Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rowe v. United States

Supreme Court brief1965

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

mo. 829 ,

GEORGE NEFF ROWE,

Petitioner

W.

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT CLAIMS

PENROSE LUCAS ALBRIGHT

Coumsel for the Petitioner

601 Perpetual Building

Washington, D. C. 20004

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON 1. D. C.

Page

The Opinion Below................................. 1

LEER a SA OR ey BR CET OTF Oe AT 2

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I reeesinnmieidaneeeiatbbdiionins 2

jE SERENE a RS A RE 3

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Reasons for the Allowance of the Writ...................0........ 9

| RATS EN A ae eA 9 EEE ER PP ae 18

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CITATIONS

Cases:

jp ee ee | Bh 7

Bland v. Connally, CCADC, 1961, 293 F.2d 852... 12

Burns Vv. Wilson, 1958, 346 U.S. 187.......................... 17

Clackum Vv. U.S., C.Cls. 1960, 296 F.2d 228.............. 9,11

Ex parte Lange, 1873, 85 U.S. [18 Wall] 163........ 9

Grant +. U.S., C.Cls. No. 30-60, decided July 12,

RRR ATR 8 ARE EG RRO Rica eo ee a ae 10

Harmon v. Brucker, 1958, 355 U.S. §79.........000...... ps WD yi

Jackson V. U.S., 1962, 297 F.2d 939, ceri. granted,

371 U.S. 900, cert. dismissed, Rule 60, 3'72 U.S.

EE Me IBA STS seo A iD NON BN a SO TS 10

Redd v. U.S., S.D.N.Y., 1908, 161 Fed. 469................ 11, 14

Statutes:

The Uniform Code of Military Justice

ee ci caannamnenneneen 4

I esas ib oleiae pines 3

ca caeceubamhoaie Sa 5

a a ctdlacaiinahoonh oe 2

The Career Compensation Act of 1949............... ea 3,8

pg GTR RR TISS Tet RAIL ORI Ow RU 3

ii INDEX (Continued)

Rules: Page

Air Force Regulation No. 39-17...... 3, 6, 16

Air Force Manual 35-4........................... 3, 6, 16

Manual! for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951...... 6, 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

No. ——

GEORGE NEFF RoweE,

Petitioner

V.

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT CLAIMS

Petitioner, George Neff Rowe, prays that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue to review the final order of the United States

Court of Claims of July 17, 1964, and the order of court

of October 16, 1964, denying petitioner’s motion for re

hearing, whereby the claim filed by the petitioner was dis-

missed in that court.

THE OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Claims dated

July 17, 1964, printed on pages 20-42 of the Appendix

to this petition, is as yet unreported and the order of

October 16, 1964, denying petitioner’s motion for rehear-

ing, not reported, is printed on page 43 of the Appen-

- dix to this petition.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Claims was

entered on July 17, 1964. Rehearing was denied Octo-

ber 16, 1964. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. Section 1255.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Air Force Regulation 39-17, :nder which

the petitioner was given an undesirable discharge from

the Air Force, was applied in an unreasonable and arbi-

trary manner since it was based upon offenses for which

the petitioner had already been tried and punished under

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and thus petition-

er’s rights under the “ifth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion were abridged.

2. Whether a commander in the Air Force can circum-

vent th Uniform Code of Military Justice and award a

punitive discharge for acts punishable by the Code when

@ court-martial has not done so, and thus petitioner’s

rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution

were abridged.

3. Whether the issuance of a punitive discharge to a per-

son in uhe Armed Forces who is opposed thereto violates

the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of

the United States.

4. Whether the Air Force can ignore its own regula-

tions and a statute leading to a fuli and fair hearing

prior to the discharge of one of its members for physical

disability where such disability is alleged to be “alco-

holism”’.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Article 44{a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,

70A Stat. 52, 10 U.S.C. Section 844(a) provides:

3

No person may, without his consent, be tried a sec-

ond time.

Part IV, which includes Articles 16-21, of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice, 70A Stat. 42-44, 10 U.S.C.

Section 816-821, in pertinent part prescribes that courts- °

martial convened under the Uniform Code of Military

Justice shall have jurisdiction to try a person subject to

such Code for offenses made punishable by such Code

and that concurrent jurisdiction exists with respect to

military commissions, provost courts and other rnilitary

tribunals in respect to offenders or offenses that may by

statute or by laws of war be tried by such military com-

missions, provost courts or other military tribunals.

10 U.S.C. Section 8811(b), 70A Stat. 544, provides:

No enlisted member of the Air Force may be dis-

charged before his term of service expires, except—

(1) as prescribed by the Secretary of the Air

Force; :

(2) by sentence of a general or special court-mar-

tial; cr

(3) as otherwise provided by law.

Section 413 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949,

37 U.S.C. (1952 edition) 283, 63 Stat. 823, provides:

The Secretary concerned shall prescribe regulations

for the administration of this title within his de

partment or agency, including regulations which

shall provide that no member of the uniformed serv-

ices shall be separated or retired for physical dis-

ability without a full and fair hearing if such mem-

ber shall demand it.

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent Air Force regulations, Air Force Regu-

lation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954) and Air Force Man-

ual 35-4, have their pertinent provisions printed on pages

4

34-41 of the Appendix as part of the Findings of Fact

of the Opinion of the United States Court of Claims.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner served for some ten years on active duty

with the armed forces (R. 18, 19). His first period of

service was for approximately five and one half years in

the Navy which was terminated in 1948 under (subse-

quently determined) honorable conditions (R. 18). While

in the Navy, petitioner suffered a serious injury to his

head which required about fifteen days of hospitalization.

This injury was incurred in line of duty (R. 18).

About one year after being discharged from the Navy,

the petitioner enlisted in the Army and later when the

Air Force became a separate service was transferred to

the Air Feree (R. 18). In the Air Force, the petitioner

underwent a splenectomy as a consequence of an injury

suffered in line of duty. Even though a splenectomy is

considered to be thirty percent disabling under the Vet-

erans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities,

the petitioner was continued on active duty and he was

honorably discharged from the Air Force and re-enlisted

in 1952 (R. 18, 19, 28, 29).

In the period of June 1953-April 1954, the petitioner

was convicted by summary court-martial or punished un-

der Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

for some seven offenses involving drinking (R. 19). On

December 10, 1953, the petitioner was punished for four

of such offenses under Article 15 whereby he was re-

stricted to the base for some four weeks and given two

hours a day extra duty for each day thereof (Joint Exh.

2, p. 39). Although this is three times the maximum pvn-

ishment authorized under Article 15 of the Uniform v . le

of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 815, 70A Stat. 41, the peti-

tioner did not complain and underwent the pu’..shment.

A summary court-martial sentence for another of the of-

5

fenses was adjudged and approved on January 25, 1954,

for a forfeiture of $65 and reéctriction to the limits of

his duty station for a period which exceeded by one day

the maximum period of restriction permitted by law _

(Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 819, 70A Stat. 43). Again,

petitioner did not complain but carried out his punish-

ment. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 36)

/ For the other offenses, in each case the petitioner was

awarded at least the maximum amount of punishment

permitted by law. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 40, 44, 45)

Despite the foregoing offenses, the record is clear that

the petitioner performed his military duties, as a cook, in

an effective maiiner. Regardless of this, petitioner’s im-

mediate commanding officer on May 6, 1954, initiated

steps leading towards petitioner’s undesirable discharge

and pursuant thereto caused the petitioner to“be given

what is described as a psychiatric examination which

found him to be suffering from alcoholism. It was the

opin:on of the medical officer giving the examination that

no mental or physical defect existed which warranted pe-

titioner’s disposition through medicai channels. By this it

was meant that it was not considered that petitioner

was suffering from a disability which might lead to his

separation or retirement therefor. The report of the medi-

cal officer, however, makes no mention of petitioner’s

thirty percent disabling splenectomy. Also, no mentién is

made of the prior head injury. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 33, 34,

R. 19, 20)

Soon after this examination the petitioner was again

in difficulty involving d:inking and charges under Article

134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice were brought

against him. On May 24, 1954, the petitioner was tried

for such offenses by a special court-martial and found

guilty as charged. The sentence was restriction to the

base for three months (even though two months restric-

6

tion is the maximum permitted by law)’ and forfeiture

of $65 per month for four months. Four members of the

court-martial reecinmended clemency (R. 20). They rec-

ommended that every available effort be made through

medica! care and other facilities available in the Air Force

to aid the airman.

