Appendix — Jacobs v. Tennessee

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APPENDIX A

IN THE :

5 _ UNITED STATES COUBT OF APPEALS.

1 . FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT -

oe nee

No. 21049

1

3 Robert Narol a a/k/ a Jimmy 1 AND

“co: Roserst GRENE,

3 Aepelesde

VERSUS nes

Unitep States or AMERICA,

. 5 f .

**

8 from the United States District Court for the

Southern — of Florida.

, (March 3, 1965.) ae

. Before Torri, Chief Judge, Grooms and McRas,

District Judges. .

Pu G There was ample idee as to each of

the appellants. to sustain the verdict of the jury and judg-

ments of conviction.

In the absence of any showing of prejudice resulting

from the holding of trial twelve days after the arraign- 3

ment of Grene, we can not determine that the trial court

erred in denying the motion for continuance.

No exceptions having been made te the charge as given

by the trial court, we find no reversible error in. the failure

of the court to give a specific charge on the accomplice

testimony i in view of the adequacy of the — as a whole.

The judgment i is AFFIRMED : Be

2

APPENDIX B

_ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS .

Fon THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 31,049

Vincent Ropert Napoui a/k/a JIMMY Napout AND

Rosert GRRX EB,

a)

1

1 2

Unrrxo Sen OF eee

! ; Appellee.

Filed ere 2, 1965

Appeals from the United States District Court id the

Southern District of Florida ;

(April 2, 1965)

. On Petitions for Rehearing

Before TuTTLe, Chief J judge, Grooms and McRar, District

— ea

5 > Irs anes that the petitions for rehearing filed sepa-

rately by Napoli and Grene in the above styled and num-

bered cause be, and the same is, hereby DENIED.

Court Rule

RULE 32

' ISSUANCE OF MANDATE

*

i yt Date of Issuance: The mandate of the court shall issue

after twenty-one (21) days from the date’ of decision un-

-less the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A certified

‘copy of the judgment, and a copy of the opinion of the

court, if any, where a new trial or further proceedings

are to be had in the lower court, shall constitute the man-

date, unless the court directs that a formal mandate issue.

The timely filing of a petition for rehearing will stay the

mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise

ordered by the court. Unless otherwise ordered, if the

_ petition is denied, the mandate shall issue after seven (7)

days from entry of the order denying the petition.

A mandate once issued will not be recalled except by the

court and to prevent injustice.

Adopted May 31st, 1963. ‘

Ar . e

UNITED STATES COURT OF ArrRAIEC

FIFTH CIRCUIT

VINCENT Ramus Narro a/k/a Jimmy NAPOLI xD

- Ropert Greve, 45. 3

Appellants.

5 vs. 5 . :

Untrep States or AMERICA, ~

3 ie: Appellee.

No 21,049 ,

Petition for Rehearing

‘Comes now the Appellant Robert Grene, by and through

his undersigned attorney and respectfully petitions this

Honorable Court for a rehearing herein, and as grounds

respectfully submits unto the Court the following.

1. That this Honorable Court has failed to consider

the question of whether or not the Appellant was denied

due process of law by the denial of his motion for a con-

tinuance at the time of surrender and arraignment, and

the holding of his rial twelve (12) days later in the cases

of 7 ;

V. 8. v. Wight, 2nd Cir., 176 F. 2d 376 7

Everitt v. United States, 5th Cir., 281 F. 2d 424

and the Constitution of the United States Amendment

Amendment ‘VL, and. further in the light of the gen-

eral recognition by the Bar of this Country that even

the most able, experienced —— of the law cannot

4a J

prepare an adequate and propertꝭ defense in a criminal

matter containing nine (9) counts and twelve (12) overt

acts in the space of twelve (12) days. :

It is respectfully suggested and alleged that the situa-

tion set forth above is prejudicial on its face and denies

the Appellant due process of law and the right to have ”

assistance of counsel for his defense.

