Appendix — Jacobs v. Tennessee
Supreme Court brief1965
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APPENDIX A
IN THE :
5 _ UNITED STATES COUBT OF APPEALS.
1 . FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT -
oe nee
No. 21049
1
3 Robert Narol a a/k/ a Jimmy 1 AND
“co: Roserst GRENE,
3 Aepelesde
VERSUS nes
Unitep States or AMERICA,
. 5 f .
**
8 from the United States District Court for the
Southern — of Florida.
, (March 3, 1965.) ae
. Before Torri, Chief Judge, Grooms and McRas,
District Judges. .
Pu G There was ample idee as to each of
the appellants. to sustain the verdict of the jury and judg-
ments of conviction.
In the absence of any showing of prejudice resulting
from the holding of trial twelve days after the arraign- 3
ment of Grene, we can not determine that the trial court
erred in denying the motion for continuance.
No exceptions having been made te the charge as given
by the trial court, we find no reversible error in. the failure
of the court to give a specific charge on the accomplice
testimony i in view of the adequacy of the — as a whole.
The judgment i is AFFIRMED : Be
2
APPENDIX B
_ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS .
Fon THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 31,049
Vincent Ropert Napoui a/k/a JIMMY Napout AND
Rosert GRRX EB,
a)
1
1 2
Unrrxo Sen OF eee
! ; Appellee.
Filed ere 2, 1965
Appeals from the United States District Court id the
Southern District of Florida ;
(April 2, 1965)
. On Petitions for Rehearing
Before TuTTLe, Chief J judge, Grooms and McRar, District
— ea
5 > Irs anes that the petitions for rehearing filed sepa-
rately by Napoli and Grene in the above styled and num-
bered cause be, and the same is, hereby DENIED.
Court Rule
RULE 32
' ISSUANCE OF MANDATE
*
i yt Date of Issuance: The mandate of the court shall issue
after twenty-one (21) days from the date’ of decision un-
-less the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A certified
‘copy of the judgment, and a copy of the opinion of the
court, if any, where a new trial or further proceedings
are to be had in the lower court, shall constitute the man-
date, unless the court directs that a formal mandate issue.
The timely filing of a petition for rehearing will stay the
mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise
ordered by the court. Unless otherwise ordered, if the
_ petition is denied, the mandate shall issue after seven (7)
days from entry of the order denying the petition.
A mandate once issued will not be recalled except by the
court and to prevent injustice.
Adopted May 31st, 1963. ‘
Ar . e
UNITED STATES COURT OF ArrRAIEC
FIFTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT Ramus Narro a/k/a Jimmy NAPOLI xD
- Ropert Greve, 45. 3
Appellants.
5 vs. 5 . :
Untrep States or AMERICA, ~
3 ie: Appellee.
No 21,049 ,
Petition for Rehearing
‘Comes now the Appellant Robert Grene, by and through
his undersigned attorney and respectfully petitions this
Honorable Court for a rehearing herein, and as grounds
respectfully submits unto the Court the following.
1. That this Honorable Court has failed to consider
the question of whether or not the Appellant was denied
due process of law by the denial of his motion for a con-
tinuance at the time of surrender and arraignment, and
the holding of his rial twelve (12) days later in the cases
of 7 ;
V. 8. v. Wight, 2nd Cir., 176 F. 2d 376 7
Everitt v. United States, 5th Cir., 281 F. 2d 424
and the Constitution of the United States Amendment
Amendment ‘VL, and. further in the light of the gen-
eral recognition by the Bar of this Country that even
the most able, experienced —— of the law cannot
4a J
prepare an adequate and propertꝭ defense in a criminal
matter containing nine (9) counts and twelve (12) overt
acts in the space of twelve (12) days. :
It is respectfully suggested and alleged that the situa-
tion set forth above is prejudicial on its face and denies
the Appellant due process of law and the right to have ”
assistance of counsel for his defense.
