petitioner stopped and purchased some Country Club

Stourt Beer at a liquor store. Subsequently, the par-

ties proceeded to a motel in Glendale, California, where

the petitioner secured a room. After petitioner had en-

tered the room, the boys subsequently followed. While

in the room the boys drank some of the beer which pe-

titioner had purchased. After the boys had consumed

some beer, the petitioner allegedly committed the acts

for which he was convicted; the alleged acts involved

the physical touching of the two boys, including the

rubbing of their chests and passing his hand over the

boys’ private parts (petitioner denied such acts).

The parties left the motel at approximately 3:50

o’clock A.M. on April 4, 1964. Upon leaving the mo-

tel, the boys proceeded independently of the petitioner,

who went to his automobile.

Oo

Petbecis Gil ele Made ad Tn iat oF iit

Business and Professions Code §25658, giving alcholic beverage

to persons under age 21, but was not convicted on such charges.

= a

Subsequently the boys were stopped by the Glendale

City Police and questioned. After the police had com-

menced their interrogation of the boys, one of the of-

ficers went over to the petitioner, who was in an auto-

mobile across the street in a parking lot adjacent to the

motel, and asked him to remain until the officer had

finished questioning the boys. The officer then re-

turned to his interrogation of the boys. After having

such further conversation with the boys” and obtain-

ing at least one of the boy’s version of what happened

in the motel room, the officer then proceeded to inter-

rogate the petitioner. Statements elicited by the offi-

cer from the petitioner during this interrogation were

subsequently received into evidence at the petitioner’s

trial over objection by defense counsel. The nature of

the statements admitted, over objection, included the

following :

1. Certain unfavorable statements which the officer

claimed petitioner had made relative to not knowing the

two boys.

2. Certain false statements initially made by the pe-

titioner to the officer, apparently in an endeavor to

avoid any involvement with the police.

How the Federal Questions Sought to Be Reviewed Were

Raised and Passed on by the Courts Below.

1. In the trial court. The question of the improper

admission into evidence of damaging statements made

by petitioner in the course of the police interrogation -

was raised by objection to the questions on the ground

that there had been no showing that petitioner had

been apprised of his right to counsel or to remain silent.

coulis

The questions, the objections, and the court’s rulings

are found in Reporter’s Transcript page 99, line 1

through page 105, line 22, and are reproduced in Ap-

pendix “D.”

The question of improper admission of the police

officer’s testimony was also raised in a motion for new

trial. The motion for new trial was denied.

The question of deprivation of due process of law

through conviction under an unconstitutionally vague

statute was not raised as such in the trial court.

2. In the Appellate Department of the Superior

Court. The question of the improper admission into

evidence of petitioner’s statements during police inter-

rogation was raised in the settled statement on appeal

and was argued in the briefs and orally.

Since no written opinion was rendered by the Ap-

pellate Department of the Superior Court no statement

can be made as to how such question was disposed of

by that court. 2

The question of denial of due process was raised in

the settled statement on appeal and was argued both

orally and at length in the petitioner’s opening and

reply briefs.

Since no written opinion was rendered by the Appel-

_ late Department of the Superior Court no statement can

be made as to how the question of deprivation of due

process was disposed of by the court.

isis

Reasons for Granting the Writ and Argument

Amplifying Same.

a of

A penal statute which fails to advise a potential de-

fendant before he acts of what the laws command or

forbid is unconstitutionally vague.

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.

385 ;

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451.

In 1952 Penal Code Section 647a(1) was attacked

in the California Courts as failing to be sufficiently

certain. People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App. 2d 895, 246 P.

2d 173. The attack was in essence twofold. First,

it was argued that the words of the statute were in-

herently ambiguous. Secondly, and more significantly,

it was asserted that because the difference between

criminal and non-criminal conduct was made dependent

upon the subjective emotional reaction of a child (14.e.,

whether the child was annoyed), the statute indeed

failed to provide the requisite advance notice consonant

with due, process. This latter point was met by the

Court as follows:

“The annoyance or molestation which is forbidden

is in no sense a purely subjective state on the part

of the child. The objectionable acts of a defendant

constitute the annoyance or molestation contem-

plated by the statute.” (112 Cal. App. 2d at 901-

902.)

In 1955 in People v. McNair, 130 Cal. App. 2d 696,

279 P. 2d 800 (1955), the objectionable acts of a de-

fendant as referred to in People v. Pallares, supra,

were further defined. The Court stated:

- =

“If the conduct of a detendant is so lewd or ob-

scene that the normal person would unhesitantly

be irritated by it, such conduct would annoy or

molest within the purview of section 647a., subdi-

vision (1), Penal Code.” (130 Cal. App. 2d at

698.)