2. That this Court has failed and overlooked the argu-

ment set forth by the Appellant that he was denied due

process of law by the actions of the trial court throughout

the trial and that the record herein, on its face, shows

that the Appellant has been denied due process of law

required by the Constitution of the United States Amend-

ment V. Appellant respectfully sets forth in support of

this position and contention the cases of:

‘ Baker v. United States, 5th Cir., 156 F2d 386

Gomila v. United States, 5th Cir., 146 F2d 372

Hunter v. United States, 5th Cir., 62 F2d 217

Adler v. United States, 5th Cir., 182 F 464

United States v. Standard Ou Company, 7th Cir.,

317 F2d 884

United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 2nd Cir., 241 Fd 157

3. That this Court has failed to consider, or has over-

looked the contention that the evidence herein was purely

circumstantial and does not exclude every reasonable

‘hypothesis other than guilt. This Court has consistently

held that the. test in circumstantial evidence cases is

_ -whether the inferences which could have been reasonably

drawn from the evidence were not only consistent with

guilt, but whether they were inconsistent with every

reasonable hypothesis of i innocence.

Bryan v. United States, 5th Cir., 175 F2d 223, aff’d

338 U.S. 552, 70 S. Ct. 317, 34 L. Ed. 335, rehear-

ing denied 338 U.S. 957, 70 S. Ct. 491, 94 L. Ed.

590

Crane v. United States, 5th Cir., 148 F2d 615.

Da

Williamson v. United States, 5th Cir., 332 F2d 123

Thomas v. United States, 5th Cir., 239 F2d 7

Wise v. United States, öth Cir., 241 F2d 345

United States ex, rel Argento v. Jacobs, 175 F. Supp.

877 s

Knight v. United See Sth Cir, 279 72d 675 cert.

den’d 370 U.S. 923, 82 S. Ct. 1565, 8 L. Ed. 2nd

4. That this Court has failed to consider or has over-

looked the proposition that the fair administration of

justice requires a specific charge on accomplice testimony, .

notwithstanding any other charges that are given; and that

no exception need be made by counsel for the Appellant

upon the conclusion of the charges with respect to the

failurè to give a charge on accomplice testimony, inas-

much as this failure to so charge would constitute funda-

mental érror. In support of this contention, Appellant

respectfully: cites the cases of:

Surratt v. United States, 269 F2d 240, 106 U 8. App.

D. C. 49

McQuald v. United States, 195 Fzd 987, 91 U.S. App.

D. C. 229 cert. den'd 344 U.S. 929, 73 8. Ct. 499,

97 L. Ed. 715

~Brickey v. United States, 8th Cir. 123 F2d 341

United States v. Tarricone, 2nd Cir. 242 F2d 555

Ward v. United States, 5th Cir., 296 F2d 898

West v. United States, 5th Cir., 113 F2d 68, Cert:

den’d 311 U. S. 647, 61 S. Ct. 33, 85 L. Ed. 413

Peel v. United States, 5th Cir., 316 F2d 907

. Lylés v. United States, 5th Cir., 249 F2d 744

. Phelps v. United States, 5th Cir., 252 F2d 49, 52

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of em 1965.

Attorney for

BxRNAR⁰ BERMAN,

Attorney for Appellani Robert Grene

1440 79th Street Causeway, }

Miami Beach, Florida, 33141

6a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

, FIFTH CIRCUIT

Vincent ROBERT Napou a/k/a Jimmy Napout AND

Rosert (RENE;

Appellants.

: vs. 3

Unstrep States or Aunica,

: Appellee.

No 21,049

On Appeal from the United States District Court ey the

Southern District of Florida

Brief of Appellant Robert Grene

SuprremgnTaL SrarzMENT or THE Case |

The indictment against the Appellant, Robert Grene,

was issued on July 3rd, 1963. On July 5th, 1963, a warrant

for the arrest of the Appellant, Robert Grene, was issued,

and on J uly 10th, 1963, the Appellant, Robert Grene, sur-

rendered in open Court and was arraigned, his motion for

continuance being denied at the time of arraignment.

A trial of this cause was commenced on July 22nd, 1963.

and terminated on July 30th, 1963. 8

A prior indictment against the other two 0

in this cause was issued February Ist, 1963. The indict-

ment herein and the prior indictment were the same as

. the counts on which all the defendants were tried, and as

to these counts the only change was the naming of the

Appellant, Robert Grene, as an additional defendant.