After petitioner had been charged with the offenses for

which he was later tried by court-martial, but before the

court-martial itself, petitioner’s immediate commanding

officer recommended to the commander of petitioner’s duty

station that the petitioner appear before a Board of Of-

ficers convened under Air Force Regulation 39-17 to de-

termine petitioner’s fitness for retention in the service.

No mention was made of petitioner’s splenectomy or head

injury. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 28-35)

Such recommendation was approved by the commander

of petitioner’s duty station and following the court-mar-

tial, on May 28, 1954, the petitioner appeared before a

designated Board of Officers. By regulation, before peti-

tioner was to appear before such Board, he was supposed

to have a further physical examination to determine wheth-

er any mental or physical defect of sufficient import ex-

isted to warrant action, Air Force Manual 35-4 (per-

taining to disability separation or retirement). The reg-

ulations required ‘when physical or mental defects of

major import are involved, the medical officer will sub-

mit to the board a concise report in which the essential

points of the mental and physical condition of the air-

man are described, ....” However, such an examination

and report was not ordered or made. (R. 25, Joint Exh.

2, p. 1-22)

At the Board, the petitioner was represented by coun-

sel but there is no indication that such counsel was a

lawyer and no requirement that he so be. Among other

1 Manual for Courts-Martial. United States, 1951, p. 209.

7

things evidence was introduced before the Boar? of the

offenses for which the petitioner had just been court-

martialed some four days previously. (Joint Exh. 2,

p. 3)

With reference to the petitioner’s work, his immediate

commanding officer testified that his work was favorable.

In fact ne had no complaints at all concerning his work

and considered him a very good cook. To his knowledge,

petitioner had never come to work under the influence

of alcohol nor did he recall that he had ever reported late

for work because of drunkenness. In addition, he had

not received any complaints of drunkenness which oc-

erred either in the barracks or on when petitioner was

on duty. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 6)

The Board called as a witness one Technical Sergeant

Howard M. Campbell who was petitioner’s supervisor.

He testified that the petitioner was an excellent cook

and a good worker who ceuld accomplish in two hours

what it took others a half day to do. (Joint Exh. p. 11)

As a third witness, the Board called Technical Ser-

geant Herman C. Strickland, who was the food service

supervisor having the petitioner in his section. This wit-

ness in resumeing his experience with the petitioner

stated as follows:

I would like to state that I have a kind of mixed

feeling for him. I have close to 18 years service of

which the majority has been in food service career

field. Have been Food Service Supervisor since No-

vember 1942 and have had a large number of work-

ers working for me, civilians while stationed in

China, civilians while in the Philippines and civilians

working for me down here. I can truthfully say

that during the 12 years I have never had a more

willing worker or cook that seemed to take more in-

terest in his work. He is an excellent cook, good

worker, does not mind working, doesn’t shirk his

8

duties at all. Obediently carries out his order to

the letter. Does not question why. Another thing

I have noticed about him was when he got in trouble

and drew a restriction from the delinquency re-

ports received, never once did he break one of those

restrictions. It seemed to him that they were mili-

tary orders to be carried out just like the orders I

would give him during his tour of duty and he would

carry them out. Never had him to report for duty

under the influence cf whiskey, nor have him to

drink while on duty, or leave duty before being prop-

erly released. . . . I would like to go on record as

saying that I feel the Air Force, doing what it is to

retain experiencec personnel, they claim it costs

a good deal of money to train them, it seems to me

if it is at all possible to give this man some kind of

medical treatment to correct the disease, that I feel

he has just as much of a disease as if he had TB, and

reclaim him for the military :ervice, it would not only

be doing the man a big favor, but would also be a

benefit to the service. You do not get the high cali-

bre of working men ev2ry day that you have in this

man. I have men down there that I could gladly

spare two of, the service I get from them, better thar.

this one man... . (Joint Exh. 2, p. 11-12)

Despite such evidence the Board recommended that the

petitioner be given an undesirable discharge from the

service because of “habits or traits of character mani-

fested by chronic alcoholism.” This was approved by the

officer having general court-martial jurisdiction and the

petitioner was so discharged on July 1, 1954. At no time

did the petitioner give his consent or request such a dis-

charge, but to the contrary he opposed same. The Board

in question made no findings and was not authorized to

make any findings as provided by Title IV of the Career

Compensation Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 816-825, pertaining to

members of the armed services who were separated and

retired for physical disabilitv. (Joint Exh. 2, p. 1-22)

9

The petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies

before the Air Force Discharge Review Board and the

Air Force Correction Board. Because of the undesira-

ble discharge, the petitioner has been denied compensa-

tion for his otherwise compensable disability by the Vet-

erans Administration (R-21-23, 29).

Suit was brought in the Court of Claims on the theory

that the discharge was not validly issued and, accord-

ing.y, petitivurer had not been legally discharged (R. 1-6).

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

This case raises questions of fundamental importance

concerning the rights of armed forces personnel.

It is singularly clear in this case that the Air Force

tried the petitioner under the Uniform Code of Military

Justice for a series of offenses for which he was awarded

the maximum or more than the maximum punishment the

law allowed. He was then taken before a Board of Of-

ficers, tried essentially for the same conduct, and award-

ed a punishment which the U.S. Court of Claims once

called in the case of Clackum v. U.S., 1960, 296 F.2d 228,

“one of the most severe penalties which may be imposed

by court-martial.” As a result of these proceedings

wherein the petitioner was twice placed in jeopardy and

doubly punished, he was not only stigmatized for life

but also a forfeiture of disability compensation from the

Veterans Administration for a thirty percent disability

was worked upon him. It is difficult to conceive of a

more patent disregard of the protections both as to pro-

cedure and the limits of punishment that Congress in-

tended servicemen to have.

Ex parte Lange, 1873, 85 U.S. [18 Wall] 163, estab-

lished that dual punishment for the same offense was

double jec \ardy under the Fifth Amendment and this

case challenges the application of a regulation which

10

circumvents the Uniform Code of Military Justice and

awards a further punishment, a punitive discharge, for

acts punishable by the Code when a court-martial has

not done so.

The situation in the instant case is not unlike where

a prosecuting attorney would be authorized in a case

where he concluded that the sentence was inadequate to

impose such additional penalties which he — the

accused person deserved.

The Commissioner of the Court of Claims considered

the treatment of the petitioner was justified on the basis

of the decision of the Court of Claims in Jackson v.

United States, No. 403-60, decided January 12, 1962,

297 F.2d 939, certiorari granted, 371 U.S. 900, certiorari

dismissed under Rule 60, 372 U.S. 950. In Jackson, the

Court of Claims found an undesirable discharge on the

basis of a conviction by an Oklahoma court which was

subsequently set aside on appeal to be justified.