The language used by the Court in McNair has been

cited again and again by the California Courts in de-

fining “annoy or molest” as used in the statute and

hence under the principle announced in Winter v. New

York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947) constitutes the standard

by which a defendant is to be judged.? In each of the

following cases the McNair definition has been used

by the California Courts to define “annoy or molest”

in an objective sense.

People v. Fernandez, 196 Cal. App. 2d 265, 16

Cal. Rptr. 482 (1961);

People v. Carskaddon, 49 Cal. 2d 423, 318 P.

2d 4 (1957);

People v. Carskaddon, 170 Cal. App. 2d 45, 338

P. 2d 201 (1959);

People v. Thompson, 167 Cal. App. 2d 727, 335

P. 2d 249 (1959);

People v. Moore, 137 Cal. App. 2d 197, 290 P.

2d 40 (1955). :

Though the California Courts in dealing with ques-

tions of vagueness inherent in Penal Code Section 647a- _

(1) have often found synonyms for annoy,* such syno-

meaning for the of the determination of -the statute’s con-

by the United States S Court as definitely as

if the statute had been amended by the legislature.

Seas Oden hee ter eae “ce oe used in Penal

Code Section 647a(1) is synonymous with the word “annoy.”

People v. Pallares, supra, at 112 Cal. App. 2d 901.

= a

nyms despite their clarity have always contained an ele-

ment of the subjective reaction of the child. See for

example Peopie v. Pallares, supra, at 112 Cal. App. 2d

901, where the court uses such words as irk, offend,

injure.

It is submitted that a standard based upon what will

“unhesitantly irritate a normal person” can never pass

constitutional muster.

Initially it should be noted that not all lewd or ob-

scene acts fall within the purview of the statute. Rather,

only those lewd or obscene acts “which would unhesi-

tantly irritate a normal person” are forbidden. No quar-

rel is found with the use of the words “lewd” or

“obscene” as these words have well-established common

law meanings. It is the series of words which are used

to modify “lewd” or “obscene” which create the dif-

ficulty.

The word “irritate” is certainly too vague to furnish

the requisite standard. Webster’s Third International

Dictionary includes in its definitions of “irritate” ‘the

following: “To excite impatience, anger or displeasure

in...” Clearly this standard dictionary definition

shows full well the vagueness which is inherent in the

words “irritate.” When has a defendant irritated? When

he has displeased or when he has angered a “normal per-

son”? Or, must a defendant’s conduct do both? Cer-

tainly one can be displeased without being angered.

The word “unhesitantly” fairs no better. Webster’s

Third International Dictionary, in its definition of

“hesitate,” includes the following: “1 a. To hold back

in doubt or indecision; avoid facing a decision, en-

counter or problem. b. To hold back from or as if from

—9—

scruple. 2. To delay use momentarily; pause.” Hence,

“hesitate” can refer to a state of mind or a state of

action. Which’ is required by the language of the Mc-

Nair case? If the act of the defendant immediately

causes some reserved sense of displeasure, is this

enough? Or, does the language permit time to reflect

upon the defendant’s action, provided only that the ulti-

mate conclusion is an undoubting anger?

What does seem to be clear from the McNair de-

cision is that different juries faced with identical sets

of facts will be free to determine what the law requires,

depending upon their individual interpretations of words

such as “irritate” and “unhesitantly.”

Finally, assuming arguendo that no problem is

created by the use of the words “unhesitantly” and “‘ir- .

ritate,” the term “normal person” is doubtedly so vague

as to be beyond definition.

The tetm “normal person” might be used in either

a psychological or sociological sense. In a psychologi-

cal sense “one might try to distinguish a “normal in-

dividual” from an “abnormal individual.” The problem

here, however, as pointed out by Dr. James C. Cole-

man, Professor of Psychology, University of Cali-

fornia at Los Angeles, in his book ABNORMAL

PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE, at page 12,

is that:

“A sharp dividing line between ‘normal’ and ‘ab-

normal’ behavior simply does not exist, contrary to

popular belief . .. Not only does the behavior of dif-

ferent individuals range by imperceptible degrees

from the normal to the abnormal, but one indi-

vidual may shift at different times to different

positions along the range.”