Surrrementan SraremEnt OF THE Facts

At the outset it is to be noted that the Statement of

Facts set forth in the Government’s brief does not present

the facts in a clear, concise and accurate manner. The evi-

. dence and testimony does not completely support all of

the statement of facts set forth in the Government’s brief.

7a

Appellant, Robert Grene, first met Eldred Altman

Reames in the Fall of 1962 (TS-59; TR-563.) At that time

a discussion was held -relative to land in Brazil (TR-59,

60; TR-563-564). In October, 1962, Appellant, Robert

Grene, and Reames reached an agreement relating to the

construction of 10,000 homes on the Reames property in

Brazil (TR-354, 355; TR-565). At the request of Reames,

Appellant, ‘Robert Grene, submited a proposal to a firm |

in Atlanta, Georgia; nothing came of this submission (TR.

564). Appellant, Robert Grene, then introduced defen-

dants, Napoli and Ross to Reames (TR-60; TR-357; TR-

357; TR-568) ; the defendant, Napoli, being a builder Who

had engaged in extensive consrtuction work in the Miami

area, and the defendant, Rosa, representing that he had

funds available to — the transaction (TR-60; 61; TR.

521). Reames had previously referred the Appellant,

Robert Grene, to an insurance agency for the purpose of

obtaining a commitment for funds for the project (TR-

566), and Appellant, Robert Grene, had received a letter

‘and telegram on that matter (TR-532, 533; TR-566). The

conditional. commitment required insurance coverage or

guarantee from Lloyds of London or similar institution

(TR-533 ; TR-566). This coverage or guarantee was never

obtained.

Reames was to receive fifty (50%) per cent of the profit

from his transaction with Napoli and Rosa (TR-64) ; Ap-

pellant, Robert Grene, was to be given forty (40%) per

cent of Reames profit from the land transaction as a

finder’s fee (TR-64. >.

_ The parties met for the first time on or about the 1st

or 2nd day of January, 1963 on a boat docked behind

Reames’ house (TR-353). During the discussion held at

this time, Reames’ son came aboard the boat and showed

Appellant, Robert Grene, and Napoli through the boat

while Reames was talking to Rosa (TR-392; TR-570).

Reames. testified that Appellant, Robert Grene, had n8

knowledge of the $160,000.00 in money orders (TR-523).

At the time Savage was signing the money orders there

is a direct contradiction i in his testimony as to whether or

8a.

not Appellant, Robert Grene knew what he was doing (TR-

215; TR-279), or even saw him signing the money orders,

and whether or not he even saw Grehe; the Appellant,

Robert Grene, testifying that he never saw the money

a orders at any time (TR-577) and that he never saw Savage —

signing the money orders or anything else (TR-583). |

c : Porurs Invotvep :

I. Wuetuer on Nor THe APPELLANT, GRENE, was DENIED

Dun Process or Law sy THE Dentau or His Motion

FoR A CONTINUANCE AT THE TIME OF ARRAIGNMENT AND

HR HoT DING or His Tawi Tweve (12) Days AFTER

ARRAIGNMENT. |

a WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT, GRENE, was DENIED 3

Dun Process or Law sy THe Actions or THE TRIAL

Court THroveHout THE TRIAL Heeein.

III. Wuertuer on Nor, Wirn Respect ro Counts I AND II,

TREE GovERNMENT PRoveD THE APPELLANT, GRENE, -

Gumrr-· or THE CHARGES: BEYOND AND TO THE EXCLUSION .

or Every Reasonapte D oT WHEN THE OxLY Evi-

DENCE PRESENTED was PuRELY (CrmcuMSTANTIAL.

IV. Wueruer on NOT THE Court CoMMITTED FUNDAMENTAL

* Epror in Famine to Instruct tHe Junx on THE Law

Recagpinc THE WEIGHT To BE AFFORDED TO THE TESTI-

mony or Apmrrrep ACCOMPLICES.