2. That this Court has failed and overlooked the argu-
ment set forth by the Appellant that he was denied due
process of law by the actions of the trial court throughout
the trial and that the record herein, on its face, shows
that the Appellant has been denied due process of law
required by the Constitution of the United States Amend-
ment V. Appellant respectfully sets forth in support of
this position and contention the cases of:
‘ Baker v. United States, 5th Cir., 156 F2d 386
Gomila v. United States, 5th Cir., 146 F2d 372
Hunter v. United States, 5th Cir., 62 F2d 217
Adler v. United States, 5th Cir., 182 F 464
United States v. Standard Ou Company, 7th Cir.,
317 F2d 884
United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 2nd Cir., 241 Fd 157
3. That this Court has failed to consider, or has over-
looked the contention that the evidence herein was purely
circumstantial and does not exclude every reasonable
‘hypothesis other than guilt. This Court has consistently
held that the. test in circumstantial evidence cases is
_ -whether the inferences which could have been reasonably
drawn from the evidence were not only consistent with
guilt, but whether they were inconsistent with every
reasonable hypothesis of i innocence.
Bryan v. United States, 5th Cir., 175 F2d 223, aff’d
338 U.S. 552, 70 S. Ct. 317, 34 L. Ed. 335, rehear-
ing denied 338 U.S. 957, 70 S. Ct. 491, 94 L. Ed.
590
Crane v. United States, 5th Cir., 148 F2d 615.
Da
Williamson v. United States, 5th Cir., 332 F2d 123
Thomas v. United States, 5th Cir., 239 F2d 7
Wise v. United States, öth Cir., 241 F2d 345
United States ex, rel Argento v. Jacobs, 175 F. Supp.
877 s
Knight v. United See Sth Cir, 279 72d 675 cert.
den’d 370 U.S. 923, 82 S. Ct. 1565, 8 L. Ed. 2nd
4. That this Court has failed to consider or has over-
looked the proposition that the fair administration of
justice requires a specific charge on accomplice testimony, .
notwithstanding any other charges that are given; and that
no exception need be made by counsel for the Appellant
upon the conclusion of the charges with respect to the
failurè to give a charge on accomplice testimony, inas-
much as this failure to so charge would constitute funda-
mental érror. In support of this contention, Appellant
respectfully: cites the cases of:
Surratt v. United States, 269 F2d 240, 106 U 8. App.
D. C. 49
McQuald v. United States, 195 Fzd 987, 91 U.S. App.
D. C. 229 cert. den'd 344 U.S. 929, 73 8. Ct. 499,
97 L. Ed. 715
~Brickey v. United States, 8th Cir. 123 F2d 341
United States v. Tarricone, 2nd Cir. 242 F2d 555
Ward v. United States, 5th Cir., 296 F2d 898
West v. United States, 5th Cir., 113 F2d 68, Cert:
den’d 311 U. S. 647, 61 S. Ct. 33, 85 L. Ed. 413
Peel v. United States, 5th Cir., 316 F2d 907
. Lylés v. United States, 5th Cir., 249 F2d 744
. Phelps v. United States, 5th Cir., 252 F2d 49, 52
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of em 1965.
Attorney for
BxRNAR⁰ BERMAN,
Attorney for Appellani Robert Grene
1440 79th Street Causeway, }
Miami Beach, Florida, 33141
6a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
, FIFTH CIRCUIT
Vincent ROBERT Napou a/k/a Jimmy Napout AND
Rosert (RENE;
Appellants.
: vs. 3
Unstrep States or Aunica,
: Appellee.
No 21,049
On Appeal from the United States District Court ey the
Southern District of Florida
Brief of Appellant Robert Grene
SuprremgnTaL SrarzMENT or THE Case |
The indictment against the Appellant, Robert Grene,
was issued on July 3rd, 1963. On July 5th, 1963, a warrant
for the arrest of the Appellant, Robert Grene, was issued,
and on J uly 10th, 1963, the Appellant, Robert Grene, sur-
rendered in open Court and was arraigned, his motion for
continuance being denied at the time of arraignment.