_ oe

In a sociological sense the term “normal person”

might be taken to describe the statistically average

American. However, it is clear that the very hetero-

genous make-up of our Nation, with the varying

religious, national and economic background of our

people, creates a situation in which no such statistically

- average American can be found. As stated in THEY

AND WE, by Peter I. Rose, Professor of Sociology

and Anthropology at Smith College and University of

Massachusetts, at page 15:

“Between the prescriptions set forth in the Pre-

amble to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights

and the actual behavior of many people there exists

a wide range of circumscribed standards of be-

havior which vary markedly from group to group,

from place to place, and from time to time. The

formal and informal policies of the region, state,

and local community ; the social, economic, religious

and political groups to which one belongs; the at-

titudes of parents, teachers, and peers; and the

demand of particular intergroup and interpersonal

situations of interaction, all greatly influence the

ways in which individuals act toward others.”

Hence, regardless of whether the term “normal per-

son” be used\in a psychological or sociological vein, the

term is one which has little or no meaning in fact

and is therefore totally vague and ambiguous.

In ‘the case at bar, the petitioner is a resident alien

of the United States. If his conviction is allowed to

stand, he will not only be subject to a six-month jail

sentence prescribed by the trial court, but what is far

—

more significant he will be subject to deportation as an

alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude.*

Moreover, even asSuming that petitioner would not

be subject to such a harsh penalty as deportation, he

nonetheless would under California law be branded as a

“sex offender” and hence be required to register as such

with the Chief of Police in every California city where

he might thereafter reside. Such registration might be

required to continue for the rest of petitioner’s life, long

after he had served the sentence pronounced by the trial

court.®

Every year hundreds of Californians are branded for

life as “sex offenders” because of convictions under

Penal Code Section 647a. Statistics are not available for

convictions in the Justice and Municipal Courts (where

*8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4) provides that every alien who “is con-

victed of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within

five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or

confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a year

or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of two

crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single

scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined

therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a

single trial.”

petitioner’s two convictions in this case would be

determined to arise out of a single scheme, petitioner may none-

theless face deportation in that in 1956 petitioner was convicted

in the Los Angeles Superior Court of violation of P.C. 470-For-

gery.

5Under California Penal Code Section 290 every person con-

victed of specified crimes including Section 647a(1) must regis-

ter as a sex offender with the appropriate law enforcement agency

in every city in which he subsequently resides. Unless the de-

fendant can qualify to have the conviction expunged under Cali-

fornia Penal Code Sections 1203.4 or 1203.4a, the requirement of

registration remains for the duration of the defendant’s life.

(1988). Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324 P. 2d 990

cenl Danss

petitioner was convicted),* but the records of convic-

tion in the Superior Courts of California as maintained

by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics in the office of the

State Attorney General show the following :"

Convictions 1962 105

Convictions 1963. 114

Convictions 1964 101

In addition, it is to be noted that certain of these

persons are being convicted not for what they did but

rather simply for what they said. A conviction under

California Penal Code Section 647a(1) does not require

that the defendant do any physical act; mere words are

enough. People v. McNair, supra; People v. Thompson,

supra, People v. Carskadden, 170 Cal. App. 2d 45, 338

P. 2d 201. In the latter case a defendant was convicted

solely for statements made to a 17-year-old girl.

It is submitted that where a conviction is based upon

a statute which is so inherently ambiguous and where *¢

such conviction can lead to the ultimate deportation of

the petitioner, that the Supreme Court should review

the decision particularly in view of the fact that the

statute is being applied to convict hundreds of Califor-

niaris every year and brand them for life as “sex of-

fenders” sometimes in circumstances where the only

conduct of the defendant was an act of speech alone.

SAll first offenses under Penal Code Section 647a(1) are mis-

demeanors and are therefore filed in either justice or municipal

courts.

TThe statistics cover convictions under Penal Code Section

647a(1) and eg “he No breakdown between the two sub-

divisions is available. Penal Code Section 647a(2) is set forth in

Appendix “E.” In addition, certain of the convictions involved

misdemeanors (even in the Superior Court) because the

convictions arose out of a of guilty on a charge other than

that with which the defendant was originally charged.

ae.

Il.

In the case at bar, there was received into, evidence,

over petitioner’s objection, testimony of a police officer

concerning the officer’s interrogation of petitioner. The

interrogation itself took place after the officer had ques-

tioned the two boys whom petitioner had allegedly mo-

lested and at least one of the boys had fully related

what had previously transpired that evening insofar as

the acts of petitioner were concerned. No arrest had been

made prior to the interrogation of petitioner but peti-

tioner had been required by the police to remain for in-

terrogation until the police had finished their ‘question-

ing of the two boys.