2. ARGUMENT

POINT I. |

WHETHER on NOT THE APPELLANT, Greng, was DEXD Dun

Process or Law sy THE DENHL or His Morrox ror a

ConTINUANCE AT THE TIE OF ARRAIGNMENT AND THE

Hor or His Taian Tom (12) Dars Arter An-

RAINER.

It is the position of the e iain that he was

effectively denied his Constitutional right to due process of

; law by the trial court’ 5 refusal to grant his motion for a

3

| | da

continuance, and requiring him to be tried twelve (12)

days after his arraignment. It stands as a matter of gen-

eral recognition by the Bar of this Country that it is im-

possible for even the most able, experienced practitioner

of the law to prepare an adequate and propery defense in

à Criminal trial on an indictmerit involving nine (9) counts

and twelve (12) , overt acts in the 3 * twelve (12)

days.

The Constitution of the United binde, Amendment VI.

provides in part:

„In all criminal prosecutions, the accused small .

have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The Courts have held that the right to competent counsel

encompasses the fact that counsel must have sufficient and

adequate time to prepare the case, and be familiar with

the law involved. ;

L. S. v. Wight, 2nd Cir., 176 F2d 376

The denial of adequate time to prepare a case on behalf

‘of a defendant violates the provisions-ef the Constitution

of the United States, Amendment V, which provides in

pr:

„No person shall be. .. deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law . .

In a case arising in this Circuit it was held that 1

counsel was appointed by the Court in the April term and

trial was held on June Sth of the same year there was not

adequate time for the attorney to prepare a proper de-

fense and the Court committed fundamental error in de-

nying motion for continuance.

Everitt v. United States, Sth Circuit, 281 F2d 429.

Applying the law as set forth to the instant case, and

the general knowledge of this Honorable Court with re-

. spect to the time necessary for even the most able, experi-

‘enced practitioner of the law to adequately and compe-

tently prepare for trial, it is immediately apparent that

10a

3 the trial Court committed fundamental error in denying

the Appellant, Grene’s motion for a continuance. The de-

nial of the motion denied to the Appellant, Grene, the

privileges and immunities granted to him under Amend-

ment V and Amendment VI. of the Constitution of the

United States.

POINT II.

WHETHER on NoT THE APPELLANT, Guenz, Was DxxID Don

Process or Law By THE komm OF THE Tera Court

THROUGHOUT THE TriaL HEREIN.

It has been held on any number of occasions s that where

the trial judge, by his actions, though inadvertent, actively

participates i in the trial so that an impression is conveyed

to the jury of the guilt of the defendant, the defendant has

been denied his privileges and immunities under the Con-

stitution of the United States, Amendment V.

This Court has held:

„We are committed to the view that it is of the es-

' sence of a fair trial that the judge conduct it with

complete disinterestedness, and that if he fails to do

so, the judgment will be reversed.

Baker v. United States, Sth Circuit, 156 Fad 386

See also: |

Gomila v. United States, 5th Cir., 146 F2d 372

Hunter v. United States, 5th Cir., 62 F2d 217

Adler v. United States, 5th Cir., 182 F 464

In the Gomila case, supra, it was held that the trial court

should not examine the witnesses in such a way as to pre-

judice the defense, and that to do so is patent error on

2 the face of the record which can be recognized by the Ap-

pellate Court even where there was no objection in the

trial court. : 1

In the case of:

United States v. Standard Oi ce 7th Gir. a

317 F2d 884

the trial judge asked questions, the enn majority f

of which were useful to the prosecution, and further volun-

*

*

trial.

lla ) |

teered ‘objections and gratuitously struck testimony 80 -as

to aid the prosecution: The Appellate Court held that

this action, while unintentional, conveyed to the jury the

impression that the judge believed the defendant guilty,

and that, therefore, the defendant was deprived of a fair

It is elementary that the trial judge must, at all times,

be aware and always remember that the jury is always

attentive to his words, attitude and demeanor and that he

can influence the jury, though inadvertent, by his actions

throughout the trial, veut 8

In the case: . eee st oh

United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 2nd Circuit, 241 F2a

157 \ 3

the judge in the trial court exhibited an attitude of im-

patience and annoyance to proper objections and interrup-

tions as if they were capricious, absurd or unnecessary.