The Court of Claims, being aware that certiorari had

been granted in Jackson,? omitted the Jackson citation

from its opinion—otherwise identical with that of the

Commissioner—and substituted therefor the case of Grant

v. United States, No. 30-60, decided July 12, 1963. The

Grant case, however, did not involve an undesirable dis-

charge. On the motion for rehearing, the Government

argued that Grant was, nevertheless, a proper basis for

the action by the Court of Claims inasmuch as Grant

stood for the proposition that an undesirable discharge

as an administrative discharge is not a punitive dis-

charge.

2? This was clear from specific comments of judges of the Court of

Claims in oral arguments. At least one judge appeared to feel that

the Department of Justice should not have settled Jackson after

certiorari had been granted.

1l

It is thus clear to all familiar with military law that

the instant case stands for the proposition that an un-

desirable discharge is not a punitive discharge. This we

challenge. Indeed, the legal and practical disabilities

attending the issuance of a bad conduct discharge by

court-martial sentence (with numerous legal safeguards

prescribed by law) and those of an undesirable discharge

(without such safeguards) are essentially identical. In

fact, it would seem that the undesirable discharge is

probably the more odious of these twin malefactors since

it frequently connotes homosexuality.*

The Court of Claims is turning back the clock fifty

years to Reid v. U. S., S.D.N.Y., 1908, 161 Fed. 469,

where the view was taken that the character of an un-

desirable discharge was not punishment. This view is

diametrically opposite to an ezrlier and more enlightened

decision by the ‘ourt of Claims, Clackum v. United

States, 246-56, Janaary 20, 1960, 296 Fed. 2d 228, where-

in it was stated:

A dishonorable discharge is, for a soldier, one of

the most severe penalties which may be imposed

by a court-martial. Elaborate provisions for re

view of court-martial sentences within the military

hierarchy, and potentially by the Court of Military

Appeals, are included in our military laws. Yet the

Air Force regulations discussed above provide that

if the evidence at hand is so unsubstantial that a con-

viction by a court-martial would be unlikely, the

executive officers of the Air Force may themselves

convict the soldier and impose the penalty. It is as

if a prosecuting attorney were authorized, in a case

where he concluded that he divn’t have enough evi-

—

3 So testified Chief Juage Quinn ‘* the Court of Military Appeals.

Committee Print, Constitutional Ri’ hts of Military Personne!, Sum-

mary—Report of Hearings by Subcommittee on Constitutional

Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,

Pursuant to S. Res. 58, 88th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2.

12

dence to obtain a conviction in Court, to himself

impose the fine or imprison:nent which he thought

the acciised person deserved.

The Government defends this remarkable arrange-

ment, and its operation in the instant case, on the

ground that it is necessary in the interest of an ef-

ficient military establishment for our national de-

fense. We see nothing in this argument. The plain-

tiff being a member of the Air Force Reserve, on ac-

tive duty, the Air Force had the undoubted right to

discharge her whenever it pleased, for any reason

or for no reason, and by so doing preserve the Air

Force from even the slightest suspicion of harboring

undesirable characters. But it is unthinkable that

it should have the raw power, without respect for

even the most elementary notions of due process of

law, to load her down with penalties. It is ate in the

day to argue tnat everything that the executives of

the armed forces do in connection with the discharge

of soldiers is beyond the reach of judiciai scrutiny.

Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579.

It is inconsistent with Bland v. Connally, C.C.A. D. C.

1961, 293 F.2d 852, wherein Judge Washington stated

on page 858:

What is at stake, therefore, is merely the Navy’s

right to punish or labei, ard not its right to secure

itself against subversives. . .

.. . We think it must be conceded that any dis-

charge characterized as less than honorable will re-

sult in serious injury.

It cortrasts with the viewpoint of the Court of Mili-

tary Appeals, which in a compartively recent report ‘

stated :

* Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals

and the Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces and the

General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury pursuant to

the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the Period January 1,

1960 to December 31, 1960, p. 12.

13

The unusual increase in the use of the admir:

trative discharge since the code became a fixture has

led to the suspicion that the services were resorting

to that means of circumventing the requirements

of the code. The validity of that suspicion was con-

firmed by Major General Reginald C. Harmon, then

Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, at the

annual meeting of the Judge Advocates Association

held at Los Angeles, California, August 26, 1958. He

there declared that the tremendous increase in un-

desirable discharges by administrative proceedings

was a result of efforts of military commanders to

avoid the requirements of the uniform code. Al-

though he acknowledged that men thereby affected

were deprived of the protections afforded by the code,

no action to curtail the practice was initiated.

It is contrary to the information of Senator Sam J.

Erwin, Jr., senior United States Senator of the State of

North Carolina who, as Chairman of the Subcommittee

on Constitutional rights of the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, has been conducting a congressional study of

the constitutional rights of military personnel. The Sen-

ator, in a speech published in full in the Judge Advocate

Journal, Bulletin No. 35, June, 1963, stated as follows:

Pree Proceeding first to the administrative discharge

under other than honorable conditions, I find it in-

disputable that such a discharge can be as damag-

ing as a punitive discharge imposed by a court-mar-

tial. In fact, the Subcommittee has been told that

some would prefer a bad conduct discharge from

a special court-martial to an undesirable discharge

issued administratively.

Secondly, the effects of a discharge under other

than honorable conditions, however imposed, are not

limited to the military career of the person affected;

instead such a discharge will follow the individual

the rest of his life; it will affect his reputation, his

job opportunities, and his veterans benefits. .. .

14

oxen {f the allegations against the serviceman con-

stitute a violation of the Uniform Code for which

he could be court-martizled, especially if the service-

man requests a court-martial, in which he would

~ have the safeguards prescribed by the Uniform Code,

then the Services should not be able to accomplish

indirectly what they could not do directly. That is,

they should not be able to adjudge a man guilty and

stigmatize him with an undesirable discharge with-

out granting him the procedural protections that

Congress intended he have. Of course, I would not

dispute the Services’ power under such circum-

stances to discharge the man under honvrable con-

ditions; but that power has not been at issue.

It well may be that in the days of Reid, an undesirable

discharge had little effect on a man’s subsequent life other

than on his eligibility for Veterans Administration bene-

fits and was comparable to being “fired” from any other

job. This situation no longer prevails. Today, beyond

dispute, the punitive nature of the discharge is treated by

employees in much the same light as a conviction for a

felony and effectively bars the individual from the pur-

suit of many vocations irrespective of his talents. Yet

it is given for trivial offenses, often to minors, and the

undesirable discharge is frequently awarded where a

court-martial could not do so. Discharges of dishonora-

ble nature punish unequally and often harshly. In this

age of the job application form and background investi-

gation, the dishonorable discharge constitutes a modern

scarlet letter and a cruel and inhuman punishment for

the type of offenses generally involved. This case chal-

lenges the constitutionality of such punishment.

Under the Table of Maximum Punishments for the

Uniform Code of Military Justice,” a bad conduct dis-

charge is not permitted for trivial offenses unless there

5 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, p. 228.

15

is a previous record of at least two previous convictions

under court-martial in the individual’s record. Here the

petitioner had only one such previous court-martial con-

viction at the time of his second court-martial. In ef-

fect, the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives 2 mem-

ber of the services three “strikes” before he is “out”.

By regulation, the Secretary has changed this rule to two

or even less “strikes”—depending upon the initiative of

the local commanding officer to process the individual for

an undesirable discharge.

This case challenges the authority of the Secretary of

the Air Force to diminish the rights which Congress has

given to servicemen under the Uniform Code of aiiditary

Justice before they can ke given a punitive discharge.

The instant case is unique in that all the evidence in-

dicates the petitioner’s military record for the period of

service whick terminated in the undesirable discharge

was good except, and only except, for those offenses for

which he was punished. Based upon such offenses, the

petitioner was considered to be suffering from alcoholism.’