Included among the officer’s testimony were various

Statements of petitioner, which, though not confessions

or. admissions, were damaging because such statements

untrue and were made apparently for the purpose

voiding involvement with the authorities.

In view of the importance of the decision in Esco-

bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, and the potential de-

portation of defendant, it is submitted that the court

should grant certiorari herein in order to clarify when

an investigation can be said to have focused on a par-

ticular defendant and whether the principle announced

in Escobedo is applicable to damaging statements which

do not constitute confessions or admissions.

Conclusion.

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip ArTHuR BINDER,

Attorney for Petitioner Haik Gharibians.

INITIATE POLL PTT IML GL Te

APPENDIX “A”,

It is the order of the court that defendant be sen-

tenced to 180 days in the Los Angeles County Jail

on Count I. . . . Court orders defendant to serve 180

days in the Los Angeles County Jail on Count 2. J¢ ts

the further order of the Court that said sentences are

to run concurrently... .

August 6, 1964.

APPENDIX “B”.

In the Appellate Department of the Superior Court

of the State of California for the County of Los

Angeles.

Superior Court No. CR A 5975

People of the State of California, Plaintiff and Re-

spondent, vs. Haik Gharibians, Defendant and Appel-

lant.

Trial Court No. M 21545

On Appeal from the Municipal Court of the Glendale

Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of Cali-

fornia. Kenneth A. White, Judge.

This cause having been argued and submitted and

fully considered, judgment is ordered as follows:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judg-

ment as to Count I made and entered in the Municipal

Court of the Glendale Judicial District, County of Los

Angeles, State of California, in the above entitled cause

be and the same is hereby affirmed. The judgment as

to Count II is reversed with directions to re-sentence

7

in accordance with law. The appeal from order deny-

ing motion for new trial is dismissed. (P.C. 1466.)

January 14, 1965.

By the Court

” | sone i ie

‘ding J

Smith, :

Judge.

Swain,

Judge.

APPENDIX “Q”.

California Penal Code §647a(1).

Every person who annoys or molests any child under

the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punishable upon first

conviction by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars

($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not

exceeding six months or by both such fine and impris-

oS subsequent conviction or upon the first conviction after

a previous conviction under Section 288 of this code

by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than

one year:

APPENDIX “D”.

HAROLD HINDS, JR.

called as a witness by and on behalf of the People,

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testi-

fied as follows:

The Clerk: State your name, sir.

The Witness: Harold Hinds, Jr.

The Clerk: Thank you. How do you spell that?

The Witness: H-i-n-d-s.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Moore:

Q. Officer, what is your business or occupa-

tion? A. Police officer, City of Glendale.

Q. Were you employed in that capacity on

April 4, 1964? A. Yes, sir.

Q. On that date, did you see the preceding

witnesses, Rod Watfers and Pat Ryan? A. Yes,

I did.

Q. What time did you see them? A. It was

approximately 3:50 a.m.

Q. Where did you see them? A. They were

standing on — just off the parting lot across from

the Astromotel, the 300 block East Colorado.

Q. When you saw them, what did you do?\

A. @f turned my police vehicle around, stopped,

talked to them.

Q. After you talked to them, what did you do?

A. What do you mean after I talked to them?

Q. Did you see the defendant as you were talk-

ing to the witnesses? A. Yes, I did.

Q. Where was he? A. He was in his vehicle

driving gut of the parking lot of the Astromotel.

»

——

Q. What kind of vehicle was that? A. 1963

Jaguar, XK-E.

Q.. Do you recall the license number? A. No, I

don’t.

Q. What did you do upon seeing the defend-

ant? A. I asked him to sit and wait over there

while I questioned the two boys.

Q. Did he stay on the lot? A. Yes, he did.

Q. Did you go to the automobile later and talk

to him? A. Yes, I did.

Q. All right. What did you first see when you

went to the vehicle? A. I asked—well, first I

asked him to get out of the car, and I observed

inside the vehicle some cans of beer.

Q. And did you talk to the defendant? A. Yes,

I did.

Q. Did you ask him for some identification?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did he show you any? A. Yes. He produced

his driver’s license and stated that he was a prac-

ticing intern, working at the Hollywood Medical

Center on Hollywood Boulevard.

Q. And what did his identification show? A. ”

I believe it was Dr. Haik Gharibians.

Q. Now, were there any witnesses at the time

you talked to the defendant? A. Myself and the de-

fendant. :

Q. About what time was this? A. This was

approximately 4:00 a.m.