He also made gratuitous comments disparaging defense

counsel and the defense. The Court held that such re-

peated. indications of displeasure and indications of a

nature to indicate that the judge thinks little of what

counsel is doing is prejudicial and denies the defendant

4 fair trial.

Also see: i .

Edgington v. United States, 10th Cir., 324 F2d 491

In the instant case the trial judge injected many remarks

(TR 51, 103, 112, 142, 157, 158, 165, 169, 192, 255. 256. 281.

(TR-51. 103. 112. 142. 157, 158, 165, 169, 192, 255, 256, 281,

290, 291, 317, 318, 319, 321, 345, 356, 861, 368. 371. 372.

290. 291. 317. 318. 319. 321. 345, 356, 361, 368, 371, 372,

386, 390, 420, 437, 438, 439, 448, 457, 469, 474. 477. 482.

386. 390. 420. 437. 438. 439. 448, 457, 469, 474, 477, 482,

486, 488, 490; 500, 502, 504, 505, 506, 507, 514. 518. 519.

486. 488. 490. 500. 502. 504. 505, 506, 507, 514, 518, 519,

521, 527, 539, 555, 567, 576, 577, 578, 582, 588. 601. 602

821. 527: 539. 555. 567, 576, 877, 578, 582, 588 601, 602,

607, 609, 613, 620, 624, 634, 635, 643, 645, 664. 679. 694.

607. 609. 613. 620. 624, 634, 635, 643, 645, 664, 679, 694,

700, 706, 709, 711, 713, 722, 724, 732, 741, 742. 747. 748.

700. 706. 709. 711. 713, 722, 724, 732, 741, 742, 747,.748,

749, 754, 757, 759) which could have no other effect than

to influence the jury prejudicially to the Appellant, Grene.

In fact on several occasions the trial * recognized

this, and commented:

Mind you when 1 request attorneys to direct ques-

tions in a different way, that means nothing about

my opinion of the case.“ (78. 527)

. And farther, the judge said:

“ Again, paying no attention to my criticism, because

it means nothing except to keep this on an even keel.“

(TR-578)

Also in this cause the trial judge ay ober for

and on behalf of the prosecution.

What i is the matter with you, Mr. District Attorney!

He has gone all 3 a document and 7” *

even object to it. .

IF Mr. Bates is not going to object, I will object. .

| (TR-158)

: And on another occasion the trial _ sgid to Mr.

Bates:

| We are way out of the direct. I do not know what

we are doing here. Why don’t you object.“ (TR-356)

A further review of the transcript of testimony will re- |

veal an overwhelming number of questions and comments

by the trial judge favorable to the prosecution, and which

could:only convey an impression to the jury that the judge

believed the Appellant, Grene, to be guilty. 3

It is to be noted that Appellant recognizes that the trial

judge must by virtue of his position act as a moderator |

so.as to keep the trial flowing smoothly and that, there-

fore, he must interject himself into the trial on occasion.

13a

It is further recognized that many of the comments in the

instant cause standing naked would not constitute harm-

ful error. However, the cumulative content of the over- -

whelming number ‘of comments and questions favorable

to the prosecution in the instant cause did not, and could

not afford to the Appellant, Grene, a fair and impartial trial

under the law. The action of the trial judge, inadvertent

though it was, had no other effect than to convey to the

jury an impression that the judge believed the Appellant,

Grene, to be guilty as charged. This result deprived —

- . Appellant, Grene, of a fair trial and due process of law

as guaranteed by Amendments V and VI of the Constitu-

tion of the United States. ö e

POINT III.

“WuerTHER on nor, Wirn Respect to Counts I Ax II, THE

GoveRNMENT PRovep THE APPELLANT, Greve, GuILTY oF

‘THE CHarGEs BEYOND AND To THE EXCLUSION or EVERY

REasonaBLE Dovst WHEN THE ONLY EvmENcE Pre-.

SENTED was PuRELy CIRCUMSTANTIAL.