Under Air Force regulations in effect at the time of peti-

tioner’s discharge, “physical disability” was defined as

any manifest or latent impairment of function due to

disease or injury regardless of the degree of impairment

(R. 28). If the petitioner was suffering from alcohol-

ism, a disease, it follows that he had a “physical disabil-

ity” as defined and, under the Air Force regulations,

should have been referred to a medical board and ulti-

mately to a physical evaluation board where he would

have been given a statutory full and fair hearing under

the criteria set forth in Title IV of the Career Com-

pensation Act of 1949. This is the case without even

* At least one doctor subsequently diagnosed petitioner’s condi-

tion as “Schizophrenic Reaction, Catatonic Type”. See report of

Dr. Y. Takahashi in record of proceedings of Air Force Board for

Correction of Military Records.

16

considering the petitioner’s splenectomy which was rata-

ble at thirty percent under the Veterans Administra-

tion Schedule for Rating Disabilities and serves to em-

phasize the cavalier treatment which petitioner has re-

ceived.

In connection with the foregoing it will be noted that

the Regulations of the Air Force in force when petitioner

was being processed for his discharge (AFM 35-4, Chap-

ter 2, Subsection 7) provided that a patient whose fit-

ness for further duties appears, for medical reasons, to

be “in doubt” will be referred to a medical board. The

regulation pursuant to which the petitioner was dis-

charged, AFR 39-17, provides that the discharge of en-

listed personnel under such regulation will be accom-

plished only after a “conclusive determination” has been

made that a mental or physical defect does not exist which

would warrant consideration under AFM 35-4, which is

a regulation dealing with separations and retirement fcr

physica] disability (R. 23, 28).

Here the petitioner was at least thirty percent disabled

under the Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating

Disabilities. Yet no reference was made to the existence

of such disability in the report submitted by the medical

officer in the case. Nor did the immediate commanding

officer in his recommendation make any mention of such

disability. What is required to be “in doubt” or for “con-

clusive determination” so as to preclude petitioner’s con-

sideration by a medical board!!?

Moreover, after it was determined to refer the peti-

tioner to a Board of Officers. under the regulations he

should have been scheduled to appear before the unit

medical officer or base surgeon to ascertain whether any

mental or physical defect of sufficient import to war-

rant action under AFM 35-4 existed. If the medical

officer did not consider such defect to exist, he was

to submit to the Board a concise report in which the

17

essential points of the mentai or physical condition of

the petitioner were described. This was not done in

petitioner’s case and apparently the requirement was

completely overlooked (R. 25).

This court in Burns v. Wilson, 1953, 346 U.S. 137, 142

held that service personnel are protected by the Consti-

tutional guarantee of due process and this case challenges

the due process of the procedures utilized to discharge

petitioner.

Petitioner was not given an undesirable discharge be-

cause his service was “desirable. Rather, he was given

such a discharge because he was considered an unde-

sirable type of person. But is this sufficient reason for

the Air Force to punish a man—particularly beyond that

authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice?

The decision of the Court ot Claims conflicts with Har-

mon v. Brucker, 1958, 355 U.S. 579 and is inconsistent

with the language of this Court in Bell v. United States,

1961, 366 U.S. 393, 401, wherein it is observed:

In the Armed Forces, as everywhere else, there

are good men and rascals, courageous men and cow-

ards, honest men and cheats. If a soldier’s conduct

falls below a specified level he is subject to disci-

pline, and his punishment may include the forfei-

ture of future but not accrued pay. But a soldier

who has not received such punishment from a duly

constituted court-martial is entitled to the statutory

pay and allowances of his grade and status, however

ignoble a soldier he may be.

This case challenges a procedure which punishes a

member of the Armed Services merely because in the

eyes of someone he may be an undesirable person and not

because his conduct has fallen below the specified

level.

18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfuly submitted,

PENROSE LUCAS ALBRIGHT

Counsel for the Petitioner

601 Perpetual Building

Washington, D. C. 20004

\"

19

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

No. 256-60

(Decided July 17, 1964) _

GEORGE NEFF ROWE

Vv.

THE UNITED STATES

Penrose L. Albright for plaintiff. Mason, Mason and

Albright on the briefs.

Arthur E. Fay, with whom was Assistant Attorney

General John W. Douglas, for defendant.

Before JONES, Senior Judge, WHITAKER, LARAMORE,

DURFEE and DAVIS, Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM: This case was referred pursuant to Rule

45 (since April 1, 1964 Rule 57) to Trial Commissioner

Mastin G. White, with directions to make findings of fact

and recommendations for conclusion of law. The Com-

missioner has done so and has written an opinion with

which we agree and which we adopt with minor modifi-

cations. This case differs from Sofranoff v. United States,

Ct. Cl. No. 9-62, decided April 17, 1964, in that the perti-

nent regulations were not followed in that case, whereas

they were followed in the present case. Plaintiff, is there-

fore, not entitled to recover, and his petition is dismissed.

20

The opinion, as modified, is as follows:

The plaintiff, who had served in the Armed Forces as

an enlisted man for more than 10 years, was given an

undesirable discharge by the Air Force on July 1, 1954.

The Air Force purported to act in accordance with Air

Force Regulation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954). At the

time of this discharge, the plaintiff was serving under

a 6-year enlistment in the Air Force, and he had com-

pleted only a little more than one-third of the 6-year

term.

The plaintiff alleges in the first amended petition that

the undesirable discharge of July 1, 1954, “was invalid

and illegal and did not effect his separation from the Air

Force * * *.” He accordingly seeks in the present ac-

tion to recover military pay and allowances for the period

commencing July 2, 1954, the day after he was dis-

charged. The plaintiff states in this connection that he

is entitled to recover pay and allowances up to the date

of judgment, but it should be noted at the ouiset that any

recovery would necessarily be limited to the unexpired

portion of the 6-year term of the enlistment from which

the plaintiff was discharged. Murray v. United States,

Ct. Ci. No. 237-57, decided June 7, 1961, p. 6 of slip

copy; Smith v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 28-60, decided

December 6, 1961, p. 9 of slip copy; Clackum v. United

States, Ct. Cl. No. 246-56, decided March 6, 1963, p. 2

of slip copy.

The plaintiff’s allegation of invalidity and illegality

respecting the undesirable discharge of July 1, 1954, is

basec primarily upon the contention that the Air Force,

under its own regulations, could not properly issue an

undesirable discharge to him without first referring his

case to a medical board for a determination as to whether

he was entitled to retirement or a discharge because of

physical disability. In addition, the plaintiff asserts in a

brief filed for the consideration of the commissioner that,

21

in view of the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice, there is at least substantial doubt whether the

Air Force could validly provide by regulation for the ad-

ministrative issuance of undesirable discharges.

The second of the points mentioned in the preceding

paragraph will be discussed first.

It apparently is the plaintiff’s theory that any form

of discharge certificate issued by a military service which

is phrased in derogatory language and which diminishes

the benefits that otherwise ould be available to the dis-

charged serviceman is a punitive discharge; and since

Congress, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice en-

acted as Section 1 of the Act of May 5, 1950 (64 Stat.

107),’ expressly authorized courts-martial to adjudge dis-

honorable discharges and bad-conduct discharges as pun-

ishments against persons convicted of criminal offenses

defined in the Code, this impliedly prohibited the mili-

tary services from providing by regulation for the ad-

ministrative issuance of any sort of derogatory discharge

that would disminish’ the benefits otherwise available to

the discharged person.