A trial of this cause was commenced on July 22nd, 1963.
and terminated on July 30th, 1963. 8
A prior indictment against the other two 0
in this cause was issued February Ist, 1963. The indict-
ment herein and the prior indictment were the same as
. the counts on which all the defendants were tried, and as
to these counts the only change was the naming of the
Appellant, Robert Grene, as an additional defendant.
Surrrementan SraremEnt OF THE Facts
At the outset it is to be noted that the Statement of
Facts set forth in the Government’s brief does not present
the facts in a clear, concise and accurate manner. The evi-
. dence and testimony does not completely support all of
the statement of facts set forth in the Government’s brief.
7a
Appellant, Robert Grene, first met Eldred Altman
Reames in the Fall of 1962 (TS-59; TR-563.) At that time
a discussion was held -relative to land in Brazil (TR-59,
60; TR-563-564). In October, 1962, Appellant, Robert
Grene, and Reames reached an agreement relating to the
construction of 10,000 homes on the Reames property in
Brazil (TR-354, 355; TR-565). At the request of Reames,
Appellant, ‘Robert Grene, submited a proposal to a firm |
in Atlanta, Georgia; nothing came of this submission (TR.
564). Appellant, Robert Grene, then introduced defen-
dants, Napoli and Ross to Reames (TR-60; TR-357; TR-
357; TR-568) ; the defendant, Napoli, being a builder Who
had engaged in extensive consrtuction work in the Miami
area, and the defendant, Rosa, representing that he had
funds available to — the transaction (TR-60; 61; TR.
521). Reames had previously referred the Appellant,
Robert Grene, to an insurance agency for the purpose of
obtaining a commitment for funds for the project (TR-
566), and Appellant, Robert Grene, had received a letter
‘and telegram on that matter (TR-532, 533; TR-566). The
conditional. commitment required insurance coverage or
guarantee from Lloyds of London or similar institution
(TR-533 ; TR-566). This coverage or guarantee was never
obtained.
Reames was to receive fifty (50%) per cent of the profit
from his transaction with Napoli and Rosa (TR-64) ; Ap-
pellant, Robert Grene, was to be given forty (40%) per
cent of Reames profit from the land transaction as a
finder’s fee (TR-64. >.
_ The parties met for the first time on or about the 1st
or 2nd day of January, 1963 on a boat docked behind
Reames’ house (TR-353). During the discussion held at
this time, Reames’ son came aboard the boat and showed
Appellant, Robert Grene, and Napoli through the boat
while Reames was talking to Rosa (TR-392; TR-570).
Reames. testified that Appellant, Robert Grene, had n8
knowledge of the $160,000.00 in money orders (TR-523).
At the time Savage was signing the money orders there
is a direct contradiction i in his testimony as to whether or
8a.
not Appellant, Robert Grene knew what he was doing (TR-
215; TR-279), or even saw him signing the money orders,
and whether or not he even saw Grehe; the Appellant,
Robert Grene, testifying that he never saw the money
a orders at any time (TR-577) and that he never saw Savage —
signing the money orders or anything else (TR-583). |
c : Porurs Invotvep :
I. Wuetuer on Nor THe APPELLANT, GRENE, was DENIED
Dun Process or Law sy THE Dentau or His Motion
FoR A CONTINUANCE AT THE TIME OF ARRAIGNMENT AND
HR HoT DING or His Tawi Tweve (12) Days AFTER
ARRAIGNMENT. |
a WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT, GRENE, was DENIED 3
Dun Process or Law sy THe Actions or THE TRIAL
Court THroveHout THE TRIAL Heeein.
III. Wuertuer on Nor, Wirn Respect ro Counts I AND II,
TREE GovERNMENT PRoveD THE APPELLANT, GRENE, -
Gumrr-· or THE CHARGES: BEYOND AND TO THE EXCLUSION .
or Every Reasonapte D oT WHEN THE OxLY Evi-
DENCE PRESENTED was PuRELY (CrmcuMSTANTIAL.
IV. Wueruer on NOT THE Court CoMMITTED FUNDAMENTAL
* Epror in Famine to Instruct tHe Junx on THE Law
Recagpinc THE WEIGHT To BE AFFORDED TO THE TESTI-
mony or Apmrrrep ACCOMPLICES.