This is a case of ‘‘guilt by association.” The record in

this cause is devoid of any testimony which directly or in-

directly shows that the appellant, Grene, had any knowl-

edge that the money orders involved in the fiancing of

the Brazilian land development deal, a project Appellant,

Grene, had -been working on for some time prior to the

appearance of the Defendants, Napoli and Rosa, upon the

scene, were stolen, forged or were anything other than

valid money orders. The record shows that Appellant, E

Grene was acting as an agent on behalf of Reames for the

limited purpose of procuring investors and developers,

and it was for this sole purpose he introduced Napoli and

Aosa to Reames. If there is even a scintilla of evidence

in this cause against the Appellant, Grene, which could,

by some stretch of the imagination connect him with the

charges set forth in the indictment, it is purely circum-

stantial and does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis

consistent with his innocence as required by law. :

14a .

_ This Circuit has consistently held that circumstantial .

evidence will not sustain a conviction unless every reason-

able hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant is

Bryan v. United States, 5th Circuit, 175 Mad 223,

aff’d 336 U.S. 552, 70 S. Ct. 317, 94 L. Ed. 335,

rehearing denied 336 U. 8. 957, 70 S. Ct. 491, 94

L. Ed. 590

Also, 3

rasen v. United States, Sth Gir. 148 F2d 615

The test in circumstantial evidence cases is whether the

inferences which could have been reasonably drawn from

the evidence were not only consistent with guilt, but

whether they were. inconsistent with every reasdnable

hypothesis of innocence.

Williamson v. United States, 5th Cir., 332 F2d 125

„The testimony of two. (2) accomplices, Robert Savage

and Harley Reames, is the only possible scintilla of evi-

dence which could raise any inferemee with respect to

the participation of Appellant, Grene, i in the alleged crimes.

And, even as to this testimony, the witnesses were contra-

dictory in their statements concerning ‘Appellant, Grene,

and his participation (TR-215, 279) and were cefuted by

other witnesses. The testimony of the conspirator, Sav- |

age, as to Grene’s knowledge was at best an assumption on

his part not based on actual kriowledge (TR-279), and even

more important did not exclude every reasonable hypo-

: thesis consistent with the innocence of the Appellant.

Grene. In addition, after the conspirator, Harley Reames,

had testified as to alleged conversations involving the ‘Ap-

pellant, Grene, upon closer examination he testified that

— be was confused as to conversations and did not recall .

them (TR-121, 122, 123). Again the- testimony showing

a failure to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent

with innocence. | . 7 7

15a

With respect to the initial eM versation between Reames

and Rosa on the boat, the only testimony to show that Ap-

pellant, Grene, was present during the conversation was

utterly and completely refuted by all witnesses. (TR-142,

150; TR-392; TR. 5700. 6 Hy

This Court has emphatically sustained the proposition

that circumstances which raise a mere suspicion of guilt

will not sustain a verdict of guilty. tA 1

Tuomas v. United States, 5th Cir. 239 F2d 7

Wise v. United States, 5th Cir., 241 F2d 545

It has also been held that the mere fact that a person

is seen in the vicinity of the commission of a crime is not

sufficient evidence of his complicity in the said crime.

United States ex rel Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp.

877 |

Again, this 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

to sustain a charge of conspiracy there must be proof be-

yond a reasonable doubt that each accused was connected

with the conspiracy. ree

Knight v. United States, 5th Cir. 279 F2d 675 cért.

den’d 370 U. S. 923, 82 S. Ct. 1565, 8 L. Ed. 2d

503 | ;

Inn the case of United States v. Ah Kee Eng, supra, the

court was faced with a situation wheréin. the defendant,

Eng, met with two parties. He was asked by these. parties

if he would like to purchase heroin. Eng replied in the

affirmative, agreeing to pay $1,000.00 for five packages.

The two parties were arrested after this conversation,

when they had the heroin in their passession, but before

they sold the same to Eng. Eng was arrested and charged

with the offense of conspiring to import heroin into the

United States illegally. The Court held that there was

absolutely no evidence to show that Eng knew that the

heroin had been imported or that the parties he was deal-

ing with were to bring the heroin into the country. Eng

was never told where or how the heroin was obtained.