It is pertinent to observe that the same statute which

enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice also pro-

vided in Section 6 (64 Stat. at p. 145) that the former

Article of War 108, as amended (41 Stat. 809), should

continue to have the same force, effect, applicability as

theretofore, although it should no longer be known as an

Article of War. The statutory provision formerly desig-

nated as Article of War 108 declared in part that no

enlisted man should be discharged before the expiration

of his term of service except by order of the President,

or by order of the Secretary of the military department

1The Uniform Code of Military Justice is now incorporated in

Title 10 of the United States Code as Chapter 47.

22

in which he was serving,’ or by sentence of a court-

martial. Substantially similar statutory language had

been in effect since the enactment of Article of War 11

by the Act of April 10, 1806 (2 Stat. 359, 361); and it

had been judicially held that svch language granted to

the executive branch of the Government authority to

determine the form and terms of discharge certificates to

be issued administratively to discharged military per-

sonnel (Davis v. Woodring, 111 F. 2d 523, 525 (D.C.

Cir., 1940)), it being sufficient if the form and terms

of a discharge certificate adequately indicated the nature

of the service performed (Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S.

539, 545 (1947)). Furthermore, this executive authority

had heen held to extend to the issuance administratively

of discharges without honor. Reid v. United States, 161

Fed. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y., 1908). Congress showed a clear

intention, in Section 6 of the same statute which enacted

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, that the executive

authority respecting military discharges should continue

and should rot be affected by the enactment of the Code.

The authority of the Secretary of the Air Force, sub-

sequent to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Mili-

tary Justice, to provide by regulation for the administra-

tive issuance of undesirable discharges was upheld by

this court in the case of Grant v. United States, No. 30-

62, decided July 12, 1963.

On the basis of the decision in the Grant case, it is nec-

essary to reject the plaintiff’s contention in the present

case that the Secretary of the Air Force could not validly

provide by regulation for the administrative issuance of

undesirable discharges.

? Article of War 108 referred to the Secretary of War, but the

powers of that office devolved upon the Secretary of the Army and

the Secretary of the Air Force by virtue of Title II of the National

Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495, 499).

23

Of course, regulations promulgated by the Secretary

of a military department to govern the administrative

issuance of discharges that disadvantage the discharged

person with respect to future benefits must meet the

basic requirements of due process of law. Clackum v.

United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404, 408, 410 (1960); Bland

v. Connally, 293 F. 2d 852, 858, 860 (D.C. Cir., 1961).

Furthermore, whatever regulations may be promulgated

must be followed by a military service in connection with

the issuance of such discharges. Service v. Dulles, 354

U.S. 268, 388 (1957); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,

539-540 (1959); Murray v. United States, supra, at p. 6

of slip copy; Smith v. United States, supra, at p. 9 of

slip copy.

This brings us to a consideration of the contention

made by the planitiff in the present case that, under the

Air Force’s own regulations, it could not properly issue

an undesirable discharge to the plaintiff without first re-

ferring his case to a medical board for a determination

as to whether he was entitled to retirement or a discharge

because of physical disability.

At the time pertinent to this litigation, Air Force Reg-

ulation No. 39-17 constituted the authority within the

Air Force for the discharge of enlisted personnel because

of “unfitness.” The grounds for the issuance of such a

discharge were set out in the regulation, and these in-

cluded “evidence of habits or traits of character mani-

fested by * * * chronic alcoholism * * *,” this being the

particular ground that was involved in the plaintiff’s

case. The regulation prescribed a rather elaborate pro-

cedure, which included the convening of a board of offi-

cers to consider the case of an enlisted man whose dis-

charge for unfitness had been recommended, the holding

of a hearing by the board, and the right of the affected

person to appear before the board in person and to be

represented by counsel. The board could recommend that

24

the affected person be discharged because of unfitness and

be given an undesirable discharge, or that he be dis-

charged because of unsuitability under Air Force Regu-

lation No. 39-16 and be given a general discharge, or that

he be retained in the service. The board’s action was

subject to consideration and approval or disapproval by

the convening authority and by the commander exercis-

ing general court-martial jurisdiction.

The plaintiff apparently relies upon the portion of

Air Force Regulation no. 39-17 which declared that

a discharge under the regulation could be accomplished

only after “Conclusive determination has been made

that a mental or physical defect does not exist which

wou'l warrant consideration under AFM 35-4.” In this

connection, the plaintiff, prior to his appearance before

the board of officers set up under Air Force Regulation

No. 39-17, was given an examination by an Air Force

medical officer. The diagnosis was “Alcoholism, chronic,

moderate, manifested by excessive drinking, disorderly

behavior when under the influence of alcohol * * *.” The

medical officer concluded that there were no mental or

physical defects which warranted disposition of the plain-

tiffs case through medical channels, and recommended

that the -'-‘*tiff be separated from the service under

the provisic.us of Air Force Regulation No. 39-17 because

of alcoholism.

According to the plaintiff, the conclusion that there

were no mental or physical defects warranting disposi-

tion of his case through medical channels was erroneous.

The plaintiff refers to the fact that, as shown by his

medical records in the Armed Forces, he once sustained

a head injury which required that he be hospitalized for

about 15 days, a splenectomy was performed upon him,

and he was a chrunic alcoholic.

The plaintiff calls attention to Air Force Manual 35-4,

which was cited in Air Force Regulation No. 39-17 and

25

which covered the subject of retirement and separation

of military personnel by virtme of physical disability.

The manual provided in part that:

A patient who is unfit or whose fitness for further

general military service appears, for medical rea-

sons to be in doubt will be referred to a medical .

ware. * F*

The plaintiff argues that his case, because of the head

injury, the splenectomy, and his chronic alcoholism, came

within the scope of the quoted language, and, therefore,

that it was necessary for the Air Force to refer his case

to a medical board for consideration of the question

whether he was entitled to retirement or a discharge be-

cause of physical disability, before the Air Force could

properly decide on the issuance of an undesirable dis-

charge to him.

The head injury mentioned by the plaintiff was sus-

tained on or about June 10, 1947; while the plaintiff

was serving as an enlisted man in the Navy. He was

hospitalized for this injury until on or about June 25,

1947. Thereafter, the plaintiff continued to serve in the

Navy until February 6, 1948, when he was discharged.

A year later, he enlisted in the Army, and he served as

a soldier for more than 4 months, after which he was

transferred to the Air Force. The plaintiff served in

the Air Force for more than 5 years, which involved a re

enlistment. Each enlistment and reenlistment involved a

medical determination by the military authorities that

the plaintiff was physically qualified to perform full mili-

tary duty. Moreover, the plaintiff has not presented io

the court evidence proving that, after the period of hos-

pitalization in June 1947, the plaintiff’s physical capacity

to perform full military duty was affected by the 1947

head injury. Consequently, the mere fact that this head

injury occurred in i947 was not sufficient to raise a

doubt concerning the plaintiff’s physical fitness to per-

26

form the duties of his grade at the time in 1954 when

his case was being processed under Air Force Regulation

No. 39-17.

The splenectomy was performed on the plaintiff in

November 1950, while he was serving with the Air Force.

After the operation, the plaintiff had a 60-day period of

convalescence, and he was then assigned light duties for

a period of 3 or 4 weeks. At the end of the latter period,

the plaintiff was given regular duties to perform. He

served out his then current enlistment and was discharged

by the Air Force on February 13, 1952. The next day,

the plaintiff reenlisted in the Air Force; and he served

under that enlistment until the discharge of July 1, 1954,

that is involved in the present litigation. The reenlist-

ment in 1952 involved a medical determination by the

military authorities that the plaintiff was physically

qualified at the time, notwithstanding the splenectomy,

to perform full military duty. The plaintiff has not at-

tempted to rebut this by introducing evidence for the

purpose of proving that, after the period of convalescence

and the period of light duties previously mentioned, the

1950 splenectomy actually affected his physical capacity

to perform full military duty during the remaining years

of his military service. The plaintiff seems to regard

as conclusive the circumstance that, at the time of the

pla:ntiff’s discharge on July 1, 1954, the Veterans Ad-

ministration z:ated a splenectomy as a 30-percent dis-

ability. This is immaterial, however, .s the disability

ratings of the Veterans Administration are based upon

statutes and regulations different from those that govern

the retirement or discharge of military personnel. Holli-

day v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 647, 649 (1954).