2. ARGUMENT
POINT I. |
WHETHER on NOT THE APPELLANT, Greng, was DEXD Dun
Process or Law sy THE DENHL or His Morrox ror a
ConTINUANCE AT THE TIE OF ARRAIGNMENT AND THE
Hor or His Taian Tom (12) Dars Arter An-
RAINER.
It is the position of the e iain that he was
effectively denied his Constitutional right to due process of
; law by the trial court’ 5 refusal to grant his motion for a
3
| | da
continuance, and requiring him to be tried twelve (12)
days after his arraignment. It stands as a matter of gen-
eral recognition by the Bar of this Country that it is im-
possible for even the most able, experienced practitioner
of the law to prepare an adequate and propery defense in
à Criminal trial on an indictmerit involving nine (9) counts
and twelve (12) , overt acts in the 3 * twelve (12)
days.
The Constitution of the United binde, Amendment VI.
provides in part:
„In all criminal prosecutions, the accused small .
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
The Courts have held that the right to competent counsel
encompasses the fact that counsel must have sufficient and
adequate time to prepare the case, and be familiar with
the law involved. ;
L. S. v. Wight, 2nd Cir., 176 F2d 376
The denial of adequate time to prepare a case on behalf
‘of a defendant violates the provisions-ef the Constitution
of the United States, Amendment V, which provides in
pr:
„No person shall be. .. deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law . .
In a case arising in this Circuit it was held that 1
counsel was appointed by the Court in the April term and
trial was held on June Sth of the same year there was not
adequate time for the attorney to prepare a proper de-
fense and the Court committed fundamental error in de-
nying motion for continuance.
Everitt v. United States, Sth Circuit, 281 F2d 429.
Applying the law as set forth to the instant case, and
the general knowledge of this Honorable Court with re-
. spect to the time necessary for even the most able, experi-
‘enced practitioner of the law to adequately and compe-
tently prepare for trial, it is immediately apparent that
10a
3 the trial Court committed fundamental error in denying
the Appellant, Grene’s motion for a continuance. The de-
nial of the motion denied to the Appellant, Grene, the
privileges and immunities granted to him under Amend-
ment V and Amendment VI. of the Constitution of the
United States.
POINT II.
WHETHER on NoT THE APPELLANT, Guenz, Was DxxID Don
Process or Law By THE komm OF THE Tera Court
THROUGHOUT THE TriaL HEREIN.
It has been held on any number of occasions s that where
the trial judge, by his actions, though inadvertent, actively
participates i in the trial so that an impression is conveyed
to the jury of the guilt of the defendant, the defendant has
been denied his privileges and immunities under the Con-
stitution of the United States, Amendment V.
This Court has held:
„We are committed to the view that it is of the es-
' sence of a fair trial that the judge conduct it with
complete disinterestedness, and that if he fails to do
so, the judgment will be reversed.
Baker v. United States, Sth Circuit, 156 Fad 386
See also: |
Gomila v. United States, 5th Cir., 146 F2d 372
Hunter v. United States, 5th Cir., 62 F2d 217
Adler v. United States, 5th Cir., 182 F 464
In the Gomila case, supra, it was held that the trial court
should not examine the witnesses in such a way as to pre-
judice the defense, and that to do so is patent error on
2 the face of the record which can be recognized by the Ap-
pellate Court even where there was no objection in the
trial court. : 1
In the case of:
United States v. Standard Oi ce 7th Gir. a
317 F2d 884
the trial judge asked questions, the enn majority f
of which were useful to the prosecution, and further volun-
*
*
trial.
lla ) |
teered ‘objections and gratuitously struck testimony 80 -as
to aid the prosecution: The Appellate Court held that
this action, while unintentional, conveyed to the jury the
impression that the judge believed the defendant guilty,
and that, therefore, the defendant was deprived of a fair
It is elementary that the trial judge must, at all times,
be aware and always remember that the jury is always
attentive to his words, attitude and demeanor and that he
can influence the jury, though inadvertent, by his actions
throughout the trial, veut 8
In the case: . eee st oh
United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 2nd Circuit, 241 F2a
157 \ 3
the judge in the trial court exhibited an attitude of im-
patience and annoyance to proper objections and interrup-
tions as if they were capricious, absurd or unnecessary.