16a

‘The Court stated that there was absolutely no testimony

to show that Eng was involved in a conspiracy to import

heroin into the United States illegally and his conviction

could not stand.

We are here dealing with an analogous fact tation as |

that existing in the. Eng case, supra. There is no evidence

herein to show that Appellant, Grene, knew that the money

orders were stolen, or were anything other than valid

money orders. The’ record further reveals that the trial

court herein recognized that Grene knew nothing of the

transportation of the said money orders to Miami; strik-

ing that allegation from the conspiracy count of the in-

dictment (TR-764; 768; 771).

Fiurther, and in 3 the trial court in this cause

recognized the insufficiency of the evidence presented by

Government in all counts against the Appellant, Grene_

(TR-765).

his right for an impartial trial, that the trial judge should

have instructed the jury on the law concerning the weight

to be afforded to the testimony of an alleged acoomplice.

‘Under the circumstances of this case, more especially

the evidence against Appellant; Grene, it was imperative

and fundamental to his right for an impartial trial, that

the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the law’

concerning the weight to be afforded to the testimony of

an alleged accomplice.

This Court has oft times voiced the proposition that

while a conviction may be based on the testimony of. ac-

complices the judges should charge the jury concerning

the fact that such testimony should be carefully scrutinized -

by the jury and they should be charged at to the weight -

to be given such testimony. ;

_ West v. United States, 5th Cir., 113 Fd 68, Cert.

den d, 311 U. S. 647, 61 S. Ct. 33, 85 I. Ed. 413

Peel v. United States, 5th Cir. 316 F2d 907

Lyles v. United States, 5th Cir. 249 F2d 744

y

17a

The Court stated in: )

Phelps v. United States, 5th Cir. 252 F2d 49, 52

„A skeptical approach to accomplice testimony is a

mark of the fair administration of justice. . the

fair administration of justice requires that if there is

complice the jury should resolve the doubt and receive

a reasonable doubt as to whether a witness is an ac-

full instructions on the law of accomplice testimony,

including a caution against placing too much reliance

upon the testimony of an ‘accomplice.”

POINT IV.

WETHER on Nor THE CouRT CommiITTED FunpaMENTAL Ex-

* O

non Ix Maine To INSTRUCT THE Jer on THE Law

Recampinc THE WEIGHT ro BE AFFORDED TO THE TESTI-

MONY OF ADMITTED ACCOMPLICES. i ;

—

It has been universally held that the evidence of an ac-

complice must be carefully crutinized by a jury and should

be regarded with suspicion. . ;

Surratt v. United States, 269 F2d 240 106 U. S. App.

D. C. 49 i

McQuald v. United States, 198 F2d 987 91 U. S. App.

D. C. 229, cert. den'd, 344 U. S. 929, 73 C. Ct. 499,

97 L. Ed. 715⁵5 3

Brickey v. United States, 8th Cir. 123 F2d 34

United States v. Tarricone, 2nd Cir. 242 F2d 555

Ward v. United States, 5th Cir., 296 898

In the instant case, the trial judge allowed the cause

to go to the jury without any specific instructions on the

law concerning the weight which the jury should afford

to the testimony of an accomplice. It is respectfully sub-

_ mited that this failure of the trial judge constituted funda-

mental reversible error. . See . Or ae

ConcLuUsION .—

It is respectfully submitted that the cause herein and

the conviction of the Appellant, Grene, should and must

be reversed in order that justice prevail. The errors

424

OTTO SRE:

18a

which were committed in the trial of the ‘Appellant, Grene,’

are so fundamental in nature that to allow his conviction

to stand would be to ty in the face of the law and a travesty

of justice.

The points argued in this brief reflect such 1

error patent upon the face of the record that this Court

must take cognizance of the fact that the Appellant, Grene

was denied the due proces of law guaranteed to him by

the Constitution of the United States, Amendment V.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of February, 1965.

Bernagp Berman |

Attorney for Appellant—Robert Grene .