We turn now to a consideration of the plaintiff’s chronic

alcoholista, which, according to the Air Force’s determi-

nation, rendered the plaintiff unfit for continuation in

the service. The plaintiff refers to the dictionary defi-

27

nition of alcoholism as “A diseased condition caused by

the excessive use of alcoholic liquors” (WEBSTER’S NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2d edition, unabridged) ;

and he contends that his chronic alcoholism was at least

sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether his unfitness for

further general military service was attributable to medi-

cal reasons, within the meaniug of the sentence pre-

viously quoted from Air Force Manual 35-4, this mak-

ing it necessary thai his case be referred to a medical

board for a determination of this question before the

Air Force could properly issue an undesirable discharge

to him under Air Force Regulation No. 39-17.

It is not necessary for the court to decide whether al-

coholism is or is not a disease, from the technical medi-

cal standpoint. It is sufficient for the purposes of the

present case that the Air Force, in its Regulation No.

39-17, dealt specifically with chronic alcoholism on the

part of enlisted personnel and prescribed a procedure

whereby such personnel would be discharged from the

service. These provisions dealing expressly with chronic

alcoholism would necessarily remove alcoholism from the

scope of the provisions of Air Force Manual 35-4 deal-

ing generally with the subject of physical disability. Bal-

timore Nat. Bank v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S: 209, 215

(1936).

For the reasons indicated above, it is my opinion that

the Air Force had the authority to promulgate its Regu-

lation No. 39-17 providing (among other things) for the

issuance of undesirable discharges to chronic alcoholics,

and that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the Air

Force did not act in accordance with this regulation when

it issued an undesirable discha:ge to the plaintiff.

It is my recommendation, therefore, that the petition

be dismissed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States. He

resided at 3805 Military Road NW., Washington, D.C.,

when this action was initiated.

2. On October 3, 1942, the plaintiff entered upon a

period of active duty with the Navy, serving as an en-

listed man.

3. (a) On or about June 10, 1947, while the plaintiff

was serving on active duty with the Navy, as indicated in

finding 2, he suffered an injury to his head, for which he

was hospitalized until on or about June 25, 1947. This

injury was held to be “LOD” (in line of duty).

(b) The evidence in the record does not show that,

after the period of hospitalization mentioned in para-

graph (a) of this finding. the plaintiff’s physical capacity

to perform full military duty was affected by the head

injury referred to in paragraph (a) of this finding.

4. (a) On February 6, 1948, the plaintiff was given an

undesirable discharge by the Navy.

(b) Subsequently, the Navy Board of Review, Dis-

charges and Dismissals canceled the undesirable dis-

charge mentioned in paragraph (a) of this finding and

issued to the plaintiff a discharge under honorable con-

ditions by reason of unsuitability.

5. On February 8, 1949, the plaintiff enlisted in the

United States Army. This enlistment involved a medical

determination by the military authorities that the plain-

tiff was physically qualified to perform full military duty.

The plaintiff was transferred to the United States Air

Force on June 20, 1949.

6. (a) On November 12, 1950, while the plaintiff was

serving on active duty with the Air Force under the

enlistment referred to in finding 5, a splenectomy was

29

performed upon him. The splenectomy was held to be in-

curred in line of duty.

(b) After the splenectomy mentioned in paragraph

(a) of this finding, the plaintiff went through 2 60-day

period of convalescence, and then resumed the perfor-

mance of military duties. He was assigned light duties

for a period of 3 or 4 weeks, and then was given regular

duties.

(c) The evidence in the record does not show that, after

the period of convalescence and the period of light duties

referred to in paragraph (b) of this finding, the plain-

tiff’s physical capacity to perform full military duty

was affected by the splenectomy mentioned in paragraph

(a) of this finding.

7. On February 13, 1952, the plaintiff was discharged

under honorable conditions by the Air Force.

8. On February 14, 1952, the plaintiff reenlisted in

the Air Force for a 6-year term. The reenlistment in-

volved a medical determination by the military authori-

ties that the plaintiff was physically qualified to perform

full military duty. The plaintiff served under the en-

listment of February 14, 1952, until July 1, 1954, when

he was discharged as undesirable under circumstances

related in subsequent findings.

9. During the period June 1953-Aprii 1954, while the

plaintiff was serving in the Air Force under the enlist-

ment mentioned in finding 8, he was convicted by court-

martial or punished under Article 15 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice for the following offenses:

(a) being disrespectful toward a commissioned officer,

failing to obey a lawful order of a commissioned officer,

and disorderly conduct in station on or about June

26, 1953;

30

(b) being drunk and disorderly in public on or about

November 16, 1953;

(ec) driving while intoxicated on or about November

22, 1953;

(d) driving while intoxicated on or about December

1, 1953;

(e) being drunk in public on or about December 3,

1953;

(f) being drunk in public on or about January 21,

1954; and

(2) being drunk in public on or about April 21, 1954.

10. On May 6, 1954, the piaintiff was given a psychia-

tric evaluation by an Air Force medical officer. The

diagnosis was “Alcoholism, chronic, moderate, manifested

by excessive drinking, disorderly behavior when under

the influence of alcohol * * *.” The medical officer rec-

ommended that the plaintiff “be separated from the miii-

tary service under the provisions of AFR 39-17 because

of alcoholism.” In this connection, it was concluded by

the medical officer that there were no mental or physical

defects which warranted disposition of the plaintiff’s

case through medical channels, which would have pro-

vided the plaintiff with a full and fair heariag by a phy-

sical evaluation board.

11. Under the date of May 20, 1954, the commanding

officer of the plaintiff’s organization, the Unit Command

Section, 3625th United States Air Force Hospital, Tyn-

dall Air Force Base, Florida, recommended that the

plaintiff appear before a board convened under Air Force

Regulation No. 39-17 to determine his fitness for reten-

tion in the service. The commanding officer’s recommen-

dation stated (among other things) that “Airman has

given evidence of chronic alcoholism and disorderly be-

havior by repeated commission of offenses * * *,” and that

31

“In view of the shove pattern of behavior and futile at-

tempts made to effect rehabilitation of this airman, I con-

clude that it [sic] is of minimal benefit to the Air Force

and his retention therein would be detrimental to the good

of the service.” ?

12. (a) On May 24, 1954, the plaintiff was tried at

the Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, before a special

court-martial for allegedly violating Article 134 of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice by being drunk at a

public place on or about May 18, 1954, and being drunk

in station on or about Mv 15, 1954.

(b) At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff was

found guilty of the charge and specifications, and he was

sentenced to be restricted to the limits of the Tyndall

Air Force Base for 3 months and to forfeit $65 per month

for 6 months.

(c) A recommendation for clemency, signed by four

members of the special court-martial was submitted un-

der the date of May 27, 1954.

13. (a) On May 28, 1954, at the Tyndall Air Force

Base, Florida, the plaintiff appeared before a board of

officers appointed pursuant to Air Force Regulation No.

39-17 by the commanding officer of the 3625th Flying

Training Wing (Interceptor). After a hearing, the board

made the following finding:

The board finds that the respondent properly falls

within the category outlined in paragraph 3a(1),

AFR 39-17, “habits or traits of character manifested

by chronic alcoholism.”

The Board made the following recommendation: |

The Board recommends that Airman Basic George

N. Rowe be discharged because of unfitness and given

an und-sirable discharge.