He also made gratuitous comments disparaging defense
counsel and the defense. The Court held that such re-
peated. indications of displeasure and indications of a
nature to indicate that the judge thinks little of what
counsel is doing is prejudicial and denies the defendant
4 fair trial.
Also see: i .
Edgington v. United States, 10th Cir., 324 F2d 491
In the instant case the trial judge injected many remarks
(TR 51, 103, 112, 142, 157, 158, 165, 169, 192, 255. 256. 281.
(TR-51. 103. 112. 142. 157, 158, 165, 169, 192, 255, 256, 281,
290, 291, 317, 318, 319, 321, 345, 356, 861, 368. 371. 372.
290. 291. 317. 318. 319. 321. 345, 356, 361, 368, 371, 372,
386, 390, 420, 437, 438, 439, 448, 457, 469, 474. 477. 482.
386. 390. 420. 437. 438. 439. 448, 457, 469, 474, 477, 482,
486, 488, 490; 500, 502, 504, 505, 506, 507, 514. 518. 519.
486. 488. 490. 500. 502. 504. 505, 506, 507, 514, 518, 519,
521, 527, 539, 555, 567, 576, 577, 578, 582, 588. 601. 602
821. 527: 539. 555. 567, 576, 877, 578, 582, 588 601, 602,
607, 609, 613, 620, 624, 634, 635, 643, 645, 664. 679. 694.
607. 609. 613. 620. 624, 634, 635, 643, 645, 664, 679, 694,
700, 706, 709, 711, 713, 722, 724, 732, 741, 742. 747. 748.
700. 706. 709. 711. 713, 722, 724, 732, 741, 742, 747,.748,
749, 754, 757, 759) which could have no other effect than
to influence the jury prejudicially to the Appellant, Grene.
In fact on several occasions the trial * recognized
this, and commented:
Mind you when 1 request attorneys to direct ques-
tions in a different way, that means nothing about
my opinion of the case.“ (78. 527)
. And farther, the judge said:
“ Again, paying no attention to my criticism, because
it means nothing except to keep this on an even keel.“
(TR-578)
Also in this cause the trial judge ay ober for
and on behalf of the prosecution.
What i is the matter with you, Mr. District Attorney!
He has gone all 3 a document and 7” *
even object to it. .
IF Mr. Bates is not going to object, I will object. .
| (TR-158)
: And on another occasion the trial _ sgid to Mr.
Bates:
| We are way out of the direct. I do not know what
we are doing here. Why don’t you object.“ (TR-356)
A further review of the transcript of testimony will re- |
veal an overwhelming number of questions and comments
by the trial judge favorable to the prosecution, and which
could:only convey an impression to the jury that the judge
believed the Appellant, Grene, to be guilty. 3
It is to be noted that Appellant recognizes that the trial
judge must by virtue of his position act as a moderator |
so.as to keep the trial flowing smoothly and that, there-
fore, he must interject himself into the trial on occasion.
13a
It is further recognized that many of the comments in the
instant cause standing naked would not constitute harm-
ful error. However, the cumulative content of the over- -
whelming number ‘of comments and questions favorable
to the prosecution in the instant cause did not, and could
not afford to the Appellant, Grene, a fair and impartial trial
under the law. The action of the trial judge, inadvertent
though it was, had no other effect than to convey to the
jury an impression that the judge believed the Appellant,
Grene, to be guilty as charged. This result deprived —
- . Appellant, Grene, of a fair trial and due process of law
as guaranteed by Amendments V and VI of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. ö e
POINT III.
“WuerTHER on nor, Wirn Respect to Counts I Ax II, THE
GoveRNMENT PRovep THE APPELLANT, Greve, GuILTY oF
‘THE CHarGEs BEYOND AND To THE EXCLUSION or EVERY
REasonaBLE Dovst WHEN THE ONLY EvmENcE Pre-.