Q. Was this also on April 4? A. Yes.

Q. Were the statements he made at the time

freely and voluntarily made? A. Yes, they were.

Q. What did you say to the defendant and what

did he say to you?

oo

Mr. Lakritz: I would object to the introduction

of any statement by the defendant to the police of-

ficer unless there is a foundation laid in accordance

with the latest decision of the Supreme Court of

the United States.

The Court: Do you wish to lay your founda-

tion?

Mr. Moore: I believe—

The Court: The objection is overruled.

Mr. Lakritz: The latest decision of the Su-

preme Court having reference to the introduction

into evidence of any kind of confession or admis-

sions made by a prime suspect in a criminal action,

and I believe the Supreme Court held some such

statements or admissions or confessions would be

inadmissible unless the defendant had prior been

advised of his right to obtain counsel and to have

counsel present.

The Court: Now, the objection is overruled.

Read the question, please, Miss Reporter. (Record

read. ) ?

The Witness: After I had his identification in

my possession, I asked him if he knew the two

young men standing across the street on Colorado.

Mr. Lakritz: Your Honor, again, I don’t wish

to interrupt. I want to be clear on that continuing

objection to this line of questioning having refer-

ence to any conversation or admissions as to any

type of testimony by this police officer with this

particular defendant on the grounds and basis that

I have stated before, if I am not mistaken the exact

holding of that case—I stand on whatever the hold-

ing of that case is, and I make any objection based

on the language and holding of that case.

£

The Court: Now, actually, there is no question

pending at this time, either.

Mr. Lakritz: No. There was. He answered the

question.

Mr. Moore: What was the last question and

answer ?

(Record read.)

Q. By Mr. Moore: What did he say?

Mr. Lakritz: Your Honor, I object.

The Court: The objection is overruled.

Mr. Lakritz: But it is under—

The Court: I understand the grounds.

Mr. Lakritz: I continue to stand on—

The Court: You go to the step of whatever

objection you are going to make when op-

portunity and occasion arises.

Mr. Lakritz: All right. Thank you.

The Witness: At this time I asked him when

I had his identification in my possession—

Mr. Lakritz: I object again to this particular

question on the same grounds and same bases

as the prior objections.

The Court: The objection is overruled.

Will the reporter read the question.

(Record read.)

The Witness: He stated, no, he did not know

the two boys standing across the street.

Q. By Mr. Moore: What did you next ask

him? A. This time—

Mr. Lakritz: I again repeat the objection.

The Court: Objection is overruled. *

Mr. Lakritz: Thank you.

The Witness: I asked him to whom the beer

cans belonged and he stated they belonged to him.

>.

a

Q. By Mr. Moore: What did you next ask

him? ye

Mr. Lakritz: Again, I object.

The Court: Objection overruled on the same

grounds.

Mr. Lakritz: Thank you.

The Court: Do you know what the question

was?

(Record read.)

The Witness: I don’t really exactly.

Q. By Mr. Moore: What were the .further

conversations you had with him?

Mr. Lakritz: To which again I object.

The Court: Qverruled on the same ground.

The Witness: ic stated that he did not know

Watters, and he had seen the two hitchhiking

earlier in the evening and had picked them up.

Q. By Mr. Moore: Was there any further

conversation with the defendant?

Mr. Lakritz: To which, again, I object and

- move to strike all of these questions. :

The Court: The motion to strike and the ob-

jection is overruled on the same grounds.

Mr. Lakritz: I move to strike all of the an-

swers of this particular officer as to all of the

last ten or so questions.

The Court: The motion to strike is denied on

the same grounds. .

The Witness: I asked Mr. Gharibians if he

had any beer. I directly asked Mr. Gharibians if

he had given the boys any beer, and he said only

one canor glass.

a

Q. By Mr. Moore: Was there any further

conversation?

Mr. Lakritz: Again, restate my objection at

this time and move to strike any answer.

The Court: The motion to strike is denied and

the objection is overruled.

The Witness: -I specifically asked about the

two boys and he said, no, he definitely did not.

Q. By Mr. Moore: Is that all of the conversa-

tions you had with the defendant? A. That’s

all.

Mr. Moore: No further questions.

Mr. Lakritz: No questions.

The Court: Step down, Mr. Hinds.

Mr. Moore: The People rest, your Honor.

APPENDIX “E”.

California Penal Code §647a(2).

Every person who loiters about any school or public

place at or near which children attend or normally con-

gregate is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of

not exceeding fivé’hundred dollars ($500) or by im-

prisonment in the county jail for not exceeding six

months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.