32

(b) The ‘finding and recommendation of the board

were approved by an officer having general court-martial

jurisdiction on June 21, 1954.

14. Pursuant to the proceedings mentioned in find-

ings 10, 11, and 13, the Air Force issued an undesirable

discharge to the plaintiff on July 1, 1954.

15. (a) On July 9, 1954, the plaintiff requested that

the issuance of an undesirable discharge to him on July

1, 1954, be reviewed by the Air Force Discharge Review

Board, and that the character of the discharge be changed.

(b) The board concluded, however, that the evidence

submitted was insufficient to warrant a change in the

type and nature of the plaintiff’s discharge.

(c) Accordingly, the Secretary of the Air Force on or

about October 20, 1954, directed that the plaintiff’s ap-

plication be denied.

16. Subsequently, the plaintiff applied for a recon-

sideration of the review of his discharge. This request

was denied on or about January 26, 1956.

17. (a) In February 1956, the plaintiff applied to the

Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records for

a change in the nature of the discharge that was issue?

to him on July 1, 1954.

(b) The plaintiff’s application was denied without a

hearing, on the ground that the plaintiff had not sub-

mitted sufficient evidence to establish a showing of prob-

able error or injustice.

18. (a) On March 25, 1960, the plaintiff filed another

application for relief with the Air Force Board for Cor-

rection of Military Records. In this application, the plain-

tiff requested the following corrective action:

(*) That on July 1, 1954, I was not discharged

from the Air Force, but was retained on duty and

RS

was duly reenlisted on February 14, 1958, for a

further period of six years.

(2) In alternative to (1) above; That on July 1,

1954, I was placed on the temporary Gisability re-

tired list and on July 1, 1959, I was permanently

retired for physical disability together with appro-

priate findings to support such action under the

provisions cf Title IV of the Career Compensation

Act of 1949, as amended, and codified in 10 U.S.C.,

Ch. 61.

(3) In alternative to (1) cr (2) above; That on

July 1, 1954, I was discharged from the Air Force

with a discharge under honorable conditions.

(b) A hearing was held on July 5, 1961, before the

Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records on

the plaintiff’s application. The plaintiff personally ap-

peared and testified before the board, and he was repre-

sented before the board by his present legal counsel.

(c) In passing upon the plaintiff’s second applicativa,

the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records

made the following findings (among others) :

27. On the basis of applicant’s record of continu-

ing misconduct without response to rehabilitation

efforts, his commander was fully complying with

regulations in recommending that an AFR 39-17

Board consider applicant’s fitness for retention in

the service. The Board found applicant unfit by

reason of habits or traits of character manifested dy

chronic alcoholism. The commander and the Board

had full knowledge that applicant’s performance of

duty was excellent when he was on the job; however,

he was a constant disciplinary problem due to exces-

sive use of alcohol and resulting absence, ines pacity

and disorderly conduct which negated his value to

the service. There was no evidence, medical or other-

wise, that he had any mental or physical disability

that would warrant processing his case through medi-

34

cal channels. Applicant’s alcoholism has never been

considere’ . have been caused by psychiatric dis-

ease whi... would be compensable under service and

VA regulations. It is our opinion that the findings

and recommendations of the AFR 39-17 Board are

fully sustained by the evidence.

28. Careful study of the facts and circumstances

of this case leads to the conclusion that applicant’s

alcohclism resulted from intemperate and wanton

overindulgence in alcohol and was thus due to his

own intentional misconduct. Applicant has failed to

demonstrate that an error or injustice exists in his

case and his application should be denied. It is

stressed that this finding is based only upon service

following the reenlistment contracted 14 February

1952,

(d) The Air Force Board for Correction of Military

Records recommended that the plaintiff’s second applica-

tion be denied.

(e) On December 18, 1961, an Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force approved the recommendation of the Air

Force Board fox Correction of Military Records and de-

nied the plaintiff’s second application for relief.

19. At the time pertinent to this litigation, Air Force

Regulation No. 39-17 (9 February 1954) provided in

part as follows:

1. Purpose and Scope. This Regulation outlines

the conditions and procedures, and constitutes the

authority within the Air Force for the discharge of

enlisted personnel * * * serving on active duty for

unfitness. * * *

2. Policy. All commanders will maintain high per-

sonnel standards within the Air Force. Constant

atter:ticn will be given to the problem of early rec-

ognition of unfit airmen and elimination in cases

where rehabilitation has proven impossibie or im-

35

practical. An airman will not be reassigned who

has demonstrated unfitness for any of the reasons

listed in paragraph 3a, until proceduce outlined

herein has been followed, except as provided in para-

graph 5. Commanders who thus avoid proper dis-

position of substandard airmen are not accepting

their command responsibility, create serious morale

problems in the gaining unit, and add to the cost of

final elimination.

a. The discharge of enlisted personnel under this

Regulation will be accomplished only after:

(1) Conclusive determination has been made that

a mental or physical defect does not exist which

would warrant consideration under AFM 35-4.

(2) Definite determination has been made that,

for any of the causes mentioned in this Regulation,

the person cannot be rehabilitated to the extent where

he may be expected to become a satisfactory airman.

Action will not be taken under this Regulation in lieu

of disciplinary action.

* * * *

3. Procedure. The procedure to be followed in re-

porting airmen fer board action with a view to sepa-

ration for unfitness and subsequent action required

are set forth in a and b below. Care will be exer-

cised in the evaluation of an airman prior to recom-

mending that he appear before a board of officers or

be discharged for any of the reasons indicated. When

appropriate, all aspects of the character guidance

program will be employed prior to making such rec-

ommendations.

a. Commander’s Report. When an airman has

demonstrated that he is unfit for further retention

in the military service for any of the reasons indi-

cated in (1) and (2) below and his rehabilitation

is considered impracticable after repeated attempts

to accomplish same have failed (except where at-

tS, ER RE EY IE 7 : 4. Mee ee ate abe i . © ~ ree ~e

36

tempts at rehabilitation are impracticable as in con-

firmed drug addiction), his commander will report

the facts (see b below) to the next higher command

and recommend that the airman be required to ap-

pear before a board of officers convened under the

authority contained herein. The commander will

make such a report if the airman:

(1) Gives evidence of habits or traits of char-

acter manifested *; antisocial or amoral trend,

chronic alcoholism, criminalism, sexual perversion,

drug addiction, pathological lying, or other miscon-

duct. * * * [Emphasis supplied. }

* * + *

b. Composition of Report. The commander’s re-

port will include the following data:

oa * * *

(9) Report of medical officer, including statement

that there are no mental or physical defects sufficient

to warrant consideration under AFM 35-4. When

applicable, report of psychiatric examination will be

obtained. * * *

* * 4 *

4. Application for Discharge. Airmen who do not

hold a Reserve commission will be afforded the op-

portunity to request discharge in lieu of board ac-

tion.

+ * * *

5. Action When Airman Does Not Sign Applica-

tion. Except when other disyosition of the case is

considered warranted by intermediate commanders,

including reassignment of the airman to another sec-

tion or unit, the report will be forwarded to the

immediate wing or comparable level commander who

will, if he considers such action appropriate, con-

vene a board of officers to d2termine whether the

airman should be discharged ‘‘or unfitness. * * *

37

a. Medical Evaluation. An airman scheduled to

appear before the board will first appear before the

unit medical officer or base surgeon. This medical

officer will ascertain whether any mental or physical

defect or sufficient import to warrant action under

AFM 35-4, exists.

(1) When physical or mental defects of major im-

port are not involved, the medical officer will sub-

mit to the board a concise report in which the es-

sential points of the mental and physical condition of

the airman are described, to include a statement that

there are no mental or physical defects which wvuld

warrant action under AFM 35-4. Unless the respond-

ent, his counsel, or the board requests the presence

of the medical officer before the board, this report

will be received and considered by the board with-

out requiring the medical officer to appear.