1440 79th Street Causeway . :

Miami Beach, Florida, 33141

19a

APPENDIX. E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPRALS

‘FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21049

3 “Vincent Rosert Napout, a/k/a Jimmy NaroLI AND

Rosert _— Appellants,

V. * i

. . UNrrep Srarns or AMERICA, Appellee.

On Consweration or THE APPLICATION OF the appellant

Robert Grene in the above numbered and entitled cause

for a stay of the mandate of this Court therein, to enable

appellant Robert Grene to apply for and to obtain a writ

of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the. United States,

> It Is Onperep that the issue of the mandate of this Court

in said cause be and the same is stayed for a period of

thirty days from April 2, 1965; the stay to continue in force

until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court,

provided that within thirty days from April 2, 1965, there

shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of

the ‘Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari petition

and record have been filed. It isfurther ordered that the

Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of a copy of

an order of the Supreme Court denying the writ, or upon

the expiration of thirty days from April 2, 1965, unless

the above-mentioned certificate shall be filed with the Clerk

of this Court within that tine.

/s/ Exvsert P. Torrie,

} Chief Judge.

Dated: (OntormaL Frap)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. -

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT , |

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. 21049

D. C. Docket No. 68.75 CRO .

— Rosert Napout, a/k/a Jimmy Napoui Axp

a | Rosert Greve, Appellants,

v.

Untrep States or America, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

N Southern Distriet of Florida.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, Grooms and McRae,

7 District Judges.

Judgment |

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District. Court for the

‘Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel ;

Ox ConsiperaTion Wuereor, it is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said. Dis-

- trict Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, af-

firmed. ~~

! ä | March 3, 1965.

Iss as Mandate: April 12; 1965 |

Cy

21a

APPENDIX G

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-

ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land

or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in.

time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offense to- be twice put in jeopardy

. Of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall

pensation. .

- private property be taken for public use, without just com-

Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of

the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed, which district shall have been previously as-

certained by law, and to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-

nesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-

_ taining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance

of Counsel for the defense.

Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 2314, Transportation of

Stolen Goods, Securities, Moneys, Fraudulent State Tax Stamps, or

articles Used in Counterfeiting Fe win amt)

Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce

any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the ©

value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been

stolen, converted or taken by fraud; or

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or

property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-

resentations, or promises, transports or causes to be- ns-

ported, or induces any person to travel in, or to be trans-

22a

ported in interstate commerce in the execution or conceal-

ment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of

| money or property having a value of $5,000 or more; or

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports

_ in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, ©

altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing

the same to have been — forged, eae or

c counterfeited; or .

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, 8

in interstate or foreign commerce, any tool, implement, or

thing used or fitted to be used in falsely making, forging, .

altering, or counterfeiting any * or tax stamps, or

any part thereof —

Shall be fined not 1 more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than ten years, or both.

This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged,

altered, counterfeited or spurious representation of an ob-

ligation or other security of the United States, ‘or of an.

obligation, bond certificate, security, treasury note, bill,

promise to pay or bank note issued by any foreign govern-

ment or by a bank or corporation of any foreign country.

As amended July 9, 1956, c. 519, 70 Stat. 507; Oct. 4, —_

Pub. L. 87—371, §2, 75 Stat. 802.

Title 18. United States Code Annotated, Section 371, Conspiracy to

Commit Offense or to Defraud United States

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any

offense against the United States, or to defraud the United

States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any

purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to

éffect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not

more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,

or both. :

If, however, the offense, the, commission of which i is the

object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punish-

; 23a

a ment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum

1948, ©. 645, 62 Stat. 701.

Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 473, Dealing in

_ Counterfeit Obligations or Securities

__ Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, receives, or

delivers any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obliga-

tion or other security of the United States, with the intent

that the same be passed, published, or used as true and

genuine, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned

not more than ten years, or both. June 25, 1948, c. 645,

62 Stat. 705. |

Title 18, United States Code Annotated, Section 2,

ari ik: Dealing in Principas

Whoever commits an offense against the United States,

or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,’ or procures

its commission, is a principal.

Whoever causes an act to be done, which if directly per-

formed by him would be an offense against the United

States, is also a principal and punishable as such.

N

—

punishment provided for such misdemeanor. June 25,

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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