SENTED was PuRELy CIRCUMSTANTIAL.
This is a case of ‘‘guilt by association.” The record in
this cause is devoid of any testimony which directly or in-
directly shows that the appellant, Grene, had any knowl-
edge that the money orders involved in the fiancing of
the Brazilian land development deal, a project Appellant,
Grene, had -been working on for some time prior to the
appearance of the Defendants, Napoli and Rosa, upon the
scene, were stolen, forged or were anything other than
valid money orders. The record shows that Appellant, E
Grene was acting as an agent on behalf of Reames for the
limited purpose of procuring investors and developers,
and it was for this sole purpose he introduced Napoli and
Aosa to Reames. If there is even a scintilla of evidence
in this cause against the Appellant, Grene, which could,
by some stretch of the imagination connect him with the
charges set forth in the indictment, it is purely circum-
stantial and does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis
consistent with his innocence as required by law. :
14a .
_ This Circuit has consistently held that circumstantial .
evidence will not sustain a conviction unless every reason-
able hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant is
Bryan v. United States, 5th Circuit, 175 Mad 223,
aff’d 336 U.S. 552, 70 S. Ct. 317, 94 L. Ed. 335,
rehearing denied 336 U. 8. 957, 70 S. Ct. 491, 94
L. Ed. 590
Also, 3
rasen v. United States, Sth Gir. 148 F2d 615
The test in circumstantial evidence cases is whether the
inferences which could have been reasonably drawn from
the evidence were not only consistent with guilt, but
whether they were. inconsistent with every reasdnable
hypothesis of innocence.
Williamson v. United States, 5th Cir., 332 F2d 125
„The testimony of two. (2) accomplices, Robert Savage
and Harley Reames, is the only possible scintilla of evi-
dence which could raise any inferemee with respect to
the participation of Appellant, Grene, i in the alleged crimes.
And, even as to this testimony, the witnesses were contra-
dictory in their statements concerning ‘Appellant, Grene,
and his participation (TR-215, 279) and were cefuted by
other witnesses. The testimony of the conspirator, Sav- |
age, as to Grene’s knowledge was at best an assumption on
his part not based on actual kriowledge (TR-279), and even
more important did not exclude every reasonable hypo-
: thesis consistent with the innocence of the Appellant.
Grene. In addition, after the conspirator, Harley Reames,
had testified as to alleged conversations involving the ‘Ap-
pellant, Grene, upon closer examination he testified that
— be was confused as to conversations and did not recall .
them (TR-121, 122, 123). Again the- testimony showing
a failure to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent
with innocence. | . 7 7
15a
With respect to the initial eM versation between Reames
and Rosa on the boat, the only testimony to show that Ap-
pellant, Grene, was present during the conversation was
utterly and completely refuted by all witnesses. (TR-142,
150; TR-392; TR. 5700. 6 Hy
This Court has emphatically sustained the proposition
that circumstances which raise a mere suspicion of guilt
will not sustain a verdict of guilty. tA 1
Tuomas v. United States, 5th Cir. 239 F2d 7
Wise v. United States, 5th Cir., 241 F2d 545
It has also been held that the mere fact that a person
is seen in the vicinity of the commission of a crime is not
sufficient evidence of his complicity in the said crime.
United States ex rel Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp.
877 |
Again, this 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
to sustain a charge of conspiracy there must be proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that each accused was connected
with the conspiracy. ree
Knight v. United States, 5th Cir. 279 F2d 675 cért.
den’d 370 U. S. 923, 82 S. Ct. 1565, 8 L. Ed. 2d
503 | ;
Inn the case of United States v. Ah Kee Eng, supra, the
court was faced with a situation wheréin. the defendant,
Eng, met with two parties. He was asked by these. parties
if he would like to purchase heroin. Eng replied in the
affirmative, agreeing to pay $1,000.00 for five packages.