* * * *

b. Board Convened by Immediate Wing or Com-

parable Level Commander. Boards of officers will

be convened under this authority by the wing or com-

parable level commander and will consist of not less

than three nor more than five officers, at least one

of whom is of field grade. One member of the board

will be a legal officer or officer possessing legal ex-

perience, if available, especially in instances where

the airman is represented by counsel. * * *

* * . 7

ce. Board Procedure.

* ® - * +.

(3) An airman appearing before a board of offi-

cers convened under this Regulation is entitled to

military counsel of his own selection if reasonably

available. The airman may retain civilian counsel at

no expense to the Government. If military counsel

of the airman’s own choosing is not available, com-

petent military counsel will be furnished by the con-

vening authority. However, if the person specifically

38

declines counes! in writing, counsel need not be fur-

nished.

d. Authorized kecommendations:

(1) The board will recommend that the person

be:

(a) Dis harged because of unfitness and given

an undesirable discharge, or

(b) Discharged because of unsuitability under

AFR 39-16, and given a general discharge, or

(c) Retained in the service.

* * * a

(3) Discharge, if fecommended, will be for unfit-

ness, except that discharge because of unsuitability

(under AFR 39-16 without referral to another board) .

may be recommended in borderline cases if military

circumstances and the character of service rendered

by the airman during his current period of service

so warrant. As examples, such circumstances would

apply where the cause of unfitness has been minor,

regarding the length of.- efficient service or where

there has been a definite effort at self-control, or

where an airman has, during his current period of

service, disti:guished himself by an act of heroism

which in itself reflected great credit on the airman

and the military service.

f. Action by Convening Authority:

(1) Board proceedings will be closely examined

by the convening authority and a determination made

on the propriety of action recommended.

(2) The convening authority will forward the

board proceedings with his recommenda:'on to the

commander exercising general court-martial juris-

diction (herein-after referred to as the “approving

authority”).

39

g. Action by Approving Authority:

(1) Board proceedings will be closely examined

and a determination made on the propriety of action

recommended. This examination will include a re-

view by the staff judge advocate for legal sufficiency.

(2) The approving authority in person will ap-

prove the action recommended by the board or di-

rect other appropriates disposition of the case. This

authority will not be delegated.

* * * *

8. Form of Discharge Certificate To Be Given.

When discharged because of unfitness, DD Form 258

AF, “Undesirable Discharge,” will be furnished.

When discharged because of unsuitability, DD Form

257AF, “General Discharge,” will be furnished.

* * * *

20. (a) At the time pertinent to this iitigation, the

foreword to Air Force Manual 35-4, covering the sub-

ject of “Physical Evaluation for Retention, Retirement

and Separation {of Military Personnel],” stated in part

as follows:

1. Purpose and Scope. This Manual prescribes

the procedure and sets forth the authority for the

retention, retirement, and separation of members of

the Air Force with physical defects or disabi ities

which render such members wifit. * * *

2. Statutory Authority. P.L. 35i, 81st Cong.,

Career Compensation Act of 1949 * * * which gen-

erally superseded previous provisions of law relat-

ing to physical disability retirement, provides re-

quirements for determining eligibility for physical

disability retirement and provisions for separation

with severance pay by reason of physical disability.

This statute is uniform in its application to all mem-

bers without regard to component or grade. The pro-

visions of the Career Compensation Act of 1949 and

40

certain other applicable laws are explained in detail

in section. II, chapter 1.

(b) Paragraph 1 of section I of chapter 1 ¢f the manu-

al cited in paragraph (a) of this finding contained the

following definitions (among others) :

i. Physical Disability—A physical or mental condi-

tion arising from one or more physical defects and

which may render a member unfit to perform the

duties of his office, rank, or grade.

n. Physically Unfit or “Unfit”—Physical inability

to perform the duties of the office, rank, or grade

held, which are required during the performance oi

full military duty, field as well as garrison, in both

peace and war.

e * 2 *

q. Incurred—Appearing herein as part of the

phrase “physical disability incurred while entitled to

receive basic pay,” refers to the coming into being,

while the member is entitled to receive basic pay, of

physical disability rendering such member unfit to

perform the duties of his office, rank, or grade.

r. Duties of Office, Rank, or Grade—The duties of

the particular office, rank, or grade, which are re-

quired in the performance of full military duty, field

as well as garrison, in both peace and war.

(c) Paragraph 7 of section II of chapter 2 of the man-

ual cited in paragraph (a) of this finding provided as

follows:

7. Refferral to Medical Board —

A patient who is unfit or whose fitness for further

general military service appears, for medical rea-—*

sons, to be in doubt will be referred to a medica!

board. The medical board consists of three or more

officers appointed by the surgeon or hospital com-

and facilities permit, establish the diagnosis, niake

recommended findings of fitness and unfitness, and

make appropriate recommendations of action on the

disposition of the patient. The board will be con-

ducted in accordance with the instructions of the

appointing authority, and principles of AFR 14-20.

21. As of July 1, 1954, paragraph 1-i of section I,

chapter 1, Air Force Manual 35-4, was revised to pro-

vide as follows:

i. Physical Disability—Ainy manifest or latent im-

pairment of function due to disease or injury regard-

less of the degree of impairment. The presence of

physical disability does not necessarily require a find-

ing of unfitness for duty. The term “physical dis-

ability” includes mental diseases other than such in-

herent defects as behavior disorders, personality dis-

orders, and primary mental deficiency.

(1) Impairment of function is hereby defined as

any lessening or weakening of the capacity of the

body or any of its parts, to perform that which is

considered by accepted medical principles to be the

normal activity in the bodily economy.

(2) Manifest impairment is defined as that which

is accompanied by signs and/or symptoms.

(3) Latent impairment is defined as that which is

not accompanied by signs and/or symptoms but which

is of such a nature that there is reasonable and moral

certainty, according to accepted medical principles,

that signs and/or symptoms will appear within a

reasonable period of time.

22. The plainiiff was not, at the time of his undesira-

ble discharge mentioned in finding 14, or in the several

months immediately preceding such discharge, referred

to a medical board, within the meaning of paragraph

7 of section II of chapter 2 of Air Force Manual 35-4

(see finding 20(c)).

23. (a} Under the Veterans Administration Schedule

for Rating Disabilities in current use at the time of the

plaintiff’s discharge on July 1, 1954, a splenectomy was

rated as a 80-percent disability under code number 7706.

(b) The plaintiff has been denied compensation for

such disability under laws administered by the Veterans

Administration.

24. The plaintiff’s entire service from February 8, 1949,

to July 1, 1954, is considered by the Veterans Ad-

ministration as one continuous period of service; and since

the plaintiff was not discharged therefrom under condi-

tions other than dishonorable, he is not entitled to bene-

fits under laws administered by the Veterans Adminis-

tration on such period of service.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a

part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a

matter of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover,

and the petition is therefore dismissed.

5 ETE AE MR en

43

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

)

256 GEORGE NEFF ROWE ) v. THE UNITED STATES

ORDER

These cases come before the court on motions or peti-

tions for rehearing, reconsideration, to alter, amend or set

aside judgments and orders, to amend findings of fact, for

reversal of order, for new trial, for oral presentation,

motion according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and for other relief, under Rules 68 and 69 of the Rules

of this court and, on consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED this sixteenth day of October, 1964,

that said motions be and the same are denied as follows:

256 George Neff Rowe. Plaintiff’s motion.

BY THE COURT

Don N. LARAMORE

Acting Chief Judge

* a 2 *

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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