The two parties were arrested after this conversation,
when they had the heroin in their passession, but before
they sold the same to Eng. Eng was arrested and charged
with the offense of conspiring to import heroin into the
United States illegally. The Court held that there was
absolutely no evidence to show that Eng knew that the
heroin had been imported or that the parties he was deal-
ing with were to bring the heroin into the country. Eng
was never told where or how the heroin was obtained.
16a
‘The Court stated that there was absolutely no testimony
to show that Eng was involved in a conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States illegally and his conviction
could not stand.
We are here dealing with an analogous fact tation as |
that existing in the. Eng case, supra. There is no evidence
herein to show that Appellant, Grene, knew that the money
orders were stolen, or were anything other than valid
money orders. The’ record further reveals that the trial
court herein recognized that Grene knew nothing of the
transportation of the said money orders to Miami; strik-
ing that allegation from the conspiracy count of the in-
dictment (TR-764; 768; 771).
Fiurther, and in 3 the trial court in this cause
recognized the insufficiency of the evidence presented by
Government in all counts against the Appellant, Grene_
(TR-765).
his right for an impartial trial, that the trial judge should
have instructed the jury on the law concerning the weight
to be afforded to the testimony of an alleged acoomplice.
‘Under the circumstances of this case, more especially
the evidence against Appellant; Grene, it was imperative
and fundamental to his right for an impartial trial, that
the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the law’
concerning the weight to be afforded to the testimony of
an alleged accomplice.
This Court has oft times voiced the proposition that
while a conviction may be based on the testimony of. ac-
complices the judges should charge the jury concerning
the fact that such testimony should be carefully scrutinized -
by the jury and they should be charged at to the weight -
to be given such testimony. ;
_ West v. United States, 5th Cir., 113 Fd 68, Cert.
den d, 311 U. S. 647, 61 S. Ct. 33, 85 I. Ed. 413
Peel v. United States, 5th Cir. 316 F2d 907
Lyles v. United States, 5th Cir. 249 F2d 744
y
17a
The Court stated in: )
Phelps v. United States, 5th Cir. 252 F2d 49, 52
„A skeptical approach to accomplice testimony is a
mark of the fair administration of justice. . the
fair administration of justice requires that if there is
complice the jury should resolve the doubt and receive
a reasonable doubt as to whether a witness is an ac-
full instructions on the law of accomplice testimony,
including a caution against placing too much reliance
upon the testimony of an ‘accomplice.”
POINT IV.
WETHER on Nor THE CouRT CommiITTED FunpaMENTAL Ex-
* O
non Ix Maine To INSTRUCT THE Jer on THE Law
Recampinc THE WEIGHT ro BE AFFORDED TO THE TESTI-
MONY OF ADMITTED ACCOMPLICES. i ;
—
It has been universally held that the evidence of an ac-
complice must be carefully crutinized by a jury and should
be regarded with suspicion. . ;
Surratt v. United States, 269 F2d 240 106 U. S. App.
D. C. 49 i
McQuald v. United States, 198 F2d 987 91 U. S. App.
D. C. 229, cert. den'd, 344 U. S. 929, 73 C. Ct. 499,
97 L. Ed. 715⁵5 3
Brickey v. United States, 8th Cir. 123 F2d 34
United States v. Tarricone, 2nd Cir. 242 F2d 555
Ward v. United States, 5th Cir., 296 898
In the instant case, the trial judge allowed the cause
to go to the jury without any specific instructions on the
law concerning the weight which the jury should afford
to the testimony of an accomplice. It is respectfully sub-
_ mited that this failure of the trial judge constituted funda-
mental reversible error. . See . Or ae
ConcLuUsION .—
It is respectfully submitted that the cause herein and
the conviction of the Appellant, Grene, should and must
be reversed in order that justice prevail. The errors
424
OTTO SRE:
18a
which were committed in the trial of the ‘Appellant, Grene,’
are so fundamental in nature that to allow his conviction
to stand would be to ty in the face of the law and a travesty
of justice.
The points argued in this brief reflect such 1
error patent upon the face of the record that this Court
must take cognizance of the fact that the Appellant, Grene
was denied the due proces of law guaranteed to him by
the Constitution of the United States, Amendment V.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of February, 1965.
Bernagp Berman |
Attorney for Appellant—Robert Grene .
1440 79th Street Causeway . :
Miami Beach, Florida, 33141
19a
APPENDIX. E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPRALS
‘FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 21049
3 “Vincent Rosert Napout, a/k/a Jimmy NaroLI AND
Rosert _— Appellants,
V. * i
. . UNrrep Srarns or AMERICA, Appellee.
On Consweration or THE APPLICATION OF the appellant
Robert Grene in the above numbered and entitled cause
for a stay of the mandate of this Court therein, to enable
appellant Robert Grene to apply for and to obtain a writ
of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the. United States,
> It Is Onperep that the issue of the mandate of this Court
in said cause be and the same is stayed for a period of
thirty days from April 2, 1965; the stay to continue in force
until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court,
provided that within thirty days from April 2, 1965, there
shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of
the ‘Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari petition
and record have been filed. It isfurther ordered that the
Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of a copy of
an order of the Supreme Court denying the writ, or upon
the expiration of thirty days from April 2, 1965, unless
the above-mentioned certificate shall be filed with the Clerk
of this Court within that tine.
/s/ Exvsert P. Torrie,
} Chief Judge.
Dated: (OntormaL Frap)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. -
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT , |
OCTOBER TERM, 1964
No. 21049
D. C. Docket No. 68.75 CRO .
— Rosert Napout, a/k/a Jimmy Napoui Axp
a | Rosert Greve, Appellants,
v.
Untrep States or America, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
N Southern Distriet of Florida.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, Grooms and McRae,
7 District Judges.
Judgment |
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District. Court for the
‘Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel ;
Ox ConsiperaTion Wuereor, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said. Dis-
- trict Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, af-
firmed. ~~
! ä | March 3, 1965.
Iss as Mandate: April 12; 1965 |
Cy
21a
APPENDIX G
Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in.
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to- be twice put in jeopardy
. Of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
pensation. .
- private property be taken for public use, without just com-
Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously as-
certained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
_ taining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for the defense.
Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 2314, Transportation of
Stolen Goods, Securities, Moneys, Fraudulent State Tax Stamps, or
articles Used in Counterfeiting Fe win amt)
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the ©
value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud; or
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises, transports or causes to be- ns-
ported, or induces any person to travel in, or to be trans-
22a
ported in interstate commerce in the execution or conceal-
ment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of
| money or property having a value of $5,000 or more; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports
_ in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, ©
altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing
the same to have been — forged, eae or
c counterfeited; or .
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, 8
in interstate or foreign commerce, any tool, implement, or
thing used or fitted to be used in falsely making, forging, .
altering, or counterfeiting any * or tax stamps, or
any part thereof —
Shall be fined not 1 more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.
This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged,
altered, counterfeited or spurious representation of an ob-
ligation or other security of the United States, ‘or of an.
obligation, bond certificate, security, treasury note, bill,
promise to pay or bank note issued by any foreign govern-
ment or by a bank or corporation of any foreign country.
As amended July 9, 1956, c. 519, 70 Stat. 507; Oct. 4, —_
Pub. L. 87—371, §2, 75 Stat. 802.
Title 18. United States Code Annotated, Section 371, Conspiracy to
Commit Offense or to Defraud United States
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
éffect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. :
If, however, the offense, the, commission of which i is the
object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punish-
; 23a
a ment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
1948, ©. 645, 62 Stat. 701.
Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 473, Dealing in
_ Counterfeit Obligations or Securities
__ Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, receives, or
delivers any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obliga-
tion or other security of the United States, with the intent
that the same be passed, published, or used as true and
genuine, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both. June 25, 1948, c. 645,
62 Stat. 705. |
Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 2,
ari ik: Dealing in Principas
Whoever commits an offense against the United States,
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,’ or procures
its commission, is a principal.
Whoever causes an act to be done, which if directly per-
formed by him would be an offense against the United
States, is also a principal and punishable as such.
N
—
punishment provided for such misdemeanor. June 25,
9
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.